ALLIANCE THEORY AND BEHAVIOUR:
ANGLO RUSSIAN EDUCATION ALLIANCES
Robin Matthews
AIMS IN RELATION TO A DOCTORAL
PROGRAMME
• INTERDISCIPLINARY IDEAS
• Physical, biological and social sciences
• Imaginative techniques from outside academia
• GENERAL THESIS
• Coalition behaviour and evolution
• 3 coalitions (alliances) OPEC, Anglo Russian HE, Simulation
• FOUNDATIONS
• Complexity and game theory
NETWORK OF DISTRIBUTED
DECISIONS IN ORGANIZATIONS
NETWORKS OF
ORGANIZATIONAL STORIES
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COMPLEXITY
• INTERDEPENDENCE
• Large number of interacting variables
– time
– Space
• MANY BEHAVIOURS
• NO SIMPLE (CAUSAL)SEQUENCES
• QUALITATIVE CHANGE
• Emergence
• selection
• ADAPTATION
• Co-evolution
B
C
A
Random
network
Connectors
F
Nodes (vertices)
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Small world
D
E
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Complex networks the global financial
system
Preferential attachment
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Games
• ZERO POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE SUM GAMES
• INTERDEPENDENCE
• Nash equilibrium
• Evolutionary stability
• RULES OF THE GAME
• COOPERATIVE AND NON CO-OPERATIVE GAMES
Type 1 Alliances
• Akin to joint equity ventures.
• Partners (B1 and R1) invest
institutional assets (broadly
defined to include physical
assets, staff, knowledge,
expertise and infrastructure)
into a separate entity, (termed
a joint venture, JV) which
reports to and is monitored by
both institutions.
• Usually long term designed t
achieve broad aims.
• Wide bandwidth and scope
• Division of payoffs between
institutional stakeholders is
determined by broad
contractual arrangements
(memoranda of agreement,
statements of intent, specified
shares cash revenues).
Type 2 Alliances
• Simple and specific
arrangements.
• One partner (B1), sells, leases
or hires assets to a second
(R1) who is responsible for its
management and usually
reports to B1, who is
responsible for monitoring and
control.
• Usually short term, designed to
achieve specific aims.
• Narrow bandwidth and scope..
• Contractual arrangements on
division of monetary payoffs
between institutional
stakeholders are very specific
Relationships are multi level
GB
GR
B1
R1
B2
R2
B3
R3
Figure 2
foundations
complex adaptive systems.
Cooperative games
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Coalitions formed at many levels of the
organization matrix.
Search process potentially NP hard.
Large numbers of activities and
possible coalitions.
Search mediated by organizational
grammar.
Grammar is itself a complex adaptive
system.
Evolution in the form of new coalition
structures on the organization matrix.
Strategy is an evolutionary process.
Interdependence
between
large
numbers of activities: non linearity.
Three ontological domains: (R), (P)
and ().
Learning takes the form of
exploiting existing potential (P) and
exploring for new potential in ().
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Payoffs realised in (R): signalled by
decisions by agent stakeholders about
coalition formation.
Represented by binary strings.
Payoffs from coalitions represented as
transferable utilities.
Agency problem extends to many
stakeholders.
Payoffs can be distributed in many
different ways to stakeholders.
Behaviour conditioned by
organizational grammar.
Many different coalitional games
possible on the organization matrix.
Coalitions must at least be viable.
Coalition structures unlikely to satisfy
core conditions.
Coalitions gravitate to as state of self
ordered criticality.
A1
A2
A5
A3
A4
A6
A7
A8
networks of relations
GB
B1
B2
4
3
B3
5
2
6
1
9
7
R1
8
R2
R3
GR
Binary Relationships Investigated
in the study
Figure 4(b)
Significant relationships in higher education partnerships
R1
British Institution
R2
1
British Institution
R3
2
British Institution
3
B1
Russian Institution
British Academic
Russian Academic
4
British Academic
Russian Student
5
British Academic
6
B2
Russian Institution
Russian Academic
Russian Student
8
7
9
British Student
British Student
British Student
Russian Institution
Russian Academic
Russian Student
B3
Figure 5(a)
Relationships Investigated
Essential features of type 1
partnerships
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Binary relationships at many levels.
Usually between public sector
organizations.
May receive seed money from
foundations and government
agencies.
Encouraged and morally supported
by embassy and British Council (at
institutional and faculty/department
level): graduation ceremonies,
visiting lectures.
Joint venture has a separate
identity.
Long term, wide spectrum of
payoffs (scope and bandwidth).
Relatively low discount rates.
Long term aim to be self-financing.
Institutions do not capture all
payoffs.
May evolve from type 2 alliances.
Essential features of type 2
partnerships
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Few binary relationships.
May be public, private or
public/private sector
partnership.
Often initially subsidised:
grants from foundations and
government agencies.
Usually emanates from joint
effort, university, faculty and
department level.
Strong monitoring and control
by UK institution.
A package of payoffs (with
narrow bandwidth and scope).
Aim for an excess revenues
over costs annually.
Relatively high discount rate.
Relatively short term.
May be exploratory and
precursors of type 1.
Payoffs from Alliances in Higher Education
Between Russian and British Institutions
General Remarks
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Payoffs from Russian British alliances in higher education include monetary
and non-monetary, direct and indirect, tangible and intangible, long and shortterm components.
Academic partnerships (including both education and training of Russians
located in the UK and in Russia) enhance future diplomatic and trade
relationships and contribute to economic growth.
We differentiate payoffs according to bandwidth (the size and variety of payoffs
resulting from a partnership and scope (the number of stakeholders and the
variety of stakeholder groups affected by the payoffs).
The principal stakeholders identified in British (B) and Russian (R) alliances in
higher education are governments (BG, RG) institutions (B1, R1) academics
(B2, R2) and students (B3, R3).
Bandwidth and scope are significant influences on the type of partnership
agreement.
Tangible elements include; income streams to institutions, enhanced incomes
to graduates (and sometimes academics), and enhanced career opportunities,
outcomes in terms of graduate qualifications, research, publications, and
contribution to RAE scores and knowledge transfer.
There may be significant intangible payoffs; reputation, staff development, staff
training and development, richer cultural perspectives and greater international
understanding.
Payoffs from Alliances in Higher Education
Between Russian and British Institutions
General Remarks
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Students benefit from access to international academics, alumni
networks, and exchange and travel opportunities. UK academic
processes are seen as reliable, and fair.
Programmes offered in Russia are economical on student time
(especially part time or block learning modes): a feature particularly
important for Russian business students since the Russian
environment changes rapidly, management skills are scarce and
(prolonged – a year or more) absence from the Russian scene is seen
as disadvantageous.
Consumption benefits accrue to an educated population exposed to
international influences.
Many payoffs are public goods: they are durable, long term, they
benefit communities generally; they have wide bandwidth and scope.
Downside risks to governments of promoting partnerships are
negligible and benefits may be substantial.
Institutions have relatively high discount rates and rate reputation
risks highly.