Subordination or cooperation? New interfaces between
development and security policy (with reference to examples
from Germany)
Stephan Klingebiel / Katja Roehder
1
Introduction
"No development without security" is proving more and more to be a developmentpolicy paradigm, one that calls for new approaches in the field of development policy.
The discernible distance between development and military actors and their tasks of the
past, has in recent years rapidly diminished. This applies to Germany, but also to most
other bilateral donors and multilateral institutions (including the United Nations).1 Thus
far, however, too little reflection and discussion have been devoted to the consequences
implied by this state of affairs.
Afghanistan, the Balkans, Liberia, and – for some donors – Iraq are topical examples
for the growing closeness between development and security. The World Bank analysis
"Breaking the Conflict Trap”2 documents the close mutual relationship between
development-policy and military engagement. The report even assumes that
development policy is in a position to provide help in lessening risks in post-conflict
situations that could be sufficient to permit reductions in military presence.
The boundaries defining development-military cooperation are not always clearly
drawn among the group of bilateral development actors. Traditionally, for members of
the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) one of their top "no-go areas" in
terms of assistance was direct support for operational capacities of military actors.
1
2
See e.g. Griffin, Michèle (2003): "The Helmet and the Hoe: Linkages Between United Nations
Development Assistance and Conflict Management", Global Governance, No. 9, pp. 199-217.
Furthermore, areas that are not officially classified as ODA (Official Development
Assistance)-eligible are often exempted. The lack of clarity as to whether or not
activities such as those related to security-sector reform are eligible for ODA support
highlights the reluctance by some development actors to fully embrace the new
development-military ‘closeness’.
There are several reasons why the changing relationship between development policy
and the military has entered the focus of public attention. First, a significant number of
so-called "protracted crises" are characterised de facto by trusteeship rule – and
therefore involve functions that extend beyond purely military tasks (e.g. Kosovo,
Afghanistan, Iraq). These situations are often marked by efforts to stabilise fragile
security, to restore effective statehood, and to embark on a course of economic and
social reconstruction.3 Nation-building tasks, already a major element of peace
missions, are taking on a growing role in this context.4
Second, development policy is increasingly interested in gaining more constructive
influence in post-conflict situations, in some cases even expects contributions from the
field of security policy and advocates or calls for military intervention to end violent
conflicts. In April 2004, the German Minister for Economic Cooperation and
2
3
4
Collier, Paul et al. (2003): Breaking the Conflict Trap. Civil War and Development Policy, A World
Bank Policy Research Report, Washington D.C.
On this issue, see e.g. Ferdowsi, Mir. A. / Volker Matthies (eds., 2003): Den Frieden gewinnen. Zur
Konsolidierung von Friedensprozessen in Nachkriegsgesellschaften, Bonn: Stiftung Entwicklung
und Frieden; Debiel, Tobias (ed., 2002): Der zerbrechliche Frieden. Krisenregion zwischen
Staatsversagen, Gewalt und Entwicklung, Bonn: Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden.
See e.g. King's College (2003): A Review of Peace Operations. A Case for Change, London, para.
14: "Peace operations in their growing complexity have increasingly included state-building
functions."
3
Development called for peacekeeping troops to be sent to Darfur/Sudan5; and, in a 2003
appeal, international non-governmental organisations active in Afghanistan called for an
expansion of the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) mandate there6.
Third, other policy fields, above all foreign and security policies, are coming more
and more to expect, and call for, an active involvement of development policy in postconflict situations. Experiences made with past military missions are cited as reasons:
As the European Security Strategy (ESS), prepared by the High Representative of the
EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and approved by the European
Council in December 2003, puts it, "In almost every major intervention, military
efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos."7
Finally, the growing number of overseas missions directly involving the German
Bundeswehr8 have served to move the overall spectrum of German policies and their
potential scopes of action into the focus of public attention. Germany thus provides a
useful case study to explore the changing relationship between military and
development actors and policies.
5
6
7
8
4
"UN Blue Berets should monitor cease-fire in Western Sudan. Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul and
Gerhart Baum call for lasting peace solution for Darfur region", BMZ press release, April 29, 2004.
International Rescue Committee (2003): "Afghanistan: A Call for Security", http://www.reliefweb.int
(30.01.2004).
Council of the European Union (2003): A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security
Strategy, 12 December 2003, Brussels, p. 12. Also for the operations of other countries like the U.S.
a serious lack of civilian capacity in peace and stability operations is identified, and proposals are
made to strengthen civilian functions; see e.g. "United States Institute of Peace (2004): Building
Civilian Capacity for U.S. Stability Operations. The Rule of Law Component", Special Report No.
118, April 2004, Washington, D.C.
Currently some 7,300 Bundeswehr soldiers are directly involved in missions abroad, including
ISAF, KFOR (Kosovo Force), SFOR (Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Enduring
Freedom. The costs for these missions have increased more than tenfold between 1995 and 2003.
(Data from: http://www. Bundeswehr.de/forces/print/einsatzzahlen.php (08/11/04); Klingebiel,
Stephan / Katja Roehder (2003): Development-Military Interfaces. New Challenges in Crises and
Post-conflict Situations, Bonn: German Development Institute, p. 3.
The relationship between civil and military actors includes on the one hand civil
actors, e.g. from the fields of foreign and development policy, and the other hand
various instruments such as democratization and equipment aid, dispatch of civil peace
personnel, humanitarian aid, police aid provided by civilian actors, or support for
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), etc. Looking at the case of the developmentmilitary relationship, we find that interest in the civil component tends to focus on
development-policy actors and instruments. "Relationship" refers to all forms of
interaction between the two groups of actors. That is, the term may encompass targeted
cooperation strategies, a deliberately complementary approach, or unintended sequences
of actions carried out by actors linked by a relationship structure. The present text thus
sees the terms "interface" and "linkage" as synonymous.
This paper discusses the current challenges that this new relationship poses for
development policy. A number of examples, with special focus on Germany, serve to
illustrate some of the ongoing changes. The paper provides an overview of the different
relations between development policy and military actors / security policy and
categorises development-military interfaces. Finally, the paper outlines some initial
strategic reference models open to development policy in its relationship to military
actors and other externally oriented policy fields.
9
Collier, Paul et al. (2003): Breaking the Conflict Trap. Civil War and Development Policy, A World
Bank Policy Research Report, Washington D.C.
5
Legitimacy of military missions as a precondition for development policy in postconflict situations
The mandates, and thus the legitimacy, of military missions play an important role in
the development-military relationship in post-conflict situations debate. This applies, to
take a prominent example, for the engagement of some donors in Iraq as well as for the
debate in Germany on the character of the German reconstruction efforts in the Kunduz
Region of Afghanistan.
The need for mandated military missions has today found widespread acceptance.10
Pre-emptive interventions, however, and other military activities without an adequate
mandate, and thus without sufficient legitimacy under international law, have attracted
considerable controversy and are widely rejected.11
In general practice we can distinguish three categories of military operations:12
1.
The use of autonomous, unilateral state power. Example: the 2003
military intervention in Iraq.
2.
Military operations covered by a UN Security Council mandate.13
3.
UN peace missions with classic monitoring, buffering and, aid mandates
geared to restoring deficient state power.
10
11
12
13
6
For a discussion from the view of development policy, see e.g. Collier et al. (2003): Breaking the
Conflict Trap, pp. 163ff.
See e.g. Center for Defense Information (2002): "The U.S. National Security Strategy: A View from
Europe", October 9, 2002; http://www.cdi.org/national-security-strategy/brussels/cfm, (08/01/04).
Based in large part on Bothe, Michael (2003): "Militärische Gewalt als Instrument der
Konfliktregelung: Versuch einer rechtlichen und politischen Ordnung zehn Jahre nach dem Ende des
Ost-West-Konflikts", in: von Schorlemer, Sabine (ed., 2003): Praxishandbuch UNO. Die Vereinten
Nationen im Lichte globaler Herausforderungen, Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, pp. 24f.
These would include Operation Enduring Freedom, which was legitimised by the UN Security
Council under Resolution 1368 on combating all forms of international terrorism.
Furthermore, in connection with UN peace operations (categories 2 and 3) we speak
of different types of military peace missions which are legitimised under Chapter VI or
Chapter VII of the UN Charter:14
-
Traditional peacekeeping, which is based on consensus and neutrality and
provides only for self-defence measures (e.g. in the Sinai in the 1950s and in Cyprus
in the mid-1960s).
-
Multidimensional peacekeeping, which is geared to the dynamics of
processes and provides for an expansion of non-military functions (e.g. in Namibia
in 1989/90 and Cambodia in 1992/93).
-
Robust peacekeeping or peace enforcement, which also provides for a
possible use of military force (e.g. in Somalia).
-
Peace support and governance operations, in which the assumption of
political and administrative functions plays an additional, important role (e.g. in
Kosovo and in East Timor).
Accordingly, international military peace missions are increasingly assigned nationbuilding functions. The concrete shape given to UN peace operations may vary
considerably in this context. This applies as well for the profile defined for non-military
and civil activities (including reconstruction) and the extent to which a mandate covers
14
See Kühne, Winrich (2003): "UN-Friedenseinsätze verbessern. Die Empfehlungen der BrahimiKommission", in: von Schorlemer: Praxishandbuch UNO, pp. 716ff.; Debiel, Tobias (2002): UNFriedenssicherung in Subsahara-Afrika. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen multilateraler
Konfliktbearbeitung in regionalisierten Bürgerkriegen, Duisburg: Institut für Entwicklung und
Frieden, pp. 462ff.
7
protection of the civilian population.15 Apart from the mandate, though, this also
depends on the capacities available to a mission, as we have seen in cases of missions
that have proven problematic.16 The 2000 Report of the Brahimi Commission, which
was written on behalf of the UN Secretary-General, goes in detail into the experiences
made by UN peace missions and calls on the UN to give greater weight to the civil
component of peace missions.17
The type of military engagement is also a highly relevant factor for developmentpolicy decisions. Thus, there should, as a matter of principle, be no doubts as to a
military mission’s legitimacy and mandate under international law before development
policy considers to get involved in reconstruction efforts.18
Perspectives of different actors involved
The development-military relationship is influenced by national factors such as the
closeness, or distance, between development policy and foreign policy, the share that
humanitarian aid and emergency relief account for in the work done by development cooperation, and national traditions and experiences made with military interventions.19
15
16
17
18
19
8
For more in-depth information, see ICISS (2001): The Responsibility to Protect. Report of the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa.
On this point, see Kühne (2003): "UN-Friedenseinsätze verbessern", and Debiel (2002): UNFriedenssicherung in Subsahara-Afrika.
Brahimi-Report (2000): Report of the Panel of the United Nations Peace Operations,
A/55/305.S/2000/809, New York.
See also the position of the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development: Federal
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (2004): "BMZ Discourse. On Developmentbased and Military Responses to New Security Challenges", BMZ Discussion Paper No. 2, Bonn,
pp. 10 f.
See overview on chances and risks of cooperation from the perspectives of different actors, table 1.
Viewed from the perspective of development policy, closer convergence and/or
cooperation with the military involves a number of risks and chances.
20
On the one
hand, it may be assumed that improved mutual understanding leads to greater coherence
in reconstruction efforts in post-conflict countries. Development policy could contribute
more of its specific strengths and competences for purposes of decision-making in the
fields of military and foreign policy. In exchange it could tap the know-how of military
actors for its own work, e.g. in the field of security-sector reform. A further aspect is
concerned with the possibility that a military presence could provide for a more stable
security situation on the ground, a situation from which development-policy would
stand to benefit.
On the other hand, though, there are also risks involved. These are bound up with the
possibility of military dominance and a diminished influence of development-related
concepts in connection with short-term political or military missions. It is furthermore
argued that development policy could be made to share responsibility for a military
strategy in cases in which such a strategy lacks sufficient legitimacy or acceptance. And
not least, development-policy actors might in this case be faced with the risk of
becoming targets of armed attacks (soft-target debate).21
In the framework of the new peace missions, like those in the Balkans and
Afghanistan, the military is itself becoming increasingly involved in carrying out
20
21
An array of concerns by development policy practitioners is presented by Picciotto, Robert (2004):
"Aid and Conflict: the Policy Coherence Challenge", article presented at UNU-WIDER Conference
“Making Peace Work”, 4-5 June 2004, Helsinki, pp. 1-3.
Developments in recent years show an increasing number of development-actors (NGOs etc.) used
as target for violent actions. Staff is sometimes kidnapped or killed. Therefore security risks are
more and more an issue for development policy.
9
genuinely civil tasks. In the framework of the concept "Civil-Military Cooperation"
(CIMIC) both the Bundeswehr and NATO routinely conduct strategically conceived
civil reconstruction projects (in the sense of “force protection”) that have impacts on the
domain of development policy. While focusing on the aim of increasing the acceptance
of military presence in conflict areas, military actors nevertheless see the risk of a
watering down of their military mandate (so-called mission creep).22
Development and humanitarian NGOs, taking up the debate underway in the field of
humanitarian aid, have engaged in an intensive discussion over the complexities
involved in the military-civil relationship. European NGOs in particular, pointing to the
principles of neutrality and impartiality, largely reject co-operation with military actors
and voice criticism of any blurring of the boundaries between military and civil
aspects.23
22
23
10
For details on CIMIC concept and activities see e.g. Braunstein; Peter (2001): "Zivil-Militärische
Zusammenarbeit der Bundeswehr im Balkan-Einsatz", Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 20/2001,
pp. 37-46; Hardegger, Sascha (2003): Cimic-Doktrin im Spannungsfeld zwischen humanitärer Hilfe
und militärischer Krisenintervention, Studie der Forschungsstelle für Internationale Beziehungen
der ETH-Zürich, Beitrag No. 41, Zurich; Heinemann-Grüder, Andreas / Tobias Pietz / Daphne Lipp
(2003): "Hintergrundpapier zum Thema 'Verhältnis von militärischen und entwicklungspolitischen
Komponenten beim Wiederaufbau in Post-Konflikt-Situationen'", Bonn: Bonn International Center
for Conversion.
See e.g. VENRO (2003): "VENRO Position Paper: Armed Forces as Humanitarian Aid Workers?
Scope and Limits of Co-operation Between Aid Organisations and Armed Forces in Humanitarian
Aid", May 2003, Bonn: VENRO; for an overview on the debate see Barry, Jane / Anna Jefferys,
(2002): "A Bridge Too Far: Aid Agencies and the Military in Humanitarian Response", HPN
Network Paper No. 37, London: ODI.
Table 1:
Chances and risks of development – military co-operation
from the perspective of the different actors involved
A
Chances
Risks
ctor
11
- Security
and stability as the sine
that development policy may
qua non for the development of the
find itself subordinated to a military
country affected
strategy as well as to short- term
- Security
as a condition required
for the engagement of development
- Constructive
influence on
security strategies
- Influence
political considerations
- Security
risk in that development
policy may find itself in the position
policy
Development policy
- Risk
on approaches adopted
of a target of attacks
- The
possibility that involvement of
development policy may serve to
by military actors in areas relevant to
legitimise and support military
development policy
interventions
- Coherence
of overall policy,
- Risk
of public criticism along the
including consideration of aspects
lines: "Development policy providing
relevant to development policy
military assistance"
- Resources
may be diverted from
the "core business" of development
policy (i.e. long-term tasks)
- Resources
used for noncivil tasks
are not eligible for recognition as
ODA
- Regional
reorientation of
development policy
- Possible
inability to adhere to
principles of development policy
12
Military
- Greater
acceptance on the part of
- Possibility
of mission creep when
the local population due to better
the military takes on a growing
planning of civil activities
number of civil tasks on the ground
- Access
to additional
- Demands
for more
(development policy) resources
transparency/disclosure of military
(financial, advisory, implementation)
strategy vis-à-vis third parties
- Parallel
command structures and,
possibly, restriction of powers of
discretion on the military side
- Complementary
and effective
approach in acute crises based on
NGOs
purely subsidiary aid provided by
the military
- Depending
- Loss
of impartiality and neutrality
- Security
risk (NGOs as a soft
target)
- Diversion
on the concrete case,
of funds to countries in
which military missions are underway.
a more secure setting for the
implementation of projects and
programs.
In international comparison, the situation among donors varies. German development
policy has had a tradition marked by a relatively distanced relationship to security
policy and military actors, while in the US, for instance, the examples of Afghanistan
and Iraq are illustrations of the way in which development policy may assume a role
immediately supportive of strategic military goals. Here, it is in part difficult to discern
13
any clear-cut separation of the tasks of development policy and the military.24 The UK
is widely seen as an object lesson in innovative inter-ministerial action, one in which
development policy has retained, or indeed even enlarged, the self-assured role it plays.
This goes not least for the new mechanism of joint conflict prevention pools. 25
Development-military interfaces
In recent years the interfaces and overlaps between development policy and the
military or security policy have grown dramatically in number. They can be classified
under four categories.
First Interface: Security and stability are framework conditions that are essential for
development policy. In most post-conflict situations the framework conditions needed
by development actors for their reconstruction work are predicated on the stability and
security brought about by military measures. Ongoing conflicts are marked by the
following, additional aspect: as representatives of international engagement, aid
organisations are more and more becoming direct soft targets for local conflict parties.
In the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, this situation is taking on dramatic dimensions,
one main reason being that the international conflict parties are blurring the lines
between military and civil activities.26
24
25
26
14
See e.g. Fitz-Gerald (2004): "Addressing the Security-Development Nexus", p. 17.
DFID / FCO / MOD (2003): The Global Conflict Prevention Pool. A Joint UK Government
Approach to Reducing Conflict, August 2003, London; DFID / FCO / MOD / Treasury (2004):
Evaluation Report EV647. Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools. Synthesis Report, March
2004, London.
See e.g. Humanitarian Practice Network: Iraq and the crisis of humanitarian action,
http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2616 (011/08/04); Stapleton, Barbara J. (2003): "The
Provincial Reconstruction Team Plan in Afghanistan. A New Direction?", paper prepared for the
Second Interface: A second field for development-military interfaces has to do with
strategic planning and conception. This would include general concepts and individual
country and regional policies. At the government level in Germany, these interfaces are
concerned with information-sharing and development of joint strategies.
-
Inter-ministerial co-operation and mechanisms serve the purpose of
information-sharing and development of joint strategies in and among the various
policy fields concerned. In the framework of this inter-ministerial co-operation the
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) is,
for instance, able to bring its influence to bear on cross-cutting government concepts
and the formulation of country strategies. The BMZ has, for example, played a role
in shaping the structure of the German reconstruction teams currently deployed in
Kunduz and Feyzabad (Afghanistan) as well as on the formulation of the mandate
for the military component involved. The mechanisms of co-operation include,
among others, the Federal Security Council, ministerial consultations, and in
particular inter-ministerial co-operation, e.g. co-ordination of the German
contribution to the G8 Africa Action Plan (GAA).
-
Deliberate integration and subordination of development policy in short-
term political and military strategies would include in particular the extensive use of
instruments of development policy, but also of humanitarian aid, in the framework
of military approaches, e.g. in US-Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in
Afghanistan.
symposium „State Reconstruction and International Engagement in Afghanistan“, 30 May-1 June
2003, Bonn: ZEF.
15
Third Interface: Another interface is concerned with various situations involved in
funding for non-civil measures and missions as well as civil activities conducted by the
military.
-
Development policy funding for non-civil measures and missions: There are
a number of different current examples which can, as far as their character is
concerned, be viewed as a shift of the boundaries defining the traditional practices
of development policy. For instance, € 5 million of un-disbursed funds were made
available from the European Development Fund (EDF) to support the Economic
Organisation Of West African States (ECOWAS) peace mission in Liberia.27 In
November 2003 the decision was taken to set up a Peace Facility for Africa (an
initial € 250 million) that is to be financed from the EDF and used to fund non-civil
peace missions in Africa.28
-
Development-policy funding for civil activities conducted by the military:
One main example that deserves mention here is the BMZ's funding of CIMIC
measures conducted by the Bundeswehr.
-
Military competition for development funds: To conduct CIMIC measures,
the military competes e.g. with the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) or NGOs for funds in the fields of humanitarian aid and
development assistance.
27
28
16
Klingebiel/Roehder (2004): Development-Military Interfaces, p. 15.
Detailed information on the EU website: http://www.europa.eu.int.
Fourth Interface: The last field of interfaces covers a variety of different operational
approaches.
-
Interministerial projects: The German support for the Kofi Annan
International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra/Ghana is seen as a
pilot project for the development of a coherent and inter-ministerial concept
involving the German Foreign Office (AA), the Federal Ministry of Defence
(BMVg), and the BMZ.
-
Military conduct of typical development co-operation measures: This may be
observed above all in the framework of CIMIC (e.g. in the field of vocational
training).
-
Military provision of concrete protection functions for development policy
actors and measures and benefits of an improved security situation: Apart from the
general role played by the military in the field of security, concrete forms of cooperation may also develop on the ground.
-
Co-operation in training and capacity-building: In various contexts military
and development-policy actors are involved, on a reciprocal basis, in training and
capacity-building functions as well as in dialogue forums, e.g. in the framework of
the German Federal College for Security Policy (BAKS), the Bundeswehr
Command and Staff College (Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr), or the course on
"Civil-Military Cooperation Abroad" (ZMZ A) offered by the German Academy for
Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Defence (AKNZ).
Examples bearing on the debate over development military interfaces
17
There are several interesting examples of immediate current relevance, all of which
represent closer forms of co-operation between civil and military actors.
Integration of military and development actors in Afghanistan:
The strategy of using reconstruction teams to stabilise the security situation and
accelerate reconstruction in Afghanistan may be seen as a particularly important
precedent. The PRTs of the US in particular are an example of integrated civil-military
"units" used directly to integrate reconstruction activities within the US military
strategy. In the framework of its reconstruction team in Kunduz, Germany is relying on
a three-pillar concept consisting of independent but co-ordinated sectors (development
policy, foreign policy, defence) as a means of deliberately distinguishing its approach
from that pursued by the US.29
Proactive inter-ministerial co-operation in the UK
The UK has been working for some time now with a proactive co-operation model
which provides for strategic co-operation between development policy and the military
– on the one hand, within the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD)
of the Department for International Development (DFID) and on the other hand by
developing an inter-ministerial strategy and funding instrument (so-called Conflict
Prevention Pools) for the government's conflict-related work abroad.30
29
30
18
See Klingebiel/Roehder (2004): Development-Military Interfaces, pp. 23ff.
See Fitz-Gerald (2004): "Addressing the Security-Development
Klingebiel/Roehder (2004): Development-Military Interfaces, pp. 29ff.
Nexus",
pp.
13ff.;
Intensive co-operation between development policy and the military at the European
level
The rapid pace of developments at the European level are of particular importance
for future development-military interfaces. In the European Union there are a number of
approaches that – building on the "Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts"
(Gothenburg 2001) – are aimed at expanding the EU's civil and military capacities and –
in particular – their combined use. The task facing the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is to
systematically integrate the whole of the EU's external relations, including development
policy.31 One element of great importance to the EU's overall external relations may be
seen in the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted by the Council in December
2003. In view of the new threats analyzed in the document, one of the strategy’s main
concerns is to increase civil-military cooperation. The Union, it states, “could add
particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian
capabilities.”32
The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana
was set up in 1998 as a regional training center; the aim was, among other things, to tap
Ghana's experience in peace missions and make it available to other African countries.
The training program includes e.g. courses on military-police tasks as well as
31
32
See Child, Patrick (2003): "Europe in the World: CFSP & its Relation to Development",
presentation at the KfW-Forum on Developing Countries, 14 November 2003, Frankfurt/M.
Council of the European Union (2003): European Security Strategy, p. 13.
19
preparatory training for military observers. Germany is using various instruments to
support the development of the KAIPTC in the framework of its G8 Plan for Africa:
-
Development of a course model on the use of civil forces for peacekeeping;
the project is being funded by the BMZ and implemented by the Berlin Zentrum für
Internationale Friedenseinsätze (Center for International Peace Missions / ZIF); the
GTZ is responsible for handling and transacting the project.
-
The German Foreign Office funds are being used to construct / equip the
Centre, the Federal Ministry of Defence is responsible for implementing the
measures.
-
Support for training operations is provided by a German Bundeswehr
instructor specialized in the field of civil-military cooperation. In Germany African
training personnel is trained by the Federal Ministry of Defence and the German
Foreign Office.
Defining the position of development policy
Development-policy engagement in post-conflict situations: interest in coherent
approaches
Development policy – mindful of the fundamentally limited options open to external
actors – has important and useful means to potentially contribute to addressing
challenges that typify the security challenges of fragile staes. It can help restore
effective statehood and to embark on the process of post-conflict economic and social
20
reconstruction. This is all the more the case in view of the fact that peace missions have
grown increasingly complex in nature.
Viewed against this background, development policy can be said to have a
fundamental and strategic interest in shaping its interfaces with other externally oriented
policy fields, including security policy. One of the crucial tasks facing development
policy is therefore to define its position on the character and shape which should and
can be given to this process. This is not to rule out the possibility of tensions and
occasional differences in perception, for instance as regards individual regions or
countries.
Development policy not only has a fundamental interest of its own in
comprehensively shaping its interfaces with foreign and security policy. Outside
pressure aimed at inducing development policy to "fall into line" and show more
"flexibility" has grown dramatically. This is clearly illustrated by the present, and at the
same time crucial, cases of reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and funding for
military peace missions from development funds (e.g. in Liberia).
On the other hand, there are a number of possibilities for development policy by
engaging in more intensive co-operation with other externally oriented policy fields to
exercise constructive influence in terms of coherence with development goals.
Sensitive areas
21
It cannot be said that all development-military interfaces are fundamentally
problematic in nature. But it is possible to identify four sensitive areas from the
perspective of development policy that must be taken into consideration in efforts to the
shaping of interfaces:
1.
Subordination of development policy to a military logic: Any
subordination of development policy to military contexts or short-term action
constraints that deprive development policy of its say on the "whethers" and "hows"
of policy should be rejected (examples: the embedded role of development policy in
the PRTs conceived and set up by the US; options of development policy following
the war in Iraq in 2003).
2.
Implementation by the military of measures with a development
character: In this area the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ should continue to play the
central role. As far as the field of humanitarian aid is concerned, the relevant actors
have defined clearly outlined exceptions in which the military may be allowed to
assume certain tasks.33 As far as the spectrum of functions of development policy is
concerned, there appear to be no such reasonable exceptions for the military.
3.
Development policy as a source of funding for military missions: Both in
principle and in the individual case development policy should continue to refrain
from funding military missions (by partner countries and organisations). True, there
are legitimate funding needs in the field, and these needs are evidently – one need
think here only of the EDF-Liberia debates34 – not covered by specific and suitable
33
34
22
See Barry/Jefferys (2002): A Bridge Too Far, pp. 15ff., who sum up the discussion on this issue.
In 2003 a sum of €5 Million was used from the 8th European Development Fund in support of the
ECOWAS (Economic Community for West African States) military mission in Liberia.
budget lines (above all in the framework of CFSP/ESDP). But development policy
should not move in to fill this gap, since this is beyond its scope.35
4.
Development policy as a source of funding for civil activities conducted
by the military: Since civil activities of the military are generally geared to
achieving higher-level goals (above all force protection) that have little to do with
the goals of development measures, development policy should not provide funding
for them.36
A number of problems faced by development policy in post-conflict reconstruction –
e.g. the question of whether or not it is possible to enforce development-policy
principles in such situations – are chiefly due not to the presence of military but to
difficult starting conditions encountered in the countries affected.
Principles of development policy
Furthermore, any more pronounced linkage with military components may have
direct implications for fundamental principles of development policy. We can
distinguish two forms of principles: (1) general principles (the civil character of
development policy and “do no harm”) and (2) development-policy principles with
impacts at the operational level (above all sustainability / long-term character and
partner orientation / ownership). In general terms, closer contact between development
35
36
The imbalance between development and military budgets is reflected in numbers: „Aid still uses
only seven percent of the resources absorbed by the military worldwide ($56b vs. $794b)“ (Picciotto
(2004): "Aid and Conflict", p. 2).
This is not at all to say that civil measures conducted by military actors may not be legitimate or
appropriate and useful in view of concrete situations on the ground.
23
and military actors need not necessarily mean any curtailment of these principles; but in
this case three fundamental conditions must be given:
–
Acceptance of the military by both the local population and conflict
parties.
–
Independence of development-policy activities from military actors.
–
Clearly outlined cooperation based on division of functions and limited
in time.
Strategic reference models
There are, in essence, three strategic models that are conceivable for German
development policy (and also other donors) to position itself vis-à-vis security policy
and military actors:
1. Distance strategy:
The aim of a distance strategy is to retain the historically and socially conditioned
distance between development policy and security policy and military actors.
The hoped-for advantage would be a relatively large measure of ministerial
autonomy for decisions taken largely on the basis of development-policy considerations,
i.e. involving the possibility to reach decisions without having to focus unduly on
foreign-policy and short-term political constraints. Development policy would in this
case be free to concentrate on longer-term tasks, including the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals.
24
The potential risks of such a strategy would include the possibility that, given the
important political challenges involved in central conflicts (e.g. Afghanistan), any
pronounced distance strategy might serve to cast doubt on the relevance of development
policy. In this case development policy would be relinquishing its ability to take a
constructive hand in shaping elementary framework conditions (security) and would
lose some of its influence on security- and foreign-policy strategies concerning such
countries.
2. Co-operation strategy:
Based on far closer co-ordination and joint approaches with foreign- and securitypolicy actors, a co-operation strategy would seek to give more weight than it has in the
past to the concept of "development through security."
The hoped-for advantage would be a strategy fully coherent in terms of overall
policy; this would mean a policy in which development policy would be better able to
bring its interest and concerns to bear on security-related and military thinking and
approaches.
The potential risks of such a strategy would include the possibility that development
policy would be forced to make a good number of compromises and concessions on
principles as well as on concrete approaches bound up with short-term and military
considerations. Development policy would have to bear greater responsibility for
military actions. Finally, development policy would have to come to terms with the risk
that other actors might seek its co-operation not least with an eye to existing financial
resources and that these resources would in this case no longer be available for the
current "core business" of long-term development policy.
25
3. Complementary strategy:
A complementary strategy would aim for goal conformity and, in strategically
selected fields, a complementary approach involving security- and foreign-policy actors.
This would, in other words, be an interrelated and thus mutually complementary
approach, but one which would not entail any overlaps between the two fields involved.
That is, the military would, for its part, define its tasks in such a way as to ensure that
they do not include any development-policy measures; and development would be
conceived in such as way as to ensure that it does not take on or fund any noncivil tasks.
The hoped-for advantage would be an approach which, compared with a distance
strategy, would, on the whole, prove more coherent and effective, but without blurring
the lines between tasks and spheres of responsibility.
One potential risk of this strategy would be the possibility that development policy
might find itself harnessed to overriding considerations of other policies (e.g. security
and/or foreign policy) and see at least some of its interests and concerns sidelined.
The advantages and significance of these reference models depend on the interface in
question. They could seek orientation along the following lines:
-
Complementarity for the interface "Security and stability as framework
conditions for development policy": In this area close co-ordination is appropriate,
indeed essential in many cases, although it should focus primarily on informationsharing. One essential principle here is a clear division of tasks. Co-operation, on
26
the other hand, would entail an overlapping approach of the kind involved in direct
military protection (e.g. escorts).
-
Complementarity to co-operation for the interface "Strategic planning and
conception": Many situations call for a complementary or even a joint strategic
approach.
-
Complementarity for the interface "Funding": A prudent approach to the
funding of noncivil measures and missions as well as for the civil activities of
military actors is one that involves complementarity, but not overlaps. That is,
approaches or individual activities can and should be planned jointly, although
funding should be based on the specific tasks and areas of responsibility of the
policy fields involved.
-
Case dependence for the interface "Operational approach": Here the benefits
derived from joint interfaces concerned with operational matters will depend in very
large measure on the individual case. Accordingly, action strategies should be
chosen on an individual basis.
Conclusion
Development policy and military actors and/or security policy share an increasing
number of indirect and direct points of contact as well as fields of possible co-operation.
In the past some of these points of contact hardly even entered the minds of the actors
involved. These interfaces and overlaps have grown dramatically in recent years.
Development policy is on its way to defining for itself a responsibility for overall policy
that goes far beyond its present tasks and competences.
27
While there is reason to welcome many of these points of contact, serving as they do
to enhance the overall coherence of given policies, we can at the same time pinpoint
some sensitive areas that pose an inherent risk of instrumentalising development policy
and blurring lines of competence.
Development policy's future concern must be to define its position on the character
which should and can be given to shaping the interfaces with other externally oriented
policy fields. This process should, among other things, accord greater weight to
development-policy considerations in areas of concern for security policy. As far as
reconstruction efforts are concerned, legitimacy of military missions must always be a
precondition when development policy engagement is considered.
Facilitating more effective action entails overcoming the gulf previously existing
between development and security policy, and civil and military activities. In many
situations, fragmented approaches present a serious obstacle to more effective
contributions. This applies equally to governments and international organisations both
with broad mandates (for instance, in the case of the United Nations, the relationship
between UN development organisations and the DPKO / Department of Peacekeeping
Operations), or comparatively “narrow” ones (e.g., NATO in the defence policy sector).
However, it should be noted that greater alignment and cooperation between
development policy and the armed forced does not automatically lead to a resolution of
potential conflicts of interests in the goals set, or a prevention of diverging perspectives.
The allocation of ODA resources varies (by country and region, for example) depending
on whether the assistance is targeting the Millennium Development Goals (poverty
reduction, absorption capacity, performance etc.) or the reduction of threats to security
28
and stability (the actions of those in power, the fragility of the state, or the limited
monopoly on the use of force, etc.).
29
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33