Does Illegality Breed Violence?
Drug Trafficking and State-Sponsored Protection Rackets
Richard Snyder and Angelica Duran-Martinez
Department of Political Science
Brown University
USA
Illegality and Violence:
What is the Relationship?
Violence
High
Illegal, high violence
No
Legality
Drug trafficking: Burma before
1990s; Colombia; Mexico after
mid 1990s
Poaching: Democratic
Republic of Congo, Kenya,
Zimbabwe
Low
Illegal, low violence
Drug trafficking: Burma after 1990;
Mexico before mid 1990s
Poaching: Namibia, South Africa
Legal, high violence
Yes
Diamond mining: Liberia,
Sierra Leone
Emerald mining: Colombia
Legal, low violence
Conditions for Emergence of StateSponsored Protection Rackets
• The State: The Capacity to Enforce
– Make a credible threat to enforce the law
• Criminal Organizations: The Capacity to
Comply
– Make payments to state officials
– Carry out agreed on behaviors, such as sharing
information, refraining from violence, controlling
“public hazards”
Protection in Time and Space
• The likelihood that state-sponsored
protection rackets will form depends on the
time horizons of public officials.
• The Geography of Enforcement and
Criminality
The Geography of Enforcement and Criminality
a. One protector, many organizations
i
b. Many protectors, one organization
ii
iii
a
b
c
d
iv
c. One protector, one organization (per jurisdiction)
d. Changing the boundaries:
Many protectors, many organizations
1
1
2
i
a
b
iii
a
c
3
c
ii
i
ii
d
d
iii
iv
3
b
iv
6
4
5
The Geographies of Criminality and Enforcement in Mexico:
Areas of Cartel Influence and Dispute
Juarez Cartel
Sinaloa Cartel
Gulf Cartel
Gulf Cartel,
Sinaloa Cartel
Preferences of Protectors and Criminal Organizations Over
Number of Actors, and Hypothesized Likelihood of Violence
Ratio of
Protectors to
Criminal
Organizations
Rank Order of Preferences
Protectors
Likelihood of Violence
Criminal Organizations
(a) One protector,
many organizations
1
4
Moderate
(b) Many protectors,
one organization
4
1
Moderate
(c) One protector, one
organization
2
2
Low
(d) Many protectors,
many organizations
3
3
High
The Breakdown of Protection in Mexico:
From Stable Pacts to Strategic Violence
• Increase in Political Competition: shortens the time
horizons of public officials
• New Entrants into the Illicit Market: makes
coordination between public officials and illicit
organizations more difficult
• Anti-Corruption Reforms: reconfigures the
geography of enforcement, causing a dealignment
with the geography of criminality
Redrawing the Boundaries of Enforcement in Mexico:
New Jurisdictions Created by the Reform of the PGR in 1996
The Geographies of Criminality and Enforcement in Mexico:
Areas of Cartel Influence and Dispute
Juarez Cartel
Sinaloa Cartel
Gulf Cartel
La Familia
Gulf Cartel,
Sinaloa Cartel
Sinaloa Cartel
Los Zetas
Does Illegality Breed Violence?
• Not always, and never directly. The
relationship between illicit markets and
violence depends on institutions of
protection.
• If state-sponsored protection rackets form,
then illicit markets can be peaceful.
• Conversely, the breakdown or dismantling of
state-sponsored protection rackets can lead
to violence.
The Geographies of Criminality and Enforcement in Mexico:
Areas of Cartel Influence and Dispute
Juarez Cartel
Sinaloa Cartel
Gulf Cartel
La Familia
Sinaloa Cartel
Gulf Cartel,
Sinaloa Cartel
The Geographies of Criminality and Enforcement in Mexico:
Areas of Cartel Influence and Dispute
Juarez Cartel
Sinaloa Cartel
Gulf Cartel
La Familia
Gulf Cartel,
Sinaloa Cartel
Sinaloa Cartel
Los Zetas