Congress and Political Science
John Berg, “Unequal Struggle”
Chapter 1.
Studies of Congress: Lack Theoretical Complexity
Unit A Theory of Congressional Behavior?
Literature on Congress is rich and detailed, but it fails to place Congress within
a general theory of American politics.
We know a lot about how Congress functions, but very little why it functions the
way it does, that is, what socio, political or economic forces may or may not
shape congressional action.
Goal of Book: Develop a Marxist Theory of Congress:
Berg seeks to resolve this limit on our understanding by presenting a class analysis of
congressional action.
But, first, he reviews the literature on Congress…
Congress: Reviewing the Literature
Prevailing Schools of Thought:
Scholars have looked at Congress through several interpretative frames, including:
Evaluative Analysis
Pluralist Analysis
Institutional Analysis
Evaluative Analysis (1)
Evaluative Analysis:
Until the 1960s studies of Congress often centered on questions about the strength
of Congress, the quality of its representation, and ways in which the institution
could be improved. There was little consideration for more theoretical
assessments of the factors that determined congressional action.
Example:
Wilson (1885): indicted Congress as corrupt, but so no need to develop a formal
theory, that is, to explain why it was beholden to provincial interests, and prone
to obstructionist tendencies.
Core Assumption (Pluralist?)
Wilson assumed the public had the unobstructed power to reform Congress…to
choose “what kind of Congress it wanted…”
Early Theories of Congress (2)
Early Attempts at Theory:
There were some early attempts at theory:
Examples:
Burns (1963): (Like Wilson) also called for reform, after he indicted
Congress for being overly conservative. He went one step further and
identified what he regarded as the roots of Congress’ conservatism:
1) Members were elected locally (as opposed to nationally)
2) Specific institutional rules, such as seniority, favored Southern members.
By identifying the reasons (safe districts, powerful comm. Chairs) for Congress’
continued conservatism in the 1960s, Burn’s work contributed to calls for reforms
of Congress in the 1970s by means of reapportionment, the election of comm.
Chairs, etc…
Early Theories of Congress (2)
Early Attempts at Theory:
Other early attempts to explain congressional behavior included:
Orfield (1975): identified, amid the tumult of the Vietnam that Congress and the
President and reversed roles: Congress was no longer the conservative check on
the executive branch, but a guard against Schlesinger’s “Imperial President”
(1974).
Continued Need for Theory: Limits of Burns and Orfield
But, neither Burns or Orfield could explain why the reversal of roles between
Congress and the presidency occurred.
We need to explain, rather than simply blame Congress.
Pluralist Accounts of Congress (11-15)
Pluralism:
Pluralist accounts of politics in the US are predicated on the idea that the electoral
politics is unfair and unequal, but nonetheless open. As a result, the political
system is shaped by the activities and agendas of groups that openly compete for
influence.
Pluralism and Congress: Insightful, but Limited
Group pressure does impact congressional action, but there are conceptual limits to
pluralist interpretations of Congress. Congressional action is not reducible simply
to the influence of competing interest groups.
Pluralist Accounts of Congress (11-15)
Testing Pluralism: What Would Pluralists Say?
There have any number of instances when public pressure had virtually no impact on
congressional decision-making.
Examples: Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy:
1) Vietnam War (Unpopular)
2) Covert Action in Angola (1975) (Unknown)
3) US Troops in Lebanon (1983) (Unwanted)
What Would Pluralists Say?
Congress should have ended the war in Vietnam, ignored the intervention in Angola
and prevented president Reagan from committing troops to Lebanon. But in each
instance it acted differently: inaction, swift action, no action…
Pluralist Accounts of Congress (11-15)
Another Example: Pluralism and Reagan’s 1981 Budget
The congressional response to Reagan’s first budget provides another example of the
inability of pluralism to explain or predict congressional action.
Pluralism and Pace of Government: Things Move Slowly
Since, in the pluralist view, government is open to, and thus populated by competing
interests groups, dramatic change rarely happens.
Reagan’s Budget: Where Were the Pluralists?
As such, one would have expected that Reagan’s budgetary proposals, once
released to Congress would have been “disaggregated,” if not destroyed by
competing groups. Instead, they were passed in an single vote…
Institutionalist Analysis (15-20)
Institutionalist Analysis: Autonomous Congress
The central claim in institutionalist accounts of Congress is that members of Congress
are for the most part autonomous, and thus act, both individually and as an
institution free of outside influence.
Source of Congressional Autonomy: Rules and Customs
They have achieved such autonomy through the introduction of certain rules and
as a result of specific internal institutional customs.
Institutionalist Analysis (15-20)
Competing Institutionalist Interpretations of How Congress Works:
There are a number of varying institutional accounts of Congress.
Examples:
Krehbeil (1991): Members of Congress are primarily motivated by a
desire to enact good legislation.
Fenno (1973): Members’ actions are shaped by reelection concerns, a desire to
enact good policy, and taken together these interests determine each
committee agendas…
Institutionalist Analysis (15-20)
Institutionalist Analysis: Member Socialization
Given that members act autonomously, that is, independent of direct outside
influence, the focus of congressional research should be on member
socialization. How do incumbents socialize new members?
Institutionalist Analysis (15-20)
Testing Institutionalism:
How well can institutionalism explain the actions of Congress in the three foreign
policy areas we discussed earlier?
Examples: Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy:
1) Vietnam War (Unpopular)
2) Covert Action in Angola (1975) (Unknown)
3) US Troops in Lebanon (1983) (Unwanted)
Institutionalism can reasonably explain why Congress acted to block Angola
operation (learned from Vietnam). Presumably, they supported the Lebanese
campaign.
What about the Reagan budget?
Enough members thought a change was necessary.
Institutionalist Analysis (15-20)
Institutionalist Analysis: Limitations
Though institutionalism provides many important insights in the actions of members
of Congress, it does not adequately support its central claim: what is the source
of Congress’ autonomy?
…
Institutionalist Analysis (15-20)
Studies of Congress: General Lack of Theoretical Clarity
In this way, institutionalism mimics most prevailing interpretations of Congress to
the extent that it fails to provide a broader theoretical understanding of
congressional behavior.
We know how Congress works, or does not work, in terms of the power of
committees and incumbency, the mechanics of law making –floor procedures,
the role of staff. What we lack is a clear understanding why Congress does and
does not respond to group pressure, why its structure have and have not
changed…
Note on the Dangers of Functionalism:
Functionalism as a concept is centered (often mistakenly) on the idea that
institutions themselves, and not simply the people who manage or occupy them
may at times directly shape political choices, actions or outcomes.
Marxian Study of Congress (20-30)
Marxism: Dialectical Materialism
Conceptually, Marxism rests upon the claim that social life is fundamentally
economic in nature, specifically that class position, and thus class struggle form
the central axis of historical change and human development.
Analytical Use Value: The Importance of Class in American Politics
As such, what Marxism contributes to a study of American politics, and Congress
specifically is an appreciation for how economic forces, operationalized as
coherent class interests impact congressional decision-making.
…
Marxian Study of Congress (20-30)
Modes of Marxism:
Of the central tenets of early Marxist thought was the idea of “economic
determinism.”
Economic Determinism:
If the key division in society is economic, than it is reasonably to believe
that the those who control the economy (means of production) also direct
the structures of the state (means of protection) as well as society (means
of legitimacy/Hegemony).
Poulantzas’ Contribution:
1) Relative Autonomy of the State
2) Determination in the Last Instance…
Marxian Study of Congress (20-30)
But when is there Relative Autonomy, and when do the imperatives of he capitalist
class system interject?
Berg’s Theory:
Relative autonomy is limited to isolated working class victories. Any systematic
changes, such a direct challenge to economic, political and military power of the
capitalist class is blocked.
Marxian Study of Congress (20-30)
Applying Marxism to Congress:
What can a Marxian study of class tell us about Congress? There has been some
research along these lines:
Example: Argument
Brenner (1983): the actions of members are shaped not by outside
forces, such as pressure groups, but by their own internalization of
perceptions of and support for capitalist ideals.
Limits of Analysis:
Need to look not only at economic forces, but also political factors.
Marxian Study of Congress (20-30)
Applying Marxism to Congress:
A more refined application of Marxist analysis to Congress must consider the
following:
1) Political elites may identify (consciously or unconsciously) with
capitalist class interests, but
2) The working-class (non-hegemonic forces) can resist such policies.
Examples: Vietnam, Angola and Lebanon
Popular opposition to Vietnam did not stop the war, but it helped stay the hand of
the US government in Angola. Only when elite class interests pushed back in the
1980s, did Congress once again capitulate in Lebanon…
Marxian Study of Congress (20-30)
Applying Marxism to Congress: Reagan 1981 Budget
Neither pluralist, nor institutionalists can fully account for the swift passage of
Reagan 1981 budget.
What would Marxist Say?
The passage of the budget demonstrated not only that there are clear structural
limits (and preferences) in politics, but that the intellectual terrain (how the
legislation and its opponents are perceived, both by themselves and their
constituents) plays an important role in the success or failure of legislation.
…