Int Environ Agreements
DOI 10.1007/s10784-015-9313-6
ORIGINAL PAPER
Coalition strategies in the climate negotiations:
an analysis of mountain-related coalitions
Rishikesh Ram Bhandary1
Accepted: 4 November 2015
! Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
Abstract This paper investigates the process of coalition formation for issue-specific
coalitions. I use the Alliance of Small Island States and the Coalition for Rainforest
Nations as case studies to inductively create a framework on coalition formation. This
framework is tested against two coalitions, both advocating for mountain issues in the UN
climate negotiations. These two coalitions differ in the type of coalition sought, the
strategies deployed thus far, and the type of support they have received, including the role
of non-state actors. The framework helps identify significant gaps in the efforts of the two
coalitions, including capturing the most salient link between climate change and mountains, translating technical input into negotiating positions, and identifying the most
appropriate form of the coalition and forum to pursue these interests. In doing so, this paper
provides insights into the limits of linking issues to the climate change agenda (‘‘climate
bandwagoning’’), issue proliferation and its implications for coalition management for
actors like the Group of 77 and China, and the nature of multi-scalar interactions in regime
complexes.
Keywords
Climate change ! Negotiations ! Sustainable development ! Mountains
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Climate negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) could offer an opportunity to address issues related to
& Rishikesh Ram Bhandary
[email protected]
1
Center for International Environment and Resource Policy, The Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, 160 Packard Avenue, Medford, MA 02155, USA
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mountain systems. Proponents of mountain issues like Nepal, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan
have tried to rally other countries to create a coalition to push mountains into the mainstream. Such an attempt represents an attempt by low-power parties to influence the course
of a highly complex multilateral negotiation and reflects how countries navigate the
diversity of interests contained in larger political coalitions like the Group of 77 and China.
This strategy also represents an attempt at ‘‘climate bandwagoning,’’ a deliberate action on
the part of countries dissatisfied with the progress on an issue at another forum to shift to
climate negotiations (Jinnah 2011; Jinnah and Conliffe 2012). This paper proposes a
coalition strategy framework and assesses two efforts to form coalitions on mountains in
the climate negotiations.
Agenda 21 remains the most visible demonstration of commitment by the international community to address mountain issues. It dedicated an entire chapter (Chapter 13)
to mountains. The primary proponent of mountains as a separate issue area under
Agenda 21 was a group called Mountain Agenda. The Integrated Center for International
Mountain Development (ICIMOD),1 the International Mountain Society (IMS), the
United Nations University (UNU), and the Swiss Development Corporation (SDC) as
well as countries such as Switzerland, Canada, Nepal, and Ethiopia were instrumental in
championing mountains as a distinct issue area. The activities of the Mountain Agenda
group ranged from producing The State of the World’s Mountains: A global report2 to
making direct interventions through supportive parties in the preparatory process for the
UN Conference on Environment and Development. Ives (1993) and Kaczmarski and
Cooperrider (1997) provide a detailed account of how mountains entered the international agenda.
Similarly, the Rio?20 outcome document, The Future We Want, acknowledges the
impact of climate change on mountains in paragraph 210 (UN 2012a), and the subsequent
UN Secretary General’s report on sustainable mountain development explicitly encourages
‘‘better integration’’ of mountain issues into the UNFCCC and notes REDD-plus as an
action area by which forests in mountain areas could be conserved (paragraph 94 (i) (e))
(UN 2012b).
Article 4.8 of the UNFCCC provides a legal anchor for mountain issues as it allows the
UNFCCC to discuss ‘‘specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties’’ including
mountain systems (Article 4.8 (g)) and landlocked and transit countries (Article 4.8 (i))
(UNFCCC 1992: 8). Furthermore, vulnerability of mountain states has been affirmed in the
preamble of the UNFCCC where ‘‘fragile mountainous ecosystems’’ among others are
recognized as being ‘‘particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change’’ (UNFCCC
1992: 2).
Despite such a legal basis provided by the UNFCCC, documents and interviews with
officials and documents reveal two general concerns with the state of mountain issues
under the UNFCCC. First, as the focus under the UNFCCC is undoubtedly on reducing
greenhouse gas emissions, a narrow focus on carbon has come at the cost of taking an
ecosystem-wide perspective. A concrete manifestation of this approach is in climate
finance where global benefits are financed by subsidizing incremental costs (Schwank et al.
2010). Second, there exists a perception that the language on vulnerability has been used
1
The members of ICIMOD are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Myanmar, Nepal, and
Pakistan.
2
Stone, P.B. (Ed.). (1992). The State of the World’s Mountains: A global report. London: Zed Books.
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selectively to emphasize particular sets of countries even though the preamble of the
UNFCCC would justify mountain states to be considered ‘‘particularly vulnerable’’ as well.
For example, only the Least Developed Countries have been provided with funds to
prepare National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA) through the Least Developed
Countries Fund (GEF 2015).
The overarching research question for this paper is the following: What are the
factors and steps involved in achieving issue-specific interests in multilateral negotiations? In other words, how do actors successfully pursue issue-specific interests in
multilateral negotiations? To answer this question, I propose a coalition strategy
framework that includes the process of coalition formation and execution by examining,
among others, how issue properties interact with the opportunities and constraints of
multilateral negotiations. With this article, I aim to provide an empirically rich account
of the strategies deployed to pursue issue-specific interests through coalitions. The
emphasis of this paper is on coalition formation as opposed to assessing a coalition’s
effectiveness. By investigating the coalition formation process, we are able to investigate how and under what conditions a coalition is able to come together. This allows us
to understand the variation in success that issue-specific coalitions are able to achieve.
1.2 Research methods
This paper follows Raiffa’s asymmetrically prescriptive/descriptive approach. Raiffa
(1982) describes this approach as one where the researcher ‘‘is concerned with studying
and understanding the behavior of real people in real conflict situations’’ (Raiffa 1982: 21).
It is asymmetric because the recommendations are geared toward one side—in this case,
the proponents of the mountain coalitions. As Raiffa (1991) argues, ‘‘wise prescriptions
should ideally be based on good descriptions,’’ this paper provides detailed narratives of
the two mountain coalitions structured on the basis of the inductively created coalition
formation framework (Raiffa 1991: 14). These descriptions are compared against the
established framework to generate prescriptions. Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)
and Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN) are used as mini case studies to trace the
process of coalition formation. The attention is restricted to AOSIS and CfRN only as they
are the most prominent issue-specific coalitions.
Semi-structured interviews were used as the primary source of data to trace the coalition
formation process. The author carried out interviews with negotiators and other stakeholders in Bonn (at the meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies in June 2011) and in Kathmandu
in August 2011. Interviewees consisted of negotiators from concerned countries, other
interested parties, and non-governmental experts and representatives. Press statements and
outputs of expert meetings have also been utilized. As the paper’s scope of analysis is
politically sensitive, interviews were conducted on a no-attribution basis.
The paper is organized into three distinct parts. The first part consists of a review of
pertinent theoretical literature. This section is followed by an analysis of two existing
coalitions in the UNFCCC—AOSIS and CfRN. Insights from these two coalitions will
be used to create a coalition formation framework. Finally, the third part of the paper
will be the asymmetrically descriptive/prescriptive component of the negotiation analysis. The proposed coalition formation framework will be used to prescribe a strategy
for mountain states to engage with each other in the climate negotiations process.
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2 Coalition formation process
2.1 The literature
The literature on multilateral negotiations is in broad agreement about the role of coalitions. First, coalitions offer a management value by helping to reduce the number of actors/
issues in multilateral settings. Second, coalitions add stability to the multilateral negotiations by guiding party behavior and adding an element of predictability (Lax and Sebenius
1991; Sjöstedt et al. 1994; Dupont 1996). We can glean two important considerations for
coalitions from the literature. First, what is the underlying interest that brings parties
together? Second, what nature and form of the coalition is appropriate?
Common interests and ideological proximity are two factors (separately or together)
seen as necessary for an alliance. Gamson (1961), however, underplays the role of common
values, or one could argue, shared ideology, and posits that coalitions, by their nature, are
‘‘temporary, means oriented, alliances among individuals or groups which differ in goals’’
(Gamson 1961: 374). Emphasizing the transient nature of alliances leads Gamson to
suggest that coalitions need ‘‘tacit neutrality’’ (original emphasis) on issues that are not
immediate to persist. Therefore, the need for the extent of commonality of interests and
ideology is circumscribed by the issue at hand (Gamson 1961: 374).
The form of the Group of 77 in the climate negotiations fits Gamson’s description of
coalitions, particularly regarding the lack of value consensus and tacit neutrality. Nyerere,
the then president of Tanzania, at the fourth ministerial meeting of the G-77, recognized
that the Group was not cohesively bound by a single ideology and that the variety of
interests contained within the Group naturally lent to factions (Sauvant 1981). As the
Group as a whole maintains tacit neutrality over specific issues while remaining united
over larger systemic ones, it is possible for issue-based coalitions comprising of the G-77
members to emerge (Najam 1995). Chasek and Rajamani (2003) argue that ‘‘smaller,
issue-based coalitions can often be an important complement’’ to a larger coalition (like the
G-77) (Chasek and Rajamani 2003: 255). Smaller coalitions will allow countries to pursue
specific interests with greater precision while basing the small coalition on a larger one that
will lend it political support.
Lessons from domestic coalition politics indicate that only the parties necessary to form
a winning coalition will aggregate together reflecting the principle of minimum size (Riker
1962; Gamson 1961). The application of the winning coalitions concept, however, is
problematic in the case of climate negotiations. As climate negotiation tends to be more of
a rule-making exercise with only vague notions of the distributional consequences and
successful outcomes, this winning coalition approach does not offer predictive power for
coalition formation. Furthermore, coalitions come together with the effort of different
types of actors—some are parties to the treaty at hand, while others are non-state actors
aiming to influence the process. As a result, the type of reward expected also varies
substantially by actor type.
Climate negotiations are also characterized by asymmetric power distributions. Perhaps
it illustrates the ‘‘structuralists’ paradox’’ quite well: How can weak states negotiate with
strong states and yet obtain favorable outcomes? (Betzold et al. 2012; Habeeb 1988;
Zartman 1997). This paradox encourages us to look at factors that go beyond the traditional
concept of power as negotiated outcomes do not always seem to flow from power distributions (see Weiler 2012). To remedy power deficits, actors may adopt strategies that
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include forming coalitions or partnering with intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations (Chasek 2005).
Zartman and Rubin (2000) identify four categories of strategies that weak states can use.
Context can be used to generate norm-based strength and moral legitimacy, e.g., AOSIS.
Target strategies can be used to leverage power of the stronger parties as Handel (1990)
suggests. Third parties can be drawn in. Finally, the process of negotiations itself can be
manipulated to achieve one’s ends. We will see in the following discussion how AOSIS
and CfRN have carried out a combination of these strategies.
The evolution of international regimes has been studied extensively. More specifically,
for example, Chasek and Rajamani (2003) have described a model for the evolution of
multilateral negotiations. They argue that it involves four phases: issues definition, factfinding, bargaining, and implementation, review, and strengthening of agreements. The
primary thrust of Chasek and Rajamani is on the evolution and execution of multilateral
negotiations rather than on coalition building. Similarly, Young offers a model of institutional dynamics (Young 2010); however, he is also less concerned with how actors
operate within the regime than the evolution of the entire regime itself. This paper offers an
actor-oriented framework on the process of coalitions in and across regimes, rather than a
systemic explanation for regime change itself.3
In the next section, I will discuss the strategies used by AOSIS and CfRN to create
alliances. While it will not be possible to give full accounts of AOSIS and CfRN, this paper
will extract major lessons learned from these coalitions that are useful to understand the
strategies that were deployed. These cases will be followed by a coalition strategy
framework that characterizes the pattern of coalition formation and execution in climate
negotiations.
2.2 Lessons from AOSIS
AOSIS illustrates how weak-power states can band together to play a major role in
negotiating an international regime. Ashe et al. (1999) argue that the First Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) provided a major jolt to
the small island states through its unequivocal portrayal of the impact of climate change on
small island states:
Half a million people living in archipelagos and coral atoll nations that lie almost
entirely within three meters of sea level… and other archipelagos and island nations
in the Pacific, Indian Ocean and the Caribbean could lose much of their beaches and
arable lands, which would cause severe economic and social disruption (IPCC WG
II, 1990).
The desire to form AOSIS came from the fear of the demands of the small island states
‘‘get[ing] lost in the din’’ and falling into the shadows of the larger developing countries as
developing countries traditionally negotiate under the Group of 77 (Ashe et al. 1999: 212).
They go on to posit that ‘‘small states have been historically, politically and economically
marginalized by the international community and by the larger states of the developing
3
The focus of this paper is on issue-specific coalitions. Using the typology offered by Dupont (1996), we
can generate one that is more specific for the climate negotiations. Political coalitions would include: G77,
ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America), and AILAC (Independent Alliance of Latin
America and the Caribbean). Issue-specific coalitions include AOSIS, CfRN, and the LDC group. Structural
or tactical coalitions include: BASIC (Brazil, China, India, South Africa), the Cartagena Dialogue, LMDCs
(Like-Minded Developing Countries), Environmental Integrity Group, and Umbrella Group.
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world’’ (Ashe et al. 1999: 210). Hence, the contention was not just about the scale of
impact but also a palpable sense of disempowerment in the international system.
The role of expert input from non-governmental organizations has been identified as
being crucial for AOSIS (Chasek and Rajamani 2003; Betzold 2010). Betzold (2010)
identifies borrowing power as the method by which AOSIS was able to operate so
effectively in a highly power asymmetric negotiation. For example, Vanuatu invited
Robert Van Lierop, an influential lawyer and social activist, to serve as the ambassador and
permanent representative of Vanuatu to the United Nations (Shibuya 1996–1997). More
generally, AOSIS has continued to rely on consultants to negotiate on its behalf, and such a
strategy has allowed the coalition to tap into a pool of expertise that simply would not be
available domestically (Betzold 2010; de Agueda Corneloup and Mol 2014).
Furthermore, NGOs were able to assist the translation of scientific information into
negotiating positions for AOSIS. This entailed backing-up positions by the latest and most
robust scientific evidence (Betzold 2010). AOSIS was a natural ally for the progressive
environmental NGOs, and the coalition was able to obtain a great deal of legal support,
particularly from the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development
(Betzold 2010; Yamin 1998). For example, this high level of preparedness was reflected
through the draft protocol that AOSIS submitted prior to COP 1 (during preliminary
negotiating rounds, before the UNFCCC came into force) and was constantly trying to put
the pressure on parties to adopt targets and timetables (Yamin 1998).
In evaluations of the role of the AOSIS and their success in obtaining favorable
negotiation outcomes, scholars have found coalition strategies and the moral voice of small
island states to be salient factors. Both Ashe et al. (1999) assessing AOSIS’ performance in
the negotiation of the climate treaty (UNFCCC) and de Agueda Corneloup and Mol (2014)
on the Copenhagen outcomes find that AOSIS was successful based on the metrics they use
(Ashe et al. 1999; de Agueda Corneloup and Mol 2014).
Given the absence of significant resources (power defined in the structural sense), de
Agueda Corneloup and Mol (2014) argue that other three leadership strategies helped
AOSIS. AOSIS exercised entrepreneurial leadership inside and outside the formal negotiating process. By committing to ambitious, domestic climate actions, AOSIS members
demonstrated environmental leadership. And, command over science allowed AOSIS to
play intellectual leadership.
The process of coalition formation and execution for AOSIS represents a classic case
whereby a set of countries was able to connect scientific research and desired policy goals
through the process of negotiations aided through the borrowing of power. NGOs were the
source of this borrowed power and helped AOSIS come together as a group in order to
negotiate effectively in the climate process. The moral case made the small island states no
doubt helped to buttress their demands (de Agueda Corneloup and Mol 2014).
2.3 Lessons from CfRN
CfRN was established in 2007 to provide convening space for rainforest nations to develop
common positions on forest-related issues. The mission of CfRN does not mark exclusivity
to the UNFCCC or any other process, but underscores underscored the need for interlinkages across forums (Coalition for Rainforest Nations n.d.).
Compared to AOSIS, CfRN is a loose coalition. CfRN has 41 coalition members
comprising of tropical developing countries. The coalition members are supported by
developed countries, NGOs, and academic institutions. While CfRN meets to develop joint
submissions, they do not coordinate negotiation positions other than on forest issues.
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Furthermore, they also do not meet on a regular basis, and its ‘‘solidarity and coordination
vary from session to session’’ (Banda and Oppermann 2011: 537). However, CfRN does
have a secretariat in New York and its staff are the negotiators participating in the
UNFCCC talks.
The evolution of REDD and the role of the CfRN reveal a careful sequence of steps
inside and outside of the UNFCCC that bolstered the case for REDD. Costa Rica and
Papua New Guinea, the two initial proponents of the deforestation and forest degradation
agenda in the UNFCCC process, led a joint submission to place tropical deforestation on
the agenda at the 11th Conference of Parties in Montreal in 2005 (UNFCCC 2005). Soon
thereafter, the G8 Gleneagles Communiqué: Climate Change, Energy, and Sustainable
Development emphasized the importance of carbon sinks, particularly the Amazon and the
Congo basins, in the stabilization of emissions, livelihoods, biodiversity, and sustainable
development in general (G8 2005). The support for REDD was further enhanced by the G8
Heiligendamm Summit in 2007 where the World Bank was given the mandate to develop a
‘‘forest carbon partnership’’ (G8 2007: 19). The World Bank officially launched the Forest
Carbon Partnership Facility in 2007 in Bali, building on the ‘‘political and intellectual
leadership’’ of the CfRN (FCPF 2008: 3). In this way, CfRN was able to make use of the
context as a source of power through forum shopping. Doing so meant that CfRN had to be
a part of a larger coalition that wanted to push REDD onto the agenda including actors such
as The Nature Conservancy, the World Bank, and donor countries.
CfRN was also successful in casting REDD in terms of the interests of the developed
countries to push deforestation forward. First, forest-related emissions account for almost
20 % of total emission and also have low abatement costs relative to other sources (UNREDD n.d.).4 Second, CfRN was eager to explore market-based finance mechanisms.
These mechanisms would allow funds to be generated through domestic or international
carbon markets in developed countries or internationally. The Forest Carbon Partnership
Facility had created the Carbon Fund as one of its two funds to specifically pilot performance-based payments for REDD. Similarly, avoided deforestation was included as a
sector through which carbon credits could be bought in the Waxman-Markey bill (America
Clean Energy and Security Act 2009).5 After the Copenhagen Climate Conference did not
deliver the expected agreement on REDD, an interim arrangement was sought and
countries pledged $4 billion dollars at the Oslo Climate and Forest Conference in 2010. As
a result, by presenting REDD as a means by which significant emissions reductions could
be achieved in a cost-efficient way, the proponents of REDD helped to unlock an agreement under the climate regime that had been deadlocked under the UN Forum on Forests.
REDD officially entered the climate negotiations through the Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC
2007).
While the two frameworks described differ in the manner in which they operated to
borrow power, they offer examples of how low-power parties were able to be far more
influential than what their power base would indicate (Zartman and Rubin 2000). These
two examples will be utilized to create a coalition strategy framework in the next section.
4
IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report, however, puts the entire agriculture, forests, and land use sector at
around 25 % of global emissions (IPCC 2014).
5
The proposed ‘‘International Deforestation Reduction Program’’ made provisions for this.
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2.4 A coalition formation framework
The forgoing sections provide illustrative examples of the strategies deployed to pursue
issue-specific interests in the climate negotiations. Based on the insights offered by the two
coalitions described, I propose a basic framework to characterize coalition strategies in
sustainable development negotiations. The level of execution is kept at the sustainable
development level to allow forum shopping and to recognize the many linkages between
sustainable development issues. The steps and indicators involved in this process are
outlined in Table 1.
The framework presented is sequential in nature. The stages of the framework are
tightly linked and help provide the necessary scaffolding material to structure the narrative
of the case studies. It is important to recognize that the progression of a coalition through
various stages can be influenced through feedback effects from other stages.
2.4.1 Impetus
Kingdon (1984) argues that a window of opportunity arises to address a problem when the
three streams of problem, policy, and politics combine. Hence, agenda setting is aided by a
crisis event or any development that is able to gain enough visibility. The role of epistemic
communities has been extensively discussed in the literature (see Haas 1993, for example).
The report of the IPCC Working Group II caused much alarm to small island states and
provided impetus for them to come together as one coalition. Similarly, CfRN came
together in 2007 after considerable scientific advancement in understanding carbon fluxes
associated with forestry. If there is not enough awareness of the impending crisis, Lall
(1966) posits that negotiations will become prolonged and the sense of urgency will be
missing. However, as evident from the Kingdon (1984) model of streams and Chasek’s
(2001) precipitants for negotiations, a sense of crisis alone is not sufficient.
Table 1 Coalition formation framework
Stage
Characteristics and indicators
Impetus
Growing agreement on the scientific basis of the problem
Crises
Agenda-setting influences like campaigns
Windows of opportunity in protracted negotiations
Anchoring
Consensus on problem definition
Capacity building of negotiators (legal, negotiations)
Turning scientific information into negotiation positions
Identifying entry points into the negotiation regime
Meeting of experts
Emerging organizational structure
Expansion of partnership base
Coalescence
Critical mass of coalition members to hold the momentum
Agreement on operational procedures/internal management
High-level political commitment
Action
Joint submissions
Lobbying
Forum Shopping
Translating negotiated decisions into programmatic outcomes
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Impetus for coalition formation does not have to be an external shock or a scientific
discovery of an imminent crisis. Impetus for action can be endogenous to the regime
structure itself. That is, if the climate regime picks up pace, there will be an incentive for
parties to bring in issues of their interest that are not getting attention in other regimes.
Similarly, slow movement in the other international forums can also trigger the introduction of an issue in a particular treaty regime.
Some indicators of this stage would include scientific reports regarding the problem/
potential crises and events that capture public interest like a major flood.
2.4.2 Anchoring
The anchoring phase is where the scientific world meets the political, as negotiators
attempt to straddle across these two universes. This second step involves achieving a
consensus among coalition partners on the problem definition by translating scientific
knowledge into a form that can be fed into the negotiations. This is a stage in which NGOs
and other third parties can play a major role. NGOs offer both the expertise that draws on
scientific evidence and the ability to sustain public attention. During this stage, potential
partners will show enhanced interest by recognizing the momentum that the coalition is
starting to achieve. Capacity building will be required for negotiators not familiar with
negotiating in international forums. An understanding of mutual expectations among
coalition partners will emerge. This will inform the nature of the organization structure.
Indicators of this stage are: convening expert groups, joint technical papers, enhanced
problem definition, identification of entry points into the negotiations, and a strategy for
engaging in the target regime.
2.4.3 Coalescence
Perhaps the most critical step is for the coalition is to coalesce. The first two steps allow
negotiators to generate options and identify priorities for the newly forming coalition. In
other words, the first two steps help to generate the scope of actions for the coalition. If
there is a perception about this coalition being a successful coalition, there will be
incentive for a greater number of parties to join, thereby attaining the necessary critical
mass to continue. Success can be an achievement that is largely procedural and not necessarily substantive. Coalescence will also entail the emergence of an organizational
structure—while this could come in a variety of forms, the most critical requirement is to
generate a basis for continuous engagement. This phase will also be marked by high-level
political commitment. After the groundwork by the technical experts and negotiators has
been carried out, the coalition can take a political turn to signal that political capital is
behind the new coalition.
Once a coalition comes this far, it will no longer be bound to the original negotiation regime
that spawned its formation. It may take a life of its own and enter into another treaty regime.
This lateral movement, also called forum shopping, is a major feature of the modern international regime, and coalitions undoubtedly reflect this feature (Raustiala and Victor 2004).
2.4.4 Action
Finally, once the coalition has identified a set of priorities and has become cohesive
enough, it pursues its goals through the negotiating body. If the decisions obtained through
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a particular forum are weak, the coalition can continue to engage in the forum until it
achieves a satisfying outcome. Similarly, coalitions can shape and reshape their priorities
based on scientific input and political realities. For example, CfRN entered the UNFCCC
forum as it saw movement on forest issues at this venue, even though the UN Forum on
Forests possesses the mandate to deal with forestry issues. The Forest-11 Declaration of
CfRN frames the coalition as an attempt to help further the internationally agreed goals
under Agenda 21, the UN Forest Principles, and the Millennium Development Goals
(Tropical Rainforest Countries’ Leaders 2007). Similarly, as described in the introductory
section, countries had been convening in line with Chapter 13 of Agenda 21 on mountains
in the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) track. The momentum winded
down after the Bishkek Summit in 2002. Among other things, by asking for a greater
emphasis on mountain issues in the UNFCCC, the negotiators are tacitly underscoring the
lack of progress in other institutional settings.
3 A tale of two proponents
This section discusses two attempts at forming a coalition around mountains in the
UNFCCC. I first provide a descriptive narrative of the efforts at forming mountain
coalitions using the framework developed in Sect. 2. The last part of this section offers a
prescriptive analysis based on the same framework in Sect. 2.
3.1 The mountain initiative
Nepal had spearheaded an attempt to create a broad-based coalition to support mountain
issues in the UN climate negotiations. As Nepal chaired the Least Developing Countries
Group in the UNFCCC process (2012–2014), attention to this initiative has waned. Efforts
undertaken by Nepal to set up a coalition, however, give us instructive insights.
3.1.1 Impetus
Two weeks prior to COP15, resonant of the Maldivian President Nasheed’s underwater
cabinet meeting, the Nepali government held a cabinet meeting at the Base Camp of Mount
Everest that came up with a 10-point ‘‘Everest Declaration.’’ Shortly thereafter, the
Government of Nepal (GoN) was able to mobilize Everest summiteers for a ‘‘Summiteers’
Summit’’ in Copenhagen. This was the first major international event that the GoN
organized on climate change, and it greatly helped to put the Himalayas in the spotlight as
negotiations were underway in the Bella Center in Copenhagen. In addition, COP15 itself
was very well attended by Nepali officials—from members of parliament, advisers to the
Prime Minister, and a major cross section of the Nepali civil society (personal observation,
2009).
Negotiators identify the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report’s conclusions on glaciers
and glacier lake outburst floods and accelerated warming in high altitudes as having a
catalytic impact (Interviews 2 and 3, 2011). However, as the coalition formation framework in Sect. 2 describes, impetus may arise from the dynamics of the negotiations itself.
Interviews with officials confirm that the Copenhagen Climate Summit was seen as a
critical meeting where mountains could receive significant attention, and the programming
was designed to ride the momentum.
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3.1.2 Anchoring
A year later, the GoN presented the clearest articulation for the Mountain Alliance Initiative at a side event it organized at the Cancun Climate Talks 2010.6 The Secretary of
Environment, Joshi, argued that the inherent vulnerability of mountain systems had made
climate change an issue of major importance to Nepal and that climate change would have
negative effects both upstream and downstream in the mountain watershed regions (GoN
2010). Joshi further argued that while mountains had gained attention in Agenda 21
through an entire chapter (Chapter 13), implementation had been weak. The GoN sensed
the need for ‘‘collective and coordinated efforts to address climate change impacts’’ on
mountain systems (Interview 2, 2011). The GoN further envisioned the MAI to also
encompass knowledge and experience sharing, connect upstream and downstream issues,
and fill the information void regarding mountain systems.
The GoN signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the ICIMOD to provide
technical backstopping. As a part of this support program, ‘‘International Expert Consultation Meeting: Meeting Initiative on Climate Change’’ was organized by the GoN and the
ICIMOD in September 2010 bringing together experts from 15 countries and various
international agencies. The consultation was able to ‘‘identify strategic issues and topics
that are of significant importance to the global mountain community in the context of
climate change’’ (Government of Nepal & ICIMOD 2010: 13). This meeting was expected
to create ground for a ministerial meeting planned in March 2011 by advancing technical
cooperation (Interviews 1 and 5, 2011).
We can make two observations about the Expert Consultation Meeting. First, the
meeting explicitly recognized that forming an alliance would be necessary for internal
coordination ‘‘as there would be formal commitments among mountain countries’’
(Government of Nepal & ICIMOD 2010: 13). Second, SIDS and CfRN were seen as
models that could be replicated—both in terms of shaping the process of negotiations and
the outcomes in the form of financial flows (Government of Nepal & ICIMOD 2010).
The ICIMOD has been able to provide stable support, and this has somewhat redressed
the political instability that has been plaguing Nepal. As the mandate of the ICIMOD lies
in the Hindu Kush-Himalaya region, it has not able to play a larger role (Interview 7,
2011). Furthermore, officials believe that without greater political clarity and effort, it
would be challenging to convene a ministerial meeting to give the Mountain Initiative a
major push (Interviews 6, 7 and 8, 2011).
3.1.3 Coalescence
At the Copenhagen Climate Summit, the then Prime Minister of Nepal, Madhav Kumar
Nepal, formally made the first high-level proposal for an ‘‘Alliance for Mountain Adaptation.’’ This was the outcome of a regional consultation ‘‘Kathmandu to Copenhagen’’ that
the Government of Nepal (GoN) organized in August 2009.7 This call was supported by
the 16th Summit of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) held in
Thimphu in April 2010. The Summit Declaration ‘‘welcomed the Government of Nepal’s
initiative to organize a ministerial meeting of Mountainous Countries in Kathmandu’’
6
Discussions between Nepali, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz delegates on a potential mountain-based coalitions
started to take place from the Bangkok meeting in 2009 (Government of Nepal & ICIMOD 2010).
7
This meeting was held from August 31 to September 1, 2009 and brought together high-level officials
from South Asia and neighboring countries.
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(SAARC 2010: 3). To give the initiative a renewed momentum after Copenhagen, the GoN
organized an informal side event during the meeting of Subsidiary Bodies of the UNFCCC
in Bonn in June 2010 (Interview 2, 2011).
By 2011, the GoN stressed that it envisioned a ‘‘common platform’’ rather than a
traditional negotiating bloc or alliance (Interview 3, 2011). The most illustrative example
of how the GoN’s view on the nature of the coalition had changed is reflected in the shift
from the term ‘‘Mountain Alliance for Adaptation’’ in the Copenhagen address to
‘‘Mountain Initiative’’ in 2011. Officials claim that any name containing the term alliance
would denote a negotiating political body (Interviews 2 and 3, 2011). Eschewing alliance
would allow the epistemic, political, and research dimensions to meld.
Political uncertainty in Nepal, as it passed through a transition to a republican setup,
reduced the convening power of Nepal. As a result, while the coalition did progress on to
the coalescence stage, a combination of domestic political difficulties including the lack of
continuity of leadership meant that the coalition was not able to progress further or to fill
gaps in the earlier stages. Furthermore, as Nepal took over the leadership of the Least
Developed Countries group in the climate negotiations for 2012–2014, the Mountain
Initiative has not remained active.
3.2 The Mountainous Landlocked Developing Countries model
The Mountainous Landlocked Developing Countries model is an alternate approach to
advancing mountain issues in the UNFCCC negotiations. Afghanistan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan champion this approach.
3.2.1 Impetus
The MLDC has heavily emphasized the vulnerability of its members to glacial retreat, the
lack of extensive research on the risks and impacts of climate change on mountain systems
and the vertical zoning of the countries, that is, topography that does not allow habitat
migration. MLDC officials hold that there has not been enough work on understanding
vulnerability and risks faced by mountainous countries (Interviews 9–11, 2011). They
single out the Nairobi Work Programme as having achieved precious little so far (Interviews 9–11, 2011).
3.2.2 Anchoring
The MLDC has underscored the vulnerability of landlocked mountainous states and like
the Mountain Initiative finds Article 4.8 (g) and (i) and the preamble of the Convention as
offering legal bases for pursuing action on mountains (Interviews 9 and 10, 2011). MLDC
officials are also of the view that the Bali Action Plan, agreed to in COP 13 2007,
inadvertently encouraged countries to brand themselves as being more vulnerable than
other ones (Interview 8, 2011). They maintain that prior to Bali, developing countries had
not been disaggregated into camps that could be ranked in terms of vulnerability (Interview
8, 2011). MLDC officials feel that such precedence has been set, especially with the ‘‘Most
Vulnerable Countries’’ category that the Copenhagen Accord so eagerly embraces (Interview 8, 2011).
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3.2.3 Coalescence
The MLDC has defined membership more tightly than the MAI. This remains the most
critical difference between the two approaches. The MLDC places a major emphasis on
being ‘‘landlocked’’ and how this attribute of its member states amplifies their vulnerability
to the adverse impacts of climate change. While MLDC officials are not against the idea of
an open coalition in the form proposed by Nepal, they remain insistent that ‘‘landlocked’’
needs to be underscored. The case for landlocked mountainous countries was made clearly
by Armenia’s submission to a meeting of mountainous countries at the sidelines of the
UNFCCC meeting in 2011:
We find it necessary to give special attention to and underline the ‘‘landlocked’’
status of countries. It does not mean at all that ‘‘landlocked’’ countries oppose in
some way to ‘‘Mountainous Partnership’’, rather it gives additional characterization
to countries under this category by underlying their particularly vulnerable nature as
‘‘landlocked’’ countries and invites attention to this fact (Armenia 2011).
Nepal, on the other hand, has shown considerable resistance to the idea of creating a
coalition based on landlocked developing mountainous countries. Officials say that this is
primarily due to three reasons. First, the GoN feels that a coalition comprising of Annex 1
and Non-Annex 1 countries can have a stronger impact (Interviews 2, 3 and 7, 2011). As
the major thrust of the coalition will be on knowledge sharing and increasing research and
dialogue, the GoN feels that having a wide coalition base will serve that purpose. Second,
the GoN wants to channel its coalition activities through the Group of 77 and China, the
primary negotiating bloc for developing countries (Interview 1, 2011). As indicated above,
the name of the coalition floated by the GoN has been altered a couple of times. This is
primarily a reflection of the GoN’s changing conception of what is politically feasible and
what is not. Efforts to downplay alliance and stress the issue-specific nature of the
Mountain Initiative also sits more easily with the tacit neutrality approach of the G-77 and
China.
The membership base of MLDC can be understood by analyzing the structural constraints to participation of its member countries. The initial MLDC proponents were
Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. All three of these countries are former Soviet
republics. Hence, they did not belong to the Group of 77 and do not consider themselves to
be developing countries in the same fashion that the developing country parties do under
the UNFCCC. Central Asia and the Caucasus, Albania, and Moldova (CACAM) had raised
the lack of clarity of the term developing countries in reference to the Bonn Agreements on
the implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (decision 4/CP.4) (UNFCCC
1998). As the decisions adopted at COP 4 reference developing countries for capacity
building, development and transfer of technologies, and additional guidance to the operating entity of the financial mechanism, CACAM believed that it left out non-developing
parties that were listed as Non-Annex I (Interviews 7 and 8, 2011).
MLDC officials recognize that they are not in a position to operate as an alliance due to
internal capacity and the extent of resources at their disposal (Interviews 7–10, 2011).
MLDC delegations to the UNFCCC meetings are small, and the coalition itself has the
formal support of four countries. Officials accord this restricted delegation size to two
factors. First, delegations from the MLDC are not members of the Least Developed
Countries group (apart from Afghanistan) and therefore are not eligible for the same level
of support that the UNFCCC Secretariat accords to delegates from LDCs (Interview 8,
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2011). In addition, as delegates from the MLDC mainly come from the Ministry of
Environment or a similar department charged with natural resources, they face resource
problems to support their attendance (Interview 8, 2011). In addition, MLDC officials also
remarked that they face language barriers as they were trained in the Soviet system and find
it difficult to respond spontaneously to developments in English-heavy negotiations (Interview 9, 2011).
With the application of the framework presented above to MLDCs, three issues come to
the fore. First, while the coalition is clearly prompted by the impacts of climate change and
was driven by the momentum that the climate negotiations had prior to the Copenhagen
conference, the coalition has remained stuck at the anchoring stage. Second, efforts to give
the coalition a formal shape and thereby progress to and beyond the coalescence stage have
been prevented by contested visions on how mountain-related coalitions should operate.
Third, inadequate engagement with civil society and international organizations that could
lend the coalition power has further undermined the ability of the coalition to progress
through the stages identified.
3.3 Prescriptive analysis
This prescriptive section assesses and evaluates the two mountain coalitions of Sect. 3.2
using the coalition formation framework and its implications (developed in Sect. 2). The
descriptions of where the coalitions stand against the coalition formation framework allow
us to generate prescriptions for future action.
3.3.1 Impetus
Climate impacts, in the mountain regions, have not been presented as an impending crisis.
For example, when officials present the case for a coalition, they present a wide array of
impacts that climate change will have in mountain societies but do not identify imminent,
singular events. The challenge faced by mountain states is to distill the link between
mountains, and climate change in a public relations-friendly manner is clear. The nature of
climate impacts was more or less clear, at least in a symbolic sense for AOSIS and CfRN.
At the Central Asia regional meeting organized by the Mountain Partnership Secretariat
and UCA Mountain Societies Research Centre and partners from November 9 to 11, 2011,
the meeting concluded that a branding exercise was necessary comparable to the Amazon
forests known as the lungs of the earth (Central Asia Regional Meeting 2011). The meeting
further emphasized the need to be inclusive so that the metaphor can capture highlands and
lowlands. One such idea was ‘‘Highlands to Oceans (H20)’’ (Central Asia Regional
Meeting 2011).
3.3.2 Anchoring
The analysis above points to the need for negotiators to firmly connect the scientific and the
political aspects to develop a strategy for the way forward. There is a strong convergence
of interest in issues like mountain-related research, observation systems, water stress, and
glacial lake outburst floods. These common areas have to be presented in the climate
negotiations. A special group comprising of negotiators and legal experts could complement the work done by the expert group to identify the appropriate means to pursue these
issues (Government of Nepal & ICIMOD 2010).
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3.3.3 Coalescence
Martinez and Susskind (2000) have suggested a collaborative problem-solving process to
allow competing coalitions to develop a common vision. In an effort to get the two
competing groups together, the Mountain Partnership organized a meeting on June 3, 2011,
on the margins of the meeting of AWGs and the SBs of the Convention. This meeting
proved to be useful to understand the two models.
What is evident from both of the mountain coalitions is that they swing to and fro from
the anchoring stage to the coalescence stage. The key unresolved issue is the portrayal of
the link between mountains and climate change in a manner that is adequately inclusive for
both sets of proponents.
While coalitions might form under a common sense of urgency and common vulnerability,
if the crisis has distributional consequences, the sorting out of winners and losers can limit the
scope of interaction. Furthermore, the time duration for cooperation can be limited and parties
might switch their focus to distributive bargaining/claiming value even at the prospect of
creating additional value. This could be one reason why the countries have not been able to
firmly move from the anchoring stage to the coalescence stage. This underscores the
importance of reaching a strong agreement on the scope of actions that the coalition will
engage in and the demands that it will put forward in the climate negotiations.
3.3.4 Action
Execution of the coalition will require a skill set that technical negotiators may not possess.
Therefore, a mobilization of diplomats that are well versed with multilateral negotiations is
critical. Similarly, neither coalition has demonstrated a careful consideration of the
advantages and disadvantages of pursuing mountain issues through the climate negotiations. The strong focus on carbon, in terms of abatement and sequestration, at the cost of
the more contextual ecosystem-wide goods and services hampers the extent to which
mountain issues can be addressed.
The limits of climate bandwagoning also need to be recognized. For example, Wapner
identifies a central paradox of climate bandwagoning—while the increase in diversity of
interests hitching themselves on the climate bandwagon increases attention and resources
for climate change, it also means that action on climate change itself may not progress
(Wapner 2011). This point is particularly salient given the all or nothing approach of the
UNFCCC. Mountain countries might have to loosen their stances on other aspects of
negotiations to make some gains on mountain issues.
Similarly, from the very outset, the international regime for mountains was conceptualized as being based on regional organizations. The organization of the Mountain Partnership reflects this networked structured. Proponents of mountain issues, therefore, face
the complex task of not just bringing together regional aspirations on mountains but casting
them into a climate-friendly form.
4 Conclusion
As presently structured, the configuration of the climate talks is not friendly to advancing
mountain issues. The division parties along the line of developed and developing countries
limit the extent of resources and scope of cooperation possible for all parties, particularly
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as countries belonging to the former Soviet Union are difficult to categorize. The carboncentric approach of climate negotiations is too restrictive to properly address sustainable
mountain development and related components like watershed management. Similarly,
immediate and urgent projects have been prioritized for adaptation finance. However, the
climate negotiations are open to the entry of many substantive issues, and mountain
countries will have to frame mountain issues in a manner that is suitable for the climate
talks. Two general insights can be gleaned. First, the issue at hand needs to be tied to
climate change in a manner that is scientifically sound and compatible with the selected
forum. Second, as issue-specific advocates are often low-power parties, a broad alliance of
state and non-state actors is needed to push an issue forward. Whether these are necessary
and/or sufficient conditions, however, is for further research.
We can identify four areas for further research. First, the conditions under which a
political group like the Group of 77 can maintain tacit neutrality need to be identified. To
what extent can member states pursue their particular interests and how does issue proliferation in turn affect the ability of the G-77 manage itself as a coalition? Second, more
research is also needed on the behavior of coalitions that are not issue-specific. An initial
typology was identified in the literature review section. Third, at a policy level, with the
mandate of the CSD’s successor body, the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable
Development, to facilitate the integration of the three pillars of sustainable development,
what are the implications for sustainable mountain development? Fourth, the limits of
climate bandwagoning may also expose the converse of regime complexes. While there are
certain issues with a high density of overlapping international institutions, how do we
address regime voids?
Acknowledgments The author thanks Kelly Sims Gallagher, Bill Moomaw, and Eileen Babbitt for
comments. Support for this research was received from a research grant from BP International Ltd., the
Center for International Environment and Resource Policy, Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School,
and the Fletcher School’s PhD conference fund.
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