Rational and Experiential Processing 1
Running Head: DISTINGUISHING INFORMATION PROCESSING STYLES
Distinguishing Between Rational and Experiential Information Processing Styles
Monica Karsai
Wittenberg University
Rational and Experiential Processing 2
Abstract
The purpose of this study was to examine differences in rational and experiential thinking
styles. Eight measures were used in conjunction with the Rational-Experiential Inventory to
determine strengths and weaknesses of each style. The rational style correlated with academic
measures, reasoning ability, self-control, and creativity. Also, the rational group scored
significantly better than the experiential group on academic measures and reasoning skills and
marginally significant on creativity. The experiential style was positively associated with social
skills (emotional support and conflict management). All of the significant results confirmed the
hypotheses, except for the prediction that the rational group would score worse on creativity than
the experiential group. Finally, the variables that discriminated significantly between the rational
and experiential groups were, in descending order, Cognitive Reflection, Grade Point Average,
and ACT/SAT composite scores.
Rational and Experiential Processing 3
Distinguishing Between Rational and Experiential Information Processing Styles
The way people make decisions depends upon a variety of factors, including how
important the decision is, how much information they have about the situation, and how the
decision affects their lives. Most importantly, decisions are shaped by the way humans think.
Some people rely more on instincts while others rely on weighing options and consequences and
thinking through each problem thoroughly and objectively. The way humans process information
not only affects the way they view the world, but shapes personality as well. For example,
preferring to think objectively and in a step-by-step manner may be associated with stronger
interests and strengths in sciences. Furthermore, thinking intuitively may lead one to be more
superstitious and more likely to believe in the unexplainable (Epstein, 2008). While there are
multiple theories on different processing styles, Epstein’s Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory
focuses on what he calls rational and experiential processing styles (Pacini & Epstein, 1999).
Rational and experiential styles of thinking are quite different. While humans may utilize
both styles, they are independent (Epstein & Pacini, 1999). The rational style is characterized by
concrete rules, reasoning, and conscientiousness. Also, this process is slow, verbal, and nonemotional components (Epstein & Pacini, 1999). In contrast, experiential processing is
characterized by intuitive, holistic thinking (big picture as opposed to the individual elements)
that is fast, primitive, and is associated with interpersonal relationships, emotionality, and the
ability to think abstractly. Additionally, the experiential system is closely related to creativity
and humor, whereas the rational system is superior in planning and considering long-term
consequences (Epstein, 2008). The rational process develops through actively seeking
knowledge, especially through formalized education, whereas the experiential process develops
through life experiences. (Epstein, 1994).
Rational and Experiential Processing 4
These two systems have distinct evolutionary histories. The experiential system evolved
first and is used for adaptations by animals other than humans. However, it is stronger for
humans due to the development of the cerebral cortex (Epstein & Pacini, 1999). This system also
has ties to Freudian theory. Freud discussed two types of processes, primary and secondary. The
former (comparable to the experiential system) is unconscious, unrefined, and free of rules while
the latter is conscious, logical, involves realistic reasoning, and delays gratification (Epstein,
1994). The primary process continuously attempts to override the secondary process and
therefore, attempts to suppress rationality. Freud believed that this could be prevented by making
unconscious desires conscious and apparent via psychoanalysis. While the secondary process
evolved out of the primary process, it is necessary for adaptation and survival because humans
cannot survive by relying on the primary process alone (Epstein, 1994). Reasoning by analogy,
Epstein argues that this why it is necessary for humans to have both the rational and experiential
processing styles; they cannot operate on a daily basis with only one style. Having both systems
allows humans to generate their own theory of reality (Epstein, 1994) and in turn, to be able to
function and make sense of daily occurrences.
Because the rational system can consciously trace steps to a conclusion, it seems
reasonable that it is somehow more adaptive than experiential processing. However, there are
several instances that demonstrate situations where the experiential is favored over the rational,
even if the conclusion is irrational. In particular, many people share an irrational fear of flying,
but feel completely comfortable driving every day, even though statistics show that driving is
more dangerous than flying (Epstein, 1994). Though people know that flying is safer, they have a
stronger, irrational, fear of this activity. Also, believing in superstitions proves that though there
is no rational evidence for the phenomena, humans still choose to believe in them. As cited in
Rational and Experiential Processing 5
Epstein (1994), Gallup indicated that one in four adults believe in ghosts, one in six have
communicated with the deceased, and one in seven believe they have seen a UFO. Another
phenomenon detached from rationality is religion (Epstein, 1994). If humans operated on
rationality alone, religion would not exist; other factors are associated with the belief in religion.
To understand and appreciate religion, the experiential system is necessary. While these
examples reveal how rationality and experientiality exist without being in direct competition
with one another, Denes-Raj and Epstein’s study demonstrated how humans can choose an
irrational conclusion while “knowing” the rational conclusion.
Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994) conducted an experiment to determine factors that would
cause participants to go against their rational judgment. In the experiment, participants had to
decide to draw from one of two bowls to attain a red jelly bean that is among white jelly beans.
The first bowl contained 1 red jelly bean in a bowl of 10 total beans (10%). The second bowl
contained 5 to 9 red jelly beans in a bowl of 100 total beans (5%-9%). Participants chose the
larger bowl instead of the small bowl from which to draw because they ignored the ratio of red
beans to white beans and instead focused on the absolute number of red beans, even though the
probability was lower when the absolute number was larger (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994).
Participants claimed that they knew the probability was lower but felt that choosing the larger
bowl was associated with a larger probability of obtaining a red jelly bean (Denes-Raj & Epstein,
1994). This is an example of the circumstances under which participants will favor an irrational
judgment over a rational judgment. That is, they ignored reason and relied instead on their
emotions, or their experiential style of thinking.
In another example, participants were presented with vignettes and asked (1) how they
would behave in each given situation, (2) how they thought others would behave, and (3) how a
Rational and Experiential Processing 6
logical person would behave in a given situation (Epstein & Pacini, 1999). Participants indicated
that they knew the logical behavior; however, they believed that they themselves and others
would not act accordingly. Instead, they would act according to the experiential system rather
than the rational system. Similar to the jelly bean experiment, participants predict that they will
behave irrationally even when they are fully aware of the rational route.
To assess an individual’s information processing preference, Epstein developed the
Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI). The earlier version of this measure included the Need for
Cognition (NFC) and Faith in Intuition (FI) subscales (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Then, a newer
version was created which included the subscales Rational Ability (possessing the ability to think
rationally), Rational Engagement (preferring to think in a rational manner), Experiential Ability
(the ability to interpret and use one’s emotions and intuitions), and Experiential Engagement
(preferring to rely on emotions and intuitions for decision making) (Pacini & Epstein, 1999).
Correlates of rational and experiential thinking include scales from the Big Five (Pacini
& Epstein, 1999). Specifically, rational thinking correlated positively with openness and
conscientiousness, and experiential thinking correlated positively with neuroticism,
agreeableness, and extraversion. Also, rationalism correlated with Ego Strength, responsible
behavior, delaying gratification, and self-control. Correlates of experientialism include emotional
expressivity, agreeableness, and neuroticism (Pacini & Epstein, 1999).
The old version of the REI indicated that men prefer rational processing while women
prefer the experiential style (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996). Moreover, when other
measures were used in relation to the old version, Need for Cognition was associated with
adjustment, self-esteem, dominance, SAT scores, and GPA. Faith in Intuition was associated
with self-esteem and dominance as well. In interpersonal relationships, Faith in Intuition was
Rational and Experiential Processing 7
related to a relationship security and Need for Cognition was associated with using rational
tactics in dealing with relationship conflict (Epstein et al., 1996).
This study assessed cognitive tasks and personality variables hypothesized to
discriminate between rational and experiential styles of thinking. Specifically, this study
compared rational and experiential thinkers using the newer version of the REI on the following
variables: academic skills, reasoning skills, planning skills, social skills, and creativity.
Hypothesis 1: Rational thinkers will report higher levels of academic achievement than
experiential thinkers as indexed by GPA and ACT/SAT scores. Furthermore, they will also score
higher on cognitive reflection, planning tasks, and self-control. Hypothesis 2: Experiential
thinkers will have higher scores than rational thinkers on measures of social skills (specifically,
conflict management and emotional support) and creativity.
Method
Participants
Participants were 75 Wittenberg University students, 46 females (61.3%) and 29 males
(38.7%). Seventy-one participants were Caucasian (94.7%) and 4 were African American
(5.3%), 8 were freshmen (10.7%), 24 were sophomores (32.0%), 23 were juniors (30.7%), and
20 were seniors (26.6%). Students enrolled in introductory psychology courses received credit or
extra credit for their participation, depending upon the professor’s participation policy.
Materials and Apparatus
Nine measures were included in this study. A demographics sheet (Appendix 1) was
constructed to collect information on the following subject variables: gender, race/ethnicity,
major, class year, GPA, and standardized test scores. The second measure was the RationalExperiential Inventory (REI: Pacini & Epstein, 1999), which consists of 40 statements;
Rational and Experiential Processing 8
participants responded to each statement on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (definitely not
true of myself) to 5 (definitely true of myself). The REI includes four subscales: Rational Ability,
Rational Engagement, Experiential Ability, and Experiential Engagement plus Rational and
Experiential composites (Pacini & Epstein, 1999).
Next, the Emotional Support and Conflict Management subscales of the Interpersonal
Competence Questionnaire (Buhrmaster, Furman, Wittenberg, & Reis, 1988) were utilized to
assess social skills. There were 16 statements on which participants rated their abilities on a 5point Likert scale ranging from 1 (I’m poor at this; I’d feel so uncomfortable and unable to
handle this situation, I’d avoid it if possible) to 5 (I’m extremely good at this; I’d feel very
comfortable and could handle this situation very well). Statements referred to a variety of social
situations, such as listening skills, giving advice, and conflict management.
To assess self-control, 20 items were taken from the International Personality Item Pool
(Goldberg et al., 2006). Participants were instructed to rate how well each item described them
using a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (very inaccurate) to 5 (very accurate). Higher scores
reflected higher self-control.
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) has three, open-ended questions that test
mathematical and reasoning skills. The items are designed to have an intuitively obvious yet
incorrect answer (Frederick, 2005). Determining the correct answer requires some reflection.
Total scores are the number of items answered correctly.
To assess creativity, participants were given a Cartoon Task from Sternberg’s Rainbow
Project (2006). This measure is composed of five pictures. Participants write captions for any
three of them. These captions were scored on four subscales- Originality, Cleverness, Humor,
and Appropriateness. Each subscale was scored on a 5-point scale; higher scores reflect greater
Rational and Experiential Processing 9
creativity (Sternberg, 2006). A second measure of creative ability was administered: The
Symbols Test from the Kit of Factor-Referenced Cognitive Tests (Ekstrom, French, Harman, &
Dermen, 1976). This was a timed task on which each participant was given five words and
instructed to create up to five symbols representing that word (i.e. for the word “food”, one could
draw a fork and spoon). Participants had five minutes to complete this task. A total score (out of
25) was recorded.
Two reasoning tasks were included: (1) The Map Planning Test from the Kit of FactorReferenced Cognitive Tests (Ekstrom et al., 1976), consists of a grid on which participants had to
start at one point and end at another. However, there are blocked paths, making the connections
challenging. Each correct path involves passing the side of one numbered building, which
participants recorded. There were a total of 10 trials for each of two grids (20 for the entire task).
The time limit was 3 minutes. (2) Nonsense Syllogisms Test (Ekstrom et al., 1976). This 4minute task involves 15 items each including two statements and a conclusion. The task is to
determine if the conclusion was good or poor reasoning. Correct responses were summed to
compute a final score (out of 15 points).
Procedure
Participants were tested in small groups. After signing a consent form, folders were
distributed to participants containing all materials to be completed. Two different orders of
materials were used. The first order was: Symbols Test, Map Planning Test, Nonsense
Syllogisms Test, Cartoon Task, CRT, Self-Perception Scale (a rating of self-control),
Interpersonal Situations Scale (containing the Emotional Support and Conflict management
subscales), REI, and then the Demographics Sheet. The second order was as follows:
Demographics Sheet, Self-Perception Scale, Interpersonal Situations Scale, REI, Symbols Test,
Rational and Experiential Processing 10
Map Planning Test, Nonsense Syllogisms Test, Cartoon Task, and then the CRT. Students were
instructed when to pause between materials because some were timed while other questionnaires
were not. When the participants were finished, they were told to contact the experimenter if they
had any questions or wanted more information about the study and the results. The total duration
for each session was approximately 40 minutes.
Results
Reliabilities
Cronbach’s alpha was used to estimate the internal consistency reliabilities of the scales.
Most of the reliabilities were greater than .70, except for the Nonsense Syllogisms Test, Symbols
Test, CRT, and the four subscales of the Cartoons Task. All of the reliability estimates are
displayed in Table 1, which also includes descriptive statistics by gender.
Order Effects
Independent sample t-tests were used to assess order effects (see Table 2). Significant
order effects were found on several measures. Scores were higher for participants who completed
the questionnaires before the tasks for the SPS. Also, for the Emotional Support subscale of the
ISS, scores were higher for those participants who completed the questionnaires first.
Order effects were also detected for the Cartoons task; participants scored higher when
they completed the questionnaires before the tasks. Three of the four subscales also showed
order effects. Participants scored higher when they completed the questionnaires first than the
tasks first for the Cleverness subscale. Moreover, participants scored higher on the Humor
subscale when they completed the questionnaires before the tasks. Lastly, participants scored
higher on the Appropriateness subscale when they completed the questionnaires first instead of
completing the tasks first. No order effects were found for Originality.
Rational and Experiential Processing 11
Gender Differences
Independent sample t-tests revealed significant gender differences on four measures (see
Table 1). On the Rational composite, both of the Rational subscales (Engagement and Ability),
and the CRT, men scored higher than women.
Correlational Analyses
The correlational analyses provided partial support for Hypothesis 1 (see Table 3). As
predicted, scores on the REI Rational composite correlated significantly (p < .05) and positively
with GPA, SAT, and ACT, as well as with CRT and Self-control scores. However, Rational
scores also correlated positively with scores on the Conflict Management subscale of the ISS,
and with the Cartoon Task subscales. Specifically, Rational scores were positively related to
Originality, Cleverness, Humor, and Appropriateness.
Patterns of correlations of the REI subscales, Rational Engagement and Rational Ability,
were similar to those reported for the Rational composite. Both subscales correlated positively
with both SAT and ACT scores. They were also positively related with CRT scores and Conflict
Management. However, only Ability correlated with Self-Control scores. Scores on the Cartoon
task were also associated with each subscale. Specifically, they were positively related to
Originality, Cleverness, and Humor. However, Appropriateness was correlated only with the
Engagement subscale.
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the Experiential composite correlated positively with both
the Conflict Management and Emotional Support subscales of the ISS and negatively with GPA
and Nonsense Syllogism scores. Similarly, the Experiential Engagement subscale was negatively
related to GPA, and Experiential Ability and CRT scores were negatively correlated.
Experiential Ability correlated positively with Emotional Support. However, Engagement
Rational and Experiential Processing 12
correlated with both Emotional Support and Conflict Management. Ability, but not Engagement,
was negatively related to Nonsense Syllogism scores as well. Engagement correlated with the
Appropriateness subscale of the Cartoons task, but there were no other significant correlations
for this scale. Finally, correlations involving measures other than the REI are presented in Table
3.
REI Group Analyses
To increase the sensitivity of the analyses to individual differences in rational and
experiential processing, median splits on the REI composite scales were used to create two
subsets of participants: high experiential/low rational (N = 25) and high rational/low experiential
(N = 21). These groups were then compared on all of the study’s measures using independent
samples t-tests. Participants who scored either high on both scales or low on both scales were
excluded from analyses (N = 29). The rational group had significantly (p < .05) higher GPAs,
reported higher ACT scores, and had higher CRT scores than the experiential group (see Table
4).
A marginally significant difference (p < .10) was found for total scores on the Cartoon
task, where rational participants scored higher than the experiential participants. Marginally
significant differences were found as well for three of the four subscales on the Cartoon task.
Specifically, the rational group scored higher than the experiential group on Originality,
Cleverness, and Humor. There was no significant difference for Appropriateness.
Table 5 reports the distribution of information processing styles by academic major,
which were categorized as follows: Education, Humanities, Natural Sciences, Social Sciences,
and Undeclared. All major types had more experiential processors than rational except for
Rational and Experiential Processing 13
Natural Sciences, which had more rational processors than experiential (see Table 5). Because of
the small number of non-Social Sciences majors, statistical tests were not performed.
Discriminant Function Analysis
Finally, discriminant function analysis assessed the collective accuracy of the predictor
variables at classifying members of the rational and experiential subgroups, and the contributions
of individual predictors to the classification. The single discriminant function correctly classified
89.5% (17 of 19 participants) of the experiential group members, but was somewhat less accurate
at identifying rational group members, 78.9%, (15 of 19 participants). Significant (p < .05)
contributors to classification accuracy were made by (in descending magnitude) Cognitive
Reflection Test scores, ACT scores, and Grade Point Average. For this collection of measures,
this is consistent with the Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory where Pacini and Epstein (1999)
concluded that reasoning ability and academic skills distinguished rational from experiential
thinking styles.
Discussion
This study was designed to identify personality and ability variables that discriminate
between rational and experiential information processing styles. It was hypothesized that rational
processing would be closely linked to academic achievement, reasoning, planning, and self
control. Additionally, experiential processing was hypothesized to be more associated with
emotionality and creativity. These hypotheses were derived from Epstein and Pacini’s
characterization of the two types of thinking. In their research, rational processing correlated
with (non)-neuroticism, conscientiousness, ego strength, and positive beliefs about the world.
Experientiality was associated with positive relationship beliefs, extraversion, and emotional
expressivity (Pacini & Epstein, 1999).
Rational and Experiential Processing 14
In the current study, rationality correlated positively with the academic measures of
SAT/ACT scores and GPA, and with CRT scores, self-control, conflict management, and
creativity. The correlations between SAT/ACT scores, GPA, and CRT scores confirm the
hypotheses concerning rationality, and confirm Pacini and Epstein’s work (1999). However, it
was predicted that conflict management and creativity would be more strongly associated with
experientiality. Perhaps since conflict management involves reasoning through problems, this is
why it was correlated with rational processing as opposed to experiential processing. The
independent samples t-tests confirmed these results. However, t-tests concerning REI groups and
creativity were only marginally significant.
Similar to the research of Pacini and Epstein (1999), experiential processing correlated
positively with emotional support and conflict management, but correlated negatively with GPA
and Nonsense Syllogisms (reasoning ability). This is consistent with the hypotheses of this study.
Comparisons of the two groups on emotional support, conflict management, and Nonsense
Syllogisms were not significant. This indicates that while experiential processing is correlated
with these variables, experiential processors do not perform significantly higher on these than do
rational processors.
Map Planning and Symbols did not discriminate significantly between the two groups
although Map Planning scores were higher for rational processing than experiential processing,
which is consistent with the hypothesis. However, in contrast to the hypotheses, rational
processors scored higher than experiential processors on the Symbols test, a creativity task.
It was concluded that since rational processors scored higher than experiential processors
on a majority of the measures, perhaps the rational-type is associated with better strategy in test
taking, independent of the type of test. This may be due to rational thinkers’ reliance on
Rational and Experiential Processing 15
elemental views of situations as opposed to experiential thinkers’ more holistic approach
(Epstein & Pacini, 1999). Therefore, it is possible that rational processors were more carefully
examining each measure and each question in each measure, whereas experiential processors’
goal was simply to complete the experiment. Moreover, experientiality is associated with the use
of heuristics. Perhaps the measures used in this study are performed more successfully without
the use of heuristics (Epstein et al., 1996). Specifically, using heuristics on the CRT led to lower
scores on this measure. Lastly, the measures seemed more related to formal education-type tasks
than real-world experience, giving the rational type an advantage (Epstein, 1994).
The discriminant function analysis revealed that three measures discriminated
significantly between the two types of processing. These included the CRT, GPA, and
standardized test scores. Interestingly, while many tasks and questionnaires were used in this
study, the only measures that accurately grouped participants into the two types of processing
included a three item task and two self-reported measures.
The gender differences were comparable to those reported by Pacini and Epstein (1999).
In particular, males scored significantly higher on the rational scales than did females. Also,
females scored higher on the experiential scale than did males, except on experiential ability.
This may be explained by the stereotype that females tend to be more emotionally-inclined than
males. Due to the fact that this stereotype is well-known in society, females may feel the need to
fulfill this expectation (Epstein et al., 1996). Furthermore, the connection to emotion may be
associated with women following their intuitions rather than reason.
Two orders of measures were used to detect order effects. Unfortunately, multiple order
effects existed. Specifically, those who completed the questionnaires before the cognitive tasks
scored higher than those who completed the tasks first on the following measures: Self-Control,
Rational and Experiential Processing 16
Emotional Support, and Cartoons. One possible cause of these effects is practice. Perhaps filling
out questionnaires first allowed participants to adjust to the testing environment before
completing the tasks and in effect enabled them to “warm up” their thinking skills.
There were several limitations of this study. To gain a better understanding of differences
between rational and experiential processors, a larger, more diverse sample of adults should be
tested. Furthermore, non-students should have been included as well. Secondly, perhaps
measures other than self-report should be used to assess academic achievement. While selfreports are usually quite accurate for academic facts, academic tasks could have confirmed
achievement in case participants were inaccurate in their GPA and score estimates.
Another improvement to this study would be to incorporate a more psychometricallysound creativity task. Scoring for the Cartoons task is very subjective. Additionally, the Cartoons
task is a relatively new measure and has yet to be validated. Perhaps this measure would be a
better creativity measure to use after it has been refined. In the meantime, another creativity
measure should be utilized.
While each processing style has its own strengths and weaknesses, one is not superior to
the other. Awareness of the differences between rational and experiential processing is important
to everyday interactions. It allows humans to explain the reasons behind an endless list of
actions. Furthermore, it permits researchers to determine how people may react in many
scenarios, whether the situation is academic, social, or involves creativity. Differences between
rational and experiential processing styles is a relatively unresearched topic in psychology.
Further research should be conducted to better understand these two styles. Possible areas of
interest include: adjustment, aggression, relationship success, and stress management. Though
many of the differences have yet to be examined, it is evident that rational and experiential styles
Rational and Experiential Processing 17
can determine many other personality characteristics. Only through establishing these differences
will researchers better understand how humans make decisions and interact with one another.
Rational and Experiential Processing 18
References
(2009). ACT-SAT Concordance. Retrieved March 18, 2009, from The ACT, Inc. Website:
http://www.act.org/aap/concordance/.
Buhrmaster, D., Furman, W., Wittenberg, M. T., & Reis, H. T. (1988). Five domains of
interpersonal competence in peer relationships. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 55, 991-1008.
Denes-Raj, V., & Epstein, S. (1994). Conflict between intuitive and rational processing: When
people behave against their better judgment. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 66, 819-829.
Ekstrom, R. B., French, J. W., Harman, H. H., & Dermen, D. (1976). Manual for kit of factorreferenced cognitive tests. Princeton, NJ: Educational Testing Service.
Epstein, S. (2008). Intuition in judgment and decision making. New York: Taylor and Francis
Group.
Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious. American
Psychologist, 49, 709-724.
Epstein, S. & Pacini, R. (1999). Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology. New York: The
Guilford Press.
Epstein, S., Pacini, R., Denes-Raj, V., & Heier, H. (1996). Individual differences in intuitiveexperiential and analytical-rational thinking styles. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 71, 390-405.
Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 19, 25–42.
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Goldberg, L. R., Johnson, J. A., Eber, H. W., Hogan, R., Ashton, M. C., Cloninger, C. R., &
Gough, H. C. (2006). The International Personality Item Pool and the future of publicdomain personality measures. Journal of Research in Personality, 40, 84-96.
Pacini, R., & Epstein, S. (1999). The relation of rational and experiential information processing
styles to personality, basic beliefs, and the ratio-bias phenomenon. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 76, 972-987.
Sternberg, R. J. (2006). The rainbow project: Enhancing the SAT through assessments of
analytical, practical, and creative skills. Intelligence, 34, 321-350. Rational and Experiential Processing 20
Appendix 1
Demographic Information
1. Gender (please circle):
Male
2. Race/Ethnicity (please circle):
White (Non-Hispanic)
American Indian or Alaska Native
Female
Black (Non-Hispanic)
Asian/Pacific Islander
Hispanic
3. Major: ____________________________________________________
4. Class Year: __________________
5. Cumulative GPA: _____________
6. Indicate your scores on the following standardized tests (if applicable):
Please breakdown each test score by section if possible (verbal, quantitative, etc.)
a. SAT score : ____________________________
b. ACT score: _____________________________
c. GRE (general) score: _____________________
Rational and Experiential Processing 21
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Reliability Measures
Subscale
GPA
SAT
Verbal
Quantitative
ACT Score
REI
Rational
Engagement
Ability
Experiential
Engagement
Ability
Cognitive Reflection
Self-Control
Interpersonal Situations
Emotional Support
Conflict Management
Symbols
Map Planning
Nonsense Syllogisms
Cartoon
Originality
Cleverness
Humor
Appropriateness
Mean
Male Female
3.08
3.12
1188.08 1172.97
633.33 676.67
663.33 633.33
25.96
25.41
Male
0.52
138.04
43.67
85.48
3.34
SD
Female
0.53
153.19
37.86
46.19
3.56
78.52
39.14
39.38
69.03
34.03
35.00
1.48
67.97
68.04
34.26
33.78
70.37
35.78
34.59
0.85
66.07
9.61
6.24
4.67
10.07
5.93
5.58
1.06
7.92
10.49
5.53
6.30
11.40
7.11
4.90
1.01
8.04
31.59
28.83
13.90
10.45
8.79
31.97
7.62
7.62
6.59
10.14
32.91
27.17
13.54
10.41
8.04
31.41
7.37
7.59
5.96
10.50
4.08
5.21
3.54
4.35
2.18
8.81
2.98
2.50
2.32
2.00
4.92
4.98
3.10
4.09
2.41
6.32
1.97
2.00
1.90
1.33
*. Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
**. Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
t
-0.30
0.40
-1.46
0.56
0.63
α
4.35**
3.54**
4.12**
-0.52
-1.10
0.34
2.60*
1.00
0.89
0.84
0.82
0.88
0.87
0.70
0.60
0.76
-1.21
1.38
0.46
0.04
1.36
0.32
0.44
0.07
1.28
-0.94
0.86
0.83
0.58
0.86
0.53
0.87
0.56
0.59
0.58
0.54
Rational and Experiential Processing 22
Table 2
Order Effects for (A) Tasks First and (B) Questionnaires First
Mean
Subscale
A
B
GPA
3.14
3.06
SAT
1184.52 1174.06
Verbal
672.50 628.00
Quantitative
667.50 642.00
ACT Score
25.71
25.56
REI
Rational
69.89
74.24
Engagement
34.81
37.45
Ability
35.08
36.79
Experiential
67.86
71.79
Engagement
33.92
36.26
Ability
33.95
35.53
Cognitive Reflection
1.19
1.00
Self-Control
64.24
69.29
Interpersonal Situations
Emotional Support
31.27
33.50
Conflict Management
27.11
28.50
Symbols
13.46
13.89
Map Planning
10.19
10.66
Nonsense Syllogisms
8.43
8.24
Cartoon
29.27
33.92
Originality
7.05
7.87
Cleverness
6.86
8.32
Humor
5.59
6.79
Appropriateness
9.76
10.95
*. Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
**. Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
SD
A
0.57
168.58
45.74
73.66
3.95
B
0.48
123.18
37.01
78.87
2.96
t
0.64
0.28
1.62
0.50
0.17
11.87
6.72
6.80
10.86
6.99
5.08
1.13
8.74
10.48
5.53
5.78
10.63
6.27
5.14
1.01
6.37
-1.68
-1.86
-1.17
-1.58
-1.53
-1.34
0.77
-2.86**
5.13
5.94
2.76
3.87
2.71
6.91
2.41
2.14
1.82
1.75
3.85
4.09
3.70
4.46
1.94
7.07
2.34
2.01
2.17
1.23
-2.13*
-1.19
-0.58
-0.49
0.36
-2.88**
-1.48
-3.03**
-2.58*
-3.41**
Rational and Experiential Processing 23
Table 3
Correlation Matrix for All Measures Used
Variable
1
1. GPA
2. SAT
3. Verbal
4. Quantitative
5. ACT Score
REI
6. Rational
7. Engagement
8. Ability
9. Experiential
10. Engagement
11. Ability
12. Cognitive Reflect.
13. Self-Control
Interpersonal Sit.
14. Emotion. Spprt.
15. Confl. Mngmnt.
16. Symbols
17. Map Planning
18. Nonsense Syll.
19. Cartoon
20. Originality
21. Cleverness
22. Humor
23. Appropriate.
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
-.25*
.15
.14
.42**
.50
-.08
.45**
.69*
.90**
.95**
.30
.27
.52
.23*
.22
.19
-.35**
-.26*
-.41**
.29*
.09
.33**
.29*
.28*
.05
.14
-.09
.50**
.03
-.35
.04
-.50
.15
.32
-.12
-.30
-.06
.34
.12
.39
-.02
-.16
.16
.09
-.21
.40**
.32*
.38**
-.03
.08
-.18
.55**
.08
.90**
.90**
-.12
-.13
-.08
.36**
.27*
.62**
-.11
-.07
-.15
.38**
.20
-.11
-.17
.00
.26*
.29*
.94**
.89**
-.19
.15
.68**
-.12
.12
-.09
-.05
.13
.04
.24*
.13
.15
.19
.13
-.03
-.17
.02
-.07
.39**
.34**
.12
.07
.15
.12
.09
.43
.46
-.13
.22
-.17
.08
.03
.29
-.01
-.05
.14
.12
.15
.60
-.24
-.26
-.30
-.02
-.45
-.01
-.23
.00
-.10
.39**
.38**
.16
.12
.18
.14
.11
.14
.36**
.04
.08
.11
.42**
.34**
.43**
.44**
.26*
.08
.38**
.13
.09
.13
.46**
.36**
.46**
.50**
.28*
.17
.27*
-.06
.06
.08
.30**
.26*
.32**
.29*
.19
.33**
.26*
-.02
-.12
-.25*
.06
-.03
.04
.08
.18
.32** .28*
-.21
.27*
.20
.09
.01
-.05
-.02
-.03
-.20
.28*
-.18
-.30** .48**
.16
-.07
.23
.06
-.14
.26*
.12
-.08
.19
.15
-.04
.21
.26*
.04
.11
*. Correlation significant at the .05 level (two-tailed).
**. Correlation significant at the .01 level (two-tailed).
13
14
.35**
.34** .42**
.14
.04
.04
-.02
-.13
-.24*
.17
.23*
.15
.18
.19
.27*
.04
.19
.22
.18
Rational and Experiential Processing 24
Table 3
Correlation Matrix for All Measures Used
Variable
16. Symbols
17. Map Planning
18. Nonsense Syllogisms
19. Cartoon
20. Originality
21. Cleverness
22. Humor
23. Appropriateness
15
16
.16
.03
-.02
.17
.13
.21
.10
.16
.11
.03
.10
.09
.10
.07
.07
17
18
.09
.19
.03
.08
.09
.17
.05
.18
.06
.28* -.14
19
20
21
22
.88**
.96**
.90**
.76**
.82**
.73**
.49**
.85**
.71**
.59**
*. Correlation significant at the .05 level (two-tailed).
**. Correlation significant at the .01 level (two-tailed)
23
Rational and Experiential Processing 25
Table 4
REI Group Analyses
Subscale
GPA
SAT
Verbal
Quantitative
ACT Score
REI
Rational
Engagement
Ability
Experiential
Engagement
Ability
Cognitive Reflection
Self-Control
Interpersonal Situations
Emotional Support
Conflict Management
Symbols
Map Planning
Nonsense Syllogisms
Cartoon
Originality
Cleverness
Humor
Appropriateness
Mean
Ration. Exper.
3.36
2.84
1246.32 1178.95
656.67 690.00
660.00 620.00
27.58
25.26
SD
Ration. Exper.
0.49
0.47
114.22 148.51
40.42
42.43
100.00
56.57
2.85
3.05
t
-3.63**
-1.57
0.89
-0.50
-2.42*
80.81
40.43
40.38
61.33
30.52
30.81
1.71
67.71
63.60
32.08
31.52
76.92
39.68
37.24
0.68
66.12
7.08
4.59
3.72
6.49
4.41
3.74
1.06
8.33
7.12
5.42
4.37
5.48
3.64
3.17
0.75
7.05
-8.18**
-5.58**
-7.32**
8.83**
7.72**
6.32**
-3.88**
-0.70
31.00
27.29
13.52
12.19
9.00
33.81
8.00
8.29
6.76
10.76
33.20
27.72
12.80
10.12
8.16
29.92
6.84
7.08
5.76
10.24
5.10
5.06
2.69
4.33
2.77
7.90
2.74
2.33
2.12
1.41
3.40
4.95
3.16
4.34
2.12
5.49
1.77
1.85
1.45
1.42
1.75
0.29
-0.83
-1.61
-1.16
-1.96
-1.73
-1.96
-1.90
-1.24
*. Significant at the 0.05 level.
**. Significant at the 0.01 level.
Rational and Experiential Processing 26
Table 5
Crosstabs of Processing-Type by Major-Type
Major Type
Education
Humanities
Natural Sciences
Social Sciences
Undeclared
Total
Rational
1
3
5
11
1
21
Experiential
2
5
1
14
3
25