Religious Research Association, Inc.
Rationality, Choice, and the Religious Economy: Individual and Collective Rationality in
Supply and Demand
Author(s): Carl L. Bankston III
Source: Review of Religious Research, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Dec., 2003), pp. 155-171
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RATIONALITY, CHOICE, AND THE RELIGIOUS ECONOMY:
INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RATIONALITY
IN SUPPLY AND DEMAND
CARLL. BANKSTON III
TULANEUNIVERSITY
REVIEWOF RELIGIOUSRESEARCH,2003, VOLUME45:2, PAGES 155-171
One of the most useful contributionsof rational choice theories to the sociology of
religion has been the concept of the religious economy.However,this study argues
that the rationalchoice view of the religiouseconomystill suffersfrom serious shortcomings. Here, I argue that the concept of rationality in economic action is more
complex than rational choice theoristsgenerally recognize.Part of this complexity
involves the multi-dimensionalnatureof the concept and part of it involves thefact
that degrees of rationalityin individualactions mustbe understoodin relationto collective actions and contexts. One of the consequencesof the underdevelopedunderstanding of rationality is that theorists have tended to gloss over the processes by
which individualsand groups makedecisions that create demandsfor specific types
of religiousgoods. I attemptto approachtheseproblemby describingthe dimensions
of rationality,by describing the relationsbetween rationalityat the individuallevel
and at aggregate levels, and byprovidinga schematizationto suggest how supplyof
religious goods and demandfor them interactat individualand collective levels.
he rationalchoice approachto religion has become increasinglyinfluentialover the
courseof the past decade,andit has been a sourceof substantialcontroversy(Sherkat
and Ellison 1999; Williams 2000). Perhaps the most useful contribution of this
approachto the study of religion has been the idea of the religious economy, an idea that
has providedthe basis for a "newparadigm"in the sociology of religion (Iannaccone1992;
Warner1993). While the rationalchoice idea of the religious economy has made valuable
contributionsto the sociology of religion, the notion of rationalityemployed by its proponents is still theoretically under-developedand it is generally used with little precision.
Closer analysis of this notion can yield a bettermodel of how religion can be said to function as an economy,andit can demonstratemore clearlyhow an economic perspectivemay
explain religious behaviorwithoutimputinga uniformrationalityto all action.
Rationalchoice theory,also called rationalaction theory,is a theoreticalmodel developed to account for the ways in which the actions of individuals yield aggregate consequences(Coleman1990;ColemanandFarraro1992;Hedstr6m1993;HechterandKanazawa
1997; Zafirovsky 1999). In this essay, I will concentrateon two fundamentalproblemsfor
rationalchoice views of religion thatareimplicitin this theoreticalmodel. First,if one says
thatreligious, beliefs, actions, and associationsare consequencesof the rationalchoices of
individuals,one must define rationalityclearly,in a mannerthatis not tautologousand that
takes into considerationthe varyinguses of the term. Second, one needs to be clear about
the connectionbetweenindividualchoices and aggregatesocial phenomena.Religion, like
other institutions,does not simply involve individualsmaking choices among a range of
rT
155
Review of Religious Research
commodities.It entailsindividualsbecomingpartsof social aggregatesthathave goals and
internalpatternsof organizationof theirown andthatshapeboth the choices and the goals
of the individuals.Therefore,afterI examinethe conceptof rationalityand attemptto present a plausible definition,I considerhow rationalityand the individuallevel may be connectedto rationalityas a collectivephenomenon.Finally,I attemptto makeclearthe relevance
of my re-conceptualizationby discussing how rationality,as I have defined it at both the
individualand the collective levels, may be relatedto the idea of the religious economy.
RATIONALITY DEFINED: A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL CONCEPT
Rational choice explanationsof religion often tend to offer ratherbrief definitions of
rationality.This is troublingbecause the term is one that is often used in differentways,
althoughin ways thatare generallyrelated.One of the most fundamentalcharacteristicsof
rationalityis its teleologicalor goal-orientedcharacter.Traditionalismin the Weberiansense
is not rational,in partbecause traditionalways of thinkingand behaving are producedby
patternsreceivedfrom the past, ratherthanby considerationof goals (Weber[1922] 1978).
Along these lines, Sherkat(1998) has found that traditionalsocializationfactors are predominantinfluences on contemporaryreligious beliefs and practices.
The teleologicalcharacterof rationalityis the traitmost often identifiedby rationalchoice
theoristsof religion (Boudon 1998) and it is often takenby these theoristsas the defining,
or even the only trait.StarkandBainbridge(1987:113)proclaimthat"rationalityis marked
by consistentgoal-orientedactivity."While socializationis undoubtedlyan importantinfluence on religious attachments,these attachmentscannotbe reducedto socializationalone.
Explaininghumanphenomena,includingreligion, as orientedtowardgoals can be seen as
a useful responseto whatWrong(1961) has termedthe "oversocialized"conceptof human
nature,and it makes the valid point that, whateverone's ultimateposition on freedom of
will, in practicaltermswe cannoteffectivelyunderstandhumanactionsby portrayinghuman
beings as automata,since this would make it extremelydifficult to accountfor changes in
individualand collective behavior(Spickard1998).
A second trait,an orderedprocedurefor obtainingthe end, is implicit in the intentionality of rationality.An algorithm,a form of logic has to guide an actor or decision-maker
to the goal. Syllogistic reasoning is the classic form of logic, but contemporaryrational
choice theoristsaremore likely to emphasizethe cost-benefitanalysis, which incorporates
syllogistic reasoningto comparethe efficiency of means in achieving ends.
If (a,-E) representsa numericalvalue of a strengthof the relationshipbetween a given
act anda desiredend (the syllogisticconnectionof the two), thenwe can qualifythis numerical value by dividing it by the cost (in effort or foregone opportunities)of the act. Since,
undermost situations,a desiredend can be achievedby means otherthan a, (a2,a3,a4 ...),
we need to comparemeansof achievinggoals to one another,with the value of each meansgoal associationqualifiedby the costs of the means.
Equation1.
(al-E)/c(al)_
n
E(aiE)/c(a)
(i=l)
156
Rationality,Choice, and the Religious Economy
When a, yields a greatervalue in this equation than any alternative,then the greatest
gain has been achieved at the least cost, an outcome frequentlyidentified with rationality
(Becker 1975; 1976; 1996; ColemanandFarraro1992). If the possible rangeof acts is constrainedby imperfect informationor understanding(as De Palma, Myers, and Papageorgiou 1994 have found), then this model can still work within the specified constraints:the
numberand identity of ai will simply be limited (Bohman 1992). Indeed, since rational
choice theory specifies thatindividualactions vary because of differingopportunitystructures (Coleman 1993), we can classify limitationsof informationas partof any available
opportunitystructure.More seriously, in actual outcomes, the maximum possible value
yielded by the equationcannotbe identified, eitherby actorsor observers,and actors will
often settlefor less thanoptimization.For this reason,manyrationalchoice theorists,including rationalchoice theoristsof religion (Starkand Finke 2000), have leaned towardHerbert Simon's (1957) versions of means-end associations. In one version, Simon suggests
thatactorsengage in "satisficing"ratherthanmaximizingoutcomes.The problemwith this
suggestionis thatany subjectivelyacceptableresultcan be said to "satisfice,"meaningthat
all goal-relatedbehaviorcan be seen as equally rational,regardlessof the amountor effectiveness of calculationinvolved. Rationalitythen contains only two values, "0" and "1,"
andfor those who explainall humanbehaviorin termsof goals, the second value is extended to all cases. In anotherversion,preferredby Starkand Finke (2000), Simon (1957) suggested thatindividualsengage in "subjectiverationality."Once again,however,this seems
to reduce all action to a dichotomousmeasureof rationality,on which actions all tend to
receive the same value.
Reactingto earlierperspectivesthatcharacterizedreligion as irrational,comparedto science or otherendeavors,Starkand Bainbridge(1985; 1987), Starkand Finke (2000), and
Stark(1996) portrayreligion as just as rationalas these other endeavors.Further,all religious commitments and behaviors are presentedas possessing the quality of rationality,
including extreme acts of asceticism and martyrdom(see, particularly,Stark 1996). As
Boudon (1998) has remarked,one way in which rational choice theorists can deal with
behavioris by positinga deeperlevel of instrumentalism.
This,
apparentlynon-instrumental
however,raises as many difficulties as it solves.
There is something unsettling about a model of rationality that implicitly places the
SummaTheologica of St. ThomasAcquinas on a par with the pillar-sittingof St. Simeon
Stylites.Further,a theorythatessentiallydevelops a dichotomousvariableand then assigns
all cases a value of "1" does not lend itself to any kind of verification.In orderto meaningfully thinkof religious behavioras rational,then, a theoristmust admit some degree of
non-rationalityinto the evaluationof the behavior.The act in which an individualengages
may have a value lower thanthe highest value yielded by the equationabove. This may be
because traditionoutweighs calculationin the choice of behavior,or because the behavior
is not determinedby calculationat all, but by emotion (Scheff 1992).
One can see a given act or belief as "rational,"then, to the extentthatit is characterized
by conscious choice to achieve a goal (as opposed to acceptanceof tradition)and to the
extent that the act or belief involves systematic calculation to achieve the goal. Readers
may note, though,thatthese firsttwo dimensionsinvolve actionsor beliefs directedtoward
single goals. All individuals,though,have multiplegoals. They desirematerialgoods, social
status,and even benefits that "areso beyond direct,this-worldlysatisfactionthat only the
gods can provide them"(Starkand Bainbridge1985).
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Review of Religious Research
Heath (1976:79) makes a simplistic and erroneousclaim when he states that "rationality has nothingto do with ... goals."This overlooksthe fact thatgoals rarely,if ever, stand
in isolation from othergoals. Every end is connectedto otherends, and these may be consistent or inconsistent.The rationalityof an end, then, is the degree to which it contributes
to otherdesiredends. It follows thatto determinethe rationalityof an individual'sbehavior, we need to know not only the strengthof the relationshipbetween a specific act and a
specific end, but also the strengthof the relationshipbetween that end and otherends.
Since individualsdesire multiple ends, they may desire ends that are inconsistentwith
each other.Piker(1972) offers an interestingexampleof the problemof consistencyin Thai
religion. The Buddhistbelief in Kamma(Karma,in Sanskit),in which one receives good
or evil as a consequenceof good or bad actions, seems to contradictthe widespreadbelief
in magically efficacious amuletsamongThai Buddhists.We might note, though,thatthese
believersattemptto rationalizetheirbeliefs; they attemptto come up with explanationsthat
makeapparentlycontradictorybeliefs consistent.Piker(1972:24) suggeststhatthese uneasily juggled articlesof faith shouldbe understoodin termsof coherence,definedas "theconviction-however arrivedat, however supported-that one's guidingbeliefs aretrue,"but
consistency is still a problemto the extent that adherentsconsciously considertheirvarying beliefs. When Piker asked Thai Buddhistsaboutmagic and moral causation,they did
not simply shrugoff his questions.Instead,they attemptedto make theirbeliefs "rational"
by creatinglines of reasoningaimed at consistency.
One continuing problem of multiple goals is that short-termgoals may conflict with
long-termgoals. The short-termrationalityof smoking a cigaretteto satisfy a cravingfor
nicotine generallyhas a negative relationshipto the long-termgoal of avoiding an agonizing death from lung cancer (see Ainslie 1975). In religion, even more enticing physical
pleasuresthan smoking may endangeropportunitiesfor salvation.
I am arguing,then, thatrationalityconsists of at least threemajordimensions:teleology, systematizationof means,andconsistencyamonggoals. On all threedimensions,human
actions can be interpretedin terms of degrees. Thoughts and behavior may be directed
towardachieving goals, but they are also productsof socialization. Calculationaimed at
goals is generally presentin human affairs,but it an be lessened by lack of clarity about
ends, emotional excitement, and other influences. Individualswill hold some goals that
contradictothers.
I will arguebelow thatrecognizingthe multi-dimensionalcharacterof rationalitydoes
not underminethe primaryargumentsof the religious economy model. On the contrary,it
providesa basis for pointingout the similaritiesbetweenreligious goods and othersortsof
goods. Purchasesof commoditiescan involve habit,impulsebuying,andconflictingdesires.
However, neitherreligion nor the social venues customarilythoughtof as marketscan be
understoodby referenceto individualprocesses alone. Understandingthe role of rational
choice in religion necessitates a considerationof the connection between individual and
collective rationality.
INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RATIONALITY
At the aggregateas well as at the individuallevel, social behaviorcan possess degrees
of rationalityon all threedimensions.Although structural-functionalist
thought,following
Parsons (1949), tends to present all social structuresas goal-oriented,social phenomena
can be consciouslydirectedtowardachievinggoals to differentdegrees.For example,Cole158
Rationality,Choice, and the Religious Economy
man (1993:7) maintainedthatmodernsocieties had undergonea rationalization,which he
describedas a shift away from primordialsocial organization,built chiefly on the inherited institutionof the family, and toward"purposivelyconstructedcorporateactors."
Althoughit may be maintainedthatreligiousorganizationsin generalareorientedtoward
goals, such as obtainingthe favor of the gods or salvationfor adherents,they differ in the
extent to which they are purposivelyconstructed.The intentionaldecision to form a religious community, for example, is one of the characteristicsthat Warner(1994; 1998a;
1998b) has described as the "de facto congregationalism"of many immigrantreligious
groupsin the United States.In the home countriesof many immigrants,accordingto Warner, religious groupingswere often based on place of residence or historicalheritage.
One of the interesting implications of acknowledging intentional purposiveness as a
dimension of collective as well as individual rationalityis the implication, found in the
above-cited works of Warner,that complex, urbansocieties can be both more rationalon
this dimensionand more religious thanruralsocieties. The conscious constructionof religious groups and organizationsfor sharedends can intensify commitmentand participation, a point thatis consistentwith the findingsof Finke and Stark(1988) andFinke, Guest,
and Stark(1996).
Aggregated social behavior can also possess degrees of systematic processes of optimizationof goal achievement,in the sense of meansexplicitly organizedaccordingto rules
for the efficient realization of group outcomes. As Weber ([1922] 1978:987) observed,
"bureaucracyis the means of transformingsocial action into rationallyorganizedaction."
Coleman (1993), in the articlecited above, takes a Weberianview of the rationalizationof
society as systematization.To the extent thatsocial action is guided towardspecified ends
by well-defined and well-coordinatedsocial structures,we can considerthe action rationalized on the second dimension.
The less a social group is organizedtowardachieving clearly identified goals, the less
rationalit is. Traditionmay dominategroups,as well as individuals,to varyingdegrees. In
addition, there are clear aggregate equivalents to non-calculatedemotional reactions by
individuals.Scheff (1992:102)pointsout that"stockmarketpanics,famines,andwarsoften
begin with impulsive,unaware,and/orout of controlbehavior."Less catastrophicoutcomes,
such as unpredictablysky-rocketingdemandsfor scooters or furbiescan result from nonrationaltrendbehavior(Ormerod1998; Thaler 1991; 2000).
Collectiverationalitymay also be a matterof consistencyamongends. Groupsandorganizations, as well as individuals,often have multiplegoals and these goals are frequentlyin
conflict. This may be a particularlyimportantpoint in the sociology of religion because
religious organizationsare generallyjustified on the basis of their pursuitof supernatural
goals, but maintainingandpromotingorganizationstendsto committhem to seculargoals.
Thus, Spinoza, in an epistolary debate on the spiritualauthorityof the Catholic Church,
"readilygrantsthatit is singularlywell-organizedfor power and profit"(Israel2001:227).
Starkand Bainbridge(1985) have seen this tendency towardthe secularization(the pull
away from spiritualgoals) as a centralpartof the dynamicof religious organizations,since
this form of secularizationdrivesthe formationof new, highly committedreligious groups.
Multiple goals have also been a key issue in anotheruse of the word "secularization,"
in secularizationtheory,the view thatpluralisticsocieties, which incorporatenumerouscollective goals, tend to move away from religious belief. Berger (1969) in the past argued
that modernizationtended to lead to general secularization.More recently,Berger (1997)
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Review of Religious Research
has abandonedthis view, acknowledgingthe continuingprevalenceof religion in modern
societies. However, I think secularizationtheoristsmay have been correctin arguingthat
thereare many aspects of modernsociety thatare inconsistentwith collective supernatural
goals. The problemof secularizationtheorymay lie in the overly facile notion that growing inconsistency between secular and supernaturalgoals necessarily leads to the abandonmentof the latter.Instead, as I will arguein greaterdetail in looking at the religious
marketplace,inconsistencycan introducean elementof irrationalityinto the marketof ideas
thatcan actuallylead to proliferation.
If one can use the word "rational"in similar ways when talking about individual and
aggregatelevels, one must be carefulto avoid implying thatthese two levels arethe same.
While aggregatephenomenaemerge from the decisions of individuals,the rationalchoices of individualsdo not necessarilyresultin the rationalorganizationof groupsor societies.
Just as individualbehaviorcan be rationalin the shortrun and irrationalin the long run,
behaviorcan be rationalfor individualsand irrationalfor groups,in the sense thatimmediate individualgoals may be at odds with sharedgoals. Frank(1999) has discussed how
individualeffortsto maximizecompetitivenessin thejob marketcan shiftfundsfrominvestment to consumptionand diminishultimatecollective productivity.
We can, in general,representthe relationshipbetween cumulativeindividualdecisions
and collective outcomes as:
Equation2.
(al-E)/c(al)
(al-E)/c(al)
+
(al-E)/c(al)
...
+
n
E(a,E)/c(a,)
n
E(ajE)/c(a,)
(i=l)
(i=l)
Ec
n
E(aE)/c(a)
(i=l)
whereEcrepresentsthe collective outcome, andthe ratiosrepresentthe rationalityvalue of
each individualdecision.Now, it is possiblethatEccan have a high value (i.e., a high degree
of desirabilityas a goal), even when the sum of the individual-levelratiosis low. Individuals can be socialized to sacrifice their own interestsfor the common good, for example.
Further,widespreadacceptance of religious authorityon the basis of traditionalone can
conceivably contributeto social order.It is also possible that the sum of individual-level
ratios can be high, while Ec is low. This would be the case when the pursuitof individual
goals is at variancewith a collective goal.
Withregardto rationalchoice theoriesof religion, this means thatreligious choices can
be collectively irrational(i.e., inconsistent with desired outcomes) even if they are individuallyrational,as well as individuallyirrational(or non-rational)andcollectively rational. Even if Christianitycontributedto the goals of individuals(as Stark 1996, maintains),
we can still see it as destructiveto Roman society, a la EdwardGibbon.While many contemporaryhistorianswould be reluctantto see the RomanEmpire"falling"due to the triumphof Christianityandbarbarism,it is still plausibleto interpretthe spreadof Christianity
as part of a ruling class withdrawalfrom the civic and familial obligations of public life
(Brown 1988). Whetherwe see a particularreligious phenomenonas rationalor not, then,
depends on whetherwe are seeing it in terms of individualor collective goals and on the
associationbetween individualand collective goals in a specific situation.
160
Rationality,Choice, and the Religious Economy
Both aggregategoals and individualpursuitsof ends are consequences of the ways in
which individualchoices affect and are affected by each other.The calculationsthat individuals make are based on the kinds of calculationsthey see othersmaking.Whateverthe
supernaturalor secular goal realization value of Christianity,for Romans or for Roman
society, as it became a more widespread religion and then the dominantreligion of the
empire,people in the Thirdand FourthCenturyMediterraneanworld became more likely
to choose Christianityas a solutionto theirsocial and spiritualproblems.In somewhatsimplified manner,this can be representedin the following terms:
Equation3.
(a,-E)/c(al)
(al-E)/c(al)
(al-E)/c(al)
-
n
E(arE)/c(ai)
(i-l)
n
a(a,E)/c(ao
(i=l)
E,Ec
'...
n
(arE)/c(a;)
(i=l)
The rationalizationof society,in the sense meantby Coleman(1993), can be understood
as the establishmentof a patternof correlationsamong individuals,so that the intentional
decision-makingof individualsincreasesin value, resultingin an overallorientationtoward
teleological behavior. Of course, the associations of individual decisions should not be
understoodas a linear chain, but as a structuredpattern.Moreover,the increasein rationality simply meansthatindividualdecisions are moreclosely linkedto the outcome.It does
not mean that the outcome is the best possible for the group. Coleman (1993) explicitly
suggestedthatfavorableoutcomesmay sometimesbe the consequencesof primordialsocial
organizations,characterizedby relatively low intentionality.
Further,the amountof variationin individualgoal-seeking can be connectedto collective ends. Heckathorn(1993) has arguedthatwithin-groupheterogeneitycan contributeto
collective action when the action's success is most problematic,such as when the temptation to free-ride is great or when the benefits of contributingare uncertain.Heckathorn
maintains,however,thatgroupheterogeneityimpedes collective action when social cooperationis least problematic.If we take groupheterogeneityto mean variationin interests
(goals), then we can see collective ends as relatedin varying ways to the standarddeviation in means-goalassociations,as well as to their sums. Thereis, then, yet anotherway in
which individualgoal-seeking may result in collective goals:
Equation4.
(al-E)/c(al)
(al E)/c(al)
o~a~~~~~"
'
n
n
E(a,E)/c(ai)
E(a-E)/c(ai)
(i=l)
(i=l)
(a,-E)/c(al)
-
Ec
n
E(a-E)/c(aj)
(i=l)
My discussion to this point suggests that the term "rationalchoice" is actually a much
more complex concept thanis generallyrecognized.I have arguedthatusing the termin a
161
Review of Religious Research
meaningfulfashionentailsrecognizingits multi-dimensionalcharacterandrecognizingthe
fact thatrationalityis a matterof degree on all dimensions.In addition,I have maintained
that rationalityis frequentlyused to describe both individual and aggregatephenomena.
Further,I have attemptedto show the variablenatureof the relationshipbetween individual decisions with degrees of rationalityand aggregateoutcomes. This is a criticalpoint,
since one of the goals of rationalchoice theoryis to explain how social aggregatesemerge
from individualdecisions. However, the issue of how and why the cumulation,organization, and heterogeneity of individual decisions vary in their associations with collective
outcomesremainsopen. In the following section,I will arguethatthe value of an economic
model of religious behavior does not lie in a tautologous assumptionthat all religion is
rational.Instead,I will arguethatan economic model can help us understandhow and why
the systematicintentionalityof individualdecisions is relatedto collective outcomesin differing ways in differentsituations.
RATIONALITY AND THE RELIGIOUS MARKET
The Problem of Contexts
The analysisof the concept of rationalitythatI have laid out above raises the following
questionsaboutrationalchoice in religion:In what ways do individualreligious decisions
vary in degrees of goal orientation,systematicmeans of achieving goals, and consistency
among goals? How are variationsamong individualdecisions relatedto aggregatedifferences in explicit goal attainmentas a basis for groupexistence, the organizationof groups
for the attainmentof ends, and to varietyamong goals? The first step to approachingthese
difficult questions involves recognizing how aggregateentities function as both contexts
and corporateactors and how individualactors operatewithin variouslevels of contexts.
A numberof authorshave recognizedthe importanceof seeing the rationalityof behavior in termsof social contexts (Ellison andSherkat1995; Granovetter1985; 1993; Sherkat
1997; Sherkatand Wilson 1995). More generally, Victor Nee (1998) has seen "contextboundrationality"as a key characteristicof whathe termsthe new institutionalismin socican providea usefulway of approaching
ology,andhis descriptionof thisnew institutionalism
the problemof rationalityin individualand collective life. As Nee and Ingram(1998) see
it, contexts are not imposed from withoutby a social structureexternalto the interactions
of individuals,but arise from those interactionsby means of norms.
One can createa frameworkfor thinkingabouteconomic behavior,and aboutreligions
as economies, by adaptinga version of Nee and Ingram's schematizationof contextual
embeddedness.I lay out this version of contextualeffects and actorsin Figure 1.
Since I will be discussingthis below in termsof an economy,I referto the broadestconceptual level as the marketenvironment. This level describes the macroeconomic and
macrosociologicalsetting of social behavior,within which both collective and individual
actors exist. It includes such features as technological capacities, the tools available for
social interaction;social and political structures,the institutionalframeworksfor social
exchanges;and stability,the conditionsthat shape expectationsaboutthe future.
The level of the marketenvironmentcan be illustratedby Stark's(1996) accountof the
spreadof early Christianity.Withoutthe technology of literacy and withoutthe roads and
Mediterraneanmaritimetransportation
connectingthe partsof the RomanEmpire,it is difficult to see how widespreadconversioncould take place or how some standardof orthodoxy could be established.In Stark'saccount,moreover,the sociopolitical system of the
162
Rationality,Choice, and the Religious Economy
Figure 1.
and
Actors
in the Production and Consumptionof Goods
of
Levels
Contexts
Conceptual
Contexts
Market Environment.
Technological Features
Large Scale Social/Political Structures
Market Stability
Formal Corporate Actors
Informal Social Groups
"
Actors
Individual Decisions
Empireplayed a criticalpartin the rise of Christianity,since the existence of relativelyprivileged social classes in cities provided a source of potentialconverts.Expectationsabout
the future,in the form of plagues and economic and political instability,also affectedreligious decisions.
Withinthis setting, formally organizedcorporateactorstook various shapes and made
and carriedout decisions. The Romanbureaucracycame into existence as an agent in the
context of the Empireand enactedpersecutionsor maintainedperiodsof relativetolerance.
The ChristianChurch,as an organization,graduallyemergedand became a partof life in
the Mediterraneanworld.
Formalorganizationsrespondedto a changing setting. The bureaucracyof the Empire
was madepossible by its political and social hierarchyandby the interconnectionsof communicationand transformation.This bureaucracymay have been re-shapedin the era of
Diocletian (245-313 C.E.) as a responseto changes in the economic and political environment of the Empire(Barnes1982;Williams, 1985). However,the functioningof the bureaucracy and otherpolitical structuresalso resultedfrom the interconnectionsof individuals,
from the kinds of personal and family ties that Coleman (1993) referredto in the article
discussed above.
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Review of Religious Research
Marketenvironmentsprovidecontextsfor formalorganizationsand those environments
areshapedby the actionsof formalorganizations.Similarly,organizationsarebothcontexts
for informalassociations of individualsand result from those informalassociations. The
structuresof the ChristianChurchemergedfrom contactsamong groupsof Christians,but
these structuresalso shapedinformalgroupconnections.It will be noted thatI have drawn
an arrow,also, frommarketenvironmentsto informalgroups.Interpersonalassociations,as
well as formalorganizations,dependon such generalenvironmentalfactorsas existingtechnologies of communication,sociopoliticalstructures,and influences on expectations.
Finally,informalassociationsbothprovidecontextsfor the decisions of individualsand
are derived from those decisions. Informalgroups also mediate all other levels of influences on individual decisions. If individuals perceive instability in an environment,for
example, they do so because of the informationthey receive from their social contacts.
Social class shapes decisions as a result of the experiences that people in differentsocial
classes have with otherhumanbeings. Organizationsinfluenceindividualsby shapinginteractions.When individualsmake decisions, the information,tastes, and understandingthat
make these decisions possible are all producedby specific social circumstances.Both formal organizationsand informal groups have dual characters.They are collective actors
becausethey have goals andmeansof achievinggoals thatariseout of individualdecisions,
and they are contexts because they provide settings for action.
This brief discussion has attemptedto provide some basis for an examinationof individual and collective choices of action and for the contextualinfluences on those choices,
while the precedingsections describedthe natureof rationalityin decision-making.Now,
in orderto investigatehow contextuallyshapeddecisions in religionmay be seen as rational choices, I will turnto a more explicit descriptionof how religion may be seen as economic behavior.
Religious Contextsand Actors as Economies: Supply and Demand
Structures
Sherkatand Ellison (1999) have observedthattheoristsof religion can be divided into
those who approachthe religiousmarketplacefromthe supplyside andthose who approach
it fromthe demandside.Takinga supplysideperspective,some of theforemostrationalchoice
theoristsof religionhave arguedthatthe deregulationof religionincreasesreligiousactivity
by increasingthe supply of religious goods (lannacone 1991, 1992; lannacone,Finke, and
Stark 1996). In the words of Starkand Finke (2000:193), "religiousdemandis very stable
A
over time and ... religiouschangeis largelythe productof supply-sidetransformations."
to
of
wide
of
can
demands
a
plurality religiousinstitutions,by providing
range choices, respond
for supernatural
goods in an efficient andmulti-facetedmanner.This supplyside view contrastswith the formulationsuggestedbut laterabandonedby PeterBerger,who maintained
that competitionunderminedreligions as sources of meaningby challenginginstitutional
claims to monopolisticcertainty.When therearemanyclaims to the truth,he argued(Berger 1968; 1969), no single claim can be convincingand all are weakened.
The supply-sidevs. demand-sidedebateis a centralone in economicsin general,as well
as in the economics of religion. Perhapsthe century's most influential economist, John
MaynardKeynes (1936) advocatedan economic policy centeredaroundconsumerdemand
as the drivingforce.Along similarlines, JohnKennethGalbraith(1958) observedthattechniques of productionin the economies of the West had outstrippeddistribution,resulting
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in an unprecedentedquantityof goods availablefor consumption,even thoughthe buying
power of individualsmight lag far behind this productivecapacity.
One can begin to think about the interconnectionsof supply and demandby recognizing thatdemandis a matterof makingchoices. Consumerswith finite resourcesfor acquiring goods choose among the goods available to them. This suggests that a purely supply
side approachto religiousactivitiesreallycannotalso be a rationalchoice approachbecause
the formerwould consideronly the availabilityof goods and not how people make choices among them.
In addition,an economic model of religion that looks only at supply tends to presenta
top-down perspective, in which individuals are chiefly passive recipients of collectively
createdgoods. This not only makesit difficultto examinehow individualsmaketheirchoices, it also drawsattentionaway from a centralgoal of rationalchoice theory:the explanation of how individualactions and decisions yield social aggregates.
Empirically,it would be hardto reconcile a constantdistributionof religious demand
with such occurrencesas the suddenpopularityin "bornagain"Christianityin the 1970s
and 1980s (Warner1993). Theoretically,demandcannot be stable if many of the predictors of demandareunstable.Choice in religiousactivityand expressionis widely acknowledged to be affectedby social class ( Demerath1965; Roof andMcKinney 1987; Starkand
Glock 1968), social mobility (Alston 1971; Lauer 1975; Nelsen and Snizek 1976 ), racial
or ethnic minority status (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi. 1975; Ellison and Sherkat 1995 ),
socializationby family andpeers (SherkatandWilson 1995) andindividuallife events (Ellison 1991; Stark1996; Wallace 1975). None of these influencesaredistributedin a constant
fashion across history or geography.
An account of religion as an economy, then, can not simply assume that choices will
automaticallyfollow goods that are somehow made available. Instead, such an account
must explainhow individualchoices both respondto contextsand createcontexts.One can
begin to do this by consideringhow individualsdecide what their wants are and how they
will satisfy these wants.
If we returnto Equation1, individualsdo act teleologically.They seek to achieve goals
and, generally,they seek to achieve these goals as efficiently as possible by choosing the
best possible means. The choice of the means is constrained,though,by both information
and socialization (Sherkatand Wilson 1995; Sherkat1998). Both informationand socialization are productsof social contacts. Since social contactsresult from the influences of
individualson one anotherthereis continualreciprocitybetweenindividualdecisions about
goals and the means of achieving goals and social constraints.
The social constraintsthat groups place on individualsmay vary.A primarysource of
variationin social constraintsis participationin multiple groups.It is a standardsociological axiom thatpluralisticsocieties presentindividualswith varied, sometimes contradictory ends and that individualsmust choose among those ends. The more an individualis
confrontedwith multiple groups,the less action is a matterof acceptanceof given means
and goals and the more action is a matterof conscious choice and calculation.Individual
choices, again, vary in rationality.
The fact that a multiplicity of ends tends to increase the systematic and teleological
character of social action means that there is a curious relation between the first two
dimensions of rationality (goal-orientation and systematic means of achievement)
and the third (consistency of goals). As possible goals increase in numberand in varia165
Review of Religious Research
tion, individuals are faced with choosing among ends and with rationalizing apparent
inconsistencies.
Choosing a desiredproduct(a goal) often entailschoosing a social group.Even material products,such as homes or automobiles,often establish group membership.For social
goods, such as clubs or churches,groupmembershipis generallyimplicitin the goods themselves. Becoming or remaininga Buddhist or a Mormonusually means associating with
Buddhistsor Mormons.Groupmembership,in turn,reinforcesthe kinds of goods that are
considereddesirableand helps to addressthe problemof inconsistencyraisedby a pluralistic society. SouthernBaptistsfaced with choosing between a belief in divine creationand
acceptanceof Darwinianevolutionmay find the problemat least partlyresolvedby the resolute faith of fellow church-goers.
Groupsreinforcereligious choices because religious goods, like virtuallyall products,
are createdby collaboration.People create religious goods; such as beliefs, services, and
practices;together.In this process of collaboration,they intensify the belief thatthe things
they createareto be valued and desiredandthey help to re-defineuniversalhumandesires
in termsof theirproducts.Religious preferencesare shapedand intensifiedthroughsocial
contactsin the processof consumptionof religiousgoods (Sherkat1997).All humanbeings
may well have desiresfor rewardsthatcannotbe suppliedby naturalisticmeans (Starkand
Bainbridge1985). However,it is only throughsocial participationin a particularcommunity of production and consumption that these become defined as desires for Christian
kerygma,BuddhistNirvana,or Muslim paradise.
As communitiesof religious productioncontinue in existence, they tend to be institutionalized.Norms become more explicitly formalizedas rules and social positions become
offices. This is a tendencyin any group,but is especially markedwhen the groupcomes to
include a largernumberof people than can maintainface-to-face contact.As the production of social goods increasesandpersonalinteractionsfeed demandfor those goods, small
firms become formalcorporateactorsand numbersof small firms mayjoin togetherwithin an emerging organizationalframework.Thus, after the death of the GautamaBuddha,
the Buddhist sangha began to take shape among groups of Indian monks and Buddhist
councils began to compose the Buddhistscripturesandto attemptto establishunified doctrines (Reat 1995; Skilton 1997).
The expansionand integrationof corporateactorsis frequentlyreferredto as rationalization. J.P.Morganand his business associates, for example, tendedto see themselves as
rationalizingAmericanbusinessby bringingdiversegroupswith diversegoals into an integratedcorporatestructure(Strouse 1999). This movement towardestablishingconsistency through the extension of formal corporatepower may be seen as a general trend of
businesshistoryin the United Statesthroughoutthe late nineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies (Chandler1970; Cochran1962; Sklar 1988). In religious history,we can see similar
movements towardrationalization.The ThirdBuddhistCouncil, convened at Pataliputra
about250 B.C.E. underthe EmperorAsoka, attemptedto rationalizeBuddhisminto a single corporateform (Reat 1995; Skilton 1997). The Council of Nicea, which openedin 325
C.E. underAsoka'sRomancounterpart,
Constantine,was partof an ongoing seriesof efforts
to establisha consistent,universalisticform of Christianity(Pelikan 1971).
Among religious firms as well as business firms, then, efforts at rationalizationtend to
reducevariationin goal-seekingamongandwithingroups.As variationwithingroupsorganized into formal corporatestructuresdecreases (that is, as the value of Equation4 goes
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Rationality,Choice, and the Religious Economy
down for groups in corporatestructures),competition among the formal structuresmay
decreasein intensityor the formalstructuresmay combinethroughmergers.In eithercase,
thereis a tendencytowardmonopolization.The post-WorldWarII homogenizationof American religion that Sherkat(2001:1485) refers to as "the heyday of the liberal Protestant
mainline"can be seen as trend towardreligious corporatizationand standardizationthat
mirroredsimilartrendsin the society at large.
Monopolies or quasi-monopoliesmay be helpful for the productionof a limited range
of existing types of commodities.Economies of scale can enable a large automobilemanufacturerto produceautomobilesor for a churchto producemasses. But therearealso problems with this kind of mass production.First, as Coleman (1993) observed in the article
discussed above, some kinds of productiveactivities are done betterby small groups,precisely because of the influence that the goal-seeking behaviorof individualshas on other
individuals.Second, innovationis often more difficult for rigid, highly formalized,rationalized corporateentities thanit is for people workingin the flexibility of informalgroups.
Therefore,wheneverthereis a demandfor productsthatrequirethe intensivecollaboration
of small groups,small firms, with an emphasison groupinteractionsratherthanon formal
organizationalstructure,tend to out-competethe largerfirms.
One can see two expressionsof rationalityin this consolidationvs. competitionmodel.
On the one hand,movementtowardmonopolizationcreatesgreateruniformityof goals and
systematicmeans of achieving goals. On the otherhand, this very uniformityand systematizationtends to limit the element of choice on the partof individual consumers.While
individualchoices, made in the context of groups,lead to the creationof formalcorporate
actors,aggregaterationalizationcan ultimatelyconstrainthe choices of individuals.There
is, then, a continualtension between the collective and individuallevels.
This patternfits ratherneatly with Starkand Bainbridge's(1985) cycle of secularization, revival, and religious innovation.Again, however, I do not thinkthat we can assume
stable demandfor religious goods, any more than we can for otherkinds of goods, given
the recognized variationin influences on demand.Most of those influences are mattersof
what I have termedthe "marketenvironment."Determinantsof religious mobility in the
United States, for example, have shifted in importanceover time with succeeding historical cohorts (Sherkat2001). Operatingwithin social groups,individualsdevelop and communicateto one anotherdemandsfor religiousgoods as a resultof the commonexperiences
of those individuals.lannaccone(1988) has proposedin a formalmodel thatsectarianreligions, with norms at odds with those of the largersociety, tend to appealto those with relatively low secularopportunities.When secularopportunitiesarediminishingor perceived
to be low, one may expect pluralisticchallenges to dominantreligions to take the form of
sectarianism.If, however,opportunitiesarerapidlychanging,this can createa differentsort
of demand,yielding differentsortsof religious suppliers.If it is truethatcults appealto the
relatively educated and privileged (Stark and Finke 2000), the demand for the kinds of
goods producedby cults will increasein times of economic expansionand social optimism
and producersof cult goods will flourishaccordingly.
In additionto economic fluctuations,political structuresare aspects of the marketenvironmentthat influence supply and demandfor religious goods throughformal corporate
actorsandthroughsocial groups.Centralizedor centralizingpolitical structuresoften favor
the developmentof monopolies, whetherof economic or religious goods. The de-regulation of firms, though,not only increasessuppliesof goods, it also increasesdemand.When
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formal corporateactorsand the informalgroupswithin them compete for customers,they
createcustomersthroughsalesmanship.Pluralism,then,can stimulateconsumerism,a widespreaddesire for the abundanceof goods that re-orients the goals of individuals within
social groups.
CONCLUSION
Rationalchoice theories of religion have fallen short of providingan adequatedefinition of rationality.A complex and multi-dimensionalconcept has been presentedas a relativelysimplematterof goal-seekingbehavior.Nevertheless,the economicmodelof religious
behaviorproposedby rationalchoice theoristsis an extremelyuseful one and considering
the kinds and degrees of rationalityinvolved in religious behaviorcan help us understand
how individualchoices create and respondto collective phenomena.
I have arguedthatrationalityshouldbe seen as a matterof goal-orientation,systematic
means of goal attainment,andconsistencyamonggoals. These arecharacteristicsthatexist
to differentdegreesin humanactivities,not qualitiesthatareeitherpresentor absent.Moreover, individualdecision making,characterizedby degrees of rationality,resultsin collective goal orientations, systematic means of collective goal attainment,and consistency
among collective goals. The ways in which the dimensions of individual rationalityare
related to each other and the ways in which individualrationalityis relatedto collective
processes and outcomes depend on specific circumstances.I have arguedthat these circumstancescan be understoodin termsof a market,with supply and demandmediatedby
conceptuallevels. While this supportsthe economic model of rationalchoice theoristsof
religion, it revises this model by placing more emphasison the role of demand,as well as
by offering a schematizationof how a multi-dimensionalrationalitymight functionat levels of contexts and actors.
Address Correspondenceto: Carl L. BankstonIII, Departmentof Sociology, 220 Newcomb Hall, TulaneUniversity,New Orleans,LA 70118. [email protected]
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