CONNECTING THE MISSING LINKS
The Geopolitical Dimension of the OBOR in South Asia
- Madhu Raman Acharya
China’s Silk Road initiative, commonly called as the One Belt One Road (OBOR), has attracted the interests
and captured the imagination of many in South Asia and elsewhere. This is seen in the many write ups and
discussions on the subject in recent times. The concept of the OBOR has brought up several new
opportunities in connectivity and economic integration between China and South Asia. It has also become a
matter of geopolitical significance to countries in South Asia, including to Nepal.
Though the term “Silk Road” actually appeared only in the late nineteenth century [1], the concept of
connectivity between China its surrounding areas originated two millennia ago. The trade routes flourished
between 2nd century BCE and the 15th century AD. The route was also a conduit for spread of Buddhism in
China’s western region. The importance of the Silk Road diminished due to invention of sea travel, in which
the British and the French attained superiority over the Chinese.
“Silk Road” was a name given to a collective network of routes that spread in various branches. It began
from the historic city of Xian, capital of Saanxi Province, and ended in Constantinople (Istanbul) in Turkey. It
crossed the Pamir Plateau and the Gobi Desert in the Central Asia. In the north the routes crossed extended to
the famous cities of Samarkand and Bukhara, now in Uzbekistan. In the south the routes started from
Lanzhou, now the capital of Gansu Province in northwest China, and reached Calcutta in India. Another
southern route travelled southwest from Kashgar to Xinjiang in China and then to Pakistan via the famous
Karakoram Mountains in the Hind-Kush Himalayas. It reached Taxila, now in Pakistan, and eventually to the
sea. One route started southward from Dunhunag to Tibet and crossed over to Nepal and then to India. Yet
another branch continued to Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Khorasan region of Iran, Mesopotamia (now in Iraq)
and into Anatolia in Turkey.
Under China’s Han Dynasty, General Zhang Qian had travelled across the continent (c. 138-125 BCE)
connecting smaller countries to China’s trade in the 2nd century BCE. It was in these routes that famous world
travelers like Fai-han (337-422 CE) and Huen Tsang (c. 602-664 CE) had travelled in the ancient times. There
are accounts of the travel of Atisha Dipankar (c.982-1054 CE), a Bengali Buddhist monk, to Tibet in the 11th
century via Nepal. Famous Venetian merchant Marco Polo (1254-1324) also travelled in this route.
The concept of OBOR includes the twin proposals including the New Silk Road Economic Belt and the
21st-Century Maritime Silk Road that China’s President Xi Jinping proposed in 2013 for connectivity in the
surface and ocean front respectively. The New Silk Road Economic Belt seeks to connect China through
overland to Europe. The Maritime Silk Road aims at reviving the traditional sea route between East China and
the Western Europe. It starts at Guangzhou in China and passes through Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean,
the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea, connecting to continental Europe
and Africa. It was part of the old Spice Route, where China had maritime connection for many centuries. It
was in this route that the Chinese Admiral Zhang He (1371-1437) is believed to have taken naval voyages to
Southeast, South and West Asia as well as Africa and to have visited the Indian Ocean with his naval fleet
seven times and erected a stone tablet in 1411 at Sri Lankan coastal town of Galle[2].
Map 1: Overland and Maritime Silk Routes (news.xinhuanet.com)
No comprehensive blueprint exists for the OBOR routes. In fact, there are several impressions and
interpretations of the route. Only available comprehensive map is the one published by the Chinese news
agency Xinhua (see Map 1), which is also incomplete, as it does not show overland routes connecting South
Asia. There are other impressions, which show Silk routes branching to South Asia (see Map 2).

Paper submitted to the seminar on “Belt and Road Initiative and South Asia” organized by the China Study Center and the
Nepal Institute for Strategic Studies on 28 April 2017 in Kathmandu
(1)
Map 2: An impression of the OBOR (www.css.ethz.ch)
An ambitious project
OBOR is an ambitious project. It is expected to connect China with Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, the
Middle East, and Europe- covering 65 countries with 4.4 billion people (two-thirds of the world’s population)
and $ 2 trillion GDP (nearly a third of the world). It involves a huge network of participating countries. Some
100 countries are believed to have expressed interest to be part of this scheme and some 40 countries have
already signed MoU with China in this regard. It requires huge investment, especially in the development of
connectivity and infrastructure. An estimated $8 trillion is required to be invested for infrastructure
development by 2020 and more thereafter. It is also expected to be a long drawn project. In fact, the Chinese
plan for the OBOR is expected to take up to 35 years and it might take lot more financial commitment than is
estimated at the moment. The OBOR is said to be the Chinese equivalent of the U.S. Marshal Plan, which
required heavy U.S. investment for rebuilding the post-World War Europe, ostensibly launched to check the
spread of the Soviet influence and communism in the continent. In fact, there is no equivalent endeavor to the
OBOR in its grandeur, perhaps except the Chinese Great Wall.
The OBOR project is linked with the famous “Chinese dream” formulated by President Xi Jinping and his
declaration for “rejuvenating the Chinese nation”. It also reflects China’s “grand diplomacy” in positioning
itself as the world’s superpower in the making and for transferring its surplus for investment in its sphere of
influence and expansion of market for its domestic enterprises. It is another way of demonstrating and sharing
its newfound global economic power. It largely aimed at countering the Western influence in its region and
part of China’s alternative worldview, such as through the establishment of the BRICS Bank (officially the New
Development Bank) and the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) as well as promotion of the a
more development-friendly “Beijing Consensus” in the place of the neoliberal “Washington Consensus”.
Through this proposal, China is hoping to revive its ancient global influence by way of sharing and integrating
its global economic prowess with the countries in the region.
The OBOR is also linked to China’s twin goals, including the centenary in 2021 of the founding of the
Communist Party of China in 1921 and the centenary in 2049 of the founding the People’s Republic in 1949.
China has pledged to double its 2010 GDP by 2021 in the first centenary. The second centenary is related to
building a prosperous, strong, culturally advanced, harmonious and modern socialist country by 2049. Both
grand proposals fit into the overarching strategy and objectives of the OBOR.
China has invested significant political, diplomatic, economic and technical resources for advancing the
OBOR initiative. China has signed MoU with many countries and engaged in many projects under this. China
has sponsored many think tank conferences and helped establish institutional set up to promote the OBOR in
the participating countries.
A vision for connectivity and economic integration
The OBOR initiative reflects China’s belief in inter-dependence and economic integration for a stable world
order. It seeks to develop harmonious relation with the participating countries through creating a mutual
stake in an integrated and prosperous region. It is an extension of China’s “peripheral diplomacy”, which
concerns about the simultaneous development of its neighbours and contiguous regions. It fits within China’s
declared policy of Panchsheel or the peaceful co-existence with its neighbours. It is a diplomatic initiative that
seeks to jumpstart a new mode of regional cooperation around China.
Among other things, China seeks to achieve five main objectives from the OBOR, including to: i) build
trust and develop good neighborliness, ii) work for win-win cooperation, iii) stand together and assist each
other, iv) enhance mutual understanding and friendship and v) stick to openness and inclusiveness. The
OBOR seeks to achieving economic integration, strengthening economic collaboration, improving
connectivity, and promoting trade, investment, tourism and energy security. It includes famous five pillars
(2)
namely: i) policy coordination, ii), infrastructure development and connectivity, iii) trade facilitation, iv)
financial integration and v) people-to-people ties. It must be noted here that all five pillars of the OBOR are
important for Nepal and South Asia.
OBOR is not just a connectivity master pan- it is a blueprint for economic development integration of the
countries in the region. Through OBOR, China also seeks to enhance its soft power in the region. The revival
of the Silk Road spirit seeks to reinvigorate the civilization, culture, knowledge and communication in the
participating countries. The revival of the Silk Road will be an open conduit for ideas and flow of cultural and
popular interaction between China and the participating countries.
It is expected to create better environment for Chinese investment, upgrade the infrastructure, and
expand the Chinese market in the participating countries. Success of the OBOR initiative will be measured in
investments made, projects completed, friendships and alliances strengthened, and geostrategic position
improved [3]. It also seeks to increase energy security in the region, as the OBOR region involves countries
with huge reserves of oil, gas and minerals. In the energy sector, China hopes to counter-balance Russia and
accessing the energy-rich central and west Asia through the OBOR.
OBOR is a win-win both for China and developing countries that are participating in the initiative. It has
multiple benefits for the participating countries as well as for China, including through building road, rail and
air connectivity and economic corridor development, bringing development synergy, increasing mutual
interdependence, and investing in development of infrastructure. China may get more contracts and
investment opportunities in the participating countries, particularly in filling the infrastructure and
connectivity gaps in the region, including in South Asia. China seeks to adopt a gradual, incremental and
inclusive approach to regionalism, which is also the characteristic of the OBOR initiative. It also seeks to
revitalize the old cultural - civilizational and economic links that China had in the region.
The Missing Links
South Asia does not figure in the maps that have been unveiled under the OBOR, except that the Maritime
route touches Kolkata and Colombo. One of the niceties of the OBOR is that new routes should not
necessarily fall under the ancient incent Silk Road. There are three possible routes that could link South Asia
to the OBOR initiative. In this regard the OBOR is a flexible platform that can accommodate routes in the Belt
and Road Initiative.
The first is the proposed China-Myanmar-Bangladesh-India corridor, which is better known as BCIM. It
includes the famous Ledo Road between Assam in India and Kunming in China passing through Burma. This
road was built during the World War to resume supplies to China when the Burma Road was cut by Japanese
in 1942[4]. The proposed BCIM corridor starts from Kunming in China and passes through Mandalay in
Myanmar and Dhaka in Bangladesh and on to Kolkata in India (see Map 3).
Map 3: Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor
(economists-pick-research.hktdc.com)
(3)
Map 4: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (www.quora.com)
The second is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which involves road and rail link from
Xinxiang in China to Gwadar Port in Pakistan through the famous Karakoram Mountains (Map 4). It
incorporates the famous Karakoram Highway, which is often described as the eighth wonder of the world, for
the elevation and difficult terrain through which it passes. China and Pakistan have already signed deals for
investing around $ 67 billion in the development of infrastructure and economic connectivity along this route.
Map 5: Proposed Extension of Qinghai-Tibet Railway
(Tibetanjournal.com)
The third is the Beijing-Lhasa Expressway with extension to Nepal and to Patna in India. The real game
changer in this context will be the expected arrival of the Qighai-Tibet Railway to Nepal by 2020. The railway
has already arrived to Shigatse (496 km from Kathmandu) in Tibet. China is expecting to extend the railway to
Nepal border at Kerung (Gyirong) as well as to Yadong near the Chumbi Valley in the east. A third extension
is expected to reach Burang, near the Tinkar Pass in the west. The arrival of Chinese railway is going to change
the geopolitical map of the Nepal’s northern region (see Map 5). China has proposed to extend the railway
from Kerung to Kathmandu and to Lumbini in Nepal. A Chinese company has already submitted a proposal
to Nepal for conducting the feasibility study of the Rasuwagadhi-Kathmandu railway line (121 km). China has
also proposed to revive the traditional route between Lhasa and Patna via Nepal.
(4)
Map 6: Connecting South Asia to China (infonepal.net)
There is certain opportunity cost attached to these routes, as the comparative advantage Nepal has in
these routes may not exist forever. Though the Nathu-La pass (4,310m) is inaccessible in the winter, it can
offer a direct link between India and China. Similarly, the opening of the BCIM Corridor and the CPEC
corridor can leave Nepal out. There is a need to connect Nepal to these corridors. In this regard, the proposal
(see Map 6) to connect the BCIM corridor to Kathmandu and Lhasa makes a good deal of sense [5].The route
would connect Tibet to India via Nepal and it would enter Bangladesh where it would meet another Belt
coming from Kunming via Myanmar.
The Gateway to South Asia
Chinese scholars have kept reiterating that China likes to see Nepal as a “gateway’ to South Asia. China has
proposed to develop Kerung Port for the link to South Asia. Historically, Nepal has been a hub for entrepot
trade between South Asia and China. “Nepal used to be an important thoroughfare in the ancient Silk Route”,
said Nepal’s Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal at a speech during his visit to Beijing in March 2017, adding
“It was a vibrant trade entrepot that connected parts of Central Asia with South Asia”. Nepal’s historical
entrepot significance was lost after the opening of the Nathu-La Pass via Sikkim, upon the recommendation of
the Younghusband Mission (1903-04). After Tibet came under China, the Nathu-La route was closed and
Nepal’s significance returned. It became feasible to connect to Tibet from Nepal after the opening of the
Kodari Highway in 1965. But the traditional glory has not returned, as there are problems related to
infrastructure and security. At the moment, the Kodari route remains closed after it was devastated by the
2015 Nepal earthquake. Nepal and China should work towards re-opening this route as soon as possible.
Nepal should seek to establish the missing links in the ancient Silk Road though the OBOR initiative. We
should also seek to revive the old corridors between Nepal and Tibet such as the Salt Trade Routes, through
Mustang, Kerung and Kuti. These routes were conduits for trade of salt and wool through Nepal since the
ancient times.
Nepal has started opening the Kali Gandaki Corridor- linking Lumbini to Mukitnath-Damodar Kund-Lo
Manthang and Mansarovar. There exists the possibility for the extension of the extension of Mahakali
Highway to Tinkar Pass. Nepal and China have already agreed to open the Hilsa Pass in Humla and
Kimathanka Pass in Taplejung. Similarly the Mechi, Koshi and Karnali Highways can be extended to the
Chinese border. Raxaul-Kerung Highway is already a possibility. The opening of the Fast Track Road between
Kathmandu and Nijgadh in the Terai can also reduce the distance between India and China via Nepal. These
road corridors make transit between India and China through Nepal becomes a real possibility. Already
Nepal’s transit agreement with India and China has allowed transit through Nepal on a reciprocal basis.
Through the extension of OBOR road and rail connection, Nepal can become a “dynamic bridge” between
India and China. “Nepal can develop as a bridge between China and South Asia”, said the 8-point declaration
adopted at the OBOR seminar held in Kathmandu in January 2017. The declaration also mentioned Nepal’s
“geostrategic advantage” in the OBOR framework. This brings the possibility of making a “land-linked”
country instead of being confined to a “land-locked” one. Nepal can change itself from being a “yam” or buffer
to a bridge between two giants. Nepal offers unique advantage to become the gateway from China to South
Asia. OBOR offers Nepal to shift from “transit demander” to “transit provider”. Nepal can become a “transit
economy” integrated in the supply and value chain of both the Indian and Chinese economies. This is no more
just a rhetoric, but a reality now.
The possibility of trilateral cooperation between Nepal, India and China was endorsed at the OBOR
summit held in Kathmandu OBOR in January 2017. The concept of China Nepal Economic Corridor (CNEC)
has already been floated. This can be extended to make China Nepal India Economic Corridor (CNIEC).
OBOR should not just be viewed as an opportunity to establish the road and rail connectivity.
(5)
The OBOR can unleash potentials of trilateral cooperation between Nepal and its bigger neighbours. That
requires in-depth studies that generate evidence of future investment. It also requires homework, especially
on the part of Nepal, including in the informal and quiet diplomacy in convincing the virtues of trilateral
cooperation to both India and China. Then, it calls for a concerted plan of action to benefit from the concept,
in which both India and China can be expected to invest.
Opportunities galore
The OBOR offers several advantages and opportunities for Nepal and South Asia The execution of the OBOR
is expected to increase the trade through better connectivity, corridor development, economic integration,
and policy coordination, which constitute as the major elements of the Chinese overture. The Silk Road
initiative is also an opportunity to reduce Nepal’s over-dependence with India in trade and transit. Transit is
yet another area in which Nepal can significantly benefit from the OBOR scheme. Landlocked Nepal has
already signed a transit treaty with China. Participating in the OBOR initiative, Nepal can establish transit to
the sea from the Chinese mainland as well as to the energy-rich Central Asian republics through China.
During the visit of Prime Minister K. P. Oli in March 2016, Nepal signed several agreements with China,
including on transit, transmission, new routes, infrastructure development, road and rail connections etc.
Transit through China will help connect Nepal to sea from China as well to the energy rich Central Asian
republics, which are otherwise not yet strongly connected to Nepal. These agreements have a lot of elements
complementarity to the OBOR. They must be implemented in all sincerity. Nepal needs to prioritize the
implementation of the agreements reached with China on these counts, as all of them are building blocks to
connectivity.
One area in which the OBOR can unleash potentials is in the field of foreign direct investment. China is
already significantly involved in each of the South Asian countries, including in the construction of ports,
airports and other infrastructure projects. The OBOR may help increase China’s investment South Asia in
these sectors profoundly. China is already the largest investor in Nepal. The increased connectivity, economic
integration and policy coordination can provide further incentives for the Chinese investment in Nepal. There
is already huge Chinese interest in Nepal in construction and infrastructure development. There is increasing
Chinese interest in Nepal’s hydropower sector. There is potential of attracting the Chinese investment in big
hydropower projects in Nepal. Recently, Chinese investors pledged investments proposals amounting to $8.3
billion) in Nepal during the investment summit held on 2-3 March 2017 in Kathmandu. Nepal should seek to
establish Special Economic Zones (SEZ) focusing the Chinese investors. For that matter, Nepal and China
should sign the bilateral investment protection agreement (BIPPA) as soon as possible.
The OBOR offers huge opportunities in tourism. It can help revive connection to the old Buddhist sites
along the route. The improved connectivity will help boost tourism in the region. The number of Chinese
tourists visiting Nepal has increased in recent years. In 2015, there were 67,000 Chinese tourists visiting Nepal.
Soon, the Chinese tourists are expected to outnumber the Indians. Even if Nepal can attract 1% of China’s 120
million outbound tourists (2015), it will be a huge advantage for Nepal. Nepal offers many things for the
Chinese tourists, including those visiting Nepal during the Chinese New Year holidays and those coming to
Lumbini, the birthplace of Lord Buddha. About 15 million tourists, mainly the Chinese, visit Tibet each year. If
we can bring a fraction of that to Nepal, it will be a big boost to tourism. China has projected that up to 35
million tourist will visit Tibet by 2020. That would be a possibility if the connectivity overland through rail
and road to Kathmandu and to Lumbini were to improve.
There may be good opportunities for countries like Nepal through the access to the funds under various
initiatives which China has helped create. There is the $ 40 billion New Silk Road Fund. The Asian
Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), of which Nepal has already become a member, has $ 100 billion.
Most of the AIIB member countries are also part of the OBOR, making it easier for the Bank to invest in the
OBOR projects. The New Development Bank under the BRICS has $ 50 billion. Altogether, there is $ 190
billion available (Table-1) for investment in various projects in the OBOR region. Besides, China Development
Bank and Exim Bank of China also invest in the OBOR region in construction and infrastructure projects. It is
likely that more funds will be available for investment in the participating countries under these initiatives.
Even if we can access a small amount out of these funds, it could be of great benefit to Nepal and South Asia.
S. No.
1.
2.
3.
Table- 1: Available funds under various initiatives
Initiatives and Funds
Amount in billion US$
New Development Bank (BRICS Bank)
50
Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB)
100
Silk Road Fund
40
Total
190
There is likelihood of these funds being invested in big projects in the OBOR countries. China is already
investing $ 24 billion in Bangladesh and $ 67 billion in Pakistan, the latter under the China Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC). China has recently increased its economic aid to Nepal fivefold. There is the potential of
using this aid in establishing the missing links.
(6)
There is huge interest in Nepal in the OBOR proposal, seen in the increased write ups, increase in the
activity of think tanks and increase in the visit of China’s think tanks, business and political contacts under
this initiative. The Nepal Chapter of the Belt and Road International Trade and Investment Platform was
launched in Kathmandu since November 2016 as a private sector-led initiative to promote the OBOR.
China has huge expertise and advantage in the development and extension of the high speed railways. At
the movement, China has a network of 19,000 km high speed railways in which the rails can run up to 350 km
per hour. The expansion of the Chinese high-speed railway technology would be of great advantage to South
Asia.
Given the numerous benefits that the OBOR can unleash for Nepal and for the region, the question is not
if we should join it. Rather it should be focussed on how can make most out this concept joining the initiative
in its fullest form. OBOR seeks to connect 65 countries, of which 40 have signed deals with China in this
regard. There is no reason as to why Nepal and countries in South Asia should be left out in this important
overture. Nepal readily signed the preliminary MoU on OBOR in 2014. China has proposed an extended MoU
on the subject, the draft of which is lying with Nepal Government. Nepal should complete its homework in
this regard and sign the MoU before the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF), called as
the OBOR Summit, being held in Beijing on 14-15 May 2017. For that matter, Nepal should proactively
participate in that summit, possibly at highest political level.
The geopolitical complexities
The OBOR project is not without problems and challenges. First of all there is no agreed blueprint or
complete map of routes, as there are different interpretations of it. China has kept the proposal intentionally
flexible in order to accommodate the interests of various countries and regions. This is one reason why China
does not intent to replicate the exact copy of the ancient Silk Road. Rather the route connections are left to
each “Belt” as the need may arise.
There is some confusion in the use of the terms “Belt” and “Road” in OBOR initiative. In fact, the term
“Belt” applies for the overland routes and “Road” for the ocean routes. Since this is an ambitious project, the
roadmap for implementation can be highly challenging. It can be a long drawn-out project, which can easily
lose its momentum in the long-run. It also includes the security-wise sensitive Western areas of China, where
opening up can be problematic. There is the challenge of terrorism, which undermines economic integration
owing to skewed focus on security over economics.
Though the OBOR concept is built upon a broad partnership, it basically China’s unilateral proposal and
vision. Through this, China is considered to be seeking to leverage its military, economic and political power
towards the asymmetrical and weak neighbouring countries in its periphery. It is also linked with China’s
strategy of balancing its uneven development in its Western provinces and to make use of its excess of
economic, material and technical capacity in production of wealth and creation of market opportunities in its
neighbourhood.
There is no inter-governmental institutional structure to look after the implementation of the OBOR
projects. There is no multilateral decision-making mechanism in the matter. Most of these projects will have
to be carried out through agreement between China and the participating countries bilaterally. It does not
have a central authority or organization that can execute its projects in collective interests. Everything will
have to be worked out under bilateral or regional agreements between China and the respective regions or
countries. This poses difficulty in smooth execution of the projects under the OBOR. Plus the multiple
windows that may be activated with regard to funding the projects, such as through e Silk Road Fund, AIIB,
the BRICs Bank (NDB) and the China’s domestic banks may also be difficult to coordinate in the on ground.
This is something the OBOR summit in Beijing can discuss to sharpen the funding and execution mechanisms
for the OBOR projects.
Though the OBOR is basically an economic and connectivity proposal, it has geopolitical significance to
Nepal and South Asia, some degree of suspicion exists over China’s “geopolitical intentions” under this
initiative. For example, India has its reservation with the CPEC passing through the Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir. The proposed maritime belt involves the Indian Ocean. India is also suspicious of the OBOR
extension to the “String of Pearls” encircling India in the Indian Ocean. In geopolitical terms, this is about the
network of Chinese military and commercial installations and relation starting from the Chinese mainland in
the east to the Port of Sudan in Africa (see Map 7). India has floated the concept of Indian Ocean Five (IO-5),
a security grouping in the Indian Ocean connecting India to the island states of Sri Lanka, Maldives,
Seychelles and Mauritius.
(7)
Map 7: String Peals and the Maritime Silk Road (spsnavalforces.com)
China may also have to face resistance in the OBOR, especially in the Maritime Silk Road, where China’s
ambitions and position do not match that of the many Southeast Asian countries, India and the United States.
That is particularly true in the case of South China Sea.
Map 7: Indo-Pacific Arc (: press-files.anu.edu.au)
India is proposing an Indo-Pacific Arc as an alternate to the OBOR. It extends from west India all the way
to Japan (see Map 7). It includes the traditional maritime players such as Australia, India and China as well as
the “blue-water” entrants such as Japan and South Korea. It has opened avenue of new cooperation as well as
source of tension in the region including in the South China Sea, which lies at the gravity of the Arc [6].
Though this is basically a security and strategic concept linking the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, it has the
potential of being, if executed, a rival to the China’s Maritime Silk Road and a counter to China’s dominance
in the South China Sea. This fits into India’s “Look East Policy” and good political relations the countries in
Southeast Asia and in the Pacific, including Australia.
The sensitive geopolitical dimension also relates to Nepal’s participation in the OBOR. “China needs to
understand that Nepal has a geopolitical complexity”, said Nepal’s foreign minister, Dr. Prakash Sharan
Mahat, during an OBOR conference held in Kathmandu in Jan 2017 [7]. This is an indirect reference to the
delay Nepal is making in signing the MoU on OBOR with China, in which India is suspicious of the Chinese
geopolitical intentions.
India’s cooperation becomes crucial to the success of OBOR. India’s concern in OBOR- should be left to be
resolved bilaterally between India and China. India and China are already on the path of what can be
described as “constructive regionalism”. They are already cooperating in the BRICS. The two countries have
started what has been named as “strategic dialogue”, the first of the kind was held in February 2017 when
India’s Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar visited China.
India and China may be competing for strategic space in South Asian countries. Some competition
between India and China may not be necessarily a bad thing for Nepal and other South Asian countries.
“Benign competition between China and India will be conducive to development in South Asia”, says Hu
(8)
Weijia in a write-up, adding that the question is to “how to avoid cut-throat competition as Beijing and New
Delhi jostle for influence” [8].
China’s OBOR and India’s “Look East” are not necessarily mutually exclusive with each other. There are
complementarities between them in many aspects. Both aim at improving connectivity and deepening
regional economic integration. “India and China should seek common ground while strengthening
cooperation with South Asian countries to promote regional integration”, says Hu Weijia in the write up cited
above.
The OBOR may also bring China and USA face to face, including in the South China Sea and in the U.S.
policy of “Asia pivot”, which signals the “strategic shift” in the U.S. policy from Atlantic to the Pacific (read
China). Though what happens to the “Asia pivot” under U. S. President Donald Trump is unclear yet, checking
the spread of the U. S. influence in Asia, including in the South China Sea remains one of China’s key strategic
interests in promoting the OBOR, though which China seeks to expand its sphere of influence checking the
outside powers in the region. Plus the emerging strategic partnership between India and United States and
feeling of being encircled by the U.S. compels China to focus in gaining influence through the OBOR.
Yet another challenge lies in the area of security. China has security concerns in opening up its restive
Western provinces. The mere reiteration of “One China” policy by each of the participating countries in the
OBOR may not be sufficient enough to address China’s security interests that may be undermined by
increased openness through the connectivity. The delay in the opening of the Kodari route and relocation of
the Chinese border town of Khasa after the 2015 Nepal earthquake has also to do with the Chinese security
concerns. The agreement to open more border crossing points between Nepal and China may also be subject
to such security restrictions. That is the reason why China opened the Korala Pass in Mustang for a few days
only and closed soon thereafter. Nepal has a policy of policy of not allowing its soil against the Chinese
security interests. To assuage the Chinese security concerns, Nepal will have to assure that China’s vital
security interests will not be compromised when there will be increased connectivity through the border with
Tibet.
There are various risks associated with the OBOR countries, including that of political instability,
regulatory and legal risk, labour market uncertainty risk, environmental and social concerns etc. in the
participating countries. Some of these risks can be mitigated with enhanced cooperation between China and
the OBOR countries.
Conclusion
Despite the geopolitical complexities associated with it, OBOR provides unique opportunity for enhanced
regional economic integration through connectivity and corridor development unleashing potentials in the
areas of trade, investment, tourism, energy security and people-to people contacts. South Asia is uniquely
placed to gain advantage from the OBOR, if it can help establish the missing links of connectivity and
economic corridors with China. India’s participation would be vital for the success of the OBOR, for which
India and China should work bilaterally in the same cooperative spirit in which they are doing in the BRICS
and other issues. With their bilateral trade approaching to $ 100 billion a year, China and India will stand to
gain from through enhanced cooperation in their respective initiatives like the OBOR and the Look East,
which have complementarities as both seek to enhance economic integration and connectivity for better
development of the region. Other South Asian countries, with which China has extensive engagement and
relations, should stand to benefit from participating in the OBOR partnership, as it provides opportunities for
increased investment in connectivity, infrastructure development and economic integration.
End Notes:
[1]
German geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen coined the term “Silk Road” first in 1877 to describe the route of silk
trade between China and Europe.
[2]
Tharoor, Shashi (2014), China’s Silk Road Revivial, Project Syndicate, 14 October 2014, accessed at www.projectsyndicate.org
[3]
Enright, S. A. (2016), One Belt One Road: Insights for Finland. Länsi-Pasila: Finland Team-Tekes – the Finnish Funding
Agency for Innovation.
[4]
Later, the Ledo Road was renamed as Stillwell Road after the U.S. General Joseph Stillwell (1883-1946) under whose
supervision the road was constructed.
[5]
Amatya, Sumitra “China’s one belt one Road initiatives – the Case for Reviving Nepal’s Land-Link Role”, Nepal
Views - December 23, 2016, infonepal.net
[6]
Graham, Euan and Henrick Z. Tsjeng, eds. (2014), Navigating the Indo-Pacific Arc, S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, RSIS Monograph No. 32 November 2014
[7]
The Kathmandu Post, 19 January 2017
[8]
The Global Times, 30 March 2017
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