SOURCE TEXTS FOR PINKER
SELECT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING
1. Haidt, Jonathan. “Elephants Rule.” Chapter 3 of The Righteous Mind, p 52-71. Pantheon
Books, 2012.
2. Haidt, Jonathan. “The Moral Foundations of Politics.” Chapter 7 of The Righteous Mind, p
128-154. Pantheon Books, 2012.
3. Haidt, Jonathan. “Religion is a Team Sport.” Chapter 11 of The Righteous Mind, p 246-273.
Pantheon Books, 2012.
SELECT AT LEAST ONE OF THE FOLLOWING TEXTS
TED TALK VIDEO & TRANSCRIPT: Frans de Waal on Moral behavior in animals
http://www.ted.com/talks/frans_de_waal_do_animals_have_morals.html?utm_source=newsletter_we
ekly_2012-04-10&utm_campaign=newsletter_weekly&utm_medium=email
“I believe there's an evolved morality. I think morality is much more than what I've been talking about,
but it would be impossible without these ingredients that we find in other primates, which are empathy
and consolation, pro-social tendencies and reciprocity and a sense of fairness. And so we work on these
particular issues to see if we can create a morality from the bottom up, so to speak, without necessarily
God and religion involved, and to see how we can get to an evolved morality.”
Paul Copan. “God, Naturalism, and the Foundations of Morality.” in The Future of Atheism: Alister
McGrath and Daniel Dennett in Dialogue, ed. Robert Stewart. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008.
http://paulcopan.com/articles/pdf/God-naturalism-morality.pdf
“Naturalism does not inspire confidence in our belief-forming mechanisms. Indeed, naturalism has the potential
to undermine our conviction that rationality and objective moral values exist. If our beliefs—moral or
epistemic—are survival-enhancing by-products of Darwinistic evolution, why think that we actually
have dignity, rights, and obligations—or that we are thinking rationally? A theistic worldview, on the
other hand, does inspire confidence that we can know moral (and rational) truths—even if they do not
contribute one whit to our survival.”
Jones, Dan. “Moral psychology: The depths of disgust.” Nature 447, 768-771, 14 June 2007.
Is there wisdom to be found in repugnance? Or is disgust 'the nastiest of all emotions', offering nothing
but support to prejudice? Dan Jones looks at the repellant side of human nature.
Saltzstein, Herbert D. Kasachkoff, Tziporah, “Haidt's Moral Intuitionist Theory: A Psychological
and Philosophical Critique.” Review of General Psychology, Vol 8(4), Dec, 2004. pp. 273-282
ABSTRACT: Jon Haidt's (2001) proposal (see record 2001-18918-008) for a moral intutionist theory of
morality is criticized on psychological and philosophical grounds, including (a) the apparent reduction of
social influence to one kind, overt compliance, and the virtual ignoring of the role of persuasion in moral
and other decision making; (b) the failure to distinguish development of a psychological entity from its
deployment or functioning; and (c) the failure to consider, in distinguishing cause and reason as
explanatory concepts, the motivating power of reasons. Arguments for an evolutionary approach to
morality are also faulted on the grounds that they assume that adaptation is served by nonmoral rather
than moral (fairness- and benevolence-based) criteria. Finally, the authors suggest that an intuitionist
approach such as that of Haidt may obscure important aspects of moral decision making.
Haidt, Jonathan ; Review of General Psychology, Vol 8(4), Dec, 2004. pp. 283-290. “The Emotional
Dog Gets Mistaken for a Possum.”
ABSTRACT: H. D. Saltzstein and T. Kasachkoff (2004) (see record 2004-21519-004) critique the social
intuitionist model (J. Haidt, 2001) (see record 2001-18918-008), but the model they critique is a strippeddown version that should be called the "possum" model. They make 3 charges about the possum model
that are not true about the social intuitionist model: that it includes no role for reasoning, that it reduces
social influence to compliance, and that it does not take a developmental perspective. After a defense of
the honor of the social intuitionist model, this article raises 2 areas of legitimate dispute: the scope and
nature of moral reasoning and the usefulness of appealing to innate ideas, rather than to learning and
reasoning, as the origin of moral knowledge. This article presents 3 clusters of innate moral intuitions,
related to sympathy, hierarchy, and reciprocity
Fine, Cordelia. “Is the emotional dog wagging its rational tail, or chasing it?” Philosophical
Explorations; Mar2006, Vol. 9 Issue 1, p83-98
Abstract: According to Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist model (SIM), an individual's moral judgment
normally arises from automatic ‘moral intuitions’. Private moral reasoning—when it occurs—is biased
and post hoc, serving to justify the moral judgment determined by the individual's intuitions. It is argued
here, however, that moral reasoning is not inevitably subserviant to moral intuitions in the formation of
moral judgments. Social cognitive research shows that moral reasoning may sometimes disrupt the
automatic process of judgment formation described by the SIM. Furthermore, it seems that automatic
judgments may reflect the ‘automatization’ of judgment goals based on prior moral reasoning. In line with
this role for private moral reasoning in judgment formation, it is argued that moral reasoning can, under
the right circumstances, be sufficiently unbiased to effectively challenge an individual's moral beliefs.
Thus the social cognitive literature indicates a greater and more direct role for private moral reasoning
than the SIM allows
Levy, Neil. “The wisdom of the pack.” Philosophical Explorations, Mar2006, Vol. 9 Issue 1, p99-103
Abstract: This short article is a reply to Fine's criticisms of Haidt's social intuitionist model of moral judgement.
After situating Haidt in the landscape of meta-ethical views, I examine Fine's argument, against Haidt, that the
processes which give rise to moral judgements are amenable to rational control: first-order moral judgements,
which are automatic, can nevertheless deliberately be brought to reflect higher-order judgements. However,
Haidt's claims about the arationality of moral judgements seem to apply equally well to these higher-order
judgements; showing that we can exercise higher-order control over first-order judgements therefore does not
show that our judgements are rational. I conclude by sketching an alternative strategy for vindicating the
rationality of moral judgements: by viewing moral argument as a community-wide and distributed enterprise, in
which knowledge is produced by debate and transferred to individuals via testimony.
Kalis, Annemarie. “Improving moral judgments: Philosophical considerations.” Journal of Theoretical
and Philosophical Psychology, Vol 30(2), 2010, 94-108.
ABSTRACT In contemporary moral psychology, an often-heard claim is that knowing how we make moral
judgments can help us make better moral judgments. Discussions about moral development and improvement
are often framed in terms of the question of which mental processes have a better chance of leading to good
moral judgments. However, few studies elaborate on the question of what makes a moral judgment a good
moral judgment. This article examines what is needed to answer questions of moral improvement and
development. It distinguishes 3 types of claims that are at stake: descriptive claims, metaethical claims, and
normative claims. To find out what makes certain moral judgments better than others, one needs to have insight
in the psychological processes and capacities underlying moral judgment formation. However, one also needs to
address the question of what makes a moral judgment justified, and this in turn requires a view on the nature of
moral goodness and on the question of what makes a judgment moral at all. The author discusses possible ways
in which philosophical theories in the areas of metaethics and normative ethics can contribute to the answering
of such questions. Also, she provides concrete suggestions for doing interdisciplinary research that is able to
address those questions in moral psychology that have both normative and descriptive aspects. (PsycINFO
Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
EXTRAS
Clarke, S. 2008: SIM and the City: Rationalism in Psychology and Philosophy of Haidt's Account of
Moral Judgment. Philosophical Psychology, 21, 799-820.
Fine, C. 2006: Is the emotional dog wagging its rational tail, or chasing it? Philosophical
Explorations, 9, 83-98.
Levy, N. 2006: The wisdom of the pack. Philosophical explorations, 9, 99-103.
Pizarro, D. A. and Bloom, A. 2003: The intelligence of the moral intuitions: Comment on Haidt
(2001). Psychological Review, 110, 193-196.
Saltzstein, H. D. and Kasachkoff, T. 2004: Haidt’s moral intuitionist theory: a psychological and
philosophical critique. Review of General Psychology 8, 273-282.
Improving moral judgments: Philosophical considerations. Kalis, Annemarie
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, Vol 30(2), 2010, 94-108. doi: 10.1037/a0020290
ABSTRACT
1. In contemporary moral psychology, an often-heard claim is that knowing how we make moral
judgments can help us make better moral judgments. Discussions about moral development and
improvement are often framed in terms of the question of which mental processes have a better chance
of leading to good moral judgments. However, few studies elaborate on the question of what makes a
moral judgment a good moral judgment. This article examines what is needed to answer questions of
moral improvement and development. It distinguishes 3 types of claims that are at stake: descriptive
claims, metaethical claims, and normative claims. To find out what makes certain moral judgments
better than others, one needs to have insight in the psychological processes and capacities underlying
moral judgment formation. However, one also needs to address the question of what makes a moral
judgment justified, and this in turn requires a view on the nature of moral goodness and on the question
of what makes a judgment moral at all. The author discusses possible ways in which philosophical
theories in the areas of metaethics and normative ethics can contribute to the answering of such
questions. Also, she provides concrete suggestions for doing interdisciplinary research that is able to
address those questions in moral psychology that have both normative and descriptive aspects.
(PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)