VYTAUTO DIDŽIOJO UNIVERSITETAS
TEISĖS FAKULTETAS
Saulius Žėkas
CAN E-VOTING GUARANTEE DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS?
Teisės vientisųjų studijų programa, valstybinis kodas 60101S103
Vadovas (ė)___Prof. Charles Szymanski_______ ________ ______
(Moksl. laipsnis, vardas, pavardė) (Parašas) (Data)
Apginta ________Doc. Dr. Julija Kiršienė______ ________ ______
(Fakulteto dekanas) (Parašas) (Data)
Kaunas, 2013
TURINYS
SANTRAUKA ................................................................................................................................................... 2
SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................................................... 5
INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................................................. 6
DIRECT ELECTIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 8
UNIVERSAL ELECTIONS ............................................................................................................................ 12
SECRET ELECTIONS .................................................................................................................................... 14
EQUAL ELECTIONS ..................................................................................................................................... 18
FREE ELECTIONS ......................................................................................................................................... 21
CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................................................. 24
LITERATURE LIST ........................................................................................................................................ 28
1
SANTRAUKA
Daugelis mūsų jau senokai naudojas elektronine bankininkyste, elektroninėmis
parduotuvėmis, kai kuries netgi naudojasi savivaldybių teikiamomis paslaugomis interneto pagalba.
Kai kurios valtybės žengė dar toliau ir pradėjo naudoti elektroninį balsavimą. Lietuvoje rinkimai
vyko praėjusiais metais ir jų metu netilo diskusijos dėl galimybės balsuoti internetu. Elektroninis
balsavimas turi dvi pagrindines formas. Tai nuotolinis balsavimas naudojantis internetu kuomet
balsavimo vietos nestebi valstybei atstovaujantys asmenys. Arba balsavimas naudojant
elektroninius balsų įrašymo įrenginius. Šis balsavimas yra gan panašus į tradicinį nes balsavimo
vieta yra stebima valstybės, partijų ir nepriklausomų tarptautinių stebėtojų.
Šiame darbe bus nagrinėjama trijų valstybių, kurios įgyvendino elektroninio balsavimo
projektus patirtys. Darbe keliamas klausimas: Ar gali elektroninis balsavimas užtikrinti
demokratiškus rinkimus? Ieškant atsakymo į šį klausimą pirmiausia būtina žinoti kokie rinkimai
laikomi demokratiškais. Rinkimai pripažįstami demokratiškais jeigu jų metu laikomasi šių principų:
1. Visuotiniai rinkimai (kiekvienam asmeniui atitinkančiam rinkimų įstatyme numatytus
kriterijus turi būti užtikrinta balsavimo teisė)
2. Lygybė rinkimuose (turi būti užtikrinta kad visi balsai turėtų vienodą vertę)
3. Laisvi rinkimai (turi būti užtikrinama galimybė asmeniui balsuoti savo nuožiūra, be
pašalinių asmenų įtakos)
4. Tiesioginiai rinkimai (turi būti užtikrinama, kad asmuo negalėtų balsuoti už kitą asmenį)
Norint atsakyti į darbe išsikeltą klausimą buvo analizuojama kaip Estijos, Šveicarijos ir
Brazilijos elektroninio balsavimo sistemos atitinka minėtus reikalavimus.
Kaip jau buvo minėta tiesioginių rinkimų principas reikalauja, jog būtų užtikrinama
kad asmuo galėtu balsuoti tik už save. Naudojant tradiciniam balsavimo metodą šio reikalavimo
įgyvendinimas yra paprastas. Tačiau kuomet balsavimas vyksta nuotoliniu būdu naudojant internetą
iškyla problema efektyviai nustatyti balsuojančio asmens tapatybę. Tiesioginių rinkimų principas
Estijoje buvo įgyvendintas naudojant asmens tapatybės kortelę su integruota mikroschema. Ši
kortelė su mikroschema, įgalina Estijos piliečius pasirašyti dokumentus elektroniniu parašu taip
patvirtinant savo tapatybę. Šveicarijoje dalis identifikavimo procesui naudojamos informacijos
atsiunčiama paštu, kita dalis yra asmens konfidenciali informacija. Gavęs visą informaciją apie
artėjančius rinkimus Šveicarijos pilietis gali nuspręsti koks balsavimo metodas jam yra
parankiausias ir juo pasinaudoti. Brazilija naudoja elektroninius balsų įrašymo įrenginius tad galėtų
2
naudoti ir tradicinius asmens identifikavimo metodus. Tačiau Brazilija ketina automatizuoti ir šį
procesą ir asmenų identifikavimui naudoti biometrinius skaitytuvus, asmens tapatybė būtų
nustatoma pagal asmenų
pirštų antspaudus. Kol kas ši sistema buvo įdiegta ir išbandyta
nedaugelyje rinkimų apylinkių, tačiau jos efektyvumas verčia manyti, kad biometrinių skaitytuvų
naudojimas Brazilijoje plėsis. Visose trejose šalyse naudotos elektroninio balsavimo sistemos jau
vykusiuose rinkimuose sugebėjo išpildyti tiesioginių rinkimų principo keliamus reikalavimus.
Visuotiniai rinkimai reiškia, jog asmuo turi teisę balsuoti nepaisant turto, lyties,
išsilavinimo etc. Bet šis principas yra skaidomas į du reikalavimus: kiekvienas asmuo turi gauti
teisę balsuoti ir galimybę balsuoti. Įteisinant elektroninį balsavimą antrąjį reikalavimą įgyvendinti
kur kas sudėtingiau. Nes toli gražu ne visi asmenys turi vienodas galimybes naudotis kompiuteriu ir
internetu. Taipogi ne visi asmenys turi reikiamas žinias pasinaudoti
informacinėmis
technologijomis ir atiduoti balsą elektroniniu būdu. Estija reikalavimą suteikti lygias galimybes
balsuoti elektroniniu būdu, užtikrino suteikdama galimybę asmenims balsuoti viešosiose interneto
prieigose. Taip pat buvo pradėta programa, kuri mokė žmones naudotis kompiuteriais ir internetu ir
taip plėtė jų žinias, idant vėliau šie žmonės sugebėtų balsuoti elektroniniu būdu. Šveicarijoje visa
informacija ir biuleteniai siunčiami paštu, tad asmuo gavęs rinkiminę korespondenciją gali nuspręsti
kuris balsavimo metodas elektroninis, tradicinis ar balsavimas paštu jiems yra priimtiniausias.
Brazilijai šio principo įgyvendinimas nebuvo aktuali problema nes užtikrinti rinkimų visuotinumą
jie naudojas tas pačias priemones kaip ir tradicinį balsavimo metodą naudojančios šalys.
Slaptas balsavimas reiškia kas asmens atiduotas balsas turi išlikti anonimiškas.
Anonimiškumas yra kritiškai svarbus nes jeigu vartotojas numano, kad jo balsas gali būti matomas
tretiesiems asmenims jis gali balsuoti už vieną ar kitą pusę bijodamas tolimesnių pasekmių. Tad
užtikrinant, jog elektroniniu būdu atiduotas balsas išliks anonimiškas didžiausias iššūkis tenka
kompiuterinei balsavimo sistemai. Estija šią problemą išsprendė sukurdama kompiuterinę sistemą,
kuri užtikrina balsų anonimiškumą taip pat kaip balsavimas paštu. Estijoje šis principas vadinamas
„Voko metodu“. Šveicarija norėdama užtikrinti, kad elektroniniu būdu atiduotų balsų neįmanoma
atsekti iki jų davėjų išleido specialų rinkinį reikalavimų, kuriuos turi atitikti kompiuterinė sistema
neleidžianti atsekti balsų. Kadangi Brazilijoje balsavimas vyksta stebimoje aplinkoje naudojant
balsų įrašymo įrenginį, problemų dėl balsų atsekimo iki asmens atidavusio balsą tiesiog negali kilti.
Lygių rinkimų pagrindinis reikalavimas yra, jog kiekvienas asmuo galėtų balsuoti tik vieną
karta, ir tie pateikti balsai būtų tos pačios vertės. Taip pat išskiriamas ir trečias šio principo
reikalavimas, užtikrinti lygias galimybes balsuoti. Elektroninio balsavimo atveju tai reiškia lygias
galimybes naudotis reikiamomis priemonėmis pateikti balsą. Būtent dėl šio principo Estijoje ir
Šveicarijoje kilo itin daug diskusijų, nes nepaisant visų mokymo programų ir įrengtų viešų
prisijungimo prie interneto taškų, neįmanoma užtikrinti visiškai lygių galimybių. Dėl to klausimas
3
buvo perduotas Estijos Aukščiausiajam teismui, spręsti ar elektroninis balsavimas nepažeidžia teisių
tų asmenų, kurie negali laisvai naudotis internetu. Estijos Aukščiausiasis teismas pasisakė Estijos
Aukščiausiasis teismas pasisakė, jog elektroninis balsavimas nepažeidžia teisių tų asmenų, kurie
negali balsuoti elektroniniu būdu. Nes jiems suteiktos galimybės balsuoti kitais būdais. Labai panaši
nuomonė buvo išdėstyta Šveicarijoje: papildomos balsavimo galimybės suteikimas, kuris
palengvina šios pilietinės pareigos atlikimą tam tikrai grupei, nepažeidžia kitų grupių teisių.
Brazilijoje lygios galimybės balsuoti buvo pasiektos būtent su elektroninio balsavimo pagalba, nes
jis gerokai palengvino balsavimo procesą neišsilavinusiems asmenims. Prieš elektroninius rinkimus
Brazilijoje dėl didelio kandidatų skaičiaus rinkėjai turėdavo įrašyti kandidato vardą į biuletenį. Tai
sukeldavo itin daug problemų neišsilavinusiems asmenims, kurie nesugebėdavo to padaryti. Tad
elektroninio balsavimo įteisinimas įgalino daugelį neišsilavinusių Brazilijos gyventojų įgyvendinti
savo balsavimo teisę.
Laisvi rinkimai reiškia, kad jie turėtų vykti be jokios neteisėtos įtakos balsuojančiam
asmeniui. Estijoje šis principas buvo įgyvendintas leidžiant asmenims elektroniniu būdu balsuoti
keletą kartų. Šios teisės įgyvendinimas padarė neteisėtą asmenų įtakojimą bei balsų pirkimą
bereikšmį. Nes įgalinus pakartotinį balsavimą net jei asmuo buvo papirktas balsuoti už vieną ar kitą
kandidatą jis vėliau galėtų atiduoti savo balsą per naują už kitą kandidatą. Brazilijoje šis principas
buvo įgyvendintas įteisinus atiduotų balsų popierinį patvirtinimą. Po kurio laiko kuomet buvo
įteisintas elektroninis balsavimas Brazilijoje iškilo klausimas, kaip užtikrinti kad elektroniniu būdu
atiduodami balsai užskaitomi teisingai. Tam tikslui buvo įteisintas balsų popierinis patvirtinimas ir
balsuojantys asmenys gali pamatyti ar jų atiduoti balsai užskaityti pasirinktam kandidatui.
Šveicarijoje vyrauja nuomonė, kad labiausiai pažeidžiama rinkimų sistemos dali yra balsuojančio
asmens kompiuteris. Todėl sistema buvo orientuota į tai kad būtų galima nustatyti ar balsai buvo
klastoti prieš jiems patenkant į serverį.
4
SUMMARY
Electronic devices are getting more and more important in our everyday life. We have ecommerce, e-banking, e-democracy, maybe we should step even further to e-voting. There are two
main types of e-voting: remote e-voting and DRE. During remote e-voting, when votes are casted
using computer connected to internet. DRE e-voting, (direct-recording electronic voting systems),
it’s physically supervised voting where votes are casted using electronic vote recording machine.
Question raised in this work: “Can e-voting guarantee democratic elections?” There are still many
doubts despite experience of numerous countries that have implemented e-voting. In this work is
analyzed experience of Estonia, Switzerland and Brazil. All three countries have e-voting systems
that proved to be successful and able to comply with requirements raised to guarantee democratic
elections. These requirements are:
5. Universal elections (guarantees equal suffrage for everybody)
6. Equal elections (guarantee that all ballots have the same influence on the result)
7. Free elections (guarantees no unlawful influence)
8. Secrecy of election (only the voter is aware of his decision)
9. Direct elections (prevents someone from voting on behalf of other voter)
Each country had different experience trying to make its e-voting system satisfy all 5
principles. And all three countries succeeded, we can say that because: systems are working,
systems complies with democratic elections principles, voters trust and use those systems, and
international community recognizes results of elections.
5
INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of this century electronic devices has an important role in our lives.
Today we have e-commerce, e-banking and of course e-democracy. There were many ideas that
were used in practice, but none of them are getting as much attention as e-voting. Since Lithuania
was set free from Soviet Union almost each election voter turnout extremely low. Only 50 percent
of people having right to vote came to polling stations. Elections are an important event in every
country. Results of election decides path of a country for next 4 years. If only half of eligible voters
comes and states their decision we can say that electoral system is not working properly and people
are not represented in parliament proportionally.
There are many specialists and even more opinions why people are not coming to vote.
But one general Idea is that people would vote if voting system would be more convenient. And the
e-voting comes to the light. Electronic voting (also known as e-voting) is a term encompassing
several different types of voting, embracing both electronic means of casting a vote and electronic
means of counting votes.1
There are two types of e-voting and in this work and in this work will be overlooked and
analyzed cases of few countries that e-voting exploited the most.” There are two types of Electronic
voting which can be identified as: e-voting which is supervised physically by independent electoral
authorities or governmental representatives like the machines at polling stations and Remote
electronic voting is where the vote is not physically supervised by government or independent
representatives like voting from a personal computer, mobile phone or television via the internet
also known as i-voting.”2
What criteria’s enables e-voting to work? After analyzing Estonian experience R. Michael
Alvarez, Thad E. Hall, Alexander H. Trechsel determined that major are these four things:
1. Widespread internet penetration
2. A legal structure that addressees e- voting issues
3. Identification system that allows for digital authentication of the voter
4. Political culture that is supportive of Internet voting
Now according to Lithuanian Statistic department there were 57% of Lithuania households
that had personal computer. And there were 55% of households that had and used internet
connections. Comparison to these numbers in Estonia that executed remote parliament e-voting in
1
2
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_voting> [visited 05 03 2013].
<http://www.bravenewballot.org> [visited 04 02 2013].
6
2007, 53 %of households had an internet connection. So speaking of starting positions Lithuania is
already ahead of Estonia when it enables remote internet voting.
When we speak about legal structure that e-voting requires several things has to be
covered:
1. In legislation should be said how voters will be recognized
2. In legislation should be stated when citizens can vote via e-voting
3. In legislation should be stated when an how votes will be counted
There are many arguments for e-voting and many against. But most common of them is
that e- voting system is not able to maintain democratic voting basics.
So what are basic democratic principles that e-voting electoral system should be able to
maintain? According to McGaley there are several principles of elections that have to be sustained
in democratic elections.
10. Universal elections (guarantees equal suffrage for everybody)
11. Equal elections (guarantee that all ballots have the same influence on the result)
12. Free elections (guarantees no unlawful influence)
13. Secrecy of election (only the voter is aware of his decision)
14. Direct elections (prevents someone from voting on behalf of other voter)
In the rest part of the work I’ll try to motive that e-voting as electoral system is capable to
guarantee these democratic election principles.
7
DIRECT ELECTIONS
According Melanie Volkamer and Dieter Huter principle of direct election basically means
that each voter can cast ballot just for himself. As well this principle one of the tasks is to prevent
voting on behalf of other person. And so comes first issue regarding electronic voting –
authentication system. In traditional voting systems countries as Lithuania voting places voter’s
registration are monitored. This is impossible in those countries that have remote e-voting as
Estonia and Switzerland. But direct election principle can be satisfied even such conditions.
There are more than few countries that had e-voting trials and few countries that held
national parliament election where voters could use electronic voting systems. Each country had to
authenticate voters and each did it a bit differently. So which authentication system is the best and
most suitable for Lithuania?
Now in Lithuanian electoral law main articles talking about voter’s authentication is article
no 30, no 31 and no 65. Article no. 30 is presentation of a voter card. It is necessary in that case is
person is going to vote in earlier election or not in his declared election district. Voter card it‘s like
an invitation for a person to come and vote in elections. In voter card is indicated this information:
1. voter‘s name and surname
2. voter‘s declared living address
3.
voter‘s declared election district name, number, and polling station address
4.
the name and number of single-member constituencies for which are assigned to the
territory of the voters declared election district
5.
voter number in elections district voters list
6.
day of the election, information how long polling station is open, invitation to participate in
elections and other important information for voter.
Article no. 31 regulates who and how delivers voter cards for persons. Usually it’s done by the local
election district commission. They deliver voter cards and gives it direct to a person or to a person
that lives together with a voter. Article 65 describes how authentication process is going on during
voting day in polling stations. When voter comes to polling station he must present document to
prove his identity or voter card. By the way it is important to note that internet technologies are
already used during elections. According article 65 polling stations that has connection to electronic
voters list has to indicate in it if voter comes to vote. Case that is described above represent classical
voter authentication, where it’s physically supervised by representatives of governmental or
independent electoral authorities. Some countries that are using DRE ( direct-recording electronic
8
voting systems) are still using physical supervision, but other countries, are trying to make all
voting process automated, beginning from voter authentication and finishing with vote counting.
In year 2002 Estonian parliament presented DSA or „Digital Signature Act”. DSA and
other similar laws (the Local Communities Election Act, the Referendum Act, and the Riigikogu
Election Act etc.) allow Estonian citizens not only to access government via internet connection but
to vote during elections as well. For that purpose Estonians are using ID cards with microchip
inside that has approved digital signatures. Use of these ID cards stepped even further in year 2005
when Estonia first time executed elections where citizens had remote voting possibility using their
ID cards and digital signatures inside them as authentication tools.
Voting and authentication process during e-voting in Estonia goes like this. Voter that
decided to vote during e-voting has to cast his vote during the advance voting period from 6th to 4th
day before Election Day. In order to vote he has to have this equipment: ID card, PIN numbers
associated with ID card, computer and smart card reader and internet connection (it is important to
mention that if person does not possess smart card reader he can go to vote in public places that has
computers with smart card readers for this purpose). Person with all equipment mentioned earlier
must go to special website where he is asked to put his ID card into smart card reader and insert first
pin code. If PIN is correct voter sees his candidate list. After picking one of the candidates voter has
to insert his second PIN number to confirm his choice. After this confirmation voter signs his digital
ballot and when system confirms that voter digital signature is valid his vote is moved to another
server, where he stays until tabulation.
Lithuanian experience concerning ID cards with microchips and e-government is quite
similar to Estonian. ID cards with microchips were released in 2009 January in Lithuania. Until
2010 September there were released more than four hundred thousands of them, it’s around
seventeen percent of all Lithuanian citizens that has a right to vote. It passed more two and a half
years so we can assume that numbers of persons that has new ID card has increased even higher.
These ID cards can be used not only to authenticate persons identity bus to sign documents
digitally. As well ID card can be used to connect to e-government pages to use various public
services. There are ideas to make use of ID card even broader. It is aim now that ID card would be
used in an organization that provides financial and other electronic services. For a person who have
only ID card but does not have computer or smart card reader solution are public internet access
points3.
So for the comparison we may say that Lithuania and Estonia are using the same ID card
technology with microchips. In both countries ID cards are used gain access to e-government public
3
<http://www.vipt.lt/cms/app?service=external/index&sp=5783&sp=5440> [visited 02 05 2013].
9
services. Only and the biggest difference is that in Estonia moved further and enabled to use the
same ID card in remote e-voting for citizen authentication.
Other countries are trying to adopt remote e-voting as well. One of them is
Switzerland, in which several cantons already have e-voting, while other cantons are considering
this opportunity. A canton that already has their own e-voting system is Geneva and Zurich and
Neuchatel. Other cantons is one of those systems, most used of them is Geneva’s e-voting system.
Switzerland voter authentication practice is different than Estonian. In these three Switzerland
cantons before elections all official documents are sent out to voters by mail three weeks before the
date of the voting. With enclosed information voter can either cast vote by mail, online, or at the
ballot box. Voting card that person gets is valid only for the upcoming election. In fact, it signifies
the right to vote in the election and ensures the “one man, one vote” principle since it cannot be
used a second time. Jan Gerlach and Urs Gasser in their Switzerland e-voting case study analyzed
voter authentication in Geneva canton during e-voting. “In order to be verified as an eligible voter,
the e-voter has to enter an individual identification number. It is located on the ballot sheet and is
changed for every polling occasion. Of course, one can try inserting random numbers, but the
chance of finding an existing number is one in five billion. When the system recognizes the user as
an authorized voter, he or she is then connected to a secure server.”4 As well it is important to
mention that in Switzerland during e-voting no additional software or hardware is needed.
Switzerland authorities chose rather to explain everything more through the voting process in web
site. Voter authentication goes quite similarly in Zurich canton as well. All documentation about
elections is sent by mail. Each voter gets “a user-ID, hidden PIN-code, “fingerprint” for verifying
the validity of the browser certificate, as well as a special security symbol for further
authentication”5 As well each voter gets special codes for SMS based voting, but this voting system
was discontinued after 2007. Probably the main difference between these two cantons is in
preparation before e-voting and voter’s registry.
Geneva canton had their voter’s registry in
electronic format centralized before start of the e-voting, and Zurich canton which is much bigger
voter’s registry was independent in each community. But Zurich canton solved this problem easily
solved when e-voting system was enabled to get this information from each community within
canton automatically.
As was mentioned earlier other countries in election process are using DRE ( directrecording electronic voting systems). Countries using DRE have two options, voter’s authentication
keep standard physical supervision, or use automated systems such as biometric authentication. One
4
Jan Gerlach, Urs Gasser, Three Case Studies form Switzerland: E-Voting (Berkman Center Research
Publication
No.
2009-03.1);
<
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/GerlachGasser_SwissCases_Evoting.pdf> [visited 03 03 2013].
5
Ibid.
10
of such countries is Brazil. E-voting first time in Brazil was introduced in 1996. At the beginning
Brazil was using classic voter authentication process physical voters supervision but in 2008
election first time was introduced biometric voters authentication system. Only three Brazilian cities
in the 2008 municipal elections were using biometric voters authentication system. Two years later,
their use was extended to 60 municipalities. 2012 October 7th Brazil held another municipal
election and 7.5 million of 140 million Brazilian voters were using fingerprint-based biometric
machines. Brazil government expects to use biometric identification for the entirety of its electoral
roll by 2018. By then largest South America democracy will achieve fully automated voting process
and be one of the leading countries in e-voting. The goal of the biometric registration program is to
eliminate the possibility of someone taking someone else's place to vote, making it practically
impossible for frauds to be committed during the voting procedure. In Brazil a biometric
fingerprint-based system were included into the voting platform with the purpose of avoiding voter
impersonation or having a person vote multiple times. There are opinions against biometric
authentication, the most common of them is that none machine is perfect and biometric scan system
may reject eligible voter due to errors, or the system may falsely accept fingerprints as valid. There
were issued research and results came that out of 1000 cases only twice system rejects or falsely
accepts fingerprint. Stephen Mayhew publisher and co-founder of Biometrics Research Group, Inc.
Says that if something goes wrong and system rejects eligible voter from voting there must be a
safeguard. Usually such things happen when voter does not have sufficient biometric properties
within the measured domain. In this case scenario there should be possible to authenticate person by
some other means, like physical supervision or facial authentication. In Brazil this problem was
solved digitally photographing each voter. Later on in a case if their fingerprint is not recognized by
the authority’s biometric system, government officials had all that electoral district voters digital
photographs and can authenticate voter manually. Other error that was mentioned before is false
acceptation of not eligible voter. Main reason for such error is the uniqueness of tested fingerprints.
Sonja Hof from University of Linz in her work mentioned “Even with assuming that a finger print
is actually unique, a finger print reader will not yield different readings for all users. This stems
from the fact that a finger print does not yield the complete finger print as a picture for matching
against the stored template, but it actually reduces the input to a predefined feature set of typical
characteristics. This introduces a theoretical upper boundary on the number of individuals that a
biometric system can distinguish between.”6 That’s why countries that are using biometric voter
authentication methods should be able to cope with such sudden problems. Just like that did Brazil.
6
Sonja Hof, E-Voting and Biometric System?; <http://subs.emis.de/LNI/Proceedings/Proceedings47/Proceeding.GI.477.pdf> [visited 04 04 2013].
11
According these three different countries, that all has automated voter authentication
process, experience it is possible to determine most important aspects that should be implemented
before start of automated voters verification process.
1. Electronic voters registry
2. Opportunity for each voter use e-voting possibility
3. Widespread internet penetration
4. Authentication by other means in case of automated voter authentication failure
I believe that if Lithuania is going to implement e-voting it is going to be remote e-voting
as in Estonia or Switzerland. In that case Estonian experience and voter authentication method
would be suitable for Lithuania. We have ID cards with microchips as Estonians. Lithuanians can
use these cards to access e-government and to sign documents digitally. So Lithuania already has
huge part of infrastructure, it just has to enable e-voting legally.
UNIVERSAL ELECTIONS
Universal election or universal suffrage is the right to vote, regardless of property
requirements or other measures of wealth. According the free encyclopedia universal suffrage has
two necessary components, the right to vote and opportunities to vote. So can e-voting be
implemented and carry on these two aspects “right to vote and opportunities to vote“. In most
democratic countries as well in Lithuania basic requirement to get right to vote is age limit, eligible
voter must be 18 years old, and capable. During e-voting main issue is opportunity to vote, because
not all voters may have equal opportunity to cast their vote electronically due lack of equipment or
knowledge. But these obstacles can be easily removed as we’ll see further. Even more e-voting with
enabled audio voting option can help visually impaired voters to cast their votes secretly.
Brazil has the same requirements for eligible voters, but they has more issues. There are still
quite high rate of illiterate people. In the 1994 elections for the lower house of the legislature over
forty percent points of casted votes were blank due to simple reason, illiterate people were not able
to understand what is written in ballot sheets, or they were not able to write down their candidate if
it’s required. As F. Daniel Hidalgo noted the previous election system was disenfranchising Brazil’s
poorest and least educated, those people that are most vulnerable, and whose rights has to be
protected the most. E- Voting helped a lot to improve situation, for comparison between 1994 and
12
2002, the blank or invalid votes rate in national legislative elections decreased by thirty four percent
points. So how was this spectacular change achieved? It all happened after e-voting was introduced
in Brazil.
In Brazilian election choice in encouraged and because of that usually election
commission was creating a giant ballot for hundreds of candidates. So prior to the full adoption of
electronic voting in 2000, election officials required voters to write the name or assigned number of
their preferred candidate on the ballot. And as was mentioned before those poorest and least
educated were not able to vote simple because of inability to write down candidate name. When evoting was introduce in Brazil situation changed because this system was orientated to help those
people who are unable or unaccustomed to writing. The E-Voting system in Brazil associates a
candidate to a simple number. On the election day, voter has to enter this number into a very simple
voting machine. When the number is typed, the machine shows the photo of the candidate and a
screen requesting confirmation through a set of color coded buttons. The machine contains only
numbers and 3 other color-coded buttons: "confirm" (green), "correct" (white) and "void" (orange).
When the voter presses "confirm", the machine then registers the vote. Of course this system is not
perfect as wrote one of Brazilian voters in his blog, but it already has enabled audio voting option
for visually impaired. For comparison in Lithuania and other traditional voting systems visually
impaired has to put their trust in other person, who fills ballot for them.
In Estonia election system and laws are different than in Brazil, and there are other tools to
make E-Voting universal. In Estonian case this tool is DSA act. It enables e-voting using ID cards.
As Ülle Madise, Professor of Constitutional Law at Tartu University and Priit Vinkel, Elections
Department of the Chancellery of Riigikogu, noted in their work “Since 2002, an ID card has been
the new generation’s mandatory primary identification document. The ID cards are issued by the
government and contain certificates for remote authentication and digital signature. Every Estonian
citizen or resident alien above age 15 must have an ID card.”7 So what this means that one of two
instruments needed for E-Voting is mandatory and every citizen has it. The other part of this system
that makes E-voting work is ID card reader. Epp Maaten in his work „Towards e-voting: Estonian
case „wrote that it is not enough to provide people with ID cards. Government must provide and the
other half of equipment that would make e-voting work. „The number of people holding ID-cards
has increased very rapidly but possessing the card is not enough for e-voting. Giving a digital
signature implies that voter had a computer with the proper software installed and a card reader.
The software enabling the use of the ID-card and digital signature is freeware, the card reader costs
about 20 €. Thus, insufficient number of card readers, the complexity of software installation and
Ü. Madise, Priit Vinkel, ‘’Constitutionality of Remote Internet Voting: The Estonian Perspective.
Dordrecht’’, Juridica International (2011, No. 18), p. 5.
7
13
the lack of knowledge how to give a digital signature may endure as obstacles of widespread evoting.“8 So Estonian government made some moves to overcome digital divide.
1. There were national training where Estonians adults were learning computer and internet
training.
2. Project “Village road” was started. With this project Estonia established internet connection
in public libraries, and equipped it with needed hardware and software for e-voting.
3. In 2004 over 500 access points for e-voting was established.
As we can see Estonia made e-voting to comply with universal voting principles by providing tools,
equipment and training. So even people unaccustomed to use computers or those that do not have
internet connection at living place would have competence and ability to cast their vote by internet.
Like and many countries Switzerland has their own approach to e-voting. They has the
most simple tool to ensure universal e-voting. Because all the passwords needed for voting is
delivered by mail. So generally in Switzerland situation is quite similar as in countries that have
traditional voting. Because all the information (passwords and voter card) is delivered by mail and
person can choose which form of voting is more convenient for him.
In conclusion we can say that universal election principal can be easily guaranteed during
e-voting. It is quite clear that use of internet is growing each year. More and more households are
connected to internet, and those who are not may use free access points in public libraries and other
places. E-voting as well has opportunity to help vote visually impaired people and so fulfill
universal elections principle even more than it can do traditional voting. If we look at these issues
as they were Lithuanians there would be no problem at all.
Lithuania is leading in Europe
according free public internet access points. 75 % of Lithuanians has a computer and 73 % of
population are using internet every day. So if remote e-voting would be implemented in Lithuania,
people would have opportunities and knowledge to use this voting method.
SECRET ELECTIONS
The secret election or otherwise “the secret ballot is a voting method in which a voter's
choices in an election or a referendum are anonymous.”9 The key aims are to ensure that voters
8
9
Epp Maaten, Towards remote e-voting: Estonian case (Talin: 2007), p. 89.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_ballot> [visited 13 05 2013].
14
would be able to cast their ballots in private. For countries that has implemented e-voting to comply
with secrecy of election principle was one of the greatest challenges. When voting takes place not in
usual polling place but in other dimensions as absentee voting or voting over the internet voters
coercion may occur. In such a situation, there is a danger that another person could get to know
voters decision, and so make the voter cast their vote in a specific way. „Illicit influencing of voters
can also take place when a voter believes that he or she may face consequences for voting a
particular way and the voter does not trust that the election officials or voting technology will keep
his vote confidential.“10 In an event of such mistrust voter is usually willing to give up to another
political party influence over his voting decision. On other hand in these days’ people their political
opinion is very often expressing loudly in blogs, social networks, or conversations. That’s why
during remote e-voting main focus regarding secret elections principle is on system stability. It
should be able to not let trace back e-vote to voter.
Despite all the challenges Estonia and
Switzerland managed to surpass these requirements and to gain people trust to use e-voting.
E-voting project in Estonia had to deal with both secrecy requirements, ad did it perfectly.
Estonian e-voting system is called envelope method and is based on traditional mail voting. As we
will see further this is suitable system in order to keep voters trust, because of its simplicity and
correspondence to traditional mail voting. In traditional mail voting these steps must be taken. Voter
has to provide identity documents and voting commission gives ballot and two envelopes. One of
them is inner envelope and there is no information on it about voter. Marked ballot has to be put in
inner envelope. After that inner envelope has to be placed in outer envelope, on which voter address
is written, so vote could end up in polling station where voter is registered. In polling station where
the voter is registered commission determines is the voter which sends the vote eligible. If voter is
eligible then his inner envelope is taken outside and placed in ballot box unopened. So this is the
process how right to secrecy is implemented for voters by mail. Estonian e-voting has very similar
technology, just it is digital. Epp Maten in his work „Towards remote e-voting: Estonian case
„describes these digital envelope method steps:
1. “The voter inserts the ID-card into a card reader and opens the homepage of the National
Electoral Committee,“11
2. “a relevant candidate list of voter’s constituency is displayed according to the voters
personal identification number,”12
10
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOV'T AND REG'L DEV., ELECTRONIC VOTING - CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES 8-13 (2006), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/krd /red/2006/0087/ddd/pdfv/298587-evalgrapportengelsk201106.pdf
11
12
Epp Maaten, Towards remote e-voting: Estonian case (Talin: 2007), p. 87.
Ibid.
15
3. “the voter makes his/her voting decision, which is encrypted and can be defined as inner
envelope,”13
4. “the voter confirms his/her choice with a digital signature and the outer envelope comes up,
voter gets a confirmation, that his/her vote has been recorded,”14
5. “at the vote count the voter’s digital signature (outer envelope) is removed and at the final
stage the members of the National Electoral Committee can only collegially open the
anonymous e-votes and count them.”15
So this is how voter’s right to anonymity can be kept during the counting of the votes. To
ensure privacy during remote e-voting procedure like in Estonia is impossible. This problem
admitted even by Supreme Court of Estonia „The most effective way to guarantee the freedom of
the voters from any external influences is to allow for voting only in polling divisions and in voting
booths, where a voter enters alone. It is clear that in the case of electronic voting in an uncontrolled
medium, that is via Internet outside a polling division, it is more difficult for the state to guarantee
that voting is free of external influence and secret.”16 But in the other chapter Supreme Court of
Estonia as well said that “The voter's possibility to change the vote given by electronic means,
during the advance polls, constitutes an essential supplementary guarantee to the observance of the
principle of free elections and secret voting upon voting by electronic means. A voter who has been
illegally influenced or watched in the course of electronic voting can restore his or her freedom of
election and the secrecy of voting by voting again either electronically or by a ballot paper” 17 So
basically what Supreme Court of Estonia meant here, though it is impossible to guarantee that
voting via internet is totally private and uninfluenced additional opportunities in system may help to
reduce possible harm.
Because Brazil for e-voting are using DRE machines they had not any secrecy problems.
Brazilian e-voting is happening in polling place, so there is no external influence, and voting is
secret, and it complies with democracy standards.
Totally different situation is in Switzerland. It is important to mention that there were three
Switzerland cantons that started e-voting project. And one of them, Geneva canton, project was the
most successful, and later on it was free of charge passed to other cantons if they wish to use. And
quite high number of cantons took this opportunity. Switzerland as Estonia has implemented
remote e-voting. But differently than in Estonia in Switzerland almost all information about e-
13
Ibid.
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Supreme Court of Estonia: Petition of the President of the Republic to declare the Local Government Council
Election Act Amendment Act (passed by the Riigikogu on 28 June 2005, unconstitutional 2005 09 01, Talin), chapter 28;
<http://www.nc.ee/?id=381> [visited 02 03 2013].
17
Ibid.
14
16
voting is sent by mail three weeks prior election. As it was mentioned before, to guarantee privacy
during casting of e-vote is impossible. So Switzerland really never even bothered to raise a question
about privacy during e-vote casting moment. Even further there were some discussions isn’t privacy
overrated, because high numbers of persons loudly expresses their voting decisions in social
networks or some other ways. But there are very high requirements for e-voting system that voters
would trust the system and wouldn’t be afraid to use it. As Norwegian ministry once noted illegal
influencing of voters can also take place when a voter believes that voting system is not able to keep
his vote confidential and it could face the consequences for the decision he made. In order to get rid
of such mistrust Switzerland made special criteria’s for e-voting system:
1. “E-ballots are encrypted by randomly mixing alphanumerical characters to their content.
Anyone who would get hold of the ballot would see only a meaningless series of
numbers.”18
2. “When the ballot is returned to the voter for confirmation, a picture is woven in to make it
still more difficult to read. This image is generated using the unique voting card number and
is printed on the card so the voter can compare and check that he isn’t connected to a
counterfeit site.”19
3. “The voting card also reproduces the voting server’s digital certificate’s fingerprint.”20
4. “Voters’ identity and ballots are kept in two distinct files.”21
5. “Voters’ identity is anonymous (no names in the system).”22
6. “Before opening, the content of the electronic ballot box is “shaken” by applying an
algorithm to change the order in which the e-ballots will come out. This impedes any
matching of the entries in the voters’ register with the e-ballot box, which could allow a
cross reading (who voted for what).”23
7. “All hardware elements are configured to only react to the queries consistent with a normal
voting procedure.”24
8. “Servers are connected to the network only during the votes.”25
9. “Infrastructure is redundant and data is stored twice.”26
10. “The servers are located in a safe room; only a few operators (having undergone a security
inquiry) can access them, never alone.”27
Michel Chevallier, Michel Warynski, Alain Sandoz, “Success Factors of Geneva’s e-Voting System“ Electronic
Journal of e-Government (Volume 4 Issue 2 2006), p. 55 – 62.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
18
17
11. “Representatives of political parties cast a number of “test votes” in a “test e-ballot box” and
record them aside so they can check that the system yields the expected outcome.”28
Basically countries that has adopted e-voting are used to focus on e-voting system
stability and fact that casted ballots wouldn’t be possible trace back to voters. For privacy
during the voting is paying less attention because of three things: people are tend to express
their opinion before election freely which side in elections they are going to choose, there are
no effective ways to guarantee privacy, and there are other features in the voting system that
makes privacy less important. As results of the previous elections showed people in Estonia and
Switzerland trust e-voting platforms these countries created and popularity of e-voting is
growing. If Lithuania would decide to implement e-voting main requirement as for mentioned
countries before would be to guarantee that votes are impossible to trace back to voter, and
additional requirement is to get people to trust the e-voting platform.
EQUAL ELECTIONS
Another requirement that has to be met in order of democratic election is equal election. A
basic interpretation of this standard is that each person only has one vote to cast.”29 The other
interpretation of this standard explained at United Nations Human rights Committee, General
Comment No. 25: The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and The Right of Equal
Access to Public Service (Art. 25) requires that all voters votes would be counted equally, and the
last interpretation is that all voters should have equal access to the place of voting. First
interpretation that all votes should be counted equally it is easy to comply with for Estonia and
Switzerland, but e-voting in Brazil improved situation here. Most difficult part for Estonia and
Switzerland is to guarantee equal access to the place of voting. Estonia Switzerland and Brazil has
different experiences and solutions how to comply with equal elections standard and its
interpretations.
Estonia “one person – one vote” principle carried into effect a bit differently than other two
mentioned countries. Because of the importance of free elections, principle that is described further,
27
Ibid.
Ibid.
29
Pierre Garrone, Fundamental and Political Rights in Electronic Elections, in The European Union and e-voting
(Alexander H. Trechsel & Fernando Mendez eds., 2005), p. 113.
28
18
Estonian citizens can vote during e-voting as much as they like. But always only the last vote
counts. So the principle “one person – one vote” stays untouched. As well person, who voted during
advanced e-voting, can later vote during elections day. On such happening paper vote is counted
and votes casted during advanced e-voting are discarded. As we can see even if the voters can vote
several times only one vote is counted. Requirement that all voters would have equal access to the
place of voting is tricky. As was mentioned before Estonia has launched several programs in order
to make e-voting accessible to the most of citizens. But it is clear that to reach this goal is quite
impossible. For that reason there are several different voting methods such as: voting at home, post
voting, e-voting and traditional voting on elections day. Estonian Supreme Court has stated “The
principle of equal treatment in the context of electing representative bodies does not mean that
absolutely equal possibilities for performing the voting act in equal manner should be guaranteed to
all persons with the right to vote. In fact, those who use the different voting methods provided by
law (advance polls, voting outside the polling division of residence, voting in custodial institutions,
home voting, voting in a foreign state, etc.) are in different situations. For example, the voters who
have to use the possibility of advance polls are in a situation different from that of the voters who
can exercise their right to vote on the election day. The guarantee of absolute actual equality of
persons upon exercising the right to vote is infeasible in principle and not required by the
Constitution. “30 Quite similar, only a bit narrower opinion has expressed by Allison A. Stacker in
comment on Cyber-Elections and the Minority Voters Response,, analyzing e-voting under United
States Voting Rights Act. „In the context of voting procedures, the presence of multiple methods of
casting one's ballot cannot cause one group in society to have an unfair advantage over another
group. “31 So as we can see it was stated in two different countries that e-voting cannot cause
inequality during voting process as long as there are alternative voting methods which could choose
citizens unable to vote digitally.
Brazil had different issues that concerned equality in elections. As it was mentioned earlier
before in Brazil is still quite high rate of illiterate people. According the Brazilian census „23% of
adults are unable to read or write a simple note and 42% did not complete 4th grade. Moreover,
before 1994 Brazilian paper ballots required voters to write a candidate’s name or electoral number
and involved only written instructions. This resulted in a substantial quantity of error ridden and
blank ballots being cast, generating a large number of residual votes (not assigned to a candidate
and discarded from the tallying of results). “32 According to Thomas Fujiwara in the beginning e-
30
CRCSCd, 1.9.2005, 3-4-1-13-05, paragraph 24, http://www.nc.ee/?id=381 [visited 09.10.2012].
31
Allison A. Stacker, Comment, Cyber-Elections and the Minority Voters Response, 4 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 475, 480 (2003)
(contending that removing voting from the public sphere creates increased security and privacy risks).
32
Thomas Fujiwara, Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness,and Infant Health: Evidence from Brazil, (Princeton), p
1
19
voting was used only in largest ones Brazilian municipalities, and the rest where still using paper
ballots. Such dividing gave a good chance to compare voting methods in Brazil. “Estimates indicate
that EV reduced residual voting in state legislature elections by a magnitude larger than 10% of
total turnout. Such effect implies that millions of citizens who would have their votes go uncounted
when using a paper ballot were de facto enfranchised.”33 Considering fact that municipalities using
e-voting method were the ones in cities with higher literacy rate, difference in rural areas where
literacy rates are lover should be even higher. So basically e-voting in Brazil helped to restore
equality, because traditional paper ballot voting where Brazilians had to write candidates’ names,
numbers was eliminating from elections those less educated people.
Switzerland has remote e-voting as Estonia, but has different approach to “one voter – one
vote principle”. Estonia is letting for person to vote as many times as he wish during advanced evoting, and once during elections day traditional way. Always only last vote or vote casted
traditional way is counted. Switzerland for person in elections is letting to vote once. As it was
described earlier, all documentation about upcoming elections person is getting by mail. “With the
enclosed personal voting card voters can either submit their ballot by mail, online, or at the ballot
box. The voting card is only valid for the upcoming ballot. In fact, it signifies the right to vote in the
election and ensures the “one man, one vote” principle since it cannot be used a second time.”34 As
we can see in Switzerland e-voting case all procedures related to “one voter – one vote” principle is
kept as similar as possible to traditional paper ballot based voting. On the other hand another
interpretation of equal election, that all people should have the same opportunities to use e-voting
raised some discussion but never was a big issue, because of two main reasons: over 60 % of
Switzerland citizens are using internet, and there is tendency of this number growth, the other
reason is that for a while e-voting is not replacing any of current voting methods, it’s only
supplementary option. Switzerland case just confirms Estonian Supreme Court and Stacker opinion
that additional method of voting cannot discriminate other groups that are using traditional voting
methods.
So in conclusion countries that are using remote e-voting method stated that it is very
difficult to guarantee equal access to e-voting place for all people. But on the other hand in both
countries remote e-voting is additional voting method, people still can use traditional voting method
or postal voting. As stated courts in different countries it is not violations of rights if additional
opportunity to cast vote is given. Basically we could say that e-voting only gave chance to vote for
those people who are not able to vote traditionally. If Lithuania would decide to implement e-voting
33
Ibid., p. 2.
Jan Gerlach, Urs Gasser, Three Case Studies form Switzerland: E-Voting (Berkman Center Research Publication No.
2009-03.1), p. 7; < http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/GerlachGasser_SwissCases_Evoting.pdf> [visited 03 03 2013].
34
20
it should consider using Estonia or Switzerland solutions to fulfill equal elections principle, and
make e-voting additional e-voting method. In such case none rights would be violated, and would
be given opportunities for those who cannot vote traditionally.
FREE ELECTIONS
General idea of free election is that it has to be without any coercion and other unlawful
influence. During the remote e-voting one of the biggest threats is considered voting place. It cannot
be monitored and there prevails possibility of coercion and other unlawful influence.
Again
situation in Estonia Switzerland and Brazil are different concerning fulfillment of this principle.
Each country had own solution to a problem and managed to make their e-voting system to comply
with free elections principle.
Because of this threat Estonian government “promulgate amendments, which allowed Ivoting and gave to the I-voter the right to replace I-vote once given with another I-vote or paperballot.“35 This amendment supposed to decrease the possibility of unlawful influence. It would be
meaningless to do such influence, because after casting another vote via internet and all the efforts
would be wasted. „Right before the very first use of I-voting in 2005 municipal elections, the
Riigikogu decided to change some I-voting provisions and the President used his suspense veto“.36
President of Estonia believed that such rights for people who use advanced e-voting would be unfair
and unconstitutional on behalf of other voters that are using traditional ways of voting, and may cast
vote only once. So after some discussion this case went to Estonian Supreme Court. „The Supreme
Court Chamber of Constitutional Review pointed out that, despite repeated electronic voting, there
was no possibility of an I-voter affecting the voting results to a greater degree than can those voters
who use other voting methods. From the standpoint of the voting results, this vote was deemed in
no way more influential than a vote cast by paper ballot.“37 Furthermore Estonian Supreme court
said his opinion about importance of this provision to the e-voting “The principle of freedom of the
vote gives rise to the obligation of the state to protect voters from persons attempting to influence
35
See note No. 7, p. 12.
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
36
21
their choice.“38 So this opinion of Supreme Court approved casting of multiple e-votes and ended
discussion about voter coercion and buying of votes during advanced remote e-voting.
Brazil had different issues than Estonia concerning free elections principle. Because Brazil
are using DRE system, they can monitor voting place they can apply traditional security
measurement and prevent voters coercion and other unlawful influence. But the issue that was
raised in Brazil after voting with DRE was verifiability of casted votes. After some elections society
raised a question about verifiability of the votes, because there were no way to be sure how the
votes were casted and was they counted correctly. That why after election 2002 in Brazil Voterverified paper audit trail was introduced. Voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) or verified paper
record (VPR) is a method of providing feedback to voters using a ballot less voting system. A
VVPAT is intended as an independent verification system for voting machines designed to allow
voters to verify that their vote was cast correctly, to detect possible election fraud or malfunction,
and to provide a means to audit the stored electronic results.”39 In Brazil this was achieved simply
improving existing DRE machines, adding incorporated printer. And in elections that were held in
2002 Brazilians could verify if their vote was registered correctly. Voter after casting his vote
would be able to see printed ballot receipt. On the other hand this ballot receipt is impossible to
damage or alter because it is protected by cover and plastic. After election held in 2008 these
machines were recalled due to high cost of maintenance, but later on elections held in 2012 returned
because none better solution has not been found. Brazil still is considering alternatives for VVPAT
such as “parallel voting“, “software auditing“, “additional electronics and/or software, to produce
and verify digital signatures on all manner of things“. In conclusion Brazil made its election
verifiable with VVPAT, and common voters got the chance to check the reliability of the system,
and they began to trust e-voting system even more. This solution does not fit for all sides so Brazil
are still using voter – verifies paper trail audit system, but at the same time is looking for better
system that could replace VVPAT.
Switzerland government differently that Estonia are not concerned about physical
voter coercion or votes buying cases. Most of authors agree that main reason for that are old
traditions of democracy in Switzerland. That’s why main focus in Switzerland is kept on systems
stability. It is believed that voter’s computer is the weakest element off all system. And while
Switzerland is looking for their own answer to this issue, Norwegian experience. “In Norway, the
38
39
Ibid.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voter-verified_paper_audit_trail> [visited 04 01 2013].
22
problem has been mitigated by introducing return codes which enable voters to verify whether their
vote has been tampered with before arriving at the servers. “40
As we saw each country had its own issue and solution to that issue. To guarantee that vote
was recorded correctly Brazil introduced voter verified paper audit trail. . Estonia to guarantee that
voter wouldn’t be coerced allowed e-voter to cast his ballot several times and only one vote is
counting. In that way buying of votes and coercion is useless because voter just might cast another
e-vote. Main concern in Switzerland regarding this principle was voter’s computer which was
considered as weakest link where vote can be tampered. I believe that situation in Lithuania is
similar as in Estonia and Switzerland, that’s why these both systems should be combined into one.
In such case nor physical neither digital unnoticed and effective unlawful action would be
impossible.
40
Ardita Driza-Maurer, Oliver Spycher, Geo Taglioni and Anina Weber, E-voting for
Swiss abroad A joint project between the Confederation and the cantons, (Bern, 2011)
23
CONCLUSIONS
In this work was analyzing e-voting and its possibilities. Main question raised in work, is it
possible for e-voting to meet all principles attributable to democratic elections. Answer to this
question was sought through analysis of three countries that has implemented e-voting. Those three
countries are: Estonia, Brazil and Switzerland. Each one of them has different e-voting system
comparing with another two. Estonia has implemented remote e-voting or otherwise i-voting.
Switzerland has three models of remote – voting from cantons of Neuchatel, Geneva and Zurich.
But when is talking about Switzerland e-voting system it means Geneva e-voting system, because it
is used most common in Switzerland cantons. Brazil has e-voting with DRE. It means that all
ballots are recorded and counted by electronic machine.
Each elections in order to be described as democratic must be confirmed that these
principles were not damaged:
1. Direct elections
2. Universal elections
3. Secret elections
4. Equal elections
5. Free elections
Direct elections means that each voter can vote only for himself, main issue concerning
this principle is voter authentication. In traditional voting system voter authentication is executed in
monitored voting place. But such case is impossible during remote e-voting in Estonia or
Switzerland. Each of these countries chose different path to execute voters authentication. In
Estonia it is done with the help of Digital signature act and special ID card with microchip inside. It
is really convenient because this card must have all Estonia citizens and there are many public
places where card readers are available to use all the time. Switzerland voter authentication practice
is different than Estonian. In these three Switzerland cantons before elections all official documents
are sent out to voters by mail three weeks before the date of the voting. With enclosed information
voter can either cast vote by mail, online, or at the ballot box. Voting card that person gets is valid
24
only for the upcoming election. In fact, it signifies the right to vote in the election and ensures the
“one man, one vote” principle since it cannot be used a second time. Countries using DRE have
two options, voter’s authentication keep standard physical supervision, or use automated systems
such as biometric authentication. One of such countries is Brazil. Only three Brazilian cities in the
2008 municipal elections were using biometric voter’s authentication systems. Two years later, their
use was extended to 60 municipalities. 2012 October 7th Brazil held another municipal election and
7.5 million of 140 million Brazilian voters were using fingerprint-based biometric machines. Brazil
government expects to use biometric identification for the entirety of its electoral roll by 2018.
Universal election or universal suffrage is the right to vote, regardless of property
requirements or other measures of wealth. According the free encyclopedia universal suffrage has
two necessary components, the right to vote and opportunities to vote. In most democratic countries
as well in Lithuania basic requirement to get right to vote is age limit; eligible voter must be 18
years old, and capable. Brazil has the same requirements for eligible voters, but they has more
issues. There are high rate of illiterate people in Brazil and that was reason why in elections held in
1994 over 40 % of casted votes were blank. Usually in Brazil are hundreds of candidates so
elections officials often required writing down candidate name or number. And those illiterate
people were not able to do that, so instead they were just leaving ballots blank. When e-voting
system was introduced situation changed because it is very simple to use the DRE machine. Voter
just has to punch number of candidate and in the voting machine screen appears photo of the
candidate, so the voter can check if he‘s not mistaken. After that confirmation of the vote is
executed through three colored buttons. In Estonia as it were said earlier tools that are needed for
remote e-voting is ID card with microchip, card reader and computer. ID card is mandatory for
every Estonian citizen or resident alien. Later on Estonian government started project during which
established internet connection in public libraries, and equipped it with needed hardware and
software for e-voting. Estonia made e-voting to comply with universal voting principles by
providing tools, equipment and training. So even people unaccustomed to use computers or those
that do not have internet connection at living place would have competence and ability to cast their
vote by internet. Switzerland has the simplest way of ensuring right to vote for each eligible voter.
All all the information (passwords and voter card) is delivered by mail and person can choose which
form of voting is most suitable for him.
Secrecy of election principle means that voter‘s choice in elections has to be anonymous.
Estonia dealt with secrecy of voting requirement with „envelope method“. It‘s called like that
because this method is very similar to traditional postal voting only put in digital area. This
simplicity and resemblance helped Estonians to understand and trust that this method is available to
protect their votes anonymity. Brazilian e-voting is happening in polling place, so there is no
25
external influence, polling places are monitored and voting is secret, and it complies with
democracy standards as much as traditional voting. In Switzerland were different situation than in
Estonia there were some discussions isn’t privacy overrated, because high numbers of persons
loudly expresses their voting decisions in social networks or some other ways. But there were
applied very high standards that people would believe that votes casted electronically wouldn‘t be
possible to trace back to voter.
Equal elections has several interpretations, “a basic interpretation of this standard is that
each person only has one vote to cast“41Other interpretation requires that all voters votes would be
counted equally and third requires that all voters should have equal access to the place of voting.
Before launching of e-voting system in Estonia it‘s Supreme Court noted that it is impossible to
guarantee absolutely equal possibilities for all citizens during elections. But that is the reason why
there are different methods of voting provided by law. And citizens that are in different situation
can use different kinds of voting methods. E-voting in Brazil helped to restore equality during
election, because rights of those poor and illiterate people were violated. Violation happened mainly
because illiterate people were not able to express their opinion in writing during election. What an
improvement that was best showed first election when e-voting was available only in in largest ones
Brazilian municipalities, and the rest where still using paper ballots, and even then e-voting reduced
blank ballots by 10 % of total turnout. Switzerland e-voting case all procedures related to “one voter
– one vote” principle is kept as similar as possible to traditional paper ballot based voting. All
documentation before voting is sent by mail, and with information inside the voter card person may
vote traditional way, by mail or online. Voting card that person receives is valid only for an
upcoming elections, in the later ones information that is in voter card would be useless. Such
method ensures the “one man, one vote” principle since it cannot be used a second time.
Free elections principle means that elections must be executed without unlawful influence
on voter’s decision. It is very difficult to guarantee that in remote e-voting. That is the reason why
Estonian government implemented right for voter to replace his casted e-vote by another e-vote or a
paper ballot during election Day. Switzerland which has remote e-voting just as Estonia didn’t pay
so much attention to voter’s coercion during casting of e-vote. Main focus there is on system
stability. It is stated in Switzerland that weakest link in all e-voting system is voters computer.
That‘s why great deal of attention is paid to assure that votes were not tampered before reaching the
server. Brazil had different issues, after few elections were raised question of casted vote’s
verifiability. So after elections 2002 was introduced voter-verified paper audit trail. This system
41
Pierre Garrone, Fundamental and Political Rights in Electronic Elections, in The European Union and e-voting
(Alexander H. Trechsel & Fernando Mendez eds., 2005), p. 113.
26
enabled voter to see printed vote, how their vote were recorded, and this way ensures voters that
their casted vote was not tampered.
Switzerland, Estonia and Brazil have to meet requirements set by five democratic elections
principles. Fact that numerous elections were executed with help of e-voting and was recognized by
international community speaks that e-voting can guarantee democratic elections. Transparent evoting system combined with traditional and postal voting systems are able not only to maintain
high democratic values during elections, but even raises that bar a bit higher.
Lithuania is going towards e-voting system. Though it is still unclear which model will be
selected, here are some suggestions after reviewing Estonia’s, Switzerland’s and Brazil’s e-voting
models.
1. For voter’s authentication should be used ID cards with microchips. These cards are already
circulating in Lithuania and are often used to access e-government. So people are
accustomed to this card and use of it would help to gain trust of voters.
2. If Lithuania would decide to choose remote e- voting easier to guarantee opportunity to vote
because Lithuania is leading country in Europe according free public internet access points.
Over 75 % of Lithuania‘s people has a computer and 73 % of population are using internet
every day. So if remote e-voting would be implemented in Lithuania, people would have
opportunities and knowledge to use this voting method.
3. If Lithuania would decide to implement e-voting in order to comply with secret election
principle is necessary to maintain system stability. Vote that was casted electronically
should be impossible to trace back to the voter.
4. If Lithuania would decide to implement e-voting it should make e-voting additional voting
method. In such case none rights would be violated, and would be given opportunities for
those who cannot vote traditionally
5. In order to prevent voter’s coercion and tampering of the casted votes before they reach
servers Lithuania should combine Switzerland and Estonia’s experience. In such case nor
physical neither digital unnoticed and effective unlawful action would be impossible.
27
LITERATURE LIST
Legal acts:
1. Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo rinkimų įstatymas, 2012 11 16, Nr. I-2721
2. Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucija, 1992 10 25.
3. Digital Signature Act, 2000 03 08. (Estonia)
4. Local Government Council Election Act, 2002 03 27. (Estonia)
5. Riigikogu Election Act, 2002 06 12 (Estonia)
International legal acts:
1. UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 25: Article 25
(Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote), The Right to Participate in
Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service, 12 July
1996, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7, available
at:
http://www.refworld.org/docid/453883fc22.html [accessed 26 May 2013]
Foreign Court practice:
1. Judgment of the constitutional review chamber of the supreme court of Estonia:
Petition of the President of the Republic to declare the Local Government Council
Election Act Amendment Act, passed by the Riigikogu on 28 June 2005,
unconstitutional, (2005).
Special literature:
1. Volkamer M., Grimm R., Multiple Casts in Online Voting: Analyzing Chances.
Saarbrucken: German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence, 2006.
2. Spycher O., Koenig R., Haenni R., Schlapfer M., A New Approach Towards CoercionResistant Remote E-Voting in Linear Time. Zurich, Biel, Fribourg: 2009.
3. Philips M. D., Soudriette R. W., Testing Democracy: How Independent Testing of E
Voting Systems Safeguards Electoral Integrity. Colorado: 2011
4. Hidalgo F. D., Digital Democracy: The Consequences of Electronic Voting Technology
in Brazil. UC Berkeley: 2010.
28
5. Sutton M., When Personal Computers are Transformed into Ballot Boxes: How
Internet Elections in Estonia Comply with the United Nations InternationalCovenant
on Civil and Political Rights. American University International Law Review 23, 2009.
Vol. 2.
6. Alvarez R. M., Hall T. E., Trechsel A. H., Internet Voting in Estonia. Caltech/MIT
Voting Technology Project, 2008.
7. Gritzalis D., Secure Electronic Voting. Syros: 2002.
8. McGaley M., McCarthy J., Transparency and e-Voting Democratic vs. commercial
interests. [connected 2013-03-22]// available at: http://neu.e-voting.cc/wpcontent/uploads/Proceedings%202004/1.16.mcgaley_mccarthy_p153-164.pdf
9. Driza – Maurer A., Spycher O., Taglioni G., Weber A., E-Voting for Swiss Abroad.
[connected 2013-02-07]// available
at: http://www.bk.admin.ch/themen/pore/evoting/07311/index.html?lang=fr&download
=M3wBPgDB_8ull6Du36WenojQ1NTTjaXZnqWfVp7Yhmfhnapmmc7Zi6rZnqCkkId3f3
6BbKbXrZ6lhuDZz8mMps2gpKfo.
10. Gerlach J., Gasser U., Three Case Studies from Switzerland: E-Voting. [connected
2013-03-15]// available at:
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/GerlachGasser_SwissCases_Evoting.pdf
11. Volkamer M., Hutter D., From Legal Principles to an Internet Voting System.
[connected 2013-04-02]// available at:
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/GerlachGasser_SwissCases_Evoting.pdf
12. The National Election Committee, E-Voting System Overview. [connected 2013-0427]// available at: http://www.vvk.ee/public/dok/Yldkirjeldus-eng.pdf
13. Mägi T., Practical Security Analysis of I-voting Systems. Master’s Thesis 2007.
[connected 2013-05-07]// available at: http://triinu.net/e-voting/master%20thesis%20evoting%20security.pdf.
14. McGaley M., Gibson P., Verification and Maintenance of e-Voting Systems and
Standards. [connected 2013-03-19]// available at: http://www-public.itsudparis.eu/~gibson/Research/Publications/E-Copies/ECEG08.pdf
15. Pieters W., Becker M. J., Ethics of evoting An essay on requirements and values in
Internet elections. [connected 2013-03-15]// available at:
http://eprints.eemcs.utwente.nl/13894/
16. Ü. Madise, Priit Vinkel. Constitutionality of Remote Internet Voting: The Estonian Perspective.
[connected 2013-04-13]// available at:
http://www.juridicainternational.eu/public/pdf/ji_2011_1_4.pdf
17. Matten E., Towards remote e-voting: Estonian case. [connected 2013-02-04]// available at:
http://subs.emis.de/LNI/Proceedings/Proceedings47/Proceeding.GI.47-9.pdf
18. Gritzalis D. A., Principles and requirements for a secure e-voting system.[connected 2013-0315]// available at: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404802010143
19. Thomas Fujiwara, Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness,and Infant Health: Evidence
from Brazil. [connected 2013-05-05]// available at:
http://www.princeton.edu/~fujiwara/papers/elecvote_site.pdf
20. Chevallier M., Warynski M, Sandoz M., Success Factors of Geneva’s e-Voting System.
[connected 2013-05-15] available at:
http://www.ejeg.com/issue/download.html?idArticle=78.
21. Pierre Garrone, Fundamental and Political Rights in Electronic Elections, in The
European Union and e-voting
29
22. Epstein J., Symposium: Privacy, Democracy, and Elections, *885 INTERNET
VOTING, SECURITY, AND PRIVACY. William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal May,
2011.
23. Miller B. J., THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE, THE RIGHT TO KNOW, AND
ELECTRONIC VOTING IN MONTANA. Montana Law Review Summer, 2008
24. Niemi R., THE IRONY OF ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINES. Albany Law Journal
of Science and Technology, 2008.
25. http://countrystudies.us/brazil/100.htm
26. http://www.idea.int/publications/introducing-electronic-voting/upload/PP_e-voting.pdf
27. http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ivote/final_report.pdf
28. http://www.verifiedvoting.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/NSFInternetVotingReport.pdf
29. http://www.parliament.uk/documents/post/pn155.pdf
30. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_ballot
31. http://subs.emis.de/LNI/Proceedings/Proceedings47/Proceeding.GI.47-7.pdf
30