LECTURE 8: EMOTION REGULATION
Key word:
 “Control”: from the control of emotions to self-control
Introduction (1/4)
The importance of regulation
Biological pathways linking early life stress to later psychopathology:
In girls but not boys, a history of
maternal stress during infancy
predicts heightened basal
afternoon cortisol during
childhood, which predicts
reduced resting-state
amygdala-vmPFC functional
connectivity during
adolescence. Variability in this
functional connectivity, in turn,
mediates the association
between childhood cortisol and
adolescent symptoms of
anxiety and depression.
Emotion regulation & emotional disorders:
Anxiety disorders, mood disorders, or borderline personality disorder are defined by dysregulated emotional states
(DSM).
Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, schizophrenia, or autism do not require but include emotion dysregulation
(DSM).
1
A circumplex model of affect:
There are a large number of secondary emotions: emotions that
provide us with more complex feelings about our social worlds
and that are more cognitively based. The secondary emotions are
derived from the basic emotions but are more cognitive in
orientation.
Model of emotional sensitivity versus emotion regulation:
To illustrate the distinction between emotional sensitivity and emotion regulation, the figure above displays the
development of an emotional response over time. To simplify matters, the figure only shows a single emotional
response with a single maximum strength.
Emotional sensitivity is represented by the entry gradient, or the steepness with which the emotional response
reaches its full force. Emotional sensitivity is determined by any variable that influences people’s initial emotional
response to the situation, including the nature of the stimuli that people encounter, personal characteristics, and the
broader situation.
The offset of the emotional response is depicted in the figure as the exit gradient, or the steepness with which the
emotional response returns to a neutral baseline. Variables that influence the exit gradient belong to the process of
emotion regulation. Similar to emotional sensitivity, emotion regulation is determined by the characteristics of the
person, the stimuli that the person encounters, and the broader situation.
Down-regulation processes aim to achieve a steeper exit gradient, resulting in a speedier return to the baseline. By
contrast, maintenance processes aim to achieve a flatter exit gradient, such that the emotional response is
maintained over a longer period of time. Up-regulation processes may even increase the magnitude of the emotion
response, for instance, when people engage in response exaggeration.
2
Labels & taxonomies





Automatic*
Implicit
Intrinsic
Proactive (antecedent)
Self-regulation 1, with the emphasis on self (me)
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
controlled/voluntary
explicit
extrinsic
reactive (response)
self-regulation 2, with the emphasis on regulation
(control)
And (!) …
 Self-regulation (resources account, ego depletion**,
willpower)
vs.
emotion regulation (process account)
* Automatic ≠ implicit ≠ self-regulation.
** Ego depletion: Ego depletion refers to the idea that self-control or willpower draw upon a limited pool of mental
resources that can be used up.[1] When the energy for mental activity is low, self-control is typically impaired,
which would be considered a state of ego depletion. In particular, experiencing a state of ego depletion impairs
the ability to control oneself later on. A depleting task requiring self-control can have a hindering effect on a
subsequent self-control task, even if the tasks are seemingly unrelated. Self-control plays a valuable role in the
functioning of the self on both individualistic and interpersonal levels.
Caveat: Emotion regulation is not always adaptive.
3
Self-regulation/Self-control (2/4)
 Self-regulation (resources account, ego depletion**, willpower) vs. emotion regulation (process account)
The imbalance of motivations contributing to the refractory period of self-control:
According to the elaborated process model, the refractory period of self-control is the product of an imbalance
between motivational needs for exploration, leisure, and ‘want-to’ goals after having exerted effort on exploitation,
labor, and ‘have-to’ goals. This desire for balance originates from evolutionary pressures motivating organisms to
trade-off their desires for exploitation of a known resource against exploration of potentially new resources
(ultimate level). This adaptive function translates to a natural tendency to seek a balance between desires for
externally rewarded labor versus inherently rewarding leisure (intermediate level). This motivated switching
between labor and leisure is evolutionarily adaptive because it allows
an organism not only to mentally engage in a task to attain rewards
and resources, but also to disengage from it and seek activities that
may be even more gratifying. These ultimate and intermediate
accounts lay the groundwork for a process account suggesting
that initial acts of control lead to shifts in motivation away from
‘have-to’ or ‘ought-to’ goals, and toward ‘want-to’ goals
(proximate level). Thus, previous acts of cognitive effort lead
people to prefer activities that they deem enjoyable or gratifying over
activities that they feel they ought to carry out because they correspond
to some obligation or introjected goal.
How self-control exertion at time 1 leads to self-control failure at time 2:
According to the elaborated process
model, self-control exertion at time 1
leads to the motivated switching of task
priorities, wherein mental work become
increasingly aversive, making mental
leisure increasingly attractive. These
changing task priorities translate to
shifts in motivation away from ‘have-to’
goals and toward ‘want-to’ goals.
Because motivation can be decomposed
to a mental representation of a goalstate and the emotion (i.e., valence and
arousal) that gives this goal-state vigor,
shifts in motivational priorities lead to
attendant changes in attention and
emotion to ‘have-to’ versus ‘want-to’
goals. Thus, self-control exertion at time
1 alters the salience of (and attention to)
‘have-to’ versus ‘want-to’ goals and the
intensity of experienced emotions
associated with these goals.
4
Self-regulation: 3 ingredients forming a loop:
“The extent to which people influence, modify or control their own behavior”
1) Standards
2) Monitoring
3) Operating
Limited capacity! Depletion! Implied attention control!
Moment of weakness >< irresistible impulses
Underregulation vs. Misregulation
Feedback loop (self-regulation):
Addiction:
A healthy brain:
A dysregulated brain:
This model sums up brain circuits involved with addiction and obesity: reward/saliency, motivation/drive,
memory/conditioning and inhibitory control/emotional regulations. Disrupted activity in brain regions involved with
inhibitory control/emotional regulation when coupled with enhanced activation of reward/saliency and
memory/conditioning leads to enhanced activation of the motivational/drive circuit and the resultant compulsive
behaviour (drug taking or food ingestion) when the individual is exposed to the reinforcer (drug or food),
conditioned cues or a stressor. Note that circuits that regulate mood as well as internal awareness (interoception)
are also likely to modulate the ability to exert control over incentive drives.
5
How to measure it:
 with the “check the loop”-approach with specific tasks (often implicit; depletion investigated)
 with explicit instructions and effects on task/stimuli
 with self-reports/questionnaires (e.g., reappraisal vs. suppression)
Ego depletion
A classical ego depletion study:
In an experiment, people who forced themselves to eat radishes instead of tempting chocolates subsequently quit
faster on unsolvable puzzles than people who had not had to exert self-control over eating.
Stroop performance as a function of self-control and glucose conditions:
The study sought to provide evidence of a causal
relationship between glucose and self-control by using
direct manipulations of blood glucose available for selfregulatory tasks. Participants first completed either a task
that required self-control (attention control) or a task that
did not require self-control. Participants then drank a
lemonade that had been sweetened either with sugar (and
hence glucose) or Splenda (a good tasting sugar substitute
that does not increase blood glucose). The sugar lemonade
shake should restore glucose. It was predicted that
participants who controlled their attention during the first
task would perform worse on a subsequent stroop task
than participants who did not control their attention, but
that a glucose drink would attenuate this effect.
The interaction effect of the self-control condition and the glucose condition was significant and consistent with
predictions (see Figure 2 for adjusted means). In the placebo condition, attention control participants made more
errors. This, however, was not the case in the glucose condition. A glucose drink thus eliminated the tendency for an
initial self-control task to impair stroop performance, consistent with the hypothesis that glucose replenishes what
has been depleted.
6
Disturbed glucose disposal in patients with Major Depression:
19 patients with typical major depressive disorder (MDD), 7 patients with atypical major depression, and 30 men and
women of a healthy comparator group were studied using a stepwise glucose clamp procedure. The glucose clamp
technique is considered to be the “gold standard” for the assessment of whole-body glucose disposal. Glucose
disposal rates were assessed and concentrations of hormones involved in glucose allocation were measured.
Whole-body glucose disposal was reduced in patients with typical and atypical depression. The observed
neuroendocrine responses suggest a hyperactive allocation system in typical depression and a hypoactive allocation
system in atypical depression.
Prevalence of depression in individuals with impaired glucose metabolism or undiagnosed diabetes:
This study examined the prevalence of depression in impaired glucose metabolism (IGM) and undiagnosed diabetes
(UDD) subjects relative to each other and to normal glucose metabolism (NGM) and previously diagnosed type 2
diabetes (PDD) subjects by reviewing the literature and conducting a meta-analysis of studies on this topic.
Results of this meta-analysis show that the risk of depression is similar for normal glucose metabolism (NGM),
impaired glucose metabolism (IGM), and undiagnosed diabetes (UDD) subjects. Previously diagnosed type 2 diabetes
(PDD) subjects have an increased risk of depression relative to impaired glucose metabolism (IGM) and undiagnosed
diabetes (UDD) subjects.
Brain basis
Functional neuroimaging studies of self-regulation:
Functional neuroimaging studies of self-regulation and its failures suggest that self-regulation involves a balance
between subcortical brain regions representing the reward, salience and emotional value of a stimulus and
prefrontal regions associated with self-control. When this balance tips in favor of subcortical regions, thus bottomup impulses, either because of a failure to engage prefrontal control areas, thus top-down mechanisms, or because
of an especially strong impulse (e.g. the sight and smell of cigarettes for an abstinent smoker), then the likelihood of
self-regulatory failure increases.
7
Directed-forgetting task and activations:
The working memory directed-forgetting task is composed of 3 trial types: lure, yes, and control trials.
On each trial, 6 words were presented for
storage in working memory, following which
participants were directed to forget three of
these words. A probe word was then presented,
and participants had to indicate whether the
probe was one of the remaining stored words.
The critical feature of this task is that sometimes
participants were presented probe items
(“lures”) that had to be forgotten from working
memory, hence, requiring a negative response.
Responses (accuracy and reaction time) to these
critical lures were compared with responses to
probes that had not been presented in the
memory set (“controls”, i.e., probes that were
not in memory to begin with).
Significant activation for the lure-control contrast
across all participants is seen in:
- the left inferior frontal gyrus (LiFG)
- the right inferior frontal gyrus (RiFG)
- the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)/superior
frontral gyrus (sFG)
- the caudate
- the precuneus
- the left inferior parietal lobule (LiPL)
In this sensitivity map positive and negative values are
distributed across the feature-selected network, particularly in
the left inferior frontal gyrus (LiFG), showing that the whole
network was involved in classification and that regions were not
entirely selective for one group.
Areas in blue represent voxels that are higher in low-delayers’
maps. Areas in orange/yellow represent voxels that are higher in
high-delayers’ maps. The QD classifier was a bit more accurate in
classifying high delayers than low delayers. This was not
surprising given that high delayers were more homogeneous as
a group in their pattern of activation and, therefore, clustered
together more tightly. Considered collectively, these analyses
suggest that dimensionality of brain networks and subsequent
classification maps provide important information concerning
biological predictors of self-control ability.
8
Self-control in decision-making involves modulation of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) valuation
system:
The researchers recruited self-reported dieters and used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to study the
neural activity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) while the
participants made real decisions about which foods to eat. Participants performed three tasks in the scanner. In the
first two parts, they rated 50 different food items for taste and health separately. On the basis of these ratings, we
selected a reference item for each subject that was rated neutral in both taste and health. In the final part, subjects
were asked to choose between each of the foods and the reference item. One decision was randomly selected and
implemented at the end of the study. Participants
indicated the strength of their decision by using a
five-point scale (strong no, no, neutral, yes, and
strong yes), which provided a measure of their
relative value for eating that food instead of the
reference item. Following the previous literature,
we refer to this measure as a goal value, which
refers to the amount of expected reward
associated with consuming the food.
You can see the percentage of the time participants chose the food over the
reference item. The self-controllers (SC) group chose not to eat likedunhealthy food items more often than the bon-self-controllers (NSC) group
did. The self-controllers (SC) group also ate liked-healthy food items more
often than the non-self-controllers (NSC) group did. Error bars denote
standard errors.
Regions of ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) in which activity correlated
with goal values across all participants and regardless of their degree of selfcontrol were found.
Beta values in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) increased with goal
values.
9
The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) area reflecting goal values in the
current study (yellow) overlaps with several areas that have been found to
correlate with goal values in previous studies.
On the left you can see correlations between ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC) activity and health and taste rating.
Left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG)/Brodmann’s area 46 (BA46) showed negative taskrelated functional connectivity with the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC)
during decisions about unhealthy items by the self-controllers (SC) group.
Conjunction analysis showed voxels that were correlated with goal values and
exhibiting significant positive task-related functional connectivity with left inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG)/Brodmann’s area 46 (BA46).
10
This diagram summarizes the results and illustrates the path through which the left
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) might modulate activity in the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). Blue lines represent negative interactions, and red lines
represent positive ones.
11
Emotion-regulation (3/4)
 Proactive (antecedent) vs. reactive (response)
The modal model of emotion:
A process model of emotion regulation (1):
A process model of emotion regulation (2):
According to this model, emotion may be regulated at five points in the emotion generative process: (1) selection of
the situation; (2) modification of the situation; (3) deployment of attention; (4) change of cognitions; and (5)
modulation of experiential, behavioral, or physiological responses. The first four of these are antecedent focused,
the fifth is response focused. The number of response options shown at each of these five points is arbitrary.
We focus on two specific emotion regulation strategies: reappraisal and suppression.
12
Hypothetical continuum illustrating relationships among the forms of cognitive control of emotion:
The left and right anchors for the continuum represent the exclusive use of attentional control or cognitive change,
respectively, to modulate emotion perception and/or responses. Red and blue text denote strategies for controlled
emotion generation and regulation, respectively. This continuum is intended to serve a heuristic function, helping to
visualize relationships among control strategies
Extended model of emotion regulation:
The x-axis represents time prior to and subsequent to an emotionally arousing event (time 0) and the y-axis
represents the range of regulatory processes from habitual to effortful. Example regulatory processes are indicated
with filled circles. Affect-biased attention, in yellow, is an antecedent and reflexive form of emotion regulation
involving visual selective attention that tunes the contents of what we ‘see’ in the first place, before we encounter it.
13
Classification in terms of targets and functions:
A dual classification in terms of targets and functions was found to be helpful in organising the literature on
emotion-regulation strategies.
1. Need-oriented emotion regulation for hedonic needs:
including strategies of:
a) turning attention away from negative information or towards positive information
b) interpretative biases
c) bodily activities such as binge eating or smoking
2. Goal oriented emotion regulation for goal pursuits:
including strategies of:
a) distraction through cognitive load
b) cognitive reappraisal
c) bodily activities such as expressive suppression, response exaggeration, and venting
3. Person oriented emotion regulation for maintenance of the global personality:
including strategies of:
a) attentional counter regulation
b) cognitive activities such as expressive writing or accessing autobiographical memories
c) bodily activities such as controlled breathing and progressive muscle relaxation
There is consistent empirical support for each of these strategies, though more work remains necessary to fully
understand their underlying processes.
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ):
14
Emotion regulation strategies and psychopathology groups:
 Avoidance was positively associated with anxiety,
depression, and eating.
 Rumination was positively associated with
anxiety, depression, eating, and substance.
 Suppression was positively associated with
anxiety, depression, and eating.
Conversely, problem solving was negatively
associated with anxiety, depression and eating.
Reappraisal was marginally negatively associated
with anxiety, negatively associated with depression,
and not associated with eating.
Activations in the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC), medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC):
15
Activations in lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC):
Above you can see the activations in (a) lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) and (b) medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC)
associated with different forms of cognitive control over emotional responding located dorsal and ventral to z=20
(roughly the median z-coordinate). Each point corresponds to an activation focus representing the results of a
contrast isolating regions related to control, shape- and color-coded according to the type of strategy used.
The (c) activation key indicates which shapes correspond to which types of cognitive control. As described in the
text, regulation strategies differ in the extent to which they draw upon dorsal prefrontal cortex systems supporting
redescription of emotional associations or ventral prefrontal cortex systems supporting alteration of these
associations through choice and learning.
As is illustrated in (a) and (b) and listed (by reference number) in (d), reappraisal and placebo recruit dorsal medial
prefrontal cortex (dorsal MPFC) and both dorsal and ventral lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC), whereas extinction and
reversal primarily recruit dorsal and ventral medial prefrontal cortex (dorsal and ventral MPFC) and only ventral
lateral prefrontal cortex (ventral LPFC). Fewer studies have examined attentional distraction and emotion
generation, which recruit ventral lateral prefrontal cortex (ventral LPFC) and both dorsal and ventral medial
prefrontal cortex (dorsal and ventral MPFC).
16
A functional–anatomical organization of regions supporting the role of mental state attribution (MSA) in emotion:
Mental state attribution (MSA) = one type of social cognitive capacity in processing emotion, i.e., the ability to
explain behavior in terms of intentional mental states. The role of it can be considered in three domains: (i)
understanding emotion, (ii) learning emotionally significant information and (iii) regulation of emotional responses.
Midline regions [e.g. medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC)] interconnected with
emotion centers support representations of internal states and might be coding
emotional qualities of mental state attributions (MSAs). By contrast, lateral
regions [e.g. the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) and temporal parietal junction
(TPJ)] interconnected with visuospatial centers support externally generated
representations and might be coding cognitive aspects of mental state
attribution (MSA).
Closely aligned to the midline section along with the insula (①), posterior
regions [e.g. the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), posterior insula (PI) and the
medial anterior cingulate cortex (mACC)] support simple ‘first-order’ sensory
aspects of mental state attribution (MSA), whereas representational complexity
increases as the information is re-represented in more anterior regions [e.g.
medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC)].
② Ventral regions [e.g. the amygdala (A), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), striatum
(Stri) and ventral MPFC (vMPFC)] are predominantly engaged in stimulus-driven
processes, whereas dorsal regions [e.g. dorsal MPFC (dMPFC) and LPFC] support
performance monitoring and reflective processes of mental state attribution
(MSA).
Schematic of major anatomical sub-divisions in the frontal lobes:
Boundaries and Brodmann areas (BA) are only approximate.
Arrows indicate anatomical directions of anterior/rostral (front)
versus posterior/caudal (back) and dorsal (up) versus ventral
(down).
17
Theoretical accounts of the rostro-caudal gradient in the prefrontal cortex (PFC):
a. From a working memory perspective, rostral and caudal prefrontal cortex (rostral and caudal PFC) can be
distinguished on the basis of processing domain general versus specific representations. Hierarchical versions of
this perspective propose that domain-specific posterior frontal regions can be modulated by the maintenance
domain general rules in anterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (anterior DLPFC) and frontal polar cortex (FPC) .
b. Relational complexity proposes a gradient in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) with respect to evaluation of simple
stimulus properties, first-order relationships among the properties, and second-order relationships among
relationships.
c. The cascade model proposes four levels of control that are distinguished by temporally disparate control signals,
either sensory, context, episodic or branching.
d. Abstract representational hierarchy proposes that regions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) are distinguished by the
level of abstraction at which representations compete in a hierarchy of action representations.
Lateralized organization of superior, lateral prefrontal cortex with regard to the hierarchical model of motivation:
The thickness of the arrows corresponds to the hypothesized
strength of the relationship. The larger brain is an axial view of
the superior surface of the brain viewed from above. The smaller
brain is a sagittal view of the lateral surface of the right
hemisphere. The location and coverage of the ovals/circles is
meant to represent a relative placement rather than a
delineation of specific cortex.
18
Suppression
An emotional suppression study:
The first trial began when subjects were told that the television screen would be blank for about a minute and that
this time should be used to "clear your mind of all thoughts, feelings, and memories". After this I-min baseline
period, subjects received the following instructions: "We will now be showing you a short film clip. It is important to
us that you watch the film clip carefully, but if you find the film too distressing, just say 'stop.' " These instructions
were followed by the neutral film, and after the film there was a I-min postfilm period. Subjects then completed a
self-report inventory to assess their emotional reactions during the neutral film.
The second trial began with the same 1 min baseline procedure. Subjects were given the foregoing instructions a
second time and then watched the burn film. After the film, there was a 1 min postfilm period, and then subjects
completed a self-report inventory to assess their emotional reactions during the burn film.
The third trial began with the same 1 min baseline procedure. Subjects then received one of two sets of instructions,
as determined by their random assignment to one of two conditions (no suppression or suppression). For subjects in
the no suppression condition (n = 22), the foregoing instructions were repeated. Subjects in the suppression
condition (n = 21), however, received the following instructions:
“[…] This time, if you have any feelings as you watch the film clip, please try your best not to let those feelings show.
In other words, as you watch the film clip, try to behave in such a way that a person watching you would not know
you were feeling anything. Watch the film clip carefully, but please try to behave so that someone watching you
would not know that you are feeling anything at all.”
Subjects then watched the amputation film, which was followed by a 1 min postfilm period. After the postfilm
period, subjects completed a self-report inventory to assess their emotional reactions during the amputation film.
1 Ratings of disgust expressive behavior (change
from prefilm baseline) for amputation film and
postfilm periods, with standard errors of the
mean.
2 Ratings of overall facial movement [change
from prefilm baseline] 1 for amputation film
and postfilm periods, with standard errors of
the mean.
3 Ratings of face touching [percentage of
subjects who touched their face] for
amputation film and postfilm periods, with
standard errors of the mean.
4 Ratings of body movement [change from
prefilm baseline 1] for amputation film and
postfilm periods, with standard errors of the
mean.
5 Frequency of blinks [change from prefilm
baseline 1] for amputation film and postfilm
periods, with standard errors of the mean.)
19
Emotion self-reports by condition for the amputation film, with standard errors of the mean:
Above you can see second-by-second scores (change from prefilm baseline) for finger pulse amplitude during the
amputation film. (Note that the ordinate's scale is such that increased arousal [i.e., decreases in finger pulse
amplitude] is upward.)
Above you can see second-by-second scores (change from prefilm baseline) for skin conductance level during the
amputation film. (Note that the ordinate's scale is such that increased arousal [i.e., increases in skin conductance
level] is upward.)
20
Emotion suppression and memory:
All participants viewed emotionally negative and neutral pictures and were asked to rate the pictures according to
their subjectively experienced arousal. Participants in the emotion suppression group were instructed to suppress
their emotions elicited by the pictures, whereas the others
simply watched the pictures. First, participants shortly practiced
the picture-viewing task outside the fMRI scanner. After
practicing, participants were positioned in the fMRI scanner.
Next, they performed the picture-viewing task, while functional
MR-images were acquired. Participants did not know that the
pictures had to be recalled afterwards and were not instructed
to remember the pictures for later free recall.
Subjects in the emotion suppression group remembered fewer negative
and neutral pictures.
Participants in the watch group showed more activity in the right hippocampus
compared to subjects in the emotion suppression group during encoding of
subsequently recalled pictures independent of picture valence.
For exploratory purposes the parameter estimates at the peak voxel in the right
hippocampus for negative and neutral pictures separately is showed.
21
Reappraisal
Meta-analysis of reappraisal studies:
Formal meta-analysis detected consistent reappraisal-related activations across nine reappraisal studies that used
IAPS pictures for negative emotion induction. In an extended sample of 13 studies which included further studies
using other negative emotion induction methods similar consistent activations were observed. The only additional
frontal activation cluster found in meta-analysis was in the right anterior lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC). (See
rightmost slice.)
An fMRI study of cognitive reappraisal:
The event-related emotion regulation task was used in this study. At the start of each trial, an instruction word was
presented in the middle of the screen (‘decrease’ or ‘look’; 4 seconds), a picture was presented (negative if
instruction was decrease (regulation instruction), negative or neutral if instruction was look (non-regulation
instruction; 8 seconds) followed by a rating period (scale from 1–4; 4 seconds) and then the word ‘relax’ (4 seconds).
The comparisons from the 8-second picture presentation period are the only trial periods reported here. Following
presentation of each picture, participants were prompted to answer the question ‘How negative do you feel?’ on a
scale from 1 to 4 (where 1 was labeled ‘weak’ and 4 was labeled ‘strong’).
22
Here you see the ratings of self-reported negative affect taken
after each trial for conditions in which individuals were asked
to look and respond naturally to neutral pictures (Look
Neutral), look and respond naturally to negative pictures (Look
Negative) and use cognitive reappraisal to decrease their
negative affect while looking at negative pictures (Decrease
Negative).
On the left the whole brain activations in men and women for
the regulation contrast (Decrease Negative > Look
Negative) are represented. Midline anterior cingulate activity is
shown in panel A. Panels B and C are lateral renderings of the
right and left sides of the brain respectively.
There’s greater left amygdala activity in men
than women for the down-regulation contrast
(Look Negative > Decrease Negative). Men show
greater down-regulation of left amygdala, as
evidenced by greater decreases when using
cognitive regulation. Contrast values from this
region for the regulation contrast (Look
Negative > Decrease Negative) and reactivity
contrast (Look Negative > Look Neutral) are
shown on the right.
There’s greater ventral striatum activity in
women than men for the regulation contrast
(Decrease Negative > Look Negative). Contrast
values from this region for the regulation
contrast (Look Negative > Decrease Negative)
and reactivity contrast (Look Negative > Look
Neutral) are shown on the right.
Kanske
23
Impaired regulation of emotion: neural correlates of reappraisal and distraction in bipolar disorder and unaffected
relatives:
Design:
The experimental paradigm confronted participants with 32 emotional, highly arousing (16 negative, 16 positive) and
16 neutral, low arousing images (from the International Affective Picture System, IAPS). They were required to
simply view the pictures (view condition) or to downregulate the emotional response by reinterpreting the meaning
of the stimuli (reappraisal condition) or by distraction through an arithmetic task (distraction condition). Each picture
was presented once in each condition (except for neutral images, which were not presented in the reappraisal
condition) yielding 128 pseudorandomly presented trials.
Instructions regarding the condition were displayed after an
initial emotion induction phase (1 s) as a semi-transparent
overlay on the images. The regulation phase (6 s) was followed
by a rating of participants’ current emotional state on a ninepoint scale using the Self-Assessment Manikins ranging from
unpleasant to pleasant (4 s). Participants were instructed and
trained outside the scanner in the application of the emotion
regulation strategies. Six additional training trials were
presented inside the scanner. In case of any difficulties with the
procedure, the practice block was repeated, which resolved all
problems as reported by the participants. Participants
completed a questionnaire after the experiment that asked for
the applied regulation techniques to ensure correct application
of the instructions.
Twenty-two euthymic patients with bipolar-I disorder (BD) and 17 unaffected first-degree relatives of BD-I patients
(Rel), as well as two groups of healthy gender-, age- and education-matched controls (Con) were included in this
study. Euthymia in bipolar disorder is simply defined as a relatively stable mood state, a normal, non-depressed,
reasonably positive mood…
Emotional state ratings during the experiment:
The means of self-assessment-Manikin-valenceratings are displayed for bipolar patients (left),
healthy relatives (right) and their respective
controls.
Analysis of the emotional state ratings after each trial yielded a significant main effect of emotion in the viewing
condition. Planned comparisons revealed that negative and positive trials differed from each other and from neutral
trials indicating successful emotion induction. There were no group effects regarding bipolar patients and controls,
but regarding relatives and their controls there was a significant interaction of emotion and group indicating less
positive ratings of positive stimuli in relatives. Comparing bipolar patients with relatives showed the same pattern.
24
Regarding the effects of the different regulation strategies on emotional state, a significant main effect of emotion, a
main effect of task, as well as a significant interaction of emotion and task were found. Repeated contrasts regarding
the interaction revealed that emotional pictures were rated less negative or positive during distraction and
reappraisal as compared with the view condition. There were no group effects regarding bipolar patients and
controls, but regarding relatives and their controls there was a significant interaction of emotion and task with group
indicating stronger downregulation of positive emotion during reappraisal in controls. There were no differences
between bipolar patients and relatives.
Effects on the amygdala:
a An increased amygdala activation during reappraisal
was found for bipolar patients compared with their
respective controls, as well as % signal change in the
left amygdala.
b An increased amygdala activation during reappraisal
was found for relatives of bipolar patients, compared
with their respective controls, too, as well as % signal
change in the left amygdala.
c The difference in % signal change between the
reappraisal and view conditions correlated negatively
with habitual reappraisal use in the Cognitive
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ).
d Habitual reappraisal use in the Cognitive Emotion
Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ) was also decreased
in bipolar patients and relatives.
Orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) regions of reversed functional connectivity to the left amygdala in bipolar patients (a) and
healthy relatives (b) compared with their respective controls:
25
Conclusions (4/4)
Functional neuroimaging studies of self-regulation:
Don’t forget following figure. The explanation of it was given on page 7.
Neural model of emotion regulation illustrating neural systems implicated in voluntary and automatic
subprocesses of emotion regulation:
Feedforward pathway: medial prefrontal cortical
system, including the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), the
subgenual and rostral anterior cingulate gyrus
(subgenual and rostral ACG), the hippocampus and
parahippocampus and the dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex (MdPFC)
Feedback pathway: lateral prefrontal cortical system,
including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and
the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC)
26