“Human Freedom and the
Self”
Roderick Chisholm
The Free Will Problem:
„
“The metaphysical problem of human freedom ….
– “Human beings are [morally] responsible agents;
“…but this fact appears to conflict with a deterministic view of human
action (the view that every event that is involved in an act is caused by some
other event);
„ “…and it also appears to conflict with an indeterministic view of human
action (the view that the act, or some event that is essential to the act, is not
caused at all.)”
„
Chisholm’s Challenge:
„
If an act has no cause at all (i.e., is the result of random chance),
it makes no sense to hold someone morally responsible for it.
– Ayer also made this point.
„
If an act was caused by a prior event (which was in turn caused
by a prior event, etc., i.e., was caused by something outside the
agent’s control), we shouldn’t hold the agent responsible for it.
– Compatibilists (like Ayer) disagree on this point.
„
Is there any alternative? I.e., is it possible for an act to be
caused, and yet not caused by a prior event?
– For it to be caused, but such that one could have done otherwise?
»
For Chisholm, it makes sense to hold people morally responsible for their
behavior only if there is another alternative.
Freedom and Moral Responsibility:
•
“…if a man is responsible for a certain event or a certain state
of affairs, then that event or state of affairs was brought about by
some act of his, and the act was something in his power either to
perform or not to perform.”
•
Alternately put: we hold people morally responsible for an act
only if they could have acted otherwise, i.e., only if they had
contra-causal freedom with respect to that act.
Libertarian Freedom:
What Chisholm believes we must have in order to be
morally responsible.
•
Moral responsibility presupposes that the agent is “in control.”
• The factor that makes the difference (in whether or not some act is
committed) is the agent who chooses the outcome.
•
Freedom for libertarians requires that a free agent could have
chosen otherwise,
• i.e., it requires contra-causal freedom.
“We must not say that every event involved
in the [free] act is caused by some othe r
event; and we must not say that it is not
caused at all.”
“We should say that at least one of the events that are involved in
the [free] act is caused, not by any other events, but by something
else instead. And this something else can only be the agent….”
Indeterminism implies free acts have no
cause at all.
•
Chisholm’s Objection to Indeterminism:
•
•
If the event is not determined by a cause, it is the result of random
chance, which is not consistent with moral responsibility.
What Chisholm concludes:
–
–
–
In order to have moral freedom, we must deny that free events are
completely caused by previous events.
But we don’t want to claim that free events are not caused at all (as this
would make them the results of random chance).
So it must be that free events are not (ultimately) caused by a previous
event, but instead are caused by the agent.
In Other Words:
„
When we say that an act is “free” (i.e., that it involved the kind
of freedom necessary for moral responsibility)…
– We do not mean that …
» it had no cause, or
» that it was caused by a previous event (which was caused by a previous event,
and so on).
– We do mean that …
» it was caused by a person.
„
This is what Chisholm means by an “agent.”
Two Types of Causes:
“… a staff moves a stone, and is moved by a hand, which is moved
by a man.” —Aristotle
•
Event causation: (“Transeunt” Causation )—An event or states of affairs
that is caused by a previous event.
•
Agent Causation: (“Immanent” causation)—An event or states of affairs
that is caused not by a previous event, but by an agent.
• Where an “agent” is an “actor,” i.e., a “person” with a free will.
Indeterminism and Libertarianism:
„
Agree that moral responsibility presupposes contra-causal
freedom (i.e., that the agent could have acted otherwise).
„
Disagree that …
– … Contra-causal freedom presupposes that an act have no cause
whatsoever.
» The indeterminist believes this, but Chisholm’s libertarianism denies this.
– … Moral responsibility presupposes that an act have no cause
whatsoever.
» Again, the indeterminist seems committed to this, but Chisholm’s
libertarianism denies this.
Libertarianism:
„
1) The kind of freedom requisite for moral responsibility is not
compatible with the claim that every event has a physical cause.
„
2) But, Libertarians say, this principle is false.
–
„
On Chisholm’s view, this is not because some events have no cause
whatsoever (this is what the Indeterminist believes), but because some
events (namely, free acts) are caused by something other than a
physical event—i.e., by an agent.
3) So, human beings are free and so are morally responsible for
(some of) their behavior.
–
These free acts are caused, but not ultimately by a physical event, and
are caused in such a way that the agent could have acted otherwise.
The difference:
Both presuppose that the agent could have acted otherwise, i.e.,
that the agent had contra-causal freedom with respect to the act.
„
Libertarianism:
–
„
Distinguishes between agent causation and event causation. (Morally)
free acts not caused by a physical event, but are caused by an agent,
and so contra-causal freedom is possible even if an act is caused.
Indeterminism:
–
Assumes that all causes are physical events, and so contra-causal
freedom is possible only if an act is uncaused.
Chisholm’s Libertarianism:
„
Explaining freewill does not require strict indeterminism, i.e.,
the claim that free acts are not caused.
„
Yet, free will is not possible if one’s acts are (completely)
caused by previous events.
„
So, to explain free will without adopting indeterminism,
Chisholm claims that free acts are not uncaused, but are caused
by “agents,” and not (solely) by previous events.
–
i.e., the ultimate cause of your free action is you.
Objection: Agent Causation is Incoherent
„
What, exactly, is an “agent?”
– Does agent causation presuppose substance dualism, i.e., does it
presuppose the existence of non-physical “minds” or “souls?”
„
What exactly, is agent causation?
– To claim that an event “inside” an agent causes the agent to act is (so
far) just event causation. Agent causation says that something that is
not an event (i.e., the agent) is the ultimate cause of the choosing. But
how does this work? Is it the existence of the agent that causes the
choosing? But the agent exists over a period of time. How could the
existence of the agent (over a span of time) cause a particular choosing
at a particular time?
Objection: Agent causation makes free
agents “unmoved movers.”
„
Reply: Maybe so. But …
y Event causation isn’t well understood either (we don’t really
understand causation of any sort).
• Agent causation is more clearly known than event causation—
because we personally experience it.
Hmmmmm …..
„
Chisholm believes that in order to be morally responsible for
some act,
– that act had to have been caused by the person (“agent”) doing it, but
– the person was not caused by anything outside of his/herself to act this
way.
– This suggests, that in acting freely, a person is, like God, an un-caused
causer!
» What do you think about this?