Journal of Sports Sciences, 2002, 20, 707± 715
Cognitive interference during competition among
volleyball players with diþ erent goal orientation pro® les
ANTONIS HATZIGEORGIADIS* and STUART J.H. BIDDLE
Department of Physical Education, Sports Science and Recreation Management, Loughborough University,
Loughborough LE11 3TU, UK
Accepted 1 May 2002
In this study, we examined interfering thoughts during sport competition among university volleyball players as
a function of dominant goal orientation and outcome. In particular, we investigated the performance worries
and thoughts of escape experienced while performing in athletes with high task and low ego orientation and
athletes with high ego and low task orientation. Goal orientations were assessed before the start of a volleyball
tournament, whereas cognitive interference was assessed on three diþ erent occasions after games. The results
revealed no consistent diþ erences for performance worries. In contrast, in all analyses we found that athletes with
high ego and low task orientations reported more thoughts of escape when losing than when winning, and more
thoughts of escape than athletes with high task and low ego orientations when winning or losing. The results
support in part the suggestion that a high ego orientation, when not accompanied by a high task orientation, can
be linked to motivationally maladaptive cognitions.
Keywords: ego, motivation, negative thinking, task.
Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that in sport the ability to
pay attention to the task without being distracted by
irrelevant cues is necessary for eþ ective performance
(Singer et al., 1991). Moreover, Orlick (1990) stated
that if there is one mental skill that distinguishes
successful from less successful athletes, it is the ability to
adapt and refocus in the face of distractions. Although
attention has a relatively long research history, several
issues have remained unexplored. Eysenck and Keane
(1995) noted that most research dealing with concentration has been concerned with attention to the
external environment, ignoring distractibility by
self-generated thoughts. As Moran (1996) pointed out,
despite its importance, athletes’ vulnerability to such
distractions has attracted relatively little attention within
the cognitive psychology framework. Moran (1996)
referred to these interfering thoughts as internal
* Address all correspondence to Antonis Hatzigeorgiadis,
Department of Physical Education and Sport Science, University
of Thessaly, TEFAA, 42100 Karies, Trikala, Greece. e-mail:
[email protected]
distractions that divert individuals’ attention from the
task to be performed.
Internal distractions have received considerable
attention in educational settings, where the question of
thought-shifting during task performance was ® rst
addressed. The term `cognitive interference’ has been
used to describe such disruptions of concentration and
refers to thoughts that individuals experience while
executing a task that are not related to the execution
itself (Sarason, 1984). Based on research conducted in
educational achievement settings (e.g. Carver, 1979;
Carver and Scheier, 1981, 1984, 1986), Carver and
Scheier (1988) suggested a control process model of
attention, which has proved helpful for understanding
the mechanisms underlying the phenomenon of taskinterfering thoughts. In brief, they proposed that, in
achievement settings, human behaviour is regulated by
a system of feedback control. People establish goals in
relation to certain values or standards and use these
standards as reference points. When behaviour is displayed, individuals monitor themselves in terms of these
goals. In their attempts to reach the goal, individuals
periodically interrupt their task-directed eþ orts to
assess the likelihood of achieving the goal. When, during
Journal of Sports Sciences ISSN 0264-0414 print/ISSN 1466-447X online Ó
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
2002 Taylor & Francis Ltd
708
this process, discrepancies between goals and task
performance are detected, individuals experience interfering thoughts, mostly of a self-evaluative nature, and
worry over performance adequacy. If at that point
individuals perceive that the desired goal is still attainable, eþ orts towards the goal are renewed. In contrast,
if they doubt that the goal can be reached and they
perceive further eþ orts to be futile, impulses to disengage from further eþ orts are experienced. Carver and
Scheier (1988) went on to suggest that such impulses
can lead to behavioural withdrawal (disengagement
from the task). However, when circumstances prevent
behavioural withdrawal (e.g. in a class environment),
disengagement can be expressed mentally and can take
the form of withdrawal thoughts and reduced eþ orts.
The control process model of attention has been
widely tested in educational psychology. In a classroom
environment (test anxiety), research has been conducted to identify relationships between cognitive
interference and performance. Furthermore, experimental research has explored the mechanisms by which
cognitive content in¯ uences performance through
manipulations of expectancies towards goal attainment,
goal-performance discrepancies and rate of progress
towards a goal (for a review, see Carver, 1996). In sport,
it is only recently that the control process model has
attracted the attention of researchers. In particular,
Edwards and Hardy (1996), Hardy (1996) and Swain
and Jones (1996) examined the relationship between
anxiety and performance and found that control process
theory can be useful for understanding and explaining
the positive eþ ects anxiety might have on performance.
Swain and Jones (1996) concluded that the control
process model requires further consideration within
sport psychology research.
Summarizing the contentions of control process
theory, two important aspects can be identi® ed in
relation to the aims of the present study. First, when
discrepancies between a goal and behaviour are
detected, individuals experience interfering thoughts
mostly in the form of worries regarding performance.
Second, when these discrepancies are perceived to be
unrecoverable, interference can also involve withdrawal
thoughts.
Using Carver and Scheier’ s model, cognitive interference can be characterized as a goal-related experience.
The extent to which the goals individuals pursue are
achievable is related to the likelihood that discrepancies
between goals and performance will occur and, subsequently, to the occurrence of worries related to
performance. Furthermore, when such discrepancies
are detected, the extent to which goals are controllable
is related to individuals’ perceptions of being able or
unable to complete the action successfully and,
subsequently, to the appearance of thoughts of escape.
Hatzigeorgiadis and Biddle
Taking into account the theoretical links between cognitive interference and the goals individuals pursue, as
these emerge from Carver and Scheier’ s (1988) control
process model, we wished to investigate the occurrence
of performance worries and thoughts of escape within
the framework of a contemporary achievement goal
theory, namely goal orientations theory.
Over the last decade, goal orientations theory
(Nicholls, 1984, 1989) has been among the most
in¯ uential theories in the domain of achievement
motivation. The theory has proved to be valuable in
explaining the cognitions, aþ ect and behaviour individuals display in achievement settings, including sport
(Duda, 1993). Goal orientations theory suggests that
ability, the demonstration of which is of central importance in achievement settings, can be assessed on the
basis of two diþ erent goal perspectives. First, a task goal
orientation focuses on learning, mastery and personal
improvement, and leads individuals to judge their
ability based on self-referenced criteria. Secondly, an
ego goal orientation focuses on demonstrating ability
by establishing superiority over others, and leads to
judgements of ability based on comparative criteria.
In relation to the present study, a major point of
interest of goal orientations theory is the extent to which
goals are achievable and controllable for individuals
adopting diþ erent goal orientations. Task orientation is
characterized by a self-referenced focus and thus goals
are thought to be more achievable and controllable
(Nicholls, 1989). In contrast, ego orientation, which is
characterized by an external comparative focus, has less
achievable and controllable goals (Nicholls, 1989)
because factors outside the control of the individual
(such as the performance of the opponent) can play an
important role.
According to Carver and Scheier’ s (1988) model,
the occurrence of performance worries depends on
discrepancies individuals detect between goals and
actual performance while performing. Therefore,
adopting more achievable goals should be linked to
smaller discrepancies and, subsequently, less worrying
thoughts. In contrast, pursuing less achievable goals
should be related to experiencing more worrying
thoughts, since larger discrepancies between goals and
performance are more likely to occur. Furthermore,
Carver and Scheier postulated that control over goal
attainment is a signi® cant determinant of individuals’
response to performance de® cits. When discrepancies
between goals and performance are identi® ed, by
individuals perceiving they have control over goal
attainment, eþ orts will be renewed. In contrast, for
individuals perceiving they have less control over goal
attainment, further eþ orts are seen as futile and
withdrawal thoughts may be experienced. Thus, an
examination of performance worries and thoughts of
709
Cognitive interference as a function of goal orientation
escape within the framework of goal orientations
should help us in understanding interfering thoughts
experienced while performing.
In a sample of collegiate skiers, White and Duda
(1991) reported that task orientation was negatively
correlated with tendencies to experience worries and
withdrawal thoughts. In an experimental study, Newton
and Duda (1993) examined the relationship between
goal orientations and performance cognitions across
three bowling games. In one of the three games, task
orientation was found to be negatively correlated with
performance worry and positively correlated with
keeping one’ s concentration. The lack of consistency
across the three games was attributed to the small
sample size and the non-competitive environment in
which the games took place.
In a study of cognitive content, Hatzigeorgiadis and
Biddle (1999) examined interfering thoughts in relation
to goal orientations and perceived competence based on
a retrospective design (asking participants to indicate
how often they usually experience interfering thoughts
during competitions). The original form of the Thought
Occurrence Questionnaire (Sarason et al., 1986) was
used to assess cognitive interference and psychometric
evaluation revealed that the task-related worries subscale was problematic. Thus, worries were not included
in the analysis. The study examined the independent
eþ ects of task and ego orientations and the results
revealed that ego orientation in a low perceived ability
group was related to experiencing thoughts of escape.
Factor analytic studies on goal orientations have
supported the orthogonality of task and ego orientations
(Duda and Nicholls, 1992). Therefore, individuals can
have both high or both low task and ego orientations,
or one orientation can be dominant. Hardy (1997)
argued that, in addition to independent eþ ects, interactive eþ ects of task and ego orientations should be
examined. Thus, the present study, in contrast to that
of Hatzigeorgiadis and Biddle (1999), examined diþ erences in cognitive interference between groups of
athletes with diþ erent goal orientation pro® les. Because
the present study was designed to investigate whether
goal orientations can be helpful in explaining diþ erences
in interfering thoughts based on the theoretical framework of Carver and Scheier (1988), we focused on
athletes for whom one orientation was dominant.
Thus, two goal orientations pro® les were contrasted:
one involving individuals with high task and low ego
orientations and one involving those with low task and
high ego orientations.
A ® nal point of interest regarding individuals focusing
on task or ego goals is the importance of outcome. As
Duda (1993) pointed out, regardless of whether a task
or an ego orientation prevails, highly task- or egooriented individuals can be considered competitive.
However, task-oriented athletes ± in contrast to egooriented athletes ± probably diþ er in the way they
approach a competition and in terms of the objective of
the competitive experience. Despite the fact that they
are both interested in winning, it is the relative importance of the competitive outcome, and the psychological
damage associated with losing, that possibly discriminates psychological responses between task- and egooriented individuals. Research in educational settings
under conditions of success and failure has con® rmed
that, for individuals with a high ego orientation, in
contrast to those with a high task orientation, outcome
is a crucial determinant of cognitions (e.g. Diener and
Dweck, 1978, 1980).
Consequently, diþ erences in cognitive interference
between individuals adopting task and ego goal orientations were examined as a function of game outcome
(i.e. winning and losing). That distinction was expected
to be crucial for individuals with a high ego/low task goal
orientation, but not for those with a high task/low ego
goal orientation. The following hypotheses were tested:
1. The high ego/low task athletes would experience
more performance worries and thoughts of escape
when losing than when winning and more than the
high task/low ego goal athletes when winning or
losing.
2. There would be no diþ erences in performance
worries and thoughts of escape between the high
ego/low task athletes when winning and the high
task/low ego athletes when winning or losing.
3. There would be no diþ erences in performance
worries and thoughts of escape for the high task/low
ego athletes when winning or losing.
Methods
Participants
The participants were 71 volleyball players (50 males,
21 females) who took part in the ® nals of the British
Universities Sport Association league. They were aged
23.1 ± 3.0 years (mean ± s) and their mean competitive
experience (years participating in competitions) was
6.5 years.
Instruments
Cognitive interference. The Thought Occurrence
Questionnaire for Sport (TOQS; Hatzigeorgiadis and
Biddle, 2000) was used to examine occurrence of interfering thoughts. The questionnaire was developed based
on interviews with athletes, experts’ assessment and
factor analytic procedures. Psychometric evaluation of
the instrument has provided adequate support through
evidence of content, convergent, discriminant and
710
concurrent validity. Con® rmatory factor analysis has
shown satisfactory factorial structure (e.g. comparative
® t index = 0.96, non-normed ® t index = 0.93, standardized root mean squared residual = 0.06, root mean
squared error of approximation = 0.06). The `performance worries’ subscale (TOQS-W) comprises six items
(e.g. `During the game I had thoughts that we are not
going to achieve our goals’ ; `. . . about previous mistakes I have made’ , `. . . that I’m having a bad day’ ). The
`thoughts of escape’ subscale (TOQS-E) also comprises
six items (e.g. `. . . about stopping’ , `. . . that I do not
want to take part in this game anymore’ ). Athletes were
asked to report on a 7-point Likert scale how frequently
they experienced the listed thoughts during the game
just completed (1 = never, 7 = very often). Previous
research (Hatzigeorgiadis and Biddle, 2000, 2001a;
Hatzigeorgiadis, 2002) has shown satisfactory internal
consistency for the instrument’ s subscales (a = 0.78±
0.90).
Goal orientations. The Task and Ego Orientation in
Sport Questionnaire (TEOSQ; Duda and Nicholls,
1992), an instrument whose psychometric properties
have been repeatedly supported (see Duda and
Whitehead, 1998), was used to assess goal orientations.
The TEOSQ comprises 13 items and two subscales
measuring task orientation (e.g. `I feel most successful
in volleyball when I do my very best’ , `. . . I learn a new
skill by trying hard’ ) and ego orientation (e.g. `. . .
I am the best’ , `. . . I am the only one who can perform a skill’ ). Ratings were made on 5-point scales
(1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree).
Procedures
The day before the start of the three-day tournament,
teams involved in the games were introduced to the aims
of the project, described as an investigation of `what
is going on in the mind of an athlete during sports
performance’ , and were asked to participate. On the
same occasion, teams that agreed to participate (n = 10)
were told what was to follow and were asked to
complete a questionnaire pack that included informed
consent, demographic characteristics and the TEOSQ.
During the following days, the athletes were asked to
complete the Thought Occurrence Questionnaire for
Sport immediately after three games that took place on
diþ erent days. Completion of the questionnaire, which
took approximately 10 min, took place in the sports hall.
The ® nal sample included only players that participated
in all three games for at least one set.
Analysis
Two goal orientation pro® le groups were created: one
comprised participants with a high task and low ego
Hatzigeorgiadis and Biddle
orientation and the other participants with a low task
and high ego orientation. The two groups were subsequently split depending on the outcome of each of the
three games (win or loss). Therefore, four groups were
tested in each of the three analyses (one analysis for
each game): high task/low ego-win, high task/low egoloss, high ego/low task-win and high ego/low task-loss.
To test the hypotheses, three one-way multivariate
analyses of variance with planned comparisons were
performed. Because there were speci® c hypotheses
about diþ erences between the groups, analysis with
planned comparisons was the most appropriate
(Stevens, 1996).
Results
Descriptive statistics
Means, standard deviations and Cronbach alpha
internal consistency coeý cients for all variables are
presented in Table 1. In accordance with previous
research in sport (e.g. Fox et al., 1994), task and ego
orientations were orthogonal (r = - 0.08). The `performance worries’ (TOQS-W) and `thoughts of escape’
(TOQS-E) subscales of the Thoughts Occurrence
Questionnaire for Sport were moderately correlated in
the three games (r = 0.34± 0.48).
Correlations between goal orientations and cognitive
interference scores in the three games are presented in
Table 2. Task orientation was negatively correlated with
TOQS-W in games 1 and 3 and negatively correlated
with TOQS-E in all three games. Ego orientation was
positively but rather weakly correlated with TOQS-W in
games 1 and 3, and positively correlated with TOQS-E
in all three games (once more the relationship was rather
weak in two of the three games).
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (mean ± s) and internal
consistency (Cronbach’ s alpha) for all variables (n = 71)
Variable
Descriptive
statistics
Internal
consistency
Task orientation
Ego orientation
TOQS-W game 1
TOQS-W game 2
TOQS-W game 3
TOQS-E game 1
TOQS-E game 2
TOQS-E game 3
3.96 ± 0.52
2.46 ± 0.89
2.51 ± 1.03
2.52 ± 0.94
2.54 ± 0.98
1.55 ± 0.83
1.54 ± 0.87
1.55 ± 0.83
0.72
0.86
0.71
0.78
0.74
0.86
0.90
0.85
Abbreviations: TOQS-W and TOQS-E are the `performance worries’
and `thoughts of escape’ subscales, respectively, of the Thought
Occurrence Questionnaire for Sport.
711
Cognitive interference as a function of goal orientation
Table 2. Correlations between goal orientations and
cognitive interference scores for the three games (n = 71)
TOQS-W game 1
TOQS-W game 2
TOQS-W game 3
TOQS-E game 1
TOQS-E game 2
TOQS-E game 3
Ego
Task
0.11
- 0.01
0.17
0.22
0.15
0.16
- 0.23*
- 0.08
- 0.28*
- 0.34**
- 0.29*
- 0.26*
*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01.
Abbreviations: TOQS-W and TOQS-E are the `performance worries’
and `thoughts of escape’ subscales, respectively, of the Thought
Occurrence Questionnaire for Sport.
Planned comparisons
In relation to the hypotheses and in accordance with
previous research (e.g. Fox et al., 1994), the participants
were classi® ed into high task/low ego (n = 21) and high
ego/low task (n = 18) groups by a median split on task
and ego orientation scores (the median scores were 4.00
and 2.33 for task and ego, respectively). The two subsamples were further divided in relation to the outcome
of the three games. The numbers of participants in each
group and their mean scores on the Thought Occurrence Questionnaire for Sport (TOQS) are presented in
Table 3. To test the speci® c hypotheses, multivariate
analysis of variance with orthogonal planned comparisons were performed for each of the three games.
Examination of z-scores and Mahalanobis distances
indicated that there were no univariate or multivariate
outliers among the groups. Departures from normality
(expected skewness for the `thoughts of escape’ measures) did not aþ ect the results of the analyses. This
was evident when the analyses were repeated after
transforming the variables (logarithmic transformation)
to deal with skewness, as the results remained the same
(no changes in diþ erences between the groups for the
multivariate and univariate tests).
The ® rst analysis involved TOQS scores obtained
after the ® rst game. The results, based on Pillais’
criterion for unbalanced designs (Tabachnick and
Fidell, 1996), revealed a signi® cant multivariate eþ ect
(Pillais’ trace = 0.44, F6,70 = 3.32, P < 0.05). The univariate tests showed signi® cant eþ ects for the TOQS-E
subscale (F3,35 = 6.18, P < 0.05), but non-signi® cant
eþ ects for the TOQS-W subscale. Planned comparisons
con® rmed the hypothesized diþ erences for the TOQS-E
subscale. The high ego/low task athletes reported more
thoughts of escape when losing than when winning, and
more thoughts of escape than the high task/low ego
athletes when winning or losing. Moreover, among the
latter three groups, no signi® cant diþ erences were
noted. The results from the ® rst planned comparisons
are presented in Table 4.
Analysis of the second game also revealed a signi® cant
multivariate eþ ect (Pillais’ trace = 0.37, F6,70 = 2.61,
P < 0.05). The univariate tests revealed signi® cant
eþ ects for the TOQS-W subscale (F3,35 = 3.02, P < 0.05)
and the TOQS-E subscale (F3,35 = 2.98, P < 0.05). As in
the ® rst analysis, the planned comparisons con® rmed
the hypothesized diþ erences for the TOQS-E subscale.
However, analysis of the TOQS-W subscale did not
con® rm the predictions. In particular, we found that: (a)
the high ego/low task athletes when losing did not diþ er
from the other three groups; (b) the high ego/low task
Table 3. Cognitive interference scores for the four groups in each of the
three games (n = 39)
High task/low ego
High ego/low task
Win
Lose
Win
Lose
Game 1
TOQS-W
TOQS-E
n = 12
2.00
1.17
n=9
2.87
1.35
n=9
2.54
1.52
n=9
2.85
2.69
Game 2
TOQS-W
TOQS-E
n=9
1.78
1.04
n = 12
2.5
1.33
n=7
2.95
1.69
n = 11
2.55
2.17
Game 3
TOQS-W
TOQS-E
n=9
2.15
1.06
n = 12
2.33
1.26
n=7
2.83
1.49
n = 11
3.18
2.00
Abbreviations: TOQS-W and TOQS-E are the `performance worries’ and `thoughts
of escape’ subscales, respectively, of the Thought Occurrence Questionnaire for
Sport.
712
Hatzigeorgiadis and Biddle
Table 4. Results of one-way multivariate analysis of variance with planned comparisons for TOQS scores in the three games
(n = 39)
Planned comparisons (t-test)
Multivariate
F
Eþ ect size
Game 1
TOQS-W
TOQS-E
3.32**
0.22
Game 2
TOQS-W
TOQS-E
2.61*
Game 3
TOQS-W
TOQS-E
2.53*
Univariate
F
g2
Group 4 to
groups 1, 2, 3
Group 3 to
groups 1, 2
Group 2 to
group 1
1.69
6.18**
0.13
0.35
0.98
4.14**
0.25
0.76
- 1.92
- 0.49
3.02*
2.98*
0.21
0.20
0.46
2.51*
2.29*
1.28
- 2.02*
- 0.75
2.68
5.15**
0.19
0.31
2.26*
3.52**
1.47
1.39
- 0.46
- 0.57
0.18
0.15
Abbreviations: TOQS-W and TOQS-E are the `performance worries’ and `thoughts of escape’ subscales, respectively, of the Thought Occurrence
Questionnaire for Sport.
Note: Group 1, high task/low ego-win; Group 2, high task/low ego-lose; Group 3, high ego/low task-win; Group 4, high ego/low task-lose.
*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01.
athletes when winning reported more worries than
the high task/low ego athletes when both winning and
losing; and (c) the high task/low ego athletes reported
more worries when losing than when winning. The
results for the second game are presented in Table 4.
Analysis of the third game revealed a signi® cant
multivariate eþ ect (Pillais’ trace = 0.36, F6,70 = 2.53,
P < 0.05). The univariate tests revealed a signi® cant
eþ ect for the TOQS-E subscale (F3,35 = 5.15, P < 0.05)
and an eþ ect that approached signi® cance for the
TOQS-W subscale (F3,35 = 2.69, P = 0.06). The planned
comparisons con® rmed the hypothesis for the TOQS-E
and TOQS-W subscales, indicating that the high ego/
low task athletes when losing scored higher than the
other three groups of athletes on both subscales. There
were no diþ erences between the other three groups.
Although the univariate eþ ect for the TOQS-W subscale only approached signi® cance (P = 0.06), the
results of the planned comparisons were considered
important because of the eþ ect size (g2 = 0.19), which
was not negligible. However, this particular result
should be interpreted cautiously and also in relation to
the results of the previous analyses. The results of the
third analysis are displayed in Table 4.
Discussion
Following the work of Carver and Scheier (1984, 1988),
which suggested that cognitive interference is a goalrelated experience, we tried to determine whether goal
orientations are connected to tendencies to experience
interfering thoughts. When examining goal orientations
independently, consistent negative correlations for the
three games were revealed between task orientation and
thoughts of escape. Further analyses involving goal
orientation pro® les in relation to game outcome were
conducted to provide better insight into the relationships between goal orientations and cognitive interference, but also to examine the importance of outcome
in in¯ uencing these relationships.
We expected that individuals with a high ego and
low task orientation would report more worries under
unfavourable than favourable conditions, and more
worries than individuals with a high task and low ego
orientation under both conditions. This hypothesis was
only con® rmed in one of the three analyses. Overall, the
results of the analyses were inconsistent, suggesting that
there may be other factors in¯ uencing this relationship.
In studying students across three bowling games,
Newton and Duda (1993) reported that in only one of
the three games was task orientation negatively correlated with worries about performance. Even though
their analysis had the disadvantage of single-item
measures to assess cognitive content, the lack of consistency across the three games is similar to the results of
the present study.
It is also possible that our hypotheses were incorrect.
The fact that individuals with diþ erent goal orientation
pro® les did not diþ er, at least in the expected way, can
be justi® ed if we approach the issue from a diþ erent
angle. In particular, it is likely that individuals adopting
Cognitive interference as a function of goal orientation
diþ erent goals may experience similar worries; however,
the source of these worries can be diþ erent. For
example, for athletes with a high task/low ego orientation, their worries might stem from discrepancies
between targeted and actual performance (dissatisfaction with their own performance). For athletes with
a high ego/low task orientation, their worries might
stem from discrepancies between targeted and actual
outcome based on a win± lose distinction (failure to
achieve the desirable outcome). In both cases, the worry
experienced can be similar if the desired standards
cannot be reached.
Measures of perceived performance, which were not
used in the present study, can help determine whether
such an explanation can be supported. In particular,
such measures would enable us to assess whether
worries occur when athletes perceive their performance
as being inadequate in relation to their goal, irrespective
of goal orientations. In a study of middle-distance
runners, Hatzigeorgiadis and Biddle (2001b) found that
the diþ erence between time-goal and ® nishing time was
the best predictor of interfering thoughts reported
by athletes during a race. Even though these authors
used actual and not perceived measures of performance,
the results provide indirect support for the above
hypothesis, especially for athletes with high task orientations, because the nature of the assessed goal (timegoal) is predominant within task orientations.
Further support for the above arguments is provided
by Nicholls (1984), who noted that individuals with
diþ erent orientations adopt goals of varying diý culty.
In particular, Nicholls suggested that individuals high
in task orientation are likely to choose more challenging goals. Such goals can lead to greater discrepancies
between target and performance and, subsequently,
more worries. Although the above explanation appears
plausible and is theory driven, the inconsistency of the
results also indicates the need to explore the issue
further.
Hatzigeorgiadis and Biddle (2001a) found that
performance worries can be either facilitating or debilitating depending on expectancies of goal attainment.
In particular, they reported that, for athletes holding
high expectancies of attaining their goal, worries were
linked to increased eþ ort, whereas for athletes holding
low expectancies, worries were linked to decreased
eþ ort. In relation to the present results and the contentions of goal orientation theory, it could be hypothesized that it is not the frequency of worries that diþ ers
for individuals with diþ erent goal orientation pro® les,
but the response to such worries. Thus, task-oriented
athletes may respond to worry with increased eþ ort,
whereas for ego-oriented athletes worry may result in
eþ ort withdrawal. The latter hypothesis appears to be
supported by the present results for thoughts of escape.
713
Analysis of thoughts of escape con® rmed the predicted
relationships consistently. In particular, we found that
when game outcome was unfavourable, individuals with
a high ego and low task orientation suþ ered signi® cantly
more thoughts of escape than those with a high task and
low ego orientation. When the game outcome was
favourable, no diþ erences between individuals with
diþ erent goal orientation pro® les were noted.
In line with these ® ndings, research in educational
settings has shown that when an ego orientation prevails
outcome is an important determinant of cognitions and
behaviour (Dweck, 1992). In experiments involving
cognitive tasks, Diener and Dweck (1978, 1980) examined thought content under conditions of success and
failure in relation to goal orientation. In the success
condition, all participants reported their thoughts to be
related to problem-solving strategies. In the failure condition, ego-oriented participants engaged in negative
self-evaluative cognitions, whereas task-oriented participants focused again on problem-solving strategies
and instructions to sustain eþ ort and concentrate on the
task.
Diþ erences in cognitive patterns could be attributed
to the way success is operationalized within the two
orientations. Outcome, when judged by a winning±
losing distinction, depends on factors outside the individual, such as the performance of the opposition and,
in the case of team sports as in the present investigation,
on the performance of other individuals within the team
and the team as a whole. The lack of control over outcome suggests that within an ego orientation, when
unrecoverable discrepancies between goals and progress
of the game are detected, thoughts of escape are more
likely to occur.
Carver and Scheier (1986) argued that withdrawal
symptoms are likely to be expressed mentally when
physical withdrawal from the setting is not socially
sanctioned ± that is, when withdrawal is negatively
valued as in sport. In research conducted to examine
these contentions, mental disengagement was indicated
through performance decrements (e.g. Carver and
Scheier, 1982) and also oþ -task thinking (e.g. Diener
and Dweck, 1978). Furthermore, consistent with this
reasoning and the results of the present study, Gallassi
et al. (1981) found that during a test mental disengagement reported retrospectively was expressed in the form
of frequent thoughts concerned with escape. Similar
results with retrospective measures have been reported
in sport (Hatzigeorgiadis and Biddle, 1999).
Although the present study oþ ers some interesting
and potentially useful results, there are shortcomings
that should not be overlooked. First, only a small
number of athletes were represented in each of the
contrasted groups. However, the eþ ect sizes (see
Table 3) and the fact that to counterbalance this limit-
714
ation data collection was repeated on three occasions,
allows us some con® dence in the results, especially those
for thoughts of escape.
Another issue is the nature of team sports in relation
to individual and team goals and perceptions of
individual success, which cannot be accounted for
based on a win± lose distinction. Discrepancies between
goals and performance, which, according to Carver and
Scheier (1988), generate interfering thoughts, may
involve either individual goals and performance or
team goals and performance. An individual’ s goal for
performing well may be realized, but still discrepancies
between team goal and performance may generate
worry. Similarly, the best player of a game might not
experience worry despite being on the losing side. Such
scenarios could not be examined in the present study,
partly because we used the Task and Ego Orientation
in Sport Questionnaire, which is oriented towards
individual goals, but also the win± lose distinction that
was adopted. Despite that, the win± lose distinction did
prove crucial for individuals with a high ego and low
task orientation. However, future research examining
the speci® c goals individuals pursue (e.g. asking before
the game what their goals are) may help examine issues
related to team and individual goals and performance
that could not be examined in the present study.
Despite these shortcomings, the present ® ndings
have signi® cant ecological validity. Thus, they can be
considered valuable preliminary evidence for further
and more robust insights into the interfering thoughts
that athletes experience while performing.
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