Bringing Actors Back In:
Political Choices and Sources of Post-Soviet Regime Dynamics
Vladimir Gel’man
(University of Helsinki / European University at St.Petersburg)
Critical Issues in the Research of Contemporary Russian Politics
University of Helsinki, 1 June 2017
Political Choices and Sources of Post-Soviet Regime Dynamics
• State of the art in the research of contemporary Russian politics – a
“dismal consensus”;
• Durable authoritarianism is consolidated, very little (if any) chances
for democratization in the foreseeable future;
• Structural barriers – (1) an international environment (low linkages
and leverages); (2) resource curse effects on survival of autocracies;
(3) strengthening of the state’s use of coercion and repressions, etc.
– seems unavoidable in the short term;
• Hopes only for the distant future – successful pursuit of economic
development over decades might create favorable conditions for a
would-be democratization at the time of next generations (Hale,
2015; Treisman, 2015)…
Political Choices and Sources of Post-Soviet Regime Dynamics
• “Alas! That the day of our joyful tomorrow // I shall not witness – and
neither shall you” (Nekrasov, The Railway, 1864);
• Sounds as a replica of “dismal consensus” about the global state of
democracy and democratization in the 1970s;
• O’Donnell about the beginning of “Transitions” project in 1979:
• “… we found this [structural – V.G.] perspective rather dismal, so we
thought to emphasize political factors, purposive political actions,
and show how politics could counteract or activate these slowly
moving structural factors. We also had the notion… that the impact
of structural variables on behavior is not a constraint but is itself is
variable” (Munck, Snyder, 2007: 292)
Political Choices and Sources of Post-Soviet Regime Dynamics
• Counter-arguments in defense of agency in analysis of regime
changes:
• (1) regime changes are launched and developed over time as side
effects of moves taken by political actors (often unintentionally) so
outcomes are not predetermined – cases of Gorbachev in 19881991 or Yanukovych in 2013-2014 (democratization by mistakes?);
• (2) most political actors are ruthless power-maximizers, and they
could be constrained only by other domestic and/or international
actors and factors (and these constraints may change over time);
• (3) regime changes are by and large shifts of various autocracies
and struggles among would-be autocrats rather than intentional
building of democracy
Political Choices and Sources of Post-Soviet Regime Dynamics
• “Autocracy is prevented and democracy is permitted by the
accidents of history that leave a balance of power or stalemate – a
dispersion of force and resources that makes it impossible to make
any leader or group to overpower all the others” (Olson, 1993: 573);
• “Lord of the Flies” (Golding, 1954) – an alternative model of political
regime changes – (1) collapse of the previous regime (catastrophe);
(2) forming a new coalition of would-be rulers (Ralph and Jack); (3)
breakdown of the coalition and exclusion of minority leader (Ralph)
and his followers; (4) usurpation of power by Jack; (5) a repressive
tyranny of Jack (killing of Piggy, hunting on Ralph); (6) a new
catastrophe (fire, launched by Jack’s tribe); (7) coming of external
actors (navy officers), who stopped the disaster… and what next?
• What happens in post-Soviet Eurasia in terms of these models?
Political Choices and Sources of Post-Soviet Regime Dynamics
• Basically, two scenarios:
• (1) “pluralism by default” (Ukraine, Moldova) – Olson’s model: deep
fragmentation of elites and their clienteles; no one is able to usurp
power, and attempts of monopolization caused counter-mobilizing:
stalemate as a mechanism of prevention of autocracy;
• “democracy is permitted” - a necessary yet insufficient condition for
making democratic institutions really work (caused poor quality of
governance, etc.);
• BUT! - a fragile low-level equilibrium of non-autocracy and risks of
new intra-elite conflicts which may result in zero-sum game at
certain point;
Political Choices and Sources of Post-Soviet Regime Dynamics
• (2) “Lord of the Flies” model (Russia) – collapse of the previous
regime (1991), zero-sum usurpation of power by Yeltsin (1993), and
strengthening of monopoly under Putin in the 2000s, reshaping of
winning coalitions, cooptation and/or coercion toward alternative
actors, repressive “politics of fear” as a tool of maintenance of
control;
• … but there is no new catastrophe as of yet;
• problems of sustainability and performance – limited chances for
dynastic leadership succession (Brownlee, 2007), incentives for
elites to behave as “roving bandits” (Olson, 1993);
• risks of a new disequilibrium are likely to increase over time;
• … BUT! - chances for a new zero-sum game are petty high;
Political Choices and Sources of Post-Soviet Regime Dynamics
• The list of unknown structural variables for post-Soviet Eurasia and
beyond:
• Changes in international environment – at the moment, it looks
rather unfavorable for prevention of autocracy (let alone permission
of democracy), similarly to the 1970s: is this forever?
• Would resource curse lose its relevance after the end of oil boom of
the 2000s, similarly to the 1980s?
• Sluggish economic growth (or stagnation) – would these conditions
remain long-lasting and how they might affect preservation of the
status-quo?
• … and similarly to the 1970-1980s, structural arguments are not
always useful for prediction of changes “here and now”;
Political Choices and Sources of Post-Soviet Regime Dynamics
• … and what went wrong with the role of actors and their choices?
• analysts tend to label them in terms of “good guys” vs. “bad guys”
(Hollywood movie paradigm) or consider all actors as “bad guys”
(film noir paradigm) but rarely consider actors as self-interested
opportunists;
• analysts tend to over-demonize political actors (e.g., Putin) as
omnipotent well-informed strategists, who always able to predict
everything and do only right moves (well, is it true?);
• analysts themselves (as well as actors, whose actions they observe)
have little capacity of prognostic power in a changing environment
(regime change in Ukraine in 2013-2014 as a prime example);
Political Choices and Sources of Post-Soviet Regime Dynamics
• A bias for hope?
• Revisiting the mode of analysis from normative to positive frames;
• breaking ”dismal consensus” of the 2010s (emerged as a reaction
on overly optimism of the 1990s – yet, many new autocracies are
cases of failed democratization…)
• Shift of conceptual frames – ”think possibilistically, not
probabilistically” (Schmitter’s interview in Munck, Snyder, 2007:
324);
• Focus on autocatic failures (e.g., Ukraine in 2013-2014) as well as
on erosion of competitiveness (e.g., Hungary after 2010);
• … and what else should be added for the future research agenda?
Political Choices and Sources of Post-Soviet Regime Dynamics
• Comments are welcomed!
• ([email protected])