STRATEGIESTO
MAXIMIZEASSET
UTILIZATIONINTHE
CALIFORNIAFREIGHT
SYSTEM:PARTI–
BACKGROUNDAND
GENERAL
RECOMMENDATIONS
March2016
AWhitePaperfromtheFreightEfficiency
StrategiesDevelopmentGroup
LeadAuthor:MiguelJaller,UniversityofCalifornia,Davis
WorkingGroupMembers:JamesJack,CoalitionforResponsible
Transportation;CynthiaCory,CaliforniaAirResourcesBoard;Chris
Shimoda,CaliforniaTruckingAssociation;MikeJacob,Pacific
MerchantShippingAssociation;andKerryCartwright,PortofLos
Angeles
AbouttheFreightEfficiencyStrategiesDevelopmentGroup
InJuly2015,GovernorJerryBrownissuedExecutiveOrderB-32-15,directingseveralstate
agenciestoworktogetherindevelopinganintegratedactionplanthatwill“establishclear
targetstoimprovefreightefficiency,transitiontozero-emissiontechnologies,andincrease
competitivenessofCalifornia’sfreightsystem”andthattheplanshould“identifystatepolicies,
programs,andinvestmentstoachievethesetargets”.Inresponse,aninteragencygroupwas
formedtooverseethedevelopmentoftheCaliforniaSustainableFreightActionPlan(CSFAP).
MembersoftheinteragencygroupincludetheCaliforniaAirResourcesBoard,theCalifornia
DepartmentofTransportation(Caltrans),theCaliforniaEnergyCommission(CEC),andthe
Governor'sOfficeofBusinessandEconomicDevelopment(GO-Biz).Aspartofdevelopingthe
plan,theinteragencygrouphassolicitedfeedbackfromabroadrangeofstakeholdersthrough
avarietyofengagementactivitiesandoutreachefforts.Acomponentofthisengagementwas
thedevelopmentoftheFreightEfficiencyStrategiesDevelopmentGroup(FESDG)madeupof
freightexpertsfromacademia,industry,andgovernment.Thepurposeandmaintaskofthis
groupwastoproduceaseriesofwhitepapersthatidentifypromisingstrategiesforincreasing
theefficiencyofthefreightsystem.Aseriesofsixpapersweredevelopedoverthecourseofsix
months.Eachpaperfocusesonaspecificthemeforincreasingfreightefficiencywithinthe
largerfreightsystem.
AbouttheNationalCenterforSustainableTransportation
TheNationalCenterforSustainableTransportationisaconsortiumofleadinguniversities
committedtoadvancinganenvironmentallysustainabletransportationsystemthroughcuttingedgeresearch,directpolicyengagement,andeducationofourfutureleaders.Consortium
membersinclude:UniversityofCalifornia,Davis;UniversityofCalifornia,Riverside;University
ofSouthernCalifornia;CaliforniaStateUniversity,LongBeach;GeorgiaInstituteofTechnology;
andUniversityofVermont.Moreinformationcanbefoundat:ncst.ucdavis.edu.
Disclaimer
Thecontentofthewhitepapersproducedbythegrouprepresentsdiscussionsamongmany
individualsrepresentingvariousfreightindustrystakeholders.Itmaynotreflectconsensuson
thepartofalloftheparticipants,nordothesepapersnecessarilyrepresenttheofficialopinion
orpolicyoftherepresentedorganizations,butratherarangeofthinkingthatmightbeusedto
informandbuildconsensusforthedevelopmentoftheCaliforniaSustainableFreightAction
Plan.Giventheperspectiveofthevariousfreightstakeholders,paperauthorshaveattempted
toincludedissentingopinionsandareasofconcurrencewheretheymayexist.Thisdocumentis
disseminatedunderthesponsorshipoftheUnitedStatesDepartmentofTransportation’s
UniversityTransportationCentersprogram,intheinterestofinformationexchange.TheU.S.
GovernmentandtheStateofCaliforniaassumesnoliabilityforthecontentsorusethereof.Nor
doesthecontentnecessarilyreflecttheofficialviewsorpoliciesoftheU.S.Governmentand
theStateofCalifornia.Thisreportdoesnotconstituteastandard,specification,orregulation.
Acknowledgments
ThisstudywasfundedbyagrantfromtheNationalCenterforSustainableTransportation
(NCST),supportedbyUSDOTandCaltransthroughtheUniversityTransportationCenters
program.TheauthorswouldliketothanktheNCST,USDOT,andCaltransfortheirsupportof
university-basedresearchintransportation,andespeciallyforthefundingprovidedinsupport
ofthisproject.
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TABLEOFCONTENTS
EXECUTIVESUMMARY...................................................................................................................3
Abstract..........................................................................................................................................6
IntroductionandBackground........................................................................................................6
OverviewoftheFreightSystem.....................................................................................................7
Keystakeholders,theirrolesandinteractions...........................................................................7
CargoandVehicleMovements..................................................................................................8
InefficienciesintheFreightSystem.............................................................................................10
InefficienciesintheOn-roadTruckingSector..........................................................................10
InefficienciesintheMaritimeSector.......................................................................................15
SummaryandGeneralRecommendations..................................................................................17
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FundingforFreightInfrastructure&CleanEquipment
EXECUTIVESUMMARY
Thefreightsystemisoneofthekeycontributorstoahealthyeconomy.However,thevehicles,
equipment,andfacilitiesusedbythedifferenteconomicagentsthatconductfreightoperations
producesignificantexternalities:congestion,environmentalemissions,andsafetyissues,
amongotherimpacts.Therefore,publicandprivateinitiatives,measures,orstrategiesto
mitigatethesenegativeexternalities,andmovethesystemontoamoresustainablepath,area
priority.
Inresponsetothisneed,theFreightEfficiencyStrategyDevelopmentGroup(FESDG),a
collaborativeeffortbetweenacademia,publicandprivatestakeholders,andgovernment,was
convenedinAugust2015withtheultimategoalofidentifyingfreightsysteminefficienciesin
Californiaanddevelopingasetofefficiencyimprovementstrategies.
Thispaper(PartIofatwo-partseries)discusseskeyfindingsfromtheeffort.Itprovidesan
overviewofthefreightsystemintermsofthemainstakeholders,theirrolesandinteractions;
theimpactsfromthetypeofvehiclesusedtomovecargoin,outandthroughouttheState;and
variouspressinginefficiencies.
Wheninvestigatingthedynamicamongthestakeholders,severalkeypointsareidentified:
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The industry objectives, business models, and regulatory compliance requirements
associatedwitheachofthelargenumberofstakeholdersaresomeofthefactorsthat
evidencethesystem’scomplexity.
Although there is multiplicity of stakeholders, the performance of the system may be
drivenbythedecisionsofalimitednumberofplayerswhohavewithgreaterdecisionmakingpowers(e.g.,shippers,receivers).
Designingpoliciesorstrategiestofosterbehavioralshiftsandefficiencyimprovements
requiresidentifyingtheappropriatedecisionmakercapableofinfluencingsuchchange.
The freight system is comprised of a number of supply chains, each with different
operationalpatterns(e.g.,distributivenetworks,spokeandwheelpatterns,corridors).
Freight activity manifests itself in different forms, depending on the layer of the
economy:1)internationaltradeeconomyfreightgateways(i.e.,seaports,airports,land
portsofentry);2)domesticmanufacturing/agriculturaleconomy;and3)thedistribution
andurbaneconomy.
Although usually overlooked, the freight traffic generated by the domestic
manufacturing/agriculturalanddistributioneconomiesisamagnitudelargerthantraffic
generatedbytheinternationaltradelayers.
Therearemyriadtypesofefficienciesandinefficienciesworthdiscussion:
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Thefreightsystemexperienceshighlevelsofpressurefrombothexternalandinternal
factors. Government, market, and environmental conditions require the system’s
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playerstosqueezeprofitmargins,insomecases,creatinginefficienciesattheexpense
ofotherplayersandevenattheexpenseoftheirownsub-systems.
Due to the silo nature of the freight system components, efficiency gains at the subsystemleveldonottendtoequatetonetgainsintermsofasystemoptimum.
Congestion, highway capacity, safety, geometrics, surface conditions, and intermodal
connectionsarekeyconcernsofthetruckingindustry.
Thereareseveralcorridorsandfreightbottlenecksaffectingtheefficiencyofgoodsand
passengermovementsindifferentregionsoftheState.
Congestion (in its various forms) is an important factor contributing to the system’s
inefficiencies.
The share of accidents caused by trucks is small; however, accidents involving heavydutyvehiclesaremorelikelytoresultinfatalities.
Thereareissueswithtruckroutesandfreightplanning.
Inefficienciesassociatedwiththebulkoffreightvehiclemovements,andwiththelast
mileanddistributioneconomy,aretheresultofalackofplanningandconsiderationfor
thefreightindustryingeneralplanningprocesses;theimportanceofthelastmileand
distributioneconomyhasbeenneglectedinparticular.
The general public and some public officials, usually associate the major freight issues
with on-road motor carriers. However, these carriers are only the conduit between
points of origin and destination; because of how the system works, shippers and
receivers tend to be the ultimate decision makers that determine how, when, and
wherefreightoperationsoccur.
HoursofServiceRules,especiallytheHoursofServiceofDriversFinalRuleof2011,if
implemented,couldintroduceadditionalinefficienciesinthefreightsystem.
There are concerns in the trucking industry about the predicted shortage of qualified
truckdrivers.
Within the seaports, congestion and inefficiency can be seen at the intersections of
multiple portions of the supply chain and multi-modal transactions across multiple
businesslines,allinoneconcentratednode.
Port labor disruptions during contract negotiations, and/or lack of new terminal
infrastructure,canimpactCalifornia’seconomiccompetitiveness.
International cargo movement patterns that translate into congestion at seaports can
alsoresultinsignificantdelaysfortruckslookingtopickupanddropoffcargo.However,
inefficiencies do not only affect the land side of marine terminals. Vessel loading and
dischargeisalsosusceptibletocongestion,atagreatexpensetovesseloperators.
InlightoftheGovernor’sExecutiveOrder,itisimperativethatCalifornia’svariouspublic
agenciesinitiate,continue,orreinforceeffortstoaddressfreightefficiencyissuessuchasthose
outlinedabove.Theseeffortsshould,ingeneral,concentrateon:
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Conductingsoundfreightplanningatalllevels;withemphasisonurbanfreight.
Identifying behaviors that need to be fostered, or mitigated, among the various
stakeholders.
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Developingparticipatorystakeholderengagement.
Fosteringinformationsharing.
Developing plans, agreements and platforms for active conversation to address labor
issues;andinvestinworkforcedevelopment.
Investinginresearchandcontinuedimprovementefforts.
Ingeneral,tryingtoachievethegoalofimprovingfreightefficiencywillrequirecoordinated
effortsbetweenthepublicandprivatesectors,academia,communities,andanyotherrelevant
stakeholders.Astherearenumerousdifferenttypesofissuesidentifiedwithinthefreight
system,itisnotlikelythatasinglestrategywillresultinsignificantimprovements.Thisisa
complexsystemrequiringmulti-partcomplexsolutions.
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Abstract
Thispaper(thefirstofatwo-partseries)discusseskeyfindingsfromacollaborativeeffort
betweenacademia,publicandprivatestakeholders,andgovernmenttoidentifystrategiesto
improvetheefficiencyofCalifornia’sfreightsystem.Indoingso,thepaperprovidesabrief
overviewofthesystem,withanemphasisonkeystakeholders,theirrolesandinteractions,and
implicationsassociatedwiththetypesoffreightmovementsandlayersoftheeconomy.
Moreover,theworkdiscussesmajorinefficienciesintheon-roadtruckingandmaritimesectors,
wherecongestionoftenimpedesmaximizingassetutilization.PartIpresentsanumberof
generalrecommendationstoimprovefreightefficiency;Specificstrategiesarediscussedinthe
secondpartofthisseries.Inaddition,thispaperacknowledgesthefactthatitisnotlikelythat
anysinglestrategywillresultinsignificant-enoughimprovementsonitsown;theinherently
complexnatureofthesystemwillrequireanequallycomplexsetofsolutions.
IntroductionandBackground
Thefreightsystemisoneofthekeycontributorstoahealthyeconomy.However,thevehicles,
equipment,andfacilitiesusedbythedifferenteconomicagentsthatconductfreightoperations
producesignificantexternalitiesincludingcongestion,environmentalemissions,andsafety
issues,amongotherimpacts.Therefore,publicandprivateinitiatives,measures,orstrategies
tomitigatenegativeimpactsandmovethesystemtowardsamoresustainablepatharea
priority.Ingeneral,thetypeofstrategiesthatcouldbeimplementedrangefrominfrastructure
improvementsandtechnologicaladvancementstofreighttransportationdemandmanagement
strategies(whichfocusonbehavioralchanges).Althoughinfrastructureandtechnology
enhancementsareessentialcomponentsofacomprehensiveimprovementstrategy,these
alonecannotaddressunderlyingbehavioralaspectsthattranslateintosysteminefficiencies.
ThisconceptisevenmoreacuteinageographiclocationsuchasCalifornia,whereimportant
largetrafficgeneratorssuchasthemaritimeports,internationalborder,extensiveagriculture
andproductionlands,andhugeconsumptiondemandinitslargemetropolitanareasinteract
andexhibitdiversefreightpatterns,operations,andissues.Thefreightsystemexperienceshigh
levelsofpressurefrombothexternalandinternalfactors.Government,themarket,and
environmentalconditionsrequirethesystem’splayerstosqueezeprofitmargins,insome
cases,creatinginefficienciesattheexpenseofotherplayersandevensub-systems.Moreover,
efficiencygainsatthevarioussub-systemsdonotequatetoasystemoptimum.Therefore,
puttingforwardaplantoimprovetheefficiencyoftheCaliforniafreightsystemasawhole
requiresanunderstandingofitsmultiplestakeholders,industryrelations,andthecurrent
opportunitiesandconstraintsfacedbythesystem.
Inthissense,PartIdiscussessomeofthefindingsfromtheFreightEfficiencyStrategy
DevelopmentGroup(FESDG).TheFESDGisacollaborativeeffortbetweenacademia,publicand
privatestakeholders,andgovernment,sponsoredbytheCaliforniaDepartmentof
Transportation(CALTRANS)andtheAirResourcesBoard(ARB).Anumberofstakeholdershave
beenconveningsinceAugust2015,withtheultimategoalofidentifyinginefficienciesfacedby
thefreightsystemandputtingforwardasetofstrategiestoachieveamoreefficientfreight
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system.Indoingso,akeyfirststepwastoprovideinsightastothepossiblerootcause(s)of
majorinefficienciesaffectingthesystem.
Inadditiontoassessinginefficiencies,thispaperdescribessomeoftheaspectsandnecessary
conditionsthatneedtobeconsideredwhendefiningoridentifyingremediatingstrategies.
Specificstrategiesarethendiscussedinacompanionpaper.
Thispaperisorganizedasfollows.SectionIIprovidesabriefoverviewoftheCaliforniafreight
system,emphasizingkeystakeholders,theirrolesandinteractions.SectionIIIdiscussesmajor
inefficienciesaffectingthesystem.SectionIVprovidesasummaryanddiscussescrucialpoints
tobeconsideredinthedevelopmentofimprovementstrategies.
OverviewoftheFreightSystem
Keystakeholders,theirrolesandinteractions
Atfirstglance,variousstakeholdersintheCaliforniafreightsystemcanbeclearlyidentified.
Theseincludecarriercompanies(e.g.,rail,oceanvessel,truckers,etc.);shippers;receivers(e.g.,
beneficiarycargoowners,retailers,manufacturers,farms,businesses,households);public
agencies;terminal,distribution,warehousingandancillaryfacilityoperators;intermediaries
andlogisticsoperators;regulators;thegeneralpublic;tradeorganizations;unions;law
enforcement;and,non-governmentalorganizations.
AccordingtotheCaliforniaFreightMobilityPlan1,thecurrentcorefreightsystemincludes:
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Twelvedeepwaterseaports(11privateand1public),
Numerousprivateportandterminalfacilities,
Twelveairportswithmajorcargooperations,
Two Class I railroads and twenty-six short-line railroads operating over approximately
6,000milesofrailroadtrack,
Approximately 5,800 center-line miles of high-traffic-volume interstate and state
highways,
Three existing, and one future, commercial land border ports of entry (POE) with
Mexico,
Intermodaltransferfacilities,
Approximately 19,370 miles of hazardous liquid (includes crude oil, refined petroleum
products,andotherhighlyvolatileliquids)andnaturalgaspipelines,
Avastwarehousinganddistributionsector,and
Numerouslocalconnectorroadsthatcompletethe“lastmile.”
Thesheernumberofstakeholders(eachwiththeirownobjectives,businessmodels,regulatory
compliancerequirements,andareasofinfluence),makesdescribingtheirinteractions,and
evenunderstandingtheimpactofefficiencyimprovementstrategies,adauntingtask.Within
thesystem,therearenumerousmarketforcesthataffectthewayeachindividualplayer
performsandtherolethatitplays;eachsubsetofeachsupplychainaimstoachievethesame
endgoal:tomaximizeitsownutilityandefficiency,andtominimizeitsowncostofdoing
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CaliforniaDepartmentofTransportation,CaliforniaFreightMobilityPlan(Final)Chapter2.1~2.3,2013.
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business.Itisimportanttonote,,asdiscussedbefore,thateachindividualplayeractingto
maximizeitsownefficiencydoesnotguaranteeachievingagreatertotalsystemsefficiency.
Atthispoint,itisimportanttomentionthatalthoughallplayersmaybeperforminginsidea
supplychainwithmanystakeholders,theperformanceofthechainmaybedrivenbythe
decisionofalimitednumberofthem(havingincreaseddecisionpower).Inmanycases,the
shippersand/orthereceiversofthecargoaretheonesdefiningthefrequencyofdistribution,
mode,routes,andeventransactionschedules;withtherestoftheplayersadjustingtothese
requirements.Thishighlightstheneedtofullyidentifytheseinteractionswhendesigning
policiesorstrategiesinordertoreachtheappropriatedecisionmaker.Ingeneral,the
effectivenessofanystrategieswillnotonlybetheirabilitytoaddressthekeyproblembutalso
toreachtheadequatestakeholder.Forexample,PierPasscongestionchargesaresuccessfulat
shiftingcargofrompeakdemandperiodstooff-peakdemandperiodsmainlyduetothesystem
designwherethefeeswerepaidbyreceiversandnotbythemotorcarrierdrayagecompanies.
CargoandVehicleMovements
Describingthefreightsystemrequiresdefiningthesupplychainsthatcomprisethesystem.The
systemdoesnotdrivefreight;freightdemanddrivesthesystem.Eachsupplychainsystemis
madeupofthousandsofinvestmentsincompanies,properties,publicinfrastructureprojects,
vehiclesandpiecesofequipment.Thedifferentstakeholdersthatareapartofeachsupply
chainreacttothedemandforfreight.Thisistheultimatemanifestationofthefreighteconomy,
wheremonetarytransactionstranslateintothemovementsofgoods(andthevehiclesthat
carrythem)frompointsofproductiontothoseof(intermediateorfinal)consumption.Toputit
inperspective,thesemanifestationswhichoccuroverandoveragainwithinthefreightsystem
contributetoone-thirdoftheeconomyanddirectandindirectjobsinCalifornia.
Mostsupplychainsaredistributivenetworks;othersareformedinspokeandwheelpatternsor
corridors.SomearedefinedwithintheboundariesoftheStatewhileothersspanstatelines.In
somecases,productstobeconsumed,transformed,orexportedintheState,mayhavealready
enteredandexitedtheboundariesseveraltimes.Someflowsofcargopassthroughurbanareas
whileothershavetheurbanareasasthedestination.Thisisofgreatimportancesince
efficiencyimprovementswillnotonlybeneededinsidetheStatebutupstreamintheirout-ofstatesupplychains.Inmanycases,lastmilechallengesandinefficiencieshindertheefficiency
gainsinthelonghaulportionofthetransport.Theseimpactswillvaryacrossdifferenttypesof
geographiesandurbanareas.
Withoutlossofgenerality,onecanassumetheseareastobecomprisedofdifferentlevelsof
threemainlayersoftheeconomywherefreightplaysarole:theinternationaltradeeconomy,
domesticmanufacturing/agriculturaleconomy,andthedistributioneconomy:
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Internationaltradeeconomyfreightgatewaysincludeseaports,airports,andlandports
of entry. Usually, these operations concentrate along specific freight corridors
connecting the port or border facilities and import or export facilities such as
warehousesanddistributioncentersormanufacturingplantsandfarms.
Domestic manufacturing/agricultural economy include users who build, grow,
transform,andstoregoods.Thisisanimportantlayerwhichdrivesasignificantportion
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of urban economies (the majority of the production centers are localized in or near
urbanareas).
Thedistributioneconomyisrelatedtothefinalconsumptionofthegoods.Traditionally,
the final recipients of goods were almost always freight intensive businesses, such as
retail,wholesale,andfoodandbeverage,butnowdirectresidentialdeliveriesconstitute
agrowingandsignificantpercentageofurbanfreightmovements.
Itisimportanttohighlightthat,althoughusuallyoverlooked,thefreighttrafficgeneratedby
thedomesticmanufacturing/agriculturalanddistributioneconomiesareofamagnitudelarger
thantheinternationaltradelayers.Table1showstheestimatedaveragedailytrucktripsin
SouthernCalifornia,withtheinternal2trucktrafficrepresentingalmost85%ofthetraffic.This
issimilartotheproportionofurbangoodsmovementscomparedtomajorfreightgeneratorsin
othergeographiclocations.
Table1:DailyRegionalTruckTripsbyCategorybyCounty3
Eachoftheseeconomiesbringsasetofstakeholdersandplanningneeds.Somearemultimodalinnature,whileothersaredominatedbyasinglemode.Freightoperationsandpatterns
canalsoshowahighdegreeofvariability,dependingonthecomposition(percentageoftrade,
manufacturinganddistribution),imposingadditionalplanningandmodelingchallenges.
Whilethispaperwillsimplifythefreightsystemintermsofthesethreelayers,supplychainsare
complexandanyfurtherdetailwouldrequireanalysisofadditionalechelonsorintermediary
stepsofthechain.Eachoftheselayerswillalsoexhibitdistinctmodesoftransport,fromlarge
oceanvesselcarrierstransportingthousandsofTEUstocargo-bikesorevenpersonalparcel
deliveriesatresidentiallocations.Evenatthesedifferentscales,thetypesofinefficiencies
couldbeverysimilar,yettheapproachestosolvethemratherdistinct.
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InternalTruckTrips:ThesearetrucktripsthathavebothanoriginandadestinationwithintheSCAGregionand
aregeneratedbylocalindustries,constructionsites,domesticwarehousesandtruckterminalsandresidences.
3
http://scagrtpscs.net/Documents/2016/draft/d2016RTPSCS_GoodsMovement.pdf
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InefficienciesintheFreightSystem
Ingeneral,inefficienciesinthefreightsystemtaketheformofcongestion,whichinturncan
resultinhigherlevelsofenvironmentalpollution,additionalsafetyconditions,andnegative
impactsoneconomicgrowthandinvestment.
InefficienciesintheOn-roadTruckingSector
Accordingtoa1998statesurveyoftruckingfirms,4congestion,alongwithhighwaycapacity,
safety,geometrics,surfaceconditions,andintermodalconnections,wasaprincipalconcernof
theindustry.Sincethattime,growthinfreighttraffic,overtheroadoratspecificfreight
bottleneckshaveonlycausedmorerecurringandpredictablecongestioninselectedlocations;
whilethetemporarylossofcapacity,ornonrecurringcongestionthatiscausedbyincidents,
weather,workzonesandotherdisruptions,isstillnotablywidespreadeveniflesspredictable5.
InCalifornia,themajorcongestedhighwaysinthepeakperiodareconcentratedinitstwo
largesturbancores,intheSanFranciscoBayAreaandgreaterLosAngeles.Accordingtothe
corridorreliabilitybufferindex,theleastreliablecorridorsin2010were6:
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WestboundI–80,AlamedaCounty,BTI7:79percentintheAMpeak.
WestboundSR–22,OrangeCounty,BTI:75percentintheAMpeak.
EastboundSR–91,OrangeCounty,BTI:74percentinthePMpeak.
NorthboundSR–57,OrangeCounty,BTI:70percentinthePMpeak.
SouthboundSR–57,OrangeCounty,BTI:67percentinthePMpeak.
AccordingtotheAmericanTransportationResearchInstitute(ATRI),theLosAngeles
metropolitanareahadthehighestcosttothetruckingindustryduetocongestionwith$1.1
billionaddedoperationalcosts8.Specifically,thetop5bottlenecksidentifiedarelistedbelow9.
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SR-60atSR-57inLosAngelesCounty
I-710atI-105inLosAngelesCounty
I-10atI-15inSanBernardinoCounty
I-15atSR-91inRiversideCounty
I-110atI-105inLosAngelesCounty.
4
Regan,A.C.,andGolob,T.F.(1999).Freightoperators'perceptionsofcongestionproblemsandtheapplication
ofadvancedtechnologies:Resultsfroma1998surveyof1200companiesoperatinginCalifornia.Transportation
Journal,57-67.
5
U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, Freight Management and Operation,
http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/freight/freight_analysis/freight_story/congestion.htm.
6
CaliforniaDepartmentofTransportation,CaliforniaFreightMobilityPlan(Final)Chapter2.1~2.3,2013.
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BufferTimeIndex(BTI)isareliabilitymeasureoftraveltime.BufferTimeisthedifferencebetweentheaverage
travel time and the 95th percentile travel time as calculated from the annual average. The Index is estimated
considering a number of roadway sections (using VMT to weight the various) sections and controlling for the
averagetravelrateacrossallthesections.Ingeneral,themeasurecouldbeexplainedastheextraBTI%travel
timethatatravelershouldallocateduetovariationsintheamountofcongestiondelayonatrip.
8
AmericanTransportationResearchInstitute(ATRI).CostofCongestiontotheTruckingIndustry.April2014.
9
American Transportation Research Institute (ATRI). Congestion Impact Analysis of Freight Significant Highway
Locations.October2014.
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Inaddition,thereaderisreferredtotheGoodsMovementAppendixinthe2016-2040Southern
CaliforniaAssociationofGovernments’(SCAG)RegionalTransportationPlan10fordetailed
analysisoffreightbottlenecksaffectingthefreightsystemintheregion.
Intermsofsafety,theCaliforniaHighwayPatrol(CHP)StatewideIntegratedTrafficRecords
System(SWITRS)reportedthatofthe2,758totalnumberoffataltrafficcollisionsin2010,
235involvedtrucks(1outof10)11.Truckdriverswereatfaultinonly75oftheincidents,
indicatingthatinfatalcollisionsbetweencarsandtrucks,automobiledriversarefarmore
likelytobeatfaultthantruckdrivers.Similarproportionscanbefoundwhenlookingatinjury
collisionstatistics.However,thoughtheshareofaccidentscausedbytrucksissmall,accidents
involvingheavy-dutyvehiclesaremorelikelytoresultinfatalities.
Otherinefficienciescanbeassociatedwithlackofinformationsharing.Someoftheseproblems
arisebecauseofthesilonatureofcurrentoperationalpatterns,andothersstemfromtechnical
reasons.Stillothertransportationplanninginefficienciescouldtakemanyforms,examples
includeissueswithtruckrouteplanning,wherethemainproblemsareassociatedwith:
discontinuitiesbetweenjurisdictions;lackofdesignatedroutestodevelopingorplanned
industryclusters;andwidedivergencesbetweendesignatedanddefactotruckroutes.
Theinefficiencieswhichareassociatedwiththebulkoffreightvehiclemovements,thelastmile
andthedistributioneconomy,aretheinherentresultofalackofplanningandconsideration
forthefreightindustry,ingeneral,andneglectoftheimportanceofthelastmileandthe
distributioneconomy,inparticular.Usually,thisistheresultoflackofvisibilitybyFederalor
Regionalregulatoryormanagemententities;inothersbecausethe“atomization”ofthe
operationsdoesnotfallwithinthetraditionaldefinitionoffreight.Thisisbothintermsofthe
cargo(volumes)andthevehiclesormodesused.However,recentfederalinitiatives(STAA,
ISTEA,SAFETEA-LU,MAP-21andFAST)haveincreasedtheattentionfortheroleoffreight
movementsinurbanandmetropolitanareas.
On-roadmotorcarriers,especiallyfor-hire,bothfulltruckload(FTL)orlessthantruckload(LTL)
facechallengeswhichareaccentuatedbythefactthatthegeneralpublicandpublicofficials
usuallyassociatethemajorfreightissuestotheiroperations.Itisperceivedthatthesearethe
companiesusingthevehiclesthatgeneratecongestion,parkingproblems,adisproportionate
amountofemissions,andaccidents(byseverityandlikelihoodofresultingincasualties).
However,becauseofhowthesystemworks,thesecarriersareonlytheconduitbetweenpoints
oforiginanddestination(explicitlyshippersandreceiversdecisions)whicharetheonesthat
determinehow,when,andwherethoseoperationsoccur.Developingstrategiesthatsolely
focusonthesestakeholders,whichhasbeenthetraditionalpractice,willnottakethesystem
farenoughastheadditionalcostsandothersysteminefficienciesaremainlyabsorbedbythese
companieswithoutaffectingotherlegsofthechain.
Inadditiontothefactorsdiscussedbefore,twoaspectsrepresentathreatforefficiency
improvements:hoursofservicerules,anddrivershortages.Thesearediscussednext.
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http://scagrtpscs.net/Documents/2016/draft/d2016RTPSCS_GoodsMovement.pdf
CaliforniaDepartmentofTransportation,CaliforniaFreightMobilityPlan(Final)Chapter2.1~2.3,2013.
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HoursofServiceRules
HoursofService(HOS)ruleshavetoppedthelistofleadingtruckingconcernsforthepastfew
years(seeFigure1).In2004,a34-hourrestartwasfirstintroducedinhours-of-servicerules.
HOShavebeen(andcontinuestobe)revisedovertheyears.Thelatestupdate(Hoursof
ServiceofDriversFinalRule)waspublishedintheFederalRegisteronDecember27,2011,with
aneffectivedateofFebruary27,2012andcompliancedateofremainingprovisionsonJuly1,
2013.
Changestothe34-hourrestartandthe30-minutebreakwerethebiggestchangestobemade
since2004.TheupdatesaddedthefollowingchangesandprovisionstotheexistingHOS
rules:12
1)1a.m.to5a.m.RestartProvision:avalid34-houroff-dutyrestartperiodmust
includetwoperiodsfrom1a.m.to5a.m.
2)OneRestartperWeekRestartProvision:useoftherestartislimitedtoonetimeper
week(onceevery168hoursfromthebeginningofthepriorrestart).
3)RestBreakRequirement:adrivermaydriveonlyif8hoursorlesshaspassedsince
theendofthedriver’slastoff-dutyorsleeper-berthperiodofatleast30minutes.
13
Figure1:Distributionofindustryissueprioritizationscores 12
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration - See more at: https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/regulations/hours-ofservice#sthash.fMoFHwkP.dpuf
13
ATRI (2014). Critical Issues in the Trucking Industry. http://atri-online.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/ATRI2014-Top-Industry-Issues-Report-FINAL.pdf
12
TheFinalRule,however,wassuspendedinDecember2014.Congresssuspendedthechanges
totherestartprovisionsaftertruckinggroupscomplainedregulatorsdidn’tcompleteastudy
whendevelopingtherules.Changes,especiallythe2consecutive1-5ambreaks,werebroadly
opposedbytruckinginterests.Regulatorsarguedthattherulesweremeanttoincreasesafety
andreduceexcessiveworkhours.Thetruckingindustryclaimedthatshiftingworkhoursto
hoursofgreatercongestionismoreriskyandthatregulatorsfailedtostudythisproperly.
ItisimperativethattheStatecarefullyaddressesthepotentialnegativeimpactsthattheHours
ofServicerulescanhaveforfreightefficiency,becausetheenforcementoftherestart
provisionsoftheFinalRulewouldintroducesignificantinefficienciesintheCaliforniaFreight
System.Forinstance,itwouldmakedifficultforsomeoftheoperatorsthatwanttoparticipate
inextendedhoursoroff-hoursoperationsasitwilllimittheirearlytravelalmosttwiceper
week.Consideringtheuncertaintyintruckingfreightoperations,therulecouldgreatlyreduce
theefficiencyoftruckingcarriersandimpedetheachievementofthemandateofthe
Governors’ExecutiveOrder.Figure2showsaclearexampleoftheinefficienciesthatcouldbe
introducedbytherule.Dependingonthescheduling,therestartrulecouldtranslateina
minimumof1hourlostandmaximumof17hoursforeveryrestart.Thisisamajorinefficiency
asthe34hourrestartrulecouldbecome51hours.Insomecases,duetodifferencesintime
zones,thiscouldmeanevenlongerdowntimes.Parkingavailabilityisanotherfactorthat
shouldbeanalyzedwhenevaluatingtheHOSrule.
Figure2:TheimpactofHoursofServiceRules14
14
http://www.joc.com/sites/default/files/u48502/InteractiveGraphics/HoursOfServiceRestartChart.pdf
13
Asaresultoftheconcerns,astudywasorderedandscheduledtobereviewedbytheU.S.
FederalMotorCarrierSafetyAdministration(FMCSA)andCongress.Thisreportisstillpending
asofFebruary2016.Recently,theFMCSAeasedconcernsthatthesuspensionwouldbelifted
andruleswouldbereinstatedthisyear.Thishasbeenreferredtoasaregulatory"snapback",
andisfearedandopposedbytruckingandshippinginterests.Thesuspensioncannotbelifted
untilCongressreceivestheagency’sreport,butithasbeensomewhatunclearwhetherthe
FMCSAcansimplyreinstatethesuspendedrulesafterthereportisdelivered,orifCongress
mustactfirst.
Concernsassociatedwithtruckinghoursofservicerulesincludelimitedproductivityand
compensationissues.Congress’ssuspensionoftheprovisionsiscreditedwithfreeingupas
muchas1to3percentoftruckloadcapacityin201515.“…Teamoperationswereprobablymost
affected…,”saidBillMatheson,presidentofintermodalandlogisticsservicesattruckingfirm
Schneider.“…Therollbackgavethemprobably2to3percentoftheirproductivityback...”Itis
alsobelievedthatstudiesarelikelyunderestimatingthenegativeimpactsaswell,sincesome
driversmayhavebeencheatingthesysteminordertoavoidproductivitylosses,thussoftening
theimpactseeninreportednumbers.Intermsofcompensation,alltruckersaremajorly
concernedwiththepossibilityoffewerworkedhoursduetohoursofservicerules.
DriverShortages
Inadditiontohoursofservicerules,anotherconcernrelatedtolaborinthetruckingindustryis
thepredictedshortageinqualifiedtruckers.Hiringisn’tup,oratthesamerateasinpast,and
retirementsmeanthelossofexperienceddrivers.
Thekeyfindingsfromrecentreportsandnewsaboutthedrivershortageprobleminclude16,17:
“…Overthepast15years,thetruckingindustryhasperiodicallystruggledwitha
shortageoftruckdrivers
In2014,thetruckingindustrywasshort38,000drivers.Theshortageisexpectedto
reachnearly48,000bytheendof2015.Ifcurrenttrendsholditisexpectedtogrow
to175,000by2024.
Thereisalsoaconcernofquality,in2012,88%offleetssaidthatmostapplicants
weresimplynotqualified.
Overthenextdecade,thetruckingindustrywillneedtohireatotal890,000new
drivers,oranaverageof89,000peryear.Replacingretiringtruckdriverswillbeby
farthelargestfactor,accountingfornearlyhalfofnewdriverhires(45%).The
secondlargestfactorwillbeindustrygrowth,accountingfor33%ofnewdriver
hires.
15
http://www.joc.com/trucking-logistics/labor/hours-service-snapback-put-doubt_20150922.html
AmericanTruckingAssociation(2015).TruckDriverShortageAnalysis.
http://www.trucking.org/ATA%20Docs/News%20and%20Information/Reports%20Trends%20and%20Statistics/1
0%206%2015%20ATAs%20Driver%20Shortage%20Report%202015.pdf
17
http://www.joc.com/special-topics/driver-shortage
16
14
Ofthe7.1millionpeopleemployedthroughouttheeconomyinjobsrelatedto
truckingactivity,3.4millionweretruckdriversin2014.Thereareover10million
CDL(CommercialDriver’sLicense)holdersintheU.S.,butmostarenotcurrent
driversandnotallaretruckdrivers.Therearebetween2.5millionand3million
trucksontheroadtodaythatrequireadrivertohavesomesortofCDL.Ofthose
trucks,1.6millionaretractor-trailers.Ofthosetractor-trailers,nomorethan
800,000areusedinOTR(i.e.,non-local)operations.
Thebulkofthedrivershortageisforover-the-road(i.e.,non-local)driversoperating
heavy-dutytractor-trailers(i.e.,Class8tractors),for-hiretruckloadsector.
Itishighlyunlikelythatthedrivershortagecouldbereducedinanysignificant
mannerthroughmodalshift
Truckdriverhours-of-service,reduceindustryproductivity.Reductionsin
productivityexacerbatethedrivershortageasitrequiresmoretrucks,andthus
moredrivers,tomovethesameamountoffreight…”
Inaddition,underfederallawitisillegaltoorganizeindependentdrivers.However,advocacy
groupssuchastheteamstershavebeenorganizingdriversundersuitsclaiming
“misclassification”asindependentcontractors.Overthepastseveralyears,teamstersand
truckdrivershavewonsomelawsuitsinCAandsomedrivershaveevenbeenawardedsome
backwages.Threegovernmentagencies(theCaliforniaLaborcommissioner,theregionaloffice
oftheNationalLaborRelationsBoardandtheCaliforniaEmploymentDevelopment
Department)haveissuedrulings.Unionscanlegallyattempttoorganizedirectemployees,so
courtvictoriessuchasthosementionedabovecouldpotentiallyhaveagrowingimpactonthe
drayageindustry.Onestrategy,inadditiontolegalaction,hasbeenpicketingandwithholding
ofdriverservices,causingdelaysforallsectionsoftheportsystem.
InefficienciesintheMaritimeSector
Withintheseaports,congestionandinefficiencyarereflectedintheintersectionofmultiple
portionsofthesupplychainandmulti-modaltransactionsacrossmultiplebusinesslines,allin
oneconcentratednode.Toillustratethemanybusinessstakeholdersinvolved,Figure3showsa
dynamicpyramid,witheveryone’sultimatecustomers–theshippersandreceivers–ontop.
Thesecargoownersdetermine,inmostcases,shipmentsizes,frequencies,modesoftransport,
deliveryandtransportschedulesandlocations,andmostimportantlythedemandandthe
pricesthatwillbepaidforservicesacrosstheintermodalspectrum.Atthenextlayerthereare
oceanvesselandrailcarriers.Theirimmediatecontractualprivitytotheshippersallowsthem
tohaveamoredominantrolealongthechainsthanportterminalsanddrayagetrucking
transportoperators.Marineterminaloperatorsandpublicportauthoritiesmaintainhighlyleveragedandintensivecapitalinvestments,whichlimitmarketentryconditions,andare
dependentonthecargovolumesprovidedbyoceanandrailcarriers,whicharedemandedby
shippers.
15
Shippers,
Receivers
PublicAgencies
Regulations
Labor
PortAuthorities
Communities
…
OceanVesseland
RailCarriers
PortTerminals,andTrucking
(drayage,for-hire)Carriers
International
Economy
Disruptions
Markets
Technology
…
AncillaryFacilityandLogistics
Operators
Figure3:KeyStakeholdersoftheFreightSystem
However,therelationshipbetweenoceancarriersandportterminaloperatorsisfacing
increasedchallenges,especiallyduetoexternalfactorsdrivingchangeswithinthesystemsuch
aslabor,alliances,andcongestionatthefacilities.Forexample,recentlaborshortagesatthe
main(WestCoast)portsduetocontractnegotiations(about20,000dockworkers)accounted
for80%ofabottleneckthatimpacted36vesselsidlingatsea18.
Morechallengesareposedinthedevelopmentofeverlargervessels,whichcanboostvessel
operatingefficiencies,aswellastheincreaseduseofVessel-SharingAlliances(VSAs),withmost
majoroceancarriersoperatinginVSAsoftwotosixmemberlines.Thedirectefficienciesfrom
thevesselsarewelldocumented,i.e.,>18,000TEUvesselsprovide50%ofmoreenergy
efficiency.19
Portlabordisruptionsduringcontractnegotiationsand/orlackofnewterminalinfrastructure
canimpactCalifornia’seconomiccompetitiveness.Forinstance,theimpactsin2014/15during
theprotractedcontractnegotiationresultedinshort-andlong-termimpactsaffectingthe
systemwherebymanybeneficiarycargoownersadopteda“fourcornerlogisticsstrategy”to
diversifytheirsupplychainsinorderreducefuturevulnerabilitytolabordisruptionsattheSan
PedroBayports.The“fourcornerlogisticsstrategy”introducesredundancyinsupplychainsby
notconcentratingonSouthernCalifornia,butratheronewhichreliesonseaportsinall“four
corners”oftheU.S.(i.e.,southwest,northwest,northeast,andsoutheast).
Congestionatseaportscanalsoresultinsignificantdelaysfortruckslookingtopickupanddrop
offcargo20,21.Truckscanexperiencemajordelaysjustwaitingfordispatchtoaseaport,in
18
Bloombergbusiness(2015),“PortDealNearasOneIssueRemains,LongBeachChiefSays”,February11,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-11/port-deal-near-as-single-issue-remains-long-beachchief-says,accessedOctober2015
19
Kindberg,Lee(2015),“DeliveringSustainability:OceanShippingandSupplyChainEfficiency”,Universityof
st
California,Davis,webinar,October1 .
20
Giuliano,G.,Hayden,S.,Dell’aquila,P.,&O’Brien,T.(2008).Evaluationoftheterminalgateappointmentsystem
atthelosAngeles/Longbeachports(No.METRANSProject04-06).METRANSTransportationCenter.
20
CaliforniaDepartmentofTransportation,CaliforniaFreightMobilityPlan(Final)Chapter2.1~2.3,2013.
16
additiontoqueueingoutsidetheterminalsandwaitingtimespentinsidetheterminalswhen
conductingtheirtransactions.Overall,timespentwaitingisasignificantinefficiency.Thishasa
directimpacttodrayageoperations,andrepresentsanopportunitytoachieveefficiency
improvements.22Althoughtruckqueuesandcongestionatportterminalsgatesgenerate
inefficienciesandotherexternalities,terminaloperatorsservetheirprimarycustomerswhich
arethesteamshiplinesandmajorimport/exportcompaniesbymanagingtheirinternaldock
operationsundertheirlongshoreworkrules,leasesandcontracts,andotherconstraints23.
However,inefficienciesnotonlyaffectthelandsideoftheseterminals.Vesselloadingand
dischargeisalsoaffectedatagreatexpensetovesseloperators.
SummaryandGeneralRecommendations
TheprevioussectionsdiscussedsomeofthekeycharacteristicsoftheCaliforniaFreightSystem.
Specifically,thetypesofstakeholdersinvolved,theirdynamicrelations,andanumberof
inefficienciesaffectingthesystem.InlightoftheGovernor’sExecutiveOrder,itisimperative
thatthevariouspublicagenciesintheStateinitiate,continueorreinforceeffortstoaddress
someoftheseissues.Ingeneral,theseeffortsshouldconcentrateon:
Conductingsoundfreightplanningatalllevels
Californiaisadiversegeographiclocationintermsoffreight,withvariousrequirementsand
constraintsthroughouttheState.Toimprovetheefficiency,planningshouldbeconducted
addressingtheneedsofthedifferentsectorsandlayersoftheeconomy.Although,the
internationaltradeeconomygatewaysattractmuchoftheattentionandcandominatethe
planningagenda,thedomesticmanufacturing/agriculturalandthedistributionurban
economiesplayakeyroleinthefreightsystem.Consequently,planningresourcesarerequired
atalllevels,fromthelargeMetropolitanPlanningOrganizationstothelocaljurisdictions.Itis
importantalsotorecognizethatacrossallthesectorsandeconomies,congestion(initsvarious
forms)isakeyfactorthathindersmaximizingassetutilization,andshouldbeapriorityfor
planningorganizations.Urbanfreightisalsoplaguedwithmanyinefficienciessuchaslackof
parkinginfrastructure,conflictingregulations,andhighercostsofconductingbusinessinmany
largedenseareas.
Planningeffortswillallowidentifyingthetypesoffreightbehaviorsthatneedtobe
fosteredormitigatedamongthevariousstakeholders
Thesebehavioralchanges,willrequireinmostcases,thedesignofeffectiveincentive
programs.Theseprogramscouldincludeadequaterecognitionsprograms,financialornon
21
Barber, D., & Grobar, L. M. (2001). Implementing a statewide goods movement strategy and performance
measurementofgoodsmovementinCalifornia.METRANSTransportationCenter.
22
HavemanJ.andK.Monaco(2009).Comprehensivetruckmanagementprogram:economicimpactanalysis.
Availablefrom:
http://www.portofoakland.com/pdf/maritime/ctmp/ctmp_Beacon_Final.pdf?utm_source=redirect&utm_mediu
m=old_site_request
23
Giuliano,G.,&O’Brien,T.(2007).Reducingport-relatedtruckemissions:Theterminalgateappointmentsystem
atthePortsofLosAngelesandLongBeach.TransportationResearchPartD:TransportandEnvironment,12(7),
460-473.
17
monetaryassistance,orpricingandtaxationtypeofschemes.Thereareanumberofprograms
intheStatetryingtoachievehigherlevelsofsustainability.However,theseprogramsdonot
fullyconsideroperationalorlogisticschanges,andforthemostpart,concentrateon
technologicalimprovements.
Participatorystakeholderengagement
Eachindividualstakeholderisorhasinvestedgreateffortstoimprovehowtheyoperate.Every
companyhasanincentivetoinvestintechnology,planning,andinfrastructureinorderto
streamlinetheiroperationsandtobemoreefficientgiventhepressuresofthesupplychain.In
ordertocontinuebeingcompetitiveinamarketwhereratesareattheirlowest,companiesare
requiredtooperatewithhighlevelsofsophisticationandplanning.However,whileeach
individualcompany,industry,ormodeisorganizingitselfinwayswhicharemosteffectiveand
efficientforitself,thesupplychainasawholemaystillbenefitfromsomethird-partyincentives
whichcreateevengreatersystemefficiency.Thisinturn,requiresthedevelopmentofsystem
levelperformancemeasuresthatareconduciveofsystem-wideefficiencies.
Currently,therearealreadyongoingeffortsforsupplychainoptimizationandportoptimization
whichareresultinginsignificantimprovementsandefficiencygains.Forexample,thePortof
LongBeach’sGreenPortGatewayproject,fundedbyfederalandlocalsources,wasfinalizedin
2015.Themainpurposewastoimprovetracks’infrastructuretoenhancerailefficiencyand
expandondockcapacityinthePortofLongBeachtohaulcargocontainersdirectlytoandfrom
marineterminals24.Asaresult,750trucktripswillbeavoidedbyeachtrain.ThePortofLong
Beachhasestablishedagoalofmoving35%ofcontainersbyrailinthenext5yearswhile
aimingtoachievealongtermtargetof50%25.ThePortofLosAngelespolicyissimilar:to
provideasmuchrailinfrastructureasnecessary,andfacilitateintermodallogisticssuchthatthe
movementofdirectintermodalcargo(approximately40-50%,dependinguponterminaland
steamshipline)viaon-dockrailismaximizedtothegreatestextentpossible.Theresultsfrom
effortssuchasthese,highlighttheimportanttorecognizetherolethatplanning,collaboration
andcooperation,andincentivescanhavetofurtherproducemulti-modalandsupplychain
efficiencies.Consideringhowdiverseeachstakeholder’soperationscanbe,withtheirown
constraintsandopportunities,developingappropriatestrategiesrequiresinsightsanddetailed
analysisofhoweachsupplychainoperates.Oftenthisisinformationthatonlyspecificindustry
expertscanprovide.
Fosteringinformationsharing
Itisimportanttodevelopthemechanismstofosterinformationsharing.Whetheritisthrough
StrategyDevelopmentGroups,TaskForcesoranyothercollaborativespaces,publicagencies
shouldactivelyengagethevariousstakeholdersinthefreightandothersectorstofullyidentify
24
PortofLongBeach(POLB)(2015c),“GreenPortGatewayRailProject:FactSheet”,
http://www.polb.com/civica/filebank/blobdload.asp?BlobID=10973,accessedOctober2015
25
Railwaytechnology(2015),“California'sPortofLongBeachcompletes$93mGreenPort
Gatewayrailproject”,September18,http://www.railwaytechnology.com/news/newscalifornias-port-of-long-beach-completes-93m-green-portgateway-rail-project-4673539,accessedOctober2015
18
thekeyproblems,anddevelopsoundsolutions.Furthermore,informationsharingmaynotonly
beincentivizeforplanningpurposes,butalsotorecognizethevalueofinformationasaninput
andoutputtooperationalprocesses.AllstakeholdersparticipatinginthisFreightEfficiency
StrategyDevelopmentGroup(FESDG)haveidentifiedtheneedtomanageinformationflows,
thusdevelopinginformationtechnologiesandinfrastructureareamust.However,itisalso
importanttounderstandthefullimplicationsoftheseefforts,becauseoftheveryvalueof
information.Theresolutionofthedata,privacyconcerns,openorcontrolledaccess,the
structureofthemanagingagency,andthevalidityofthesources,arejustafewamongthe
numberoffactorsthatneedtobeaddressedwhendevelopingsuchinformationsystemsand
sharingpractices.
Other
Whileacompanionpaperfocusesonspecificstrategiestoimproveassetutilization,itisalso
importanttohighlighttheneedtodevelopplans,agreementsandengageinconversationsto
addresslaborissuestooptimizesuchresources.Labordifficultiesimpactallfacetsoffreight,
frommodestofacilities.Whilesomeoftheinefficienciesmaybedrivenbysafetyconcernsand
theassociatedregulations,itisimportanttoconsiderthefullspectrumofimpactsthat
regulationsanddecisionscanhaveacrossotheroperationalandtacticalfactors.Laborissues,
suchasdrivershortages,couldalsobeaddressedbyinvestinginworkforcedevelopment.
Investinginresearch
Ingeneral,tryingtoachievethegoalofimprovingfreightefficiencywillrequirecoordinated
effortsbetweenthepublicandprivatesectors,academia,communities,andanyother
stakeholder.Itisnotlikelythatasinglestrategywillresultinsignificantimprovements.Thisisa
complexsystemrequiringcomplexsolutions.Asaresult,itisimportantthatpublicandprivate
agenciesandorganizationssupportresearcheffortsthatcanhelpshedlightintothevarious
complexissuesaffectingthesystemandpotentialspecificsolutions.
19