Against E-Voting
Direct recording electronic (DRE)
voting terminals as currently
used are NOT better than current
hand ballot alternatives
Ryan Egan, Amber Jones, Alyssa Sankin, Page Stephens,
Amber Straight, Philip Sugg, and Diana Troisi
DEFINITION
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"A direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting
machine records votes by means of a ballot
display provided with mechanical or electrooptical components that can be activated by the
voter; that processes data by means of a
computer program; and that records voting data
and ballot images in memory components. It
produces a tabulation of the voting data stored in
a removable memory component and as printed
copy. The system may also provide a means for
transmitting individual ballots or vote totals to a
central location for consolidating and reporting
results from precincts at the central location."
(www.wikipedia.org)
Security Issues
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General Problems Include:
• Unauthorized privilege escalation
• Incorrect use of cryptography
• Vulnerabilities to network threats
• Poor software development processes
(continued on next slide)
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Specific Problems Found From
Diebold Analysis Include:
• Lack of Smartcard Cryptography
• Problems With Code
• Protected Counter is Stored in “Simple,
Mutable File”
Verifiability and Financing
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Problems Examining Bugs
Technical Problems With E-voting
Machines
Voter Discouraging
Cost of E-Voting
Usability
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Electronic Voting Machines Lose
Ballots
Electronic Election Equipment
Inexplicably Adds Ballots
Votes Jump to the Opponent on the
Screen
DREs Break Down During the
Election
Increased Problems from Human
Error in Electronic Elections
(continued on next slide)
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Increased Problems from Human
Error in Electronic Elections
Electrical Outages and Inadequate
Battery Charges
Power Surges or Static Electricity
Discharges
Fortune's Worst Technology of 2003:
Paperless Voting
Vendor Reliability
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Election Directors Rely on Vendor
Technicians During Elections
Vendor technicians even reprogram
ballots directly from the county's
equipment.
Vendor technicians test and prepare
the equipment for the elections.
(continued on next slide)
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Vendor technicians provide technical
supervision during an election.
Vendors release election results to
the media.
Vendor technicians retrieve data
from memory cards.
Vendor technicians investigate when
election equipment breaks down.
5 Myths and Realities About DRE
Systems
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Myth #1: The DRE systems are
simple to use.
Reality: Separate instructions mailed
to voters are filled with technical
jargon and contradictory instructions.
• Touch-screens are susceptible to
misalignment or poor sensitivity
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Myth #2: The DRE systems offer a
fully transparent, fair ballot.
Reality: Studies done in multiple
states have revealed irregularities,
inconsistencies, and blatant biases
that undermine the transparency of
the ballot.
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Myth #3: The DRE system is the only
efficient way to provide for handicapped
users.
Reality: DRE concessions for the
handicapped often do not effectively
address the multitude of problems.
Wheelchairs didn’t even fit between the
legs of certain DRE voting booths. Audio
interfaces are of poor quality, lengthy,
unclear, and often do not address the
problems of the blind (“push the yellow
button”).
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Myth #4: DREs are cheaper
Reality: From software and hardware
creation to testing to maintenance to
waste disposal (batteries, screens),
the costs can be two to three times
higher than other current voting
options
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Myth #5: The DRE systems are easy to maintain
on-site.
Reality: Because election officials know practically
nothing of the new software (trade secrets,
private development of software), vendor
representatives and hardware/software
specialists must ensure the voting technology
works at precincts. Trained specialists are hard to
find in certain areas, and it costs a lot of money
to hire enough specialists for every precinct.
• Unlike their traditional counterparts, e-voting systems
also require substantial testing in the days and weeks
before the election to ensure that they are working
properly. Each additional level of training, support, and
testing adds a new financial burden to the state
government administering the election—all this for a
system that’s supposed to be simpler.
CONCLUSION
Due to issues of security, verifiability,
financing, usability, and reliability,
DRE systems are a deficient method
of acquiring voting results.
Important Links
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http://www.cs.umd.edu/~bederson/voting
/
http://www.wqusability.com/articles/votin
g-background2000.html
http://www.jdom.org/h/n/WRITING/evoting/ALL/50//
http://avirubin.com/vote/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EVoting
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/20
04/11/the_problem_wit.html
http://www.votersunite.org/MB2.pdf