A Standard of Judgement
Michael Smith
Princeton University
Lecture 1: From the human condition to
a standard of judgement
Lecture 2: From a standard of judgement
to moral rationalism
Lecture 3: The best form of moral
rationalism
Lecture 4: Moral reasons vs non-moral
reasons
Lecture 5: A normative theory of blame
Lecture 6: Loose ends
Bonus discussion section: Defeat by
nature in “Force Majeure”
“Here is the beginning of philosophy: a recognition of the
conflicts between men, a search for their cause, a
condemnation of mere opinion...and the discovery of a
standard of judgement” Epictetus, Discourses III:11
We know from the armchair:
1)that we think and therefore exist;
2)that so too does a temporal order;
3)that so too does a spatial order;
4)that we are located within that spatio-temporal order as the
ground of the capacity to think, and that others may be so located
too
5)that elements within that spatio-temporal order bear causal
relations to each other, some of which are under our control, and
hence that we are even more fundamentally the ground of the
capacity to gain knowledge of the world and to realize our desires
in it;
6)that this presupposes that we are also the ground of the
capacities to will and to be instrumentally rational to some
extent—in a phrase, we are agents;
7)that because we are agents, and because agent is a goodnessfixing kind, there is a privileged standard of judgement that applies
to all agents, human and non-human, and hence that various
evaluative and deontic claims are true
We know from the armchair:
1)that we think and therefore exist;
2)that so too does a temporal order;
3)that so too does a spatial order;
4)that we are located within that spatio-temporal order as the
ground of the capacity to think, and that others may be so located
too
5)that elements within that spatio-temporal order bear causal
relations to each other, some of which are under our control, and
hence that we are even more fundamentally the ground of the
capacity to gain knowledge of the world and to realize our desires
in it;
6)that this presupposes that we are also the ground of the
capacities to will and to be instrumentally rational to some
extent—in a phrase, we are agents;
7)that because we are agents, and because agent is a goodnessfixing kind, there is a privileged standard of judgement that applies
to all agents, human and non-human, and hence that various
evaluative and deontic claims are true
We know from the armchair:
1)that we think and therefore exist;
2)that so too does a temporal order;
3)that so too does a spatial order;
4)that we are located within that spatio-temporal order as the
ground of the capacity to think, and that others may be so located
too
5)that elements within that spatio-temporal order bear causal
relations to each other, some of which are under our control, and
hence that we are even more fundamentally the ground of the
capacity to gain knowledge of the world and to realize our desires
in it;
6)that this presupposes that we are also the ground of the
capacities to will and to be instrumentally rational to some
extent—in a phrase, we are agents;
7)that because we are agents, and because agent is a goodnessfixing kind, there is a privileged standard of judgement that applies
to all agents, human and non-human, and hence that various
evaluative and deontic claims are true
We know from the armchair:
1)that we think and therefore exist;
2)that so too does a temporal order;
3)that so too does a spatial order;
4)that we are located within that spatio-temporal order as the
ground of the capacity to think, and that others may be so located
too
5)that elements within that spatio-temporal order bear causal
relations to each other, some of which are under our control, and
hence that we are even more fundamentally the ground of the
capacity to gain knowledge of the world and to realize our desires
in it;
6)that this presupposes that we are also the ground of the
capacities to will and to be instrumentally rational to some
extent—in a phrase, we are agents;
7)that because we are agents, and because agent is a goodnessfixing kind, there is a privileged standard of judgement that applies
to all agents, human and non-human, and hence that various
evaluative and deontic claims are true
We know from the armchair:
1)that we think and therefore exist;
2)that so too does a temporal order;
3)that so too does a spatial order;
4)that we are located within that spatio-temporal order as the
ground of the capacity to think, and that others may be so located
too
5)that elements within that spatio-temporal order bear causal
relations to each other, some of which are under our control, and
hence that we are even more fundamentally the ground of the
capacity to gain knowledge of the world and to realize our desires
in it;
6)that this presupposes that we are also the ground of the
capacities to will and to be instrumentally rational to some
extent—in a phrase, we are agents;
7)that because we are agents, and because agent is a goodnessfixing kind, there is a privileged standard of judgement that applies
to all agents, human and non-human, and hence that various
evaluative and deontic claims are true
We know from the armchair:
1)that we think and therefore exist;
2)that so too does a temporal order;
3)that so too does a spatial order;
4)that we are located within that spatio-temporal order as the
ground of the capacity to think, and that others may be so located
too
5)that elements within that spatio-temporal order bear causal
relations to each other, some of which are under our control, and
hence that we are even more fundamentally the ground of the
capacity to gain knowledge of the world and to realize our desires
in it;
6)that this presupposes that we are also the ground of the
capacities to will and to be instrumentally rational to some
extent—in a phrase, we are agents;
7)that because we are agents, and because agent is a goodnessfixing kind, there is a privileged standard of judgement that applies
to all agents, human and non-human, and hence that various
evaluative and deontic claims are true
We know from the armchair:
1)that we think and therefore exist;
2)that so too does a temporal order;
3)that so too does a spatial order;
4)that we are located within that spatio-temporal order as the
ground of the capacity to think, and that others may be so located
too
5)that elements within that spatio-temporal order bear causal
relations to each other, some of which are under our control, and
hence that we are even more fundamentally the ground of the
capacity to gain knowledge of the world and to realize our desires
in it;
6)that this presupposes that we are also the ground of the
capacities to will and to be instrumentally rational to some
extent—in a phrase, we are agents;
7)that because we are agents, and because agent is a goodnessfixing kind, there is a privileged standard of judgement that applies
to all agents, human and non-human, and hence that various
evaluative and deontic claims are true
More specifically concerning agents, we know from the armchair:
8)that an agent has a reason to act so as to bring about a certain
outcome if and only if: (i) she has the abilities and conceptual
sophistication required to conceive of herself as having the option
to bring that outcome about, and (ii) that outcome is desirable—or,
more accurately, desirableher.
9)that the outcome of an agent's acting in a certain way is
desirablethat agent if and only if that agent's ideal counterpart desires
that that outcome obtains.
10)that the desires an agent's ideal counterpart has are those that
that agent would have in the nearest possible world in which she
has and exercises maximal capacities to have knowledge of the
world in which she lives and realize her desires in that world where
this is to be understood in modal terms that is, as the capacities to
know what the world is like no matter what it is like and to realize
her desires in that world no matter what she desires.
11)that there would be the potential for incoherence in the exercise
of these two capacities if ideal agents didn’t all have certain
dominant coherence-inducing desires in common
More specifically concerning agents, we know from the armchair:
8)that an agent has a reason to act so as to bring about a certain
outcome if and only if: (i) she has the abilities and conceptual
sophistication required to conceive of herself as having the option
to bring that outcome about, and (ii) that outcome is desirable—or,
more accurately, desirableher.
9)that the outcome of an agent's acting in a certain way is
desirablethat agent if and only if that agent's ideal counterpart desires
that that outcome obtains.
10)that the desires an agent's ideal counterpart has are those that
that agent would have in the nearest possible world in which she
has and exercises maximal capacities to have knowledge of the
world in which she lives and realize her desires in that world where
this is to be understood in modal terms that is, as the capacities to
know what the world is like no matter what it is like and to realize
her desires in that world no matter what she desires.
11)that there would be the potential for incoherence in the exercise
of these two capacities if ideal agents didn’t all have certain
dominant coherence-inducing desires in common
More specifically concerning agents, we know from the armchair:
8)that an agent has a reason to act so as to bring about a certain
outcome if and only if: (i) she has the abilities and conceptual
sophistication required to conceive of herself as having the option
to bring that outcome about, and (ii) that outcome is desirable—or,
more accurately, desirableher.
9)that the outcome of an agent's acting in a certain way is
desirablethat agent if and only if that agent's ideal counterpart desires
that that outcome obtains.
10)that the desires an agent's ideal counterpart has are those that
that agent would have in the nearest possible world in which she
has and exercises maximal capacities to have knowledge of the
world in which she lives and realize her desires in that world where
this is to be understood in modal terms that is, as the capacities to
know what the world is like no matter what it is like and to realize
her desires in that world no matter what she desires.
11)that there would be the potential for incoherence in the exercise
of these two capacities if ideal agents didn’t all have certain
dominant coherence-inducing desires in common
More specifically concerning agents, we know from the armchair:
8)that an agent has a reason to act so as to bring about a certain
outcome if and only if: (i) she has the abilities and conceptual
sophistication required to conceive of herself as having the option
to bring that outcome about, and (ii) that outcome is desirable—or,
more accurately, desirableher.
9)that the outcome of an agent's acting in a certain way is
desirablethat agent if and only if that agent's ideal counterpart desires
that that outcome obtains.
10)that the desires an agent's ideal counterpart has are those that
that agent would have in the nearest possible world in which she
has and exercises maximal capacities to have knowledge of the
world in which she lives and realize her desires in that world where
this is to be understood in modal terms that is, as the capacities to
know what the world is like no matter what it is like and to realize
her desires in that world no matter what she desires.
11)that there would be the potential for incoherence in the exercise
of these two capacities if ideal agents didn’t all have certain
dominant coherence-inducing desires in common
More specifically concerning agents, we know…(continued):
12)that every agents' ideal counterpart therefore has: (i) a dominant
coherence-inducing desire that they do not now interfere with any
agent's exercise of their capacities to have knowledge of the world
in which they live or realize their desires in that world (on condition
that the realization of those desires would not lead them to
interfere)— for short, a dominant desire not to interfere; (ii) a
dominant coherence-inducing desire to ensure that agents have
knowledge-acquisition and desire-realization capacities to
exercise—for short, a dominant desire to help; and (iii) whatever
other desires those agents happen to have.
13)that it is desirableeach agent that that agent helps and does not
interfere, and, insofar as it is consistent with helping and not
interfering, that she does whatever she desires to do.
14)that moral reasons for action are those reasons for action where
the reason-giving features are impartial and unconditional, and all
other reasons for action are non-moral reasons.
15)that all agents have dominant moral reasons to help and not
interfere, and, conditional on their doing that, non-moral reasons to
do whatever they desire to do.
More specifically concerning agents, we know…(continued):
12)that every agents' ideal counterpart therefore has: (i) a dominant
coherence-inducing desire that they do not now interfere with any
agent's exercise of their capacities to have knowledge of the world
in which they live or realize their desires in that world (on condition
that the realization of those desires would not lead them to
interfere)— for short, a dominant desire not to interfere; (ii) a
dominant coherence-inducing desire to ensure that agents have
knowledge-acquisition and desire-realization capacities to
exercise—for short, a dominant desire to help; and (iii) whatever
other desires those agents happen to have.
13)that it is desirableeach agent that that agent helps and does not
interfere, and, insofar as it is consistent with helping and not
interfering, that she does whatever she desires to do.
14)that moral reasons for action are those reasons for action where
the reason-giving features are impartial and unconditional, and all
other reasons for action are non-moral reasons.
15)that all agents have dominant moral reasons to help and not
interfere, and, conditional on their doing that, non-moral reasons to
do whatever they desire to do.
More specifically concerning agents, we know…(continued):
12)that every agents' ideal counterpart therefore has: (i) a dominant
coherence-inducing desire that they do not now interfere with any
agent's exercise of their capacities to have knowledge of the world
in which they live or realize their desires in that world (on condition
that the realization of those desires would not lead them to
interfere)— for short, a dominant desire not to interfere; (ii) a
dominant coherence-inducing desire to ensure that agents have
knowledge-acquisition and desire-realization capacities to
exercise—for short, a dominant desire to help; and (iii) whatever
other desires those agents happen to have.
13)that it is desirableeach agent that that agent helps and does not
interfere, and, insofar as it is consistent with helping and not
interfering, that she does whatever she desires to do.
14)that moral reasons for action are those reasons for action where
the reason-giving features are impartial and unconditional, and all
other reasons for action are non-moral reasons.
15)that all agents have dominant moral reasons to help and not
interfere, and, conditional on their doing that, non-moral reasons to
do whatever they desire to do.
More specifically concerning agents, we know…(continued):
12)that every agents' ideal counterpart therefore has: (i) a dominant
coherence-inducing desire that they do not now interfere with any
agent's exercise of their capacities to have knowledge of the world
in which they live or realize their desires in that world (on condition
that the realization of those desires would not lead them to
interfere)— for short, a dominant desire not to interfere; (ii) a
dominant coherence-inducing desire to ensure that agents have
knowledge-acquisition and desire-realization capacities to
exercise—for short, a dominant desire to help; and (iii) whatever
other desires those agents happen to have.
13)that it is desirableeach agent that that agent helps and does not
interfere, and, insofar as it is consistent with helping and not
interfering, that she does whatever she desires to do.
14)that moral reasons for action are those reasons for action where
the reason-giving features are impartial and unconditional, and all
other reasons for action are non-moral reasons.
15)that all agents have dominant moral reasons to help and not
interfere, and, conditional on their doing that, non-moral reasons to
do whatever they desire to do.
More specifically concerning agents, we know…(continued):
16)that to coordinate with others in acting on moral reasons, given
how vague our knowledge of their content and weight is from the
armchair, agents must develop conventions that precisify their
content and weight
17)that these conventions may well assign non-moral reasons equal
or greater weight than moral reasons in certain circumstances
18)that in light of the weight of the moral and non-moral reasons we
can define the following deontic statuses of actions:
 an act is morally forbidden when there are moral reasons and
some of these are reasons not to perform the action that are
weightier than the moral or non-moral reasons to perform it;
 an act is morally permissible when there are moral reasons and
it isn't the case some of these are reasons not to perform the
action that are weightier than the reasons, whether moral or
non-moral, to perform it;
 an act is morally obligatory when it is uniquely morally
permissible.
 an act is supererogatory when it is morally permissible and its
performance counts especially towards the agent’s moral
credit.
More specifically concerning agents, we know…(continued):
16)that to coordinate with others in acting on moral reasons, given
how vague our knowledge of their content and weight is from the
armchair, agents must develop conventions that precisify their
content and weight
17)that these conventions may well assign non-moral reasons equal
or greater weight than moral reasons in certain circumstances
18)that in light of the weight of the moral and non-moral reasons we
can define the following deontic statuses of actions:
 an act is morally forbidden when there are moral reasons and
some of these are reasons not to perform the action that are
weightier than the moral or non-moral reasons to perform it;
 an act is morally permissible when there are moral reasons and
it isn't the case some of these are reasons not to perform the
action that are weightier than the reasons, whether moral or
non-moral, to perform it;
 an act is morally obligatory when it is uniquely morally
permissible.
 an act is supererogatory when it is morally permissible and its
performance counts especially towards the agent’s moral
credit.
More specifically concerning agents, we know…(continued):
16)that to coordinate with others in acting on moral reasons, given
how vague our knowledge of their content and weight is from the
armchair, agents must develop conventions that precisify their
content and weight
17)that these conventions may well assign non-moral reasons equal
or greater weight than moral reasons in certain circumstances
18)that in light of the weight of the moral and non-moral reasons we
can define the following deontic statuses of actions:
 an act is morally forbidden when there are moral reasons and
some of these are reasons not to perform the action that are
weightier than the moral or non-moral reasons to perform it;
 an act is morally permissible when there are moral reasons and
it isn't the case some of these are reasons not to perform the
action that are weightier than the reasons, whether moral or
non-moral, to perform it;
 an act is morally obligatory when it is uniquely morally
permissible.
 an act is supererogatory when it is morally permissible and its
performance counts especially towards the agent’s moral
credit.
More specifically concerning agents, we know…(continued):
16)that to coordinate with others in acting on moral reasons, given
how vague our knowledge of their content and weight is from the
armchair, agents must develop conventions that precisify their
content and weight
17)that these conventions may well assign non-moral reasons equal
or greater weight than moral reasons in certain circumstances
18)that in light of the weight of the moral and non-moral reasons we
can define the following deontic statuses of actions:
 an act is morally forbidden when there are moral reasons and
some of these are reasons not to perform the action that are
weightier than the moral or non-moral reasons to perform it;
 an act is morally permissible when there are moral reasons and
it isn't the case some of these are reasons not to perform the
action that are weightier than the reasons, whether moral or
non-moral, to perform it;
 an act is morally obligatory when it is uniquely morally
permissible.
 an act is supererogatory when it is morally permissible and its
performance counts especially towards the agent’s moral
credit.
More specifically concerning agents, we know…(continued):
16)that to coordinate with others in acting on moral reasons, given
how vague our knowledge of their content and weight is from the
armchair, agents must develop conventions that precisify their
content and weight
17)that these conventions may well assign non-moral reasons equal
or greater weight than moral reasons in certain circumstances
18)that in light of the weight of the moral and non-moral reasons we
can define the following deontic statuses of actions:
 an act is morally forbidden when there are moral reasons and
some of these are reasons not to perform the action that are
weightier than the moral or non-moral reasons to perform it;
 an act is morally permissible when there are moral reasons and
it isn't the case some of these are reasons not to perform the
action that are weightier than the reasons, whether moral or
non-moral, to perform it;
 an act is morally obligatory when it is uniquely morally
permissible.
 an act is supererogatory when it is morally permissible and its
performance counts especially towards the agent’s moral
credit.
More specifically concerning agents, we know…(continued):
16)that to coordinate with others in acting on moral reasons, given
how vague our knowledge of their content and weight is from the
armchair, agents must develop conventions that precisify their
content and weight
17)that these conventions may well assign non-moral reasons equal
or greater weight than moral reasons in certain circumstances
18)that in light of the weight of the moral and non-moral reasons we
can define the following deontic statuses of actions:
 an act is morally forbidden when there are moral reasons and
some of these are reasons not to perform the action that are
weightier than the moral or non-moral reasons to perform it;
 an act is morally permissible when there are moral reasons and
it isn't the case some of these are reasons not to perform the
action that are weightier than the reasons, whether moral or
non-moral, to perform it;
 an act is morally obligatory when it is uniquely morally
permissible.
 an act is supererogatory when it is morally permissible and its
performance counts especially towards the agent’s moral
credit.
Facts about what is
intrinsically desirable as
fixed by the intrinsic
desires of ideal agents
Facts about
what there is
reason to do
Evaluative and deontic facts in possible
worlds inhabited by our crappy selves
obtain in virtue of facts about the desires
the ideal counterparts of our crappy selves
have about those possible worlds
Facts about what is
morally forbidden,
permissible, and
obligatory
19) When we leave the armchair we discover that we are human beings
whose non-moral reasons have certain characteristic features:
 many of us have desires with both an affect component and a
related disposition-to-act component
 many of us have desires concerning our own happiness, where this
in turn provides us with desires concerning our own wealth, power,
and reputation.
 many of us have dispositions to cause desires in particular others
concerning ourselves, and to be caused to have desires in turn by
those others when they act on their desires, and so on and so forth
in the best case scenario; in this way the well-being of each of us
comes to be tied up with the well-being of those particular others—
in more commonsense terms, we become friends and lovers
 many of us have similar dispositions to acquire desires by iterated
interactions with natural objects and artifacts—in more
commonsense terms, we find beauty in things
20) note that many of these desires presuppose our conventional
human sense of our persistence conditions as agents
21) any of these desires also lead us to act wrongly, whether through
weakness or compulsion or recklessness, so the question arises
what we have reason to do in such circumstances.
19) When we leave the armchair we discover that we are human beings
whose non-moral reasons have certain characteristic features:
 many of us have desires with both an affect component and a
related disposition-to-act component
 many of us have desires concerning our own happiness, where this
in turn provides us with desires concerning our own wealth, power,
and reputation.
 many of us have dispositions to cause desires in particular others
concerning ourselves, and to be caused to have desires in turn by
those others when they act on their desires, and so on and so forth
in the best case scenario; in this way the well-being of each of us
comes to be tied up with the well-being of those particular others—
in more commonsense terms, we become friends and lovers
 many of us have similar dispositions to acquire desires by iterated
interactions with natural objects and artifacts—in more
commonsense terms, we find beauty in things
20) note that many of these desires presuppose our conventional
human sense of our persistence conditions as agents
21) any of these desires also lead us to act wrongly, whether through
weakness or compulsion or recklessness, so the question arises
what we have reason to do in such circumstances.
19) When we leave the armchair we discover that we are human beings
whose non-moral reasons have certain characteristic features:
 many of us have desires with both an affect component and a
related disposition-to-act component
 many of us have desires concerning our own happiness, where this
in turn provides us with desires concerning our own wealth, power,
and reputation.
 many of us have dispositions to cause desires in particular others
concerning ourselves, and to be caused to have desires in turn by
those others when they act on their desires, and so on and so forth
in the best case scenario; in this way the well-being of each of us
comes to be tied up with the well-being of those particular others—
in more commonsense terms, we become friends and lovers
 many of us have similar dispositions to acquire desires by iterated
interactions with natural objects and artifacts—in more
commonsense terms, we find beauty in things
20) note that many of these desires presuppose our conventional
human sense of our persistence conditions as agents
21) any of these desires also lead us to act wrongly, whether through
weakness or compulsion or recklessness, so the question arises
what we have reason to do in such circumstances.
19) When we leave the armchair we discover that we are human beings
whose non-moral reasons have certain characteristic features:
 many of us have desires with both an affect component and a
related disposition-to-act component
 many of us have desires concerning our own happiness, where this
in turn provides us with desires concerning our own wealth, power,
and reputation.
 many of us have dispositions to cause desires in particular others
concerning ourselves, and to be caused to have desires in turn by
those others when they act on their desires, and so on and so forth
in the best case scenario; in this way the well-being of each of us
comes to be tied up with the well-being of those particular others—
in more commonsense terms, we become friends and lovers
 many of us have similar dispositions to acquire desires by iterated
interactions with natural objects and artifacts—in more
commonsense terms, we find beauty in things
20) note that many of these desires presuppose our conventional
human sense of our persistence conditions as agents
21) any of these desires also lead us to act wrongly, whether through
weakness or compulsion or recklessness, so the question arises
what we have reason to do in such circumstances.
19) When we leave the armchair we discover that we are human beings
whose non-moral reasons have certain characteristic features:
 many of us have desires with both an affect component and a
related disposition-to-act component
 many of us have desires concerning our own happiness, where this
in turn provides us with desires concerning our own wealth, power,
and reputation.
 many of us have dispositions to cause desires in particular others
concerning ourselves, and to be caused to have desires in turn by
those others when they act on their desires, and so on and so forth
in the best case scenario; in this way the well-being of each of us
comes to be tied up with the well-being of those particular others—
in more commonsense terms, we become friends and lovers
 many of us have similar dispositions to acquire desires by iterated
interactions with natural objects and artifacts—in more
commonsense terms, we find beauty in things
20) note that many of these desires presuppose our conventional
human sense of our persistence conditions as agents
21) any of these desires also lead us to act wrongly, whether through
weakness or compulsion or recklessness, so the question arises
what we have reason to do in such circumstances.
19) When we leave the armchair we discover that we are human beings
whose non-moral reasons have certain characteristic features:
 many of us have desires with both an affect component and a
related disposition-to-act component
 many of us have desires concerning our own happiness, where this
in turn provides us with desires concerning our own wealth, power,
and reputation.
 many of us have dispositions to cause desires in particular others
concerning ourselves, and to be caused to have desires in turn by
those others when they act on their desires, and so on and so forth
in the best case scenario; in this way the well-being of each of us
comes to be tied up with the well-being of those particular others—
in more commonsense terms, we become friends and lovers
 many of us have similar dispositions to acquire desires by iterated
interactions with natural objects and artifacts—in more
commonsense terms, we find beauty in things
20) note that many of these desires presuppose our conventional human
sense of our persistence conditions as agents
21) many of these desires also lead us to act wrongly, whether through
weakness or compulsion or recklessness, so the question arises
what we have reason to do in such circumstances.
22) in the typical case, blaming someone is a reaction to their faulty
wrongdoing, where we explain why their wrongdoing is faulty in terms
of their having the capacity to act permissibly, but failing to exercise it,
and we explain their having the capacity to act permissibly but failing
to exercise it in terms of the modal fragility of their wrongdoing. The
modal fragility of their acting wrongly makes salient the possibility of a
future in which they don’t act wrongly, but it also alerts us to the
possibility that this is the beginning of a pattern.
23) the reaction to the modal fragility of their acting wrongly therefore has
to do with trust, where we trust someone when we are disposed to
treat them as though they will do what they have have reason to do
when we interact with them. To blame someone is to think of them as
having done wrong when it is their fault, and it is also to add thoughts
about their faulty wrongdoing to the stock of thoughts that we have
about them with a view to downgrading how much we trust them, and
perhaps even giving up on trusting them altogether, if a pattern of
faulty wrongdoing emerges.
24) because blaming someone is a state that disposes the blamer to
desire to act in certain ways towards the person they blame on
account of their pattern of faulty wrongdoing, blaming is correct only if
their so acting is desirable, and this in turn requires the one blamed
did so act.
22) in the typical case, blaming someone is a reaction to their faulty
wrongdoing, where we explain why their wrongdoing is faulty in terms
of their having the capacity to act permissibly, but failing to exercise it,
and we explain their having the capacity to act permissibly but failing
to exercise it in terms of the modal fragility of their wrongdoing. The
modal fragility of their acting wrongly makes salient the possibility of a
future in which they don’t act wrongly, but it also alerts us to the
possibility that this is the beginning of a pattern.
23) the reaction to the modal fragility of their acting wrongly therefore has
to do with trust, where we trust someone when we are disposed to
treat them as though they will do what they have have reason to do
when we interact with them. To blame someone is to think of them as
having done wrong when it is their fault, and it is also to add thoughts
about their faulty wrongdoing to the stock of thoughts that we have
about them with a view to downgrading how much we trust them, and
perhaps even giving up on trusting them altogether, if a pattern of
faulty wrongdoing emerges.
24) because blaming someone is a state that disposes the blamer to
desire to act in certain ways towards the person they blame on
account of their pattern of faulty wrongdoing, blaming is correct only if
their so acting is desirable, and this in turn requires the one blamed
did so act.
22) in the typical case, blaming someone is a reaction to their faulty
wrongdoing, where we explain why their wrongdoing is faulty in terms
of their having the capacity to act permissibly, but failing to exercise it,
and we explain their having the capacity to act permissibly but failing
to exercise it in terms of the modal fragility of their wrongdoing. The
modal fragility of their acting wrongly makes salient the possibility of a
future in which they don’t act wrongly, but it also alerts us to the
possibility that this is the beginning of a pattern.
23) the reaction to the modal fragility of their acting wrongly therefore has
to do with trust, where we trust someone when we are disposed to
treat them as though they will do what they have have reason to do
when we interact with them. To blame someone is to think of them as
having done wrong when it is their fault, and it is also to add thoughts
about their faulty wrongdoing to the stock of thoughts that we have
about them with a view to downgrading how much we trust them, and
perhaps even giving up on trusting them altogether, if a pattern of
faulty wrongdoing emerges.
24) because blaming someone is a state that disposes the blamer to
desire to act in certain ways towards the person they blame on
account of their pattern of faulty wrongdoing, blaming is correct only if
their so acting is desirable, and this in turn requires the one blamed
did so act.
Loose end #1
The self as a persisting thing disappears from view at a certain point
in the argument and then reappears again. It is worthwhile talking
through these two moments in the argument and seeing what
happens.
“Person” is a forensic term. Person, as I take it, is the name for this
self. Wherever a man finds what he calls himself, there, I think, another
may say is the same person. It is a forensic term, appropriating actions
and their merit; and so belongs only to intelligent agents, capable of law,
and happiness, and misery. This personality extends itself beyond
present existence to what is past, only by consciousness, —whereby it
becomes concerned and accountable; owns and imputes to itself past
actions, just upon the same ground and for the same reason as it does
the present.
John Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Chapter XXVII
Loose end #2
The account of blame provided explains why freedom, thought of as
the capacity to respond to reasons, is intimately connected with
responsibility. It also suggests that a full understanding of human
freedom—that is, the capacity of a human to respond to reasons—
will turn on empirical questions about the circumstances in which we
as humans are liable to become compulsive, weak, and reckless, and
the psychological and social resources available to us to address our
condition in should we find ourselves in these circumstances.
Loose end #3
The account of desirability and reasons for action provided explains
why, even though it is not silly for people to be tempted by the error
theory, it is still okay to hold everyone, including those tempted by the
error theory, responsible for their faulty wrongdoing.
Loose end #4
The account of desirability provided dovetails with a version of
analytic functionalism to explain both why belief and desire have the
correctness conditions they have, and why belief and desire are both
judgement-sensitive attitudes.
Loose end #5
The account of the deontic statuses of actions provided suggests that
the moral issues about which there are likely to be relatively
determinate answers are:
(i) those that take issue with social and political conventions that
betray their partialist origins; (ii) those that involve clear cases of
someone’s interfering: ie their deceiving, misleading, manipulating,
coercing, diminishing, or disabling someone when they act on their
non-moral reasons; (iii) those that involve clear cases of not helping;
and (iv) those that arise in the context of interpersonal relationships
where there is common knowledge of the relevant expectations
surrounding the nature and significance of helping and not interfering.
Moral issues where what's at stake are different preferences about
what the social conventions are to be that precisify the content of our
reasons to help and not interfere, and how weighty these reasons are
to be both vis a vis each other and vis a vis other important nonmoral reasons, will be much more indeterminate and fraught. In this
sense our moral concepts really are “essentially contested”.
Loose end #6
Similarities and differences between the view argued for here and
other views:
(i) consequentialism
(ii) Kant’s view, Christine Korsgaard’s view
(iii) Scanlon’s contractualism
A Standard of Judgement
Michael Smith
Princeton University
Lecture 1: From the human condition to
a standard of judgement
Lecture 2: From a standard of judgement
to moral rationalism
Lecture 3: The best form of moral
rationalism
Lecture 4: Moral reasons vs non-moral
reasons
Lecture 5: A normative theory of blame
Lecture 6: Loose ends
Bonus discussion section:
Defeat by nature in “Force
Majeure”
“Here is the beginning of philosophy: a recognition of the
conflicts between men, a search for their cause, a
condemnation of mere opinion...and the discovery of a
standard of judgement” Epictetus, Discourses III:11