SHORT COMMUNICATION
Exit Strategies and Safety Concerns for Machinery
Occupants Following Ice Failure and Submersion
Gordon G. Giesbrecht and Gerren K. McDonald
GIESBRECHT GG, McDONALD GK. Exit strategies and safety concerns for machinery occupants following ice failure and submersion.
Aviat Space Environ Med 2011; 82:1–6.
Background: Of all drownings, 5 to 11% occur in submerged vehicles. Winter road workers are at high risk for vehicle submersion because they drive heavy vehicles over ice. Methods: A crane was used for
repeated occupied and unoccupied submersions of a 5-ton truck/snow
plow (N 5 25) and a 1-ton truck/snow plow (N 5 23); some data were
compared to those from our previous study on passenger vehicles (Aviat
Space Environ Med 2010; 81:779-84). Results: The 1-ton truck sank
faster than an intact car, while the 5-ton truck sank within 4 s. Four subjects could escape through the windows, doors, or roof hatch when the
1-ton truck was on the surface or submerged. Hatch exit took 2-3 times
longer than windows/doors. Because the 5-ton truck sank so quickly,
there was no opportunity to escape while on the surface. With windows
open, exit through the window, door, or roof hatch could only occur
after the cab was full of water. With windows closed, rapid pressure
buildup imploded the windshield. Bulk and buoyancy of thermoprotective flotation clothing did not impede exit in any scenario. One to three
200-L sealed containers mounted to the front of the 1-ton truck increased
the Floating Phase by ;20–40 s each. Conclusions: Results suggest that
a heavy vehicle will sink before surface exit is possible. Occupants
would, therefore, be forced to breath-hold and make an underwater exit
through a window, door, or roof hatch. Front-mounted external flotation
devices on a light truck increased floating time and the possibility of exit
while still on the surface.
Keywords: cold water immersion, drowning, egress, exit, fatality, highway safety, ice roads, underwater, vehicle submersion.
A
Q1
PPROXIMATELY 400 North Americans die in submerged vehicles annually, accounting for 5–11% of
all drownings in several industrialized nations (4), with
most of these deaths occurring in open water during
spring, summer, or fall. In Canada, however, between
1991-2000, 51 deaths occurred during the winter when
vehicles broke through the ice while driving either on
makeshift (i.e., ice fishing) or official (i.e., winter roads)
transport routes (2). Each year extensive winter road
systems are constructed covering thousands of kilometers, with many sections on frozen water. Construction
and maintenance vehicles have an increased risk for ice
failure incidents for several reasons, including: 1) they
are much heavier than passenger vehicles; 2) during
construction they are on the ice before the roads are certified safe for public use; and 3) ongoing maintenance
increases ice driving exposure.
Few research studies have addressed the topic of human escape during vehicle submersion and they are
generally epidemiological in nature (13). A recent drowning of an ice road snowplow driver (8) prompted a systematic study of human safety and survival in vehicles
driving on ice or submerged in water. In Operation
Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine x Vol. 82, No. 1 x January 2011
ALIVE (Automobile submersion: Lessons In Vehicle Escape), a series of vehicle submersions with trained volunteers tested exit and survival strategies for light and
heavy vehicles.
Previous reports (4) demonstrated that light passenger vehicles float for 30–120 s, providing ample opportunity for most passengers to exit through side windows;
this can usually be completed within 60 s. Thus car drivers were simply advised to remember four action words:
SEATBELTS (unfasten immediately); WINDOW (open
or break side window as quickly as possible); CHILDREN
(help them out of their restraints, from oldest to youngest);
and OUT (get out quickly before the water rises to the
level of the side windows). The situation might be very
different for the heavy machinery operator on ice roads,
however. Anecdotal evidence suggests that heavy machinery would likely sink much faster and the advice
for driver escape/survival may be different under these
conditions. Another factor affecting these operators
is the fact that flotation clothing is recommended either during pre-construction and construction phases
only (5), or also during road maintenance phases (9).
The effect of this clothing on vehicle exit has not been
addressed.
Thus three series of trials were conducted with 5- and
1-ton truck/plows. In one series, external flotation devices were attached to the 1-ton truck to determine if
they could prevent or delay vehicle submersion. In each
series, subjects wore an insulated flotation jacket or coverall, to determine if clothing flotation and bulk interfered with vehicle escape.
This report summarizes observations from occupied
and unoccupied submersions in open water and ice trials. Since many scenarios were tested, multiple trials
were not always practical for each; therefore, mean data
are only available for some parameters. The goals were
to determine: comparative sinking characteristics of a
From the Laboratory for Exercise and Environmental Medicine, Faculty of Kinesiology and Recreation Management, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada.
This manuscript was received for review in July 2010. It was accepted for publication in September 2010.
Address correspondence and reprint requests to: Gordon Giesbrecht,
211 Max Bell Centre, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada R3T
2N2; [email protected].
Reprint & Copyright © by the Aerospace Medical Association,
Alexandria, VA.
DOI: 10.3357/ASEM.2872.2011
1
ESCAPE FROM SUBMERGING HEAVY VEHICLES—GIESBRECHT & MCDONALD
Fig. 1 Top: as a result of rapid submersion of a 5-ton truck/plow with
an airtight cab, the windshield has imploded and sits on the manikin
used for this trial. Middle: when the 5-ton truck is partially submerged so
that the ice comes up against the window and door, the only exit would
be through the windshield or roof hatch. Bottom: for the 1-ton truck/
plow, two airtight drums (total volume of 400 L) attached to the top of
the plow lengthened the Floating Phase (until water reached the bottom
of the side window).
5-ton truck and 1-ton truck, with a passenger car; the
effect of external flotation on sinking characteristics of a
1-ton truck; the factors (including clothing bulk and
buoyancy) that might limit egress from a sinking vehicle; egress strategies; if survival advice should differ for
heavy vehicles; and to develop an educational safety
program to decrease the incidence of, and fatality rate
for, vehicle submersions following ice failure.
METHODS
The study was approved by the University of Manitoba
Education Nursing Research Ethics Board. Eight male
certified scuba divers gave written informed consent to
participate. A total of 25 5-ton truck and 23 1-ton truck
2
submersions were conducted. Testing occurred on three
occasions in a quarry near Winnipeg, Manitoba. In fall
and winter trials, a 1990s model Ford 9000 5-ton dump
truck with a front mounted snow plow was used (total
empty truck/plow weight ;10,000 kg). A third set of
summer trials was conducted with a 1993 Ford F350
crew cab, 1-ton truck with a front-mounted simulated
snow plow (wide flanged steel I-beam 2.75 m long; total
empty truck/plow weight ;2800 kg). For the 1-ton
truck/plow, various external-flotation scenarios were
created by using straps to attach one or two empty,
sealed septic tanks (each with a water displacement of
1136.5 L) within the rear box and/or one to six empty,
sealed oil drums (each with a water displacement of
200 L) to the front plow structure (see Fig. 1, bottom).
Both trucks were equipped with a 60 cm 3 60 cm roof
escape hatch (Transpec Worldwide, Sterling Heights, MI;
Fig. 1, top and middle). Each vehicle had manual crank
windows. Although most cars and many trucks have electronic windows, repeated trials would not be possible with
such vehicles, as the electronics would fail during the initial trial and remain inoperative during subsequent trials.
A crane was used to lower and raise the vehicles. They
were rigged in such a way that they could either sink
completely free of the crane restraints, or under continuous control of the crane (Fig. 1, bottom). In the latter
case, the vehicle could be maintained at any level in or
under the water. The vehicles were never completely
disconnected from the crane so they could be raised
from the water at any time.
In trials involving volunteer occupants, vehicles were
equipped with scuba tanks attached within the passenger compartment. All subjects were trained scuba divers
who practiced and were prepared for breathing from the
emergency air sources if they could not exit the vehicle
as planned. Two trained safety scuba divers (members
of the Canadian Amphibious Search Team) were positioned just outside and/or inside the vehicles to provide
assistance if required. In the case of a crane failure, divers were prepared to either open a door or break a window in order to assist subject exit.
Subjects wore an insulated flotation jacket (buoyancy
69 N) or coverall (buoyancy 98 N) to determine if clothing flotation or bulk interfered with vehicle escape. Since
thermal stress was not the focus of this study, subjects
also wore a drysuit underneath the flotation clothing
during winter trials. All trials were videotaped from one
to three angles for later analyses. Due to the difficulty
and complexity of the trials, it was impractical to have
several volunteers repeatedly participating in each of
many scenarios. Rather, most scenarios were attempted
once or twice. Therefore many results are presented as
single values. Where conditions were similar, however,
results are reported as mean 6 SD.
RESULTS
Vehicle Sinking Characteristics
Each vehicle was allowed to freely sink while its attitude and sink rate were determined (Table I). The 1-ton
Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine x Vol. 82, No. 1 x January 2011
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ESCAPE FROM SUBMERGING HEAVY VEHICLES—GIESBRECHT & MCDONALD
TABLE I. VEHICLE SINKING CHARACTERISTICS WITH DOORS AND WINDOWS CLOSED.
Vehicle (Condition)
Car #1 (I)*
Car #2 (H)*
1-ton Truck/Plow (I)
5-ton Truck/Plow (I)**
Number of Trials
Floating Phase (s)
Sinking Phase (s)
Total Time to Submersion (s)
1
1
1
10
63
15
7
2
87
22
74
2
150
37
81
4
Floating Phase, time from water impact until water reaches the bottom of the side window; Sinking Phase, remaining time until passenger compartment is completely submerged. I, passenger compartment intact; H, holes in floor (total area, 2200 cm2). For the first three vehicles, values are for one
trial because only the first trials involved closed doors and windows, which remained closed and intact throughout submersion. All subsequent trials
involved one or more open or broken windows.
* Data from Giebrecht and McDonald (4).
** With the 5-ton truck the submersion rate was limited by the descent speed of the crane in 10 trials, whether the windows or windshields were intact
or not, thus all trials were the same (therefore no SD values are given) and actual times may be shorter.
truck/plow sank faster than an intact car, while the 5-ton
truck/plow sank almost immediately. In all rapid, complete submersion trials (N 5 10), the heavier truck sank
as fast as the crane could lower it (i.e., 4 s), whether windows and the windshield were closed and intact or not.
Since the support straps were always tight, it is presumed that the actual submersion time would actually
be less than 4 s.
Occupied Exit Trials
Of the 25 5-ton truck submersions, 21 were occupied,
as were 9 of the 23 1-ton truck submersions. Table II
summarizes all escape trials, not including submersions
for testing crane equipment, subject familiarization, flotation trials, or with controlled descents for video demonstration purposes. Four subjects participated in the
5-ton trials; each trial involved only one test subject (and
sometimes a cameraman in the passenger seat). The
5-ton truck sank almost immediately (4 s) and provided
no opportunity for surface exit. Initially the driver side
window was open as this is common practice while
driving on ice. The driver could not exit against the
heavy water inflow while the vehicle was sinking, although this was possible with a slower sinking car (4).
Once the truck was full of water, exit was consistently
achieved with little variability (Table II). When all windows were closed, the rapid submersion caused so much
pressure build up that the windshield imploded into the
cab. Implosion reoccurred in a second trial with a manikin
placed in the driver seat (Fig. 1 top). A subject was then
positioned behind the windshield, submerged, and exited through the windshield opening; this was difficult,
but possible.
On several occasions the 5-ton truck was partially
submerged to simulate breaking through ice in ;3-m
deep water. In this case the ice pressed against the window, preventing exit through the door or window and
necessitating escape through the roof hatch (Fig. 1, middle). In some full and partial submersion trials with
open windows, it was important to note that the rapid
inflow of water often carried pieces of ice into the cabin;
this could cause injury. Therefore, occupants should try
to protect themselves with their hands and arms.
Four different subjects participated in the 1-ton truck
trials. All four of them participated in each of the nine escape trials, exiting through their own windows and doors
or a single roof hatch, while either on the surface or submerged. Both above and below the water, it took 2-3 times
as long to exit through the roof hatch because only one
person could exit at a time. Following the full-submersion
escape trials the four subjects were asked questions about
whether their flotation suits pushed them upwards in the
cabin, would they wear flotation clothing while driving
over ice, and if the flotation clothing was a liability. They
made comments like: “the suit pushed me up and I had to
push on the roof to get leverage for opening the window”;
“it was controllable”; and “it’s a trade off between flotation and being warm when you get out.” All four stated
TABLE II. EXIT LOCATIONS AND ROUTES FOR EIGHT 5-TON TRUCK/PLOW TRIALS (ONE DRIVER), AND SIX 1-TON TRUCK/PLOW TRIALS
(DRIVER, FRONT PASSENGER, AND TWO REAR PASSENGERS; NO EXTERNAL FLOTATION).
Exit Location (Number of Trials)
5-Ton Truck (one subject/trial)
Submerged (2)
Submerged (1)
Submerged (2)
Submerged (1)
Submerged (2)
1-Ton Truck (four subjects/trial)
Submerged (1)
Partial submersion (1)
Partial submersion (1)
Submerged (1)
Submerged (1)
Submerged (1)
Exit Route(s)
Exit Times (Comments)
Window
Driver door
Roof hatch
Windshield
Window
9 and 10 s (Driver window open)
15 s (All windows closed, windshield imploded)
10 and 10 s (Windshield out)
12 s (Driver behind imploded windshield)
15 and 15 s
Front, 2 windows Rear, 2 doors
All 4 windows
Roof hatch
All 4 windows
All 4 windows
Roof hatch
10 s
10 s
22 s
15 s (1 failure, required scuba)
9s
30 s
Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine x Vol. 82, No. 1 x January 2011
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ESCAPE FROM SUBMERGING HEAVY VEHICLES—GIESBRECHT & MCDONALD
1-ton truck, the weight of the plow exaggerated the forward tilt, increased the sink rate, and reduced the
Floating Phase considerably. Nevertheless, it was possible for four subjects to exit the vehicle through windows
or a roof emergency escape hatch while it was still on
the water’s surface, as long as they took immediate
action.
Preliminary trials with external flotation devices on
the 1-ton truck provided some valuable results. The
truck rear box could accommodate two 1136.5-L holding
tanks. The box itself provided flotation until water
flowed over top of the box edges. One tank would not
keep the truck afloat while two tanks could, but in a vertical, cab-submerged position. The life-saving value of
either one or two rear-mounted tanks is therefore questionable. However, the front-mounted 200-L drums provided more positive results. Even one drum increased
the Floating Phase from ;7 to 30 s. With two and three
drums, the Floating Phase increased to ;63 and 116 s,
respectively. Thus, although the vehicle would still
eventually sink in these scenarios, the chance of safe exit
on the water’s surface would be greatly enhanced. Based
on these results, further work is warranted on the development of front-mounted flotation devices—which
could be hollow, closed cell, or even inflatable—that
could be mounted without interfering with the normal
truck/plow function.
The 5-ton truck had virtually no Floating Phase and
sank completely within 4 s. The only opportunities for
the preferred surface exit would come if ice failure occurred in water shallower than the truck height, or if the
vehicle partially broke through the ice before complete
submersion. The latter scenario was witnessed in the
first winter trial as the empty truck partially broke
through the ice while the rigging was being repositioned. The ice/water level reached the bottom of the
doors within 10 s, the bottom of the side windows after
55 s, and the cab was completely submerged after 80 s.
that they would wear flotation clothing and that it was
not a liability when they were submerged.
Unoccupied Supplemental Flotation Trials
Table III summarizes the effects of various external
flotation containers attached to the 1-ton truck/plow;
this was deemed impractical for the 5-ton truck. Flotation
trials occurred on 2 d and all were unoccupied. The
weight of the snowplow hastened the forward tilt and
reduced the Floating Phase to only 6.8 6 0.5 s (in four
trials with no front flotation). Two holding tanks (total
volume of 2273 L) in the rear box were enough to float
the vehicle on the water surface in a vertical cab-submerged position (a single holding tank would not)—
extra buoyancy was provided by the vehicle’s two empty
fuel tanks (total 172.5 L) and four tires. Because of the
water displacement of the truck box, it acted as flotation
until the vehicle sank enough for water to flow over the
top edge into the box; only then did the holding tank(s)
exert any flotation effect. Six front-mounted oil drums
(total volume of 1200 L) could keep the cab floating indefinitely, although this would be impractical in the field.
However, containers with the volume(s) of one to three
drums could conceivably be attached on top of a snow
plow or front hood. The Floating Phase was increased
from 6.8 s to 29 6 0.6 s with one drum (mean of three trials), 63.5 6 3.5 s with two drums (mean of two trials; Fig. 1,
bottom), and 116 s (one trial). In a final total submersion
trial with no flotation, external pressure crushed the roof
inwards significantly (note: the 5-ton truck also sustained
some minor roof depressions during the trials).
DISCUSSION
To our knowledge, this is the first systematic study of
heavy vehicle submersion using human subjects participating in multiple scenarios. The 1- and 5-ton trucks
were used with front mounted snowplows. With the
TABLE III. SUBMERSION VARIABLES FOR 1-TON TRUCK/PLOW WITH ADDED FLOTATION (ALL TRIALS UNOCCUPIED).
Flotation Condition
Day 1:
No flotation
RF, 2273 L ; FF, 0 L
RF, 2273 L; FF, 1200 L
RF, 2273 L; FF, 600 L
RF, 1136 L ; FF, 400 L
RF, 1136 L ; FF, 0 L
RF, 1136 L ; FF, 200 L
Day 2:
No flotation
RF, 0 L ; FF, 400 L *
RF, 0 L; FF, 200 L
RF, 0 L ; FF, 200 L *
Floating Phase (s)
Sinking Phase (s)
Cab Submerged?
Total Vehicle Submerged?
7
6
Indefinite
116
61
7
29
74
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes †
Yes †
Yes †
Yes
No. Windshield broken
No
No
Yes †
Yes †
Yes †
7
52
Yes
66
30
29
n/a
n/a
n/a
Yes †
Yes †
Yes †
Yes. Roof collapsed;
windshield broken
during submersion
Yes †
Yes †
Yes †
RF, rear box flotation includes 1 or 2 empty airtight 1136.5-L holding tanks; FF, front flotation includes 1 to 6 empty airtight 200-L drums attached to
the front of, or *above, the plow blade. Buoyancy was also provided by the vehicle’s four tires and two empty gas tanks (total tank volume 172.5 L).
†
Total submersion was predicted based on total vehicle/plow weight (;2800 kg) being greater than the total amount of flotation [internal and external
values which ranged from 373 to 1709 L (3660 to 16,760 N)]. The windshield was broken during early trials on both days (it was replaced for Day 2).
Only the Floating Phase was determined for subsequent trials because water poured in the front window during the Sinking Phase.
4
Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine x Vol. 82, No. 1 x January 2011
ESCAPE FROM SUBMERGING HEAVY VEHICLES—GIESBRECHT & MCDONALD
Although timing would vary depending on ice condition and vehicle type/weight, this event clearly emphasized that passengers should take immediate action to
exit through the doors or windows if any part of a vehicle breaks through the ice.
If a heavy vehicle like the 5-ton truck/plow does
break through completely in deep water, it will sink almost immediately and passengers will be forced to exit
after the vehicle is submerged; this conclusion is not affected by the fact that actual sinking time would be less
than 4 s (likely only 2 or 3 s). Exit can only occur through
a door, window, or roof hatch (if one is installed). Surviving this submersion scenario depends on at least two
factors. Once a vehicle is submerged completely, doors,
windows, or hatches cannot be opened until the passenger compartment is full of water, thus equalizing the
outside-in pressure gradient. Also, the chance of safely
reaching the surface ice opening diminishes as the vehicle sinks deeper.
Therefore, it seems to be advisable to roll a side window down before driving over ice (12) for several reasons. First, on both occasions when all windows were
closed, the rapid descent and consequent pressure build
up imploded the windshield. This could cause injury
and disorientation, resulting in a fatal delay in escape
actions. These observations do not suggest that windshields of all vehicle types would implode under similar
circumstances. However, if all windows are closed and
remain intact, the vehicle will likely sink quickly and
substantially before filling with water and a door or
window can be opened, thus making the swim to the
surface ice opening more difficult. Second, electronic
windows have been shown to fail or be unreliable when
submerged (1); therefore, the only time when they can
be opened reliably is before driving onto the ice. Finally,
if a window is already open, the cab will flood quickly,
making it possible to open any exit earlier. One example
of this principle was demonstrated with the roof escape
hatch. When a window was open, as soon as the top of
the window opening sunk below the water surface, the
roof hatch blew open. This occurred because the continued rapid inflow of water caused a pressure buildup
within the cab.
One other advantage of the roof hatch was demonstrated during simulated truck submersions in water at
a depth reaching the upper part of the side window (Fig.
1 middle). In this case, ice lodged against the side of the
upper cab, making it impossible to exit through the
doors or side windows. The only other available exits
were the front window or roof hatch. It may be difficult
and dangerous to break a windshield and exit past the
broken glass, while it is very simple to open and exit
through a roof hatch. We did note one possible adverse
effect of installing a roof escape hatch, however. The
hatch opening may weaken the structural integrity of
the roof. The 1-ton truck roof caved in considerably due
to pressure build-up on a full submersion trial and the
5-ton truck roof was depressed slightly after several trials. It was not determined how much the roof hatch contributed to these results, but having a side window open
Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine x Vol. 82, No. 1 x January 2011
would prevent the outside pressure buildup that compresses the roof in the first place.
Because of rapid submersion, seatbelt use is discouraged, if not forbidden, whenever driving on ice (12); this
is acceptable because with reduced speed limits on ice
roads (usually 15 km/h, but never more than 25 km/h),
the risk of traumatic injury from a collision is considered
negligible. This advice emphasizes the dissimilarity between ice failure in heavy vehicles and other rapid submersion scenarios such as rollovers into ditches and
helicopter crashes into water. Hammett et al. (6) reported
that 90% of the vehicle drowning deaths of American
soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan involved rollovers into
ditches or canals. Although these submersions are also
very rapid, occupants cannot be advised to unfasten
seatbelts just because their vehicle is driving near a waterway, since high-speed collisions are more likely than
vehicle submersion. Helicopter training assumes that
the aircraft will quickly roll over (10), therefore seatbelts
should actually remain fastened until just prior to exit in
order to maintain spatial awareness in the water.
Breaking through the ice in a heavy vehicle is likely
more dangerous than driving into open water in a passenger car. The heavy vehicle will sink much quicker,
increasing the chance that escape will occur underwater;
this greatly increases the difficulty of surviving. Also,
ice water may: 1) cause an initial gasp (part of the “cold
shock” response) (11), which could result in immediate
drowning; 2) decrease breath-hold ability (7), not allowing enough time to exit and reach the surface; and/or 3)
cause rapid weakness and uncoordination, making it
more difficult to escape onto the ice and perform subsequent survival actions.
Thermoprotective flotation clothing (i.e., jacket or
coveralls) was worn and volunteers felt a significant
protection from cold stress. One concern with this clothing is the potential hindrance of escape because of its
buoyancy and bulk. Although the volunteers did report
that they had to push up on the roof to gain leverage for
rolling down windows or opening doors, they all expressed a preference for wearing this gear. However, future studies should be conducted to confirm these
preliminary findings, to determine any effects on the
ability to swim underwater to the surface ice opening,
and to make comparisons to various aspects of helicopter egress (10). As well, further research should address
the effect of water temperature on exit procedures from
submerged vehicles.
The volunteers in this study did not specifically practice for these trials; however, they were similarly trained
in other areas and were well prepared. Thus, their performance was likely better than the general public. While
escape actions from cars on the water’s surface are
not technically difficult, they would be much more difficult from submerged heavy vehicles in ice-cold water.
This emphasizes the importance of education for winter
road users so proper responses become second nature.
Since this scenario presents so many threats to survival, a
major focus of this education should emphasize prevention of ice failure while driving. As a result of inquest
5
ESCAPE FROM SUBMERGING HEAVY VEHICLES—GIESBRECHT & MCDONALD
recommendations (8) and present observations, an educational video was produced as part of Operation ALIVE (3).
Key points include: requiring all winter road vehicle operators to wear thermoprotective flotation gear; adoption
of a “never work alone” policy; requirement that all operators be accompanied by an escort vehicle while maintaining a safe separation; and that there be annual formal
training for all workers involved in construction and
maintenance of winter roads (5,9,12). Further recommendations include installation of roof escape hatches in all
work vehicles that drive over ice roads. Also, a windowbreaking device should be mounted visibly within easy
reach of the driver for quick access. Examples include a
spring-loaded center punch or an escape hammer.
In conclusion, the following action points for occupants
of light vehicles (i.e., cars or light trucks) would only be
initiated after a vehicle hits the water: SEATBELTS off;
WINDOWS open; CHILDREN released from restraints,
from oldest to youngest; OUT through the window. Because heavy machinery sinks so fast this general format
remains, except that references to children are removed
(they would be unlikely to be involved in this scenario),
and that most of the procedure is initiated before driving
onto ice. Prior to driving on ice, occupants should prepare for the possibility of ice failure with the following
action points: SEATBELTS off; WINDOWS open; DOORS
unlocked (if possible while driving); FLOTATION GEAR
on. If ice failure does occur, the single remaining action
point is OUT; if the vehicle is still hung up on the ice, exit
can be through the doors if they will open. Once the vehicle is low enough that the doors cannot be opened, exit
through the window. If the vehicle completely breaks
through and sinks quickly, the window would already be
open for an underwater exit. At any point, a roof escape
hatch may also be used. Finally, seatbelts must be refastened once the vehicle drives off the ice, as speed limits
and the risk of collision-related trauma increases.
ACKNOWLEGEMENTS
This study was supported by the Government of Manitoba,
Department of Infrastructure and Transportation, and the Natural
6
Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) Canada. Thanks
to Dion Marcus of Affinity Welding and Design for providing and preparing the 1-ton truck/plow and flotation devices. We also thank Scott
Allingham and Farrell Cahill for logistical assistance and Donna Gillis
of Gillis Quarry, Garson, MB, for access to the gravel pit.
Authors and affiliations: Gordon G. Giesbrecht, MPE, Ph.D., and
Gerren K. McDonald, B.A., M.Sc., Laboratory for Exercise and
Environmental Medicine, Faculty of Kinesiology and Recreational
Management, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada.
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