ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ADVIESRAAD INTERNATIONALE VRAAGSTUKKEN
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COOPERATION BETWEEN THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND RUSSIA
A MATTER OF MUTUAL INTEREST
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Present are:
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OFFICIAL OPENING by Mrs. Y.E.M.A. Timmerman-Buck, President of the Senate of the
Netherlands.
Mrs. Timmerman-Buck: Dear guests. As president of the Dutch Senate it is with great pleasure to
welcome you in the plenary hall of the Senate for the Symposium on the relations between the
European Union and Russia. A symposium co-organized by the Senate and the Advisory Council on
International Affairs of the Netherlands.
I would like to especially welcome the President of the Advisory Council, Mr. Korthals Altes. I would
also like to give a special welcome to our four key note speakers, Mr. Kosachev, Chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Russian Duma. Mr. Brok, member and former chair of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament, Mr. Verberg, former President of the
International Gas Union and currently President of the Energy Delta Institute and Mr. van
Koningsbrugge, extraordinary professor at the Moscow State University and President of the Centre
on Relations between the Netherlands and Russia.
It is the strong conviction of the Dutch Senate that Europe goes beyond the borders of the European
Union. We have a very active delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and
we integrate our cross-border work into our national activities. In November I will participate in a
conference of the Association of European Senates about European cooperation in St. Petersburg.
Your gathering today to discuss the relationship of the European Union with Russia, not only
underlines the conviction of the Senate but also carries it into effect. Therefore, I am pleased to see
that representatives from so many different organizations and institutes are participating today.
The initiative for this symposium originated at the beginning of this year when the Standing
Committee on European Affairs of the Senate and the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Development Policy of the Senate decided to ask the Advisory Council on International
Affairs for a report concerning the EU and Russia. The content of this report and the importance of the
relationship itself made the committees decide to invite you for a discussion.
Since that rather uncomplicated decision, new unexpected developments occurred in Europe, leading
towards a complicated situation in the summer. The geopolitical balance as we knew it at the Eastern
borders of the EU was altered. The range of events stressed the need for today's constructive dialogue
even further.
The subtitle of the report of the Advisory Council on International Affairs 'A matter of mutual interest'
immediately puts into perspective the central notion of the report and therefore of today's symposium.
Stating that cooperation is a matter of mutual interest seems obvious and yet, in the past decades the
relationship between the EU and Russia has not always been one of convincing mutual consent.
The EU and Russia have both changed. This obviously has affected their relationship and both sides
are challenged to further shape and develop this relationship. The report gives us an excellent analysis
of the many changes that took place and offers a range of recommendations for the future.
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There are many differences, which we should not only be aware of but which we must also take into
consideration. Yet, there is an abundance of fields of common interest. Our common future is to be
found on the European continent. There is a mutual dependence and there are international challenges
facing us. The future of Russia, of the EU and of the Netherlands cannot and should not be looked
upon separately nor in an isolated matter. Hopefully, today's symposium will further encourage you to
investigate what you and your organization can do to contribute.
Dear guests, before the discussions can start I would like to inform you that on a cultural note the
Dutch men choral society Don Kozakken, conducted by Mr. Serge Latychev from Russia has offered
to add lustre to our symposium by giving a short performance. We will welcome them at the end of
our symposium.
It is a great pleasure for me now to introduce your moderator for today, Mr. Ben Knapen. He is, to be
brief, an author, a journalist, general editor of a widely known newspaper in this country,
extraordinary professor in Media and Quality and he is a member of the Scientific Council for
Government Policy. In conclusion, he is a man of many talents and therefore I can, with great
confidence, leave you in his very capable hands.
I would like to wish you a very interesting and inspiring symposium. Thank you!
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Mr. Knapen: Thank you very much, Yvonne Timmerman, for this kind introduction. I know from an
experience that you are a busy woman and as president of the Senate you have duties elsewhere to
perform. So, we thank you very much for these introductory remarks but we hope to see you later on
today, because we heard there is a slight chance that you might return when the Cossacks choir
enlightens us. Thank you very much.
Ladies and gentlemen, dear guests. Welcome here in this very special arena. We are here today to have
a discussion on the report on Russia and the EU by our Dutch Advisory Council on International
Affairs. Let me give you, just as a starter, some provocative quotes from this report to refresh the mind
and to stir up things as good as possible.
The report observes in Russia a drive to assert itself as a great power. Russia no longer wishes to be
guided by the EU on the path to democracy, the rule of law and the free market economy. The EU
approach is misplaced towards a former superpower that is back on the road to recovery. Then is says:
To the Russians modernization is not the same as Europeanization.
Then it goes on: No compromise on the principle that southern states decide for themselves which
organizations they want to join. That does not mean that NATO is obliged to admit then, which has the
Ukraine and Georgia as members. The EU must continue to insist on Russia's greater observance of
human rights and compliance with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.
This report came out as it happened on July 4. The report still talked about so called frozen conflicts.
The report delivered some remarkable blind rule that still is valid, although one may say that not all
conflicts that was referred to were frozen conflicts in the meantime. Something changed between 4th
July and today, as we all know.
The report gives useful advice as to how to structure consultations, how to avoid pitfalls and how to
use the building blocks that are already there. In short, how to get to a balanced relationship. Precisely
on this question, on how to get to a balanced relationship, I would like to continue this afternoon.
Today's order is very simple. We have four speakers. Each of them will give a short contribution and
after each presentation we will take time for questions and answers and for debate.
First of all, I would like to ask Mr. Elmer Brok to take the rostrum and make some remarks. Elmer
Brok is, as we all know, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament. I
will not quote all his functions now, because we want to have a debate this afternoon. He had a pivotal
role in all European treaties from Amsterdam via Nice to the European Constitutional Treaty ending in
the Lisbon Treaty. Mr. Brok, I am delighted to announce you. It is good to have you here. The floor is
yours!
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Session 1
Address by Elmer Brok, member and former chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
European Parliament.
Mr. Brok: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you very much for this opportunity to be in
this great hall, one of the most beautiful parliaments in Europe. To see such a hall I must say how little
history we have in the European Parliament and how much more we have to do to come to such an
image.
I must also say -- I am happy to talk about this – that I just learned that Czar Peter has lived for one
night in the Amsterdam House here at the Binnenhof. That was during the stage where Russia wanted
to become more European. Perhaps we are in a situation to discuss a similar situation again, where we
have to do all our best.
The present relations with Russia are in quite a difficult situation and not just because of the Georgia
case. On the other hand, we see that we perhaps have lost an opportunity after 1990 as there was a
possibility to build on a multilateral world which was refused by our closest ally who was looking for
unilateral policy. On the same side I must say, without excusing things that happened in Russia and
from Russia, that we have perhaps not seen something which is important in normal life. If someone is
down you have to be nice to him otherwise he will tell you later that he is back again. Perhaps we have
not done not our utmost in such a situation, which has perhaps not brought us to the present
development. Thirdly, I would like to say that the European Union itself has a weakness, because we
have no Russian policy strategy. We have strategy papers but no strategy. This has to do with the fact
that after the enlargement of the European Union in 2004, we did not have a proper debate between
ourselves to come to a common strategy. We see it every week that there is still a deep division. I
would not like to say who is right and wrong in that. Perhaps we, as old Europeans, have not
understood that new member countries have a different view of this situation than we in Western
Europe because of geographical and historical reasons. I think we have to give more assurance to our
Eastern members that we see a common solidarity, that we look into policy that we have to accept that
in the European Union we have countries with a different level of security. The security guarantee
must be the same for everyone. Therefore, I think it is very important that in the Treaty of Lisbon there
is a solidarity clause, which perhaps gives more possibilities to do so.
I would also like to talk about energy in this situation. If a countries rightly or wrongly are afraid that
Russia with its strong energy possibilities is stopping the supply to such a country then we do not have
to do something about Russia: we have to strengthen ourselves. That means for example that we need
to establish a consumer power against a supplier power. If we have the interconnectivity of our
pipelines everyone can be sure that he will not run into difficulties.
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When we have problems with Russia we should not look firstly to Russia but to ourselves, to
strengthen our internal situation. And when you strengthen your internal situation your might perhaps
have the courage to come to an open strategy towards Russia whereas because of the internal
blockades you were not able to do so. Therefore, we do not have the impact on the international
politics as we would like to have. With a better European foreign policy under the Treaty of Lisbon
and with the political will we can perhaps arrange, as Europeans, with our ally on the other side of the
Atlantic, a common approach with a multilateral framework of work politics, which gives Russia the
place it has to be as a very important power and not as someone that we are afraid of. I believe that
despite the problems we discussed in the last years you have to see that Russia is not the Soviet Union
anymore. In my understanding Russia is a great power with a lot of potential, which is looking to
come back to the world stage and have influence, not to be asked if we need Russia but normally to be
asked in part of the game. This Russia looks into its interests as every great power looks into its
interests. And if such a power looks into its interests I can find out what its interests are and then
define my answers to that. And if I have the opportunity to find a solution for that, a compromise can
be found in order to have a way that we have these interests not directed against each other but have
them combined. That is the difference with the Soviet Union, which wanted to transform the world
with a certain type of ideology. Therefore, the threat that came out of that old system is not there
anymore and therefore, I think that some of us in the European Union have to learn that we are dealing
with a different Russia, despite old problems and that this is a much better place to talk on finding
solutions.
Ladies and gentlemen, I believe that on the other hand we need Russia. There are many challenges we
face as member states of the European Union and as the European Union. We cannot even solve a loan
as member states anymore, as we have learned from the financial crisis. There are certain questions for
which the nation state is too small to do so. Therefore, we need Europe. Most of the questions we face,
on terrorism, climate change, organized crime, globalization and certain aspects of foreign aspects of
foreign security policy, no nation or country can give an answer to alone anymore. Therefore, we need
this European integration.
But we see that even a lot of these questions cannot be solved even by the European Union alone
anymore. In certain questions we need others in the world and Russia, as a member of the Security
Council and with a veto right and its potential, is in the position where we need Russia to solve certain
problems. We have seen that despite the discussions about whether we should start negotiations on the
partnership and cooperation agreement and the big discussions about these in Brussels. Only a few
days after the Georgia incident the 5+1 met because of Iran, including Condoleezza Rice, in New York
at the United Nations because everyone knows perfectly well that stopping the proliferation of mass
destruction means – Iran, North Korea – cannot be done without Russia. How can we solve certain
questions of terrorism without Russia? How is it possible to solve the Middle East conflict without
Russia? I can give many reasons why it would be better, both for Russia as well as the European
Union and the world, if we could come to common strategies and solve such problems. Therefore, I
believe that the problems we have, both historical and present ones, should not be the reason to stop us
to work on such common policies because this is indeed the question that we cannot solve alone
anymore.
Ladies and gentlemen. I therefore believe we should clearly say what we are angry about. Despite of
what I have said before, as a member of the European Parliament I will always talk about human
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rights when I see a lack of the rule of law or a lack of democracy, human rights or rights of journalists.
Human rights are not a subject on which we can make many compromises. But despite the fact that in
Russia this subject has not had the same development we believe we have had, it should not stop us
having practical and operational policies together. Here we also have to accept a common position and
limits, on both sides. Since the Helsinki Act it is forbidden to talk about spheres of influence. It is
forbidden that because of your interest another country is not allowed to join an alliance. The
sovereignty of nations who are independent cannot be stopped and must be accepted. In the case of
Georgia – whether the situation was more wrong in the beginning of the war or not; that is not my
issue today – it is very clear that we have to accept international law and that we have to accept the
territory integrity of a country that is part of this Helsinki Act agreement. But we also have to say that
you should not immediately use every right you have. Therefore, I believe that it is right that we
consider it carefully when we talk about NATO enlargement. There is a right of NATO and a right of
Ukraine and Georgia to come together but it is the question whether we want to do that now. And this
has to be considered in such a situation. Or is it not better to have developments in a peaceful way, as
the European Parliament asked for two or three years before, and to have a more practical
development for such countries, like Georgia, Ukraine and so on. A new partnership and cooperation
agreement, a free trade area, Eastern partnership or a European economic area come to such countries,
a status like Norway and Switzerland at the end of the day. Close, but not in the institutions of the
European Union. This is practical progress for such countries, which is not directed against anybody
and cannot be seen as an alibi by Russia or named as a 'threat'. This would be the practical term and
could be reached in 15 or 20 years from now. Nobody knows what the development is of such
countries of the European Union. This is a peaceful development that gives independent countries the
right to strengthen themselves, to strengthen their independence and their internal situation but without
having problems with Russia on such a basis. I hope that this decision on 1st September will become
the future strategy, that everyone agrees to that and that it will become the operational policy.
But this also means that we have to talk to Russia again. I hope that the Geneva negotiations about
Georgia will have a successful outcome at the end of the day. But I do not believe that the outcome of
these negotiations, which might last very long as a type of 'frozen conflict', should stop us starting
negotiations again for the partnership and cooperation agreement with Russia. We have stopped them
for the moment but I hope that from a Russia-EU summit on 14th November there will come a clear
statement that negotiations can now be continued. I also believe that it is both in our interest as in the
Russian interest to come to a successful conclusion to membership in the WTO. If we have both the
bilateral treaty of the PCA and the WTO – legally binding agreements between each other – it will
give more security for each other. It gives more security for investment on both sides, which again
brings interests closer together. I do not believe that this agreement in certain questions should stop us
having joint legally binding agreements on both sides, which give us a better chance for the future.
Ladies and gentlemen, this would be a basis where the European Union can look into its interests and
in the interests of its member states and gives Russia the place as an important power in this world and
that we would accept that. We have to discuss one more point, where certain points have to be
clarified. This is the proposal by president Medvedev about a security partnership, as it is named now
a Trans Alp, but a Euro-Atlantic partnership and security I would accept. We should not come to the
result that the United States are politically not part of Europe. I also do not believe that this should
come instead of existing alliances. There might be different opinions in Moscow or in the European
Union but if we see these certain preconditions they could be a good basis, also on that level, to come
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to proper negotiations that give us more security and more understanding for each other in order to
have the success Czar Peter already wanted to have some centuries ago. I think, this time we should
look into the opportunity. As a German I must say there is a feeling in Germany that it was never good
for Europe, nor for Germany and Russia to get into a war or nearly get into a war. In the Napoleon
time there was a difference. We have seen the reasons for European Unification and not just within the
European Union: the cemeteries of soldiers, of people who died because of war and dictatorship,
especially also in these countries. It is the same we have with Russia and we should learn from the
cemeteries that these things should never happen again and that we have the pride and the courage to
go to a new policy in order to build a good relationship for the future.
Thank you very much!
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DISCUSSION
Mr. Knapen: Thank you very much, Mr. Brok, for this enlightening introduction to this afternoon's
topic. We will now begin the QandA part. We have microphones in the hall. If you will please state
your name and your function we can register that. I would like to give the floor to the audience.
Mr. Kox (MP): I am a member of the Senate and I also chair the United Left Group in the Council of
Europe. And that is what my question deals with. Mr. Brok, you have mentioned the European Union
and Russia, two powers on one continent, often partners but sometimes opponents but looking for a
way how to work together. One place where the European Union member states and Russia and 20
other European states work together is the Council of Europe. I sometimes have the impression that
the European Union does not have any knowledge of the existence of that body of which, for instance,
Mr. Kosachev is very eager to be a member and to stay a member. We discussed this in Strasbourg
recently. Wouldn't it be possible that the European Union takes more advantage of the Council of
Europe and its experience to increase the cooperation between these two 'superpowers' on the
European continent? The European Union as such is, I think, not able to build all bridges to Russia and
Russia cannot build them to the European Union. But the Council of Europe is already there. Could
you comment on that?
Mr. Brok: The Council of Europe must be run for the Netherlands when I see how many people here
hold a position in the Council of Europe! Also René van der Linden reminds me every day and even
this morning about what you have said about it. The last years nearly convinced me and I believe you
should use it more.
The European Union makes two mistakes. They have no real relationship with both the Council of
Europe in Strasbourg as to NATO in Brussels, which is a mistake on both sides. The communities do
not meet each other, with individual exceptions. Here, we have to come up with better strategies. In
the questions where the Council of Europe has the competences we should deal much more with the
Council of Europe and make it in a broader way. When we talk about human rights and democracy
development, the rule of law and cultural developments and such questions, it is sometimes easier to
talk to Russia, where Russia is a member and not a European Union opponent on the other side. So, in
this way there are more ways where perhaps criticism is 'taken' easier by Russia, because there it is
part of the family. Therefore, I believe the European Council should be used more.
Mr. van Staden (AIV): Mr. Brok, I would like to thank you for your thoughtful and very balanced
speech. It is good to hear the voice of the European Parliament here. I have two questions, two points.
First of all, in the first part of your speech you referred to the deep divisions and disagreements
between the EU countries as far as the definition of our relationship with Russia is concerned. Of
course, there is no denial that there are deep disagreements. Nevertheless, against the odds the
European Union was able to act as a rather effective player or actor as far as the crisis in Georgia is
concerned. Maybe you are a little bit surprised by that but by comparison to NATO and the United
States the conclusion is warranted that the European Union made some difference. My question is here
whether there is any lesson to be learned from that experience? You rightly pointed out there is not a
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lack of common strategy but there is between the common policies. So, is there something to be
learned from that experience?
My second point is about your perception of present day Russia. Of course, you are right in claiming
that Russia is unlike the Soviet Union. However, it is an assertive power and there is a lot of talk and
Russian discourse about the post-Soviet space. There are some suggestions that Russia is rightly
claiming some 'droit de regard' as far as the common neighbours are concerned. So, here is the
question how can we persuade Russia that the European Union and Russia are sharing some interest
that this completely puts the problems here in a zero-sum perspective. In addition, what can we do to
reassure countries like the Ukraine to get rid of their fears about the Russian threat? Those were my
questions, thank you!
Mr. Brok: The divisions in Europe and in the European Union have played a role. It has shown that
the European Union was the only power that was on the stage at a certain moment. There were no
United Nations, no United States, nobody else. The meetings that president Sarkozy as president of the
European Council in Moscow and Tbilisi on 12th August and 8th September undertook were the real
reason that Europe, if it is united, could play a role. But I must also say that this was a lucky
coincidence in the present situation that it was the president of a big country who did this. If it would
have been the prime minister of Malta it might have had a somewhat different impact in Moscow. This
shows that we need the Treaty of Lisbon with the permanent presidency of the European Council but
even more because that is the place where operational policy has to be done. With this foreign minister
around we are not allowed to call foreign ministers anymore since the Dutch referendum. When we
can put together the chair of the foreign relations council of the European Council, the Solana position
and the position of the foreign relations commission – all the instruments, powers, money and staff –
we would be able to develop an operational policy, come to common points of view and take more
time for that. This was a strong proof that we need to come to the Treaty of Lisbon in order to have the
peace making capacities of the European Union and not to have been in such a lucky coincidence we
were this time.
Your second point was that in Russia there is again talk about having the space of the former Soviet
Union again. I think I made it very clear that these are independent countries that have to make their
own choices and that discussions and sounds about influence are not acceptable anymore. It is also
against the Helsinki Accords. But this should not be developed against Russia and therefore I said that
we should give such countries the strength and the perspective to come to common positions under the
rule of their own democracy and democracy building. That is an important question. We see for
example the present situation in Ukraine: every nine months there is a new government and nothing
goes forward. This instability and the internal situation is more of a danger to Ukraine than some
speeches in Moscow. I do not believe that, after it had a certain result with the Georgia, because of this
experience Russia will try and go to Ukraine next week and do a similar thing on the Crimea. At the
same time I would like to say that we should also not bring problems to the Russian navy base in
Sebastopol, where they have a contract until 2017. We have to accept that and not make difficulties for
them there. If because of these different situations we see that half of the Ukraine has a different
opinion on such questions it is better to have a constructive development within such countries to the
rule of law and democracy and a better economic situations, which will stabilize such countries as
independent countries, more than anything else. Here we should concentrate on not talking about
former and future memberships. I must also say, though I do not like to say so in the presence of
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Konstantin Kosachev, that the speech of vice president Cheney two and half years ago in Vilnius was
not helpful to believe in the innocence of our policy. He said we had to have a policy in order to make
a circle around Russia. Therefore, we also have to clarify that we do not accept such a strategy.
Mr. Hofstee (member of the AIV-Committee on the future of the Relationship between the EU and
Russia): I will try to put my question as briefly as I can and therefore I may have to put it in fairly
strong terms. This concerns the possible NATO-membership of Georgia and Ukraine. NATOmembers and EU-members all agree that it is up to any sovereign state to decide for itself whether or
not it should wish to join an international organization or not. That said, would it be correct to assume
that the enthusiasm within NATO is bigger at the other side of the Atlantic Ocean and East of Berlin
than it is West of Berlin? In other words, that the Western European members of NATO are not all
that enthusiastic about a possible NATO-membership of Georgia and Ukraine and that maybe they
also feel – as I do -- that a membership of the European Union would be much more advantageous to
these two countries and to possible other countries that are common neighbours of Russia and the
European Union? These NATO-members might realize very well that a EU-membership of Ukraine
and Georgia is not in the currents because our voters simply will not allow it. Any enlargement of the
European Union is something that cannot be discussed by any government or any politician in
Western Europe at the moment. Is it then also possible that these 'Western' or 'original' members of
NATO might allow these two countries to become members of NATO in the end, in order to defer the
question of whether these countries should join the European Union? We give them something and
then we can avoid the very important question of whether these countries should not be better off in
joining the European Union.
Mr. Brok: To make such a choice could be dangerous because of opportunism but for the moment I do
not see that. If we would enlarge the Union with the Western Balkan states, which have a clear
promise – we negotiate with Turkey – and if we would take them in and would not talk about Georgia,
we would talk about Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan. Altogether the European Union
would have 44 members. I am not quite sure whether we have not already reached the question of
overstretching. I believe the European Union as it presently is would be destroyed if we would go so
far. It has not just even to do with such countries. We now need time for consolidation of the European
Union after we have enlarged it with twelve countries. When I became a member of the European
Parliament we had nine countries and now we have 27, three times as much. We are not prepared to
major further enlargement steps under the present conditions. The Treaty of Lisbon is the last
condition of the last enlargement and is not meant so much for the future.
The second point is that after the Georgian incident there is a big opposition of the population in my
country for the Georgian and Ukrainian membership. People say: if Georgia would already have been
a member of NATO we would be at war with Russia because of Article 5. The thing is we cannot only
have members who look for the solidarity of others but also work for the solidarity. If you want to ask
for solidarity you should not provoke someone and then ask for solidarity if things go wrong. This is
when we have to talk about the missile shield, about the Estonian monument. I do not want to say
whether it is right or wrong to have a missile shield but we have to debate it with all partners if you
want to have solidarity. Solidarity is a two-way street that we have to learn in the enlarged European
Union, too.
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As regards the division of NATO, first of all I believe this is partly the old Cheney-policy to wait for
the November election in the United States. When we have a new administration and then we should
discuss the future of NATO. I do not believe that the strategy by some Americans, to make NATO a
worldwide organization, is the right approach. NATO is a European organization for collective
security in Europe. This is not an organization to build something about Russia, which is not the
Soviet Union anymore. Also, we have to come to the situation where NATO becomes again the place
of strategic decisions and debates and not to follow. Here, we have to file and do a very internal debate
within NATO. Rightly, the United States asked for an Article 5 of the NATO Treaty after 9-11 but a
few weeks later, when we came to Afghanistan, this was not used. But NATO is now involved. If we
want to become equal partners it must be a partnership. One side takes a decision and the other side
has to follow. If it does not follow it is not full of solidarity. We have to have this principal debate
about the future of NATO after the American elections.
Mr. Knapen: Thank you very much! Before we give the floor to the next speaker I have one last
question myself. In the beginning of your speech you were saying that the European Union does not
have a strategy towards Russia. You followed on by saying that we did not have a proper debate on
this issue amongst ourselves. Does this mean that the 'older' European member states like Germany
and France in particular and Poland and the Baltics were not able to create some sense of collective
security amongst each other, that they still have not been able to bridge the gap – probably a gap of
emotions – between these two parts of Europe? Is that what you are saying or are you simply saying
that we did not take the time?
Mr. Brok: I think both sides did not do it. We lost time and that is a mistake and a fault on both sides.
I would not just include Germany and France. If we look at the Baltic countries and others and at the
involvement of the smaller countries of the 'old' European Union we see these are equally important
because if it was only done by the big countries it would be seen as a directorate. I am very much
against the pictures we had of Schröder, Chirac and Putin. In this sense I am in favour of the pictures
of Tusk, Merkel and Sarkozy, to give you an example in order that the smaller countries feel at home
in Europe. I do believe that there are old and new countries, that this European Union is a big
difference from the past. In the past, over the centuries the big countries decided what was happening
in Europe and the smaller countries were the victims of it. This European Union is the place where for
the first time every country, big or small, sits at the same table of decision making. Therefore, I am
very much against any directorate solution. Any decision making like Sarkozy with the Euro Group is
now proposing means that some sit at the table and others do not. Everyone should sit at the table.
That makes the difference with the past while we had the development towards peace and we had to
defend such a situation. On the other hand we have to take time for the countries that lived so long
under dictatorships as the new member countries, with other experiences caused by communism but
also a different historical thinking because they are closer to Russia. They have another approach to
that than countries near the Atlantic Ocean. Therefore, we have to take their feelings and their fears
into account and give them the feeling that we care for them. I think it is very important to make them
feel at home. If they feel at home they feel more secure and if they feel more secure they are able to
compromise with us to have a proper policy towards Russia.
Mr. Kuiper (MP): May I add something to this question? You see you do not like the picture of
Sarkozy, Merkel, etc. It is a question about the political form of negotiating with Russia. There is an
invitation of the idea of several European countries to go bilateral with Russia. Perhaps we do not have
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clear political forms. I would like to ask you to give some ideas about the best political forms for
better negotiations. In the report there is an idea and I would like you to comment that. The idea is to
give a kind of bypass to the problems: the advice is to appoint three wise persons from the Western
countries to consult with Russia at the highest level on all problems involving common neighbours,
frozen conflicts and European security issues. I would like you comment on this, in the broader
context of giving a comment on the best political form for the future.
Mr. Brok: Too many still believe they can make a bilateral deal with Russia, especially in the energy
field. I made my positive proposal of this interconnectivity and a common European energy strategy. I
believe we have to come to that. It is quite different because most of our companies in member states
are private companies, so how can you force them into a common strategy? This is quite difficult.
Nevertheless, we have to do so in order to achieve certain positions. But that has not just to with
Russia. It has to do with Nabuko, with oil from Arabian countries and so on. We do not do it just
because of Russia. But this energy and energy security is not a European Union competence at the
moment. Only with the Treaty of Lisbon does it become a competence. This, too, is why we need this
treaty and that is sometimes forgotten. On more occasions we have to learn that we are only able to go
for our interests if we make a compromise on the European level beforehand. None of our countries is
able to go for 100% of its interests with big countries like Russia, in many other fields too. If we make
a compromise and get 70% of our interests in the European position it has a chance that it will be
accepted and that it will become reality. We have to learn this new definition of interest in all our
member countries. I am not quite sure about this proposal of three wise persons but here again I would
like to say that institutionally they should be appointed from Brussels. It is not a new
intergovernmental approach. There should not be a repeat of last time where it is Germany, France and
Britain who will send these three persons. It should be a good mix of countries, small and big, East
and West. Then it might be that they make proper proposals for that if they could compromise on a
common position.
Mr. Knapen: In that case three wise men would not do, I guess! We need more.
Mr. Brok: If you cannot do it with three, you have to take five because it is easier to find a solution!
Mr. Knapen: Thank you very much, Elmer Brok, for your participation and your answers.
We will continue now with our next speaker.
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Session II
Address by Mr. Verberg, President of the Energy Delta Institute and former President of the
International Gas Union
Mr. Verberg: Thank you Mr. Chairman. Your Excellency, ladies and gentlemen, I am honoured to
participate in this relevant symposium EU and Russia. In the mid-nineties SNAM, the natural gas
division of the Italian group ENI at that time celebrated 25 years of gas from Russia and from the
Netherlands at the same party at the same time. As usual, the sellers brought a gift for SNAM. So, on
behalf of Gasunie I was very pleased to present a nice statue of Kiny Copinga -- as you know Gasunie
is known to promote art – to make it known that we were also very happy with this Dutch-Italian gas
contact. But to the surprise of those present I also gave, be it a somewhat smaller statue, to Rem
Viakhirev, my colleague at Gazprom that time. He was puzzled: why, it is a festivity for Italy and not
between the Netherlands and Russia? I told him to think about the origin of this Dutch-Italian gas
contract. Then a smile on his face appeared and his eyes were really sparkling. Of course, he knew the
origin of the Dutch-Italian contract. The Gazprom-SNAM contract was wanted by NATO due to
potentially disturbing the delicate political balance at that time in favour of the Western alliance. Mr.
Luns, our former minister of foreign affairs at the time rubbed it quite a bit at the ministry of
Economic Affairs and at the end of the day Gasunie entered into a contract with SNAM. That was the
reason why I was quite happy to have this Gazprom-Italian contract. Otherwise, we would never have
come to Italy. Why am I telling you this after so many years? I think it shows that energy, business
and politics are always intertwined, whether you like it or not.
Let me make a few remarks about the European Union energy situation. We use in the European
Union some 3.75 tonnes of oil per capita per year. You can compare that to 8 tonnes in the United
States and by 5 in the Netherlands. That indicates our energy intensive industry and also our energy
intensive agricultural sector, greenhouses for instance. In the global setting these figures are pretty
high. Think about China; there the amount is just 1 tonne of oil equivalent per capita per year. In India
it is even 0.5. So, if you see that societies like the Chinese society and the Indian economy are taking a
fast track to develop their economic situation and if you think about the sheer size of their population,
then even small numbers in terms of energy consumption per capita becomes very important. So, even
if nowadays it is expected that China's growth will decline from a double digit figure to a single digit
figure, nevertheless the impact of China and India on the global energy situation will be enormous.
That is quite something because already now many observers think there are not enough investments
being made in the energy sector worldwide. The IEA recently published a very outspoken report on
that. Of course, you could say that prices recently declined because of an expected lower demand but
if you have a backlog in investments even a decline in energy demand will not help you out. Even
more so because the present financial and economic situation will have a lasting and deeper effect on
the investments rather than just the expected drop in your energy demand. Think also about the other
side of the coin of lower oil prices: projects that need an oil price of 70 USD/barrel to 90 USD/barrel,
like many if not all of the tar sands projects. They are of the utmost importance for the oil and gas
industry to get new and sizeable reserves from but probably will be stalled because it just does not
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work. I have not even mentioned – but now I do – the recent find offshore Brazil in the very deep
waters that at least needs 100USD/barrel and for which USD 400 billion of investments are mentioned
in the professional press.
From this I think it is clear that the ongoing development in the world will put Europe in a position
where it needs to compete very hard for the required energy. On top of that we cannot even invest very
much in our own jurisdiction of Europe, because we are a 'mature' continent, as it is being called in the
oil and gas industry. So, seeing our import dependency rising to some 92% for oil in 2030 and 80% for
natural gas, it is clear that Europe should be very, very innovative, cautious and determined to find its
energy supplies we need in order to keep our European Union machinery going on.
Of course you could think that the market will fix it. But the market is not as well accepted as we
thought in the nineties, in the aftermath of the Reagan-era. At that time, in the early nineties there was
a general belief that all over the globe the market mechanism would really be the mechanism that
would allocate scarce resources, in particular in the energy domain. That has also very much
influenced the European Commission and the European Union with respect to the liberalization. This
liberalization began in the early nineties and then you can think of a very good strategy if you have the
assumption that indeed all available hydrocarbons – I am just talking about energy – will be brought to
the global market, so that there the allocation of scarce resources will be done in the most efficient
way.
But reality is different. Studies from for instance the Clingendael International Energy Programme
(CIEP) have shown that the acceptance of the market model is not the fullest extent and certainly not
in the energy domain. Nevertheless, in Europe we went on with our liberalisation, which in itself is
good if the base assumption is true that you are in a situation with ample supplies and without
suppliers that can influence the market outcome. But if that assumption is false you are in for
problems. I think that for the energy and in particular the natural gas sector the assumption of many,
many suppliers of which none can influence the market, is false. We live in a global situation in which
there are two oligopolies: one at the consumer side and one at the supplier side. That requires different
tools in order to make the whole energy sector working efficiently and to the best of all stakeholders,
consumers as well as investors.
At the same time we based our liberalisation on this assumption – which at least for the natural gas
sector is not the right one – we tried to export to Russia this set of ideas about the organization of the
market. Of course, there were reasons for that. In the early nineties, in the Jeltsin-era, we all thought
that indeed a fully fledged market economy would be part and parcel of the Russian society. But the
Jeltsin-era was less organized and less determined to go towards a real market economy than we had
hoped for and believed in. There was a lot of applause in the West – of course – for the freedom of
press but at the same time we sometimes forgot that every society also needs some fabric that cannot
be too chaotic in order to keep society together. At the end of the nineties it became clear that Russia,
the Russian Federation, had more or less lost its position in the geopolitical scene. As is rightly
worded in the AIV-advice as well as recently in an article in the New York times: it was humiliated.
The Russian Federation was humiliated in the geopolitical setting. And that is something that cannot
last. So, we should not have been surprised that a change occurred in the Russian Federation.
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Let me get back to the energy issue, which has to do with the same issue of trying to get back your
place in the geopolitical setting and in the geopolitical picking order. First, the issue of liberalisation
and jurisdiction of the European Union. The European Union wanted to export its model, also to
Russia. But think about the real core issue of liberalisation: that was the idea of lower prices. If you
look at the gas value chain, where do you find the best economic profits? You will find it at the
upstream part. Where is that upstream part located? Not so much in Europe anymore but very much in
Russia, in the Russian Federation. So, in essence, the liberalisation asked the Russian Federation
government to accept the rules and regulations of liberalisation because we want to have lower prices
and that is by implication a lower economic rent for the Russian Federation. Is that a win-situation for
the Russian Federation? I do not think so. So, if you want to export, ideas, rules and regulations
outside your jurisdiction you had better ask yourself and check and check again whether you could
give something in exchange in order to create a win-win situation. As far as I have noticed I could not
see that happening.
Another issue that I would like to draw your attention to is that the economic rent to a large extent is
also an issue which is a dynamic part of the natural gas sector in Russia. Let me explain this to you. In
the past, in the nineties, domestic prices in Russia were very, very low. They were so low that of
course they became part of the negotiations about the WTO. One way or the other it was a kind of
dumping for the energy intensive industry based in the Russian Federation to accept these low prices
for energy if at the same time they wanted to have an open door approach for their exports to the
European Union. At the same time, during these negotiations, the government of the Russian
Federation was willing to give in with respect to the prices, not only because of the negotiations for
the WTO but also because they knew very well they wanted to have an efficient, market based natural
gas sector without giving away the economic rent of the upstream shackle of that chain.
In 2012 it can be expected that domestic prices in Russia will by and large be of the same magnitude
as export prices. Of course, the European Union could be happy about that but did you think about the
following implication? Until now – until 2012 – Gazprom and the Russian Federation have an
incentive to export gas to the detriment of domestic consumption, because exporting gas gives much
higher revenues per cubic metre than domestic consumption. If you have brought these two prices at
par, the priorities of the Russian government and the priorities of Gazprom could somewhat change
because there is no real incentive to go only for export. Even for the Russian government you can say
it in another way: how do you think the Russian government could explain to its own population that
they are deprived of natural gas because they want to export it, if the domestic prices are by and large
at the same level as export prices? So, having this economic rent being safeguarded by putting the
domestic price at a higher level, which fulfils one of the needs of the WTO negotiations and also
fulfils the need to establish a more efficient natural gas sector within Russia itself, you have also
created a situation in which Russia can reconsider its priorities. While we in the nineties thought – at
least at the official levels in the European Union – that Russia, the Russian Federation almost
automatically would renew its export and extend and expand its export of natural gas to the European
Union, nowadays that no longer goes on automatically. If you look at the real facts: Stockman Scoria
for instance is an enormous important gas region north of the Scandinavian Peninsula. You will find
liquefaction there in order to be able to send LNG to the North American market and in order to
escape the so called captive supplier situation Russia is in now. If you go to Sakhalin you see
enormous investments being made to send gas to the Pacific Rim and China. Not to Europe. If new
investments have to be made you certainly need to realize that these new investments will not serve
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production capacity for the good of the European Union by definition. So, this is another reason why
the European Union should realize that we are in competition with other major energy consuming
regions in the world. We are not alone, we have to compete. And if you want to compete and if you
realize that the Russian Federation with 25% of the world's natural gas reserves is by far the number
one – number two is Iran with 16%, but not very helpful nowadays given the geopolitical situation – it
is best to look for very constructive ways of cooperating with the Russian natural gas industry, in order
to get also your part, your share of the cake. I think that with the teams in Gasunie they have been able
to do so, to have a business win-win situation. They have the gas we want and we are willing to pay.
We have services they want to pay for. We built up respect for each other, took each other completely
serious. We had a deep interest in each other's culture and professional knowledge. We had invested a
lot of time in creating personal relationships, which are valuable even after signing the contract. We
maintained these relationships and I tell you, so far Gasunie had never been disappointed. The
Gasunie-Gazprom relationship of the last eight years had only been a success story. Also other
European gas business companies have experienced that if you have reached a good cooperation with
the Gazprom people it is possible to maintain that relationship to create and maintain a win-win
situation. May I leave it to this? Thank you.
Mr. Knapen: Thank you very much for this thoughtful and instructive contribution.
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DEBATE
Mr. van der Linden (MP): First of all, I would like to underline particularly the last part of your
introduction. Could you perhaps explain a bit more the role of education of the Delta Institute and also
the role of culture, the relationship between the Groninger Museum and the culture in Russia, in
building up this relationship and as part of business in the later phase of the relationship between
Groningen and Gasunie?
Secondly, there was a lot of confusion after the gas interruption between Russia and the Ukraine.
Many people know what was behind that. Did you have any hesitations in the past between Gasunie
and Gazprom?
Mr. Verberg: The Energy Delta Institute is a foundation, established six years ago in a partnership
between Gazprom, Gasunie and the University of Groningen. Other major actors in the energy domain
are participating now. It is a platform in which we give professional courses, including executive
master courses that are officially accredited in the domain of the natural gas business and in the oil and
gas business, the upstream course that is given in cooperation with the University of Delft, for
example. It is a platform in which people, mainly young professionals from all over the world, come
together in very interactive courses in Groningen or in other places in the world where we think we
can serve the customers. We have now had some 1200 students, amongst which is the personal
assistant of minister Revchenko and the vice-president of the Bolivian state oil and gas company. So,
we have alumni you can point at.
As regards your question about culture: very early in our relationship-building with Gazprom we were
intrigued by the rich cultural heritage of Russia. The best example was the Bilibin exposition that the
Groninger Museum organized with the assistance of Gasunie and Gazprom. Since then, many other
exhibitions in Groningen saw the light and were successful.
With respect to the present issues it is difficult for a retired CEO to really mention them because it is
no longer my business. However, it is publicly known that Gasunie has entered into agreement with
the other partners in the North stream, which is of vital importance for the supplies to North-Western
Europe and also to establish and realize the so called gas roundabout in the Netherlands, which will
enhance the securitised supply of North-Western Europe and by that of course also of the Netherlands.
Your last question was about Ukraine. If you pay your bills and do not do the wrong things business
wise I would not have expected that anything would happen like what has happened in the Ukraine. I
think the very poor name of the Ukrainian gas industry that has built up within the gas industry in
Europe is very much underestimated. They have done things that are not business-like and for which I
also would have closed the tap in order to get payment first before I would go on. If you think about
the price Gazprom was getting for the Ukrainian gas, it turned out to be a subsidy from Russia to the
Ukraine of some USD 3 billion a year. That might be ok if you belong to the same political setting but
if you have deliberately chosen to do otherwise that is your sovereignty but then you can expect these
kinds of subsidy would no longer be available to you because you have chosen to go to the other side.
By the way, the other side has never lived up to the same kind of subsidies, at least as far as I am
aware of, unless I missed some information.
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Mr. Wellenstein: Mr. Verberg reminded us of the fact that energy matters in principal are matters
between companies and not between governments. That is a comment to the often heard complaint
that the governments in Europe do not act together in this field. Indeed not, because the companies are
not theirs. But in Russia and in many other places that is different. There we deal with state
companies. So, there may be – may be not – political influence in commercial decisions. That is one
addition I would like to make to Mr. Verberg's analysis.
As he rightly said, especially for gas there is not a 'normal' market, the more so because you cannot
carry gas with you. You need pipelines to bring it to the consumer. If there is no pipeline a foreigner
cannot deliver the gas. So, the matter is much more complex than simply saying that the markets
should work. My question is the following. Would you agree that in this non-market situation, with
mutual dependence cross investments, investments from the supplier on the side of the consumer and
vice versa could be an enormously important stabilizer in the situation? Could this be a very important
item between the EU and Russia i.e. an appropriate system of protection, of foreign investments in this
case, especially European and Russian investments on each other's territories?
Mr. Verberg: Thank you for your remarks. I agree with you that cross investments could be to the
better of the relationship between these two very important regions, the European Union and Russia.
However, if you talk about cross investments you should have the right expectations. Long ago I
worked for the ministry of Economic Affairs and there I have learned that of the state's participation in
upstream concessions of let's say between 40% and 60% were deemed normal. In Sakhalin, in the
Jeltsin-era, concessions were negotiated by Western based oil and gas companies with almost no state
participation. That is not something you should consider normal because the economic rent of natural
resources should to a large extent belong to the public at large. Of course, the government is the
representative of the public at large. So, if you have the right expectations I fully agree with you. If
your question had the implication or had the undertone that investments in upstream activities in
Russia should be allowed without or with a negligible state participation, then I do not agree with you.
Mrs. Broekers (MP): Thank you, Mr. Verberg, for your speech. You said that the European Union has
to compete with the rest of the world in energy matters, maybe also in other matters but in any case in
energy matters. You also said to look for a cooperative way to deal with Russia on the energy supply.
As you know, Gazprom had a monopoly on production and on distribution. Very recently – they are
still working on it – new rules in the European Union were introduced on the internal market to forbid
companies, European Union operators, from exercising the double role of distribution and production.
Third country companies, active in the European Union, should be subjected to the same rules. What
is your opinion on this when you say that the EU has to compete with the rest of the world? Should the
European Union forego these requirements of separating distribution and production?
Mr. Verberg: With respect to the expert monopoly of Gazprom this is, as you know, very much like
the de facto expert monopoly Gasunie has had for decades, before it was changed. That was very much
stimulated by the Dutch government, because it was one of the practical tools in order to safeguard the
economic rent of our natural resources. That is my comment on your first point.
Your second question was about the unbundling. It is known that also in the European Union there is a
difference between the onshore and the offshore gas grids. These gas grids – which are really offshore
gas pipelines – were very important in order to evacuate the gas from the fields, smaller and larger, not
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also in the Netherlands but also in the remaining parts of the North Sea Shelf. It had its own legal
regime because that was the way to fine tune the economics of such reserves with the evacuation, so
that indeed the gas which was found could be brought to the market against an economic price. The
pipelines like North Stream, the friendship pipelines – though they are onshore – should be considered
as evacuation pipelines of huge reserve areas which deserve its own regime in order of the financial
and economic situation. They should not be compared to a gas pipe line between the Netherlands and
Belgium or Germany, or whatever other example you would choose.
With respect to your last remark I think it unwise of the European Union not to acknowledge that this
fine tuning in the economic and financial sphere of the evacuation pipelines and the gas regions like
Jamal, Stokman Scoria and the other regions should be placed in a different setting in order to secure
that indeed the supplies are coming to the North Western part of Europe and not just to show the world
that we are very good in pointing out and implementing regulations. If you have no cake you cannot
share it.
Mr. Knapen: I would like to thank you very much for your introductory remarks and for your
enlightening answers on a complicated issues.
Coffee-break
Mr. Knapen: We now have the privilege to listen to Konstantin Kosachev, chairman of the
International Affairs committee of the Duma, he is chairman of the Russian delegation of the council
of Europe, and he is also a former diplomat.
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Session III
ADDRESS by Mr. Konstantin Kosachev, Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of
the State Duma of Russia
Mr. Kosachev: Thank you very much for inviting me here and letting me introduce the Russian point
of view on what is going on in relations between Russia and the European Union as well as Russia and
the so called West. First of all, I would like to thank the Advisory Council on International Affairs for
their balanced and in many parts deep, good and sometimes excellent report on cooperation between
the European Union and Russia. I think that one of the major descriptions which was being used in
this report towards the Russian foreign policy of today is the definition of Russia being assertive and
trying to assert itself as a great power. I do not mind using that definition. For me assertive is
something between active and aggressive and as long as we use the definition in a positive way I
accept it. I believe that the foreign policy – if any – of the European Union may also be called an
assertive one and also that of the United States, as long as we use it the same way towards Russia. But
we are here not to speak about definitions; we are here to analyse why things are happening the way
they are. The most important question for me as a Russian citizen is why the Russian foreign policy
has become more assertive in comparison with, let’s say, the nineties.
There is one opinion on that which has been presented mostly by the newcomers to the European
Union and that interpretation is that the only reason is that Russia is over floated with oil and gas
revenues, that Russia has always been an empire and will definitely stay as an empire and behave that
way. In that case, the goal in Russia described by people interpreting it that way, is definitely to
restore control over the neighbouring states in the first hand, later on over Eastern Europe and maybe
later on over the Netherlands and other European countries. If so, the logical sequence of that would
be that the Georgian crisis was unavoidable: Russia had to take control over Georgia being a
democratic country trying to make its own democratic choice in the field of security joining NATO
and doing other things that Russia definitely disliked and wanted to prevent. Of course, by that, the
second conclusion would be that other crises are to come and Russia is definitely going to take Crimea
from the Ukraine and other tasty parts of neighbouring countries as well. Then, the logical final
conclusion would be to contain Russia to oppose to that trend and to do everything possible to protect
a united Europe against Russia.
I believe that this is a very simplified interpretation and I have another one to propose. I think that
though Russia definitely does take advantage of both high oil and gas prices, our more active foreign
policy depends on completely different motivations and has just coincided in time with the high prices.
My interpretation is that Russia, since the late nineties, feels very uncomfortable in a European
construction of cooperation. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union we have been, I believe, one of the
major sponsors of a new system of collective security the way we were seeing it. Our interpretation
was that the Cold War was over, all European countries were equal and we should build something
together, with each country taking its part of the weight, being the golden rule. Russia has joined the
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council of Europe and I believe that this is still the most important European project for Russia, thanks
to the Council of Europe. Russia has entered into a very prospective cooperation with the European
Union by signing the Partnership Agreement with not as clarified consequences, because in some
cases I believe the approach by the European Union towards Russia has been rather consumptive. I am
speaking about better access to the Russian raw materials, such as unprocessed wood to be exported
from Russia, about unlimited over flights from Europe to Asia through the Russian airspace and other
good, tasty things for the European parliament, not to mention the Energy Charter which is also very
much one sided; very good for the European Union but not as good for Russia. But in any case I
believe that the experience of our cooperation with the European Union has been much more positive
than negative if you look at the experiences from the nineties as well as from this decade.
But if you look at the field of common security – and now I am speaking about military security in the
first hand – the result for Russia has not been satisfactory at all. We have been sponsors of this new
collective system being a bit too romantic maybe. We have withdrawn our bases from Cuba, Vietnam,
Eastern Europe, the last years from the so called Post-Soviet countries, including Georgia which I
would like to stress especially. Since the end of the Cold War we have not started a single military
operation anywhere beyond the national borders of Russia. I will speak about the last Georgian
conflict a little bit later but I will now speak about the last two decades. We have fulfilled all of our
commitments according to the international agreements, including the bilateral agreement with the
United States on anti-missile systems, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and all other
possible treaties as well as ratifying the adopted version of the CFE Treaty.
What we got in response was NATO enlargement. It was the United States getting out of the antimissile treaty and NATO refusing to ratify the adopted CFE Treaty. I was listening to Mr. Brok
describing the situation inside of NATO and claiming that 'Look, we do not want to be ruled by any
country within this organisation taking decisions instead of us'. I may understand that emotion but
imagine Russia being outside of NATO and all the time being confronted with decisions being made
somewhere else in Brussels without any possibility for us to influence them.
The same goes to some extent for the European Union. If you look at this situation with Russian eyes
– specific maybe but nevertheless – you see that Malta or Ireland have veto right on very important
issues for the European policy. Not for the policy of the European Union but frankly speaking for the
European policy in general. While Russia has no chance. The area of Europe, with the extension of
NATO and with the extension of the European Union becomes much more limited for us Russians.
Just to mention one example: Cyprus. A paradise for Russian tourists. Cyprus has earned a fortune
from people from Russia coming there. But since Cyprus became a member of the European Union we
have visa requirements. Cyprus was against and Russian has asked the European Union not to do that.
This is another area and our space, our European space has become more limited as well.
So, the major problem of the united Europe of today is again like Mr. Brok put it when he described
small countries who need to have a place in Europe. I am afraid that the existing construction and the
way it is being developed right now by the majority of the European countries – I definitely do not
blame them for that, because they feel comfortable in this countries – may be not as comfortable for
countries like Russia. Countries like Russia do not have a place in this developing construction. They
do not have a good enough perspective. So, for me the greatest challenge for the European politicians
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in the European Union is to develop a construction, which should be comfortable for each European
country, Russia included and not excluded.
Now speaking about democracy in Russia, because that part of the situation was also mentioned in this
excellent report. Mr. Brok – I cite him all the time and he cannot answer me! – started his intervention
today by mentioning that he is very proud to deliver his speech in this ancient hall and that there is less
history in the European Parliament. Believe me, there is much less history in the Russian parliament.
A couple of years ago we celebrated the 100th anniversary together with Mr. van der Linden of
Russian parliamentarism. It was just a formal anniversary because out of this 100 years 70 were
somehow taken away in the Soviet period. So, we had ten years of experience before the Soviet Union
and now a little bit less than twenty years after. Believe me, that is not much. In any case, they have
started by trying to introduce an unlimited and unadopted version of the European democracy in
Russia in the early nineties. Unfortunately, we have failed because in 1993 the political part of that
system collapsed. We had tanks in the street of Moscow and we had the President of Russia fighting
the parliament of Russia. That was the defeat of the very young Russian democracy, I believe. Later
on, in 1998 the economic part of that model also collapsed because we literally followed all
instructions and advice given to us by IMF, the World Bank and other advisors. The Russian economy
was just in ruins in 1998.
Since that time we try to avoid mistakes and develop something that functions, as a model. To my
mind, democracy is just partially a self-goal. It is good to be free and it is good to have the right to
speak or to read what you want in mass media. This is a self-goal and it is good. But on the other hand,
democracy is an instrument that should make people's life better. Only in the case this instrument
functions properly it is good enough for a country. The problem of Russia as well as it is the problem
of almost every other Post-Soviet state is that the instruments of democracy, in the first hand the
political parties, are still very weak or absent. You may see what is going on right now in Ukraine. I
do not like that model of democracy. It may be absolutely free and it may be absolutely unlimited but
it ruins the country and does not assist its development. This is our experience and this is what we try
to avoid right now.
One of my German interlocutors, not being Mr. Brok this time, once gave me a very good formula. He
is absolutely in favour of import of democracy and absolutely against export of democracy. I like that
formula. Each country should be ready to accept foreign assistance, foreign advisors and foreign
experience but a precondition is that this country desires that and is ready for that development. To my
mind, it takes time for any country, including Russia. We are on the right track.
What is to be done? This is the final part of my humble contribution. People in the European Union
frequently speak about the need to develop a common strategy vis-à-vis Russia. Not against Russia,
ok, but vis-à-vis Russia. Again I may accept it but I would prefer to have a common strategy and
solidarity not vis-à-vis Russia but with Russia. I would like to mention here especially one example
that was already mentioned and this is Ukraine. In the early nineties the three Baltic states did a very
efficient thing: they wanted to speed up the access to the European Union and to NATO and they
immediately after the breakup of the Soviet Union started to provoke problems in their relationship
with Russia. I would like to remind you that Russia was a part of the Soviet Union but was the first
one to recognize the independence of the three Baltic states and assist in their independence. When
started to respond to those problems it was presented as a confirmation that Russia was a threat. This
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is why the three Baltic needed to be taken inside the European Union and NATO as soon as possible.
And they have succeeded. I acknowledge that this policy of the three Baltic states was very efficient.
Unfortunately, the same thing is being done by Georgia and by Ukraine, provoking problems in
relations with Russia and then presenting these problems as the new Russian empire coming back.
Crimea: Russians there. And this is the difference between for instance Ukraine and the Baltic States.
The Russians in Crimea have always lived there. Not just centuries, just always. They have not come
there from somewhere else, like Russia. The Ukrainian leadership right now takes intentive steps in
order to limit the Russian population in Crimea and other Eastern parts of Ukraine. Only last week
they have forbidden the Russian TV channels if they are not translated into Ukrainian, which is
impossible. The Black Sea fleet again is another subject. We are in agreement until 2017 but suddenly
they try to introduce new limitations in order to create problems and to provoke reaction from the
Russian side. The debates on history, all the more the Ukranian rebel army: if we want to have a good
cooperation the European Union needs to address that type of policy in a more attentive way in order
to prevent crises. We can come into a crisis situation with Ukraine as well, but not for the reason that
Russia is an empire but for the reason that some countries use this image of Russia in order to solve
their own problems. Then the European Union might be more consequent in its reaction on that,
protecting the national minorities and protecting the human rights. It would have been a major
contribution.
My last point is about the four spaces. Speaking about the export and import of democracy I believe
that the easiest way to develop democracy in Russia is to promote the establishment, the existence of
middle class society in our country. For that we need to have a stable economic development, together
with Europe and together with the European Union. So, my recipe would be to concentrate in our
relationship on the common space of economy, on the common space of humanitarian issues, to
promote human contact, to promote economic and social development in Russia, to disagree where we
can or may disagree – we have many matters for disagreement; fortunately or unfortunately but we
have them – but not to limit our cooperation in other fields for the reason we have disagreed in the
field of democracy and human rights. I believe we should resume our negotiations on a new agreement
as soon as possible. Russia considers itself as a European country. Russia wants to have both
economic and political cooperation with the European Union as closely as possible. We do not see any
obstacles that can prevent that development but for that the European Union needs Russia as a partner
to dance the tango and Russia needs the European Union as a partner to dance tango as well. Thank
you very much.
Mr. Knapen: Thank you very much for this very helpful perspective from the Russian side, which can
only contribute to a more sophisticated debate in this part of Europe on the relationships.
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DEBATE
Mr. van Baar (Press): Thank you for your interesting presentation. I have a question concerning the
position of Mr. Putin. Russia is supposed to have a presidential system but after the elections in March
Mr. Putin became prime minister and Mr. Medvedev became the new president. But after the situation
in Georgia this summer the European press concluded that Mr. Putin's position was confirmed as being
the strong man of Russia. How do you see this as a member from the Duma? Does this not create an
institutional problem? Is this good for the Russian democracy? How are we going to see this? I can
imagine that from the position of the Duma it creates problems if we see Mr. Putin clearly as the
strong man while at the same time Russia is supposed to be a presidential system and Mr. Medvedev
looks to be a sort of puppet of Mr. Putin.
Mr. Kosachev: To me this is a typical style of commenting things going on in Russia. First of all you
draw your own conclusion. You said that the European press concluded. Then you take that for
granted and you ask somebody else to give an explanation. Frankly speaking, I do not agree with that
conclusion. I definitely do not believe that Mr. Medvedev is a puppet of anybody, including Mr. Putin.
As a Russian politician I think that the interaction between the president and his administration on the
one hand and the prime minister and his administration on the other hand works perfectly well. There
are no conflicts at all. They have divided areas of competence, all according to the constitution. Mr.
Putin was to go to the conflict area, before Mr. Medvedev. That is true but the reason was exactly that
his competence was to speak about the urgent humanitarian issues like advocating people, restoring
communications and buildings and giving normal life back to people. This is the competence of the
government and not of the president. This is why he was there. But if you have noticed – maybe – the
partner of Mr. Sarkozy during all these difficult talks was called Mr. Medvedev and not Mr. Putin.
Believe me, he was not leaving the room in order to get advice from Mr. Putin while making
agreements with Mr. Sarkozy. He is in charge of the country. Russia is a presidential republic and I
think that we have already, when I speak about us as Russian citizens, noticed some differences in
style. Not in politics but in style. Mr. Medvedev as a professional lawyer is much more concentrated
on issues like rule and law and the legal framework of different decisions. He is much more oriented
on a dialogue, on communications with different areas and spheres of the Russian society. This
Thursday, Mr. Medvedev is going – it is not yet confirmed but I hope he will – to present his first
'state of the union' speech before the Federal Assembly. I know for sure, just for the reason I am a little
bit involved, that Mr. Medvedev works personally on the text of that speech. Of course, he gets
assistance from many experts but believe me, this is a communication between the president of the
country and experts and not anybody taking the lead instead of the president.
Mr. Münninghof (Press): I am a former correspondent to Moscow and nowadays I am a freelance
journalist with a special interest in the Russian Federation. Mr. Kosachev, thank you very much for
your analysis though I have another question as we are obsessed in this part of the world by the
financial crisis at the moment. We do not talk about anything else. I know Moscow it also struck in a
way because of this financial decline. Would you say that this financial crisis provides us with a big
opportunity to really work together to overcome this crisis, giving Russia and the European Union
even a better opportunity than we had after 9-11?
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Secondly, we have been talking about the interest we have in approaching the Russians and coming to
terms with the Russians because of economic advantages. Is it not time to say that there is a necessity
for approach because we simply need it? Or is this too idealistic a view on the matter?
Mr. Kosachev: Thank you. Speaking about the financial crisis, I believe that in these difficult times
Russia can really make a contribution to the solution of that crisis. I was following the discussions
during the previous G8 summit, the last year with Mr. Putin as president still participating there. I
know for sure that during that previous summit Russia had been the only country to mention the
upcoming of a global financial crisis in speaking about the difficulties as a result of the American
practice of mortgage loans etc. At that moment, eighteen months ago, nobody else was ready to
support that discussion. Why? It proves that sometimes Russia has a better analysis of what is going
on and maybe is better prepared for that. It is not just about the number of billions of dollars we have
in our reserves, it is about professional competence. The crisis has not yet caused any huge problems
in our economy though of course it had an impact. Not one single bank has gone into bankruptcy and
the measures taken by the Russian government until now have been taken in advance, in order to avoid
a crisis and not to overcome it. I think the coming G20 summit in New York on 15th November will be
a very interesting one. I know that Russia does prepare very detailed and very concrete proposals for
that, not just mentioning how good we are at preventing of predicting crises but coming to New York
with a very detailed program. Yes, I believe that it will create much better conditions for our
cooperation in other fields as well.
Speaking about us as neighbours, not rivals: definitely yes. The European Union countries may try to
seek other partners as far as raw materials are concerned and I understand perfectly well that a united
Europe needs to be more secure by diversifying its sources of energy supply, but all these diversified
sources of energy supply will be much more expensive. They will be and for that they will not be as
safe as you want to have them. So, for me it is better to follow an excellent example we had with the
European Union when it started with France and Germany uniting their economic interests and by that
avoiding any potential conflicts after the Second World War. This is how the European Union and
Russia should handle very difficult issues of economic cooperation. But if we will exchange shares of
the companies, if we will sign long term agreements for thirty, forty or fifty years ahead, then we will
avoid any crisis. Believe me; Russia is absolutely ready for that type of cooperation.
Mr. Kuiper (MP): President Medvedev proposed to speak about a Euro-Atlantic security partnership
with both the United States, the European Union as well as the other European countries and Russia.
At the same time, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer – the Secretary General of NATO – asked his member states
and the member parliaments to start a discussion about the future of NATO and the global security
arrangements that should be here for the next ten to twenty years. Can you elaborate a bit more on the
proposal of president Medvedev, because it was not accepted with a lot of applause although in my
opinion it might suit us all, the United States, the European Union, the European countries as well as
Russia. Could you elaborate a bit more on that concept?
Mr. Kosachev: I will give you one example: Afghanistan. Interests and goals of NATO countries on
the one hand and of Russia on the other hand coincide completely. There is no contradiction
whatsoever. We want to get back control over the countries, so that there is no more drug production
there, no terrorist bases sponsored by Al Qaeda or anybody else. We are very much interested in
having this operation of NATO as a success story. Yes, but Russia does not participate in that
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operation. We give our territory for some transit of supply but nothing else. Neither do China, India
and other countries that do not have the honour of being member states of NATO. And this is bad,
because we have the same interest but the operation is definitely not a success story. I do not know
whether our participation would bring success to that operation or not but I believe that the more
countries we have with the same coinciding interests the more chances we have that this operation
becomes a success story. So, the NATO format just limits the prospects of that success, which I
definitely dislike.
I believe that the initiative by Mr. Medvedev is definitely not meant to take the United States out of
Europe. Definitely not but on the other hand I know that the only country that will absolutely oppose
this proposal of Russia will be the United States because the existing construction is very comfortable
for the United States. Whether is comfortable or not for the European countries I do not know.
Sometimes you feel safe. You have a functioning mechanism of the decision making process, but
again it is not good for non-proliferation. It does not solve the problem. ** It is not good for
combating international terrorism, human trafficking or illegal arms' trade. It may be good for some
things but it is not good for conflict management. So either we will be able to make another
construction with each country with the same problems, the same challenges and the same threats
involved or we will again see how NATO tries to solve all global problems in the name of mankind
without being successful. What Russia does wrong is that we are not speedy enough to make our
proposal more concrete, more detailed. Sometimes it is part of our mentality to present a good idea
and to expect somebody else to develop it instead of doing that ourselves. In this case nobody will
develop this idea because again most countries which are our potential partners feel comfortable. They
would accept another construction only in the case it is better than the existing one. To propose a
better construction is a challenge for Russia. I believe we should be as concrete as possible in this
initiative. This is what I will insist on as a Russian parliamentarian.
Journalist: I would like to come back to the speech by Mr. Brok about the EU strategy vis-à-vis Russia
and the lack of it. My question to Mr. Kosachev is whether Russia has a EU strategy and, if so, what
are the objectives? He said that the challenge from the Russian perspective is to develop a construction
in Europe in which Russia feels comfortable. To me that is a very vague objective so maybe he could
tell us more how you can make Russia feel more comfortable in the European Union.
Mr. Kosachev: Feeling comfortable in terms of foreign policy is a vague definition. I agree with that. I
was trying to imagine a construction where Russia has the same participation in the decision making
process as other European countries, simply as that. There was a NATO-Russia Council which was
composed initially in an attempt to have a discussion not between 26+1 countries but as a council with
27 equal partners. It did not work. We always have been confronted with a decision already taken in
advance in Brussels and for Russia it is 'take it or leave it'. Frankly speaking, this is what we do not
like. So, what will this construction look like? I do not know. It would be naive to ask you to give up
the NATO project. But to understand that NATO is not the end of history and that this is not the
culmination of our foreign policy projects. I would like to have a discussion about that, both in Russia
and in other European countries.
Unfortunately we do not have a EU strategy in Russia. If you would ask whether we have an analysis
of whether Russia should join the European Union, theoretically, hypothetically or not, we do not have
such an analysis. The knowledge about the European Union in Russia is rather small. People do not
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understand how the European Union functions and what the membership is about, again in theoretical
terms. I would just welcome such a discussion. In case we would have such a discussion in Russia and
we would come to a certain conclusion it would be good for the relationship between Russia and the
European Union to provoke such a discussion. This is my dream. We need some strong politicians
from the European Union who would dare to invite Russia, to send Russia the signal that it is the same
as any other European country and that is has the chance to join the European Union in case it wants
to. But it will need to fulfil one thousand or one million criteria and of course this will be matter for
the year 3000 but please, consider the option. That might start a very interesting discussion inside
Russia. I do not believe it would harm the European Union anyhow, not at all. But we need to have
such a signal because right now we are in a very strange situation: the European Union has two
outwards strategies. One is towards potential candidates or future member states like Turkey or the
Ukraine that they need to do things to become member of the club. This is accepted by these countries
because yes, they want to become members of the club and this list of conditions does not humiliate
them. The other strategy is towards countries like the United States, China or the South African
Republic, that can never become members of the European Union. There are no conditions for
cooperation. They just cooperate with each other. Strangely enough, Russia is somewhere in between.
On the one hand we cannot become a member of the European Union – this is more or less accepted
by everybody – but on the other hand we need to fulfil certain criteria of behaviour in order to be
accepted by the European Union. We do not have the same motivation to fulfil any criteria. We just
have their own development. I would prefer to have a different situation. For we, as Russians, need to
make our own choice which we have not made yet.
Mr. Knapen: Mr. Kosachev, thank you very much for your introduction and for answering in the
questions in such a vivid, open way.
Our last speaker today is Professor Hans van Koningsbrugge.
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Session IV
Address by Mr. van Koningsbrugge, Director of the Netherlands-Russia Centre of the
University of Groningen and extraordinary professor at the Moscow State University.
Mr. van Koningsbrugge: Thank you! Ladies and gentlemen. I was asked to briefly comment on the
AIV report, which I will gladly do because in many respect it is a fine report. However, after reading
the report I had some mixed feelings. On the one hand the report describes quite accurately the sphere
of current problems between the European Union and the Russian Federation and tries to give some
useful leads to work together in future. As it pointed out correctly in the introduction, it is unwise to
use Russian's application of the rule of law as the sole criterion for the strengthening or weakening of
the relationship with Russia.
This seems to open the door for a broad approach and in the report there are some hints to that. But in
saying that I sometimes miss the Russian side, the Russian perspective. I will give you some
examples. It is highly important that we see that Russia has a totally different historical tradition than
Western Europe. There is a different political culture. I am not only talking about the period after 1998
but also before. We have to see that Russia is not only part of Europe – a European country – but also
that it is a separate and unique Euro-Asiatic entity with separate historical laws and developments.
I also another analysis. Why does Russia see the European Union as a threat and/or a partner? Is it
only a matter of assertiveness or are other motives relevant? What is the hierarchy in this? What
exactly are the problems with Russian accession to the WTO, which the committee regards as the most
important step for cooperation between Russia and the EU? Why is the Russian side so hesitant? If
you want to promote Russian membership of the WTO it is highly important to know what exactly the
Russian hesitations are.
Furthermore, the report puts very little emphasis on the mistakes of the Western side, the EU side, in
the relationship with Russia. What did we do wrong in the context with Russia, for instance during the
nineties? Was our strategy always right? Can we perhaps learn from our mistakes?
These problems are not without meaning. If you want to be in discussion with our Russian counterpart
you have to know why they have certain views and what their problems exactly are in their
relationship with the West. Knowing these, a real discussion can start without rhetoric.
Regarding the conclusions of the report I do not think we can really argue them but the most important
thing about these conclusions is the question how to realize them. In short – and I point to
Recommendation 1 – we have to speed up Russia's membership of the WTO. How do we get there?
Another question there is how to get the member states of the EU to take one stand in this – in this
subject in particular – and concerning Russia in general.
I would like to make some comments on the Russian economy. This morning I watched a program on
CNBC, a commercial TV program. Every morning they have a broadcast about the European economy
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and the decline of the stock exchanges. This morning the point was made that only two will be
sustainable if you compare the upcoming markets at this moments. These two were Brazil and Russia.
Although oil prices are declining the effects of this decline could be muted in the short term by oil
revenues accumulated in the reserve fund. Consumers' purchasing power and expectations are,
however, weakened by the fairly high rate of inflation, 15% per year at the moment. Growth in
domestic output is the restraint by firming capacity constraints. Several production sectors and a
strong growth centre above all and are already experiencing a shortage of skilled labour. Particularly
on the longer term, growth perspectives and economic diversification are also impaired by an
infrastructure which is deficient our outdated, in many respects.
If the liquidity crunch persists in international financial markets it may also exuberate the financial
position of Russian companies. But this crisis – and Alexander already asked for this – is also a chance
for the EU. The Russian need for diversification of the industry and the need for foreign investors
offer the EU many opportunities to work with Russia and to improve relations. In the field of the
current crisis it is impossible for one country to have its own way; they have to cooperate in broad
international terms, including the EU and Russia.
I will conclude with some small recommendations. The EU should understand that things take time in
Russia. I will make some small comparisons with the United States. It was the country of freedom in
the 18th century. 18 years after the creation of the United States slavery was abolished. Sixty years
later women got equal rights and again sixty years later equal rights were written down for the black
community. So, we should have patience with Russia. Not everything should be considered possible in
a short time.
The Russian side on the other hand should realize that assertiveness is a good thing but too much
assertiveness works counterproductive. This basic thinking should be a part of the EU-Russian
partnership, not only as a matter of common interest but as a common necessity, as was already
pointed out, because we are neighbours. And we will remain neighbours.
I will end my contribution with a small anecdote about the Czar Peter 1st, Peter the Great. He was also
in the British parliament. Some politician asked him whether he thought this system would be
something for Russia. The Czar looked at him as if seeing a fly and replied this would be impossible
for Russia for the coming 800 years. Fortunately, this was not the case!
Mr. Knapen: Thank you very much for giving this the historical perspective that always makes things
easier in life. Time will solve everything.
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DEBATE
Mr. van der Linden (MP): Could you elaborate a bit on the role of the United States in the
relationship between the EU and Russia? Could this role be helpful, also after the elections? Are the
United States really interested in a strong Europe and in a common approach of a strategy between
Russia and the European Union? How can we deal with this? Our partnership with the United States is
one of the keystones of foreign policy but it cannot be an obstacle for a relationship with Russia,
which has to be and will be one of the most important issues for the next ten to twenty years.
Mr. van Koningsbrugge: That is a very good question. The problem there is the tone of the
conversation between Russia and the United States. For some years this has been very bad. We already
talked about Mr. Cheney addressing in Vilnius; he was not only speaking about Russian democracy.
He also gave the rest of the world an example of the democracy in Kazakhstan that was working
perfectly in his view. Of course, that is an insult!
At this moment we need a new American president. Hopefully, it will be a Democrat. If it were a
Republican there will not be a lot of change and it will poison the dialogue between the West and
Russia at this moment. It is fully clear that the tone in the conversation between the EU and Russia is a
different one. It is more relaxed and it is more moderate than the American tone. So, we can only hope
for a change in the Whitehouse.
Mr. Kuiper (MP): I would like to ask a question about the Georgian incident, as it was called. It was
said – and it was felt – that Russia was the clear winner, especially vis-à-vis Georgia but also because
the Americans had a bloody nose, etc. Do we still think that is the case after two months? I read an
article in The Economist last week that for instance the Georgians themselves and especially president
Saakashvili did not consider it that bad for their country because the Russians were confronted with
reactions from the near-abroad. These reactions were very anti-Russian. There was an alarm raised
about Russian imperialism, etc. How should we judge this? Was it really a good thing for Russia or
were the reactions from near-abroad and from the Western world, the European countries not so
positive for Russia? If so, could we say it also had a price for Russia?
Mr. van Koningsbrugge: Of course it has a price for Russia. Russia lost the battle in the media. There
is another point. Of course it was in the Georgian interest to internationalize this conflict that really
happened. Now everyone is involved in it. I do not think Russia is the clear winner nor is Georgia.
There are no winners at all; both sides had losses and profits.
Mr. Kosachev: Please allow me to add one or two things. I would not call it an incident; it was a full
scale conflict. Each part of it is a loser: the people of South Ossetia for the reason they again lost a
significant number of compatriots, the people of Georgia because they have now – and I believe
forever – lost the perspective of restoring the territorial integrity of the country by political means and
of course it is a huge problem for Russia, because we are really confronted with almost the entire
world. We are in a situation where we had no other option than to act and react, which we, in
understanding that, have been trying to avoid. It was not Russia's choice to have that conflict. Until the
very last day our ambassador was shuttling between Tskhinvali and Tbilisi, trying to get people
together for a political dialogue. The existing version of the Georgian side, that they were reacting to
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Russia moving in before they started the bombing of Tskhinvali does not hold for the simple reason
that we have the Roki Tunnel and then at least four Georgian villages between the Roki Tunnel and
the city of Tskhinvali. If anyone of you has been to South Ossetia you will agree with me. To put in
South Ossetia any number of military equipment without being discovered for that is just not possible.
It is physically not possible at all. There are no other roads. In any case, just imagine the Georgian
leadership received information that the Russian tanks are moving through the Roki Tunnel and needs
to act immediately. Just theoretically, imagine this were true. I am not a military expert but to act in
this situation they would only have to block the Roki Tunnel, to let airplanes drop a bomb there but
not to bomb a civil city like Tskhinvali. These do not coincide, so to say. So again, the Russian
reaction was in response. We took the decision to respond only when we had the first confirmation of
casualties, of dead people among the Russian peace keepers. The two first report on two deaths was
the decisive factor. We had to act quickly because the civil city of Tskhinvali was bombed by heavy
rocket systems. Finally, believe me that nobody in Russia is happy about what has happened.
Definitely not. We understand that the situation has changed dramatically and we hope that finally we
will be able to find a solution that is acceptable for each party in the conflict. But right now, the only
thing Russia is doing there is to secure the lives of the people in South Ossetia and in Abhkazia. We
all have failed to prevent the conflict and now Russia takes it part of the responsibility in acting
unilaterally.
Mr. Peters (MP): I have a question for Mr. van Koningsbrugge. Thank you for your introduction. You
were rather critical of the report of the Advisory Council. You said that the perspective of the Russian
side was not presented well enough.
Mr. van Koningsbrugge: I was asked to be critical!
Mr. Peters (MP): That is great for the discussion, but could you clarify a little bit what you mean by
that? Do you mean that this report perhaps is too economical in its advice? What is your perspective?
Secondly, you have heard the frustrations of Mr. Kosachev about the treatment by the European Union
in the nineties. Russia was trying to cooperate but had many bad experiences with the EU. What
would you advise? What would you do if you were the Advisory Council? What would you advise us
now? What attitude should we take towards Russia? Perhaps Mr. Kosachev could react on that
question as well.
Mr. van Koningsbrugge: Perhaps 'economical' is too much said but other aspects should also have
been taken into account. It is a matter of priority. I can understand it but taking the WTO as the gate to
everything else is an approach I would never have chosen. But that is for the committee.
Your other question is what I should advise now. I was charmed by the idea of the three wise men.
You have the three wise men from the East at Christmas but perhaps now three wise men from the
West and three wise men from the East, behind closed doors, trying to improve the atmosphere and
trying to avoid rhetoric. No press, of course. That would be a great start in my view.
Mr. Kosachev: I have a simple answer on what the European Union should do in the current stage and
that is to have business as usual with Russia. It is as simple as that. I believe that the recent experience
from the Georgia crisis was a very unlucky one in our mutual attitudes and on your side, in some
cases. The interpretation of that crisis was automatically the same. In a dispute between a big country
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and a small country the big country can never be right and the small country can never be wrong. But
sometimes, this is not the case. As long as our criticism in this current crisis is addressed towards
Russia – and this is the case, I believe because I cannot hear any criticism from the EU towards
Georgia. The opposition there cries already. The former speaker and the former minister of foreign
affairs cry loudly that it is a democracy and other important things in Georgia, but the European Union
keeps silence; it is all about Russia. And this is wrong. Please, try to keep business as usual with
Russia and it will absolutely support the pro-European spirits in my country.
Mr. Gross (MP Switzerland): I am a Swiss parliamentarian and leader of the social democrats in the
parliamentary assembly. I am very grateful to the leader of the other social democratic in this
parliament that invited me to this discussion.
I have two questions, Mr. van Koningsbrugge. I think we should react to a historically extremely
interesting suggestion Mr. Kosachev brought up in the debate, that we should think about the
possibility that Europe and Russia will do in future what Germany and France began to do in the
period 1949-1951 and after the Benelux joined the proposition of the Steel, Coal and Mine Union. I
immediately thought that at time, in both main European countries, you had steel and coal production.
It was not one-sided. To overcome this distinction the European Union could contribute the
technology the Russians need so much. The Russians could bring in the resources. What do you think
about such a suggestion? I think we should not let it pass into the history books without mentioning it
or without thinking about it as Mr. Medvedev's proposition in Brussels concerning the security
agreement.
Secondly, in his speech he admitted himself that Russia has an extremely negative image in the West.
Some people are building on this negative image to sideline their own shortcomings and to focus the
attention on other things. We know that images are an issue of mentalities and mentalities are built by
realities. Realities may pass but mentalities still exist, although even mentalities are changing. What
could be our contribution to make the Russians contribute to overcome this own negative imagine by
developing soft power instruments where they are weak to do this? They are much used to the strong
power, which produces the negative image. These are two suggestions that could contribute very much
to the Russian development.
Mr. van Koningsbrugge: I think the cooperation between France and Germany after the Second
World War is of course a fascinating example but the comparison is not entirely equal, as you will
understand. After World War II France and Germany were equally hit and now we have Russia
progressing but the EU is much more developed. In the sphere of dependency, of needing each other,
it is a fascinating thought. Why not? But let me get back to what Mr. Kosachev said: the discussion
about the Russian membership of the EU is useful, though it might never be realized. What should
Russia do to become a member? It is good to see what we exactly want from Russia.
The negative image is of course a huge problem. An image is really important. I see it in the Dutch
newspapers; seldom there is positive news on Russia. Even if you want to correct for instance an
economic report it is not published. I have tried to do that on several occasions by writing to counter
piece to NRC. They tell you their magazine for Saturday is already filled up. What should happen is to
get a better understanding of what really happens in Russia. But also the opposite: when I talk to my
Russian students in Moscow and tell them what is happening in the West they tell me this is a totally
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different picture from what they got in the Russian newspapers. When I talk to my Dutch students I
get the same reaction.
Mr. Kuiper (MP): I would like to raise two points, the first on the cooperation on coal and steel. When
our former prime minister Lubbers introduced the idea of the Energy Charter it was meant to be a
cooperation between the European Union and Russia. But in no time the political pressure from other
parts of the world made it a charter with so many actors in it that a lot of energy was lost in trying to
settle all issues. This is just an example of how a close cooperation between the European Union and
Russia is apparently not only of interest to those two actors, although they could fit very well together.
Secondly, could it be that the very 'negative' image of Russia is to a large extent the proof of the issue
that Russia is part of the European family? When you have a brother or a sister who is not always
doing the right things you are much angrier with him than with someone who is way out of the family.
Perhaps that could give some optimism about this issue.
Mr. Knapen: Thank you very much! We have time for two more questions.
Mr. van Staden (AIV): I was part of the group that prepared this report. In fact, in the report as far as
the economic side is concerned we consider the WTO-accession of Russia is a very important
condition to arrive at the ultimate goal, which is part of the mandate of a new partnership agreement to
arrive at the free trade agreement. You cannot negotiate a free trade agreement without Russia being
part of the WTO. I think it is an anomaly that a big country like Russia is not part of the WTO. WTO
accession has two components, bilateral and multilateral. The bilateral component, as far as the EU is
concerned, was already concluded in 2004. Afterwards the bilateral one was also concluded with the
United States. I must say that I did not agree when the United States put political conditions to WTOaccession of Russia after Georgia.
The common economic space, which is part of the present partnership agreement has had no
substantive progress whatsoever. We need economic cooperation, we need to go into the direction of a
free trade agreement. WTO-accession is part of it. We were very close to an agreement on WTOaccession and I still believe we are close on an agreement. We are now valuing the Russian
perspective because at this time it is only one party that negotiates and that is the European
Commission and not 27 countries. It is a bilateral negotiation between the European Commission and
the Russian Federation. I think in that bilateral relation we know the Russian anxieties pretty well.
Mr. Knapen: That was a valuable contribution.
Mr. Trojan: As far as the point of criticism is concerned, the criticism made by Mr. van
Koningbrugge about the lack of the Russian perspective in the report I do not agree. There is a
paragraph devoted to the Russian conceptions of the European Union.
I would to pursue the debate about the international financial crisis and the opportunities that may
arise from that. Frankly speaking, there are opportunities but they are pointing more into the direction
of debate about reforming the structure of the global economic governance rather than deepening the
economic relations between the EU and Russia. Talking about global economic governance, what
springs to mind of course is the position of the International Monetary Fund. We all know that Russia
commands pretty vast monetary reserves of almost USD 600 billion. That is of course an important
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consideration. My question would be to what extent Russia is interested in being part of that debate
about the restructuring the system of global economic governance. Is Russia willing to become a
responsible stakeholder in that system?
Mr. Kosachev: Definitely, Russia is very much interested to take its part or responsibility for the
simple reason that we are now being affected by the negative components of that system. We may
continue to concentrate reserves in some funds in order to overcome the difficulties that are produced
somewhere else or we will take our part of the process. My answer is absolutely affirmative. We have
tried to participate in the G8 format, also in the part that concerns the financial discussions. It is not
yet possible to the full extent yet. The G7 ministers of finance usually meet in advance, which is not
good. I believe that the coming meeting in New York will change that situation and again, Russia is
very ready for making its own contribution to that.
Mr. Knapen: Thank you very much, all of you. I will not even try to wrap up the discussions of this
afternoon. The objective was to learn and to understand both sides. I think we made some progress on
a balanced approach of the issues. Mr. Elmer Brok said there is no Russian strategy in the European
Union and Mr. Kosachev said there is no EU strategy in Russia. There is a balance. There is also a lot
to do. And that is what we were here for. Mr. Kosachev made a surprising proposal to invite Russia
for membership of the European Union. A couple of years ago a historian told me that Russia already
wrote a letter to NATO to become a member of NATO. That was back in the fifties. From a legal
point of view they had a point, so it was decided to act as if the letter was never received. I am sure
there is no way for the European Union or for the European Commission to act in the same manner as
NATO did in the fifties, so it would be a great experiment to apply. I hope that we prepared some
ground for such a ground breaking proposal. In any case, I am sure that we all agree that it was
enlightening. We learned a lot. It always helps us to get a little bit of the flavour, the sense and the
thoroughness of attitudes and emotions and not only arguments and analyses that have to do with
relationships.
I thank Mr. Kosachev, Mr. van Koningsbrugge en Mr. Verberg for their frank, open and constructive
way they participated and contributed to the discussion. I should also include Mr. Brok. I do feel a
little bit guilty about the fact that he left. He told me he had to give a speech at 7 o'clock in Bielefeld.
My trust in the Dutch infrastructure apparently is a little bit lower than Mr. Brok's: I definitely advised
him to leave at 3 o'clock. So, I apologize for that. He really wanted to try and leave at 5. So, I thank
him for his optimism as well.
Thank you very much. You have all been the witness of a rather remarkable event and a remarkable
achievement. In one way or another the Senate, which is just a Chambre de reflexion, manages to take
the lead whenever something happens outside The Hague. Although they have full time professionals
at the other side of this court it is always the Senate who opens up the debate, takes the time for
reflection and makes all of us a little bit wiser. Thank you for that.
More or less this allows me to switch to the final remarks that are given by a man who makes a steady
contribution to the fact that this part time Chamber always has a full time agenda on opening up the
eyes of Dutchmen to the rest of the world. I give the floor to René van der Linden.
Mr. van der Linden: On behalf of the Committee of European Affairs and of Foreign Affairs of the
Senate I would like to thank today's chairman, Mr. Ben Knapen. Indeed, we are a Chambre de
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reflexion and it is usual that we take important issues on the agenda. It is not for the first time that you
served our meeting and I thank you very much for that.
We have a bonus system for those who have contributed in an excellent way to the debate. Our bonus
system consists of a very interesting present, but not the same present that is usual in some parts. Let
me give you this, Ben, as an expression of appreciation!
The same counts for the contribution of the speakers and those who took part in the discussion. May I
start with Jos Verberg? Thank you very much, Jos! Hans van Koningsbrugge, thank you very much?
May I give special thanks to Mr. Konstantin Kosachev? I know he originally had other duties. We
appreciate it very much that he gave an expressive contribution from the Russia side.
On behalf of both committees I would like to thank the AIV, the chairman of the AIV and those who
have contributed to this excellent report. They have given us this report as a basic contribution for
hopefully a debate in the Senate, to contribute to a cooperation between the European Union and
Russia as one of the most important issues for the coming years. Thank you very much!
As already mentioned, there will be a reception by the president of the Senate. Before that we will
listen to the Cossacks Choir The Netherlands, which will give a Russian flavour to this reception.
Thank you very much!
Applause.
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