Organon F 20 (4) 2013: 546-566
Rational Akrasia
JOHN BRUNERO
Department of Philosophy. University of Missouri – St. Louis. 599 Lucas Hall
1 University Blvd. St. Louis. Missouri 63121. USA
[email protected]
RECEIVED: 07-10-2012 ACCEPTED: 30-05-2013
:
F
F
akrasia
akrasia
akrasia
akrasia
: Akrasia
enkrateia
F
The Author. Journal compilation
F
Institute of Philosophy SAS
RATIONAL AKRASIA
Enkrasia
N
N
N
t
t
F
F
F
N
t
sic N
F
F
F
t
F
F
F
F
F
F
akrasia
enkrateia
F
JOHN BRUNERO
either
F or
F or
F
akrasia
akrasia
akrasia
Enkrasia
F
F
F
F
akrasia
are
akrasia,
Enkrasia
1.
akrasia
akrasia
akrasia
acting
intending to act
Enkrasia
F
F
RATIONAL AKRASIA
akrasia
against
akrasia
JOHN BRUNERO
akrasia
akrasia
internal
akrasia
epistemic
akrasia
rational
believes
akrasia
second
akrasia
RATIONAL AKRASIA
taken as a whole
is
akrasia
more rational
akrasia
JOHN BRUNERO
akrasia
akrasia
akrasia
akrasia
another alternative
akrasia
akrasia
more rational
akrasia
RATIONAL AKRASIA
Unprincipled
Virtue
more rational
akrasia
akrasia
F
F
F
F
more rational
akrasia
2.
akrasia
F
F
F
F
JOHN BRUNERO
akrasia
Enkrasia
Enkrasia
akrasia
akrasia
theoretical
responding to
Enkrasia
Enkrasia
Jack
akrasia
weakness
F
F
F
F
RATIONAL AKRASIA
Enkrasia
akrasia,
akrasia
akrasia
akrasia
JOHN BRUNERO
Enkrasia
akrasia
Enkrasia
akrasia
rationally inaccessible
RATIONAL AKRASIA
by John’s own lights
both
and
capable
does
rationally responding to
Enkrasia
F
F
F
F
3.
akrasia
Enkrasia
F
F
F
F
Enkrasia
JOHN BRUNERO
believing she ought to register and not intending to register
believing she ought to register
and not intending to register
akrasia
believing she ought to register and not intending to register
believing she ought to register
and not intending to register
combination
akrasia
RATIONAL AKRASIA
akrasia
Enkrasia
F
F
JOHN BRUNERO
F
F
ought
conclusive evidence
A,
A
A
A
why
A
Enkrasia
intend to
Enkrasia
Enkrasia
A
F
A
F
RATIONAL AKRASIA
prima facie
akrasia
believing one
ought to F and not intending to F
akrasia
state-given
JOHN BRUNERO
believing he ought to register and not intending to do so
believing he ought to complete some task and not intending to complete that task
believing one ought to F and not intending to
F
believing one ought to F and
not intending to F
RATIONAL AKRASIA
akrasia
akrasia
doesn’t
akrasia
p
p
q
p
~
~
p
q
~
~
JOHN BRUNERO
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
permitted
which
one
akrasia
requires
property
rationality
RATIONAL AKRASIA
4.
akrasia
akrasia
akrasia
akrasia
believing one ought to F and not intending to F
akrasia
akrasia
JOHN BRUNERO
References
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders.
Unprincipled Virtue
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Mind
A Companion to
the Philosophy of Action
Philosophical Quarterly
American Philosophical Quarterly
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
Mind
Mind
The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy Fall 2010 Edition .
Identity, Character, Morality.
The Chronicle of Higher
Education
Philosophical Review
Ethics
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality.
Journal of Philosophy
Moral Luck.