Lessons in Ethnic Reconciliation: A Case Study of Kosovo
Hannah Davies
Senior Honors Thesis
Sanford School of Public Policy
Duke University
Durham, North Carolina
2017
9 December 2016
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisors Professor Christina Gibson-Davis
and Professor Sarah Bermeo for their continued support and guidance throughout the thesis
process. Their feedback and patient consultation through every question change and new draft
proved invaluable. I would also like to thank Duke Alumnus, Greg Naarden, for providing a
grounding and real world perspective to my academically focused work.
Any acknowledgement would be remiss not to mention the continuous encouragement I received
from my fellow honors students. Thank you for the peer edits, uplifting words, and solidarity
during long nights in Perkins.
Lastly, to my friends and family, thank you for encouraging me to persevere. I appreciate your
phone calls, cups of coffee, and endless support more than I can say.
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Table of Contents
ABSTRACT
4
INTRODUCTION
5
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Kosovo Conflict Background
Current Kosovar Ethnic Divide
Reconciliation Framework
Reconciliation Policy in Kosovo
8
8
9
11
13
HYPOTHESIS AND IMPLICATIONS
Hypothesis
Implications
16
16
16
METHODS AND DATA
Case Study Analysis
Comparative Analysis
17
17
19
RESULTS
Case 1: Burundi
Burundi Historical Background
Ethnic Conflict in Burundi
Ethnic Reconciliation Measures in Burundi
Case 2: Guatemala
Guatemala Historical Background
Guatemala Ethnic Conflict
Ethnic Reconciliation Measures in Guatemala
21
21
21
23
26
31
31
32
34
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Lessons from Burundi
Lessons from Guatemala
Implications for Kosovo
International Involvement
Government Restructuring
Truth Commissions
Transitional Justice
39
39
40
41
42
43
44
44
CONCLUSION
Summary of Findings
Limitations
Future Research
48
48
49
50
CITATIONS
51
APPENDIX
Appendix A:
Appendix B
57
57
58
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ABSTRACT
This study uses case study analysis to determine best practices for ethnic reconciliation in
Kosovo – a country still experiencing stark ethnic divide between Albanian and Serbian
populations after the genocide in 1999. Case studies include Guatemala and Burundi, both
nations that endured and struggled to rebuild after their own ethnic conflicts. The study
specifically targets the policy areas of United Nation (UN) involvement, host government
reform, truth commissions, and transitional justice. Comparative analysis of the cases draws on
documents like UN reports/resolutions, national laws, peace agreements, truth commissions, and
court cases. The findings indicate that UN involvement in Kosovo was initially successful in
implementing a ceasefire, however could have been more effective by involving citizens in interethnic round tables. Additionally, Albanians and Serbians successfully co-exist and co-govern
through power-sharing structures within the government. The findings also suggest that a truth
commission could be beneficial to reallocate blame from an ethnicity as a whole to specific
individuals. Finally, international transitional justice efforts have been more effective in Kosovo
than in prior conflicts, yet witness corruption remains a pressing concern.
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INTRODUCTION
Kosovo – a nation whose statehood remains fiercely contested – struggles to unify its
population under one nationality. Kosovo is located in southeastern Europe, surrounded by
former Yugoslav states Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro1. According the Kosovar
National Census in 2011, Kosovo is comprised of 92.9% ethnic Albanians and 1.5% ethnic Serbs
with Turks, Ashkali, Egyptians, and Bosniaks making up the remaining population (World
Factbook 2016)2. Kosovar ethnic Albanians consider themselves culturally to be part of ‘Greater
Albania,’ a region containing Albanian, Kosovo, and parts of Montenegro and Macedonia.
Kosovar ethnic Serbs, however, culturally identify with the culture and nation of Serbia, and thus
wish to remain attached to Serbia and ruled by Belgrade – the Serbian capital. Tensions between
these two ethnic groups in Kosovo grew for decades before culminating in ethnic violence in the
late 1990s.
Ethnic tensions stem from before 1990 when Kosovo was governed as a province from
Belgrade, Serbia. As then leader of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, attempted to tighten control over
Kosovo, students and ethnic Albanians responded with protests. The Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) – an ethnically Albanian paramilitary organization – began to fight for Kosovar
independence. Serbs carried out brutal attacks and massacres against Albanians, and Albanians
responded in retaliation against Serbs. International intervention through NATO and peace
negotiations eventually forced an agreement between Belgrade, ethnic Albanians, and the KLA.
Though Serbia withdrew troops and refugees returned to their homes, deep-rooted ethnic
resentment did not resolve itself as quickly (World Factbook 2016). Today, over 15 years postconflict, clear ethnic tensions reverberate through all facets of Kosovar society.
1
2
See Appendix A for a map of Kosovo in Eastern Europe.
See Appendix B for a map of the ethnic breakdown of Kosovo by region.
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Unfortunately, the ethnic conflict in Kosovo is not an isolated incident. Burundi,
Guatemala, Rwanda, Sudan, Armenia, South Africa, and many other nations have undergone
similar tragedies, begging the question of how to move forward and rebuild once conflict ends.
Rebuilding trust post-conflict is a lengthy process because hatred can be inherited from
generation to generation. Reconciliation has two facets. It requires the restoration of both
‘vertical trust’ – the trust between citizens and institutions – and ‘horizontal trust’ – the trust
between neighbors (Rigby 2011). The policies implemented to attempt to achieve such trust,
however, vary greatly from conflict to conflict. There is no gold standard of ethnic reconciliation
policies guaranteed to bridge the divide between groups. Some argue for ‘top-down’ approaches
while others argue for ‘bottom-up’ local grassroots movements to take ownership of
reconciliation (Horowitz 1985). Some prioritize building unity and promoting healing through
truth and reconciliation commissions, while others focus on the reintegration of refugees into
society (Darweish and Rank 2012).
The wide array of policy options combined with the incidence of genocide worldwide
begs the question - have lessons from past conflicts been applied to ethnic reconciliation policies
in Kosovo, and what further best practices should be implemented based on historical precedent?
This question was examined throughout this study in order to make informed policy
recommendations for efficient reconciliation in Kosovo. This study analyzed the failed
reconciliation case of Burundi and the successful case of Guatemala in order to establish
reconciliation policy best practices. I worked within established reconciliation policy
frameworks to allow academic models of best practices to inform my analysis. Based on the
reconciliation literature and the specifics of each case, I focused my research on four main policy
areas – UN intervention, government reform, truth commissions, and transitional justice. Both
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Guatemala and Burundi provided lessons for UN intervention and transitional justice. The truth
commission in Guatemala and power-sharing model in Burundi also respectively provided
insights into successful peacebuilding. From this analysis, the lessons from each case were
applied to Kosovo to determine whether, thus far, Kosovo has initiated reconciliation policies
that align with historical lessons. This analysis also helped establish recommendations for the
future reconciliation of the Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs.
This project stemmed from the noticeable absence of literature applying the successes
and failures of past conflicts to present reconciliation efforts. Many academics analyze
reconciliation policy from theoretical perspectives to determine general best practice models. A
comparative case study analysis, however, allowed for the determination of potentially
successful policies in Kosovo, based on two contextually similar cases. Academics often argue
that contextual differences prevent the universal application of peacebuilding strategies, and thus
they proceed to develop a flexible framework they believe could be tailored to fit various
situations. Targeting the specific reconciliation effort in Kosovo, however, allowed analysis and
application of best practices to be actionable and context-specific.
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Kosovo Conflict Background
The current ethnic divide in Kosovo’s schools, towns, and government dates back to the
late 1980’s. In 1989 the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, restructured the Serbian
Constitution to reduce Kosovo’s provincial autonomy. Kosovar Albanians began rioting in
response, eventually leading the Albanians to proclaim the creation of the Republic of Kosovo in
1991. In 1996, due to widespread ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians, the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) formed to fight back against Serbian aggression. Violence continued to
escalate in the region, including a particularly brutal attack from March 5th to 7th 1998 when
Serbian security forces massacred over 50 Kosovar Albanians in the village of Prekaz (BBC
2015). After an American intervention and summit in Moscow, the UN Security Council passed
Resolution 1199 calling for an immediate cease-fire, Serbian withdrawal, and the return of
Albanian refugees.
Several failed peace negotiations took place following Resolution 1199. During peace
negotiations in Paris, Kosovar Albanians and the KLA agreed to an autonomy plan, yet Kosovar
Serbs refused and began additional military training exercises in Kosovo the following day.
NATO launched a 78-day air strike in the region until Milosevic agreed to withdraw troops. The
UN sent the Kosovo Peace Implementation Force (Kfor) and NATO to monitor the peace
process as Kosovar Albanians had begun to carry out revenge attacks against the Serbs. In
February of 2002 a power sharing deal was reached were Ibrahim Rugova, a Kosovar Albanian,
was elected President and Bajram Rexhepi, a Kosovar Serb, became Prime Minister. It was not
until 2008, however, that major European powers and the United States recognized Kosovo’s
independence from Serbia.
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Current Kosovar Ethnic Divide
Now widely recognized as its own nation, Kosovo still faces tensions between Kosovar
Albanians and Kosovar Serbs. These tensions manifest themselves in modern Kosovar society
through economic disparity between the two ethnic groups, institutionalized ethnic division, and
a culture of fear and violence.
Poverty remains a serious issue for both Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs. Access
to clean water, life expectancy, literacy, and child nutrition has improved in recent years, yet still
remains problematic (United Nations, 2016). Only 44 percent of the population is connected to a
central water system in urban areas. This number is reduced to a mere 7 percent in rural areas. In
Kosovar villages, 60 percent of inhabitants get their daily water from contaminated wells.
Investments made by international contributors, the government, and citizens are funneled into
independent water supply systems in rural areas because of the great disparity between access to
clean water in rural and urban parts of Kosovo (Korca 2006). In terms of life expectancy, in 1999
the average life expectancy for a Kosovar citizen was 67, while in 2013 the average life
expectancy was around 70. This indicates little improvement in the past 20 years (Trading
Economics 2016). The current literacy rate among citizens above the age of 15 falls around 91.9
percent, with a male literacy rate of 96.6 percent and a female literacy rate of 85.7 percent (CIA
2013). Additionally, one out of every ten Kosovar children under the age of five suffers from
chronic malnutrition. Less than 10 percent of children have access to early childhood education
(UNICEF 2016). Despite slight improvement, over 45 percent of the population still falls below
the poverty line (World Bank, 2016).
Beyond national indicators of poverty, Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs face
different economic situations. Relatively higher levels of poverty indicators are seen in Kosovar
Serbian households when contrasted with Kosovar Albanian homes (Bhaumik 2006). Per capita
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spending in Albanian households is significantly higher than that of Serbian households, and
there is a 57.3 percent incidence of poverty rate among Serbians compared to a 45.4 percent
poverty rate among Albanians (Bhaumik 2006).
Ethnic divisions are further embedded in Kosovar educational, health, and government
institutions. Parallel institutions exist for each ethnic group (Hoxhaj 2016, Kennedy 2006).
Mistrust between Serbs and Albanians has led to two systems of education. Communities with
Serbian majorities use an education curriculum from the Serbian Ministry of Education and
Sports, while schools in majority Albanian communities use a curriculum from the Kosovo
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. Neither side recognizes diplomas issued by the
other school system (OSCE 2003). Parallel healthcare systems also exist. The Serbian Ministry
of Health funds a number of healthcare facilities in Kosovo and does not share information with
Albanian run systems. Even identification cards differ. The Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs
administers Serbian ID cards to Serbs, which are then treated as forgeries and can lead to arrest if
used in Albanian communities. Belgrade, in a continual effort to regain control of Kosovo,
finances all Serbian parallel structures in the north of Kosovo in order to undermine the authority
of the Kosovo government and efforts of the United Nations (Hoxhaj 2016). The Serbian
government incentivizes Kosovar Serbs to remain loyal by providing salaries for workers in
parallel Serbian institutions. Consequently, these workers pick up salaries from both the UN and
Belgrade for their work (Kennedy 2006).
The violent and bloody history between the Serbians and Albanians in Kosovo has given
rise to a culture of fear between the groups. These tensions and fear of the ‘other’ has led to a
physical divide among towns and cities in Kosovo. For example, Pristina, Kosovo’s capital, is
home to almost exclusively ethnic Albanians. The few remaining elderly Serbian residents of the
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city keep to themselves and rarely leave the confines of their home for fear of attack (Negash
2015). The International Crisis Group has identified Kosovar Albanians, the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA), Serbian paramilitaries, criminals from Albania, and political rivals in intraKosovar Albanian conflict as groups responsible for creating and sustaining this fear culture
among ethnic groups (ICG 2004). The vibrant fear culture still present 15 years after the conflict
suggests that Kosovo did not learn the lessons of history when implementing reconciliation
policy.
Reconciliation Framework
Before examining reconciliation policies in Kosovo specifically, it is beneficial to look
more generally into theoretical framework of ethnic reconciliation strategies. Reconciliation is a
long-term process that must apply to both sides of the conflict. The term ‘reconciliation’ refers to
both the process and desired outcome (Bloomfield 2006). While scholars debate the pros and
cons of different policy tools, literature places an emphasis on UN intervention, host nation
governments, truth commissions, and transitional justice.
UN intervention strategy must be tailored to the context of each conflict, yet broad
themes and patterns of successful interventions can be identified. First, the UN strives to set up
an interim mission in the conflict region with consent of the host nation. The purpose of this
mission is to negotiate and enforce peace agreements through a presence of military and civilian
personnel (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). After enforcing a peace agreement and disarming rebel
populations, the UN turns to multidimensional strategies to build self-sustaining peace in the
region. These strategies can differ by context; yet place an emphasis on rebuilding both
institutions and emotional trust between the divided groups (Bloomfield 2006). It is important for
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international forces to recognize that to some extend, reconciliation must be locally owned.
Consequently, creating favorable conditions for local reconciliation should remain on the UN’s
agenda (Brahimi 2007).
National reconciliation is based on equality under the law, and this equality must start
within state institutions and the government before progress can be made (Brahimi 2007). This is
challenging because institutional knowledge typically lies with the former regime. Efforts to
eliminate all associated with the regime that perpetuated violence can undermine the stability of
the future state (Brahimi 2007). On the other hand, not including marginalized populations in the
new government can perpetuate the conditions that escalated into ethnic violence originally. First
recognizing the violence and establishing reparation, justice, or counseling measures before
integrating the institutions can ensure that both populations are ready to unify before attempts at
co-governance begin (ibid).
From Korea to Peru to South Africa, the peacebuilding community has placed value on
truth commissions as part of reconciliation. A truth commission is a commission tasked with
examining past wrongdoings and formulating an accurate historical narrative. Truth commissions
contribute to the collective memory of a nation to provide a communal understanding of the past
(Brahm 2007). Commissions also can pave the way for future legal actions and advance political
tolerance to achieve a future stable state. Truth commissions can be considered successful if they
garner attention from civilians and are accepted as legitimate by the public (Gibson 2009).
Finally, transitional justice exists to punish past crimes, help populations accept the past,
and recover from atrocities. Modern legal standards promote a retributive model of justice in the
form of international or ad hoc courts (Lambourne 2008). International lawyers emphasize fairly
prosecuting those who violate human rights law, which can ensure future respect for rule of law
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and deter future violence. Establishing a customary international response to genocide and
crimes against humanity can additionally serve as global deterrence for nation-states (Lambourne
2008). These four components of reconciliation policy do not dictate which policy tools are most
effective in any given context, but rather paint a broad picture of four aspects of reconciliation
that a comprehensive policy strategy should address.
Reconciliation Policy in Kosovo
Looking more specifically at Kosovo, four key groups - the United Nations, the Kosovo
government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and International Criminal Courts - have
shaped reconciliation policy. Kosovo noticeably lacks a truth commission to date. First, UN
Security Council Resolution 1244 established the United Nations Interim Administration in
Kosovo (UNMIK) in 1999. UNMIK works with both Pristina and Belgrade to, “promote
security, stability and respect for human rights in Kosovo and in the region” (UNMIK 1999).
Within UNMIK, the Office of Community Support and Facilitation often acts as an intermediary
between groups and oversee a network of community partners to, “promote tolerance and build
bridges across community fault lines.” The UNMIK provides quarterly update reports to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations to keep the UN apprised of policy implementations and
progress made (UNMIK 1999).
Additionally, amid claims of corruption and international scrutiny, the Government of the
Republic of Kosovo works towards the reconciliation of its citizens. The government claims to
guarantee fundamental human rights for all national, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious
groups through the Constitution, regulations, and other laws. The preamble of the Kosovo
Constitution outlines the government’s goal to, “build a future for Kosovo as a free, democratic,
peace-loving country that will be a homeland to all of its citizens,” and their commitment to, “the
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creation of a state of free citizens that will guarantee the rights of every citizen, civil freedoms,
and equality of all citizens before the law” (Kosovo Const. preamble).
To determine whether these goals are simply political rhetoric or if they are being
actively pursued, the US State Department routinely publishes Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices. This report analyzes the progress made by the Kosovar government in
promoting human rights and ethnic equality. In Kosovo’s reports, corruption and lack of
transparency in the government remain a serious problem year after year (US State Department
2014). In 2014, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranked Kosovo a dismal 110th out 175
countries in perceived public sector corruption. The report found that 46 percent of Kosovars
believe their public institutions to be extremely corrupt. Additionally, only 11 percent of
Kosovars believe that the government is effectively combating corruption (Open Data Kosovo
2015). Political corruption stems from weak rule of law and lack of judicial oversight, calling
into question whether laws aimed at ethnic reconciliation are enforced or simply passed to pacify
international onlookers.
Additionally, NGOs like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) promote tolerance
and non-discrimination in the region. The OSCE works with religious leaders, youth, and school
officials to promote inter-faith dialogue, implement anti-discrimination policies, and address hate
speech. They produce guidelines for educators to counter intolerance among their students and
organize conferences to embrace diversity in Kosovo (OSCE). One of the objectives of EULEX,
on the other hand, is their ‘Support to Dialogue Implementation’ policy aimed at integrating
Kosovar Serbs into security structures and civil registries (OSCE 2016).
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Finally, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is the
fourth key body involved in Kosovar ethnic reconciliation. The Court was established in 1993 by
the United Nations in response to conflict in Bosnia and Croatia. The ICTY mandate was
expanded to include Kosovo in 1999, and the court served as a justice-based approach for
reconciliation in Kosovo. This court was designed specifically to prosecute persons responsible
for violations of the Geneva Convention, customs of war, crimes against humanity, and genocide
(ICTY). The Tribunal has indicted 161 persons since its establishment, with many of those
indictments perpetrators of violence in the conflict in Kosovo. The Court keeps extensive records
on each case and provides the UN annual reports and biannual completion strategy reports
(ICTY 2016).
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HYPOTHESIS AND IMPLICATIONS
Hypothesis
Policy attempts at reconciliation made by stakeholders in Kosovo have failed to apply historical
lessons from the Guatemala and Burundi cases.
Implications
1. If this hypothesis is true, it means that Kosovo peacekeeping organizations failed to learn
from past successes and failures.
2. This analysis will identify ineffective reconciliation policy tools and areas of
improvement for lawmakers and NGO organizers in the region
3. The failure/success of Kosovar institutions to implement historical lessons can also
provide key insight into the future of ethnic tensions in the region. For example,
comparing the case of Kosovo to these cases, given the continued violence in Burundi
and moderate success of reconciliation in Guatemala, can help predict the future of
tensions.
4. The results will also have implications for future ethnic conflicts. For example, if lessons
from transitional justice are successfully applied in Kosovo, hopefully the results can be
replicated in future conflicts.
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METHODS AND DATA
This investigation looked into the effectiveness of ethnic reconciliation policies in
Burundi and Guatemala in order to apply lessons learned in those cases to the case of Kosovo.
The focus of the study was to analyze successful and failed past ethnic reconciliation attempts to
determine whether stakeholders in Kosovo are successfully implementing recommended
measures to unify the population. Initially, I analyzed ethnic reconciliation policies implemented
in the case studies of Burundi and Guatemala using a method called process tracing to
understand the best and worst practices for reconciliation. Then, I analyzed the similarities and
differences across the two cases and to Kosovo in a comparative case study analysis. This
comparative analysis was to determine how Kosovo has already built on the lessons of history
and what policy changes historical precedent suggests could be effective.
Case Study Analysis
I analyzed the reconciliation policies of Burundi and Guatemala using a method called
“process tracing” to understand best and worst practices of ethnic reconciliation (Collier 2011).
Both ethnic conflicts exhibit similarities to the Kosovo conflict, allowing for the comparison of
their reconciliation policies. Reconciliation in Burundi post-1972 is widely considered a failure
as ethnic war broke out again in 1988 (Curtis 2012). In Guatemala, however, while reconciliation
is neither perfect nor complete, policies have clearly been effective in moving the nation toward
a more unified future (Ladutke 2013) Choosing one failed and one moderately successful
reconciliation case allowed the reconciliation measures in Kosovo to be analyzed through both
successful and failed policy lenses.
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The Burundi conflict works as a comparable case study for Kosovo because of the
influence of outside nations, ethnic violence committed by both sides, and the struggle for
political dominance. Much like Kosovo struggling for independence from Serbia, Burundi
gained independence from Belgium. Both cases experienced similar influence from outside
nations on governance and policy making. The country of Rwanda, Burundi’s neighbor, consists
of the same ethnic makeup and experiences similar divisions of Tutsi and Hutu groups. The
Rwandan Genocide influenced the Burundi conflict, much like how conflicts between Albanians
and Serbs in the rest of the former Yugoslavia influenced the Kosovo conflict. In both cases,
there exists majority and minority ethnic groups that both engaged in ethnic violence. This is a
key comparison because ethnic reconciliation policies in both scenarios address the crimes of
both groups, not just the crimes of one and the grieving of another. In Burundi, the governing
Tutsi minority largely massacred the Hutu majority. Hutus also killed many Tutsis in western
Burundi in retaliation, however. Similarly, in Kosovo, the Serb ruling minority is held
responsible for a large portion of deaths, yet the majority Albanian population also retaliated
with ethnic violence at times. Finally, political instability and the vying of an ethnic majority to
take back political control from the ruling ethnic minority mark both of these conflicts. These
parallel historical circumstances give weight to the argument that reconciliation policies
implemented in Burundi might provide useful lessons for the case of Kosovo.
Additionally, the ethnic conflict in Guatemala was chosen because of contextual
similarities. Like Burundi, both the Kosovo and Guatemalan conflicts have one governing
ethnicity committing most of the atrocities with an ethnic group, considered second-class
citizens, largely on the receiving end of the violence. Additionally, Guatemala was chosen not
only because of its conflict similarities, but because in Guatemala a key response to ethnic
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conflict was the creation of a truth commission. Kosovo has implemented a wide range of
reconciliation policies, yet noticeably lacking is a form of truth commission. Comparing these
two cases will spur discussion of the effectiveness and necessity of truth commissions in peace
building. While the conflicts of Guatemala and Kosovo are reasonably similar, the reconciliation
policies implemented post-conflict differ greatly – making this case ideally suited for
comparison.
A method referred to as ‘process tracing’ was used to systematically analyze each of the
case studies. Process tracing involves attempting to discover the causal process that links a
policy and a desired outcome - a causal link between independent and dependent variables
(Bennett 2000). Process tracing, as defined by Beach and Pederson (2013), establishes theories
from existing sources and literature before examining whether all evidence supports a causal
relationship between the theory and outcome. Process tracing also determines whether the
hypothesized causal relationship functioned as predicted and whether the relationship is solely
responsible for the observed outcome (Beach and Pederson 2013). In practice, this method
facilitated the exploration into which reconciliation policies led to the failed or successful
outcomes of each of the case studies.
Comparative Analysis
After engaging in process tracing for both the case studies in Guatemala and Burundi, I
then began a comparative analysis between the cases and to the case of Kosovo. The
methodology of such a comparison involved comparing key dimensions of reconciliation
policies. Different policies were analyzed over time and across cases to understand their
effectiveness in separate contexts. Furthermore, a method known as ‘pattern matching’ allowed
for the parallel analysis of similar policies in separate cases (Goodrick 2014). For example, UN
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involvement in reconciliation was looked at in both cases. Identifying this pattern in
reconciliation policy making allowed for the comparison of the policy in each case.
Throughout my research, I discovered numerous, diverse policies that contributed to
reconciliation in each case. I used process tracing within each case to determine which policies
were the most influential on the final reconciliation outcome, before comparing how these
policies were implemented in each case. From this analysis, I established several lessons learned
from each case study that can be applied to the case of Kosovo.
In identifying reconciliation policies to analyze in Guatemala and Burundi, I narrowed
my focus to four key policy tools outlined in reconciliation policy framework. These
reconciliation approaches play a role in all three cases, ensuring that lessons would be
transferable from case to case. I found the reconciliation tools of international United Nations
(UN) intervention, government reform, truth commissions - or lack thereof - and justice systems
to be applicable to all three cases. I chose these four policy tools because they represent a range
of interest groups and give my investigation a clear direction for which policies to target.
In order to analyze documents associated with each policy area across all three cases,
I used a document coding method. I analyzed documents from the four identified policy groups,
tracking their influence in the reconciliation process. Documents I coded include UN resolutions,
mandates of UN operations in each case, UN mission yearly update reports, policy statements
posted on each government’s website, national laws altering each government’s structure, policy
statements from NGOs, peace agreements, mandates for truth commissions, mandates for
criminal tribunals, cases from tribunals, national court cases, extradition cases, and many other
documents.
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RESULTS
Unfortunately, ethnic conflict is not a new phenomenon. It occurs throughout history on
every continent. By applying the lessons learned from historical examples of post-conflict ethnic
reconciliations to Kosovo, reconciliation policy can hopefully become more effective.
Comparing Kosovo to the conflicts in Burundi and Guatemala reveals best and worst practices
that can then be applied to Kosovo.
Case 1: Burundi
In 1972, ethnic conflict broke out in the country of Burundi. The two main ethnic groups
in the nation are Tutsis and Hutus, with Tutsis making up 14 percent of the population and Hutus
making up 85 percent. The categorization of this conflict as genocide has been fiercely debated,
however, the fact remains that Tutsi perpetrators killed approximately 150,000 to 300,000 Hutu
people (World Factbook 2016). The historical context of the conflict, the ethnic conflict itself,
and unsuccessful reconciliation policies provide peace-building lessons from Burundi that are
applicable to Kosovo.
Burundi Historical Background
Ethnic strife in Burundi stems from a long history of tension in the region. During
colonial times, Burundi was ruled first by Germany from 1889 to 1918, and then by Belgium
from 1918 to 1962. In addition to colonial powers, powerful elite princes (ganwa) ruled much of
Burundi. Under colonial rule these ‘ganwas’ struggled to gain the most land and power. Further
tensions arose when, using eugenics, the Belgians identified the Tutsis as the intelligent and
superior ethnic group and established them as the elites of society by treating them as equals
(Combat Genocide 2016). The Tutsis were named monarchs and chiefs, and were put in charge
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of Hutu forced labor. Over time, the impact of the Rwandan revolution, riots, political party
crisis, and the abolition of the monarchy laid the groundwork for future conflict.
The 1959 revolution occurring in neighboring Rwanda only served to compound tensions
between Tutsi and Hutu peoples in Burundi. The Hutu majority saw the revolution as inspiration
for what a future Hutu-led Burundi could look like. The Tutsi ruling minority, however, saw the
revolution as an ominous cautionary tale. Beyond changing visions of a future Burundi, the
revolution triggered an influx of Tutsi refugees. By 1965, approximately 50,000 Tutsi refugees
had fled persecution in Rwanda - adding an additional source of ethnic tension (Lemarchand
1996). Refugees had a vested interest in the maintenance of Tutsi power in Burundi for it would
make reinstallation of Tutsi power in Rwanda more likely. In response to the Hutu revolution in
Rwanda, the Catholic Church began to support the Hutu agenda in Burundi because they saw
revolution in Rwanda as an indication of the future of Burundi.
Additional riots in January of 1962 served as a precursor to future violence. The riots
were conducted by a group of young, ethnically Tutsi men who called themselves the Jeunesse
Nationaliste Rwagasore (JNR). They were a radical, anti-Western, and increasingly violent
organization that, on January 14th, conducted a series of armed raids against the local Hutu
political party and trade union in Burundi’s capital city, Bujumbura (Lemarchand 1996). This led
to the assassination of Prince Rwagazone. His political party, the UPRONA party – a
nationalistic, Tutsi-led party – continued to collaborate with his father, King Mwambutsa, to
maintain power. This constitutional monarchy broke down in 1965 when elections gave Hutu
politicians control of both houses of parliament. In response, King Mwambutsa refused to
acknowledge Hutu gains in the legislative elections and attempted to abolish the legislature. In
response the Hutu-majority army revolted. A group of Hutu army officials attempted an
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assassination of the monarch on October 19th, while other Hutu troops attempted to gain control
of one of Bujumbura military camps. Both of these attempts failed, and Tutsi forces consolidated
power over both the military and government (Gascoigne 2001). A firing squad executed 38
Hutu officers, Tutsi forces apprehended every Hutu political leader in Burundi, impromptu
military tribunals announced 86 death sentences, and any Hutu suspected to be sympathetic to
Hutu terrorist attacks were rounded up and executed. Approximately 5,000 Hutu citizens were
killed in retaliation to these failed October coups (Lemarchand 1996).
Tutsi General Michel Micombero led the governmental response to the Hutu army coup.
Upon successfully crushing the coup, he proceeded to dismiss the ruling monarchs and set up a
centralized government, installing himself as President. He eventually assassinated the King,
ending the monarchy in Burundi and heralding in the First Republic of Burundi. The end of the
Burundi monarchy did not end ethnic tensions. In fact, deep-rooted hatred and fear of the other
was flourishing between the Tutsis and the Hutus.
Ethnic Conflict in Burundi
As the 1960’s drew to a close, ethnic strife in the region transformed from intra-ethnic
tensions to ethnic cleansing. Another failed Hutu coup in 1969 triggered the mass purging of all
remaining Hutus in positions of power, consolidating Tutsi rule. The Tutsi government grew
unstable as Tutsis began to fight among themselves for power in 1971 (Combat Genocide 2016).
Because of this instability, Hutu rebels organizing in Tanzania attempted another coup, seizing
control of cities in western Burundi and massacring all Tutsi soldiers and civilians they
encountered. In response to this Hutu militia attack, the Tutsi government ordered the killing of
all Hutu students part of a local youth movement, marking the start of the mass killings of 1972
(ibid).
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The Tutsi government response to the Hutu rebellion in 1972 is considered by many to be
genocide. Tutsi military forces proclaimed martial law over the country, enforcing a dawn-todusk curfew with paratroopers holding the airport to stop people from leaving and entering the
country. The Tutsi forces then moved to the Burundi countryside where they slaughtered Hutu
populations. All Tutsi police and military were ordered to kill Hutu subordinates. Tutsi youth
groups were also instrumental in identifying Hutu teachers and students, as young as elementary
school, to be massacred by the army. In the city of Bujumbura alone, over 4,000 students were
taken from school in trucks to nearby killing pits. By September, 200,000 Hutus had been
massacred with many Hutu refugees fleeing to nearby countries (Lemarchand 1996).
Those who attempted to broker peace between the groups during the mass killings were
summarily executed as well. Even Hutus who actively cooperated with Tutsi authorities were
murdered, along with those Tutsis who disagreed with the genocide and tried to intervene. In
response to Tutsi radical radio propaganda, the Tutsi population began to see the ethnic cleansing
of the Hutu population as their civic duty. No sector of society was left untouched. Hutu
populations in the army, churches, schools, and rural villagers were all exterminated despite
Hutu cooperation with Tutsi authorities. The definition of the Hutu ethnicity was also altered so
that a single grandparent of Hutu origins was sufficient to warrant murder (Lemarchand 1996).
Tutsi motivations behind genocide have been widely studied. Possible motivations of
genocide, according to Chalk and Jonassohn (1991) include eliminating a real or perceived
threat, terrorizing an enemy, or attempting to acquire economic resources owned by another
group. In the case of Burundi, the Tutsi minority perceived potential Hutu attacks as a real threat
to their survival and some saw systematically eliminating the Hutu population as the only way to
ensure their safety. It is also not fair to extrapolate the genocidal intentions of a radical sector of
Davies 25
the Tutsi ethnicity to the Tutsi population as a whole. In rural settings, Tutsi violence against
Hutus stemmed more from a desire to acquire material gains and wealth than a desire to wipe out
the entire ethnicity (Lemarchand 1996).
As a result of this genocide by 1973, no educated male Hutus were believed to be left
alive in Burundi. This reinforced the Tutsi position as the ruling power as there was simply
nobody left to challenge that authority. Approximately 150,000 Hutu refugees fled to
neighboring countries, like Tanzania, to escape the atrocities in Burundi. Between 1973 and
1988, a fifteen-year period of relative calm settled over the nation with very little opposition
remaining to Tutsi power (Lemarchand 1996).
Mass killing resumed in 1988 as a governmental response to rural Hutu rebel violence
against Tutsi officials. The government of Burundi estimates that 5,000 Hutu were killed in the
attacks, but independent estimates range anywhere from 5,000 to 50,000 (Chronology 2010). The
government of Burundi blames outside influences for the Hutu uprising that triggered the mass
killings. They believe Hutu populations could see the successful uprising of the Hutu in Rwanda
and were inspired to take action. The northern regions of Burundi were the most effected by the
killings and Hutu peasants fled into Rwanda to avoid persecution. Hutu forces burned bridges to
prevent the Tutsi army’s advances, which sparked an outraged response from Tutsi forces. In the
region of Marangara, the entire Hutu population had all either fled or been slaughtered over a 10
day period (After the Killing 1988). Thankfully, the killings and violence did not spread outside
of this region to the rest of the country. Major Buyoya, the sitting President of Burundi since
1987, opposed the killings and began implementing reform measures within his own cabinet,
even assigning some Hutu soldiers to his own personal guard (Chronology 2010).
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Ethnic Reconciliation Measures in Burundi
After the 1972 genocide, the Tutsis had consolidated power in the government. With little
international pressure, no measures were taken to reconcile the two ethnicities. This lack of
implemented policies led to yet another ethnically charged mass killing only sixteen years later.
After the atrocities of 1988, however, several steps towards reconciliation were taken.
International intervention, power sharing, and transitional justice measures all were designed to
promote national unity and establish peaceful cohabitation in Burundi. While none of these
measures proved particularly effective, the reasons for failure provide instruction for future
peace building policies.
International Intervention
Post-1972, the lack of international intervention allowed the situation to escalate into yet
another mass killing in 1988. International forces failed to acknowledge the genocide in Burundi,
and consequently no outside intervention in the region took place. The Tutsi majority was
allowed to continue consolidating their power over the country, eventually culminating in a
second mass killing. The more moderate Tutsi leader of Burundi, President Buyoya, began to
consider the question of national unity in the 1980s. This simultaneously gave hope to
marginalized Hutu citizens and frightened radical Tutsi forces into thinking they might be losing
the control they worked to establish. This led to the resurgence of violence in August of 1988.
The impetuous for violence in 1988 remains disputed. Most believe a group of Hutu rebels
attacked a wealthy Tutsi merchant, Reverien Harushingro, for his direct involvement in the
massacres of 1972, and continued to murder hundreds of Tutsi citizens in the surrounding area.
In response, the Tutsi army was deployed to quell any resistance, but instead punished and
eliminated all Hutus in sight, including women and children. Despite the escalation of tensions
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throughout Burundi, the international community failed to intervene and prevent such a
resurgence of ethnic conflict (Lemarchand 2016).
After this second massacre, international forces began to take notice of the situation, yet
took no concrete action to end violence and build peace. Forces were sent not to intervene, but
rather to gather facts and to assess the risks associated with the current situation in Burundi to
predict the likely future of the nation (Lemarchand 1996). The United States Congress passed
nonbinding resolution H.Con.Res.371 in October of 1988. The resolution strongly condemned
the recent violence, urged the United States government to reevaluate their bilateral relationship
with Burundi, and suggested any US assistance to Burundi be cut off, not including humanitarian
aid, until the Government of Burundi took appropriate measures to hold individuals responsible
for these attacks (US H.Con.Res.371 1988). This resolution, while condemning the violence,
refused to acknowledge the existence of genocide. Acknowledging genocide would be
acknowledging that the US and other nations failed to uphold their responsibility to intervene, as
outlined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted
on December 9th, 1948 (UN General Assembly 1948). International actors recognized the
situation in Burundi, yet no intervention was planned to help victims of violence, prevent future
violence, or start to reconcile the population.
It was not until 2004 that UN Security Council Resolution 1545 established a UN
Operation in Burundi (ONUB), 32 years after the initial genocide. The ONUB was mandated to
ensure compliance with the ceasefire agreement, implement disarmament of combatants, to
arrange free and transparent elections, and to protect civilians facing imminent violence (UN
Res. 1545). ONUB withdrew from Burundi by the end of 2006, however, without fulfilling their
mandate. In the ninth and final report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation
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in Burundi, the Secretary General reports that combatants had increased their criminal activity
against civilians while the implementation of the cease-fire remained delayed. Skirmishes
between national security forces and the National Forces of Liberation (FNL) were also
increasing as the ONUB withdrew (UN Secretary General 2008). In all, ONUB failed to achieve
its mission in Burundi and was replaced by the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi.
In sum, both the scale and timing of international intervention in Burundi was
problematic. According to reconciliation framework, enforcing a ceasefire is the UNs first step to
ending violence and starting to establish peace. The failure to implement a ceasefire in Burundi,
coupled with the failure of Tutsi-Hutu reconciliation in Burundi overall, highlights the
importance of disarmament.
Power Sharing
Burundi’s attempts at power sharing within the government can provide insight into how
well co-governance facilitates reconciliation. In Burundi power sharing began during
investigations of past wrongdoings, and extended to the integration of marginalized groups into
government institutions. The integration of a marginalized group in government decisions and
positions of power paves the way for reconciliation and inclusion; however, historical events in
Burundi suggest that disarmament and a shift in public opinion must occur first. These findings
support the reconciliation framework and theoretical models of first implementing social
reconciliation programs before attempting to integrate the government.
In response to international pressure, the Burundi government established a Hutu-Tutsi
commission in 1989. The commission investigated the circumstances of the massacre and made
recommendations to move the nation towards national unity. The commission published the first
joint Hutu-Tutsi effort to unify, the Report of the National Commission to Study the Question of
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National Unity. This report investigated past wrongdoings, outlined the current status of national
unity, and charted a course on how to further democratize existing institutions to promote
unification. Involving both sides of the conflict in investigations of wrongdoing holds all parties
accountable and can prevent the publication of a distorted and misrepresentative version of
events. This report faced extremist opposition on both sides, however, as radical groups did not
see unity as a future for Burundi (Lemarchand 1989).
Additionally, the involvement of Hutu citizens in the Burundi government increased after
1989 yet was accompanied by significant backlash from the population amidst ongoing violence.
President Buyoya agreed to reshuffle his cabinet to raise the number of Hutu ministers from six
to twelve (Curtis 2012). These initial measures were a show of good faith in response to
international pressure, but deep-rooted ethnic tensions were not to be entirely remedied through
simple bureaucratic policy shifts (ibid). It was not until 1993 that the first Hutu President was
elected after a series of elections and extreme pressure to democratize. In response, Tutsi
extremists assassinated the president, triggering violent riots and a bloody civil war. Extremists
viewed a Hutu President as a challenge to their economic and political privileges. They believed,
“a transfer of power to a Hutu carried ominous implications (Lemarchand 1989). 100,000
citizens of both ethnicities were killed in 1993 alone, with over a million fleeing the nation.
Brutal violence broke out again in 2005 following the election of the first ethnically mixed
government. While power sharing promotes reconciliation, public resentment and forgiveness
must first be addressed in order for an integrated government to effectively lead, as Gibson
explained in his reconciliation framework.
In these attempts at power sharing in the Burundi government, “political violence rather
than political dialogue prevailed” (Vandeginste 2009). Power sharing agreements in Burundi
Davies 30
were never rooted in political cooperation because of rampant distrust among politicians and
citizens alike. Some would even go so far as to argue that power sharing in such a divided
climate “constitutes a betrayal of the people’s will” (Vandeginste 2009). Furthermore, power
sharing weakened Burundi’s government, as armed violence was able to destroy political
authority. This resurgence of violence does not necessarily mean that all forms of power sharing
governments are weak, but rather stresses the importance of public support for such an
agreement and cessation of ethnic violence before the agreement goes into effect, as suggested
by academic reconciliation frameworks.
Criminal Justice
The impact of transitional justice on post-conflict nations continues to be analyzed and
debated. Some argue that, “the importance of criminal trials remains unrivaled. No other
mechanism is perceived to have a greater impact on deterrence, public confidence in the state’s
ability and willingness to enforce the law, and a victim’s sense of justice” (Freeman 2006). On
the other hand, trials can be seen as polarizing the population across ethnic, religious,
socioeconomic, and political divides. In Burundi, attempts at implementing transitional justice
have yet to come to fruition, and with recent violent outbursts, it seems unlikely that they will in
the near future.
The Arusha Peace Agreement in 2000 called for a domestic investigative team and an
international criminal tribunal to try cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide
(Arusha Agreement Art. 6 Chpt. 2). At the time, however, the transitional government did not
find justice to be a priority. Instead peace builders prioritized the integration of rebel groups into
government institutions and an end to the violence. Consequently, after much debate and little
consensus over amnesty policies, in 2011 the president nominated a committee to draft a law
Davies 31
implementing measures outlined in the peace agreement. Since 2000, not a single one of the
provisions regarding justice have been implemented from the Peace Accords. Burundi politicians
had a vested interest in maintaining political power and avoiding any accountability for past
actions, and therefore blocked any progress on transitional justice (Rubli 2013). The lack of
progress underscores the importance of political support for reconciliation, as it is nearly
impossible to implement measures that state leaders oppose. Furthermore, politicians directly
involved in genocide should be removed from power to avoid conflicts of interest in the justice
process.
Case 2: Guatemala
Guatemala has a long history of ethnic conflict with tensions dating all the way back to
the 16th century when Spanish explorers conquered the Mayans – a civilization that had been the
center of Guatemalan life since 10 AD. With this historical context, brutal war broke out in
Guatemala from 1960 to 1996. It was not until December 1996 that the Oslo Peace Accords were
signed and the peace process began (Handy 1994). The historical background of colonialism, a
36-year ethnic conflict, and various peace-building attempts provide lessons that can be applied
in the ethnic reconciliation process occurring in Kosovo.
Guatemala Historical Background
Stemming from Spanish colonial roots, Guatemala had a tradition of assigning economic
and political power to descendents of the conquistadors. The Spanish held Guatemala as a colony
from 1524 until 1821, at which time Guatemalan-born peoples of Spanish descent, known as the
criollos, successfully revolted to declare independence.
Despite the country’s newfound freedom, civil society remained stratified. Criollos were
at the top of the hierarchy, followed by the mestizos (those of mixed Spanish and Mayan
Davies 32
heritage), with the Mayans and slaves at the bottom tier of society. Ideologically, the population
split into two main camps – the elite conservatives and the lower class liberals (Handy 1994).
The social hierarchy developed in this time period lasts to modern day and is the basis for the
ethnic conflict that plagued Guatemala.
A series of political revolutions characterized the late 1800s and early 1900s in
Guatemala, setting a tumultuous political precedent. A liberal take over of power by the middle
class took place in 1871. The new liberal government undertook an extensive modernization
effort, including forced labor requiring Mayans to work between 100 to 150 days each year on
coffee plantations to ensure cheap labor and economic growth. These labor laws were later
revoked amidst a series of indigenous rebellions that lasted until the 1920s (Koonings 2002).
Elite, influential families held onto control of the Guatemalan government through the rise of
inter-ethnic conflicts. Land disputes between ethnic groups led to military intervention, which
spurred a middle class revolution – the October Revolution – in 1944.
The October Revolution of 1944 established, under Colonel Arbenz, a new political order
with a participatory system, organized worker unions, and the emergence of small-scale
entrepreneurs and farmers. Arbenz was succeeded by a series of military leaders, however, put
into power by the conservatives and the powerful Catholic Church. By 1960, left-wing guerilla
groups began to form in opposition to the government. A cycle of protests and repression
formed, and political violence in Guatemala escalated rapidly (Garcia Ferreira 2012).
Guatemala Ethnic Conflict
Ethnic tensions rose during the 1960s as civil war broke out to combat institutionalized
inequality. Several left-wing guerilla groups united forces to form the Guatemalan National
Revolutionary Unity (URNG). In 1966, the Guatemalan army, under the control of current
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President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, launched an insurgency operation to destroy the
guerilla opposition movement (Quinn 2009). In 1970 the conflict continued as Mayan rebels
began demanding greater allowance for Mayan culture in society and official inclusion of their
language and customs.
In response to Mayan unrest and rebellions, between 1978 and 1986, the Guatemalan
army began a military operation targeting the Mayan population due to rebel guerilla warfare. In
this operation, referred to as ‘Operation Sophia’, the Guatemalan army reportedly destroyed 626
Mayan villages, killed over 200,000 people, and displaced more than 1.5 million refugees.
Beyond massacring Mayan populations, the Guatemalan army issued a scorched earth policy,
burning farmlands, cultural sites, buildings, and killing livestock (Quinn 2009). Religious
leaders, like Catholic priests and nuns in the region, were also persecuted due to their support of
Mayan rights.
The bloodiest period of the conflict took place between 1982 and 1983. An estimated
70,000 people were murdered in that year alone. The army forcibly conscripted members of local
communities to conduct attacks on over 600 villages, where villagers were raped and killed
while the village itself was burned to the ground (CJA 2009). President Montt – the political
leader during this violent conflict – was ousted in a coup in 1983. By 1986, a civilian formed
government was in place and succeeded in passing a new constitution. This new government
began peace negotiations, eventually brokering a peace accord in 1996. The later formed
Commission of Historical Clarification estimates that throughout the conflict, government forces
were responsible for 93% of the violence (CEH 1999)
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Ethnic Reconciliation Measures in Guatemala
Fighting and ethnic conflict did not officially end in the region until the Oslo Accords
were signed 36 years later in 1996. The Accords mandated a cease-fire and truth commission.
Since 1996, Guatemala has been striving for reconciliation and peace. Guatemala implemented a
wide variety of peace building mechanisms, some successful and some not, from which lessons
can be drawn and applied to the Kosovo peace building process. UN involvement, Truth
Commissions, and transitional justice were all utilized in Guatemala with varying degrees of
success.
UN Intervention in Guatemala
UN intervention in Guatemala cannot be simply categorized as a success or failure.
Rather, the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala was successful in immediately implementing
the ceasefire, yet the long run implementation of the Oslo Accords was less successful. These
results indicate that Guatemala was successful in implementing the first but not the second UN
priority suggested by reconciliation framework.
The UN Verification Process in Guatemala (MINGUA) successfully monitored the
formal ceasefire on March 3rd, 1997 as mandated by the Oslo Accords. The UN mission set up
separate assembly points for the disarmament of both the Guatemalan National Revolutionary
Unity URNG fighters and the state security apparatus. In this process, MINGUA demobilized
2,928 URNG combatants and issued these fighters ID cards to reintegrate into civil society. They
also detected and cleared minefields across the country. The disarmament of the guerillas took
place ahead of schedule and the former guerillas even established their own political party to
compete in the 1999 elections (UN Peacekeeping Missions 2003). The swift action of MINGUA
staff allowed for an effective implementation of the ceasefire – supporting academic framework
that disarmament is the first step in establishing peace.
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MINUGUA’s long-term work in Guatemala, however, exemplified the importance of
willingness to criticize government actions and coordination within the UN system. MINUGUA
is widely criticized for not demanding a strict compliance with the accords and an unwillingness
to criticize government actions. Leading up to the 1999 elections, MINUGUA was unwilling to
criticize the government for fear that such criticism would cause them to lose the election to a
right-wing party, the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), who strongly opposed the peace
accords. Because of this hesitancy to enforce the Accords, Guatemala implemented few
substantive commitments by the end of 1999. This substantiates academic models that suggest
after disarmament, strict enforcement of the peace accords should be a UN priority. On the other
hand, MINUGUA should be applauded for their successful coordination not only with other UN
institutions working in region, like the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the
United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), but also with civil society. For example,
MINUGUA partnered with the UNDP to establish dialogue tables, bringing together members of
the government, military, church, civil society, indigenous groups, and political parties together
to discuss the conflict and debate over how the country should move forwards. This helped
reintegrate war affected individuals back into civil society and gave everyone a voice in the
future of Guatemala (Stanley and Holiday 2002).
Truth Commissions
Truth commissions played a formative role in the reconciliation process in Guatemala. In
the decades after the Oslo Peace Agreement, a commission was established to produce an
unbiased account of historical events. (Isaacs 2009). The report, The Memory of Silence, reached
the conclusion that of the estimated 200,000 deaths; the state and security apparatus was
responsible for around 93 percent and the guerillas approximately 3 percent (Isaacs 2009). The
Davies 36
use of a truth commission, conducted by an external moderator, the UN, legitimized the suffering
of victims, beginning the reconciliation process. Guatemala’s truth commission fulfills Gibson’s
criteria for a successful commission because the report reached a large audience and was widely
accepted as legitimate.
The success of the Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) is because of to the
structure of the commission and impact it had on the Guatemalan community. Literature
surrounding truth commissions argues that respect for the commission’s legitimacy and
widespread civilian audience make for a successful report. CEH produced a final report in
February 1999 containing individual testimonials and economic and social analysis of the
conflict. The chair of the CEH was UN-appointed and the two other commissioners were
appointed by the chair with input from the parties of the peace accord and local Guatemalan
Universities. CEH had over 200 staff members, half Guatemalan nationals and half international
professionals. Geographically diverse field offices were established to collect testimony and
conduct interviews in order to promote social healing and prevent future atrocities. The mix of
Guatemalan and international staff and the objective appointment of Commissioners allowed the
final report to be respected and considered an accurate interpretation of events (Ross 2004).
The legal and social impact of the Commission also proved its worth. By concluding that
the Guatemalan conflict was in fact a state sponsored genocide, the truth commission paved the
way for future legal action to hold perpetrators of violence responsible for their crimes. Allowing
victims of violence space to share their stories and have their voice heard played an important
social role. The CEH helped survivors overcome fear, tell their stories, and regain dignity (Isaacs
2009). Martinez of the CEH argues that there is “social value in allowing people to participate in
their individual and collective past.” (Quinn and Freeman 2003) Furthermore, while the
Davies 37
Commission cannot change the violence that occurred, official documentation of atrocities and
proportioned blame starts the healing process.
Transitional Justice
One major flaw in the reconciliation process in Guatemala is the lack of legal
consequences for perpetrators of genocide. The Oslo Peace Accords called for speedier trials,
increased access to justice, and modernizing the judicial system. Congressional reforms to
institute these Constitutional changes were voted down in a public referendum in 1999, however,
with only 18 percent of the population participating in the vote. Two attempts at legal action in
Guatemala were international human rights trials held in Spain and the creation of International
Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). Until 2007, all attempts to bring
perpetrators to justice were thwarted and impunity was granted for all past and present violent
acts. Corruption ran rampant with former human rights abusers holding key positions in
government, enjoying immunity, and blocking judicial reforms. During this time, approximately
98 percent of murders went unpunished. For example, General Montt, accused of genocide and
presiding over the atrocities between 1982-1983, kept his position as head of Congress.
Consequently, he enjoyed immunity between 2000 and 2004 (Heasley et al. 2001). The initial
failure to act, followed by international trials and the creation of an International Commissions,
was ineffective, yet can serve as an example of what not to do in future conflicts.
International and domestic attempts at the prosecution of former Head of State General
Efrain Rios Montt and seven other senior officials for genocide, terrorism, and systematic torture
are emblematic of the failure to bring justice to indigenous groups. Spanish prosecutors
attempted to try these eight men in Spanish courts under the principle of Universal Jurisdiction –
the idea that national courts can prosecute any crimes against international law (Phillippe 2006).
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After much debate over the legitimacy of Spanish jurisdiction, Spanish Constitutional Courts
procured arrest warrants for those involved in the lawsuit in 2006. General Montt managed to
avoid his arrest warrant, however, by running for Congress. Guatemalan members of Congress
enjoy parliamentary immunity (Jordisan 2014). It was not until 2013 that Montt was eventually
found guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity in a domestic Guatemalan court. By this
time General Montt was 86 years old and had been allowed to operate with impunity for the past
30 years. While the outcome of this trial can be considered successful as this was the first time in
history that a domestic court held a former head of state accountable for genocide, the 30 years in
which a perpetrator of genocide was allowed to influence the development of the nation is
unacceptable (Burt 2013). In this case, a unilateral approach by the Spaniards to enforce justice,
in additional to efforts by domestic courts, failed to hold perpetrators of violence accountable for
their actions.
In 2007, the Guatemalan government and international community came together to form
the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). CICIG has the power to
bring criminal charges within Guatemalan courts as a complementary prosecutor for current and
retroactive cases, as well as the ability to propose judicial reforms. CICIG has been involved in
more than 50 high impact cases and overseen over 20 convictions. These convictions are
evidence of improved rule of law in Guatemala and present an optimistic view of the future of
the Guatemalan justice system (Donovan 2008). As the cases are not specifically human rights
related, however, it remains unclear what effect, if any, this commission has on reconciliation
(CICIG 2013).
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Lessons from Burundi
Current turmoil in Burundi indicates that peace and reconciliation measures were
unsuccessful. President Kurunziza’s announcement of his campaign for reelection in 2015 was
met with political protests. In response, state security forces gunned down protesters. This
incident sparked a new wave of political violence in Burundi. Following President Kurunziza’s
reelection, security forces and armed rebel groups killed hundreds of citizens. Reports of
widespread torture of political opponents and the murder of civil society activists and journalists
continue through 2016 as human rights organizations call for international intervention (Human
Rights Watch).
Despite continued violence, attempts at international intervention, power sharing, and
criminal justice provide invaluable lessons for future conflicts. International invention in Burundi
failed to implement the ceasefire in a timely and forceful manner. The international community
was hesitant to recognize and respond to the genocide of 1972, allowing for the resurgence of
mass killings in 1988. UN organizations ultimately failed to complete their mandates and disarm
rebel fighters. The slow and weak response of the international community to gross violations of
human rights allowed violence to continue into the modern day.
Power sharing within the Burundi transitional government teaches the importance of
political and public support for integration. Burundi effectively restructured the government to
include minority populations and former rebel fighters. Power sharing ultimately led to more
violence in the case of Burundi, however, because extremist Tutsi populations were unwilling to
relinquish political and economic power. This case suggests a chronological adjustment to the
Davies 40
peace process with disarmament and policies to shift public opinion coming before government
integration programs.
Finally, the failure to implement a transitional justice system as outlined in the Arusha
Peace Accords highlights the need for political support and new political leaders post-conflict.
Allowing those who presided over and took part in genocide to remain in power only prolongs
conflict and blocks important reconciliation measures.
Examining which peace building approaches were used unsuccessfully in Burundi
established a precedent for failed reconciliation policies that can be used to inform the ongoing
reconciliation process in Kosovo.
Lessons from Guatemala
Overall, the trial and error of peace building policies in Guatemala provides lessons for
future international peace building efforts. The use of truth commissions and UN involvement in
the immediate disarmament of fighters were highly successful and should be replicated in future
conflicts. The unwillingness of UN missions to strictly enforce Peace Accords, however, and the
failures of international and domestic attempts at legal justice provide insight into policy
adjustments that should be made.
The exemplary implementation of the ceasefire and disarmament of rebel fighters
conducted by UN forces should be replicated in future conflicts. The swift demobilization of
combatants allowed their reintegrated into society to begin right away. The clearing of mines
across the country also began to transform Guatemala from a war zone to a peaceful nation state.
UN forces were equally as successful in their coordination with each other, civil society, and
religious and political groups to bring people together to share memories of the conflict and
discuss the future of their nation. The act of bringing people together in a roundtable table
Davies 41
facilitates interactions and discussion across deep rooted societal divides and allows all members
of society to take ownership of Guatemala’s future.
Truth commissions in Guatemala additionally legitimized the suffering of individuals and
paved the way for future legal action. Truth commissions return dignity to victims by allowing
them to share their stories and also by proportioning blame to perpetrators of violence. Having
the truth commission conducted by the UN, a third party, with assistance from those of
Guatemalan descent allowed the final publication to be respected as an accurate and nonpartisan
analysis of events.
Much like Burundi, Guatemala struggled to implement the justice reforms outlined in
peace accords. In both cases, the slow implementation of reforms allowed perpetrators of
violence to operate with impunity for years post-conflict. In addition to failures of domestic
courts, the attempted prosecution of General Montts in Spanish courts teaches that a unilateral
approach to justice raises complicated legal questions of jurisdiction and extradition. These legal
debates allowed criminals to go unpunished and operate with impunity. A multilateral approach
to justice through international courts would avoid political strife and jurisdiction debates from
holding those guilty of genocide accountable.
Implications for Kosovo
Several lessons from the historical precedents of reconciliation in Guatemala and Burundi
have already been implemented in Kosovo, while others provide policy recommendations for
future action. The lessons learned from both case studies can be broken down into the four
separate reconciliation policy areas of international involvement, government restructuring, truth
commissions, and transitional justice. The case of Guatemala provides lessons on truth
Davies 42
commissions and Burundi provides lessons on power sharing, with both cases analyzing UN
involvement and transitional justice. Overall, Kosovo as a reconciliation case study has seen the
improvement of ceasefire implementation, co-existing power-sharing government structures, and
international transitional justice efforts. Historical precedent in Guatemala and Burundi,
however, suggest that UN involvement with civilians to promote inter-ethnic discussion and a
truth commission to produce an unbiased look at the conflict could prove beneficial to the
healing and reconciliation process.
International Involvement
International forces learned from historical precedent and succeeded in implementing a
ceasefire in Kosovo. The UN Security Council began taking action with Resolution 1160, which
placed an arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Serbian population ignored
the demands and continued to intensify their genocidal campaign. In response, the UN Security
Council swiftly issued resolution 1199 in September of 1998. This resolution called for a ceasefire and the start of peacebuilding dialogue with the threat of NATO air strikes if leaders did not
agree. The forceful threat of air strikes by the Security Council led to the signing of the
Holbrooke-Milosevic peace agreement. This cease-fire did not last, however, and another
attempt at peace negotiation was outlined in the Rambouillet Agreement (Gow 1998). This
agreement stipulated institutional autonomy for Kosovo and deployed NATO troops to enforce
the peace. Serbia refused these terms, and true to their word, NATO air strikes began on March
24th 1999. On June 8th 1999 Serbia accepted the peace terms. The final agreement called for the
end of violence, withdrawal of Serbian military forces from Kosovo, creates a NATO operated
international security force (KFOR), and establishes a UN mission in Kosovo to build peace.
After this peace agreement, KFOR forces maintained an interim police/security force in the
Davies 43
region. While there were high rates of crime and instability, KFOR forced both sides to comply
with the ceasefire (Friedrich 2005). The UN learned from the failure in Burundi and success in
Guatemala, and successfully used NATO air strikes to broker and enforce a ceasefire,
establishing initial peace in the region.
The UN has not, however, facilitated round table discussions across ethnic divisions, like
they so successfully implemented in Guatemala. Many NGOs are beginning to engage in small
scale projects to establish diverse open forums throughout communities in Kosovo, but these
projects are on a small scale and do not carry the weight of a UN policy. While only time will
tell if current policies in Kosovo will be able to reconcile the divided population, historical
precedent suggests that UN sponsored round tables could be beneficial. In Guatemala these
round tables allowed the population to come together to mourn and take ownership of decisions
that shaped the future of their nation. Seventeen years removed from the conflict, such round
tables may not have the same initial impact; however, they could provide a way for citizens to
collaborate with neighbors of different ethnicities and allow their voices to be heard on matter of
governmental policy.
Government Restructuring
Restructuring the government in Burundi incited more violence because of public
opposition to reconciliation. In Kosovo, however, a partial power-sharing arrangement was
implemented that arguably perpetuates divisions due to parallel governing structures. The
Kosovar government reached an agreement to create ethnic quotas for positions in the
government so representation of all ethnic groups and political parties is present. The potential
positive reconciliation benefit for such an integrated government, however, is diminished by the
Serbian structures that govern separately in communities with high Serbian populations. This
Davies 44
maintains, not remedies, the segmented society. The Serbian authority in these regions
established separate schools for Serbian children, separate community leadership, and even
separate citizen identity cards. This perpetuates a divide society, and yet, in Burundi forcing two
ethnic groups to govern together and immediately integrate their society led only to public
backlash. Perhaps Kosovo’s separate governing structures are allowing for peaceful co-existence
within the nation. As Kosovar citizens take greater pride in their ethnic identity than their
Kosovar nationality, this unconventional approach to co-governance may be maintaining peace
until issues like a unified government rise out of public support, not international pressure.
Truth Commissions
The truth commissions in Guatemala were highly successful in legitimizing victim’s
suffering and paving the way for future legal action. No such commission ever took place in
Kosovo, however. Truth commissions serve as a fact-finding mission that strives to produce a
credible version of the events. Documenting human rights abuses is, “not to assign collective
guilt, rather to avoid collective innocence” (Sverrisson 2006). Commission help identify
individuals to hold accountable for violent crimes, while simultaneously returning dignity to
those victimized and remembering those lost. Ethnic tensions continue to underlie the operation
of Kosovo’s public institutions, “limiting the credibility of judicial institutions, and preserving a
pattern of discrimination against minorities” (Sverrisson 2006). A truth commission could ease
these tensions and transition blame from an entire population to specific groups of individuals.
Transitional Justice
Post-conflict justice in Guatemala and Burundi suggest that those who participated in the
genocide should not be allowed to continue leading with impunity after peace agreements.
Additionally, the case suggests that an international, multilateral approach to justice would
Davies 45
produce the least corrupt trials and investigations. The creation of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia achieves both of these goals and is widely considered a
successful standard of international prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The ICTY was originally founded in response to atrocities committed in neighboring
Yugoslavia under UN Security Council mandate in 1993. In 1998, amidst reports of ongoing
violence in Kosovo, Prosecutor Louise Arbor publicly announced that the tribunal’s jurisdiction
extends to crimes against humanity committed in Kosovo and that she planned to open
investigations. Serbian authorities in Belgrade refused to comply with ICTY investigations and
even denied Prosecutor Arbor entry at the border. Prosecutor Arbor, however, announced that
her investigations and prosecutions would continue, “with or without access to the territory”
(ICTY History). ICTY investigators eventually entered Kosovo with KFOR forces and has since
indicted 161 accused from crimes committed in the region (ICTY Achievements). The landmark
success of the ICTY was the prosecution of Former Serbian President Slobadan Milosevic.
Milosevic was tried in 1999 for genocide, deportation, murder, torture, willful killing, and
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds to only name a few chargers. The trial began
in The Hague in 2002 and during the prosecution’s case alone 295 witnesses testified with 5,000
exhibits entered to support Milosevic’s involvement with the mass killings. Milosevic was found
dead in his UN detention center and the cause of death was later determined to be heart attack
(Prosecutor 2002). Because of his death, no verdict was ever reached on his case.
Despite the lack of verdict on Slobodan Milosevic’s trial, the Prosecutor’s willingness to
hold even the highest political offices accountable for their involvement in the genocide
represents progress and justice for victims. The ICTY trials prosecuted Albanian and Serbian
Davies 46
leaders alike, allowing for the investigations to serve almost as a truth finding commission to
uncover the truth about the genocide.
In regard to lessons from Guatemala, the ICTY prevented those who were thought to
participate in the violence from continuing to lead the country until they were tried for their
crimes and either acquitted or imprisoned. For example, Ramush Haradinaj, the former
commander of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), was alleged to have consolidated control
over the KLA through the mistreatment and removal of Serbian citizens who did not support the
KLA. Haradinaj and co-conspirators were also charged with launching attacks against ethnically
Serbian villages and refugee camps. Haradinaj was found not to been responsible or participated
in these attacks and consequently was acquitted of all charges in both the original trial and an
appeal in 2012. Due to the disappearance of a key witness before the trial, many suspect that
corruption is hindering the pursuit of justice. Haradinaj now heads the political party of the
Alliance for a Future Kosovo (ICTY case files). This case serves as an example of the ICTY’s
commitment to examine all allegations before allowing leaders to resume political control, but
also the need to address political corruption in Kosovo. Unlike Guatemala, where politicians
operated with impunity for years before facing trial, in Kosovo politicians accused of war crimes
faced full prosecution and only returned to public life if found innocent.
Additionally, the ICTY learned from historical precedent that a unilateral, external
approach to transitional justice is the most effective. The ICTY now has respect from all
involved parties because of its role as a neutral third party, concerned with the truth and not
political standing. ICTY prosecutors come from a variety of countries, also, to avoid the
jurisdiction issues of one country unilaterally attempting prosecution, as Spain did in Guatemala.
Overall, the ICTY has been widely successful thus far and has created a new standard for
Davies 47
international transitional justice in future conflicts, thanks to lessons learned in historical
example like Guatemala and Burundi.
Davies 48
CONCLUSION
Summary of Findings
My analysis has shown that reconciliation policies in the case of Kosovo have learned the
lessons of history in some regards, but precedent still suggests several improvements. Immediate
UN involvement brokering and implementing a ceasefire was significantly more effective in
Kosovo than in Guatemala or Burundi. This is because efforts were backed by KFOR security
forces and NATO kept its threat of air strikes for non-compliance. Kosovar government power
sharing has also learned the lessons of history, though in an unexpected manner. Logically,
having separate parallel government institutions would disincentive reconciliation among ethnic
groups. In Burundi, however, integration of the government because of international pressure,
not by public opinion, led to a resurgence of violence. This case would suggest that by waiting to
integrate all levels of government until public pressure demands it, Kosovo may be avoiding
additional increased levels of violence by allowing the groups to learn to co-exist first. Finally,
the ICTY can be considered a dramatic improvement from failed approaches to justice in
Guatemala and Burundi, despite corruption issues. The ICTY embodies the multi-lateral
approach to holding violent actors accountable suggested by failed previous cases. The ICTY
now serves as an exemplary example of international involvement in the justice process that can
hopefully be replicated in future conflict zones.
Despite the successful application of these reconciliation approaches in Kosovo,
historical cases suggest that UN involvement with facilitating civilian reconciliation and the use
of truth commissions could be implemented to improve peace building in Kosovo. In Guatemala,
the use of round table discussions to bring ethnic groups together and force accountability for the
future of the country was innovative and highly successful. Additionally, truth commissions, also
Davies 49
used in Guatemala, legitimized victim’s suffering and established a credible depiction of
historical events. Both of these measures could be beneficial in Kosovo where ethnic tensions
still run high.
Overall, analyzing these three cases has painted ethnic reconciliation not as a set list of
effective policy measures, but rather as a process of trial and error. Successful policies in one
case may not translate as well to another, and no two cases are perfectly similar. Only time will
tell if these policy measures will make a difference in Kosovo, or if ethnic divisions are too
deeply rooted in society to be counteracted by international involvement or a transitional justice
system.
Limitations
Three main limitations to my research include the volume of reconciliation policies
implemented in each case, the cultural differences between the cases, and the inability to
establish a causal link between policies and ethnic reconciliation.
Because of the hundreds of organizations involved in reconciliation work in each case, it
was not feasible to analyze all policies that impact reconciliation. For example, grassroots efforts
have impacted reconciliation on a community level in each case, yet because they have a
relatively smaller impact than organizations like the UN, I had to prioritize my analysis.
Additionally, one major limitation to my research was the contextual and cultural
differences between cases. Guatemala, Burundi, and Kosovo all have difference historical
backgrounds, and while I picked cases specifically to mitigate contextual differences, case study
analysis is never perfect.
Finally, the method of process tracing and comparative analysis is unable to produce a
causal relationship between ethnic reconciliation policies and reconciliation outcomes. This is a
Davies 50
limitation because while certain policies correlate with overall reconciliation, whether the
policies are actually responsible for causing the bridge in the divide remains unknown.
Future Research
Ideas for future research provide an opportunity to design research projects that address
the limitations of my own study. Future research could specifically pick one reconciliation policy
and analyze its effectiveness across the different cases. This would allow a more in depth
understanding of how the intricacies of the policy affect the overall outcome and impact. I would
also be intrigued to study solely the use of International Criminal Tribunals in different cases and
dive more into the impact transitional justice has on corruption and reconciliation within a
nation.
It would also be fascinating to conduct an experimental study on the impact of a
particular policy across ethnic conflicts. This could be conducted within the same ethnic conflict
in separate communities to keep other influencing factors constant. For example, one community
could conduct a truth commission, while the other does not, and the effect of the truth
commission could be compared. The research implications of such a study, however, would have
to be weighed with the ethical implications of denying one community access to a reconciliation
tool in order to analyze effectiveness.
Davies 51
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APPENDIX
Appendix A:
Kosovo Map
CIA World Factbook
Davies 58
Appendix B
Map of Kosovar ethnicities
OSCE