INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL - DRIVERS, DIAGNOSE
AND INTENSITY. ONE COUNTRY DIFFFERENT SPEEDS?
Paper to be presented at the PSA 65th Annual International Conference
Sheffield, 30th March – 1st April, 2015
Local Politics 3: Inter-municipal cooperation – theory, methods and examples
WORKING PAPER: DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE WITHOUT AUTHORS’ WRITTEN PERMISSION
Ms. Joana Ferreira,
University of Aveiro, Portugal
Dr. Filipe Teles,
University of Aveiro, Portugal
Abstract
In recent decades we have seen the deepening and spreading of IMC practice. Portugal is no
exception. Since 2003, and especially in the last two years, IMC has been subject of attention
and encouragement from Portuguese Government, observing significant legal changes and
strengthening the skills covered.
In a context where local governance increasingly requires cooperation and coordination
between various actors in complex webs of more or less formal relations, IMC arises, among
other institutional solutions as a viable alternative for the production of public policies.
This paper presents a theoretical framework on the decision to cooperate, considering the
main motivations and barriers, then presenting the Portuguese case (historical, administrative
and legal frameworks) which will be objet to study by the authors.
INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL – DRIVERS, DIAGNOSE AND INTENSITY.
Theoretical framework
Compete or cooperate?
“Competition has been shown to be useful up to a certain point and no further, but cooperation, which is
the thing we must strive for today, begins where competition leaves off.”
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Against the background of increasing demand and in order to achieve efficiency, quality and democracy
objectives, municipalities are faced with the need to decide between two roads: (1) compete with other
municipalities in providing services; or (2) cooperate to take advantage of scale (Dowding & Feiock, 2012).
Inter municipal competition is explored in a model created by the American author Charles Tiebout. Tiebout
(1956) defends that voters-consumers move to the community (read municipality, in the Portuguese case)
that offers them the combination of public goods that best suits their preferences. This consumers’
movement is usually called "feet voting" to the extent that citizens express their dissatisfaction at the given
municipal supply moving to another community and not by voting at the polls.
Although there are some studies that indicate the empirical validity of Tiebout model (especially in the US
and often with sharp restrictions), in the Portuguese case this model hardly applies. Ferreira (2013)
advocates that idea, arguing that "feet voting" is not possible in the Portuguese context, due to the
characteristics of: (1) historical centralization of power; (2) reduced weight of local public expenditure in
total public expenditure; (3) reduced weight of own revenues in the municipal total revenues; (4) discretion
and lack of transparency in the allocation of municipal participation in public taxes; (5) dispersion in
assignments and municipal competences; (6) poor correlation between prices and local public goods; and
(7) limited power of self-government bodies in the management of their revenues.
Even if believing that competition, with regard to these types of goods, would allow greater efficiency and
quality in service delivery, creating conditions for a "pure" competition system in Portuguese
municipalities, would entail very high costs (not only financial).
Given the inability of competition model, cooperation between municipalities is an alternative to solve the
challenges faced by municipalities, a form of institutional innovation. Innovation ("changing process")
appears as the institutional process of creating structures or institutional policies that, before a problem or
opportunity, bring together different actors with complementary interests and resources. Although with
potential conflicting interests, network cooperation and coordination of different actors, allows new
solutions through institutional paths (Hargrave & Ven, 2006).
Without pretending to deepen the study of institutions, it is important to realize that by studying institutions,
we must address ourselves, not only on their more formal and tangible aspects (such as formal and
functional design), but also on overarching issues as habits, incentives and convictions. The understanding
(or misunderstanding) of phenomena with strong institutional features is certainly dependent on the scope
of the questions addressed.
J. Ferreira & F. Teles
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INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL – DRIVERS, DIAGNOSE AND INTENSITY.
Woodhill (2010) identified four key characteristics for this process of institutional change: (1) navigation
ability; (2) network learning; (3) political commitment; and (4) self-reflection. These four features, not
being exhaustive or exclusive, are essential to enable changes in institutions and societies.
All these characteristics are in IMC phenomenon, to the extent it involves (1) the ability to operate in
complex systems (local governance is often subject to unpredictable and rarely repeatable situations); (2)
the ability to manage a complex network of agents (citizens, other local authorities, businesses, universities,
central government, technical structures of the Chambers and IMC entities, etc.); (3) the recognition of the
need for commitment by different local authorities, population and the management of different power
relations; and (4) the establishment of secure relationships, trust and transparency.
The concept of IMC used in this paper assumes: (1) the joint work of one or more municipalities, aimed at
a common task or goal; (2) the performance of functions that are within the jurisdiction and municipal
competences; and (3) the possibility of involvement of other partners, public or private ((CoE, UNDP, &
LGI, 2010) and (Hulst & Monfort, 2007b)). Unlike advocated by some authors (Nelles, 2013) it is
considered that the concept of IMC does not require the cooperation to be voluntary, considering possible
that it arises by imposition or legal advice.
Collective action perspective
According to collective action perspective, IMC as a form of institutional innovation is a response to the
recognition of a problem or institutional limitation, presenting as key players a network of agents with
interests often contrasting, running through a series of collective political events, and usually generating
new institutional structures (Hargrave & Ven, 2006).
The model of collective action, much explored and developed by authors such as Feiock, is based on a
theory of change in which actors with conflicting interests undertake in collective efforts to achieve specific
improvements. This model is grounded on the concepts of conflict, power and political behaviour in
explaining institutional innovation process, concepts also approached by Woodhill (2010).
Conflict not only gives rise to new rules and institutions, but can also be responsible for economic and
technological development processes. Many authors argue that life in society has always implied the
existence of disparities and conflicts, which are fruitful for the maintenance of group’s identity. This
inherent and constant presence of conflict, motor for creativity and change, implies the recognition that
innovation in institutions is inevitable and continuous.
Power relation between parts, while controlling resources for which other agents are dependent on, is also
crucial in the process of collective action, in that it determines the reaction of agents to institutional
pressures. Like conflict, power has impact on institutions and is influenced by them.
Finally, political behaviour is also central to the existence of institutional innovation. Political strategies
used (manipulative or not) are interdependent, thereby influencing each other results, which induces actors
to adjust their own strategies accordingly.
J. Ferreira & F. Teles
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INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL – DRIVERS, DIAGNOSE AND INTENSITY.
IMC motivations
According to political economy theory, especially rational choice models, it is not expected that elected
politicians behave differently from private agents in the management of public institutions (Sørensen,
2007). Faced with the possibility of cooperating municipalities, seen as any other economic agent, weigh
the costs and benefits of cooperation.
In recent context of austerity and fiscal crisis, it is given particular emphasis on IMC as a means to reduce
costs. According to rational choice model, agents are rational and make decisions to maximize utility. First
generation of rational choice models assume the existence of perfect information, while second generation
models already consider that agents hold different information (Ostrom, cited by Feiock (2007)).
Due to local reality complexity (Haveri, 2006), municipalities’ fragmentation, small size of many European
cities (Diez, 2006) and external pressures (Hulst & Monfort, 2007c) many municipalities feel unable to deal
by themselves with the problems and growing pressures inherent to local public provision. In fact, the lack
of organizational, financial, human and technical resources associated with the small size of many
municipalities are strong barriers to the provision of quality public services.
According to Diez (2006), countries have been choosing three types of solutions: (1) amalgamation/ fusion
of municipalities; (2) association between different units of government; or (3) creation of a new level of
governance, with or without direct elections.
First solution, adopted by several European countries, faces high barriers due to tradition, proximity, less
responsiveness and identity. Such obstacles are particularly relevant in countries with highly centralized
patronage and tradition, as the Portuguese case (Teles, 2014). Even if such constraints do not exist, it is also
not clear what the optimal size of the municipality would be (Diez, 2006).
As several authors point out, IMC works potentially as a dual solution by allowing economies of scale and
efficiency at the same time that brings advantages in democratic terms, to the extent that keeps power in
the hands of local elected representatives, avoiding the centralization in state structures (Wollmann, 2010)
(Mäeltsemees, Lõhmus, & Ratas, 2013) (Hulst & Monfort, 2007c).
Systematizing the European experience, CoE, UNDP, & LGI (2010) identify the reasons for cooperation
between municipalities: (1) cost reduction due to the existence of economies of scale; (2) improving the
quality of services or introduction of new service; (3) use of an existing territorial area, allowing greater
recovery of investments due to the existence of externalities- for example, waste management, public
transport, cultural activities; (4) joint management of infrastructure and functions across the territory of
several municipalities; (5) greater visibility and marketing; and (6) easier access to external funds community funding.
Bel, Fageda, & Mur (2013) in their study of motivations that lead municipalities to cooperate or to privatize
the provision of certain services (waste management), conclude that small municipalities are essentially
those who feel the need to cooperate in order to reduce costs. Driven by the need to exploit economies of
scale, small municipalities are strongly encouraged to cooperate.
J. Ferreira & F. Teles
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INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL – DRIVERS, DIAGNOSE AND INTENSITY.
Recognizing that these have been the main motivations to IMC, Mäeltsemees, Lõhmus, & Ratas (2013)
point out that a certain degree of reduction and costs and increase efficiency is possible, but it is not
justifiable high expectations regarding the possibility of "miracles”. For the authors, the success of IMC
depends on local accountability and the degree of engagement of those involved in cooperation.
Obstacles to cooperation
Despite the advantages listed, risks of cooperating should also be considered even though they may be
unexpected or difficult to estimate. CoE, UNDP, & LGI (2010) identify four types of risks associated with
IMC, strongly interrelated and interdependent:
a)
Slowing down the decision-making process: the involvement of many policy makers and the
need to consult their own bodies can generate delays (or even block) decision-making process;
b) Cost duplication: although in theory IMC is created to reduce costs, bureaucratic inertia,
resistance of local leaders to power abdication and potential inefficiencies in management can
generate operational redundancies and duplication costs;
c)
Democratic deficit: while the mechanisms of democratic control in municipalities are well known
in the case of IMC they are less transparent and the public interest (including the media) is lower.
Additionally, the mechanisms of internal control and audit are more difficult to implement;
d) Political costs: successful of cooperation requires local leaders to share power and prestige, before
and after the decision to cooperate, which is not always simple. Additionally there are strong
incentives for local elected to free ride, damaging the trust between partners and undermining the
sustainability of the relationship. Political costs are primarily agency.
Given their relevance and literature maturity, there will be developed two of these problems.
Agency in IMC
The relationship of agency is one of the oldest and commonest codified modes of social interaction.
(Ross, 1973)
To a very large extent, politics is agency.
(Mitnick, 1984)
As we know agency relationship is established between two parties when one of them (called agent) acts
for the benefit of, or represents, another (called the principal) in a given decision (Ross, 1973). For Ross,
agency is universal and can develop in any part of social relations (employer and employee, voters and
elected, vendor and customer, etc.). If both parts have the objective of maximizing utility, there are strong
reasons to assume that the agent does not always act in the best interest of the principal, existing divergence
and possible conflict of interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
But why agency a problem worthy of analysis? Arrow answers clearly: “The problem acquires interest
only when there is uncertainty at some point, and, in particular, when the information available to the two
individuals is unequal.” (Arrow, 1954; pp. 1).
J. Ferreira & F. Teles
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INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL – DRIVERS, DIAGNOSE AND INTENSITY.
In agency theory, information is regarded as a commodity: it has a cost, and it can be purchased.
(Eisenhardt, 1989; pp. 64)
Imperfect information leads to: (1) agent's actions not being directly observable by the principal - hidden
action; (2) result being affected, but not absolutely determined, by agent's actions - hidden information
(Arrow, 1954). These situations give rise to two problems widely studied in the literature: (1) moral hazard,
and (2) adverse selection, respectively.
In the case of moral hazard agent is interested in minimizing his effort (action), while the principal’s interest
is the precise opposite, being convenient that the agent maximizes his efforts in order to increase output.
Agent may simply not employ in his action every effort contracted with the principal, without the second
being able to verify this absence (Eisenhardt, 1989).
The second case, adverse selection, is reflected in “misrepresentation of ability by the agent” (Eisenhardt,
1989; pp. 61). Arrow (1954) explains that agent might have made certain observations that the principal
didn’t, detaining therefore more information. Agent naturally uses this information in decision-making,
however, principal is unable to distinguish whether the information was or not used in his best interest.
Minimizing the impact of information asymmetry could be achieved with the creation of incentives, that is,
mechanisms that contribute to limit its negative effect, that result in "purchase information". These solutions
are essentially of two types: (1) financial incentives contractually established; and/ or (2) increase in
information systems (Eisenhardt, 1989).
First type of solution, financial incentives, are set out in the contract itself and should help align interests
of agent and principal, that is, encourage the first to use the information asymmetry in favour of the second.
These incentives are, of course, a cost to the principal, which must be calculated so as to achieve a level of
efficiency (Ross, 1973) and (Arrow, 1954).
In addition to financial incentives, principal has motivation to invest in information systems that allow him
to minimize the problems, both moral hazard and adverse selection, controlling the "opportunism" of the
agent. These mechanisms, not financial, have institutional/ organizational nature.
Applied to politics, literature on agency indicates the State as an agent of citizens/ voters (principals) and
the State itself as a principal, in a complex network of agents and principals. The very institutions and
public standards are organized in order to respond to this network. Thus, the above concepts apply both to
the State as representative of the citizens as to public officials and bureaucrats as agents of the State.
Problems in public policy implementation can be understood in part as a result of agency, being common
solutions as the implementation of compliance mechanisms, control, participation, coproduction and/ or
planning. Elected representatives are controlled mainly by regular elections, with limitations and
advantages arising. However, in case of bureaucrats/ civil servants, which are also involved in public policy
decision, control may be more difficult. This happens because it is required, on one hand, some
independence from politicians and technicians and, moreover, the alignment of interests for the
implementation of policies to be minimally effective.
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INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL – DRIVERS, DIAGNOSE AND INTENSITY.
In this context, with the aggravating circumstance of the many to many relation, Mitnick (1984) adds one
more problem to moral hazard and adverse selection - blind trusteeship. In political institutions, composed
of complex bureaucratic networks, it is common the existence of this third problem, in which the principal
is not able to observe the agent’s behaviour or to evaluate it. This excessive bureaucracy exacerbates the
information asymmetry problems, causing severe misuse of public money problems (Itoh, cited by Gyorgy
(2012)).
However, it should be noted that the more important a policy is for the elected representatives, the less
discretionary power on the agents (Calvert et al., 1989). This happens because, in these areas, politicians
engage more effort and resources in reducing uncertainty, which discourages the agents to act on a
discretionary basis.
Those authors present some solutions to minimize agency risks in public policy, such as configuration of
decision-making (for example, veto power over the agents' decisions), definition of budgetary constraints
on agents, redundancy capacity of principal or creation of independent agencies.
Recovering collective action theory applied to IMC, it should be noticed that local elected weigh both
collective as individual benefits and costs. In terms of individual costs, abdication of power and
responsibilities (in this case, to IMC structure) can generate a significant increase in cooperation costs
(Feiock, 2007).
With regard to individual benefits, although it is expected that local elected are primarily responsive to the
citizens of its territory, there are reasons not related to the efficiency that can (un)encourage IMC. Thus,
local elected rationally weigh the political and career incentives against the political costs associated with
being relinquish autonomy and power, which can have negative consequences election. “Despite the
potential benefits of cooperative governance arrangements, local officials often perceive the costs as far
exceeding the potential gain.” (Feiock, 2007; pp. 48).
In IMC, as in other political relations, the organs of the new structures take in cooperation management
functions and increase the distance between principal and agent because of the second order relationship
created: the principal is now the local authority which continues to be an agent for citizens (Bel & Warner,
2014). Both technical structure as indirectly elected bodies may be unable to represent the interests of
elected from each municipality, without being created financial incentives or adopted the necessary
measures to monitor and control its operations.
As regards local elected representatives, characterized by risk aversion and short-term horizons (since they
are elected for fixed periods), they can be considered particularly sensitive to the possibility of being misled
or deceived by erroneous or irrelevant information (Feiock, Lee, Park, & Lee, 2010). Moreover, local
elected present levels of risk and uncertainty aversion differentiated from each other and progressively
higher than the technical structure of inter municipal entities.
In view of this risk profile, it is expected that local elected seek to focus themselves on the demand for
information being "suspicious" from a single source - centred ego behaviour (Feiock et al., 2010). Giving
this reasoning, they invest the time and resources needed in obtaining the network information they need,
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INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL – DRIVERS, DIAGNOSE AND INTENSITY.
allowing them to get safe and validated information, as derived from various sources, even risking to get
sometimes redundant information.
Under these conditions local elected prefer according Feiock, Lee, Park, & Lee (2010) star cooperation
with a focal agent that communicates with all principals directly, as opposed to a frame with "bridges",
wherein the communication channel is not straightforward.
Similarly, local elected privilege structures with reliable links, transitivity and reciprocity. These aspects
are especially valued, to the extent that allow "repeat" actions. When there are two senses in the relationship
between the agents, the retaliation fear encourages agents to act in accordance with their commitments and
there is a greater alignment of interests.
Feiock, Lee, Park, & Lee (2010) also conclude, based on their empirical analysis, that the greater the
potential costs and benefits associated with cooperation, the greater the tendency for local elected to conduct
self-centred in the gathering of information.
In fact, as well realize Fedele & Moini (2007), given the need to deal with the inevitable free riding problem1
in IMC, the difficulties are no longer merely institutional or administrative, they are, above all, political.
“The way local leadership works now enters the game, as does the timing of the programmes undertaken,
the quality of the partnerships set up and, more generally, the ability to find effective answers, which
essentially depend on the ability of local authorities to cooperate with each other.” (Fedele & Moini, 2007;
pp. 135).
"New public policies" of cooperation require more than the appropriate institutional design, a continuous
interaction between all those involved and the presence of political leadership, after the initial negotiation
of the contract, otherwise conflicting interests may quickly reappear (Fedele & Moini, 2007).
Democracy in IMC
Democracy is a complex and plural concept, which takes on two key dimensions: freedom and
representation. Freedom focuses on the idea that democracy’s objective should be to identify the principles
necessary to ensure that individuals and minorities rights are protected, arguing that the only justification
for the exercise of power over a person, against his will, is the need to prevent other people are harmed
(Stuart Mill, cited by Cunningham (2002)). At the same time, not being possible to implement direct
democracy in large societies, the ideal democracy should be representative, which means it implies the
choice of representatives by voters, who shall perform the duties delegated to them (Cunningham, 2002).
In this process, citizens' preferences are reflected in public policies through the following stages: (1)
citizens’ preferences; (2) citizens’ voting behaviour; (3) election results; (4) public policies formulation
between elections; and (5) public policy (Powell, 2000). This scheme makes it clear that the process may
have several flaws in each of the links.
1
The well-known free-riding problem states that "is in the interest of each individual issue wrong signals [about your
preferences], showing less interest in certain activity of collective consumption, than its real interest” (Samuelson,
1954; pp. 387).
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INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL – DRIVERS, DIAGNOSE AND INTENSITY.
This exercise implies the delegation of tasks, which is established based on a principal-agent relationship,
as detailed. Strøm (2000) identifies three main reasons for voters delegate 2, coupled with the practical
difficulties of direct democracy which lead to representation: (1) the ability - limited voters’ resources to
take necessary decisions; (2) the power - lack of knowledge and skills necessary for decision-making; and
(3) problems associated with collective choice, that is, the aggregation of different individual preferences
and the coordination of collective action.
Conversely, delegation also implies accountability, which gives rise to double readings on the role of
elections in democratic systems, as discussed in detail by (Powell, 2000) e Manin, Przeworski, & Stokes
(2006). It follows that the higher the alignment between citizens' preferences and public policies carried
out by authorized representatives through elections, more democratic is governation.
IMC, by establishing yet another link in that chain, makes democratic process considerably more complex.
Thus, the implementation of IMC involves a trade-off between the main drivers of the process - reducing
costs and increasing efficiency - and democratic control (Swianiewicz, 2010).
Despite the "democratic advantage" of non-centralization, IMC makes the issue of legitimacy more
important, since the new inter-municipal bodies are not elected to oversee that territorial area, but made up
of several members elected to represent their respective territory. On the one hand, there is the question of
what the capacity of each elected leader to influence supra decision making, on the other hand, of how are
safeguarded the rights of voters/ services’ users (Mäeltsemees et al., 2013).
Based on the German experience, Wollmann highlights that “instead of the efficiency and capacity gains
that were originally expected to be the crucial advantages and merits of the introduction of the
intercommunal bodies as pivotal components of the functional “symbiosis,” operational problems and
lacks, on the contrary, have surfaced” (Wollmann, 2010; pp.85). According to the author, in that context,
fragmentation of decision, tensions and conflicts, overlapping functions, transaction costs and density of
the institutional "web" created considerable obstacles to the success of IMC.
Similarly, in France, IMC was strongly criticized by, among other things, allowing a lesser degree of
democratic control, threatening political and democratic extinction of small municipalities (Wollmann,
2011). It should be stressed that in both these situation, local governments were characterized by a strong
fragmentation (many and small municipalities).
According to Wollmann (2011), this democratic deficit tends to worsen as we increase the delegated
functions in the bodies of the inter-municipal entities. In this respect, German Constitutional Court declared
unconstitutional a diploma envisaged the strengthening of inter-municipal powers, arguing that it violated
the principle of local autonomy. This unconstitutionality could be corrected in two ways: (1) through direct
election of inter-municipal bodies; or (2) transferring again the functions to municipalities. The Court also
suggests that if the objective is to strengthen the inter functions, local governments should promote mergers
of municipalities as an alternative to strengthening inter-agencies (Wollmann, 2011).
2
Above, we focused on the reasons why the State to delegate to bureaucrats.
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INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL – DRIVERS, DIAGNOSE AND INTENSITY.
Against the problem of democratic deficit inherent to IMC, arises then the question of whether and how the
joint decision is subject to democratic control. It is important then to discuss whether citizens' preferences
are considered, both in public policy decisions (choices for the future) as in accountability for past decisions
(accountability).
Considering that local elected necessarily put aside some kind of control IMC, more than a technical
challenge is a culture challenge, in which trust is essential and can be decisive. In this sense, the partners
(and, by extension, the citizens) must have sufficient information on cooperation activity and resulting
benefits.
This concept of democratic control can be decomposed, to simplify the analysis, in two types of control:
(1) vertical - between citizens and inter-municipal entities; and (2) horizontal - between different
municipalities of the same inter-municipal entity. The first can be strengthened through mechanisms such
as elections of inter-municipal bodies (direct or indirect), enhancement of public participation and
consultation or strengthening the role of inter-municipal assemblies. The second can be operationalized
through the electoral system of inter-municipal bodies (majority, proportional ...); the bodies’ decision
rules; firing powers of some organs by other, etc..
Existence of direct elections of public decision-makers who are delegated tasks by citizens is in theory an
important form of vertical control. So it is, for inter-municipal level decisions. It isn’t, however, an
imperative for democratic control to exist, as evidenced by the practice and theory.
In very heterogeneous realities, government by majority can become a consistent form of dictatorship, to
the extent that minorities are successively excluded (Lijphart, 1999). See the Irish case where for five
decades all elections were won by Protestant representing party, leaving Catholic minority "out of
democracy". In these situations, consensus arrangements are required, rather than opposition schemes "consensus democracy". A good example is Swiss democracy (proportional and multi-party), in that
although the elections have little impact on the choice of representatives, it is considered to have a high
level of democratic control (Lijphart, 1999).
This type of democracies (fragmented or heterogeneous but stable) are presented by Lijphart (1969), as
“consociational democracies”, where political elites undertake efforts to cooperate, rather than being
opposed. “Consociational democracy violates the principal of majority, but it does not deviate from
normative democratic theory” (Lijphart, 1969; pp. 214).
In what concerns IMC CDLR & Deffigier (2008), in guidance, states that those responsible for intermunicipal management should have political representation, albeit indirect. Administrative, civil and
criminal responsibility is not sufficient especially if they have tax liabilities. In short direct election is not
vital, but there is always the need for political accountability.
“No taxation without representation” (Hulst & Monfort, 2007a; pp. 222). These authors also argue that the
higher the power assigned to the inter-municipal entity, more important is the issue of democratic control
and therefore the greater the call for direct election of its organs.
Literature on IMC points in the sense that the higher the powers of inter-municipal entities, especially where
these take fiscal powers, the greater the call for direct election. Practice shows that in most countries, the
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INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL – DRIVERS, DIAGNOSE AND INTENSITY.
organs of the inter-municipal entities are not directly elected, although some experimental exceptions such
as the Netherlands and Finland (Hulst & Monfort, 2007a).
Opting for no direct election of cooperation bodies, there should be adopted institutional designs that allow
representation of citizens and municipalities. Countries, in general, have chosen combinations of: (1)
indirect election by local elected; (2) proportional representation; and (3) majority decision (CDLR &
Deffigier, 2008).
Regardless of selected representation system, it is possible (and advisable) to create strong mechanisms of
accountability and participation (Hulst & Monfort, 2007a) (CDLR & Deffigier, 2008), to minimize the risks
mentioned in previous paragraphs. CDLR & Deffigier (2008) advises, among other things, the creation of
bodies elected by local representatives, with a clear delegation of tasks, and the creation of consultation
bodies.
Peuter & Wayenberg (2005) propose 5 control mechanisms: (1) definition of cooperation duration, forcing
municipalities to consider the motivations and institutional design on a regular basis; (2) clarification of
cooperation objectives and avoiding multipurpose solutions; (3) requirement for approval by the Municipal
Assemblies of amendments to the statutes; (4) creation of regular reports on the activity of cooperation; and
(5) strengthening the powers of the deliberative body.
Hulst & Monfort (2007a) show that local political representatives are involved very little in the life of
cooperation, mainly in the case of more operational tasks. The more scarce the role of elected
representatives, most misrepresented are citizens’ interests.
In addition to the form of election and representation, there are some mechanisms to enhance the citizens’
participation and services’ users of. CDLR & Deffigier (2008) lists some practices, namely: (1) public
access to inter-municipal bodies; (2) inter-municipal bodies’ public meetings, visits to web site and
meetings with structure’s officials; (3) extension of right to information3 to IMC; e (4) possibility of
petitions, referendums and consultations.
Portuguese empirical case
Portuguese Local Administration
Municipalities
It is difficult to speak about Portugal, without understanding the historical role of their municipalities.
Although there isn’t a consensus on the origin of Portuguese municipalities, there is no doubt about their
importance in the organization and functioning of the state and its contribution to society, being safe to
assume its existence even before the formation of Portugal, in 1143 (Ferreira, 2013).
3
Right to information is recognized in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and states that
"everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes the right to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers ".
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INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL – DRIVERS, DIAGNOSE AND INTENSITY.
Regardless the more or less centralized governance in Portugal, over the last millennium, municipalities
have always played an important role in solving collective problems of their populations (population
planning, land, infrastructures, health, housing, finance, inter-municipal relations, water supply, ...).
In recent years, the municipal situation has been characterized by a lack of own resources, which increases
the dependence on central government, and "a tension between a wide range of skills and some financial
corset"(Bilhim, 2004; pp. 12). More recently, due to economic and social crisis Portugal is facing, but also
due to strategic guidelines at European level, there has been a trend for a strengthening the role of
municipalities in social support and inclusion.
Portuguese administrative structure
Portuguese democratic state includes local authorities that may be administrative regions, municipalities
and parishes, according to the Portuguese Constitution (AssembleiaConstituinte, 1976). Although the
legislative framework welcome the existence of four levels of government on the mainland the
administrative regions were never created, existing only in the archipelagos of Azores and Madeira.
There are currently in Portugal: (1) a government of 1st level - Portuguese Government; (2) two regional
governments of 2nd level - Government of Azores and Madeira; (3) 308 local governments of 3rd level 278 municipalities on the mainland, 19 in the Azores and 11 in Madeira; and (4) 3 092 local governments
of 4th level – 2 882 parishes on the mainland, 156 parishes in the Azores and 54 parishes in Madeira.
Scale
Another relevant aspect in the analysis of Portuguese local government is the degree of heterogeneity.
Although Portuguese municipalities present a comparable size to the European situation (both in terms of
size and population) (CCRE, 2012) Portuguese municipal organization is essentially characterized by the
existence of very large gap between municipalities.
Resident population by municipality range from 1 834 inhabitants and 547 733 inhabitants; the number of
parishes by municipality varies from one parish and 89 parishes; and the municipal area ranges from 8km2
and 1 721km2 (Ferreira, 2013)4. These wide disparities between municipalities have certainly strong impact
in terms of municipal management and operation of IMC structures (without seeking to establish, for now,
any causal relationship between city size of municipalities and intensity of IMC).
Scope of municipal activity
Current legislation, in force since 2013, identifies local authority duties in accordance with a general and
open clause that states that functions of each authority are "to promote and protect the personal interests of
respective populations" (article 23 of AssembleiaRepública (2013b)), which makes these entities likely to
receive functions in all areas, since it is deemed appropriate achieved at local level.
4
Note that the data presented refer to the year 2011 are not yet implemented the reform of "fusion" of parishes, occurred
in 2013.
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INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL – DRIVERS, DIAGNOSE AND INTENSITY.
Furthermore, it is permitted and encouraged to (1) contract and decentralize state powers to municipalities;
(2) delegate municipal powers in inter-municipal entities; and (3) delegate municipal powers in parishes.
In practice, there is a complex network of powers and functions which can be transferred to other entities
of the public sphere. The range of municipal powers in this legal framework is potentially unlimited.
This (formally) wide range of functions, is supported by the constitutionally enshrined principle of local
autonomy. Although formally established as "the right and the effective capacity of local authorities to
regulate and manage, by the law, under their responsibility and the interest of the respective populations an
important part of public affairs" (article 3.º of CoE (1985)), the concept of local autonomy is, in practice,
strongly compromised by a wide range of legal and institutional constraints (Ferreira, 2013).
In fact, with regard to the weight of municipalities in the management of public expenditure, the numbers
are clear. While in Europe local sector manages on average 27% of public expenditure (CCRE, 2012) in
Portugal municipalities and parishes account for less than 10% of this expenditure (Ferreira, 2013).
Legal and historical framework of IMC in Portugal
The history of IMC
Since the early twentieth century that Portuguese legal framework provides for inter-municipal cooperation,
always in pursuit of logic and realization of common interests between two or more municipalities. In 1913,
a law was created (AssembleiaRepública, 1913) providing for the possibility of agreements between
Municipalities and later the creation of federations of municipalities, by decree, which could be voluntary
or mandatory (GovernodePortugal, 1940). Portuguese Constitution (AssembleiaConstituinte, 1976) has
recognized the right to establish associations and federations of municipalities, eliminating the existence of
mandatory associations and providing for the regulation of these associations in specific legislation.
The specific regulation of municipal associations was operationalized through various laws which created
the associations as legal persons of public law and defined its scope, coverage, and so on. In 1984 the
National Association of Portuguese Municipalities (ANMP) was created representing all municipalities in
the country before Portuguese Government (under the law GovernodePortugal (1984)). In 1991 the
metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto were created (AssembleiaRepública, 1991).
In this period, many associations were created for the development of specific purposes, common to all
municipalities members, in areas such as water supply and wastewater treatment; urban cleaning and waste
management; development of software for local authorities; distribution of fuel gas; environmental
protection; integrated management of local resources; culture and regional development, ...
In 2003, begins what may be considered a new period in the history of municipal cooperation in Portugal,
with the restructuring of municipal associations, the strengthening of democratic legitimacy and the
possibility of state powers transfer (AssembleiaRepública, 2003a) (AssembleiaRepública, 2003b).
Municipal associations are divided in general purpose municipal associations (Metropolitan Areas and
Inter-municipal Communities) and special purpose municipal associations (which could be public or
private, many of them already existing under the previous legislation). Each municipality could only belong
to one general purpose associations.
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INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL – DRIVERS, DIAGNOSE AND INTENSITY.
In 2008 (with two laws - (AssembleiaRepública, 2008a) and (AssembleiaRepública, 2008b)), there has
been new changes in legal framework, turning compatible the rules relating to associations of single and
multi-purpose associations, which overlap to the territorial areas NUTS III, and assume important roles in
the management of EU funds.
Very recently, in September 2013, a new law was published (currently in effect – Law n. 75/ 2013, 12
September) with several changes in inter-municipal cooperation which will be detailed below
(AssembleiaRepública, 2013a).
Multipurpose purpose municipal associations
Inter-municipal entities, namely multipurpose municipal associations assume the nature of public
associations of local authorities and can be distinguished between metropolitan areas (Lisbon and Oporto)
and inter-municipal communities (21 others). Their territorial design matches the NUTS III of the mainland,
forming twenty-three entities covering the 278 municipalities in the mainland.
Although several forms (more or less formal) of cooperation exist in Portugal since the early twentieth
century, in the last decade there have been numerous incentives to cooperation with benefits arising from
access to European funds and the gradual strengthening of powers.
Metropolitan Areas are established through legislation and cannot be cancelled or abandoned, while intermunicipal communities are freely formed and may municipalities decide by a simple majority of the
respective deliberative body, to abandon them. If this withdrawal occurs within three years from the date
they joined it, the municipalities "lose all financial and administrative benefits they have received because
of their membership" (number 2 of 65th article (AssembleiaRepública, 2013b)).
Objet
Inter-municipal entities have, in short, assignments in planning, regional development and provision of
some public services, promoting communication between municipalities and government departments in
various fields. In practice, their practice areas focus mainly on strategic and policy planning ("soft" skills).
With the publication of Law No. 75/2013, there has been a reform of the statutes, powers and funding of
IMC, based on the argument of strengthening "management capacity of municipalities with advantages in
terms of efficiency, rationalization of resources, standardization of procedures, creation of economies of
scale, sharing of experiences and good practices and, consequently, better the public interest " (Governo,
2012; pp. 3).
That law has reinforced certain skills before municipal - for example, the adoption of plans, programs and
investment projects and development of metropolitan/ inter-municipal interests; and, in metropolitan areas,
the possibility of local taxation.
In fact, encouraging cooperation is evident if we remember that the decree which gave rise to this law was
deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. Unconstitutionality was due, among other things, to
the breach of the principle of typicality of local authorities, by providing for inter-entities a materially
scheme identical to local authorities and to the non-exhaustive list of skills. In addition to these incentives,
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INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL – DRIVERS, DIAGNOSE AND INTENSITY.
the Local Finance Law (AssembleiaRepública, 2013a) has created additional revenue for inter entities,
depending on the regional development of respective municipalities.
Operation and organization
The operation of metropolitan areas and inter-municipal communities is established in their statutes and
these authorities may decide on the location of its headquarters, the goals to pursue and the municipalities
that compose it, since respecting the legislation, particularly in the abovementioned Law No .º 75/2013
(which content will be presented next).
The metropolitan areas are composed of three bodies: (1) the metropolitan council - a deliberative body;
(2) the metropolitan executive committee - executive body; and (3) strategic council to the metropolitan
development - consultation body (article 76).
Inter-municipal communities are composed of four bodies: (1) inter-municipal assembly - body with
deliberative functions; (2) the inter-municipal council - a body with deliberative and executive functions;
(3) the inter-municipal executive secretariat - executive body; and (4) strategic council to the intermunicipal development - consultation body (article 82).
The figures of deliberative and executive bodies, common in the Portuguese legal language, need to be
clarified for understanding and assimilation in compared terms. Municipalities and parishes as well as the
inter entities consist of a deliberative body (municipal or parish “assembly”) and an executive body (City
Council or Parish Council).
The deliberative bodies assume "orientation skills, regulation and supervision", while the executive bodies
are in charge of "permanent management of the affairs" of the respective local areas. The executive body
thus functions with permanent management of government business functions of the parish/ municipality/
inter-municipal entity (Caetano, 1990).
The inter-municipal assembly, non-existent body in metropolitan areas, is made up of members of each
municipal assembly, elected in proportion to the number of voters (article 83). If there is a quorum, the
resolutions of the inter assembly are taken by relative majority (article 54).
The metropolitan council and the inter-municipal council are composed of all Municipal Mayors of the
municipalities and are led by a president and two deputies (elected among them) (articles 69 and 88). They
have public meetings (articles 70 and 89).
Decisions of both metropolitan council as inter-municipal board are taken in accordance with a double rule
which states that decisions shall be adopted "when favourable votes of its members meet, cumulatively, to
a number equal to or greater than the votes against and the representation of more than half of all voters
universe of the municipalities of the metropolitan area" (article 105). Some matters of competence of
Metropolitan Council are exceptions, where the decision must be unanimous (article 81).
Metropolitan executive committee and the inter-municipal executive secretariat comprises a first secretary
and other secretaries (four in the metropolitan case, and up to two, in the case of inter-municipal
communities), elected by the Municipal Assemblies (articles 73, 74, 93 and 94). Its meetings are not public,
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INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL – DRIVERS, DIAGNOSE AND INTENSITY.
but should be provided for consultation and participation of the population in matters of metropolitan
interest. Minutes of meetings shall be publicized on the website (articles 75 and 95).
The strategic council to the metropolitan or inter-municipal development gathers the institutions relevant
to the inter-municipal level and has consultation functions (artigos 78.º e 98.º).
One of the main innovations introduced by the new law was the creation of an additional mechanism of
vertical control of exclusively executive bodies’ powers, the metropolitan executive committee and intermunicipal executive secretariat. Municipal Assemblies can now submit censure motions to that organ,
which determine his resignation, when approved by a majority of the municipal councils of the
municipalities of the metropolitan area/ inter community. Also the metropolitan and inter-municipal
councils and inter-municipal assembly may decide on the dismissal of those organs. This control
mechanism has not yet been applied.
Comparing metropolitan areas with inter municipal communities, the executive committees of metropolitan
areas have more extended powers and skills, in particular, "to propose to the central government investment
and development plans, programs and projects in the metropolitan interest" (article 76), competence that
fits in the case of inter-communities, inter municipal board, indirectly elected (article 90).
Nevertheless, it can be considered that metropolitan executive committee is less scrutinized than the
corresponding body of the Inter-municipal Communities, as the Inter-municipal Council (with executive
and deliberative functions) is provided with more comprehensive functions and powers than the
Metropolitan Council. In fact there is an additional deliberative body - the inter-municipal assembly - with
monitoring and supervision powers.
Besides, the law defines the retributive scheme of the exclusively executives board members, corresponding
to a percentage of the salary of the Portuguese President (article 77 and 97), when the previous legislation
established only a maximum limit for that compensation, which depended on resolution of the metropolitan
and inter-municipal councils.
Financing
The financing of inter-municipal entities, as well as the financing of local authorities, is disciplined in Law
No. 73/2013, 3 September (AssembleiaRepública, 2013a). According to article 68th of that regulation, these
structures have "their own assets and finances".
Such features include: (1) contributions and transfers from respective municipalities or other public entities
resulting from the delegation of powers and/ or contracting; (2) European co-financing; (3) credits, grants
or contributions; (4) fees and prices; (5) own property income; (6) transfers from the state budget; and (7)
other income permitted by law (article 68).
Transfers from the state budget are calculated based on transfers to the respective municipalities (1% for
metropolitan areas and 0.5% for inter-communities). Furthermore, the local finance reform operated in
2013 introduced a new share, distributed by inter-municipal entities according to the level of regional
development (article 69).
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INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL – DRIVERS, DIAGNOSE AND INTENSITY.
Put into practise clues – some reflections
"Forced" adherence to cooperation and the possibility of abandonment
As mentioned, the uptake of metropolitan areas and inter-municipal communities is established by law,
being municipalities allowed, in the second case, to subsequently leave the cooperative structure. Incentives
for cooperation (in the case of metropolitan areas, the obligation) as well as the standards set legally alter
the weighting that municipalities do about agency costs, not being properly weighted (or accepted) by local
elected at least in the moment previous to cooperation.
Considering that, in Portugal, no municipality opted to date, to abandon the respective inter-municipal
entity, it seems reasonable to assume that, in its analysis of costs and benefits, local elected representatives
consider that the potential benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs.
Alert only that the decision turned from "to cooperate or not cooperate?" in "not abandon or abandon
cooperation?". Being difficult to articulate precisely the potential costs and benefits of different
formulations, the second, the real one for elected local, entails additional costs/ benefits of abandonment
that may, or not, be significant.
In this context, it can be said that membership is not fully enforced, nor entirely voluntary. Anyway, the
possibility of individual abandonment (in the case of inter-municipal entities) is a strong control, both in
democratic terms and as a way of mitigating agency costs.
Bodies legitimacy
In the absence of direct elections of supra municipal organs, its legitimacy is given indirectly. Intermunicipal entities are a forum for cooperation, in which the skills performed, although extended over
previous years, are predominantly strategic, being decision spaces relevant to municipalities.
Considering that there are strong controls on inter-municipal activity (such as the possibility of
abandonment or dismissal of executive bodies) and skills performed, it seems unreasonable to state that the
indirect election of these bodies is sufficient reason for the lack of democratic vertical control. On the
contrary, as shown previously, direct elections are not essential for there to exist democratic control.
Safeguard that this may no longer be valid if such powers are strongly dilated to include for example tax
powers. Imagine, on the mainland, inter-municipal entities with powers similar to those of the Autonomous
Regions, run by elected representatives to govern municipalities, territory plots, and maintain local
responsibilities. We could, in this situation, ask ourselves about the legitimacy of rulers.
Multipurpose cooperation
The fact that IMC is general purpose potentially increases the democratic deficit, as found in the collected
literature. Analysed literature advices clear definition of the cooperation scope, with a breakdown of
delegated skills.
With regard to agency relationship, the enhancement of skills can be understood by local elected as an
increased political risk due to the existence of power, information or economic/ social/ cultural
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INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL – DRIVERS, DIAGNOSE AND INTENSITY.
asymmetries. It is true, however, that although the legislation apply to all inter-municipal entities, there are
powers whose delegation and transfer depends on the decision of the metropolitan/ inter-municipal bodies.
Still, those mayors with less power or greater uncertainty may feel "forced" to the exercise of such skills
by the inter-municipal entity, even voting against.
The decision process for metropolitan and inter-municipal councils
In what regards these bodies there are two concerns: (1) his presidency can become a position with political
and professional advantages (selective benefits, in the view of Feiock); and (2) the decision itself may not
reflect the interest of various municipalities’ population.
With the new legislation, there was a clear strengthening of Inter-municipal council’ powers, which
becomes an executive and deliberative body. Also the Metropolitan Council see their skills enhanced.
The double rule of deliberation, being a demanding rule, seems to allow an accurate citizens’ representation,
giving the respective mayors greater safeguards that only sufficient consensus decisions are taken. The vote
of the president of the body has the same weight as any other.
For certain issues, the law requires resolutions to be unanimously: (1) in Metropolitan Council, relative to
the number of paid members of executive body, to the charge of expenses not covered by entities revenues,
to the exercise of tax powers, and to the sale of real estate; (2) in inter-municipal council regarding the
existence, number and presence of remuneration of members of executive body. This decision rule, which
gives absolute control to every municipality, protects democracy and representation in the decision-making
process and may even impair certain board decisions.
Alert, in this context, the implications of Tsebelis theory, associated with the veto power of certain agents.
There could exist, potentially, two veto powers in the context under consideration: (1) in the proportional
decision rule, the vote of municipalities with high relative size; and (2) in the requirement of unanimity, the
sole vote against.
Tsebelis (2000) focuses on the ease with which status quo can be changed, depending on existing
institutional rules, with special emphasis on the role played by actors with veto power. Regardless of
normative trend, the author evaluates a set of institutional designs depending on agents’ veto power.
Veto players theory implies that if there are many agents with a veto, policy changes are only incremental,
existing higher levels of inertia (Tsebelis, 2000). The same reasoning can be applied to decisions at the
level of metropolitan and inter-municipal councils - the existence of veto power, especially on matters that
require unanimity, increase the potential inertia of those decisions.
As an example, we refer the situation of an Inter-municipal Community of the countryside, with little
experience of cooperation and strong political heterogeneity, where the adoption of the list to the intermunicipal executive secretariat took more than one year. In this case, the trade-off between control and
efficiency is clearly tipped in favour of the former, constituting a strong blocking source.
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INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL – DRIVERS, DIAGNOSE AND INTENSITY.
Control of the Executive Board
It is noteworthy that, compared to the Inter-municipal Assembly and the Metropolitan/ Inter-municipal
Councils, agency problems, in the case of these strictly executive bodies, tend to be more pronounced, as
the risk profile and uncertainty is different, because they are not directly subject population’s suffrage.
The new law now provides for the possibility of dismissal of the metropolitan executive committee or the
inter-municipal executive secretariat, through censorship motions approved by most municipal assemblies
or by resolution of the metropolitan/ inter-municipal councils or inter-municipal assembly.
This ability is a strong control of these organs action ("technical" or “bureaucratic”), encouraging their
alignment with the interests of local elected representatives. Recall that these two executive bodies are not
composed of local elected (as in the municipal executive), but by secretaries, proposed by metropolitan and
inter-municipal councils and elected by the Municipal Assemblies.
The dismissal may occur, as explained, in three ways, with the power granted to the Municipal Assemblies
possibly redundant, compared to the same power by the metropolitan/ inter-municipal council and the intermunicipal assembly, since the party representation tends to be similar in deliberative and executive bodies
of the municipalities. If dismissal occurs, it follows the proposal of a new list by metropolitan/ intermunicipal councils and the following election by the respective municipal assemblies, but to date there has
not been any resignation by this way.
Besides the possibility of dismissal, the metropolitan/ inter-municipal councils and the inter-municipal
assembly play monitoring and supervision functions of executive organs. In addition, the law provides for
audits and internal control mechanisms for cooperation activity.
Other powers of Municipal Assemblies
The approval of the statutes of inter-municipal communities also depends on the municipal assemblies,
allowing a direct control, even if potentially limited (by the legal requirements and the need for majority in
the approval, at inter-municipal level). By means of contracts, additional democratic controls can be
established, for example, population participation mechanisms.
Moreover Municipal Assemblies have the power to call the organs of the inter-municipal entity, to respond
to their members about the activities carried out under the inter-municipal entity. This is a direct form of
control and monitoring by the Municipal Assemblies directly elected.
Creation of the Consultation Body
The creation of the Strategic Council for the Metropolitan/ Inter-municipal Development is an important
mechanism of access to information that allows, in theory, greater alignment with the interests of citizens,
as proposed by CDLR (2008).
This is an innovative mechanism that brings together citizens and other local partners, working as a form
of vertical democratic control. The involvement of local partners, in a broad sense, can also serve to give
greater political visibility to the activity of inter-municipal entities capturing, for example, media attention,
with an impact on agenda framing and setting.
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INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL – DRIVERS, DIAGNOSE AND INTENSITY.
Participatory tools
Metropolitan/ inter-municipal councils meetings are open to public, with the possibility of intervention,
allowing a direct contact and higher levels of accountability before citizens. With regard to the metropolitan
executive committee and the inter-municipal executive secretariat, although its meetings are not public, the
consultation and participation of citizens should be provided, as well as minutes’ publication.
Presented the main risks and control mechanisms it must be added that each inter-municipal entity may
choose to create additional mechanisms (formal and informal) control. Alert only for the need for reflection
and weighing between the number of controls and normal activity of these entities, seeking to minimize
inertia factors and locks.
In conclusion, although it should be noted that even if agency problems and democratic deficit are not
important enough for municipalities to abandon the respective inter-municipal entities, they can certainly
be decisive in how cooperation flows, conditioning its intensity and results.
Haveri (2006) identified three reasons for the reforms that seek to implement IMC to be slower than
expected. First, the complexity of the decision-making process, second the uncertainty to delay the reform
process and, finally, the political leadership requirement as a condition for change. It is important to study
the motivations and inhibitions that move the local elected, recognizing the crucial role they can assume in
the success of IMC.
Project presentation
Objectives and scope
The project will focus on the type of cooperation operated by the Inter-municipal Communities and
Metropolitan Areas – inter-municipal entities in mainland Portugal. Looking to a comprehensive and yet
deepened outcome, it was decided to select an IMC configuration that maximizes the coverage of the
national territory and that is sufficiently stable to allow an in-depth analysis and comparison.
This work aims to know and describe/ characterize the functioning of all Portuguese inter-municipal entities
and identify the main obstacles and push factors justifying different performances. It is intended, therefore,
to answer the question: "How is characterized the performance of Portuguese inter-municipal entities and
what are the drivers and obstacles that justify different levels in intensity of cooperation?".
In general terms, it is intended (1) to describe and characterize, in a comparative way, the operation of the
23 Portuguese inter-municipal entities; and (2) assess the intensity of IMC in those structures, identifying
the main factors of impulse and obstacles to IMC.
The study will be based on a dependent variable and several independent explanatory variables - the
dependent variable is the "cooperation’s intensity"5 that is not intended to sort the municipalities according
5
Inspired in the work of Nelles (2013), although the setting and assumptions associated with the variable are
significantly different.
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INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL – DRIVERS, DIAGNOSE AND INTENSITY.
to their best or worst performance. It’s intended to group them according to the strength of cooperation,
which could result in the range of skills performed, level of involvement of the actors or the frequency of
interactions (to be defined). The goal is that the independent variables allow the grouping of inter-municipal
entities according to different levels of intensity (clustering).
Methodological approach
Based on collected literature, it was noticed that there are no systematic and validated methodologies to
evaluate IMC operation and performance. For this motive, it was decided to develop one specific
methodology, based on literature review and characteristics of the empirical case.
When defining methodology the following assumptions were adopted: (1) institutionalism and collective
action are complementary, which means that both institutions and agents’ rationality are considered; (2) the
study aims to achieve deep and comprehensive results, allowing to know in detail every situation (such as
a case study) and simultaneously to obtain comprehensive and reliable results without the need for
generalization; (3) data triangulation is a requisite, due to IMC complexity, but especially because intermunicipal entities act mainly within soft and multipurpose skills; (4) rankings are not desirable, once there
is no good or bad performance in contexts like IMC (Woodhill, 2010); (5) if possible, data will be compared
internationally.
Based on those assumptions, the methodology is drawn according to 6 stages, which are not necessarily
sequential:
1ª STAGE - PREPARATORY WORK
A. Theoretical framework (literature analysis and empirical studies)
B. General characterization of IMC in Portugal
C. Drawing quantitative model (definition and characterization of dependent variable, quantification
method, data processing, clustering)
2ª STAGE - ANALYSIS MATRIX CONSTRUCTION
A. Developing analysis matrix (independent
variables, quantification measures, ...)
B. Matrix validation through exploratory
interviews
3ª STAGE - DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
A. Data Collection
- Documentary information
- Interviews
B. Content and statistical analysis
4ª STAGE - DATA PROCESSING AND INTENSITY ASSESSMENT
A. Evaluating cooperation intensity
B. Clustering
C. Data analysis and conclusions about the push factors and obstacles
5ª STAGE - INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON (OPTIONAL)
A. Comparative analysis of the results with the findings of international studies
6ª STAGE - WRITING THESIS
A. PhD thesis writing and other outputs
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INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL – DRIVERS, DIAGNOSE AND INTENSITY.
Conclusion
IMC is a complex phenomenon, driven by different motivations and involving very different actors and
interests. The choice between cooperate or not to compete, taken by local elected, ideally incorporates the
weighting of different costs and benefits, some collective and other individual, associated with the transfer
of management and decision-making to another level of governance.
The historical and legal framework for IMC in Portugal provides a good object of study, because the 23
inter-municipal entities cover the entire mainland territory and are in a sufficiently low number for a
thorough examination, aside from the history of strong cooperation in some regions.
IMC operated by inter-municipal entities is established by law, and municipalities may abandon the
respective entity if they integrate an inter-municipal entity (not possible in the case of metropolitan areas).
The law provides some detail for the organic functioning of these entities and creates some controls to the
main risks associated with cooperation (such as the risk of agency or the democratic deficit).
Accepting the complexity and complementarity of IMC phenomenon, it is recognized that the conclusion
about the factors that affect the intensity of IMC in Portugal will require a much deeper empirical and
analytical study, to be developed by the authors.
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