TOM REGAN`S ARGUMENT FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS Moral agents

TOM REGAN’S ARGUMENT FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS
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Moral agents themselves have inherent value. They don’t just have experiences
with intrinsic value or disvalue (e.g. good pleasures and bad pains).
Moral agents have equal inherent value.
Because of their inherent value, harming moral agents can never be justified by the
consequences for all affected – i.e. moral agents have equal basic rights.
Moral agents have equal inherent value owing to the fact that they are all (equally)
subjects of a life.
Some moral patients are like moral agents in being subjects of a life.
These moral patients have the same inherent value as moral agents, and so the same
basic rights.
But some animals are subjects of a life too.
So some animals have the same inherent value and same basic rights as moral
agents.
Harming these animals (in experiments, by eating them, etc) can’t be justified by
the consequences for all affected.
Make it visual!
Einstein
Gaga
baby BDO
chimp
dog fish
The lifeboat case
Four normal adults and a dog are sinking fast. If nothing is done, they all drown. If
just one goes overboard, the other four survive. What should be done?
Regan thinks rights are overridable in very unusual cases—e.g. self-defense,
punishment, “prevention” cases. The lifeboat case is a prevention case. But whose
rights should be overridden? There are two relevant principles:
Mini-ride principle—in a prevention case, if all will be harmed to the same degree,
we should minimize the number of individuals harmed.
Worse-off principle—in a prevention case, if individuals will be harmed to different
degrees, we should harm the individual who has least to lose.
Applying those principles, Regan concludes: we should throw the dog overboard.
Terms
Moral agent—can think/act morally, can wrong others (e.g. me and you)
Moral patient—can’t think/act morally, but can be wronged (e.g. a baby)
Subject of a life—see pg. 22
Inherent value—value in and of itself, not instrumental value for others
Intrinsic value—goodness of pleasure, badness of pain