The Metaphysics of Axiology and the Welfare of Animals
Kris McDaniel
6-22-09
1.
Introduction
Axiology is the branch of ethics devoted to questions of value. One stem of this
branch is the theory of welfare, the central question of which is “what makes a life worth
living?” Meta-axiology is the branch of meta-ethics devoted to questions that arise when
axiology itself becomes the theme of philosophical examination. Among the questions
addressed by meta-axiology are: what kinds or varieties of ultimate value are there? If
there are different kinds of value, how are they related to each other? And to what
ontological categories of entities do values primarily accrue? The final question is a
question in a subfield of meta-axiology, the metaphysics of axiology.
It would be surprising to learn that popular views in the metaphysics of axiology
generate serious problems for certain theories in axiology proper. However, I will argue
that this is the case.
In what follows, I articulate a specific meta-axiological theory about the nature of
the kind of value I will call ‘welfare value’, which is the kind of value a life has when it
is going well or poorly for the one who lives it. I argue that the meta-axiology described
here implies a species-neutral conception of the fundamental task of the theory of
axiology. According to the species-neutral conception, the central question of the theory
of welfare is “what makes a life worth living?” rather than “what makes a human life
worth living?”1 I argue that, if we do not conflate these two questions but rather properly
attend to the central question of the theory of welfare, then we will see that certain
monistic theories of welfare, such as various forms of informed or rational desire
satsifactionism, are subject to obvious problems. The problems for these theories of
welfare stem from their inability to say anything plausible about the lives of non-human
animals such as birds or squirrels.2
The plan for this paper is as follows. First, in section 2, I articulate and defend a
species-neutral conception of the theory of welfare. In section 3, I describe a popular
metaphysic of axiology, and argue that it implies a species-neutral conception of the
theory of welfare. In section 4, I argue that this metaphysic generates problems for
monistic views of welfare mentioned above. Finally, in section 5, I argue that the most
plausible theory of welfare is a pluralist theory according to which many states can make
1
Richard Kraut (2007, p. 4) defends something like what I am calling the species-neutral conception of the
theory of welfare. According to Kraut, the fundamental concept in the theory of welfare is the concept of
the relation x is good for y. On Kraut’s view, one and the same relation is referred to in sentences like
“Growing is good for plants” and “Happiness is good for human beings”. (Things can be good for artifacts
as well.) As will emerge, I disagree with Kraut on whether the fundamental notion is the notion of being
good for or being good. Nonetheless, much of what he says I find congenial.
2
One might go further by eliminating talk of lives altogether, since such talk suggests that it is conceptually
necessary that only biological organisms can have things go well or ill for them. It will emerge, however,
that in the sense of ‘life’ relevant to axiology, everything that there is has a life.
1
a life good or bad but some of these valuable states are ones that, for contingent reasons,
many non-human animals (and some human ones) lack the capacity to enjoy.
2.
Motivating the Species-Neutral Conception of the Theory of Welfare
The species-neutral conception of the theory of welfare (henceforth: the SNC)
holds that the central question of the theory of welfare is “what makes a life worth
living?” rather than “what makes a human life worth living?” Moreover, there is no
distinctive project of determining what makes human lives good or bad for those who live
them. Rather, the fundamental project of welfare-axiology must be construed as
maximally general: the task its practitioners face is to determine which things make for or
detract from the goodness of a life in general.
We can contrast the SNC with what I will call the anthropocentric conception
(henceforth: the AC), according to which the closely connected concepts of welfare, a life
worth living, benefit, and harm primarily apply to human beings. According to the AC,
strictly speaking only human beings can have an amount of welfare, can be benefited or
harmed, although perhaps the terms “benefit”, “good life”, etc., have an extended use in
which (non-human) animals can properly be said to have had good or bad lives. (In what
follows, I will use the term “animals” to refer to non-human animals.) The property of
having a good life is a property of (only) human beings, although perhaps non-human
animals might enjoy some analogous feature. Similarly, rising is something that hot air
balloons do, whereas the temperature rises only in an analogous sense. But, according to
the AC, it would be a mistake to take theorizing about “good lives in general” to be the
central task of welfare axiology, just as it is a mistake to try to theorize about “rising in
general”, where this is conceived of as an activity that both hot air balloons and the
temperature engage in.
Although this has been contested, I hold that welfare is a quantitative property: it
makes sense to speak of amounts of welfare, and some lives being better than others
because they have a larger amount of welfare than others. Lives can be ranked not only
on an ordinal scale but also on a cardinal scale; there are facts about how much better one
life is than another. Accordingly, one might flesh out the SNC by saying that, according
to it, animal and human lives may be placed on the same cardinal scale, and so, possibly,
some human lives are better than some animal lives, some animal lives are better than
some human lives, and some human lives are equally as good as some animal lives.3
Whereas, according to the AC, there is one scale for only human lives and perhaps a
second, analogous scale for animal lives, and so comparative judgments about the relative
value of human and animal lives are best construed as metaphorical or analogical.
Although AC is rarely explicitly endorsed or even explicitly articulated, I suspect
that it is a common view among axiologists. Some evidence for this claim comes from
attending to the number of books and articles that state focus on determining “the human
good” or “the good of man”, and the relative paucity of discussion about how non-human
3
If we are friendly to the possibility of incomparable values, it might be that it is possible that there be
some human lives that are incomparable with some animal ones.
2
animals fit into the theories defended therein.4 However, despite its apparent popularity,
upon inspection AC is not terribly compelling.
Let’s first note that philosophers have been making comparative judgments about
the relative value of certain animal and human lives for almost as long as there has been
philosophy. In Plato’s Philebus, we find Socrates suggesting that the life of “a sea lung
or one of those creatures of the ocean whose bodies are incased in shells” is less valuable
than a life filled with knowledge despite the fact it is probably a very pleasant life [21c].
Moreover, the dialogue makes it clear that the project Socrates and his interlocutors are
engaged in is determining the good in general for all “animate beings”, human or nonhuman. (See, for example, the remarks made at 11c, 22d, and 60b.) In a similar vein,
John Stuart Mill famously claimed that it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than to be a
pig satisfied [Utilitarianism, p. 140]. It is clear that Mill means that the life of a satisfied
pig is not as good for the pig as the life of Socrates is good for Socrates. In other words,
Mill is comparing the level of welfare of the pig to the level of welfare of Socrates.
According to both Mill and Plato, some human lives are better than some non-human
animal lives when measured on the same scale. So if AC is true, two of the most famous
thought experiments in ethics are incoherent. But they are perfectly coherent.5
The point is not merely that these comparative judgments are true but additionally
that they are not metaphorical. Nor are they uncommon. Who has not while toiling
during a hot day envied the dog who slumbers lazily in the shade? This envy is grounded
in a judgment that the dog is currently better off than oneself. And who has not felt pity,
disgust, and even shame when discovering the horrendous conditions which animals
endure in factory farms? These emotions are grounded in the judgments that the lives of
these animals are so bad that they would have been better off never coming into being,
and that the comfortable lifestyle we enjoy—the benefits that we have accrued—have
come at a terrible cost to them. The shame in particular is grounded the judgment that the
benefits that we have accrued are far outweighed by the harms these animals suffer—this
is a comparative quantitative judgment—and in the realization that the benefits to us do
not justify the harms to them.
The fact that these comparative judgments make sense, and seem to be true, is
very hard to reconcile with the anthropocentric conception of the theory of welfare. The
ANC could perhaps explain why we assert both “the pig’s life is good” and “Socrates’
life is good” by claiming that ‘good’ is polysemous and the two senses in play here are
analogous. But in order to make comparative judgments of the goodness of a pig’s life
and person’s life, the quantity being compared must be the same in both cases, not merely
analogous.
Perhaps the champion of the AC could argue that, when we took ourselves to be
comparing a human life with the life of the happy ocean clam, we were really comparing
two human lives: the life of a typical human being with the life of a human being that is
See, for example, Robert Adams (2002, p.84) “It is one of the more difficult tasks of ethical theory to
explain what human well-being consists in—what it is to be good for a person.” Heathwood (2009) notes
that the concept of welfare must have application to animals because animals are objects of moral
consideration. However, Heathwood does not note that some of the monistic theories he takes seriously
imply that animals are not objects of moral consideration. See Degrazia (1996, p.212) for a similar
complaint about how infrequently non-human animals are considered by axiologists interested in welfare.
5
The second chapter of Carson (2000), in which Mill’s thought experiment is discussed, provides
numerous comparisons of various pigs’ lives with lives of human beings.
4
3
in many ways analogous to the life of a happy ocean clam. Similarly, when we took
ourselves to be comparing the life of a dissatisfied Socrates to the life of a satisfied pig,
we were really comparing the life of a dissatisfied Socrates to the life of a possible human
being who lives as if he were a pig. Perhaps. Suffice it to say that this account of what
we are doing when we make what appear to be sensible comparative judgments is
revisionary, and it is very hard to see how this argument could be developed.
It seems then that we should prefer the species-neutral conception over the
anthropocentric conception of the task of the theory of welfare. There is a single scale in
which human and non-human animal lives may be ranked. The task then is to provide
principles that will determine where on this scale a given life is, regardless of to which
species the owner of the life belongs.
However, it does not immediately follow from the SNC that there is not a
distinctive project of determining what makes a human life worth living. That human
and animal welfare can be placed on the same scale doesn’t show that what makes animal
lives good for them is the same as what makes human lives good for them. If there could
be reason to think, prior to engaging in axiological inquiry, that the kinds of things that
make for a good human life have nothing in common with the kinds of things that make
for a good animal life, then the claim that there should be a distinctive project of
determining the well-being of a human life would be motivated.
However, what reason could one have, prior to engaging in substantive theorizing
about welfare, for thinking that the kinds of goods and bads a human life can contain will
be radically unlike the kinds of goods and bads an animal life can contain? This seems to
be something to be discovered by substantive theorizing about welfare, not something to
be prejudged prior to inquiry.
In order to get clearer on these questions, we will need to tackle some hard issues
in meta-axiology. To these we now turn.
3.
Formal Axiology and Substantive Axiology
In what follows, I will detail a framework for the species-neutral conception of
axiological inquiry. As will emerge, the framework will be species-neutral in a radical
way.
We begin by distinguishing between formal axiology and substantive axiology. A
substantive axiological theory tells us which things are good or bad, and provides
principles for determining their respective amounts of value. Substantive axiology is a
subfield of first-order ethical theory. By contrast, formal axiology is a branch of metaethics, and is occupied primarily with questions about the ontology of substantive
axiology.6
In what follows, I will articulate an ontology of value that fits nicely with the
species-neutral conception, although it is strictly not implied by the species-neutral
conception. Let’s start by distinguishing two different kinds of value pluralism. First,
there is pluralism about kinds of intrinsic value. Second, there is pluralism about which
6
Ontological questions are not the only concern of formal axiology as I conceive of it; also of concern,
among others, are questions concerning the logic of axiological concepts. Note that as I conceive it, formal
axiology is a second-order discipline that takes as its theme first-order axiology. Formal axiology is not
simply axiology done with the aid of formal techniques.
4
sorts of things have (some particular kind of) intrinsic value. I endorse both kinds of
pluralism. We will now briefly discuss the first kind of pluralism. (The second kind will
be discussed in sections 4 and 5.)
For reasons that will emerge shortly, I consider welfare value to be a kind of
intrinsic value, one that inheres in properties, is realized in states of affairs, and accrues in
lives. But there are other kinds of intrinsic value that should be kept distinct from
welfare value. For example, there is the kind of intrinsic value cherished by
consequentialists and recognized by moral theorists who hold that the value of the
consequences is a morally relevant factor in determining what one ought to do. This
value is called ethical value by L.W. Sumner (1999, pp. 24-25, 48) and Michael
Zimmerman (2001, pp. 24-25), who also calls this kind of value the sort of value with
which Moore was concerned (2001, pp. 6 &1 5); Fred Feldman (2004, pp. 80-12) calls
this kind of value intrinsic value for the world.
A life might contain a lot of welfare value without containing much or any ethical
value: perhaps the lives of successful evildoers are lives of this sort.7 Conversely, it might
be that the existence of beautiful sunsets or complex ecosystems is ethically valuable
even if it is not possible that things go better or worse for beautiful sunsets or complex
ecosystems. Welfare value and ethical value are not identical.8
My focus here is on welfare value, not ethical value. However, I hold that the
formal axiology of welfare value is similar to the formal axiology of ethical value.9
According to the formal axiology I prefer, the basic contributors of welfare value are
properties conceived of as abundant universals: roughly, for any meaningful predicate,
there is a repeatable property corresponding to it.10 Since properties are abundant, no
substantive axiological theory is ruled out. (A substantive axiological theory should tell
us which properties are basic contributors of welfare value.) These properties are
abundant and finely individuated. Knowledge, for example, is the name of a highly
determinable property. For each thing that can be known, there is the determinative
property of knowing that thing. Most substantive axiologies are best construed as holding
that these highly determinative properties are the basic contributors of value. So, for
example, although the official slogan of hedonism is “pleasure is the good”, hedonism is
best construed as the view that each determinate of pleasure is a basic contributor of
welfare value. Accordingly, pluralism about welfare value should not be construed as the
view that more than one property is a basic contributor of welfare value. Rather,
pluralism about welfare value is the view that more than one family of properties contain
basic contributors of welfare value.11 For example, a pluralism that champions the slogan
that knowledge and pleasure both make for the good life could be formulated as the view
7
See Feldman (2004, pp. 193-198) for a discussion of this issue.
See Feldman (2004, pp. 136, 197-198) who is a pluralist for about kinds of intrinsic value for similar
reasons. Zimmerman (2001, pp. 30-31) distinguishes ethical value from prudential value, but hesitates to
call the latter kind of value a kind of intrinsic value.
9
I would also draw a pluralistic conclusion based on the metaphysics of ethical value about the bearers of
ethical value. (Perhaps the argument for pluralism about ethical value would even be more plausible?)
10
See David Lewis (1986, pp. 59-69) for a discussion and defense of an abundant conception of properties.
11
Compare with Feldman (2004, pp. 184-185). Note that, although Feldman does say that the monist holds
that there is exactly one property such that all intrinsically good basic intrinsic value states are basic
attributions of this property, I take it that the view defended here captures the spirit of Feldman’s remarks.
8
5
that each determinate of knowledge and each determinate of pleasure is a basic
contributor of welfare value.
Properties are the basic contributors of welfare value. The value of a property is
realized in atomic states of affairs that consist in an object having that property. States of
affairs are contingently existing objects that come into being whenever an object (or
objects) exemplify a property (or relation). States of affairs are complexes of objects and
properties. These entities have sometimes been called facts since they are capable of
playing the role of truthmakers, entities responsible for the truth of propositions. I
suspect that these entities could also rightfully be called events or states as well, but I will
remain officially neutral on this issue.12
States of affairs are as finely individuated as properties. The amount of value
realized in a state of affairs is a function of the contributing value of its constituent
property or relation. Since most properties or relations will not have contributory value,
the welfare value of most state of affairs will be zero. It is a job of substantive axiology
to determine which states of affairs realize non-zero welfare value.
Welfare value is a kind of intrinsic value. The claim that welfare value is a kind
of intrinsic value does not imply that a property is a basic contributor of welfare value
only if it is an intrinsic property. (If it did, then knowledge, accomplishment, or desiresatisfaction could not contribute to welfare value, since none of these is an intrinsic
property.)13 Rather, the claim amounts to the following:
(IV-1): If property P is a basic contributor of welfare value, then all states of
affairs in which something has P realize the same amount of welfare value.
Recall that that states of affairs that realize welfare value are those that consist of
some object or objects exemplifying a determinate of some basic contributor of welfare
value. Suppose a simple form of hedonism is true. Then all states of affairs that consist
of an object enjoying some determinate of pleasure, say enjoying 5 hedons of pleasure,
realize the same amount of welfare value.
Welfare value is not context-sensitive: if a property contributes a certain amount
of value to one state of affairs that realizes that property, it contributes the same amount
of value to any state of affairs that realizes it, regardless of what relations that state of
affairs stands in to other states of affairs. This is one reason why welfare value deserves
to be called a kind of intrinsic value: a state of affairs realizes a particular amount of
welfare value in virtue of the intrinsic nature of that state of affairs.
For this reason, the welfare values of complex states of affairs are not dependent
on relations or contexts in which these complex states of affairs are embedded. This
claim can be put more precisely as:
12
I will also remain neutral on the question of whether there are states of affairs that do not obtain,
although I am inclined to think that there are none. For this reason, I think that states of affairs also deserve
to be called facts. Friends of views in the neighborhood of this one include Chisholm (1986: 60), Feldman
(2000, 2004, pp. 172-173), Lemos (1994), and Zimmerman (1983, 2001). Thomson (1992, p. 97) discusses
a kind of goodness called ‘non-derivitative goodness-for’ which is ultimately possessed by states of affairs.
13
Compare with Zimmerman (2001, pp. 65-66), who argues that ethical value is a kind of intrinsic value,
even if the properties that are the basic contributors of intrinsic ethical value are not intrinsic properties.
6
(IV-2): Let S and A be complex states of affairs; let s1…sn and a1…an be the
atomic states of affairs that are the constituents of S and A respectively; let
p1…pn and q1…qn be the constituent properties of s1…sn and a1…an
respectively. If (p1 = q1 … & pn = qn) and the distribution of s1…sn in S is
isomporphic to the distribution of a1…an in A, then S and A have the same
welfare value.
In other words, two complex states of affairs built up of the same kinds of intrinsically
valuable atomic states of affairs that are arranged in the same way are equal in welfare
value.14 It is these facts that justify calling welfare value a kind of intrinsic value.15
Note that IV-1 (as well as IV-2) is stronger than the Moorean thesis that, if two
entities are intrinsically alike, then they are alike with respect to their intrinsic value.16
To see this, let us suppose that a simplistic form of hedonism is true, according to which
the basic bearers of welfare of value are states of affairs of the form S experiences n-units
of pleasure (pain). Let us suppose that Ben and Ishani both enjoy 15 units of pleasure.
The thesis that things alike with respect to their intrinsic nature are alike with respect to
their intrinsic value implies that the state of affairs in which Ben enjoys 15 units of
pleasure is equal in value to the state of affairs in which Ishani enjoys 15 units of pleasure
only if those two states of affairs are intrinsic duplicates. I see no reason to think that
these states of affairs are intrinsic duplicates: both are complexes – wholes, if you like –
and although their qualitative constituents are numerically identical, their substantial
constituents (Ben and Ishani) are intrinsically very different. It would be bizarre if the
different intrinsic character of their parts did not result in different intrinsic natures for
the states of affairs themselves.17
As far as I know, no defender of the Moorean conception of intrinsic value has
bothered to spell out what it is for two states of affairs to be intrinsic duplicates.
Presumably, this is because they see that one needn’t know all the facts about the intrinsic
nature of a state of affairs to determine the amount of value it realizes: one need only
know which property is a constituent of it. IV-1 picks up the slack left by the Moorean
thesis: IV-1 implies that these two states of affairs have the same intrinsic value. This is
intuitively the correct result. IV-1 and IV-2 jointly imply the Moorean thesis that the
intrinsic value of a state of affairs supervenes on the intrinsic nature of that state of
affairs, but go further by stating which aspect of that nature is responsible for the intrinsic
value of the state of affairs: that a state of affairs consists of a quality of a certain sort is
14
IV-2 implies that there is a function from the value and distribution of the parts of a complex state of
affairs to the value of the complex state of affairs. However, IV-2 does not imply that the value of a
complex state of affairs is simply equivalent to the sum of the values of its parts. (I myself find this
principle attractive, but it would need to be defended by more than an appeal to the claim that welfare value
is a kind of intrinsic value.) Note that, because IV-2 takes into account how the basic bearers of value are
arranged within a complex state of affairs, it is consistent with the view that when a state of affairs obtains
in a life is relevant to determining the value of that life. So a view like the one defended by David
Velleman (1991), according to which it is better for one to have the goods in one’s life occur later rather
than earlier, other things being equal, is compatible with IV-2.
15
Similar principles justify the claim that ethical value is a kind of intrinsic value. See Zimmerman (2001)
for an articulation and defense of these principles.
16
See Moore (1960, pp. 261-264) for a discussion of this thesis.
17
7
what is responsible for the intrinsic value of the whole. The intrinsic nature of the
substance having the quality is not relevant.18
We now turn to the metaphysics of lives. Let’s begin with some observations. It
seems that, when we talk about the well-being of an individual, such as a person, we are
talking about how good that individual’s life is for that individual. We say: “she has a
good life” and use this expression interchangeably with “she is well-off”. When someone
is doing poorly, when things are not going well for that person, we say “his life is not
worth living”. When someone enjoys a high degree of welfare, then she is leading a life
that is worth living; it is good in itself for her. Talk about benefiting someone is talk
about making that person’s life better than it otherwise would have been.19 This is
captured by the following claim:
(BETTER): A’s obtaining would be better for s than B’s obtaining iff the life that
s would have if A obtained is higher in welfare value than the life that s would
have if B obtained.
BETTER is a reasonable principle; I do not argue for it here. It makes use of the
notion of a life, and the notion of a life having intrinsic value. What then is a life? In
other words, in which ontology category do lives belong? Our theory of lives should be
dictated by four factors. First, lives are the sorts of things that can be bearers of intrinsic
welfare value; lives can be good or bad in themselves. Second, our theory of lives should
make it clear how it is possible that the basic intrinsic value of a state of affairs is
contributed to lives. Third, we are doing formal axiology here, and so we should not
want our theory of the metaphysics of lives to straightforwardly entail any substantive
axiological theory (or its denial) about what makes lives good or bad.20 Fourth, our theory
must be consonant with the role that lives play in our commonsense talk about them. Our
commonsense conception of lives treats lives as having the structure of narratives or
stories. Lives can be interesting or boring; things happen in them; they can be short or
long.
I take the life of an individual to be a complex state of affairs. Specifically, for
any x, the life of x is the conjunctive state of affairs that consists of any state of affairs
that has x as a constituent. Lives so construed have a narrative structure; the true story of
one’s life is that complicated proposition that corresponds to the conjunctive state of
affairs that is one’s life.
Additionally, since states of affairs realize intrinsic value, we can see why the
value of a life is in some way determined by the value of its parts. Lives are molecular
states of affairs and so their welfare value is determined by IV-2.
18
Similar remarks apply to states of affairs in which some substances bear a relation to each other.
This claim has been challenged. In an interesting article, Shelly Kagan (1994) argues that a person can
be well-off even if his life is bad. Kagan considers a man who believes that he is achieving important goals
and engaged in mutually satisfying personal relationships with his family, but is in fact grossly deceived.
Kagan suggests that although the man is well-off, his life is going badly. I lack the space to fully address
Kagan’s interesting challenge here.
20
That said, the metaphysical theory might make certain substantive axiologies more problematic than
others. As will emerge, I think it is the case that this metaphysic generates problems for various substantive
axiological views.
19
8
Lives are potentially infinitely complex: if for each property had by an individual,
there is a state of affairs in which that individual has that property, then each life will
consist of infinitely many parts. A person’s life, given this account, could not plausibly
be identified with the person’s biological life, which I take to be a complex event. There
is much more going on a person’s life in the sense relevant to ethics than in the sense
relevant to biology. Moreover, it is not plausible to claim that biological lives are the
sorts of things that we should be assigning value to. It is not unreasonable to claim that
having one’s desires satisfied, being a mutually loving relationship with another person,
or having interesting knowledge are intrinsically valuable. But none of these is an
element of a person’s biological life. Several plausible axiological views would
straightforwardly ruled out by an account of lives that identifies them with biological
events.
Persons’ biological lives are events that occur where the person is located; they
are events in the person’s body. If we take biological lives to be the appropriate object of
axiological evaluation, we surrender the central intuition that what happens in one’s life
is what determines its value.21 We can also accommodate those axiological theories that
allow that happenings occurring after the end of one’s biological life might contribute to
one’s welfare. As long as states of affairs involving x obtain, x’s life (in the sense
relevant to axiology) continues. (Accordingly, a substantive axiology that implies the
possibility of posthumous harm is not straightforwardly ruled out by this metaphysic.)
Another important feature of this account is that we can allow that every
individual, regardless of whether it is a person or not, has a life. The life of x, for any x, is
simply a molecular state of affairs that consists of all the atomic states of affairs in which
x is a constituent.22 Since tables and stars participate in states of affairs, tables and stars
have lives. This might sound initially strange, but no untoward consequences follow.
From the fact that a table has a life in the axiological sense, it does not follow that a table
can be harmed or benefited, since it does not follow from the mere fact that a table has a
life that the life of a table does (or even can) contain any states of affairs that realize
(non-zero) value. It is a question for substantive axiology which lives contain states of
affairs that realize value. But probably any substantive axiology that we find even
remotely plausible will have the consequence that the lives of tables are of no
consequence.
We should, however, welcome the consequence that nonliving things have lives
in this sense. Consider C3P0, the machine intelligence from the Star Wars movies. C3P0
is not a biological organism, and so is not alive in the biological sense. But apparently
C3P0 has goals, desires, and beliefs, as well as frustrations and failures. He seems to feel
pleasure and pain as well. So on many plausible axiologies, some things can harm or
benefit him. Given BETTER, something can benefit C3P0 only if he has a life. It is good
that this account of lives allows him one.
According to von Wright (1963, pp. 50-51), the question of what sorts of things
can be benefited or harmed has the content as the question of what sort of things have a
biological life. For the reasons just mentioned, this is doubly mistaken: it is a substantive
thesis that anything with a biological life can be benefited or harmed, and it is a
21
22
See Kagan (1994, p. 319).
I include among the life of x those states of affairs in which x stands in some relation to something.
9
substantive thesis that anything that can be benefited or harmed has a biological life. On
my view, it is not a substantive thesis that having an axiological life is necessary for the
possibility of being benefited or harmed. However, it is clearly not the case that having
an axiological life is sufficient for the possibility of being benefited or harmed.
Some environmentalists have claimed that environments literally have a welfare,
that they can be harmed or benefited.23 On this view, the environment is itself a moral
patient.24 I find this view outlandish, but given the account of lives defended here, it is a
coherent view. This is as it should be: it is the job of substantive axiology to determine
whether this view is true, not the job of formal axiology, which strives only to provide a
maximally general framework for interpreting substantive axiological claims and
disputes.25
So we shouldn’t blanch at the claim that everything has a life. It is a question of
substantive axiology which lives contain welfare value. The formal axiology presented
here appropriately founds the species-neutral conception of the theory of welfare in a
maximally general way.
We have discussed IV-2, which is a supervenience principle that tells us that the
value of a life is determined by the values (and arrangements) of its parts. For what
follows, it will be useful to have made explicit three other such principles, none of which
immediately follows from IV-2 but each of which is independently extremely plausible.
They are:
According to Belshaw’s (2001, pp. 124-126), the legal theorist Christopher Stone held this view; chapter
seven contains a lengthy discussion of whether rivers, species, or the land have a good of their own.
24
L.W. Sumner (1999 p. 50) suggests that G.E. Moore might have been committed to the view that the
ecosystem and other natural objects are moral patients. Recall that Moore (1993, pp. 150-151) denies that
any sense can be made of the notion that something is good for me unless what is meant is that it is good
and it is mine. (Heathwood (2003, p. 616 footnote #1) also interprets Moore as providing a reductive
account of welfare value in terms of ethical value; Thomson (1992, p. 109) considers the possibility that
Moore intends this as well.) As Sumner points out, given that being beautiful is intrinsically valuable, as
Moore held, it follows that beautiful mountains have a welfare, since the state of being beautiful is
intrinsically good and it belongs to the mountain. (Sumner takes this to be an objection to Moore. Perhaps
it is. Perhaps though it is also more charitable to interpret Moore as denying the existence of welfare-value
rather than as offering a reductive account of it in terms of some other kind of intrinsic value plus
ownership.)
23
25
I think that it is obvious that non-human animals, such as squirrels, can be benefited or harmed; it is not
obvious that trees or ecosystems can, and no part of the argument in the next section will presuppose that
they can. All that is argued for here is that the claim that trees and ecosystems can be harmed makes sense
and a good formal axiology should explain why this at least makes sense. There is widespread
disagreement about what sorts of things can be harmed or benefited. Summer (1999, pp. 14-15) argues for a
generality condition whereby a theory of welfare is incomplete if it cannot apply to children and cats. But
he worries (pp. 74-75) about applying it further to trees and bacteria. Degrazia (1996, pp. 226-229) argues
that only sentient beings can have positive or negative welfare. Attfield (1986, p. 168) argues that all living
creatures have a good of their own. Kraut (2007) thinks that a plant has a welfare to affect, and notes that
desire-satisfactionism cannot account for this fact. Similar remarks are made by Rolston III (2005, pp 9495). Belshaw (2001, pp. 128-129) also defends the claim that plants can be well-off. My own view is that it
is obvious that a plant can be damaged; it is not obvious that it has a welfare to affect. In other words, I
punt.
10
(Null-Life): If L is a life that contains no states of affairs that realize welfare
value, then the welfare value of L is zero.
According to Null-Life, lives with nothing intrinsically good or bad them have a net
value of zero. Strictly speaking, the conjunction of the conception of lives defended here
and Null-Life imply that every object enjoys a level of welfare. However, for the vast
majority of objects, that welfare level is zero. (And, on most plausible axiologies, for
those objects, that welfare level will necessarily be zero. How can one, for example, hurt
or benefit a star or a water molecule?)
(All-Good): If L is a life that contains some states of affairs with positive welfare
value and no states of affairs with negative welfare value, then the value of L is
greater than zero.
(All-Bad): If L is a life that contains some states of affairs with negative welfare
value and no states of affairs with positive welfare value, then the value of L is
less than zero.
I trust that All-Good and All-Bad are self-explanatory and obviously true. These
principles will be the only such principles employed in the next section.
4.
Against Cognitively Sophisticated Monisms
Monistic views about welfare identify some close-knit family of properties as the
basic contributors of welfare value. A cognitively sophisticated monistic theory (for
short, a CSMT ) is a theory in which a being can exemplify one of the properties in this
family only if that being has a significantly impressive cognitive architecture. This is a
bit vague, but the vagueness won’t in practice matter in what follows.
For the sake of specificity, let’s focus on squirrels. Squirrels are not the brightest
animals in the forest, but they can be harmed or benefited. In short, some squirrels have
lives of non-zero welfare value. In practice, it will be safe to say that a cognitively
sophisticated monistic theory is a theory in which none of the properties that contribute
welfare value can be exemplified by a squirrel. And so any CSMT will have the
obviously false consequence that every life of a squirrel is of zero value. (The principle
relied on here is Null-Life; since a CSMT implies that the lives of squirrels contain no
states of affairs that realize welfare value, the lives of squirrels have a zero welfare
value.)
Although my focus has been on an objection to certain monistic views of welfare,
it is worth noting that certain pluralistic views might also be objected to. For example,
Susan Wolf (1997, p. 223) suggests that having a meaningful life is a necessary condition
for having a good life. Wolf’s view is a version of the objective list theory (1997, p.
208), and hence is a pluralistic theory. Nonetheless, Wolf’s theory might objectionably
imply that animals cannot have good lives, if it is the case that the lives of animals must
be meaningless in the sense that Wolf articulates. Whether the life of an animal must be
meaningless is a question never addressed in Wolf (1997). If it must be, then Wolf’s view
11
is problematic despite its pluralism. And in general, an objective list theory such that
each item on the objective list requires cognitive sophistication to acquire will be just as
problematic as any CSMT.
There are a number of popular CSMTs in the literature. I will discuss only some
of them here.
Many CSMTs were developed in response to arguments against what has come to
be called simple desire satisfactionism.26 According to simple desire satisfactionism, the
value of one’s life is a function of the extent to which one’s desires are satisfied or
frustrated. Simple desire satisfactionism is not a CSMT, since squirrels are perfectly
capable of having desires satisfied or frustrated. However, the problems with simple
desire satisfactionism are numerous.27
(I note that, although simple desire satisfactionism is not a CSMT, it might still
require an objectionably high degree of cognitive sophistication. Mark Bernstein (1998,
pp. 77-78) contemplates animals and infants who feel pain but lack desires; he thinks that
they generate an objection to the simple desire theory, since such a being could feel pain
without having a frustrated desire. There is further discussion at pp. 124-125 about
whether the desire theorist should disenfranchise animals that do not have desires. I am
inclined to share this worry as well.28
One interesting alternative to simple desire satisfactionism, discussed by Parfit
(1984, pp. 496-499), is global desire satisfactionism.29 According to Parfit, a desire is
global if “it is about some part of one’s life considered as a whole, or it is about one’s
whole life.” Global desire satisfactionism is the view that the value of one’s life is a
function of the extent to which one’s global desires are satisfied or frustrated. A creature
that lacks global desires is thereby a creature unable to be harmed or benefited. Global
desire is a CSMT. In order to have global desires, one must be able to form a conception
of one’s life as a whole. One must be able to think of oneself as an object enduring
through time, and have preferences about the shape of things to come. I am no squirrel
psychologist, but I suspect that they do not have the abilities to conceive of themselves as
enduring objects or to conceive their lives as wholes. Squirrels cannot have global
desires.
To hammer the point home, it is obvious that squirrels lives can be made better or
worse: hitting a squirrel with a hammer makes that squirrel’s life go worse, since it
causes the squirrel some pain. Giving the squirrel a bag of cashews makes the squirrel’s
life go better, since it gives him some innocent pleasure. Perhaps the friend of global
desire satisfactionism could reply that what this shows is that hedonism – the view that a
life goes well to the extent that it is pleasurable rather than painful – is the correct theory
26
See Heathwood (2005, 2006) for discussions of this view.
27
Heathwood (2005) presents and attempts to defuse many of these problems.
28
I note that, on some views of pleasure and pain, it is conceptually impossible to have pleasure or pain
without having desires. For example, Chris Heathwood (2006) defends the view that, to be pleased that P is
to want that P and believe that P.
29
Carson (2000, pp. 73-74) provides an interesting discussion of the global view. There, Carson also
alleges that, “fully informed desires would necessarily be global desires.” In a moment, we will discuss
theories of welfare that make use of the notion of a fully informed desire.
12
of well-being for squirrels while global desire satisfactionism is the correct theory of
well-being for human beings. Let’s call this strategy (and others of its ilk) the disjunctive
strategy.
There are two problems with the disjunctive strategy. First, note that some human
beings might well lack global desires. Consider, for example, seriously mentally disabled
human beings who have the mental capacities of squirrels.30 According to the disjunctive
strategy, necessarily the life of any such human being has a zero welfare value. This is
absurd.
But there is a second objection to the disjunctive strategy: it is ruled out on the
grounds that welfare value is a kind of intrinsic value, and accordingly obeys the
principles discussed in section 3. Consider a human being who, for whatever reasons,
simply lacks global desires. Such a person need not be mentally disabled in any way, but
would probably be unusual. Call this person “Ben” and the squirrel “Heathwood”.
Suppose we hit both Ben and the squirrel with a hammer, and suppose that the same
quantity of pain is experienced by both. (Let’s grossly simplify and assume that these are
the only experiences of pleasure or pain either experience.) According to the strategy we
are considering, Ben’s life is of zero value since he is a human being and has no satisfied
or frustrated global desires, whereas Heathwood’s life has negative value since he is a
squirrel and he has some pain but no pleasure in his life. In Heathwood’s life, there is a
state of affairs that realizes disvalue: it is the state of affairs in which Heathwood
exemplifies P, where P is the property of being in pain to whatever degree Heathwood
(and Ben) experienced when hit by the hammer. Let us say that the disvalue of this state
of affairs is some n < 0. By IV-1, any state of affairs in which this property is exemplified
realizes n amount of welfare value. So, by IV-1, the state of affairs in which Ben
exemplified P realizes n amount of welfare value. In Ben’s life, there are no other states
of affairs that realize welfare value. So by All-Bad, the value of Ben’s life is less than
zero, not zero as the disjunctive strategy claims.31
Consider a variant of the disjunctive strategy. Call it the fine-graining strategy.
Recall that the basic contributors of welfare value are properties conceived of as finely
individuated. Consider now the determinable properties being a squirrel that experiences
pleasure and being a squirrel that experiences pain. According to the fine-graining
strategy, the determinates of these properties are basic contributors of welfare value,
rather than determinates of the determinables experiencing pleasure and experiencing
pain. None of the former properties are realized in states of affairs that make up Ben’s
life, so they do not contribute value (or disvalue) to Ben’s life. And although some of the
latter properties are realized in Ben’s life, on the fine-grained strategy they are not basic
contributors of welfare value, and so their realization does not affect the value of Ben’s
life. Similarly, on this view, the determinates of being a human being and having a
satisfied global desire for P and being a human being and having a frustrated global
desire for P are basic contributors of welfare value. None of these properties are realized
in Heathwood’s life.
30
Kraut (2007, pp. 104-109) notes that human infants are not as cognitively sophisticated as their future
selves; they presumably lack global desires as well.
31
I am inclined to think that the value of Ben’s life is equal to n, but note that All-bad does not imply that
this is the case.
13
The fine-grained strategy is highly problematic. First, it still faces the problem of
having nothing sensible to say about human beings who lack the capacity for global
desires. Second, it is axiologically absurd to hold that being a human being with a
satisfied global desire for P has positive welfare value whereas having a satisfied global
desire for P lacks welfare value of any sort. Consider an intelligent martian who although
biologically very different from human beings is nonetheless psychologically very
similar. Suppose this martian has some satisfied global desires. It would be unreasonable
for the friend of fine-grained approach to argue that the martian’s life must be of zerovalue.32 Perhaps the friend of the fine-grained approach could claim that determinables of
being a martian with a satisfied global desire for P are also basic bearers of welfare
value. But wouldn’t this claim just highlight the fact that species membership seems
totally axiologically irrelevant per se? Shouldn’t one say that the common factor in both
martian and human lives that accounts for their value the satisfaction (or frustration) of
global desires? (Provided, of course, that one is even attracted to some version of global
desire satisfactionism.)33
There are related puzzles created by the fine-grain strategy. Mark Bernstein
(1998, p. 123) discusses the possibility of using medical science to surgically modify an
ape, who as a consequence now has the potential to experience those things that would
make a human life go well. The ape is still an ape. Suppose the ape has some frustrated
global desires. Does the ape’s life go worse for him? Suppose the ape has some pains,
pains which make the lives of other apes worse. Do the pains of this super-ape make his
life go worse?
What these cases show is that, if one endorses the fine-grained strategy, one
thereby abandons a monistic view of what makes a life go well. The fine-grainer is a
welfare pluralist. Since one is already a pluralist in virtue of endorsing the fine-grained
strategy, why not be a sensible pluralist and hold that there are many things that can make
a life go well for one, regardless of species? Perhaps the satisfaction or frustration of
global desires makes for a better or worse life, but so too do the pleasures and pains
experienced in the course of one’s life. We should have no objection to the claim that
some cognitively demanding properties are among the basic contributors of welfare
value. Intuitively, the lives of many human beings are higher in welfare value than the
lives of most squirrels, regardless of whether most squirrels enjoy a better balance of
pleasure minus pain than the humans. And what explains this fact is that some
cognitively demanding properties contribute a higher amount of welfare value than
pleasure and pain.34
Other versions of desire satisfactionism are just as (overly) demanding. Consider
rational desire satisfactionism, which is the view that a life goes well for someone to the
32
In a similar vein, Bernstein (1998, pp. 120-121) argues that it is unjustifiable to hold that, e.g., martians
can’t be moral patients just because they aren’t human.
33
Ben Bradley has pointed out to me that hold that satisfying the following property is what is axiologically
relevant: being a creature that is capable of having global desires and having a satisfied (frustrated) global
desire that P. This is a property that both Martians and human beings can exemplify. But even if this
property contributes welfare value, it cannot be the only property that does, since something else must
account for the welfare of a squirrel.
34
This line of thought is pursued by Scanlon (2000, p. 123) who argues that while success in one’s rational
aims enhances one’s well-being, it isn’t the only thing that does; he notes that pleasure and pain also do.
14
extent that her rational desires are satisfied rather than frustrated. On some accounts of
what it is to be a rational desire, this theory will be highly cognitively demanding. For
example, consider the view that in order for a desire to rational it must be a desire that
would not be extinguished were the desirer to be fully informed. In his illuminating
discussion of this view, Carson (2000, p.223) notes that
Full information theories of rationality are most plausibly construed as holding
that the maximal or ideal development of sensibilities and abilities to make
discriminations, e.g., seeing the point of a joke, seeing the structures in a poem or
piece of music, empathizing with the feelings of others (knowing vividly what it
feels like to be in their positions) is part of what is involved in being fully
informed. Full information is not exhausted by the kind of knowledge that is
easily expressed in lists of propositions, e.g., I will earn more money if I become
a stockbroker rather than an artist. It is a much richer and demanding notion than
is generally appreciated.35
Carson (2000, pp. 226-230) discusses two serious worries about full-information
accounts. First, it seems highly indeterminate what someone would want were she fully
rational.36 This worry seems troubling when we consider human beings, but it seems
absolutely insurmountable when we bring non-human animals into focus. Clearly, no
squirrel will ever be “fully informed” in this sense. And does it even make sense to
inquire what a squirrel would desire if he were fully informed? How could a counterfactual of this sort even have a determinate truth-value? Worlds with fully informed
squirrels are very distant from actuality. Carson’s second worry is that the full
information account outstrips the cognitive capacities of any actual human beings. If this
is right, the account is too demanding even for humans, let alone squirrels!37
Rational desire satisfactionism faces a host of objections.38 Suffice it to say that
when dealing with these objections one must also make sure that the version of rational
desire satisfactionism one adopts is not a CSMT. I do not think the prospects for a
satisfactory view of this sort are bright.
Once we take seriously that non-human animals have a welfare, we see that there
are problems for views that we have not acknowledged. For example, Stephen Darwall
(2002, p. 8) has recently defended the view that, “What it is for something to be good for
someone just is for it to be something one should desire for him for his own sake, that is,
insofar as one cares for him”. I take seriously that there are aspects of the experiences of
non-human animals that are completely opaque to us, a thought made vivid in Thomas
Nagel’s (1974) famous paper “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Bats have a welfare, and to
35
In a similar vein, John Rawls (1971, p. 421) wrote, “Our good is determined by the plan of life we would
adopt with full deliberative rationality if the future were realized in our imagination.”
36
This worry draws on Velleman 1988.
37
I note that Carson’s (2000, pp. 239- 267) preferred view is a version of the “ideal spectator” view, which
roughly is the view that a desire is rational if it is what an ideal agent would want you to desire. On
Carson’s preferred view, the ideal agent is God. I note that Carson’s preferred view does allow that
squirrels can have rational desires.
38
15
some extent we have an idea of what we should want for a bat that we care for, for
example, a pet bat. But since we can’t know what it is like to be a bat, it is hard to see
one can confidently say that the what is good for a bat is what we should want for the bat
(insofar we care about him). It seems to me that it can’t be the case that I ought to want x
for something even though I am not, and cannot be, cognitively acquainted with x. There
might be aspects of what it is like to be a bat that we are ill-equipped to discern, and
hence cannot want that the bat experiences these aspects. Moreover, if bats lack selfconsciousness, then it can’t be that a bat ought to want something for himself insofar as
he cares for himself – a bat lacks the conceptual resources to care for himself in
Darwall’s sense of ‘care’. However, can’t some states be good for the bat even if no
human person (or bat) ought to want that state for the bat (insofar as we care about the
bat)? It is not obvious that the answer to this question is “no.”
5.
Cognitively Simplistic Monisms vs. Welfare Pluralism
If we are convinced that cognitively sophisticated monisms fail because they
imply that sentient animals such as squirrels or fish cannot have non-zero welfare levels,
we face a dilemma. We either accept a cognitively simplistic monistic view or we
embrace welfare pluralism. In what follows, I will plump for the latter.
Two examples of cognitively simplistic monisms are simple hedonism and simple
desire-satisfactionism. These views both imply that even relatively dumb creatures may
have non-zero levels of welfare, provided that they are either capable of feeling pleasure
or pain, or capable of having desires. This is an advantage of hedonism and simple
desire-satisfactionism.39 Moreover, their views also have the related advantage of
providing a nice account of when something, regardless of species or kind membership
more generally, is a moral patient, i.e., has a life that can be non-zero in welfare value.
The problem with simple hedonism and desire-satisfactionism is that they are
false. As noted earlier, the recognition of their falsity is what leads many philosophers to
pursue the problematic cognitively sophisticated monisms that were discussed in the
previous section.40 We need alternatives.
In Richard Kraut’s (1994) interesting critique of desire-satisfactionism, Kraut
notes that we need to locate the question of what makes human lives good within a
broader framework that also makes sense of what makes animal lives good. Kraut notes
that his view, that a life goes well for a human to the extent that the human loves
something worth loving, does not seem to have application to animals. His solution is to
provide, “a general account of well being for all animals, and then … ask how the more
specific conception of human well being is related to this broader framework.”
According to Kraut, “the good for each animal consists in leading the kind of life that is
appropriate to its nature. …. we explain the human good not as hedonism does, by a
single comprehensive theory applicable to all animals, but by a two-stage process in
39
But recall the possible worry about simple desire satisfactionism discussed earlier.
Hedonism is an inadequate theory of the goodness of human lives. What is under-appreciated is that it is
also an inadequate theory of the goodness of animal lives. Kraut’s (1994) example involving the bird in the
pleasure machine is apt.
40
16
which a broad account that applies universally is then made more specific by being tied
to the peculiarities of the human situation.”
The general theory that Kraut implies is fundamentally a monistic theory: the
basic contributors of welfare value are determinates of living a life in accordance with
one’s nature and presumably living a life in discord with one’s nature.41 Although such a
view is initially plausible, I have been convinced that it is ultimately not defensible. 42
Accordingly, I think we must set it aside.
Species are extrinsic – how does this effect the view – two things intrinsically alike ought
to have the same capacities for welfare. A ‘swamp wolf’ is not a wolf – in fact, it
belongs to no species, and it has no nature, and so it cannot be a flourishing member of its
species. But it can be in pain, and that pain is bad for it. So somethings can be bad for
something independent of what species it belongs to.
p.156 of Belshaw – it is commonly held that mules are not members of either speceies.
pp. 157-161 Belshaw cites sober’s view that martian tigers aren’t tigers, and makes some
tempered criticism of it.
The remaining view on the table is a kind of value pluralism, according to which
irreducibly many things contribute welfare value.
If we grant that there are plural values, and that some of these (for reasons either
contingent or necessary) cannot be experienced by some non-human animals, we ought to
be open to the possibility that there are things that contribute to the value of a non-human
life that we cannot experience. I believe that love and friendship directly contribute to
the well-being of the lover and the friend. Might not there be other emotional states or
social arrangements that are valuable in themselves, but in which we do not participate?
Perhaps being a member of a pack is an intrinsic good that wolves but not human beings
enjoy. Perhaps also there are accompanying feelings of fellowship that pack-members
feel for each other that we do not experience, but which enhance the welfare of those that
do. These possibilities are intriguing, but they are also alarming: we need to seriously
consider how our social practices might be harming animals in more ways than merely by
causing them painful sensations.
We are human beings, and so it is not surprising that inquiry has been focused on
what is good for humans. But this has distorted our view of the good, and has made
certain views seem more obvious than they deserve to be. It has also clouded our ability
to estimate the extent to which we can judge which things are good. The possibility of
valuable states beyond our ken also suggests that a certain amount of epistemic humility
is called for. The project of determining what makes a life worth living is the central task
of welfare axiology. But perhaps we should not expect to be able to complete this task.43
41
Sumner 1999, p. 69-80 discussion of teleological theory where the good of something is its pursual of
the kind of function or excellence appropriate to its kind. P. 73: discussion of how this view broadens the
scope of which things can have well-being well beyond those that are conscious; examples of philosophers
who pursue this approach are: robin attfield 1981, 1983 and Taylor 1986: 61-63.
See also Kraut 2007.
42
43
Thanks to Ben Bradley and Chris Heathwood for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
17