Transnational trade union strategies in European wage
policy
Empirical evidences from the metal sector
Conferece: ‘Getting Europe back to work.
Alternatives to Austerity’
Brussels, 6 November 2013
Vera Glassner
University of Linz, Austria
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Why wage policy coordination?
 (Forthcoming) EMU:
-
Common monetary policy in Eurozone
-
Non-accommodating monetary regime of ECB: main aim containment
of inflation
-
‚Convergence criteria‘ Stability and Growth Pact: balanced public
budgets and control of public debt
 Pressure on wages as parameter to adjust to imbalances in
international (cost) competitiveness
 Pressure on wage setting institutions, in particular centralised MEB.
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Trade unions as actors in Europeanisation of wage policy
 EU ‚enlargements‘: increasing heterogeneity of IR and welfare
regimes
 Asymmetry of social and economic integration of EU: capital
mobility vs. nationally embedded trade unions
 Withdrawal of European Commission in European social policy and
social dialogue
 TNCs and employers‘ associations: No interest in European social
dialogue and wage policy coordination (making use of regime variation)
  unilateral initiatives to coordinate wage bargaining across borders
by European and national trade unions : based on transnational
solidarity (vs. wage competition)!
3
Determinants of transnational union cooperation
 Transnational trade union action in the context of governance crisis and
wage political interventionism (decentralisation of wage setting, pressure
on public sector wages & employment, labour market deregulation and
restricting trade union and employees‘ rights) in Europe
 Standard assumption: conflicting national interests and differences in the
national systems of industrial relations - competition prevail over cooperation
 Eastern enlargement has further decreased the likelihood of trade union
cooperation
 Counter evidences
 Example I: Creation of structures and instruments for wage coordination in the
European metal sector
 Example II: Transnational union union cooperation at GM Europe/Opel (before
crisis)
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Three arguments: WHY do trade unions cooperate?
1) (Power)positions of actors shaped by their material interests and availability of
(legitimate) resources (structural, associational and institutional power).
2) Institutions at (trans)national/supranational level promote or hinder transnational
solidarity between trade unions:
Three pillars of institutions (Scott 1995; 2001; 2008):
Basis of
cooperation
REGULATIVE
e.g. labour law
NORMATIVE
e.g. normative pressure
on employers to
participate in multiemployer bargaining
CULTURAL-COGNITIVE
e.g. understanding of
solidarity
Utilitaristic
considerations,
‚appropriateness‘
Avoidance of (legal)
sanctions
Moral obligation
Compliance to
‚appropriate‘ social
expectations
Common understanding,
Internalisation of
unconcious, ‚taken-forgranted‘ frames of
interpretation
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Empirical evidences – the effects of supportive institutions
Early cross-border
coordination initiatives (1960s,
1970s)
Nordiska Metall
SE, FI, NO, IC
DACH
DE, AT, CH
Transnational CB
networks (since late
1990s)
Bargaining
Network
Nordic Europe
SE, FI, DK, NO, IC
Bargaining
Network
Western Europe
BE, NL, DE
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Institutional power resources
at national level (metal sector)
Insitutions hampering transnational
cooperation/promoting transnational
competition
Institutions supporting
transnational cooperation
Regulative/normative institutions:
Regulative/normative institutions:
AT, DE, DK, SE, NO, FI, BE, NL:
DE:
-
-
decentralisation of CB (opening clauses),
-
organisational weakness of unions in (services)
Highly coordinated and inclusive MEB
(sector level),
-
Practice to extend collective agreements
(BE, lesser in DE, NL)
-
strong role of social partners in public policy
making,
sector results in wage restraint
BE:
-
Law on safeguarding of international
competitiveness
Cutural-cognitive institutions:
AT, DE, DK, SE, NO, FI, BE, NL:
-
Welfare state traditions (social democrat,
corporatist)
-
Productivity-oriented wage policy perceived
as ‘solidaristic’
-
Deregulation of labour markets
-
Trade union identities
-
Orgnisational weakening of trade unions
-
Decentralisation of CB and flexibilisation of wage
setting
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Institutional power resources
at transnational level (metal sector)
Institutions supporting transnational
cooperation
Insitutions hampering transnational
cooperation/promoting transnational
competition
Regulative/normative institutions:
Regulative/normative institutions:
1993:EMF ‘Principles of CB policy
coordination’
Viking and Laval rulings of ECJ
1997: Transnational bargaining networks
1998: EMF CB coordination rule
General:
-
Weakening of institutions such as ESD
and European labour law
-
Economic governance: European
Semester (‘excessive deficits’, ‘excessive
imbalances’)
Cutural-cognitive institutions:
- Common language (DE, AT, CH)
- Cultural closeness and long experience of
cross-border exchange and interaction
- Common welfare state traditions (social
democrat and corporatist)
- Productivity-oriented wage policy perceived
as ‘solidaristic’
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Trade union strategies at the level of TNCs: The Opel case
(DE and PL plants)
Before the crisis (2000-2008) Europeanisation: transnational
cooperation (collective bargaining, mobilisation, industrial action)
During and after the crisis (2009-2012) (Re)nationalisation: political
lobbying, logic of influence (e.g. car scrapping schemes, extension of
short-time work regulation), strengthening influence at company level.
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Opel plants DE and PL before the crisis:
Transnational cooperation of unions
Determinants Institutional power
(Institutional
strategies)
Associational Structural power (Institutional)
power
Strategies
employers
(Institutional)
Strategies state
actors
Political
lobbying,
(sub)national
Low (tripartism not
important in DE and
PL)
Labour market
flexibilisation (DE,
PL)
Collective
bargaining
High DE: MEB and
industry collective
agreements, CB
autonomy;
Low in PL: SEB, no
industry coll.
agreements, no
employers‘
association etc.
High: high
High: high share
union densities of qualified
car industry: 70- workers, partly
90% DE; 30scarencess (e.g.
60% PL;
eastern DE and
south PL)
High (see
High: see above
above)
Low: Increase of
flexible
employment
forms,
outsourcing (cost
pressurce,
overcapacities..)
(sub)national
transnational
(global)
Medium: CB
coordination within
EMF (EEF),
Europ./International
Framework
Agreements
Threat to relocate
(DE)
Use of opening
Labour market
clauses in coll.
flexibilisation (DE,
Agreements,
PL)
‚Concession
Bargaining‘ (DE);
coercive cost
comparisons,
‚Benchmarks‘
between locations
(DE, PL)
Titel/Ersteller, Datum
10
Opel plants DE and PL before the crisis:
Transnational cooperation of unions
Institutional power Associational Structural power (Institutional)
(Institutional)
Determinants
power
Strategies
Strategies state
(Institutional
employers
actors
strategies)
Employee
High: WC and coHigh: strong
High: high share ‚conflict
Legal regulation
participation determination rights presence of
of qualified
partnership‘ (DE) workers
(DE)
unionists in
workers;
‚low-trust‘
participation,
(sub)national
Lower in PL
WCs (DE, PL) segmentation of
relations WCs and implementation of
Low: labour force unions (PL)
EU Directive in PL
transnational
High: EWC GM
(weakening of
(global)
Europe (EEF)
bargaining and
General WC Opel
organisational
power)
Industrial
action,
mobilisation
(sub)national
transnational
(global)
High: ‚strike funds‘
of unions (DE)
Lower in PL: trade
union pluralism and
rivalry
High: High
union
densities (but
declining in
PL)
Low:
segmentation of
labour force
Relocation threats
to break strikes
Medium: European
Action Days GM
Europe
Titel/Ersteller, Datum
Decisions of ECJ
weaken right to
strike
(subordinated to
11
market freedoms)
Opel plants DE and PL during the crisis:
(Re-)nationalisation and end of transnational cooperation?
Institutional power
Determinants
(Institutional
strategies)
Political
lobbying,
corporatism
(sub)national
Associatio Structural
nal power power
High: Political lobbying, High: high
industry policy in DE
union
density:
(low in PL)
70-90%
DE; 3060% PL;
Collective
bargaining
High DE: MEB and
industry coll.
Agreements, CB
autonomy;
Low in PL: SEB, no
(sub)national
industry coll. agreement,
no employer
association..
transnational
(global)
Low: Decline of CB
coordination within
EMF, within EWC, no
new
Europ./International
Framework
High (see
above)
High: high
share of highlyskilled workers,
in part, lack in
key industries
(strong exportorientation)
High (see
above)
Low: cost
pressurce,
overcapacities.
(Institutional)
Strategies
employers
(Institutional)
Strategies state
actors
Threats to relocate
production (DE and
PL)
Maintenance of
qualified labour
Industry policy
(e.g. car
scrapping
schemes)
Redundancies of
agency workers etc.,
concession
bargaining
(restructuring
agreement Opel);
increasing
competition between
locations
Employment
policy, e.g. shorttime work in DE
(PL)
Titel/Ersteller, Datum
12
Opel plants DE and PL during the crisis:
(Re-)nationalisation and end of transnational cooperation?
Institutional power Associational Structural power (Institutional)
(Institutional)
Determinants
power
Strategies
Strategies state
(Institutional
employers
actors
strategies)
Employee
High: WC and coHigh: strong
High: high share ‚conflict
Legal regulation
participation determination rights presence of
of highly-skilled
partnership‘ (DE) workers
(DE)
unionists in
workers;
‚low-trust‘
participation,
(sub)national
Lower in PL
WCs (DE, PL) increasing
relations WCs and implementation of
unemployment
unions (PL)
EU Directive in PL
transnational
Low: Declining
(PL)
(global)
transnational
cooperation within
EWC
Industrial
action,
mobilisation
(sub)national
transnational
(global)
High: ‚strike funds‘
of unions (DE)
Lower in PL: trade
union pluralism and
rivalry
Low: No
transnational
mobilisation by EEF
GM Europe
High: High
union
densities (but
declining in
PL)
Low:
segmentation of
labour force
(temporary
declining due to
redundancies of
agency workers)
Relocation threats
to break strikes
Titel/Ersteller, Datum
Decisions of ECJ
weaken right to
strike
(subordinated
to
13
market freedoms)
Conclusions
 Explanation of transnational union cooperation in wage policy needs to
take account of both material interests and institutional embeddedness
of trade union behaviour
 Institutions (rules, norms, culture) may provide support to transnational
trade union action (or might limit it)
 Structural and associational power (low unemployment/scarceness of
high-skilled labour; union density, union presence plant level etc.)
 Supportive institutions can be set up by trade unions themselves
(bargaining coordination networks, EEF GM Europe)
 However, in order to create transnationally supportive institutions of wage
bargaining coordination, (European) state support is an absolute
precondition for a solidaristic wage policy that also includes the employers‘
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side
Thank you for your attention!
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