Continuity and change in Cuban policy making
during the 21st century
An analysis of the agricultural reforms between 2007 and 2014
Peter Wiersma, s4051637
Master Thesis Political Science – International Relations
Supervisor: Dr. A. Wigger
27 March 2017
Radboud University Nijmegen
Abstract
Since 2007 far-reaching socio-economic reforms have been implemented in Cuba, which seem
to indicate a transformation away from direct state intervention towards a more free-market
attitude in areas like agriculture, housing and the financial sector. Several scholars have
suggested that these reforms need to be understood as a ‘socialist transition’, a transition in
which the Cuban government tries to maintain (economic) stability by granting more liberties
to the Cuban citizens, while at the same time ensuring the continuity of a socialist model in
Cuba. Policies aimed at the development of sustainable agriculture in the 1990s have marked
a starting point of these changes. Land reforms in 2008 and 2012 suggest a radical shift in this
domain; usufruct laws allowed for individual farming opportunities and more market-based
production and distribution of agricultural products. Whether this shift represents a gradual
and thus incremental institutional change within the existing system, or whether it marks the
ascendancy of a complete turnaround, with a commitment to capitalist organization of the
economic realm remains to be seen in the future. This thesis explains the political processes
that have led to the shift from state regulation to a system with more liberties in the agricultural
sector, as embodied in the policy reforms 2011 Lineamientos – guidelines – adopted by Cuba’s
Sixth Party Congress. It sets out to explain this by assessing two models of institutional change,
aiming to extend the institutionalist debate on the discussion about endogenous and
exogenous influences on policy change.
Key words: Institutionalism – Cuba – Cuban agriculture – Cuban transition – policy change
– policy paradigm – gradual institutional change
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Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 5
Chapter 1
Theoretical framework ....................................................................................... 10
1.1
State-centered theory in the institutionalist field...................................................... 10
1.2
The theoretical approach of historical institutionalism ............................................ 13
1.3
Theorizing institutional change: two historical institutionalist approaches ............. 14
1.3.1
Model one – Hall ................................................................................................... 14
1.3.2
Model two – Mahoney & Thelen ........................................................................... 18
1.3.3
Comparing the models........................................................................................... 23
Chapter 2
Methodology and operationalization ................................................................. 27
2.1
Research methodology and the use of sources .......................................................... 27
2.1.1
Process tracing ....................................................................................................... 28
2.1.2
Use of sources and data ......................................................................................... 29
2.2
Explanandum.............................................................................................................30
2.3
Operationalization ..................................................................................................... 31
2.3.1
Selection of Cuban institutions.............................................................................. 31
2.3.2 Exogenous and endogenous factors ...................................................................... 33
2.3.3 Model one – Hall ................................................................................................... 33
2.3.4 Model two – Mahoney & Thelen ........................................................................... 35
Chapter 3
3.1
Agricultural policy changes between 2007-2014....................................................... 38
Chapter 4
4.1
Cuba’s changing agricultural policy ................................................................... 38
Analysis............................................................................................................... 43
Exogenous and endogenous factors .......................................................................... 43
4.1.1
Exogenous factors.................................................................................................. 44
4.1.2
Endogenous factors ............................................................................................... 47
4.2
Application of model one – Hall ................................................................................ 51
4.2.1
Assessing the vulnerability of the policy paradigm ............................................... 51
4.2.2 Analysis of 3rd order change .................................................................................. 54
4.3
Application of model two – Mahoney & Thelen ........................................................ 59
Chapter 5
Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 66
References ................................................................................................................................ 72
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Introduction
“To such strategic tasks as food production, which as we have indicated is a matter of national security,
we shall continue attracting the highest possible number of people through all the existing forms of
property but in an orderly fashion.”
Raúl Castro, 2009
This excerpt was taken from Raúl Castro’s speech to Cuba’s National Assembly that took place
on the 1st of August 2009. It refers to Cuba’s food shortages, as food imports – accounting for
eighty percent of Cuban meals – had dropped by a third (Latin America Herald Tribune, 2009).
While Castro did not state it directly in his speech, the message conveyed that food production
had to be seen as an urgent matter. Prior to his speech, a series of hurricanes had struck Cuba
in 2008, damaging important infrastructure and destroying crops. They marked a starting
point of efforts that were undertaken to reform the economic model and boost Cuban food
production. This is referred to as actualización, or ‘update’ (Font & Riobo, 2013: 3).
In 2011 Cuba’s Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) approved the so-called
Lineamientos or ‘guidelines’. The Lineamientos display a much wider range of changes to be
made in Cuba’s economic development than had previously been the case. They consist of
measures in the economic, financial, social and agricultural field, intended to “update the
Cuban economic model” (PCC, 2011: 6). The updating process began in the agricultural sector
in 2008. Then it became possible for individuals and cooperatives to request idle land from the
Cuban government for farming purposes. Whereas previously state-controlled farms
cultivated the majority of lands, in recent years we see a significant increase of self-employed
farmers and cooperatives in Cuba’s agricultural sector (Mesa-Lago, 2014: 52).
The Lineamientos introduced additional measures, which made it possible to sell agricultural
products directly to the tourism industry. Previously, this had only been possible on special
farmers’ markets. Linkages between producers and (end) consumers were also simplified; it
became possible for small farmers to open bank accounts to receive direct payments from their
customers in the tourism industry (Gómez, 2014: 34). A related measure included the
abolishment of the dual currency system by 2016 and the accessibility of credit for selfemployed persons (Alejandro & Villanueva, 2014: 85). Possibilities like these extended not only
to the agricultural sector, but also to other sectors, such as the construction and transport
sector.
The fall of the Soviet Union entailed a major shift for world politics – in reality – but also in
political science itself, renewing the debate on (dis)continuity of state behaviour. This applies
to Cuba as well. Perhaps the most prominent question is why the collapse of the Soviet Union
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was not followed by a collapse of the political system in Cuba, as was the case in many EasternEuropean countries. State socialism in Cuba persisted and developed on its own. Contrary to
full Soviet collectivization, in Cuba there has always been land ownership, even after the
revolution. Cuban policymaking after 2007 clearly deviates from the socialist principles of the
Cuban political system we have seen until then. Policy objectives seem to be ‘contradictory’
with other policies, or socialist objectives. The changes in the agricultural sector display this
ambiguity in several respects. To give an illustration: individual farmers are now allowed to
build houses and other infrastructure on land that is owned by the government. However, it
does not become their property.
Similar contradictions are found in the 2011 Lineamientos; although it is recognized that the
economic and social model should be ‘updated’ to ensure economic prosperity, some of the
measures seem to go against Cuba’s longstanding socialist tradition. On the one hand stateplanned economy and non-ownership on private property are part of the socialist framework
in which the guidelines have been set up. On the other hand, their main features – to improve
production outputs and increase autonomy – display for the long-term a program that includes
decentralization and allows individuals for more market-based production and distribution
(Diaz, 2014: 6). This tendency towards less state regulation and more flexibility for producers
and consumers appears to be part of ongoing changes that favor deregulation of the Cuban
economy. Over the last ten years reforms in the agricultural sector seem to follow this trend.
Nonetheless, it remains to be seen if this transition represents an absolute turnaround in
Cuban policymaking.
Several research projects have been devoted to this phenomenon. For example: The University
of Miami has a special institute called Cuba Transition Project (CTP). Another major institute
is the ‘Cuba Project’ by the Bildner Center and City University of New York. Both projects cover
a wide range of studies to political, social and cultural change, ranging from the role of the state
in Cuban civil society to US-Cuban relations. Economic aspects, such as market reforms,
international trade relations and monetary policy are also widely covered (Feinberg & Piccone,
2014). However, the agricultural reforms have thus far not been researched in relation to
Cuba’s political institutions and its specific policy process. Understanding this relation may
provide insight into what makes the transition possible and the way it is to be interpreted in
the light of Cuban socialism. As such it is the nature of this study.
Within the field of political science, there are various theories that seek to explain regulatory
shifts like those in Cuba. Shifts imply change or discontinuity. The academic literature differs
on how change comes about, what drives it and which factors explain continuity or
discontinuity. Within mainstream International Relations (IR) theories there are several
schools one can think of, such as realism, liberalism and social constructivism. These
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approaches consider the dynamics between the domestic and international level in terms of
(world) systems, power relations and material interests, or through social constructs (Nye &
Keohane: 1987; Waltz: 1979; Ruggie: 1998; Wendt: 1999). For instance: the role ideas play in
a state’s identity, or how (international) norms on political behaviour come to be. Theorizing
state behaviour and what constrains it, is often key in their explanations for change or
continuity in politics.
However, to interpret Cuba’s agricultural policies, we need to go beyond the scope of state
behaviour. While state behaviour may provide comprehensive explanations for political
outcomes on state level, this alone is insufficient to explain why there are contradictions in
Cuba’s policymaking. Understanding how the Cuban state – or any state – behaves is a first
logical step to make. Nonetheless, with an understanding of what a state represents and how
it functions, we do not touch upon what makes state behaviour contradictive. For this reason,
we need to relate it to the political environment, be it internationally or domestically. Both
levels are relevant to the Cuban case; the US trade embargo or the level of food production may
be equally important to explain Cuba’s agricultural policies. Since the policy process itself also
seems to be key here, we need to understand which mechanisms are essential to policy change
and how these connect to Cuba’s internal and external political environment. Within the
political and social science debate on change, recent schools of institutionalism aim to address
such relations.
Though early 20th century institutionalism only concerned itself with the description of state
structures formalized into institutions, rule and law, in the second half of the 20th century, the
field developed a broader notion of institutions that was not solely confined to the
formalization of government (Bell, 2003: 4). Institutions could also be seen as an explicitation
of belief systems on the functionings of society, shaped by ideology, social norms, or ideas (Hall
& Taylor, 1996: 946). This means that societal actors such as interest groups, media or political
parties can be included in institutionalist frameworks. The autonomy of the state vis-à-vis
society and institutions, and institutional behaviour, became principal objects of research in
institutionalist studies (Bell, 2003: 7). Varying assumptions on rationality, social interaction,
the influence of culture and historical development, have led to different perspectives on
institutional change.
Recent approaches to institutionalism disagree which mechanisms affect the behaviour of
political actors through institutions and vice versa. Such approaches are commonly referred to
as ‘new’ institutionalist approaches (Bell, 2003; Hall & Taylor, 1996). The discussion involves
whether processes of change are mainly driven by an exogenous or endogenous dimension. To
illustrate: if the research unit is the ‘state’ and the aim is to explain the behaviour of a state,
explanatory factors outside the state are exogenous, while explanatory factors inside the state
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are endogenous. Institutional change is often considered to be prompted by explanatory
factors in the exogenous dimension, while no, or little attention is given to endogenous
explanations (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010: 5-7). Criticism revolves around emphasizing one
dimension too much over the other, while it is insufficiently theorized why such choices are
made. Clarifying this theoretical discussion is central to this thesis.
Two historical institutionalist models will be used to analyze the Cuban agricultural policies
and to trace their origins. Historical institutionalism views the outcomes of decision-making
primarily as a result of power relations between institutions and social groups. The causal
effects of specific historical events, so-called critical junctures, are regarded to be essential for
institutional development (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 945). It seems logical to address specific events
that may have affected – or even caused – the course of recent Cuban policymaking. However,
the factor time should not be overlooked. Amenta (2003: 114) states the need for more
argumentation by institutional scholars when “timing and sequence matter in the explanation
of outcomes.” The question arises how we assign value to events that have already occurred
and may, or may not, have had an impact on the (ongoing) policy process.
Although both institutionalist models pay attention to continuity in the policy process, the first
model by Peter Hall (1993) emphasizes the possibilities for discontinuity. It is based on Hall’s
theoretisation of the policy paradigm. A policy paradigm is a framework of ideas and norms on
political reality reflected by policymakers (ibid.: 279). Hall’s model employs an ideational
perspective to policy. Instead of focusing on institutional properties that make policy change
possible, policymaking is theorized as a learning process taking place in the institutional
environment.
The second model is by Mahoney & Thelen (2010) and theorizes how institutions structure
policy by addressing the gap between the rule and its implementation. They have developed a
framework that is – presumably – better able to account for both exogenous and endogenous
change than previous models of change, the so-called Gradual Change Framework (GCF)
(ibid.: 5). It is a causal model explaining how policy change might happen on a continuous
basis, without an emphasis on specific dimensions. Mahoney & Thelen aim to describe the
properties of institutions that make them vulnerable to change, either endogenously or
exogenously.
Both models are employed to analyze the Cuban case, namely, to compare which explanatory
factors – endogenous or exogenous – have been essential to the Cuban policy process.
Involving the broader political environment – internally and externally – brings more clarity
to the question how dimensions play a role in the Cuban policy process. However, it is not the
aim to compare the models on their respective explanatory value in this matter. The reason for
8
this is twofold: first, the models are not mutually exclusive to one another and could be
complementary. Second, each model employs different mechanisms to regard institutional
change. Nonetheless, they may provide different insights into the dimensions that play a role
in the Cuban policy process. Such nuances may be essential to understand how Cuban policy
is structured and may provide a more generalizable framework for policy change. Additionally,
it may contribute to an understanding of why and when state structures are susceptible to
institutional changes.
The following research question is derived from the inconsistencies that are observed in Cuban
policy:
What explains the changes in Cuba’s agricultural policies since 2007 towards the
introduction of market-based elements in the agricultural sector with less state
regulation, more flexibility and economic liberties?
To tackle the research question, a theoretical overview of (historical) institutionalist theory will
be presented in the first chapter, specifically with how change is regarded. The emphasis on
the exogenous dimension will be discussed, as well as its relation to the degree of autonomy of
the state. The models by Hall and Mahoney & Thelen will be explained in further detail,
including the content of the empirical indicators they describe. In addition, hypotheses are
derived from the main explanatory variables of both models, specified to Cuba’s agricultural
policy transition. Chapter two, the methodological section, first presents the used research
methods, sources and data. The section then outlines the nature of the agricultural policy
change in the explanandum. This is followed by the operationalization, which discusses the
selection of the Cuban institutions, presents the concrete operationalizations of the
endogenous and exogenous factors and empirical indicators of the models. In chapter three,
the policy measures that have been taken between 2007-2014 are outlined into detail, followed
by a discussion of the most notable changes they reflect. Chapter four, starts with an overview
of the exogenous and endogenous factors that have influenced the Cuban policy process and
are relevant to the application of both models. Next, the empirical indicators for the
institutional types of change of each model are analyzed in relation to endogenous and
exogenous factors. The findings will be presented with regard to the various hypotheses of both
models. In the final chapter the conclusion is drawn, also discussing the limitations of the study
and suggestions for further research.
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Chapter 1 Theoretical framework
The impetus of this chapter is to present a clear theoretical basis to be able to interpret the
agricultural policy changes that have taken place in Cuba since 2007. The historical
institutionalist models by Hall (1993) and Mahoney & Thelen (2010) will be applied to this
case. First, a brief theoretical background of the institutionalist field describes the context of
the debate on institutional change relevant to the models. For this purpose, the origins of
institutionalism will be discussed, as well as its relation to recent perspectives on the state and
state autonomy. The relation of the state vis-à-vis institutions and society will be touched upon.
This is the starting point for a short discussion of general assumptions historical
institutionalist theory holds relevant to institutional change. These form an important basis
for the two models and have implications for the exogenous and endogenous dimension of
institutions, which will be examined as well.
Second in this chapter is a detailed overview of the theoretical models, describing which
mechanisms and empirical indicators are used to analyze institutional change. An explanation
of Hall’s concept of policy paradigms and paradigmatic change will be given, followed by an
account of gradual change as presented in the framework by Mahoney & Thelen. The respective
hypotheses on the institutional types of change – 3rd order change and gradual change – are
deduced after the discussion of each model.
Continuing, a comparison of the models is made; this includes a visualization of the described
mechanisms and the indicators that will be used for the analysis. This provides insight into
different dimensions of the policy process that are emphasized in the models, but may also
point to specific nuances that are important for the analysis of the Cuban case. The aim is to
identify similar empirical propositions and juxtapose the propositions that fundamentally
differ.
1.1 State-centered theory in the institutionalist field
For explaining political and societal developments, perceptions on the ‘state’, have been an
important starting point for social and political sciences, specifically for the field of
institutionalism.
“The state is considered the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence. Hence, ‘politics’ for us
means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among
states or among groups within a state.” (Weber, 1921: 7)1
This statement is by 20th century sociologist Max Weber and was published in Politik als Beruf,
or ‘Politics as a Vocation’. Weber (ibid.: 12) posits the idea that the modern state dominates
the means of power and therefore, the means of political organization. In his understanding,
political organization involves every act of power affecting how a state is organized. Weber’s
perspective would become important for the discussion whether structural characteristics of
the state could affect the policy process and – more generally – how political outcomes on
state-level could be explained in relation to a state’s domestic (society) or international
environment (states or international organizations).
After World War II, so-called pluralist and Marxist approaches were dominant in the field of
political science and international relations theory. Pluralist approaches did not consider the
state as highly influential or consequential for political life. Instead, their focus was on the
variety of political actors – elected officials, citizens or specific interest groups – that were able
to influence political life.2 Pluralists emphasized that actor’s opposing interests were essential
to political outcomes. Their argumentation was based on the relation between the available
(political) resources and the ability of actors to access them. The state was only considered as
a political platform or tool, enabling such relations. Thus, the result of public policy – and the
ability to influence it – was seen as a result of different interests and resources between actors
(Krasner, 1984: 227).
Marxists contested the pluralist idea of attributing political agency to actors best able to access
political means. Where pluralists did not give attention to the state as such, Marxists argued
that the state reflected class society. Their main argument to support this claim is that the state
serves the interests of the elite class, whose aim is to maintain the status quo of capitalist
society. A 1985 article by Theda Skocpol criticized Marxist and pluralist views of the state being
merely a stage for political conflict. This criticism initiated the debate on state-institutionalism
and comparative case research. It involved theorizing institutional patterns that could explain
the variation of political outcomes across cases (Amenta, 2005: 98-99; Steinmo, 2008: 158).
Responding to Marxist and pluralist views3, institutionalist scholars ‘reintroduced’ the
Weberian idea of the state and made it their own; “States were sets of organizations in some
ways like other organizations but with unique political functions, missions, responsibilities and
roles.” (Amenta, 2005: 99) They can be considered as actors with specific organizational
structures – institutions – that centralize political authority in a given society.
Samuel Huntington, a 20th century political scientist, known for his influential work The Clash
of Civilizations (1993) published in 1965 an article on political development. Therein,
institutions are defined as follows: “Institutions are stable, valued, recurring patterns of
behaviour.” (1965: 394) In this view institutions are behavioural patterns determined by
11
specific rules and norms, either formal or informal. Huntington believes that the level of
institutionalization depends on how well (political) organizations are able to adapt and persist
in a changing environment. The more adaptable an organization is, the more it is
institutionalized in its given environment. Also, the broader the organization’s influence on its
environment, the more it is institutionalized. Arguably, both conditions hold for the position
of the state today; in modern day society it still exists as the highest form of political
organization. It could be said that the state is institutionalized in society itself, but also among
states, in the international environment. But what happens to these institutional patterns if
there are changes in the state’s environment?
Institutionalist theory attempts to describe how (state-)institutions constrain formal and
informal behaviour of political actors, shape political outcomes and persist or change over
time. They address what happens to institutional patterns if changes in the political
environment (of states) occur. This relates to what extent institutions matter with regard to the
autonomy of states and their political environment. Theoretical conceptions are generally
concerned with two central issues. The first issue is about the extent of the autonomy of the
state. That is: “can the state formulate and implement its preferences?” (Krasner, 1984: 224)
The second issue is the level of coherency between the state and its environment, domestically
or internationally. It concerns the question whether state structures influence changes in the
environment and vice-versa. For instance, Skocpol (1992) argued that state formation in the
United States – the institutionalized federal system – had a profound impact on how political
parties and interest groups dealt with (the introduction of) social policies in America.
Among contemporary institutionalists4 politics is often conceptualized in different ways, as a
process of power relations and (rational) preferences of political actors, a social learning
process, or as an expression of culture and social norms (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Despite these
conceptual differences, there is a similar understanding to be pointed out; there is agreement
that there are established patterns of behaviour in states – institutions – which seem to be
influential for political outcomes, and thus, for change or continuity. However, the main
disagreement concerns how and when these patterns of behaviour manifest and to which
extent. That is, do institutional structures – in states, political parties, international
organizations, interest groups, etc. – mainly determine political behaviour, or does this also
depend on the free choice of individuals? Or perhaps on combinations of both and on specific
moments?5
Theorization of the endogenous and exogenous dimension of institutions is necessary to
answer such questions. Distinguishing the internal from the external sources of change
provides insight into how (state-)institutions, or individuals in institutions, direct institutional
outcomes – in the form of rules, procedures, policy – in specific circumstances. Furthermore,
12
understanding endogenous change in institutions is essential to explain institutional outcomes
that have developed over time. The next section discusses the historical institutionalist view
on this matter, since this approach provides the basic framework for the two models used to
investigate the Cuban case. The emphasis lies with how political change, or continuity, is
explained in relation to the endogenous and exogenous dimension of institutions.
1.2 The theoretical approach of historical institutionalism
Like other institutionalist approaches, historical institutionalists treat states mainly as other
organizations; they argue that (state-)institutions can be instrumental in shaping the context
and roles in which political actors must behave in (Hall, 1986; March & Olsen, 1989; North,
1990). Historical institutionalism can be characterized by the view that political change is
largely determined through the contextual features of the past. It considers politics to be about
asymmetrical power relations between institutions (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 939).
Institutions raise resource considerations reflecting a ‘struggle’ for power in politics. Historical
institutionalists hold a distinctive understanding on institutional development, whereby an
emphasis is put on specific historical events, or so-called critical junctures (Mahoney & Thelen,
2010: 6). For this reason, the perspective is called ‘path dependent’. This “refers to situations
in which previous decisions set up the boundaries for future development.” (Ekelund, 2013:
104) An inductive logic is followed; this means that the causal effects of institutions on the
policy process are emphasized when explaining institutional development and political
outcomes. While historical institutionalists mostly emphasize power relations in this regard,
they also believe that ideas and worldviews may play an important role in this process (Hall &
Taylor, 1996: 940). Institutions can be regarded as a reflection of the dominant social culture,
in terms of shared norms, values and identities (Ekelund, 2013: 103).
Following Blyth (2002: 2-3) the logic of historical institutionalism is consistent with models of
punctuated equilibrium.6 This means that change only occurs within a brief timeframe during
a moment of ‘punctuation’, after which a new institutional equilibrium is established. Thus,
the source of change is exogenous to the existing institutional equilibrium and leads to a
situation that is ‘vulnerable’ to change (punctuation); in turn this leads to a new institutional
equilibrium. Several scholars have argued that moments of punctuation are likely to be
preceded by a political or economic crisis (Blyth, 2002; Krasner, 1984; Wigger & Buch-Hansen,
2014).
Assigning causal relevance to such punctuated moments in relation to the later policy process
and policy outcomes requires proper theorization. An illustration: to explain why the trade
embargo of the US against Cuba still holds, one could look at the Cuba crisis of 1962 as a
13
moment of ‘punctuation’. This crisis set in motion events that would result in a trade embargo
put into effect by the US Congress. This was a clear turning point for American-Cuban trade
relations and defining for later Cuban and American policy making. If we would want to explain
how it has been defining for the trade embargo today, it would be much more complex to
explain it simply as a ‘causal effect’ of the Cuba crisis. Instead, one would have to assess how
and why American policy making on the trade embargo has remained unchanged since the
Cuba crisis. For instance, by looking at the power relations between Democrats and
Republicans, or through the political ideas that have driven the policy course since then.
The point is that it would be easy to ascribe the Cuba crisis ex ante as the primary reason for
why the trade embargo still exists, without proper theorization on timing and results of a crisis.
The emphasis on historical (and causal) relevance of punctuated moments – critical junctures
– as part of the exogenous dimension, may disguise how, endogenously, institutional outcomes
have changed or remained constant over time.
The lack of theorization on the exogenous dimension is the most important criticism on
historical institutionalism, which is expressed by various institutional scholars (Amenta, 2005;
Blyth, 2002; Ekelund, 2013; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Blyth (2002: 4-5)
argues in this respect that we should pay attention to the role ideas play, since they “reduce
uncertainty by defining a given moment of crisis and project the institutional forms that
arguably will resolve it.” It draws attention to another issue relating to the endogenous
dimension. If critical junctures are so important for institutional change, what are then the
internal processes that make institutional arrangements – such as in the state – vulnerable to
critical junctures? These processes are often neglected.
The models by Hall (1993) and Mahoney & Thelen (2010) attempt to address the lack of
theorization in historical institutionalism. Most notable differences between their models are
the manner in which they incorporate – to a greater or lesser extent – endogenous and
exogenous indicators to describe processes of institutional change. The respective models are
presented in the next section, followed by a brief discussion on their similarities and
differences. It explains when they expect institutional change to be radical, and whether or not
radical institutional change is per definition sudden, or can also occur gradually.
1.3 Theorizing institutional change: two historical institutionalist
approaches
1.3.1 Model one – Hall
Policy paradigms and shifts
14
The model by Hall (1993) aims to address the ideational dimension of the policymaking
process leading to policy change. Policymakers have ideas on the purposes of policies, in terms
of what they should do and how they should be implemented. According to Hall, such views on
policies are shaped by the political environment policymakers operate in, a so-called ‘policy
paradigm’. A policy paradigm “(…) specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of
instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are
meant to be addressing.” (ibid.: 279) These paradigms contain ideas and norms on political
reality, which are reflected by policymakers in their policies.
Hall has derived the policy paradigm from Thomas Kuhn’s conception of scientific paradigms
in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). According to Kuhn science progresses in a
distinctive manner; during so-called periods of ‘normal science’ a specific scientific ‘paradigm’
is followed. This is a framework of ideas and assumptions scientists adopt on science, in terms
of scientific practice and generally accepted knowledge and experience (ibid: 11). In a period of
normal science, scientists aim to sustain the existing paradigm by expanding its empirical
content and making it more specific. However, as a result, it becomes likely that anomalies are
discovered that contradict the paradigm. In such instances, a paradigm may be adjusted or
revised, without being rejected. Another possibility is that the anomaly results in a crisis,
because it entails a revolutionary breakthrough incompatible with the existing paradigm. In
turn, a competing paradigm may arise that – when generally accepted – becomes dominant
(ibid: 85-86). Competing paradigms are unable to communicate with one another, since they
require a different mind-set to ‘acknowledge’ the other perspective. For this reason, switching
paradigms is a matter of choice between incompatible perspectives, also commonly referred to
as a ‘paradigm shift’. Kuhn (ibid: 94) compares this process to political revolutions; the aim is
to fundamentally change existing political institutions that hold standards and values on
society incompatible with the revolution.
Hall argues that the policy process develops in a similar way as Kuhn’s scientific paradigms.
Policy paradigms can change but maintain their broad appearances, but they can also be
replaced by an entirely new paradigm. However, a significant difference is considered: while
policy paradigms can be replaced, the process leading up to a shift is political of nature, rather
than scientific. This means that choices to switch paradigms are politically motivated, unlike
the pure scientific considerations that make scientists switch paradigms. This political aspect
has three implications for Hall’s model of paradigm shifts;
First, Hall believes a ‘political’ paradigm shift follows a logic that is based on the power
configuration between groups of actors in the institutional setting. One can think of
administrators, politicians, media and interest groups. Access to “ancillary resources” and
“exogenous factors” affect the relative power they have to change the paradigm. A switch of
15
paradigms will depend on how well these actors are able to impose the other paradigm,
depending on their “positional advantages” in the broader institutional setting (1993: 280). To
illustrate: take a policy paradigm based on a strictly regulated state economy. Administrators
will likely only implement policies through the administrative means they have to regulate the
economy, while politicians have the authority to come up with new policy ideas. As such, the
politician has a better position to impose a paradigm than the administrator.
Second, politicians decide who is authoritative in a certain policy area. In case of ambiguity
between experts on policy issues, competing politicians have to decide who holds more
authority. It is likely a paradigm shift is preceded by a debate on who holds authority on the
policy in question, rather than a focus on the policy issue itself (ibid.).
Third, a shift is likely to be preceded by policy experiments and failures. The analogy with the
scientific paradigms is again applicable; the adjustment of policies proceeds with the aim to
sustain the status quo of the current paradigm. However, while such attempts may be
undertaken with a specific goal in mind, they may also include random attempts to revise
policy. Policy experiments and failures are expected in cases where a ‘weak’ policy paradigm
exists. If the attempts are unsuccessful, policy failures may weaken the policy paradigm further
and undermine its overall coherency (ibid.).
Institutional types of change
In model one policy change is characterized into hierarchic types, 1st, 2nd and 3rd order change.
Policy change is observed in “the instruments settings, the instruments themselves and the
hierarchy of goals behind policy.” (ibid.: 278-279) The hierarchy of goals is the priority
assigned to different policy goals – for example – decreasing food scarcity has more priority
than decreasing unemployment rates. The instruments refer to material or political resources
to achieve the policy goal; for instance, the cultivation of agricultural lands, or food imports.
The setting refers to the precise realization of the instruments; training more farmers, or close
trade agreements.
Instances of 1st and 2nd order changes are considered adjustments of the policy paradigm that
keep the overall structure intact. Examples of 1st order changes are cases wherein the setting of
the policy instruments changes, but the hierarchy of goals and the instruments remain the
same. This differs from 2nd order changes, that correspond with the use of different policy
instruments, while maintaining the hierarchy of goals. If changes simultaneously occur in the
three variables, institutional change is radical. This last type – 3rd order change – is a ‘paradigm
shift’, which essentially is a turnaround of the existing policy discourse.
16
Hall (ibid.: 278) believes that 3rd order change can develop through the mechanism of social
learning: “(…) a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to
past experience and new information.” The three variables behind social learning – ‘goals that
guide policy’, ‘policy instruments and the ‘setting of policy instruments’ – are meant to
disaggregate the ideas that drive this mechanism. The main thought entails that policy
objectives and the manner of implementation of the policy, tells us something about how ideas
behind policy at time-1 have changed compared to policy at time-0.
The core of social learning is that policy will likely be the response to previous policy, whereby
policymakers learn from the experiences of previous policy and may act to adjust it or keep it
intact. 7 This may work in two ways: first, similar policy instruments of previous policies are
utilized because they are known, or are seen as an appropriate response. As such, continuity of
policy is to be expected. Second, responses by policymakers are driven by the consequences
previous policies have had for the socio-economic and political environment. Policymakers
learn of these consequences and adjust their responses accordingly. Thus, policy change is
more likely to be expected.
The question is under which circumstances these two aspects change the policy paradigm. If a
paradigm is vulnerable – for example, because of several policy failures – it seems plausible
that policymakers pay more attention to the consequences of endogenous factors in the socioeconomic environment that undermine the policy paradigm. This seems logical, since they are
able to change the policies that may have caused these consequences. These changes can be
reflected by an adjustment of policy instruments, or – more far-going – a change of policy
goals.
On the other hand, Hall (ibid.: 291) expects that “outside pressures” make policymakers more
susceptible to undertake an attempt to deal with consequences of earlier policy. Otherwise, if
no actions are undertaken, exogenous pressures can contribute to further weakening of the
policy paradigm (such as more failures). In turn, this would make it more likely that 3rd order
change takes place.
Hypotheses on 3rd order change
In the Cuban case, attention will be given to 3rd order change. The reason for this is as follows.
Instances of 1st and 2nd order change are most likely incremental changes of the policy
paradigm. Hall points out that 1st and 2nd order changes are not necessarily followed by 3rd
order change, since they may be used to support the existing policy paradigm (ibid.: 280).
However, 3rd order change supposes something else; change occurs simultaneously in the three
variables of policy. The reforms in the agricultural sector suggest that policy ideas in the Cuban
17
economic model may have shifted in this manner. It remains to be seen whether these ideas
have changed simultaneously in the three variables of policy and thus constitute a 3 rd order
change, or whether they have changed incrementally.
As indicated in the research question, we want to explain the nature of the changes involving
less state intervention, more economic liberties and the introduction of market based strategies
in Cuba’s agricultural sector. One would expect certain exogenous factors – such as climate
conditions and international market conditions – might have a major impact on the outputs of
the Cuban agricultural sector. At the same time, it seems likely exogenous factors are difficult
to anticipate, since they originate from outside the institutional environment.
It can be expected that changes in the Cuban economy are strongly related to the performance
in the agricultural sector and overall food production. Thus, it seems likely when exogenous
factors affect the agricultural sector and the overall food production, it could also influence
change of the policy paradigm. In the case of a vulnerable or ‘weak’ policy paradigm, exogenous
factors seem likely to trigger a process of 3rd order change. Such a process might be facilitated
or accelerated by the presence of endogenous factors in the institutional environment – such
as inefficiency in the Cuban economy – that pressure or undermine the policy course of the
existing paradigm.
The following hypotheses are formulated in relation to Hall’s model:
a) If a weak policy paradigm is observed, then it is likely that exogenous factors trigger a
process of 3rd order change.
A ‘weak paradigm’ is characterized by the indicators that are likely to precede a paradigm shift,
namely ‘positional advantages’, ‘debate on who holds authority over policy issues’ and ‘policy
experiments or failures’.
b) Exogenous factors make a process of 3rd order change more likely, if the existing policy
paradigm is pressured by endogenous factors in the institutional environment.
1.3.2 Model two – Mahoney & Thelen
Gradual Change Framework
Mahoney & Thelen (2010) have developed the so-called Gradual Change Framework (GCF),
that explains how institutional change occurs on a gradual basis. In the GCF they aim to model
continuous change, rather than (over)emphasizing the causal effects of specific moments in
18
time. They argue that critical junctures – as exogenous sources of change – can be important
to explain institutional outcomes, but they may also obscure why institutions are vulnerable to
change in the first place (ibid.: 5). That is to say, institutions themselves can be the cause of
institutional outcomes, even if these outcomes have been affected by critical junctures. It
means that causal effects are not necessarily attributed to the exogenous environment of
institutions; they may also be attributed to the endogenous environment of institutions.
Two assumptions are important for this argument. First, institutional outcomes are not
necessarily the result of environmental – exogenous – events, nor do they have to be
discontinuous of nature (ibid.: 7). This means that institutions can also change incrementally
in a gradual process. Institutions may adapt to the changing institutional environment over
time, without being replaced by new institutions or institutional rules. To illustrate: the NATO
alliance between western states was originally intended to provide security against the
common threat of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, despite the imminent
collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO kept existing; its right of existence was redefined over the
course of the 1990’s to include a broader mandate of military security, amongst others the
stabilization of Eastern European (NATO, 2012).
Second, institutional outcomes do not necessarily reflect specific interests of persons or
groups. Conflict over institutional resources among actors with different objectives, may result
in compromises that have unintended consequences (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010: 8). These
conflicts are likely political of nature; their outcomes depend on actors’ relative position of
power. To illustrate: a department of agriculture may have the power to invest in agricultural
technologies, but the department of finance – managing public spending – may affect the
actual decisions that are made. If reversed, this is probably less likely the case.
In the GCF, a feedback loop between power relations and the allocation of resources is
assumed. These resources can be political or material means that are formalized into
institutions, rules and procedures (ibid.). The loop works as follows: power relations between
institutional agents determine how resources are distributed. Such ‘resource considerations’
inevitably lead to uneven allocation; certain resources will be allocated to specific
(institutional) actors and purposes, while others will not. In turn, the allocation redefines
existing power relations between institutions; the feedback loop is completed.
The GCF theorizes how these power relations take shape in institutions, by addressing which
properties of their (political) environment – endogenously or exogenously – motivate different
change strategies and lead to different types of institutional change. There are two elements
that shape institutional outcomes; first, the characteristics of the political context can affect
outcomes. This is reflected by the way the context allows actors to have veto possibilities
19
within, or between institutions. These are abilities actors have to prevent institutional change,
or to direct such change. A high degree of veto possibilities means that it will be difficult to
challenge or replace existing institutional rules, whereas few possibilities entails the opposite.
Second, characteristics of institutions can affect institutional outcomes. This is reflected by the
way institutional agents are allowed discretion to enforce rules and the freedom they have to
interpret them. The level of ambiguity of a rule, and the interpretation of it, determine these
factors (ibid.: 18). According to Mahoney & Thelen, the combination of veto possibilities and
the level of discretion to interpret institutional rules will lead to different types of institutional
change.8
The type institutional change layering has been selected to investigate in the case of Cuba.
Layering means that new institutional rules are based on previous ones, involving small
adjustments, but they do not necessarily replace the original rules or institutions (ibid.: 15).
Such small adjustments may accumulate over time and eventually lead to bigger (policy)
change (ibid.: 17). Displacement is the opposite; rules or institutions are completely replaced
by others, similar to Hall’s 3rd order change. The Cuban state seems to develop new agricultural
strategies, while the institutional system appears to remain unchanged. This aspect is
interesting to investigate, as it could indicate that a process of layering is occurring in the
agricultural reforms of Cuba.
In the GCF so-called change agents are the catalysts for institutional change. They can be
individuals such as politicians, scholars that are an expert in certain policy areas. Such
(institutional) change agents are driven to change existing institutional structures. Rocco &
Thurston (2014) assess that layering is likely to occur through change agents that already
operate in the existing institutions. Change agents are capable to introduce small changes
within the institutional context, but they are not able to change it as a whole. It means that the
overall institutional system remains unchanged, while small changes or additions to existing
institutional rules are made that lead to a gradual process of layering. The following section
outlines three explanatory variables that are important to the process of layering.
Veto players and veto possibilities
Actors in the institutional and political system who hold authority to approve outcomes, or
otherwise have the capacity to steer the policy process, are defining for how institutional
change through layering comes about. Tseblis (2011: 19) defines such actors – veto players –
as follows: “Veto players are individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a
change of the status quo.” Institutional veto players are those individual or collective actors in
the political system that derive their ‘veto possibilities’ from a country’s constitution (ibid.).
20
They are granted powers to change, enforce, or implement institutional rules. Veto players
have discretionary possibilities, or access to intellectual or material capacities allowing them
to block institutional change, or drive it. These veto possibilities depend on the political or
institutional context.
It is important to note that institutional collective actors do not necessarily represent a single
uniform veto player. For example, a parliament may be occupied by different parties. In such
cases, the party holding the majority is the actual veto player, or what Tsebelis refers to as
‘partisan veto player’ (ibid.). In cases with many (collective) veto players in the institutional
environment, it becomes increasingly difficult to change the status quo. This is because
agreements need to be reached on a consensual basis, in spite of different preferences (ibid.:
39). Identifying which actors in the institutional setting are (actual) veto players in the policy
process, is the first step in distinguishing between the kind of veto possibilities they have, and
the distribution of possibilities among different (institutional) actors.
Institutional ambiguity or malleability
Institutional rules, or institutions themselves, may vary in terms of clarity and ambiguity. The
level of ambiguity provides insight into how institutional outcomes vary. Following Rocco &
Thurston (2014: 41), this is called ‘initial institutional ambiguity or malleability’. If an
institution or rule is ambiguous it means that there are few institutional rules that constrain
the actions of the institution. For example: a policy that states ‘the reduction of greenhouse
gasses’ makes a wider variety of measures possible, than a policy that states ‘reduction of
greenhouse gasses using renewable energy sources’.
Discretional freedom
Institutional outcomes may also vary because there are variations in the discretion institutional
actors have to implement – or enforce – policies according to their own interpretations
(Mahoney & Thelen, 2010: 21). This variable is defined as ‘discretional freedom’ and overlaps
with the previous indicators of ‘institutional ambiguity’ and ‘veto possibilities’. The level of
ambiguity of a rule may determine how policy is effectively interpreted and carried out by
institutional actors. If the rule is specific, it leaves little or no room for different interpretations,
or the way it should be enforced. A high level of discretional freedom is the opposite, meaning
that there is more room for variation in the interpretation or enforcement of the rule.
Important to note here, is that the discretion to enforce, or interpret, will also depend on the
veto possibilities that are available to an actor. This means that differences in the interpretation
and the enforcement of rules not only coincide with the level of ambiguity. They may also
21
depend on the allocation of veto possibilities in the institutional environment and the access
of actors to specific discretionary capabilities (to enforce and/or implement rules).
Layering in relation to the variables
With layering, the initial ambiguity (or malleability) of the institution or rules is expected to be
low. This restricts change agents to replace existing rules or institutions, so that they can only
introduce small adjustments (ibid.: 41-42). To do this, they must have discretionary
capabilities, intellectual or material resources to “carry out modest changes at the margins of
existing policies” (ibid.: 46) Material and intellectual resources may be used to lobby or
convince veto players with discretionary capabilities that institutional change is necessary. It
is expected that veto players are not able to prevent modest adjustments at these margins, as
they do not involve significant changes of the status quo. At the same time, however, veto
players may limit the discretional freedom of change agents through their veto possibilities.
Conclusively, with layering it is expected that change agents have access to the discretionary
capabilities of veto players, or are veto players themselves.
Hypotheses on gradual change
Endogenous and exogenous factors form the reasons for change. The institutional agents
determine the ‘necessity’ and/or ‘need’ for change, while the nature of change is determined
by their mutual power relations and the associated distribution of resources (as suggested by
the feedback loop). Mahoney & Thelen (ibid.: 2) emphasize the role of endogenous factors in
relation to gradual change, since they may act over a relative long period of time. Gradual
change is more likely to be related to endogenous factors than to exogenous factors, because
endogenous factors act within the institutional environment and can be influenced and
anticipated by institutional agents. Moreover, incremental changes can mitigate the effects
that follow from endogenous factors. So, if in a process of change, the institutional agents and
their mutual power relations remain unchanged by these endogenous factors, then this process
will likely have a gradual nature.
If institutional agents and their mutual power relations are characterized by strong veto
possibilities, a low level of initial ambiguity, and a low level of discretional freedom, then this
gradual change seems likely to display the characteristics of layering. That is to say, new rules
or institutions are placed atop or alongside existing ones, instead of replacing them.
Following the mechanisms and indicators that have been described under model two, the
following hypotheses are formulated:
22
a) If a process of institutional change is observed, while institutional agents and their
mutual power relations remain unchanged, then this process is likely a process of
gradual change.
b) If strong veto possibilities, a low level of ambiguity, and a low level of discretional
freedom are present in the institutional environment, then it is likely endogenous
factors trigger a process of layering.
1.3.3 Comparing the models
Moving forward with both models: it seems logical to assume that ideas over policy may change
over time. Hall’s policy paradigm is intended to address not so much institutions per se, but
the way ideas behind the rules have changed. It is difficult to formulate concrete indicators that
specify why these ideas change. They can only be derived from the results of actual policy
(objectives) that define the overall policy paradigm, for example socialist policy objectives.
Because this is more abstract, Hall’s typologies seem better suited to identify exogenous
23
sources of policy change. Periods of sudden change are associated with 3rd order change and
mostly explained as a result of exogenous factors or shocks.
Contrary to the policy paradigm model, the GCF emphasizes gradual change by looking
predominantly at endogenous factors. It makes the interaction between political context and
institutions more concrete endogenously, by describing how change agents and veto
possibilities among institutions affect one another. Nonetheless, the policy paradigm may
affect the policymaking process endogenously – in institutions – as well. The political context
of institutions is not only shaped by exogenous influences, but also – endogenously – by policy
ideas and objectives. The policy process itself, can be examined from different viewpoints
depending on the (institutional) context; namely, endogenously: between institutions, or from
the environment in which the institution functions. Exogenously: from outside the
institutional environment.
It is interesting to juxtapose layering to Hall’s 3rd order change since these institutional types
allow us to assess policy from different perspectives, namely non-radical institutional change
versus radical institutional change. Because these perspectives are mutually exclusive, the
scope of this case study is broader than if we were to look from only one institutional
perspective. In the Cuban case, it is interesting to examine if agricultural policymaking is an
example of either of these outcomes, or perhaps both. The aim is to identify which endogenous
and exogenous factors play a role in whatever sort of institutional change is occurring in Cuba.
In this sense, the (historical) institutionalist models can complement each other and transcend
the institutional labels they use to identify different kinds of institutional change. Specifically,
why is it that Cuba has introduced several decentralizing and market-based measures in its
agricultural sector? And how is it that this process seems to have taken place primarily in the
last ten years?
Both models have been visualized in Figure 1 and include a simplified representation of the
mechanisms that have been outlined. Their respective indicators have been numbered and will
be used throughout the following chapters. The arrows represent the direction in which
influences act. For instance, the feedback loop of model two is represented by the two-way
direction between ‘resources’ and ‘institutional agents’. In model one, social learning is
represented by the arrow between ‘institutional agents’ and ‘policy’. Exogenous factors have
been mentioned explicitly, while endogenous factors act within the institutional environment.
24
Figure 1 Visualization of model one and model two
25
Notes
1
Translated into English and edited by Gert & Mills (1946). Their translation is used as the primary
source for Weber’s publication in this thesis.
2
Pluralist approaches have also been described under the label ‘behaviourism’, referring to their
emphasis on human behaviour in politics.
3
For a detailed account of the institutionalist critique on pluralism, see Immergut (1998).
4
For a comprehensive overview of different institutionalist scholars and approaches, see Bell (2003)
and Hall & Taylor (1996).
5
These questions are related to the so-called agency/structure debate within social sciences.
6
The concept of punctuated equilibrium originates from evolutionary theory; it predicts that “most
morphological change [occurs] during brief speciation events and [that] virtually no change [occurs]
during the subsequent existence of the species” (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2015).
7
For more detailed knowledge on the concept of social learning, see Heclo (1974).
8
For an overview of these institutional change types and their characteristics, see Mahoney & Thelen
(2010) and Rocco & Thurston (2014).
26
Chapter 2 Methodology and operationalization
The first section of this chapter presents the method of inquiry that is used in this case study,
namely process tracing, and discusses which sources and data are used for the analysis. This is
followed by the explanandum, wherein the nature of the agricultural policy change is outlined.
The agricultural policy measures that have been taken are part of the explanandum, but will be
discussed in detail in the next chapter. The explanandum is followed by the operationalization,
which starts out with the selection of the institutional agents that have been selected to
investigate the agricultural institutional change in Cuba, for what reasons and how they relate
to Cuba’s institutional environment.
Continuing, the concrete operationalizations for endogenous and exogenous factors are
presented, after which the operationalization of the empirical indicators and institutional
mechanisms – 3rd order change and layering – are outlined for each model.
2.1 Research methodology and the use of sources
This thesis can be characterized as a single case study, or – more specifically – a single country
study (Gerring, 2006; Landman, 2008). It means that the unit of analysis – change in Cuba –
is used as the single example to investigate or make assumptions, about the theoretical
framework that is used. As such, there are several methodological implications for how this
study may be used and should be seen in a wider context.
Landman (2008: 86) points out that in comparative (political) research, single country studies
involve intensive research on particularities that play a role in a specific country, while they are
less extensive in their scope of analysis (since they concern only a single country). At the same
time, intensive research of such particularities may be helpful to pose new questions in the
research field, or expand on the applicability of certain theories in specific cases. So-called
outliers or ‘deviant’ cases may lead to new theoretical questions. Thus, single country studies
may serve two comparative purposes: first, to provide information and contextual description
on political developments or phenomena that may be useful to other cases. Second, they may
be used to gain further understanding of (causal) mechanisms described in theories, through
testing of specific outcomes, or by creating new typologies for (existing) conceptual designs
(ibid.).
In this study both purposes apply; on the one hand, the transitional phase Cuba is in, would be
difficult to understand without an understanding of how specific circumstances in the
agricultural sector relate to Cuba’s political and economic context. Inevitably, this raises
questions about the pieces of evidence that need to substantiate this aim. Empirically speaking,
the decision-making process is only perceivable through the actual outcomes of policy. To
illustrate: the Cuban Lineamientos (guidelines) of 2011 are a result of some political process in
Cuba. The result of this political process may be regarded as a fact. However, when the political
process is analyzed and theory is translated to practice, some degree of interpretation and bias
from the researcher are always present. For this study, it means that the paradigm concept by
Kuhn and Hall’s policy paradigm require more interpretation than Mahoney & Thelen’s GCF,
as their concepts are based on thought structures and ideas. This makes it more difficult to
research it empirically.
In terms of generalizability a single country study will have its limitations, since the specifics
of one case – time, context and interpretation of evidence – are not one on one comparable to
the other (Landman, 2008: 93). Even so, Alvesson & Skoldberg (2009: 21) assert that
generalizing “beyond the empirical base” depends on your epistemological view, that is what
one considers the basis for knowledge that is true. Continuing, if a view accepts “nonobservables in the form of patterns and tendencies, common to and underlying several surface
phenomena, successive expansions of the empirical area of application within a certain domain
are both possible and desirable, even in qualitative studies” (ibid.: 22) In this study, it is
accepted there are non-observables when it concerns the policy process and change. Thus,
generalization on the basis of this case does not necessarily involve that its outcomes are
representative of other cases. Rather, it follows from expanding the empirical base of the
institutionalist models and their area of application in the policy process.
2.1.1 Process tracing
In the previous section the purposes of single country studies have been established. Also, it
was stated that specific outcomes are likely not applicable to other cases. Therefore, it is
important that the internal validity of a single country study is assured (Gerring, 2006: 43). It
means that what is intended to be investigated in the case is actually analysed. Otherwise, it
would defeat the purposes of the single country study. This holds especially for researching
mechanisms described in theories, wherein causal relations between a given set of variables
often play an important role. But through what kind of evidence do we establish the presence
of these (causal) relations?
28
A technique common to (single) case studies is process tracing, which will be used in this thesis
as well. Gerring characterizes process tracing as follows: “multiple types of evidence are
employed for the verification of a single inference – bits and pieces of evidence that embody
different units of analysis (they are each drawn from unique populations).” (ibid.: 173) Single
country studies – such as this thesis – rely on contextual information and deductive reasoning
to establish patterns or causal relations between variables (ibid.: 172).
For process tracing this means that different types of contextual information may be used as
evidence to verify a certain pattern or causal relations, such as in hypotheses and theories. In
the case of this thesis, this amounts to so-called ‘thick description’. This means that the
contextual information will be used to provide highly detailed accounts of specific
circumstances or situations that may have been relevant to the Cuban agricultural policy
process. This increases external validity, as different types of contextual information can
contribute to a better understanding of the phenomenon that is researched.
In practice, such information may include both quantitative and qualitative sources, such as
documents from experts, legal documentation, policy documents, but also media coverage and
historical accounts. Important to note is that these ‘bits and pieces of evidence’ are noncomparable to one another; their relative value cannot be determined for multiple samples –
as is the case with quantitative research – because they are unique to the sample that is
analyzed (such as Cuba). Thus, the value of evidence lies not in the amount of presented
evidence, but in the quality of the presented evidence and the manner of analysis (ibid.: 178179).
Nonetheless, an attempt is made to establish a convincing narrative in the Cuban case to be
able to test the hypotheses and answer the research question. This means that the nature of the
agricultural policies between 2007-2014 are assessed; using different sources and data, the
policy changes are evaluated with regard to the hypotheses that have been formulated for each
model.
2.1.2 Use of sources and data
The sources for this case study include multiple types of information, in line with the technique
of process tracing. Several academic research groups have published comprehensive studies
and analyses on the Cuban policy transition. These groups mostly consist of Cuban and
American economists, journalists and political scientists who research the ongoing
developments in Cuba. For a large part, these studies form the empirical basis for the analysis
of Cuba’s economic situation in general and – in particular – for the different agricultural
measures that have been taken. These sources have primarily been published in English and
29
were therefore accessible. For example, Cuba’s Economic Change in Comparative Perspective,
published by the Latin America Initiative Foreign Policy, covers a wide range of recent socioeconomic developments in relation to the Cuban policy transition. Data for economic variables
– such as GDP growth and outputs in the agricultural sector – are derived from one of two
extensive Handbooks, namely, Handbook of Contemporary Cuba. Economy, Politics, Civil
Society and Globalization.
Some first-hand sources – in Spanish – by the Cuban government on the agricultural policies,
could not be used due to the language barrier. Other governmental sources, such as the
Lineamientos and the Cuban Constitution, were available in English and could therefore be
included
in
the
analysis.
2.2 Explanandum
Cuba’s agricultural policy paradigm around 2007 was based on the policy course that had been
followed after the Cuban Revolution of 1959. At its heart was a state regulated economy,
centralized decision-making and a strong emphasis on maintaining an egalitarian society on
the basis of socialist values. Constant hostility towards capitalist countries, particularly the US,
has been part of this course and Fidel Castro’s rhetoric, up until his official resignation in 2008.
The State as the principal economic agent has been key in this policy course. In the agricultural
sector this was reflected by a centralized system of production and collection, primarily
dominated by state farms, so-called basic cooperative units (UBPCs) and the agricultural state
agency ACOPIO.
The focus on this overall policy framework – which is called the ‘Fidel paradigm’ in this thesis
– seems to have shifted towards an emphasis on economic growth and productivity after 2007.
The changes that are observed in the agricultural sector display a trend towards more marketbased strategies, decentralization and an emphasis on (agricultural) productivity. This
includes certain economic liberties for agricultural producers, such as more possibilities to
acquire financial resources and to receive direct payments from the tourism sector. There is
also greater autonomy for municipalities and agricultural producers to manage agricultural
production on a local level. In this respect, linkages between producers and consumers seem
also to have been simplified through several commercialization policies, allowing – in some
cases – farmers to directly sell to consumers.
The observed changes deviate from the Fidel paradigm, as they include more market-based
strategies, decentralization, economic liberties and an emphasis on overall (agricultural)
30
productivity. At the same time, however, the 2011 Lineamientos seem to be set up under the
principles of state centralization and non-ownership of private property. Thus, it remains to be
seen whether the agricultural changes mark a turnaround in Cuban policymaking, or are part
of incremental changes in the existing system. It is the aim of this study to provide an
explanation for the nature of these changes in the Cuban agricultural sector.
2.3 Operationalization
2.3.1 Selection of Cuban institutions
The Cuban institutions that have been selected to investigate how 3rd order change and layering
have played a role in Cuba’s agricultural sector are: The National Assembly of People’s Power
(NAPP), the Council of State, Council of Ministers and Communist Party of Cuba (PCC). These
four institutions represent governmental bodies in Cuba’s state system that are relevant for
explaining the agricultural institutional change. They have been selected because they are at
the heart of the policy process and are considered to be the most important (state) institutions
in Cuba (Celaya & Henken, 2013: 101). This choice has been made as it is likely that they have
been involved in the agricultural policy process and as institutional agents shaped specific
policy outcomes. Also, choices had to be made due to the limited scope of this particular
investigation. Nevertheless, the agricultural institutional change may also have been
influenced by societal elements. For example, the content of the Lineamientos was made
publicly available, so that it could be reviewed and commented on by Cuban citizens and
academics before the Sixth Party Congress (Catá Backer, 2016: 206). The following section
describes the Cuban institutional system and selected institutions in more detail.
Cuba’s institutional system
Before 1976, the Council of Ministers – with at its head the President – operated as the sole
governmental body with legislative and constitutional power. In practice, the President only
fulfilled a ceremonial role. The Prime Minister – a function established at the end of the Cuban
Revolution in 1959 – Fidel Castro, determined actual decision making through the Communist
Party (PCC) (ibid.: 256).
The basis for Cuba’s current political system lies with the Constitution of 1976 and is derived
from the Marxist-Leninist “unity of power” principle (Wise, 2000: 258-259). It means that all
executive and legislative powers can be traced back and should be subject to the representative
31
body of the Cuban people. For this purpose, the 1976 Constitution established two state
institutions alongside the Council of Ministers, the NAPP and the Council of State. While there
have been several constitutional amendments since 1976, these three institutions remain at the
heart of Cuba’s state structure today. The members of the Politburo – the highest ranking body
in the PCC – take in key positions across the mentioned institutions.
The National Assembly of People’s Power
The 1976 constitution formally established the NAPP as the representative body of the Cuban
people. Its delegates are chosen by regional and municipal assemblies of the PCC, which are
elected by the voters of each of the 14 provinces. However, since amendments of 1992 National
Assembly deputies can also be elected directly, without the approval of municipal and
provincial voters (ibid.: 261). The delegates are chosen for a period of five years. According to
article 73 of the Constitution, the NAPP fulfils a supervisory role vis-à-vis the Council of State
and the Council of Ministers in all law-making and governance. The NAPP gathers twice a year
to ratify laws, or so-called decree-laws from the Council of State. Theoretically, they hold
sovereign power in all matters of policy (Celaya & Henken, 2013: 101; Wise, 2000: 260). The
NAPP chooses the members of the Council of State and the President. On the initiative of the
President, the NAPP elects the Council of Ministers. Presiding the Council of State, the
President acts as head of State. Moreover, the President of the Council of State, is also head of
Government as Prime Minister in the Council of Ministers (Wise, 2000: 259).
The Council of State
Article 89 of the Constitution states that the Council of State represents the NAPP and all its
corresponding duties, when it is not in session.1 Furthermore, it is the official representative
body of the Cuban State. Since the NAPP is only in session twice a year, the Council of State is
effectively the most important legislative body. It is reflected by the authority of the Council of
State to issue decree-laws that take into effect immediately, without approval of the NAPP. This
aspect makes Cuba’s state structure unique. While the NAPP holds constitutional authority,
the Council of State may amend or annul laws made by the NAPP (Celaya & Henken, 2013:
102). Other important powers of the Council of State include summoning the NAPP into special
sessions, replace members of the Council of Ministers and ratifying international treaties.2
The Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers is the executive branch of government and forms Cuba’s official
government. It consists of a ten-member Executive Committee, which is composed by the
32
Prime Minister. The Executive Committee leads all governmental ministries and agencies,
thirty-one in total. Each of these bodies have their own head administrators.3 Following article
98 of the Constitution, the tasks of the Council of Ministers are to implement and carry out
laws and policies by the NAPP and the Council of State. They can draw up bills and propose
them to these respective bodies. In this capacity, they have discretion – if necessary – to fill in
the actual regulations required to carry out laws. Furthermore, they can make propositions and
plans for the development of Cuba on socio-economic terrain, as well as organize, conduct and
supervise the implementation of them.4
2.3.2 Exogenous and endogenous factors
Exogenous factors
Exogenous factors are external influences which have a major impact on the institutional
environment, specifically on the (agricultural) policy process. They are characterized by their
one-way direction, as the causes of these factors cannot be changed, nor removed.
Furthermore, they have a sudden nature, which makes it difficult to anticipate on their effects.
This translates to effects on the Cuban economy, which trickle down on the agricultural sector.
They may have their origin in global economic and financial conditions, such as the demand
for Cuban export products, increasing costs for food imports and the ability to obtain external
funding. Furthermore, when an economy heavily relies on the agricultural sector, climate
conditions may have a major impact on the economy as a whole.
Endogenous factors
Endogenous factors are influences from within the institutional environment that have
consequences for the policy process and can be influenced by the policy process itself. They
concern structural problems in the economy that have important consequences for the
performance of the agricultural sector. This may involve overall productivity, inefficiencies, or
economic
sectors
that
have
strong
linkages
with
the
agricultural
sector.
2.3.3 Model one – Hall
Operationalization of the policy paradigm
33
The research indicators for social learning are sufficient to assess specific policy changes in the
paradigm, but insufficient to say something of the paradigm as a whole. For this purpose, the
coherency of ideas that form the policy paradigm and their vulnerabilities are also important
to address. These elements point to the ‘state’ of ideas in the policy paradigm, for example,
when shifts are more likely to occur due to an inconsistent paradigm.
There are three factors Hall mentions that will likely precede a paradigm shift (or so-called 3rd
order change with social learning). These are respectively; the positional advantages of actors
in the broader institutional setting to influence the policy paradigm, more specifically the
policy process (H2); policy issues wherein the issue itself is less important than a debate on
who holds authority on the policy issue (H3); attempts with policy experiments to reaffirm the
existing policy paradigm and/or the presence of policy failures (H4).
The institutional agents that have been outlined, namely the NAPP, the Council of State and
the Council of Ministers will be used to assess the above indicators. Moreover, Raúl Castro will
be treated as a separate institutional agent. Indicator H2 is based on the resources these agents
have to change the paradigm. Resources are discretionary capacities, such as the authority to
change existing policies or impose new regulations. These authorities are derived from the
Cuban constitution, for example, the authority of the Council of State to issue decree-laws, or
the authority of the President to replace members of the Council of State.
Indicator H3 concerns who politicians – in this case, Rául Castro – assign authority to discuss
how policy issues should be dealt with. This includes, for instance, public debate about policy
issues by citizens or (state) enterprises. It may also involve speeches that question the
effectiveness of the existing policy course. Indicator H4 covers experiments with policies that
are meant to reaffirm socialist principles and leadership, for instance, promoting mass
demonstrations, nationalistic tendencies and mobilization of the youth. Policy failures are
considered unsuccessful attempts to implement such policies.
Operationalization of 3rd order change
The indicators for 3rd order change (H1) – as explained in the theoretical chapter – are as
follows: the instrument settings of policy, the policy instruments and the hierarchy of policy
goals. If changes in H1 have occurred in conjunction, so-called 3rd order policy change is
applicable. In the analysis is investigated whether changes in the agricultural policy domain
have occurred between 2007-2014 in these specific areas. Instrument settings refer to the
concrete specifics of the implementation of policy, such as the amount of land that can be
requested under usufruct and supplementary conditions. In this example, the policy
instrument is the usufruct itself, which is formalized into law or resolutions by one of the
34
institutional agents. Policy goals are derived from endogenous factors in the institutional
environment, which represent constraints in Cuba’s domestic economy, such as low
productivity
and
inefficiency.
2.3.4 Model two – Mahoney & Thelen
Operationalization of veto possibilities and veto players
Veto players are individual institutional actors or collective actors, such as a president or prime
minister that is assigned executive powers, or a parliament that is assigned legislative powers.
In the Cuban case, the selected institutional agents – the NAPP, Council of State, Council of
Ministers and PCC – are collective actors, while Rául Castro – as President, Prime Minister
and First Secretary – is an individual actor. Strong veto players may be able to block farreaching policy changes through veto possibilities (MT1); these are discretionary capacities
that have been derived from the Cuban constitution, similar to the operationalization of
positional
advantages
(H2).
Operationalization of the level of institutional ambiguity
The level of institutional ambiguity (MT2) will be derived from different policy measures
between 2007-2014 that contradict in the same policy issue. For instance, the freedom to
determine prices for agricultural products in the tourism sector, while at the same time
transactions are under government supervision. The less contradictory, the lower the level of
ambiguity.
Operationalization of discretional freedom
The level of discretional freedom (MT3) will be based on the possibilities of institutional agents
to determine the specific implementation of agricultural policy measures. That is to say, if a
policy framework – such as the Lineamientos or a decree-law – is introduced by the same
authority that also determines how the policy measures are implemented – specifying the
conditions of implementation and the duration – a high level of discretional freedom applies.
If such a policy framework needs to be specified by more than one institutional agent – in terms
of implementation – a low level of discretional freedom applies.
35
Operationalization of layering
Layering (MT4) will be recognized on the basis of existing agricultural policy measures – such
as the usufruct law – that are expanded by means of resolutions or decree-laws, while the
original policy measure remains intact.
36
Notes
1
CUBA CONST. of 1976, as amended 2002, art. 89: “The Council of State is the organ of the National
Assembly of People’s Power that represents it in the period between sessions, puts its resolutions into
effect and complies with all the other duties assigned by the Constitution. It is collegiate; and, for
national and international purposes, it is the highest representative of the Cuban State.”.
2
CUBA CONST. of 1976, as amended 2002, art. 90.
3
Ibid., articles 95 and 97.
4
Ibid., art. 98, subsection b.
37
Chapter 3 Cuba’s changing agricultural policy
In this chapter, an overview is presented of the various policy measures that have been taken
in the agricultural sector between 2007-2014. They are part of the explanandum, but due to
the length of the previous chapter they are presented here. The measures are chronologically
ordered by year, describing new regulations and intended changes to the sector. The measures
after 2011 were taken within the Lineamientos framework and are specified as such. After the
outline of the various policy measures, a discussion follows that details the most notable
changes.
3.1 Agricultural policy changes between 2007-2014
In the section below the agricultural policy changes between 2007-2014 have been listed in
chronological order. The measures that have been taken after the Lineamientos since 2011, are
listed
separately.
2007 – price reforms in the agricultural sector
The changes in Cuba’s agricultural sector are marked by the introduction of gradual price
reforms in 2007, which were implemented by the state procurement agency ACOPIO
(Gonzalez-Corso, 2013: 102). This agency is under the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG)
responsible for setting prices and managing supply and demand in the agricultural sector.
ACOPIO acts as an intermediary between producers and consumers and is authorized to buy
surpluses from individual farmers and cooperatives, to sell these in the tourism industry and
domestic markets (Alavarez, 2004: 2). The price reforms of 2007 meant that higher prices were
paid to farmers for a select group of agricultural products, such as milk, beef and rice. The
purpose of the price reforms was twofold: on the one hand, increasing agricultural outputs by
increasing farmers’ capacities. On the other hand, to stimulate farmers to sell their outputs
directly to ACOPIO, thereby increasing cost-efficiency of deliveries and fuel. A downside of this
measure was that efficient use of capacity in the dairy industry declined, as a result of less milk
deliveries. In the meat sector, higher outputs were hindered by the poor availability of farmer
supplies in state stores and the high price of the convertible peso currency, CUC (Nova
Gonzalez & Gonzalez-Corso, 2015: 177-178).
2008 – the usufruct law
In July 2008 decree-law 259 and 282 were issued by the Council of State, introducing
possibilities of usufruct. These laws made it possible for all non-state producers – individual
farmers and all cooperatives – to lease idle land from the State. The lease was for the duration
of ten years for so-called ‘natural persons’ – individual farmers – and ‘legal entities’ –
cooperatives – and was eligible for renewal, depending on the type of cultivated crop (ibid.:
178). While usufructuaries were allowed to exploit state-owned land, several restrictive
conditions remained. The State determined prices (through ACOPIO), established output
quotas for selling produce, and the type of cultivated crop. Also, usufruct rights are nontransferable and cannot be sold (Gonzalez-Corso, 2013: 102). Finally, decree-law 282
established the official procedure to request land by means of nine different documents. In the
most favourable case an application was processed in sixty-three days (Nova Gonzalez &
Gonzalez-Corso, 2015: 179-180).
2009-2011 – administrative decentralization
Following the usufruct law of 2008, a start was made with the decentralization of
administrative authority in Cuba’s agricultural sector. In 2010, this took form in a policy
experiment, wherein sixteen of Cuba’s municipalities acted as the principal administrative unit
to implement agricultural and economic measures set forth by the government (GonzalezCorso, 2013: 103). Any necessary decision making concerning the implementation of such
measures, could be made autonomously by the municipality (including the implementation of
the usufruct law). All food producers in municipalities – State and non-State – were involved
in this process. Currently, all 169 municipalities in Cuba have a Municipal Delegation of
agriculture, tasked with managing and transferring idle lands, in line with the usufruct model.
An additional decentralizing measure involved an experiment by the Ministry of Economy and
Planning (MEP), in which five municipalities were allowed to support self-management
initiatives of economic related (production) activities (ibid.).
Decentralization continued with decree-laws 287 and 294, which were issued by the Council of
State in November 2011. These decrees downsized the State apparatus in the food and
agricultural sector, effectively dissolving a number of ministries and transferring powers to
others. First, the Ministry of Food Industries and the Ministry of Fisheries were combined.
Second, the Ministry of Sugar (MINAZ) was dissolved and replaced by the holding company
AZCUBA, which directly reports to the Council of Ministers. A number of responsibilities were
39
transferred to MINAG and MEP, respectively the management of land for sugar production
and investments in the sugar sector by the State (Nova Gonzalez & Gonzalez-Corso, 2015: 181).
2010-2011 – commercializing agricultural surplus outputs
A number of commercialization policies were introduced to stimulate domestic production
outputs, providing usufructuaries with more options to sell their produce. Starting in 2010, it
became possible for agricultural producers to sell surplus outputs – after meeting delivery
quotas to the State – to (roadside) kiosks, either run by the State or cooperatives (GonzalezCorso, 2013: 104). Nonetheless, producers were required to pay taxes and special fees for the
use of these kiosks. In November 2011, additional commercialization resolutions were issued
by a number of State entities.1 These resolutions made it possible for non-State entities –
individual farmers and all cooperatives – to directly sell products to the tourism sector and
negotiate prices in CUPs (although with State supervision). Previously, this had only been
possible with intervention of the cooperative type CCS and state agency ACOPIO (Gómez,
2014: 35). However, the conditions only applied to part of the output, selected tourism
companies, and a select range of unprocessed products, such as rice, fruits and vegetables
(Gonzalez-Corso, 2013: 104).
2011 – credit and loans for farmers
Coinciding with the commercialization resolutions, decree-law 289 became in effect in
November 2011. This law was intended to provide self-employed workers, including private
farmers, with more financial options. It included the possibility to open business bank accounts
for receiving direct payments – such as from the tourism sector – and provided in more flexible
bank loans. For example, individuals could request credit for private purposes, such as home
repairs. Resolution 99, issued by the Central Bank of Cuba, specified that private farmers could
request loans of 500 CUPs or more, for purchasing equipment, materials, or other necessary
supplies for (re-)cultivation (Gonzalez-Corso, 2013: 104-105).
Lineamientos (2011-2014)
2012 – decree-law 300, ‘updated’ usufruct law
In October 2012, decree-law 300 was issued. This law ‘succeeded’ the original usufruct law
(259) and expanded the conditions for land in usufruct use. Private farmers already having
land in usufruct could now request up to 67 hectares, opposed to the previous 40 hectares. The
lease time for legal entities (cooperatives) was extended to twenty-five years, however, this did
40
not apply for natural persons. Furthermore, private farmers were now allowed to associate
themselves with other types of cooperatives than CCSs to acquire necessary supplies for
cultivation (Nova Gonzalez & Gonzalez-Corso, 2015: 184).
2013 – expand commercialization and increase outputs
To further stimulate the decentralization of agricultural production and consumption, the
commercialization resolutions were expanded in 2013; this was done by the same ministries
that issued them in 2011.2 The resolutions consisted of deregulatory measures, which lifted
several restrictions for selling agricultural products to the tourism sector. Specifically, all types
of agricultural producers were now allowed to sell directly to the tourism sector and not just a
selected few. Furthermore, more agricultural products were allowed to be sold. 3 Prices could
also be fully determined by buyers and sellers, although sales were subjected to a transaction
fee of nine CUPs per generated CUC (ibid.).
2013 – decree-law 318 and resolution 673
In October 2013, decree-law 318 was issued. The law involved another range of policies aimed
at decentralizing the commercialization of agricultural products. The measures applied to
three provinces4, and were meant to experiment – before nationwide implementation – with
new forms of market-based methods in the agricultural sector on the basis of supply and
demand and competition (Gómez, 2014: 35; Meso Lago, 2014: 53). Specifically, special
agricultural state markets (MAEs) were created where all agricultural producers – State and
non-State – were allowed to sell their products directly to customers. Additionally, such
agricultural markets could now be leased from the State – similar to the usufruct measure –
by non-agricultural cooperatives, which were established since 2011. These could act as sales
intermediaries for agricultural producers and products, and establish market prices without
State intervention (Nova Gonzalez & Gonzalez-Corso, 2015: 185).5 Previously, such prices were
determined by state agency ACOPIO. Issued at the same time with decree-law 318 was
resolution 673, which redefined the social responsibilities of all types of agricultural
cooperatives. This measure was in line with previous commercialization strategies. The
regulations extended the responsibilities of agricultural cooperatives, to include tasks as local
deliveries and act as sales intermediaries for small agricultural producers and consumers
(Gómez, 2014: 35).
41
2014 – plans to restructure MINAG
In 2014 several plans were made to restructure MINAG. These included plans for revising the
budgetary system of the ministry, as well as transferring administrative tasks to the provinces
and eliminating administrative layers in provinces and municipalities. Moreover, several
research institutes that are concerned with agriculture are to be combined with comparable
institutes within the department of Science (Nova Gonzalez & Gonzalez-Corso, 2015: 185).
The agricultural changes
As can be seen in the policy measures that have been outlined, several decrees were issued by
the Cuban government. These decrees introduced possibilities for individuals and cooperatives
to request idle land for farming purposes, including uncultivated land of government state
farms. Legal adjustments made it possible to sell agricultural products directly to the tourism
industry, which previously had only been possible on special farmer’s markets. Small
producers could now also receive direct payments from their customers in the tourism
industry, as it became possible to open bank accounts.
Such commercialization policies were extended by allowing agricultural producers to negotiate
their own prices with the tourism sector, which previously were determined exclusively by the
agricultural state agency ACOPIO. Other regulations that were taken extended the social
purposes of the UBPCs to include tasks as local deliveries and act as an intermediary for small
agricultural producers and consumers. In the past, these tasks had also been reserved for
ACOPIO.
Another significant change involved decentralization of the agricultural sector. Decisionmaking concerning agricultural production had been a centralized affair before the agricultural
policy changes. Before, the State determined – through the Ministry of Agriculture –
unilaterally how agricultural production should be conducted, specifying the conditions in
terms of yields, sales and deliveries. Contrary to these aspects, the observed changes display
more autonomy for provinces, municipalities and agricultural producers to manage
agricultural production. Increasing autonomy of state-run enterprises and “the development
of other forms of management” are part of policy measures that also fit in this context
(Alejandro & Villanueva, 2014: 85).
At the same time, however, the 2011 Lineamientos seem to be set up under the principles of
state centralization and non-ownership of private property. Thus, it remains to be seen
whether the agricultural changes mark a turnaround in Cuban policymaking, or are part of
incremental changes in the existing system.
42
Chapter 4 Analysis
First in this chapter is a discussion of the various exogenous and endogenous factors. It
addresses the relation of the factors to the empirical indicators for the institutional types of
change first, after which the factors are outlined, as part of the analysis. Next is the application
of model one (Hall) that starts with a discussion of the vulnerability of the existing policy
paradigm, followed by the analysis on 3rd order change in relation to the respective indicators
and the endogenous and exogenous factors that have been outlined. At the end of this analysis,
an answer is provided with regard to the hypotheses on 3rd order change. Continuing, model
two (Mahoney & Thelen) is analyzed on the basis of the indicators for gradual change – layering
– and the relation to the endogenous and exogenous factors, which is then followed by a
discussion of the hypotheses on gradual change.
4.1 Exogenous and endogenous factors
In this paragraph the exogenous and endogenous factors have been outlined. They precede the
analysis of the two models, as they are relevant for the indicators of both.
In relation to Hall’s model: the exogenous factors that are outlined below, are related to the
respective indicators ‘policy goals’, ‘instruments’ and settings’, in so far they lead to urgent
reasons for policymakers to change them or to follow a different policy course. That is to say,
these factors are influences that cannot be altered and may pressure existing policy goals,
instruments and settings in the agricultural policy domain. For instance, the hurricanes
between September and November 2008 had unexpected consequences for the agricultural
outputs and productivity, influencing a change of policy goals.
The endogenous factors play a central role in the policy goals, instruments and settings, as they
are defining for the consequences of earlier policy that policymakers deal with. Policy
instruments, goals or settings can be altered if policymakers assess that the consequences of
these endogenous factors may undermine the existing policy paradigm. For example, the low
productivity in the agricultural sector influenced the introduction of a new policy instrument,
such as the usufruct law.
In relation to Mahoney & Thelen’s model: endogenous factors act over a longer period of time
in the policy process. The result of such factors influence how resources are distributed among
institutional agents. This distribution affects power relations in the institutional environment
43
which have consequences for the veto possibilities of veto players, the level of ambiguity and
discretional freedom. In the same sense, exogenous factors work through in these power
relations. However, they are less important for explaining a process that results in gradual
change.
4.1.1 Exogenous factors
The food shortages and the dependency on food imports can be indicated as the principal
problems that needed to be solved by the agricultural policy measures. The dependency on
food from abroad belonged to exogenous influences that have affected the state of the Cuban
economy and have driven policy change since 2007, in particular in the agricultural sector.
Mesa-Lago (2014: 65) states: “food imports account for 70 percent of consumption and rose
from US$ 1.5 billion to US$ 2 billion in 2011-2013.” Thus, increasing agricultural productivity
was necessary to be able to decrease the dependency on food imports. In turn, overall economic
growth was important to develop the agricultural sector and make it more efficient and
productive.
Before 2007, Cuba’s GDP had increased each year in the new millennium, peaking with a
growth of 12.1 percent in 2006 (Vidal Alejandro, 2013: 70). Between 2004-2006 Cuba profited
from a number of favourable economic conditions. This included a trade agreement with
Venezuela in 2004, which provided in the export of Cuban medical services in return for the
import of Venezuelan oil. Alongside the increased export of medical services, Cuba also
profited from the relative high international market prices for nickel, an important Cuban
export product. A substantial increase of GDP growth between 2004-2006 – at constant prices
– and the increase of total exports can be seen in table 1.
44
Table 1 GDP Growth and Foreign Exchange Constraints, 2000-2010
Source: Vidal Alejandro, 2013: 70
However, between 2006-2009 several exogenous developments laid bare structural
weaknesses of Cuba’s external economy and constrained economic growth. The first constraint
involved changed market conditions after 2006, concerning import and export of goods and
services. Although export prices for a number of goods – such as tobacco – increased, this was
not the case for other traditional Cuban export goods. Revenues from Cuba’s principal export
products, nickel and sugar, declined due to lower international prices, while food products on
the international market became more expensive. Though not directly linked to Cuba’s
domestic economy, the demand for Cuban medical services to Venezuela stagnated and had
consequences for the total import of Venezuelan oil (ibid.: 66-67). In line with the worsened
trade conditions, GDP growth between 2006-2009 declined significantly, with more than 10
percent. This trend is illustrated in table 3.6
The developments coincided with the worldwide financial crisis and Cuba’s precarious
financial position in 2008. It made the necessity to increase agricultural productivity
increasingly urgent. In first instance, Cuba’s financial position had become more pressing due
to increasing external debts. This becomes apparent in table 2, which illustrates how debts
have continued to increase since 2003, and significantly in 2008. In 2010, Cuban debts
reached “an estimated US$ 22.3 billion, representing 47.1 percent debt of its GDP.” (Pérez
Villanueva, 2013: 69) During the global financial crisis this made it more difficult to obtain
credit and funding to invest in economic growth strategies. Thus, Cuba’s financial position was
not only under pressure due to worsened trade conditions and declining growth, but also due
to difficulties to obtain external funding and credit (Vidal Alejandro, 2013: 71).
45
Table 2 Total External Debt, 2000-2010
Source: Vidal Alejandro, 2013: 69
Internationally, Cuba’s trade position had been hindered by the continuing trade embargo of
the US, in place since 1962. The last amendment was made in 2000 which involved an
exception for the export of agricultural goods for humanitarian purposes. Between 2001-2010
food imports from the US amounted for an approximate value of US$ 3.4 billion. This formed
the main share of Cuba’s total food demands of the approximate 70 percent it imported on food
and agricultural goods. In 2009 alone, total food imports were reported to be worth US$ 1.5
billion (González-Corso, 2013: 101).
The latter points to another constraint for economic growth and (agricultural) productivity,
concerning Cuba’s import/export sector as a whole. Although the overall exports of Cuban
goods increased since 2002 (see table 1), the import of goods surpassed them by far. This aspect
is best illustrated in table 3 by the overall imports of goods in 2008, exceeding trade exports
by 10.5 billion pesos. In subsequent years the deficit of imports/exports continued and added
to Cuba’s external debt (see table 2). This development came even to the point that “(…) the
government deliberately withheld foreign payments, especially in 2009.” (Pérez Villuaneva,
2014: 30). It shows how volatile Cuba’s financial position was at the time, having both negative
consequences for GDP growth (see table 1 and 3) and the dependency on (food) imports.
46
Table 3 Reforms and Macroeconomic Performance in Cuba: 2006-2013
Source: Mesa-Lago, 2014: 64
Coinciding with the exogenous developments that have been described, a series of three
hurricanes struck Cuba in 2008. These damaged Cuban infrastructure, housing and affected
agricultural outputs. As seen in table 3, agricultural growth percentages severely declined from
19.6 percent in 2007 to 0.6 percent in 2008. In 2010, a negative output of 5.1 percent can be
observed. It meant that Cuban dependency on food imports was especially critical between
2008-2010. Finally, agricultural production outputs in percentages of GDP stagnated and have
remained at similar levels since 2007.
Even though the agricultural sector does not appear influential in terms of percentages GDP
(around 3.6 percent), it has been suggested that productivity in the agricultural sector is of
“strategic importance” due to its direct linkages to other sectors of the economy, such as
transportation, industry, energy, tourism and infrastructure (Nova Gonzalez & GonzalezCorso, 2015: 176). Hence, policy measures intended to increase productivity in the agricultural
sector seem not only related to the exogenous sources of change that have been described. The
agricultural linkages suggest that endogenous sources of change have played a role as well and
became
increasingly
urgent
in
the
light
of
these
external
developments.
4.1.2 Endogenous factors
The start of Raúl’s government in 2008 was characterized by a faltering economy, declining
economic growth, high dependency on food from abroad and limitations in foreign trade,
investments and exports. In the light of the food shortages and economic difficulties, Raúl
Castro labelled food production as ‘a matter of national security’ and acknowledged that
structural reforms were necessary. After 2006, low productivity of the economy became one of
the main concerns in the agricultural sector, which had been of less concern until then. Overall
47
productivity suffered from a number of structural problems in the Cuban economy, which can
be summarized as follows (Pérez Villanueva, 2013: 23; Pujol, 2008):

the strong centralization of the economy and restricted market conditions;

inefficiencies in the agricultural sector and its linkages with other economic sectors;

distortions in the economy, particularly due to the dual currency system;

relative low wages and the lack of incentives for workers to be more productive
In the basis, centralization of the Cuban economy around 2006 revolved around large (staterun) enterprises, planned production and state employment. The government acted in this
context as the central organ for assigning resources to enterprises for their inputs, establishing
production outputs and delivery to the state (Meso-Lago, 2014: 49). This aspect has had
adverse effects on production efficiency in three ways. First, the top-down coordination of
production has made the allocation of resources a bureaucratic and cumbersome process.
Second, restrictive conditions for enterprises and service entities – what to produce and whom
allowed to deliver to – in combination with relative low wages have led to disincentives to
produce (Cordovi & Pérez, 2014: 26; Pujol, 2008: 1-2). Third, these restrictions on ‘free’
production also meant that Cuba’s domestic market primarily relied on ‘domestic production
outputs or imports’ (Meso-Lago, 2014: 49). Thus, domestic production highly depended on the
domestic linkages between different economic sectors.
The latter is illustrated by the aforementioned linkages of the agricultural sector with other
sectors of the economy. Nova Gonzalez & Gonzalez-Corso (2015: 176) assess that these linkages
represent about 20 percent of Cuba’s GDP and that “80 percent of the labor force is either
directly or indirectly related to agriculture (in terms of employment and economic activities).”
Cuba’s sugar sector, for instance, has become an important supplier of sugar cane to harvest
renewable energy from biomass. It has been suggested that such agricultural linkages have
important spillover effects – either positive or negative – on other economic sectors (ibid.).
Hence, the ‘strategic importance’ of the agricultural sector will be considered as an endogenous
source of change.
Cuba’s financial and monetary system takes a prominent place in the centralization of the
economy and is led by the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC), which oversees the nine state-owned
banks and several other financial institutions. The linkages between economic sectors can be
traced back to Cuba’s financial system, since it plays a central role in the distribution of
(financial) resources to the various economic sectors. The BCC thereby acts as the central state
apparatus managing the balance of payments and the execution of monetary and fiscal policies
(Vidal Alejandro, 2014: 73-74). This includes the dual-currency system and exchange rate of
CUPs and CUCs; the first functions as the local currency in the domestic economy, while the
48
latter functions as a convertible currency – linked to the value of the US dollar – to regulate its
dynamics.
Effectively, the dual currency system has led to a system where multiple markets exist. On the
one hand, economic sectors that primarily operate with CUCs, such as the tourism sector and
large (state) enterprises active in export markets. On the other hand, domestic sectors that
operate with CUPs, such as the agricultural sector. The combined existence of these two
markets have resulted in distortions of the Cuban economy and have negatively impacted
overall productivity and efficiency. A distortion that illustrates this problem is the limited
access to CUCs for the majority of Cubans. They receive their wages in CUPs, but are
disadvantaged due to a high exchange rate, low monthly salaries and certain goods that are
only offered in CUCs (Pujol, 2008: 9).7 The high level of state employment – 1.6 percent in
2008 – has contributed to these low wages, while at the same time leading to unnecessary state
jobs. Altogether, such factors have led to disincentives in labor productivity and overall
inefficiency (Meso-Lago, 2014: 53).
These distortions intensified in 2008, due to the exogenous developments that have been
described earlier. Cuba’s difficulties to obtain credit and its high external debt, the worsened
terms of trade and the consequences of the hurricanes, were followed by a domestic financial
crisis. This crisis pressured the financial system even more, due to a dramatically devaluated
CUC and the inability to fulfil foreign financial obligations. Additionally, the financial risks lay
exclusively with the BCC and were not spread among other Cuban banks (Videl Alejandro,
2014: 74). It meant that the consequences of the domestic crisis affected the financial economic
system in its core. Taking the described consequences and distortions into account, the
centralization of the economy will be considered as an endogenous source of change.
One of the primary reasons for low productivity in the agricultural sector has been the
inefficient use of arable land. In table 4, this trend is reflected by the amount of total arable
land in December 2007, which included 2988 hectares of cultivated land and 3631 hectares of
uncultivated land.
49
Table 4 Distribution of Agricultural Land in 2007
Source: Mesa-Lago, 2014: 52
It meant that more than 50 percent of Cuba’s land was not even used for agricultural
production. As also can be seen, state-owned land comprised 35.8 percent, in comparison to
45.9 percent for cooperatives (UBPC/CPA) and 18.3 percent for private farmers. The highest
difference between cultivated land and uncultivated land can be found under the state sector,
with 23.2 percent of cultivated land opposed to 46.3 percent of uncultivated land.
These numbers draw attention to another important aspect in the agricultural sector, relating
to the earlier discussed centralization of the economy. Herein, the distribution of land between
the ‘State’ and ‘Non state’ sectors plays a key role. Similar to other large enterprises, state farms
were subject to the centralized organization of production, which impeded their production
efficiency. In fact, similar conditions applied to production efficiency under the cooperative
sector (UBPC/CPA). Although these cooperatives do not officially belong to the State sector,
they remained under the control of ACOPIO. This state agency, responsible for the collection
of agricultural goods and establishing prices, has been criticized by Raúl Castro, Cuban
academics and the ANAP for its inefficiencies during the 1990s and early 2000s. Amongst
others, criticism involved the central pricing system – still in place in 2006 – and squandering
of goods in the collection chain, due to inadequate storage and the lack of sufficient
transportation (Alvarez, 2004: 2-3).
50
4.2 Application of model one – Hall
This paragraph consists of two sections; the first section (4.2.1) analyzes the state of the
existing policy paradigm. That is to say, it discusses if the policy paradigm has been vulnerable
for contending policy ideas before the agricultural policy measures of 2007. This will be
assessed on the basis of the indicators ‘positional advantages’, ‘debate on who holds authority
over policy issues’ and ‘policy experiments or failures’.
In the second section (4.2.2) the indicators for 3rd order change will be assessed in relation to
the endogenous and exogenous factors, in conjunction with any vulnerabilities of the existing
policy paradigm that have been established in the first section (4.2.1).
4.2.1 Assessing the vulnerability of the policy paradigm
The so-called ‘Battle of Ideas’ was launched by Fidel Castro launched in 2000. In practice, this
meant the reaffirmation of Cuban socialism and socialist values over new economic strategies,
as the principle way to develop Cuba in the future. This ‘Battle of Ideas’ followed reforms that
took place in the early 1990s, formally known as the ‘Special Period’. The definition was given
by the Cuban state to characterize a period of adjustment to new circumstances after the fall of
the Soviet Union in 1989. Until then, the Soviet Union formed a principal export market for
Cuba’s main agricultural products such as sugar and citrus, on which it received substantial
subsidies. These conditions significantly changed after the trade agreements with the Soviet
Union ceased to exist in 1991. Between 1989 and 1991 Cuba’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
decreased by 25 percent. It meant among other things that food imports stagnated, resulting
in significant food shortages. Gonzalez (2003: 727) notes: “Between 1989 and 1994, per capita
caloric intake in Cuba had dropped from 2908 to 1863 calories.”
The Special Period was characterized by the absence of a socialist strategy that could close the
economic gap of the Soviet Union and solve the food shortages. Interestingly, the reforms
introduced liberalizing market policies, allowed entrepreneurship and focused on the
development of the tourism sector (Font, 2009: 44). Additionally, several decentralizing
measures were taken in Cuba’s agricultural sector to stimulate local production. This included
the possibility to sell excess production at farmer’s markets and the right to start farming as an
individual (Gonzalez, 2003: 715).
After the Special Period ended in 1994, the Cuban leadership emphasized that these
adjustment policies were only temporary measures. Although they had positive effects on the
51
economy, fear for loss of control over the economy and rising inequality were prevalent
(Espinosa Chepe & Henken, 2013: 160). Nonetheless, the introduction of a redefined ‘Cuban’
socialist vision would wait until the late 1990s. The Battle of Ideas returned to the core belief
of Cuban socialism. In the aspiration for an egalitarian society, it focused on social and
educational development over economic growth. At the same time, Fidel Castro used the Battle
of Ideas as a political instrument. Its main implications can be summarized as follows (Font,
2009: 48-50):

reconfirmation of the Cuban leadership and the superiority of socialism;

reemphasis and awareness of socialist values;

free access to education and healthcare for all;

strengthening (young) Cuban nationalism and anti-US sentiments;

the state as the principal economic agent in a centralized economy;

abolishment of ‘market’ reforms from the Special Period and rolling back dollarization
of the economy
Before the official succession of Fidel Castro by his younger brother Raúl in 2008, Raul Castro
had been Second Secretary of the PCC, First Vice President of the Council of State and
Ministers, as well as minister of The Revolutionary Armed Forces. In the summer of 2006 Fidel
delegated most of his function to his younger brother, after which Raúl assumed authority as
provisional President of the Council of State, First Secretary of the PCC and head of the armed
forces. The presidential mandate includes amongst others replacing any member of the
Council of Ministers (the Cabinet), supervision of any ministry or state agency (and assume
authority over them at any given time), as well as the mandate to sign decree-laws or
resolutions from the Council of State and Council of Ministers.8 Six other high ranking officials
were also appointed by Fidel. They had to fulfil tasks in policy areas that were emphasized in
the
Battle
of
Ideas,
such
as
education
and
energy
(Castellanos,
2013:
412).
Vulnerability in the Fidel paradigm – as indicated by: ‘positional advantages’, ‘debate on
who holds authority over policy issues’ and ‘policy experiments or failures’
The Battle of Ideas remained the prevalent Cuban vision on socialism at least until Fidel
Castro’s (unofficial) resignation as leader in 2006 due to illness. The ‘Fidel paradigm’ – as
outlined in the explanandum – will act as the benchmark for any 3rd order policy change we
might see after 2006. Hall’s factors that indicate the vulnerability of a policy paradigm for
change are used to assess the state of the Fidel paradigm. Recapitulating from previous
chapters these are: ‘positional advantages’, ‘emphasis on authority’ and ‘policy experiments
and failures’.
52
During the period of the ‘provisional’ succession, several speeches between 2006-2008 made
clear that Raúl endorsed the idea of structural reforms and thought them to be necessary. He
criticized the agricultural sector for the inefficient use of uncultivated land and pointed out
that Cuba’s limited resources were used for food imports, while this food could easily be
produced on the island itself. As soon as his presidency became official in February 2008, Raúl
took his first measure and lifted the ban on the sales of electronic and household devices
(Espinosa Chepe & Henken, 2013: 162).
The transition of power from Fidel to Raúl had effectively been legitimized by the Cuban
constitution. Although the NAPP appointed Raúl as Fidel’s successor, the Council of State
would have been able to overrule a different decision at any given time. The presidential
authorities allowed Raúl to make unilateral decisions in the Council of State – decree-laws –
that were defining for the creation of a new policy course. First, Raúl replaced officials across
all state institutions with people that supported him. Most of these supporters came from the
military, among them Jose Machado Ventura, who succeeded Raúl as Second Secretary of the
PCC and First Vice President of the Council of State (Castellanos, 2013: 413). Second, he
dismissed two of six officials that were appointed by Fidel and reorganized the Council of
Ministers. Third, a special anti-corruption committee was established (Park, 2015: 181). The
measures illustrate the extent of the political power Raúl exerted at the beginning of his
presidency.
As (provisional) President it became immediately clear that Raúl was the new leading authority
in the overall policy course Cuba would follow. This is reflected by the repeated speeches of
Raul emphasizing the need to reform internally, but also by his openness about normalizing
the relations with the US. Shifts in authority are seen in the dismantlement of the Battle of
Ideas framework, such as the normalization of US relations. The nationalistic mass
demonstrations that were part of the Battle of Ideas were dissolved, as well as its inadequate
educational program (Castellanos, 2013: 412).
Authority was also given to public enterprises, several state agencies and the NAPP; Raul posed
them the question which kinds of problems and difficulties they experienced in Cuba’s
economy. The most prominent problems that were identified included centralized decisionmaking and bureaucracy (Pujol, 2008: 1). Additionally, Cuban research institutes active in
social studies were consulted across a range of policy subjects, such as the functioning of
agricultural cooperatives, participatory democracy and social inequality (Ríos, 2014: 53).
Raul’s emphasis on authority first – decisions about who should be authoritative in policy
issues – indicates the vulnerability of the Fidel paradigm.
53
The Battle of Ideas can be seen as a last attempt for socialist renewal in Cuba, reverting back
to ‘old’ methods from the 1960s and 1980s. Specifically, it entailed a renewal of conservative
socialism, one in which the State plays a central role in managing economic and social
development. It also included enmity towards the US and imperialism, as clear symbols of the
threats to socialism. The endorsement of socialism through mass mobilizations played a key
role in these matters and was meant to make the youth enthusiastic for the ideals of the Cuban
revolution. However, new and different circumstances applied at the beginning of the
millennium. Cuban society had changed. For example, mobilizing the younger generation for
a common socialist ideal had been increasingly difficult to achieve, especially with rising
inequality and limited prospects for the future (Font, 2009: 64). The economic circumstances
were also different; reverting back the dollarization in a number of sectors – such as tourism,
transportation and trade – would have required a complete turnaround. With increased
interdependency of these sectors, domestically and internationally, this would have hardly
been possible.
In several aspects, the Battle of Ideas can be considered as a policy experiment. The Battle of
Ideas was not only an ideological attempt for socialist renewal. It served as a political
instrument for Fidel Castro in reaffirming the usefulness of socialism in Cuban society, and to
re-establish his political authority. The Battle of Ideas was linked exclusively to Fidel’s
leadership of Cuba. This aspect made the Fidel paradigm vulnerable in case his leadership
would come to an end. Moreover, the use of outdated methods showed the inability to adapt
the Cuban model to new circumstances and a changed society. It also shows that the Fidel
paradigm became less credible as a policy framework. Even during the implementation of the
Battle of Ideas, considerable support for structural reforms had already been present, most
prominently from Fidel’s brother Raúl (ibid.). Considering these aspects and the fact that Fidel
Castro himself, during an interview in 2010, acknowledged that the ‘Cuban model’ did not work
any longer for Cuba, the Battle of Ideas – representative for the Cuban model under Fidel –
can be considered as a policy failure (Goldberg, 2010).
4.2.2 Analysis of 3rd order change
54
Starting with the transition of power to Raúl Castro, measures were taken to achieve more
stability in the agricultural sector and expand it (they have been outlined in the previous
chapter). As such, they would play a significant role for a changed economic policy course.
Several policy goals have been leading for the policy measures that have been taken since 2007.
They relate to the structural problems Cuba’s economy had been facing under the Fidel
paradigm and can be derived from the endogenous factors. The most important goal that can
be identified in the agricultural policy measures is the aim to increase agricultural production
outputs. The other goals are:

Increase the use of arable land;

Increase self-employment;

Incentivize/commercialize agricultural production;

Decentralize authority and diminish bureaucracy
These other goals are subordinate to the ‘primary’ goal of production, because they all –
directly or indirectly – are related to this goal. As explained before, these measures were taken
within the context of Cuba’s stagnating economy. In table 5 an overview is given of the
measures. They are categorized on the basis of the three indicators, policy goals, policy
instruments and policy settings. Additionally, the last row includes any adjustments of the
policy settings and mentions policy instruments that were introduced at a later time.
Table 5 Overview of Policy Measures in the Agricultural Sector since 2007.
Policy goal
Policy instrument
(in order of
(Pi)
Policy setting (Ps)
Adjustment and/or new
policy instrument
hierarchy)
Increase
All of the below
All of the below
All of the below
Increase the
Usufruct law;
Cooperatives and
(Ps) - Usufruct conditions are
use of arable
possibility to lease idle
individuals may lease land
extended; more land can be
land/increase
lands from the State
under specific conditions
requested by farmers and
agricultural
production
self-
cooperatives
employment
Incentivize
1.
agricultural
Price reforms
1.
through ACOPIO
production
2.
Commercialization
of agricultural
products
2.
Higher prices paid for
1.
(Ps) - Prices may be
select agricultural
determined by buyers/sellers,
products
although under supervision
Sales of selected
2.
(Ps) - All producers may sell
agricultural products in
to the tourism sector and
kiosks and to the
more types of products may
be sold; (Pi) - Wholesale
55
tourism sector under
markets (in three provinces)
specific conditions
for farmers, establishing
market prices without State
3.
3.
Open business bank
Loans and credits
accounts, receive direct
for self-employed
payments and request
workers, such as
credit for private
individual farmers
purposes and materials
intervention
3.
(Pi) - Responsibilities of
cooperatives extended; new
services for small agricultural
producers
Decentralize
Autonomy for
Municipalities carry out
(Ps) - Reorganization of
authority in
municipalities and
usufruct measures and
ministries, in particular MINAG;
the
provinces
make autonomous use of
agricultural
sector/
resources
transferring tasks to provinces and
municipalities
diminish
(Pi) – Decentralization
bureaucracy
experiment takes place in three
to improve
provinces with agricultural
efficiency
production on the basis of supply
and demand
The policy measures that have been taken under Raúl Castro’s government since 2007,
contradict the Fidel paradigm in many ways. The first aspect is the emphasis on economic
productivity – under Raúl – versus – under Fidel – the emphasis on social development and
nationalism. The emphasis on economic productivity as an endogenous factor becomes most
apparent in the agricultural sector through the usufruct law of 2008. This law was intended to
boost the agricultural productivity by making better use of the 55 percent of land that was still
uncultivated in 2007. However, this was not the only purpose. It was also meant to provide
more possibilities for self-employment of individuals and to create jobs outside the State
sector. In contrast, policy goals in the Fidel paradigm were not aimed at economic productivity,
but rather on social development and nationalism. Under the Battle of Ideas, this was reflected
by policy measures that promoted access to education, healthcare and mass employment
(Font, 2008: 51). Besides the lay-off of workers active in the sugar-industry, the Fidel paradigm
did not include any policies to increase agricultural productivity.
This contrast draws attention to the second contradiction, which is related to the organization
of the economy. Under the Fidel paradigm, small-scale entrepreneurship was discouraged and
policy measures were taken to discourage the use of US dollars. Transaction fees for the use of
dollars were applied and buying goods and services with dollars was prohibited. The Fidel
paradigm aimed for a centralized state apparatus and was driven by the idea that a strong
economy was to be found in state organized employment and strictly regulated production.
This endogenous factor is related to the recent agricultural policy measures in several respects,
56
the most prominent of which is the decentralization of authority in the agricultural sector.
Under Raúl, more autonomy was given to municipalities and provinces to regulate agricultural
production. Furthermore, ministries – such as MINAG – and government institutions were
reorganized or combined to remove inefficient layers of bureaucracy.
Alongside the decentralizing policy measures with more autonomy for municipalities and
provinces, were policies aimed at incentivizing agricultural production. These measures also
had decentralizing characteristics, but – more importantly – their settings introduced
liberalizing market-based elements. Initially, higher prices for a range of agricultural products
were paid to farmers by the state procurement agency ACOPIO in 2007. Additional measures
followed soon after in 2010, such as the sale of selected agricultural products to the tourism
sector and more freedom to determine prices. It also became possible – for individuals – to
receive loans from banks and direct payments for selling products (such as in the tourism
sector). The policy measures were gradually extended to include experimentation with
wholesale markets in 2013. With the wholesale markets, it became possible to directly sell
agricultural products under ‘free’ market prices to consumers.
Such policy initiatives would not have been possible under the Fidel paradigm; the aim for a
centralized economy with regulated production and state employment clearly contradicts with
the policy measures that have been taken in the agricultural sector. In terms of policy goals,
the emphasis on social development has shifted towards economic growth and production. The
State as the principal agent in a centralized economy does no longer hold in the agricultural
sector. In terms of policy instruments, shifts can be observed not only in terms of allowing
aspects such as self-employment, but also in terms of actively promoting it (such as with the
usufruct law). Finally, the policy settings in the agricultural policy measures contradict with all
key policy objectives of the Fidel paradigm, even though they do not specifically include the
agricultural sector.
In the context of the Fidel paradigm, policy goals have shifted between 2007-2010. At the same
time, these goals were accompanied by the introduction of new policy instruments and
settings. This holds true for the economic strategy that has been followed, consisting of a more
liberal market-based strategy with production incentives, the commercialization of
agricultural products and decentralization of authority. All of these measures were – directly
or indirectly – related to the policy goal of increasing overall agricultural production. Between
2011-2014 policy goals did not change; only adjustments of existing policy instruments – such
as the usufruct law – were made and some new policy instruments were introduced (such as
wholesale markets). These adjustments are consistent with 1st and 2nd order changes.
Concluding, we may assess that 3rd order policy change occurred between 2007-2010, while
policy change between 2011-2014 was consistent with 1st and 2nd order changes.
57
As has been established earlier, Cuban food dependency was critical between 2008-2010.
Exogenous pressures – adverse climate conditions and the financial crisis – during this period
intensified the already existing endogenous factor of low (agricultural) productivity and
resulted in food shortages. As a consequence, increasing agricultural production had become
a top priority between 2007-2010. This is reflected by the agricultural policy measures and the
shift of policy goals, instruments and settings. It also follows from the majority of measures
that came from decree-laws by the Council of State. Exogenous factors did not only trigger this
response, but also accelerated the implementation of a new regulatory policy course. Above all,
they intensified the problems caused by endogenous factors that had already been present
during the Fidel paradigm. These included (financial) distortions in the economy, low
productivity and inefficiency in the agricultural sector. Such factors were openly debated in
Raúl Castro’s speeches and played a role in public debate about how policy issues should be
handled. The dismissal of several government officials by Raúl Castro also points to a shift in
authority over policy issues. Moreover, the Battle of Ideas framework consistently undermined
the credibility of the Fidel paradigm in these matters.
Moving forward with what has been established, the hypotheses with respect to model one can
be assessed as follows:
a) If a weak policy paradigm is observed, then it is likely that exogenous factors trigger a
process of 3rd order change.
Indicators H2, H3 and H4 (see Figure 1) point out that the Fidel paradigm was vulnerable for
a turnaround of the existing policy course around 2007 and can be considered as ‘weak’.
Exogenous factors triggered a process of 3rd order change in the economic policy course that
was defining for the agricultural policy measures between 2007-2011. The necessity to reform
the economic sector created momentum for a simultaneous shift of policy goals, instruments
and settings as reflected in the agricultural policy measures. This transition came forth out of
financial necessity on the international markets, the dependency on food imports and the
increasing pressure on economic growth and agricultural productivity. As such, the hypothesis
is confirmed.
b) Exogenous factors make a process of 3rd order change more likely, if the existing policy
paradigm is pressured by endogenous factors in the institutional environment.
The inconsistencies in the Fidel paradigm made the paradigm vulnerable for a policy
transition, while at the same time it was pressured by endogenous factors. The consequences
of such factors undermined the policy course of the Fidel paradigm. Structural problems in the
economic and agricultural sector – low productivity, inefficiency and distortions in the
58
economy – became increasingly important to deal with under the influence of exogenous
factors. It can be assessed that endogenous factors undermined the effectiveness of the policy
course of the existing paradigm, whereby exogenous factors intensified their consequences. As
a result, attention was given to policy goals, instruments and settings of previous policy, and
to adjust them where necessary. Concluding, the pressure of endogenous factors on the existing
policy paradigm, under the influence of exogenous factors, made a policy transition with a 3rd
order outcome more likely. The hypothesis is confirmed.
4.3 Application of model two – Mahoney & Thelen
The analysis of the second model starts with a brief overview of the most important veto players
and veto possibilities in the Cuban policy process. The subsequent indicators ‘ambiguity’,
‘discretional freedom’ and ‘change of settings’ are discussed in relation to the agricultural
policy measures and the veto players that played a role. Finally, a conclusion is drawn on the
process of layering in the agricultural policy process and the influence of the outlined
exogenous
and
endogenous
factors
at
the
beginning
of
this
chapter.
Veto players and their veto possibilities
The veto players that can be identified in the agricultural policy process are:

The President, Prime Minister, the First Secretary (Raúl Castro as individual veto
player);

The Council of State;

The Council of Ministers;

The NAPP and the PCC
The Constitution considers the PCC leading for the organization of society and the State, while
the NAPP has the ‘highest supervision’ over both Councils.9 As such, their mandate is highly
ambiguous and limits their veto possibilities in the actual policy process. In contrast, the
Council of State holds extensive legislative powers in Cuba’s institutional system. It can issue
decree-laws and amend or annul laws that have been introduced by the NAPP. Hence, the
overall policy course is primarily defined through the laws the Council of State issues. In this
respect it has strong veto possibilities compared to the NAPP. Although the NAPP officially
holds similar constitutional authority as legislative body, it is effectively subordinate to the
Council of State and its President. This is reflected by the election of the Council of Ministers
59
by the NAPP, while in fact, this Council is formed on the initiative of the President.
Additionally, the Council of State represents the NAPP when it is not in session (which only
occurs twice a year). Veto possibilities of the NAPP are also undermined because the President
acts as Prime Minister of the Council of Ministers and has the authority to replace its members
at any given time.
The Council of Ministers acts as the executive body that carries out laws of the Council of State
and the NAPP through its various ministries and state agencies. However, it may also draft
bills and propose them for approval to the Council of State or NAPP. After approval, they
become ‘resolutions’ that build on existing laws – such as decree-laws – and fill in or extend
specific details of policy measures. While the Council of Ministers has no veto possibilities to
fundamentally change policy outcomes, it is able to direct outcomes at the ‘margins’ of
policymaking.
Ambiguity, discretion, policy settings and veto players in the agricultural policy process
The dynamics between veto players can best be characterized by the introduction of the
usufruct law in 2008. Without the approval of the NAPP, the Council of State issued decreelaw 259 in July 2008 as a solution to the exogenous factors of rising costs of food and the
dependency on imports from abroad. Briefly before, in February 2008, both the Council of
State and the Council of Ministers had been reorganized by Raúl Castro. The wide access of
discretionary resources that were disposable to Raúl, as President, Prime Minister and First
Secretary, allowed Raúl to control the policy reforms – as an individual veto player – across all
levels of governance. This was reflected by a high level of discretion of both the Council of State
and the Council of Ministers to direct the policy course.
The policy reforms between 2007-2011 followed a process wherein the Council of State
determined the policy course by means of decree-laws. This course included the distribution
of State-owned land to the non-State sector, marketization of the agricultural sector and
administrative decentralization. These policies are related to the endogenous factor of low
productivity and inefficiency in the agricultural sector. The Council of Ministers could finetune these policies during their implementation by issuing resolutions. The commercialization
resolutions of 2010-2011 are a fine example of how policy settings changed. State agencies that
were directly involved with commercialization, such as the ministries of agriculture, tourism,
finance and prices and the BCC, introduced additional measures to ‘support’ the policy course
set out by the Council of State.
This policy course was highly regulated, specifying into detail – either in decree-laws or
resolutions – exactly what was allowed and under which conditions. Again, the usufruct law
60
serves a perfect example; in decree-laws 259 and 282 it was exactly specified how much land
could be requested by individuals, under which terms and by what procedure. The same
applied to the sale of agricultural products to the tourism sector; the resolutions specified
which products could be sold and how much, even though prices could be determined by
buyers and sellers. These policy measures were highly unambiguous and left no room open for
contending interpretations of their implementation. It shows that despite the introduction of
significant reforms in Cuba’s economic model, centralized decision-making by the State and
constraints on ‘free’ agricultural production remained in place. This is peculiar, as it had been
acknowledged by Raúl Castro that this same State had been unable to achieve sufficient levels
of (food) production. In fact, the inefficiencies in the agricultural sector had been largely
attributed to the ineffective use of arable land by State farms.
Between 2007-2011, both Councils – led by Raúl – had more or less free discretion to
determine the policy course, without the intervention or approval of the PCC. This course was
driven by the need to stabilize the economy as a result of exogenous pressures, such as the
difficulties to obtain financial credit and rising food prices. It was also due to the awareness
that internal reforms of the economic system would be necessary, such as the distortions
caused by the dual-currency system. In April 2011 the Sixth Party Congress of the PCC took
place, where the so-called guidelines – Lineamientos – for socio-economic reforms were
approved. The Lineamientos were effectively an addition to the already existing policy course
and were meant to provide an overall framework for ‘updating’ the economic sector. They
consisted of ambiguous proposals, not aiming at any institutional renewal of the economic
system, but at the preservation of the existing socialist model of central planning and decisionmaking (Mesa-Lago, 2014: 48).
This became especially clear through Lineamientos 2, 3 and 5, which forbade the concentration
of property in the private sector, saw large State-owned companies as the principle foundation
of the economy and addressed the importance of the regulation of the Non-State sector (PCC,
2011). The Lineamientos did not pay any attention to, for example, private ownership or
extending possibilities for private entrepreneurs. De facto, the need to reform the agricultural
sector on structural issues – low productivity and centralization of the economy – was
acknowledged. At the same time, possible solutions, such as self-employment and
decentralization, were undermined or discouraged. It can be characterized as an attempt of the
PCC – as a veto player – to hold grip on the economic policy reforms and to direct the policy
course under ‘traditional’ socialist principles. The Lineamientos also constrained the veto
possibilities of both Councils to make policy changes without the PCC, thereby limiting their
discretional freedom.
61
At the Sixth Congress, Raúl Castro had argued that socialism should remain the basis for
Cuba’s economy, but that the Party should change its dismissive views on the role of the nonState sector and private entrepreneurs. However, centralization of the economy and the strong
role of the State were considered as leading principles. It did not change the contents of the
Lineamientos on this subject, as a majority of Party members were convinced that the Party
should remain in control over the economy for the sake of worker’s interests (Castellanos,
2014: 415-416). As First Secretary of the PCC, Raúl Castro could not ignore this majority, nor
dismiss the constitutional authority of the Party to be the leading for the organization of State
and society.
The Lineamientos marked the beginning of a gradual process of policy reforms that was
consistent with the process of layering. The proposals were highly ambiguous, as no specific
details on policy implementation were formulated.10 This meant that there were some
adjustments to agricultural policy settings after 2011, but no new policies were introduced. For
instance, the usufruct law was ‘updated’ in 2012, but only extended some conditions for the
amount of land that could be requested and the duration of usufruct. Another example
concerned the decentralization experiment in three provinces to organize wholesale markets;
after the experiment, they were only implemented in one of three provinces. In fact, only 15
percent of the 313 proposals in the Lineamientos had been implemented at the end of 2013
(Meso-Lago, 2014: 49).
The agricultural policy measures between 2011-2014 primarily consisted of decree-laws and
resolutions that were placed on top or alongside existing ones. Moreover, institutional
structures of the State system remained intact. Adjustments of (agricultural) policies were
limited to economic subjects, while no substantial reforms took place that changed the role of
the NAPP, Councils, or the PCC in the policy process. It can be assessed that such adjustments
took place without changes of the existing power relations between these veto players. This did
not only lead to conflicting policy outcomes, but also delayed the momentum of new economic
reforms. Endogenous factors played a role in such outcomes, as they were already present in
the institutional environment at the time of the reforms. For example, the existing dual
currency system counteracted with policy measures aimed at the commercialization of the
agricultural sector, that were intended to incentivize farmers.
The presence of a strong individual veto player – Raúl Castro – in two strong collective veto
players – the Councils – led to a significantly changed economic policy course between 20072011. During this period, a high level of discretional freedom made it possible to regulate and
define policies specifically, leaving no room for contending interpretations and ambiguity.
Nonetheless, after 2011, Raúl was not able to ignore the policy course that was set out by the
PCC in the Lineamientos.
62
The intervention of the PCC with the Lineamientos delayed the policy course by reestablishing
the dominance of the socialist system of central planning and state ownership, while also
limiting the discretional freedom of both Councils. However, discretionary resources Raúl
derived from his positions as President and Prime Minister, enabled him to make minor
adjustments – through the Councils – in the policy course. While the PCC strengthened its
position in the policy process, the veto possibilities across the different veto players remained
unchanged, as well as their power relations. It contributed to conflicting policy outcomes in an
intended economic model with more production incentives, a larger role for the private sector
and decentralization of the economy. This aspect, and the highly ambiguous nature of the
Lineamientos, led to a process of layering after 2011.
Moving forward with what has been established, the hypotheses with respect to model two can
be assessed as follows:
a) If a process of institutional change is observed, while institutional agents and their
mutual power relations remain unchanged, then this process is likely a process of
gradual change.
Although gradual change did not occur in terms of policy outcomes and was consistent with 3rd
order policy change between 2007-2010 (as established in model one), gradual change within
Cuba’s institutional system did occur after 2011. Before 2011, the PCC did not intervene or tried
to mitigate the effects of existing endogenous factors, such as low productivity and the level of
state centralization. This meant that Raúl Castro could freely implement policies that did deal
with such consequences. However, this changed with the introduction of the 2011
Lineamientos. This policy framework defined the boundaries for an ‘overall’ policy course,
including guidelines that dealt with how low productivity and state centralization should be
handled. At this moment, the importance of the economic role of the state in these matters was
considered necessary for the PCC, in any future changes to be made.
This meant that new policy ideas, such as self-employment, could not be carried out effectively
in Cuba, because the policy course that was enacted by Raúl Castro in both Councils, conflicted
with the policy course of the PCC. At the same time, the power relations between these veto
players in the institutional environment remained unchanged. That is to say, no policy reforms
were enacted to fundamentally restructure institutions such as the NAPP and Council of State,
and extend or limit their veto possibilities. Thus, their discretionary resources to influence the
decision-making process remained the same. While agricultural changes came forth from the
Lineamientos after 2011, they can be considered as compromises between conflicting policy
courses, which led to gradual change in Cuban policymaking. On the one hand, market-based
strategies and decentralization were important tools to improve agricultural productivity,
63
while on the other hand, regulation of the non-State sector was deemed important. Concluding,
it can be assessed that a process of institutional change will likely be gradual, if the power
relations between institutional agents remain unchanged. The hypothesis is confirmed.
b) If strong veto possibilities, a low level of initial ambiguity, and a low level of discretional
freedom are present in the institutional environment, then it is likely endogenous
factors trigger a process of layering.
Policy reforms between 2007-2011 did not show signs of gradualism or a process of layering in
terms of policy settings. Rather, new and different agricultural policy measures were
introduced and carried out in quick succession to one another, although highly regulated. This
was possible because Raúl Castro – as a strong individual veto player – could direct a specific
policy course via the Council of State and Council of Ministers, leading to a high level of
discretional freedom.
Moreover, interference of the PCC was absent between 2008-2010. Possibly, because the new
policy course had still yet to unfold and stabilization of the economy was most critical between
2008-2010. However, the PCC interfered as veto player in the new policy course with the
introduction of the Lineamientos in 2011. The Lineamientos were intended to consolidate the
economic reforms, but under the guidance of socialist principles and the PCC. As such, they
limited the discretional freedom of the other veto players. Endogenous factors, including the
dual currency system and strong centralization of the economy, triggered conflicting policy
outcomes. In addition, the ambiguous nature of the Lineamientos led to a process of layering
after 2011. The hypothesis is rejected, since a low level of ambiguity does not apply to the
situation that has been described.
Notes
1
Respectively: resolution 90, by the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC); resolution 122, by the MINAG;
resolution 369, by the Ministry of Finance and Prices; resolution 121, by the Ministry of Tourism
(MINTUR).
2
Respectively: resolution 58, by MINAG; resolution 9 and 352, by the Ministry of Finance and Prices;
resolution 37, by MINTUR.
64
3
These included eggs, spices and flowers. However, beef, milk and coffee were still excluded.
4
These provinces are Havana, Mayabeque and Artemisa.
5
However, prices needed to be approved by the Ministry of Prices and Finance. Several other
restrictions remained, such as the type of agricultural products it applied to.
6
Vidal Alejandro (2014) bases the relation between foreign exchange constraints and economic growth
on the so-called BPCG model, or “balance-of-payments-constrained growth model”.
7
1 CUC equals 25 CUPs. A fixed exchange rate applies.
8
CUBA CONST. of 1976, as amended 2002, art. 93, subsection c, e, j.
9
Ibid., art. 5.
10
For instance, Lineamiento 181 states “Adapt the agricultural food production to both its demand and
the changes in marketing practices.”. In terms of implementation however, it remains vague.
65
Chapter 5 Conclusion
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Cuba had to adjust to a new situation, as trade relations had
ceased to exist. Cuba’s policy course during the early 1990s involved the introduction of
liberalizing market policies, but such policies were considered as temporary measures. A clear
socialist strategy remained absent until the Battle of Ideas was presented in 2000. Through the
Battle of Ideas, Fidel Castro reemphasized the prevalence of human development over
economic growth. This was prevalent through the strong role of the state as facilitator of public
services – education – and mass employment. Liberalizing reforms were reverted, while no
attention was given to structural problems in the economy, such as low productivity and the
high dependency on food imports.
After Fidel’s unofficial resignation in 2006, the transition of power from Fidel to his brother
Rául, was the starting point for a different policy course. Raúl Castro’s announcement called
for structural reforms in 2007, within the context of a still deteriorating economy and the
increasing pressure on the available food supplies. At the same time, it had been an
acknowledged by Raúl that the policy course under the Fidel paradigm did no longer function
and that less State intervention and more market mechanisms were necessary to ‘update’ the
economic model. Thus, policy change in Cuba’s agricultural sector commenced in 2007 with
several agricultural policy measures. They displayed a deviating policy course from the Fidel
paradigm, with market-based strategies, decentralization and less State intervention.
The necessity to reduce the dependency on food imports and increase food production became
increasingly precarious between 2008-2010. Exogenous pressures consisted of unfavourable
conditions on the international markets – such as rising food prices – and the adverse effects
of hurricanes on agricultural outputs. Structural problems included low overall productivity,
declining GDP growth and inefficiencies as a result of a centralized system of production. In
the agricultural sector, such problems were reflected by the inefficient use of arable land and
stagnating outputs.
Among the various agricultural policy measures, the usufruct law of 2008 is a fine example of
a structural change of the policy course and allowed individuals to become self-employed
farmers. It meant that the non-State sector in the agricultural sector grew, while the amount
of State farms declined. The principal aim was to improve the agricultural productivity, mainly
to provide in the increasing food demand, but also to make more efficient use of the arable
State-owned land. In this regard, commercialization of the agricultural sector was also
important, as it allowed agricultural producers to directly sell to the tourism sector. This meant
that agricultural production was incentivized more than under the central system of
production and collection, as overseen by state agency ACOPIO.
After their approval in the 6th Party Congress of the PCC in 2011, the Lineamientos formed the
overall framework for socio-economic policy change in Cuba. The 313 guidelines were
ambiguous in terms of actual implementation of policies, but also contradictory with some
existing policies. While the policy course until 2011 aimed at economic decentralization and
more self-employment, the Lineamientos considered that large State-companies remained at
the heart of the economy and that strict regulation of the non-State sector was necessary. This
meant that the agricultural changes that were introduced under Raúl, consisting of marketbased strategies, more economic liberties and less state intervention, became conflicted with
the policy course of the PCC. In practice, it resulted in agricultural policies that only involved
minor adjustments of the existing policy course after 2011. That is to say, introduced
agricultural policies were maintained and subsequent additions were made, but no new
agricultural policies were introduced. The measures after 2011 continued to build on the
existing usufruct law, the commercialization policies and the decentralization of agricultural
production.
Two historical institutionalist models have been central for the analysis of the Cuban
agricultural policy changes that have taken place since 2007. On the one hand, Hall’s model on
policy paradigms, social learning and 3rd order change was assessed. On the other hand, the
model by Mahoney & Thelen on gradual processes of institutional change and the concept of
layering. These different types of institutional change suggest different policy outcomes,
namely radical and non-radical. The theoretical aim has been to examine them on the basis of
exogenous and endogenous influences on policy change, to gain a better understanding how
the policy process takes place. Specifically, to investigate the nature of the Cuban policy
transition in relation to the introduction of market-based strategies and more economic
liberties in the agricultural sector.
In the analysis of Hall’s model, it has been concluded that 3rd order policy change occurred
between 2007-2010, following a shift of agricultural policy goals, instruments and settings.
The policy course was primarily defined by the Council of State into decree-laws, while
resolutions of the Council of Ministers mostly altered policy settings. Raising agricultural
productivity had become the most important policy goal after 2007. Low overall productivity
in the economy was constrained by inefficiency in the agricultural sector and a centralized state
apparatus, which were important endogenous factors in this regard. In the context of the Fidel
paradigm, the shift became apparent through the emphasis on economic growth, instead of an
emphasis on social development. There were significant changes in terms of policy ideas,
including commercialization and decentralization of the agricultural sector.
67
Furthermore, the Fidel paradigm had been vulnerable to change, reflected by amongst others,
the speeches of Raul Castro that questioned the policy course of the Fidel paradigm. Exogenous
factors, which included adverse climate conditions, worsened trade conditions and difficulties
to obtain credit on the financial markets, triggered a new policy course towards more marketbased strategies and economic liberties. At the same time, exogenous factors intensified
existing endogenous factors that had already been present under the Fidel paradigm, such as
distortions in the economy and low overall productivity. In this respect, they made a 3rd order
outcome more likely.
In the analysis of model two, derived from Mahoney & Thelen, the conclusion was drawn that
agricultural policy reforms between 2011-2014 followed a gradual process of change that is
consistent with layering. Adjustments of existing agricultural policies reflect this, such as
subsequent updates of the usufruct law and regulations of agricultural sales to the tourism
sector. Hence, only minor adjustments to policy settings were made.
Layering becomes most apparent through the Lineamientos, which were approved during the
6th Congress of the PCC in 2011. This was an effort by the PCC to direct policy reforms under
the guidance of socialist principles and to put their mark on the policy course as veto player.
At the same time, it limited the discretional freedom of Raúl Castro, the Council of State and
the Council of Ministers as veto players. Before 2011, intervention by the PCC had been absent
allowing Raúl Castro to determine the (agricultural) policy course unilaterally through the
Council of State and Council of Ministers. Thus, as veto players, they had been able to regulate
and implement the new policy course specifically. The NAPP did not play a role as veto player
in this course.
Nonetheless, the power relations of the veto players after 2011 remained unchanged and meant
that the earlier process of 3rd order change reverted to a process of gradual change. These
unchanged power relations also contributed to conflicting policy outcomes. Compromises had
to be found between on the one hand, more market-based strategies in the agricultural sector,
while on the other hand, maintaining strict control over the non-State sector. Existing
endogenous factors, such as the strong centralization of the economy, strengthened such
contradictions. On the one hand, the PCC aimed in the Lineamientos for a strong role of the
State in the economy, while also addressing the need to decentralize. Moreover, the
Lineamientos were highly ambiguous. This aspect contributed to a low number of guidelines
that were actually implemented, while also leading to only small adjustments of existing
policies.
The analyses of both models are complementary in the sense that they point to similar
endogenous and exogenous factors that have played a role in the agricultural institutional
68
change. That is to say, exogenous factors in Hall’s model were important to explain why a weak
policy paradigm will change under the influence of exogenous pressures. Endogenous factors
were also important in this regard, as they pointed to structural problems that undermined the
effectiveness of the existing policy paradigm. In conjunction, the consequences of both type of
factors intensified existing issues that could not be dealt within the boundaries of the existing
policy paradigm.
In Mahoney & Thelen’s model, endogenous factors primarily played a role in terms of how the
power relations between institutional agents played out. That is to say, different policy courses
were followed between veto players as response to the consequences of endogenous factors.
These conflicting courses pointed out that unchanged power relations in the institutional
environment are important to explain how and when gradual change takes place. So long the
consequences of endogenous factors can be mitigated by one veto player, it is less likely that
conflicts arise over the policy course that should be followed. If this is not the case – as with
the intervention of the PCC to ensure a strong role of the State in any future policy changes –
the opposite seems to apply. In such instances, compromises between different policy courses
slow down the pace of change, leading to gradual and incremental changes in the policy
process.
Nonetheless, both models employ different mechanisms to regard institutional change; Hall
focuses on how the ideas behind policy have shifted, while Mahoney & Thelen focus on the
institutional properties that drive change. The latter supposes that endogenous factors are at
play when gradual change occurs, which is not covered by Hall’s model. These endogenous
factors have been investigated in this study and turned out to be important to the explanatory
model Hall suggests. It is questionable whether 3rd order change was complete without changes
of the institutional system and power structures that define the Cuban policy process.
Endogenous factors that were already present during the Fidel paradigm were also important
to Hall’s model, in the sense that they strengthened the exogenous factors that influenced the
institutional environment. With respect to Hall’s model: although the emphasis lies with
exogenous factors, the influence of endogenous factors should not be disregarded when
investigating 3rd order change in the context of policy paradigms.
Limitations of this study
For this study theoretical choices had to be made. It meant that the institutional outcomes that
have been assessed were limited to the institutional types of 3rd order change and layering. This
choice was made, since they represent two opposite institutional outcomes and are both
interesting to investigate in relation to the Cuban agricultural policy measures, and in relation
69
to the influence of the endogenous and exogenous factors on the institutional environment.
Institutional nuances in these outcomes may have been overlooked and led to a certain degree
of bias on their applicability in the Cuban case. This may have been strengthened by the
language barrier, that meant there were limited possibilities t0 access and review Spanishlanguage sources.
A bias may also apply to the institutions that have been selected to investigate the policy
outcomes, all of which are State institutions. Nonetheless, the intent was to involve a broad
institutional context with the institutions that are closest to the Cuban policy process. Another
perspective could be looking at a different institutional context, for instance, addressing how
societal
institutions
in
Cuba,
have
played
a
role
in
the
policy
reforms.
Suggestions for further research
In April 2016, the 7th Party Congress was held. It was another moment for the PCC to discuss
Cuba’s ongoing policy reforms. Amongst others, subjects of discussion were a national
economic development plan for 2030 and new guidelines for the period 2016-2021 (Poreh,
2016: 1). The guidelines are in fact a continuation of the 2011 Lineamientos, as most of the
2011 guidelines have still yet to be implemented. In addition, the Party leadership has
remained almost unchanged since 2011, although some newly elected Party officials have been
elected to the PCC’s Politburo. The importance of Cuban socialist principles in the reforms
continue to have high priority for the PCC. It is quite possible that this may result in more
layering in the coming years and constrain the implementation of additional market
mechanisms in the economy.
Such developments are interesting material for further research on the Cuban policy transition
and developments in the political system. Time is an important factor in this matter, and is
also a limitation to this study. Since the developments are still ongoing, the consequences and
outcomes of the eventual policy course cannot yet be overseen. Furthermore, the scope of this
study has been limited to an analysis of the policy measures that have been taken in the
agricultural sector. Of course, the economic reforms have not only played a role in the
agricultural sector, but also to other sectors with large State companies, such as industry and
energy. In this respect, self-employment, fewer State jobs and new possibilities for
entrepreneurship are interesting themes to investigate in relation to the new policy course.
Although Raúl Castro has announced that he will resign as President in 2018, he will remain
First Secretary of the PCC until 2021. Possibly, the current First Vice President – Miguel Díaz
Canel – will succeed him. This would mean for the first time – since the Cuban Revolution –
that a next generation Cuban politician would become an important veto player in the political
70
system. It could lead to a different policy course and to new dynamics between the institutions
that are leading for the policy process.
71
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