Doce Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire
Review Prescott National Forest, U.S.
Forest Service
National Oversight Review
National Incident Management Organization
5/12/2014
Doce Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Prescott National Forest
U.S. Forest Service
May 2014
“We will successfully manage fire on the landscape and fully
evaluate risks with a broad perspective and consideration for
the people we serve and the landscapes we protect.”
Thomas L. Tidwell, Chief
U.S. Forest Service
Table of Contents
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................ 1
Purpose............................................................................................................................................ 2
Doce Fire Summary ........................................................................................................................ 2
Doce Fire Chronology..................................................................................................................... 5
Meeting the Six Review Objectives – Key Observations ............................................................... 6
Lessons Learned............................................................................................................................ 14
Recommendations ......................................................................................................................... 14
Observations ................................................................................................................................. 16
Objective of this Review
The primary objective of these Programmatic/Cost Fire Reviews is to evaluate and document risk
management decision processes and actions taken on incidents and their direct or indirect effect on
costs. The review and objective analysis provides recommendations to management for incidentspecific and programmatic process improvements based on comprehensive analysis of incident
documentation.
This allows for improvement of program performance, operations, evaluation of costs, and facilitates
the application of focused improvements. In addition, the reviews provide an opportunity to
evaluate the clarity of communication of the Chief’s Leader Intent and the effectiveness of
implementation in the field.
The results of the reviews provide information crucial to the well-established learning environment
and continued improvement in fire management in the U.S. Forest Service.
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Doce Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Prescott National Forest
U.S. Forest Service
May 2014
Review Objectives
Purpose
Objectively look at actions taken
by the Incident Management Team
and the local Agency
Administrator to meet the
direction provided by the Forest
Service Chief
On December 20, 2013, James Hubbard, Deputy Chief for State
and Private Forestry (S&PF), issued a letter identifying ten large
fires that occurred in Fiscal Year 2013 to be reviewed by the
National Incident Management Organization (NIMO). This letter
emphasized the responsibility of the Forest Service to evaluate
management actions and assure they were appropriate, riskbased, and effective. The wildfires were selected based on their
complexity and national significance. They were specifically
intended to provide a cross section of the risk management
performance in wildland fires of various costs, sizes, and
oversight complexity.
Asses the consideration and
effectiveness of applying risk
management concepts to incident
cost through the associated
decisions and expenditures as an
outcome
Identify best business practices
used on fires this past season
Identify how social and political
issues factored into our decision
making
Identify which current procedures
can be enhanced or expanded
Identify improvements that can be
made in sharing and clarifying
expectations.
On January 17, 2014, Tom Harbour, Director of Fire and Aviation
Management (FAM), delivered a letter to the Regional Fire
Director, R3, identifying Judy Palmer, Finance Section Chief,
NIMO, as the lead to conduct the reviews on the Doce and Silver
Fires. The purpose of selecting these two large fire reviews is to
learn from those who were directly involved in decision making
and share those lessons based on the 2012 Risk Decision
Framework—which was included with the May 25, 2012
Wildfire Guidance letter signed by Deputy Chief James Hubbard.
Review Team Members
Judy Palmer, Team Lead, Finance
Section Chief, NIMO
John Truett, Operations Section
Chief, NIMO
Gene Madden, Safety Officer,
NIMO
Upon receipt of the Director’s letter, the Review Team Leader
met with the Region 3 Fire Director to discuss the review’s
purpose and establish a process for how to best meet the
review’s overall objectives.
In addition, pertinent fire
documentation was identified as well as several individuals who
could contribute information and serve as perspective
interviewees. Interviews were scheduled and conducted by the
review team throughout February and March 2014.
Bea Day, FFMO, Cibola NF
Sue Zahn, Contract Operations
Program Manager, FAM, Region 5
Paul Keller, Writer-Editor,
Wildland Fire Lessons Learned
Center
Doce Fire Summary
[This section tells the story of the Doce Fire, including
management decision-making regarding objectives, strategy and
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Doce Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Prescott National Forest
U.S. Forest Service
May 2014
tactics—how strategy and tactics were always focused on assuring firefighter and public
safety and the protection of values at risk.]
The human-caused Doce [pronounced “Dough-See”] Fire started June 18, 2013 at 1100
Mountain Daylight Time (MDT) on the Prescott National Forest eight miles northwest of
Prescott, AZ. The fire’s origin was near Doce Pit, a popular dispersed recreational shooting
area located on the Bradshaw Ranger District off Iron
Springs Road near the Granite Mountain Recreation
Area.
Initially reported at four acres, the wind-driven fire
rapidly grew to 70 acres, spotting and torching
across the north side of Iron Springs Road, a two-lane
paved county road.
The fire crested the saddle of Granite Mountain,
spreading quickly north and east up into the
Granite Mountain Wilderness. It was actively
burning in heavy timber and brush toward
residential areas.
Photo taken on the Doce Fire’s first day, June 18,
2013. As the fire approaches several communities,
structure protection around communities and
evacuation of residents becomes a top priority.
Within the first hours of Initial Attack, the Doce Fire—seen
here on its first day—spreads to 600 acres—threatening homes
and evacuating residents. Temperature is in the mid-80s,
humidity is only eight percent, and from 12 to 30 mph winds
are pushing the fire.
A very aggressive Initial Attack (IA) response was
nearly immediate at the Type III level with
commensurate organization and qualifications on
this fast-moving fire as it burned toward numerous
subdivisions with multiple homes. Many of the fire
personnel assigned to IA were local resources who
also served on the Southwest Type 1 Incident
Management Team (IMT) that was ultimately
ordered for the Doce Fire. Consequently, this
enabled these personnel to better understand the
local effect of fire, weather, and fuels. They were also
familiar with the affected communities.
By the end of the Doce Fire’s first day, it had already encompassed 5,000 acres. Due to the
fire’s complexity and critical values at risk, the Type 1 IMT was ordered by the Forest on
June 18, 2013. On the morning of June 19, 2013, the Type 1 IMT took command of the fire.
The IMT’s transition was expedited due to the fact that many of the Type 1 IMT members
had been involved in the fire’s IA.
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U.S. Forest Service
May 2014
Type 3 IMT Initial Strategy
The initial strategy on the Doce Fire was to use air tanker retardant drops along the fire’s
flanks going direct along the fire’s flaming front. The strategy’s objective was to tie the fire
into Blair Pass, an area of rocks and low-fuel loading. This strategy proved effective where
the retardant was applied along the fire’s flanks.
At the head of the fire, due to prior extreme drought and dry fuel conditions, the fire
continued to burn through Blair Pass and made a downhill run toward the Wildland Urban
Interface (WUI) area. Realizing the threat the fire now
posed, the Prescott National Forest’s Agency Administrator
(AA), various cooperators, and the Type 3 managers met to
discuss values at risk and the potential strategies and
tactics to be implemented.
Indirect Strategy Attains
Multiple Benefits
During the fire’s first few shifts, an indirect strategy,
focused primarily on the fire’s head and northern end, was
planned and implemented. At the same time, direct
strategies were being implemented, where appropriate,
elsewhere on the fire.
The Doce Fire’s flame front burns toward the
Wildland-Urban Interface on the fire’s first day. Due to
extreme fire behavior and exceptionally rugged
terrain, firefighter and public safety is immediately
identified as the primary value at risk on this incident.
This strategy and tactic:
 Allowed firefighters time to prepare indirect fire lines ahead of the main fire and
initiate strategic burnout operations where they could be safely conducted;
 Ensured protection of the Prescott National Forest’s resources;
 Ensured structure protection to be in place around the evacuated communities.
Initial strategy on the Doce Fire included using
air tankers to drop fire retardant along the fire’s
flanks to slow the fire’s progress.
By the Doce Fire’s third day, June 20, 2013 the
wildfire was estimated at 6,732 acres with an
additional 400 acres resulting from firing operations.
At this time, the IMT had achieved a containment of
10 percent at an estimated cost of $1 million
primarily due to aviation assets. On this third day,
hundreds of residents had been evacuated.
Additional subdivisions were put on notice for
possible evacuation.
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Prescott National Forest
U.S. Forest Service
May 2014
Due to favorable changing conditions, by the end of this third day, the IMT was able to
implement a direct suppression strategy on those portions of the fire that had previously
undergone an indirect strategy. At this time, the fire was basically contained. (It would
increase another 35 acres before official containment.)
Critical Values at Risk
Due to extreme fire behavior and exceptionally rugged
terrain, firefighter and public safety was identified as the
primary value at risk on the Doce Fire. Multiple
communities were threatened by this fire. During IA,
evacuations were ordered for hundreds of residents.
Because of these evacuations, per pre-season planning, an
evacuation center was opened. Animal disaster services
also provided shelter for animals.
Heavy or Type 1 water-dropping helicopters
work the Doce Fire on its sixth day. Due to the
successful—appropriate, risk-based, and
effective—management actions, by the fire’s
second and third burning periods, the outer
fire perimeter became secure and the threat to
the Wildland-Urban Interface was reduced.
Doce Fire Chronology
Day(s)
1
2-8
9-20
21-23
Date
06/18
06/1926
06/2707/08
07/0911
Command
Size
[From
209s]
Type 3
6,500
Type 1
6,767
Type 3
6,767
Actions
Doce Fire starts
and T-1 IMT
ordered
T-1 IMT assumes
command 6/19
T-3 IMT assumes
command on 6/27
Type 4/5
6,767
District
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Percent
Contained
Cost
0
$250,000
90
$6,495,330
100
$6,877,285
100
$6,877,285
Doce Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Prescott National Forest
U.S. Forest Service
May 2014
“We assess, analyze, communicate, and share risk before, during, and after
incidents.”
Thomas L. Tidwell, Chief
U.S. Forest Service
Meeting the Six Review Objectives – Key Observations
1) Objectively Look at Actions Taken by the Incident Management Team and the
Local Agency Administrator to Meet the Direction Provided by the Forest Service
Chief.
Pre-season meetings were conducted between several cooperating agencies. Through
these meetings, open dialogue and a line of communication was established between
the Forest Service, Prescott Fire Department, Central Yavapai Fire District, multiple
other fire districts, Prescott Police Department, Yavapai County Sheriff’s Department,
Yavapai County Emergency Services, Arizona Game and Fish Department, Arizona
Public Service, Arizona Division of Forestry, and the Prescott Area Wildland Urban
Interface Commission (PAWUIC), as well as various other groups.
Key discussion items at these pre-season meetings included: values at risk, fuels
treatment, and planning and coordinating county-wide full-scale wildland fire drills in
preparation for the upcoming fire season. These exercises (structure triage and
complex incident response) involved the Forest and the local fire and emergency
management agencies’ assets. These pre-season drills have strengthened relationships
and demonstrated the variety of skill sets and resource capabilities of the agencies
involved in this beneficial collaboration. Additionally, these drills and pre-season
meetings helped establish an across-the-board familiarity with the potential values at
risk and enhanced working relationships and trust.
The Chief’s Letter of Intent for the 2013 Fire Season and the 2012 Risk Decision
Framework, along with the “Five Rights”1, have become standard operating procedures
on the Prescott National Forest. Therefore, Leader’s Intent from the AA on the Doce
Fire was very clear from the start: 1) Keep the fire small, 2) Protect private property,
and 3) Minimize damage to private lands.
1
The “Five Rights” from James Hubbard, Deputy Chief for State and Private Forestry, U.S. Forest Service; 2012 Wildfire Guidance:
“Effective interaction between agency administrators and incident commanders is essential to safe, efficient and effective management of
incidents, utilizing: 1) The Right Plan (as informed by the Risk Decision Framework); 2) in the Right Place (where we have a reasonable
probability of success); 3) at the Right Time (when we have favorable conditions for efficient and effective suppression); 4) with the Right
Assets (those suppression assets needed to safely implement tactics in support of reasonable objectives);5) for the Right Duration (release
resources as soon as they are no longer needed).”
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U.S. Forest Service
May 2014
“Safety is not just how we do our
work; it is the essence of how we
make decisions.”
“We do not accept unnecessary risk
or transfer it to our partners.”
Thomas L. Tidwell, Chief
U.S. Forest Service
Using Liaison Officers (LOFRs) and having stakeholders meeting during the Doce Fire
proved beneficial to all agencies and residents involved. The LOFRs served in various
constructive capacities to the communities. First, they were able to immediately
address and listen to the citizens’ concerns and communicate these issues to the
appropriate parties. By having a public “face” the community knew, anxiety levels were
kept to a minimum. When the IMT held community meetings to explain strategy and
tactics, the LOFRs were able to help people understand and accept the provided
information.
2) Asses the consideration and effectiveness of applying risk management
concepts to incident cost through the associated decisions and expenditures
as an outcome.
Many of the IA personnel were local resources with extensive knowledge of the Doce Fire
area. This expertise included potential fire behavior in this area especially when burning in
the chaparral as well as “knowing” the community.
The IMT and AA held frequent discussions on both direct and indirect strategies and building
opportunities to do both, while always ensuring that contingencies were in place. At every
critical decision point, they also worked to ensure that key partners and cooperators had an
opportunity to provide input and share their thoughts. Risk management, safety of
personnel, and cost containment proved to be the overriding priorities in these
management discussions.
Throughout the chronology of the Doce Fire, the IMT was tasked with effectively
managing costs of the incident by: “Planning strategies and tactics aimed toward
achieving a high probability of success in meeting incident objectives; and seeking
opportunities to reduce costs or be smart in their spending throughout the duration of
the incident without jeopardizing success or impacting risk mitigation.”
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Prescott National Forest
U.S. Forest Service
May 2014
While many of the fire strategies and tactics planned for and implemented on this
incident, such as the decision to go from indirect to direct, addressed exposure
concerns (such as steep, rugged terrain; rolling debris; etc.) these management
decisions also helped in overall cost effectiveness.
To illustrate, decisions made in the field to limit firefighter exposure were based on
areas scouted by interagency hotshot crew superintendents and division supervisors
prior to inserting personnel into these identified high-risk areas. At the same time,
optimum areas were identified based on firefighter safety and protecting values at risk
where indirect fire tactics could best be implemented.
These successful strategies helped to shorten the duration of the fire and firefighter
exposure which, in turn, helped to reduce the costs of these actions and return critical
suppression resources back into the availability pool.
Once the fire front either slowed or its progression was impeded, a discussion was
immediately held among Operations, the IMT’s Incident Commander, and the Forest
regarding opportunities for implementing a more direct suppression strategy.
Due to these successful appropriate, risk-based, and effective management actions, by
the second and third burning periods, the outer fire perimeter became secure and the
threat to the WUI was reduced. In addition, this significant transition enabled the IMT
to place more emphasis on tactics and strategies aimed at protecting the Granite
Mountain Wilderness values and resources.
The option to burn out in the lower country also limited the more expensive use of
aircraft. This option, as opposed to going with direct fire suppression in the higher
country, also meant the need for less personnel and interagency hotshot crews.
Another cost saving and risk reducing tactic included using contract masticators and
chippers to prep roads in the chaparral reducing the need for fire crews to prep this
vegetation.
Generating Positive Cost Containment through Resource Awareness and
Management
Early in the incident, a demobilization plan was developed. As fire and suppression
conditions warranted, resources were released and reassigned. Aerial resources were
also released rapidly. The Call When Needed (CWN) helicopters were released early
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U.S. Forest Service
May 2014
and replaced with the less expensive Exclusive Use helicopters, reducing the incident’s
overall costs.
Throughout the duration of the Doce Fire, close coordination and communication was
always maintained with the Southwest Coordination Center (SWCC) regarding resource
needs on this incident as well as other ongoing incidents in the Region. A constant
evaluation of resource need and what resources could be released from the Doce Fire
was a top priority.
Early Decision to Transfer Fire Management Back to Local Unit Helps Reduce
Incident Costs
While some areas of heat and portions of uncontrolled fireline still existed within the
Doce Fire, it was determined that the fire’s escape potential was low. Discussions
continued to be held with stakeholders. The decision was made, rather than keep the
(large) Type 1 IMT in place, management of the fire would be transferred back to the
local unit. This appropriate risk-based and effective decision/strategy helped to reduce
the incident’s overall costs.
The understanding and trust developed between the Forest and its stakeholders and
cooperators, that had been established during the pre-season meetings [see previous
Objective 1] helped all interested parties agree to and appreciate this cost-saving
management transition.
3) Identify Best Business Practices Used on Fires this Past Season
On April 15, 2013, two months prior to the Doce Fire, the Prescott National Forest held
a meeting to share and discuss the importance of the Chief’s Letter of Intent for the
2013 Fire Season with local stakeholders, local fire departments, the Arizona Game and
Fish Department, Forest Line Officers, District Rangers, and Fire Management Officers.
Cooperation and support of each other’s role was a strong, common theme at this
meeting. Healthy discussions focused on values at risk and land resources that were a
high priority to each agency/cooperator/partner. A key objective was to strive for a
common understanding and identify these different values. Forest Service policy and
the use of managed fire on the landscape was also part of the discussion. Shared risk
and the Line Officer’s decision space were explained and discussed. This also permitted
the Prescott National Forest to share the limited areas where large-scale managed fired
can be utilized.
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Prescott National Forest
U.S. Forest Service
May 2014
“We assess, analyze, communicate, and
share risk
before, during, and after incidents.”
Thomas L. Tidwell, Chief
U.S. Forest Service
Providing Cost Information Prior to the Fire Season and During Incidents
Every year prior to the fire season, the Prescott National Forest puts together a virtual
kit which includes a template for a Delegation of Authority (DOA) letter for highcomplexity fires for incident management teams. Specific language in the DOA is
included to provide cost information to assist in developing Cost Share agreements by
apportioning costs by resource ownership, jurisdictional effort, or by operational
period. On incidents, this information is also addressed at the in-briefing, as well as
during subsequent discussions such as releasing resources as conditions allow.
Intergovernmental Involvement
For the past two decades, the Prescott National Forest has built a solid foundation for
encouraging and continuing its strong history of intergovernmental involvement. This
includes involvement with County Emergency Service, local fire departments, Arizona
State Division of Forestry, Arizona Department of Air Quality, the surrounding cities, the
Bureau of Land Management, and other miscellaneous government and quasigovernment entities.
Prescott Area Wildland-Urban Interface Commission
The PAWUIC is focused on fire protection within the area’s communities and has a healthy
involvement with the National Fire Protection Association’s “Firewise” Communities
Program.
Scenario-Based Drills
For more than a decade, Federal, State and local and private agencies/organizations in
this area have been meeting and coordinating annual “Basin Operation Drills” in which
they conduct a “scenario-based” mutual-aid incident exercise.
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Prescott National Forest
U.S. Forest Service
May 2014
“Before, during, and after every fire we enhance
relationships.”
Thomas L. Tidwell, Chief
U.S. Forest Service
Assisting on Type 3 All-Hazard Scenarios
Members of the Prescott National Forest have also served as coaches on Type 3 AllHazard Scenarios in part, to build local capacity and capability. In addition, the Forest
and its Districts participate in the County Chiefs’ Association’s meetings on training and
planning. This has led to numerous trainings and sand table exercises held with local
fire departments, as well as partnering on prescribed burns with these multiple
cooperating agencies.
Identifying Values at Risk – Life and Property Number One Priority
The annual “Fire Refresher” for the Resource Advisor (READ) and the annual review of
the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) were combined in 2013 on the
Prescott National Forest. Among several benefits, this allowed for a larger group
outside of fire leadership to become familiar with the Chief’s Letter of Intent for the
2013 Fire Season. Additionally, this enabled the Forest to acquaint the Resource
Advisors with the values at risk in the Forest within a variety of functional areas
including discussions on common values and priorities. It was agreed and noted that,
over all, life and property is the number one priority.
Other Successful Practices in Preparing for a Fire Incident
In addition, the Prescott National Forest at the Forest and District levels conducted a
tabletop simulation and WFDSS exercise with the key focus on READs and fire. The
Forest’s Acquisition Management Staff worked on pre-season agreements, had them in
place and had already initiated conversations with local landowners. The Forest also
preplanned and identified potential fire camp locations.
These pre-season meetings helped prepare the acting Forest Supervisor for a larger fire
with an IMT. Furthermore, prior to the Doce Fire, the Prescott National Forest acting
Forest Supervisor took advantage of an off-Forest AA “shadow” assignment. The Region
had set up such opportunities for Line Officers to shadow others on fires that occurred
within the Region.
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U.S. Forest Service
May 2014
The Region had also established a pool of coaches from the Region for less experienced
Line Officers who wanted the benefit of having experience on incidents. When the Doce
Fire started, a neighboring Forest Supervisor was assigned to the Prescott National
Forest to coach the acting Forest Supervisor.
Throughout the Doce Fire, the acting Forest Supervisor (or his representative) and
Incident Commander met daily at 1300 MDT to discuss the current fire, values,
concerns, costs and planned actions. This proved to be an excellent method for working
and collaborating with the IMT keeping communications open and establishing vital,
effective relationships and trust throughout the incident. Moreover, the acting Forest
Supervisor and the Forest’s acting fire staff were well engaged beyond these daily 1300
MDT meetings. They also attended evening planning meetings, morning briefings, and
participated in other informal discussions with the Incident Commander and IMT
members.
4) Identify How Social and Political Issues Factored Into Our Decision Making
The acting Forest Supervisor attended a pre-season strategy meeting with Yavapai
County, local fire departments, and Forest Service staff and fire personnel on his first
day. This enabled him to immediately tap into these positive relationships with
partners and stakeholders.
Topics discussed at this pre-season meeting included the Chief’s Letter of Intent for the
2013 Fire Season and values at risk. The Yavapai County representative was very
involved and had a broad knowledge of the area’s values including economics and
tourism. Good collaboration and a clear understanding of everyone’s values was a
prevalent theme at this meeting. The Yavapai County Fire Management Plan was also
discussed.
Aggressive Initial Attack had Buy-In from City of Prescott, Partners and
Cooperators
During the first 48 hours on this incident, the decision was made to utilize aviation
resources to increase the ground resources’ ability for protection of values at risk.
While this IA strategy added to the fire’s overall cost, this initial use of aerial retardant
helped keep the fire from entering into the WUI.
The Doce Fire was located just west/southwest of thousands of homes west of the city
of Prescott. During the summer fire season, southwest winds are the predominant
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Prescott National Forest
U.S. Forest Service
May 2014
winds. Therefore, this fire was positioned in an area of concern for local officials. This
was due primarily to the impact the fire could have upon the residential communities
and the potential negative impact upon the economy. Fortunately, due to existing longterm relationships and pre-season engagement sessions that expanded the
community’s partners and cooperators into the decision making process, no one was
surprised or in disagreement with the strategies employed on the Doce Fire, which
included: 1) The initial strategies and tactics using available air resources to check the
rapid spread of the fire, 2) Burn out operations, and 3) Direct attack when/where it
could be safely conducted.
5) Identify Which Current Procedures Can Be Enhanced or Expanded
Cost Apportionment with State of Arizona
For the last two years, the Region has been working with the State of Arizona on using a
cost apportionment model that all parties consider fiscally fair. Incoming IMTs should
be aware of this model. They should begin to track resources and costs as soon as they
take command of an incident. Continued efforts need to ensure that IMTs understand
the cost apportionment guidelines/process and how to apply it.
A public meeting is held on the Doce Fire’s second day.
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U.S. Forest Service
May 2014
6) Identify Improvements That Can Be Made In Sharing and Clarifying
Expectations
Past Incidents Should Not Bias Our Expectations and Management Actions on
Current Fires
Due to the proximity of the WUI, the initial strategy on previous fires in this area has
always been aggressive IA.
In 1990, another large fire occurred here, also called the Doce Fire. Many IMT members
on the 2013 fire had also been on the 1990 fire. They, therefore, had a previous
conception of potential fire behavior in this area. However, the 2013 fire did not meet
their previous mental models. The 1990 fire died down the first evening and never
crossed the top of Granite Mountain. The 2013 fire spread rapidly over the top of
Granite Mountain late on the incident’s first day, June 18, 2013.
Doce Fire Provided Fuel Treatment in Chaparral Areas that will have Future
Positive Impacts
The footprint from the 2013 Doce Fire has now provided effective fuel treatment in
areas that should allow for more fire resistance for the next two decades. In the future,
fires in this area may be successfully managed with different tactics and strategies that
will be less costly and more conducive to firefighter safety.
Lessons Learned
Recommendations
Continue to Improve on Communication with Cooperators and Stakeholders
Continue to improve on communication with cooperators and stakeholders to manage fuel
loading, improve efficiencies, reduce risk to firefighters/communities, and provide
coordinated response to incidents as provided in the National Cohesive Strategy.
Ensure a Forest PAO is Always Available During Fire Season
When the Doce Fire started, the Forest’s Public Affairs Officer was on leave. An acting PAO
had not yet been identified. Thus, until the Forest was able to get a PAO onboard no one
was specifically assigned to handle this position’s duties, roles and the production of
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U.S. Forest Service
May 2014
various products. This oversight presented challenges as to who was responsible for
getting critical information out in a timely manner. In the future, during the fire season, the
Forest should always ensure that it has a PAO or acting in place.
Need an Interagency Guideline for Cost Appropriation Protocols
There was a Cost Apportionment Team in place on the Doce Fire that consisted of Forest
Service and State employees.
It would assist the AA and IMTs if everyone had a better understanding of and general
guidelines regarding cost appropriation and protocols. During the pre-season, it should
also be ensured that expectations on this subject are understood and agreed upon across
agencies.
Need for Cost Apportionment Process Training
In 2012, the Region collaborated with the State of Arizona on cost apportionment, the Doce
Fire was the third incident since this effort was initiated. Under this cost apportionment
model, costs are based on effort. This process is modeled after the Region 5 cost
apportionment system.
Future efforts should focus on cost apportionment process training for AAs, Line Officers,
Fire Managers, and cooperators. IMTs should also be included in this training effort, with a
focus on Division Supervisors and Operations Section Chiefs.
Assign a Lead Resource Advisor to Serve as Liaison between Resource Advisors and
IMT
Initially there was confusion and some mixed messages between the READs and the IMT.
This was resolved by having a lead READ serve as a liaison between the READs and IMT to
ensure the same message was communicated.
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Prescott National Forest
U.S. Forest Service
May 2014
A DC-10 applies
aerial retardant on
the Doce Fire.
Observations
Short Duration Fire with Very Good Outcome
The Doce Fire was a short duration wildfire with a very good outcome. Everyone involved,
including the Mayor, the county commissioners, and emergency management
administrators and personnel, all believed that the IMT effectively met the desired end
state.
Use of Aviation Resources on this Fire
During the Doce Fire’s IA there was a rapid spread and a strong aerial suppression
presence due to values at risk located to the fire’s northeast. Thus, within the fire’s first 30
hours, heavy retardant use in conjunction with ground crew efforts occurred on the fire’s
flanks. This strategy proved very effective in this fuel type, keeping the fire out of the WUI.
The majority of the retardant use occurred during the first Type 3 IMT’s management of
the fire. The Type 1 IMT continued with the plan that had been established by the Type 3
IMT. (The Type 1 Incident Commander served as Operations on the Type 3 IMT.)
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May 2014
It should be noted that the Forest’s Prescott Fire Center (air tanker base) was located less
than five minutes flight time away from the Doce Fire. This permitted rapid turnaround for
air tankers.
Reconsider the Timing of this Fire Review
Both the Forest and Region felt that this fire review could have been done earlier, either
during the incident or in the fall. The earlier review would have also lent itself well to
being available for learning prior to the calendar year 2014 fire season. As of November
2014, final review of draft is occurring for use as a tool in calendar year 2015 fire season.
Delay concerns are two-fold: 1) difficulty to conduct review in spring, and 2) delayed
available lessons for 2014 fire season. Spring is a very busy time for Region 3, with
seasonal fire hiring and spring fire training occurring. When this review is released, the
Forest therefore needs to be given the appropriate lead time to ensure that they have
talking points prior to it going public on the web.
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