From: Collusion in Uniform-Price Auctions: Experimental Evidence and Implications for Treasury Auctions
Rev Financ Stud. 2015;9(3):757-785. doi:10.1093/rfs/9.3.757
Rev Financ Stud | Oxford University Press
From: Collusion in Uniform-Price Auctions: Experimental Evidence and Implications for Treasury Auctions
Rev Financ Stud. 2015;9(3):757-785. doi:10.1093/rfs/9.3.757
Rev Financ Stud | Oxford University Press
From: Collusion in Uniform-Price Auctions: Experimental Evidence and Implications for Treasury Auctions
Rev Financ Stud. 2015;9(3):757-785. doi:10.1093/rfs/9.3.757
Rev Financ Stud | Oxford University Press
From: Collusion in Uniform-Price Auctions: Experimental Evidence and Implications for Treasury Auctions
Rev Financ Stud. 2015;9(3):757-785. doi:10.1093/rfs/9.3.757
Rev Financ Stud | Oxford University Press
From: Collusion in Uniform-Price Auctions: Experimental Evidence and Implications for Treasury Auctions
Rev Financ Stud. 2015;9(3):757-785. doi:10.1093/rfs/9.3.757
Rev Financ Stud | Oxford University Press
From: Collusion in Uniform-Price Auctions: Experimental Evidence and Implications for Treasury Auctions
Rev Financ Stud. 2015;9(3):757-785. doi:10.1093/rfs/9.3.757
Rev Financ Stud | Oxford University Press