Document of
The World Bank
Report No: ICR00003616
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-45060)
ON A
CREDIT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 98.4 MILLION
(US$149 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH
FOR A
DHAKA WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION PROJECT
December 21, 2016
Global Water Practice (GWADR)
Country Department SACBN
South Asia Region
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Exchange Rate Effective 10/30/2016
Currency Unit = Bangladesh Taka (BDT)
0.0128 BDT = US$
US$ 1.00 = 78.3 BDT
FISCAL YEAR July to June
Senior Global Practice Director: Guang Zhe Chen
Country Director: Qimiao Fan
Practice Manager: Meike van Ginneken
Project Team Leader: Sudipto Sarkar
ICR Team Leader: Sudipto Sarkar
ICR Lead Author: Susanna Smets with Nishtha Mehta
ii
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ADB
BoD
CAS
DCC
DMA
DPP
DSIP
DWASA
DWSSP
EMF
FGD
FM
FSM
FY
GFDRR
GoB
ICR
IDA
IO
IRR
ISR
IWM
JMP
LIC
LICSIP
M&E
MDGs
MoF
MoLGRDC
MTR
NPV
NGO
OP/BP
O&M
PAD
PAH
PDO
PMU
Asian Development Bank
Board of Directors
Country Assistance Strategy
Dhaka City Corporation
Dhaka Metropolitan Area
Development Project Proforma
Dhaka Sanitation Improvement Project
Dhaka Water Supply and Sanitation Authority
Dhaka Water Supply and Sanitation Project
Environmental Management Framework
Focus Group Discussion
Financial Management
Fecal Sludge Management
Fiscal Year
Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction
Government of Bangladesh
Implementation Completion and Results Report
International Development Association
Intermediate Outcome
Internal Rate of Return
Implementation Status and Results Report
Institute of Water Modelling
WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program
Low Income Community
Low Income Community Service Improvement Plan
Monitoring and Evaluation
Millennium Development Goals
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development & Cooperatives
Mid-Term Review
Net Present Value
Non-Governmental Organization
Operational Policy and Bank Procedure
Operations and Maintenance
Project Appraisal Document
Project Affected Households
Project Development Objective
Project Management Unit
iii
PV
RAP
RPF
SO
STP
TA
WASA
WSS
WSP
WSUP
Present Value
Resettlement Action Plan
Resettlement Policy Framework
Support Organization
Sewage Treatment Plant
Technical Assistance
Water Supply and Sewerage Authority
Water Supply and Sanitation Services
Water and Sanitation Program
Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor
iv
BANGLADESH
Dhaka Water Supply and Sanitation Project
CONTENT
Data Sheet
A. Basic Information
B. Key Dates
C. Ratings Summary
D. Sector and Theme Codes
E. Bank Staff
F. Results Framework Analysis
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
H. Restructuring
I. Disbursement Graph
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ................................................... 1
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .................................................. 5
3. Assessment of Outcomes .............................................................................................. 11
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ............................................................. 17
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ......................................................... 18
6. Lessons Learned............................................................................................................ 20
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners............... 22
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .............................................................................. 23
Annex 2. Outputs by Component...................................................................................... 24
Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ..................................................................... 30
Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes................. 37
Annex 5: Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ......................... 39
Annex 6. Comments of Co-Financers and Other Partner Stakeholders............................ 48
Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents .......................................................................... 49
MAP .................................................................................................................................. 51
v
DATA SHEET
A. Basic Information
Country:
Bangladesh
Project Name:
BD Dhaka Water
Supply and Sanitation
Project
Project ID:
P093988
L/C/TF Number(s):
IDA-45060
ICR Date:
11/02/2016
ICR Type:
Core ICR
Lending Instrument:
SIL
Borrower:
GOVERNMENT OF
BANGLADESH
Original Total
Commitment:
XDR 94.80M
Disbursed Amount:
XDR 50.87M
Revised Amount:
XDR 50.97M
Environmental Category: B
Implementing Agencies:
Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority (DWASA)
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:
B. Key Dates
Process
Original Date
Revised / Actual
Date(s)
03/17/2009
03/17/2009
Process
Date
Concept Review:
02/01/2005
Effectiveness:
Appraisal:
07/21/2008
Restructuring(s):
Approval:
12/02/2008
Mid-term Review:
10/31/2012
11/28/2012
Closing:
06/30/2013
06/30/2016
06/13/2013
11/23/2015
C. Ratings Summary
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR
Outcomes:
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:
Substantial
Bank Performance:
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Borrower Performance:
Moderately Unsatisfactory
C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)
Bank
Ratings
Borrower
Ratings
Moderately
Moderately
Quality at Entry:
Government:
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
vi
Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory
Overall Bank
Performance:
Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Implementing
Agency/Agencies:
Overall Borrower
Performance:
Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
Unsatisfactory
C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators
Implementation
QAG Assessments
Indicators
Performance
(if any)
Rating
Potential Problem
Project at any time
(Yes/No):
Yes
Quality at Entry
(QEA):
Problem Project at any
time (Yes/No):
Yes
Quality of
None
Supervision (QSA):
DO rating before
Closing/Inactive status:
Moderately
Unsatisfactory
None
D. Sector and Theme Codes
Original
Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Flood protection
51
51
8
8
Wastewater Collection and Transportation
19
19
Wastewater Treatment and Disposal
19
19
3
3
City-wide Infrastructure and Service Delivery
50
50
Urban services and housing for the poor
50
50
Public administration- Water, sanitation and flood
protection
Water supply
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)
E. Bank Staff
Positions
At ICR
At Approval
Vice President:
Annette Dixon
Isabel Guerrero
Country Director:
Qimiao Fan
Xian Zhu
Practice
Manager/Manager:
Meike van Ginneken
Junaid Kamal Ahmad
Project Team Leader:
Sudipto Sarkar
Fook Chuan Eng
ICR Team Leader:
Sudipto Sarkar
ICR Primary Author:
Susanna Smets with Nishtha Mehta
vii
F. Results Framework Analysis
Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)
The Project Development Objective (PDO) is to improve the sustainable delivery of stormwater
drainage, wastewater and water services by the Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority
(DWASA) to the population of Dhaka through: (a) the installation of selected stormwater pumping
stations and the rehabilitation of selected canals to help improve drainage and minimize
urban flooding; (b) the rehabilitation, repair and expansion of priority investments in the city's
sewerage network and treatment plant to help improve the urban environment; and (c) supporting
DWASA's pilot expansion of water and sanitation services into selected Dhaka slums to help
increase services to the urban poor.
Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)
The revised PDO to improve storm water drainage in select catchments in Dhaka and improve
DWASA's planning capacity
(a) PDO Indicator(s)
Indicator
Indicator 1 :
Baseline Value
Indicator 2 :
Indicator 3 :
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
4000000
3600000
06/30/2016
06/30/2016
90% achieved; introduced at restructuring. The number is from the
drainage impact modeling exercise; it is the population of wards that
would see a change in flood depth and duration for a 1 in 10 year event;
the percent of female beneficiaries is 50%.
Increase in permanent storm water pumping capacity (m3/d)
Value
0
quantitative or
Qualitative)
Date achieved 12/08/2008
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Formally
Revised
Target
Values
Direct project beneficiaries (number), of which female (%)
Value
1500000
quantitative or
Qualitative)
Date achieved 06/13/2013
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
40
40
06/30/2016
06/30/2016
100% achieved; before restructuring this was an IO level indicator, lifted
to PDO level at restructuring. Due to the completion of Rampura (25
m3/s) and Kamalapur (15 m3/s) the indicator is achieved;
Increased capacity of rehabilitated drainage canals (m3/s)
Value
0
quantitative or
Qualitative)
250
250
viii
Date achieved 06/13/2013
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Indicator 4 :
06/30/2016
100% achieved; introduced at restructuring; this indicator is achieved
through the rehabilitation and development of 13 sections of drainage
canals
Number of plans prepared and approved by DWASA Board of Directors
Value
0
quantitative or
Qualitative)
Date achieved 06/13/2013
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
06/30/2016
4
2
06/30/2015
06/30/2016
50% achieved; introduced at restructuring; The sewage master plan was
approved on Sep 30, 2014; The drainage master plan on Jun 23, 2016. 2
other plans were prepared, but not approved. These plans were prepared
with BE funds & not attributed to project
Water level and number of days of waterlogging in the eastern part of
Indicator 5 : Dhaka
Value
quantitative or
Qualitative)
Date achieved
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Indicator 6 :
Value
quantitative or
Qualitative)
Date achieved
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
NA
NA
12/12/2008
06/30/2013
Indicator dropped at restructuring in June 2013; DWASA does not have
the systems to monitor this indicator
Number of households with access to sewerage services
50853
57000
12/12/2008
06/30/2013
Indicator dropped at restructuring in June 2013; sewerage investments
were cancelled at restructuring.
Increase in number of people in project area ward slums with access to
Indicator 7 : safe water
Value
0
quantitative or
Qualitative)
Date achieved 12/12/2008
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
180000
49000
06/30/2013
06/30/2016
Indicator dropped at restructuring in June 2013; LIC investments were
cancelled. However, the project included some small LIC works, and
49000 LIC residents gained access to safe water supply as a result of
project activities.
ix
Increase in number of people in project area ward slums with access to
Indicator 8 : improved sanitation
Value
quantitative or
Qualitative)
Date achieved
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
0
218000
12/12/2008
06/30/2013
Indicator dropped at restructuring in June 2013; LIC investment
component was cancelled
(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)
Indicator
Baseline Value
Original Target
Formally
Values (from
Revised
approval
Target Values
documents)
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
A new sewerage master plan for Dhaka city is approved by DWASA's
Indicator 1 : Board of Directors
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
Date achieved
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Indicator 2 :
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
Date achieved
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Indicator 3 :
no
yes
yes
06/13/2013
06/30/2016
06/30/2016
100% achieved; introduced at restructuring; The sewerage master plan
was approved by DWASA's Board of Directors on September 30, 2016
Diagnostic study on septage management practices in Dhaka
no
yes
yes
06/13/2013
06/30/2016
06/30/2016
100% achieved; introduced at restructuring; a diagnostic study on septage
management was carried out and completed by June 30, 2016;
length of storm water canals constructed/rehabilitated (m)
Value
0
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 12/08/2008
30000
20885
20885
06/30/2013
06/30/2016
06/30/2016
x
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
100% achieved
A new drainage master plan for Dhaka city is approved by DWASA's
Indicator 4 : Board of Directors
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
Date achieved
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
no
yes
yes
yes
06/13/2013
12/31/2015
06/30/2016
06/30/2016
100% achieved; indicator introduced at restructuring; The drainage master
plan was approved by DWASA's Board of Directors on June 23, 2016
Drainage modeling undertaken of the impact of the project's i) khal
Indicator 5 : rehabilitation and ii) storm water
Value
no
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 06/13/2013
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Indicator 6 :
yes
yes
no
12/31/2015
06/30/2016
06/30/2016
Not achieved; indicator introduced at restructuring; drainage impact
modeling was completed by June 30 2016 with Bank-executed funds.
Rated not achieved as this is not attributable to the project
Number of project affected households successfully compensated
Value
0
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
All entitled PAH
fully
compensated
500
prior to
relocation from
project site
441
Date achieved 12/08/2008
06/30/2013
06/30/2016
06/30/2016
100% achieved as this represents all households affected by the project
Comments
(incl. %
eligible for compensation (indicator continued)
achievement)
Indicator 7 :
Service Improvement Plan for LICs is prepared
Value
no
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 06/13/2013
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
yes
no
06/30/2016
06/30/2016
Not achieved; indicator introduced at restructuring; LIC service
improvement plan was developed in close collaboration with DWASA.
This was completed using Bank-executed funds; rated not achieved as not
attributable to the project;
xi
Annual statutory audits for DWASA demonstrating transparent and
Indicator 8 : accountable financial management (cumulative)
Value
0
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
No fiduciary
issues with
project funds
4
4
Date achieved 12/08/2008
06/30/2013
06/30/2016
06/30/2016
100% achieved; Annual audits have been submitted regularly; indicator
Comments
(incl. %
was continued
achievement)
Indicator 9 :
Water utilities that the project is supporting
Value
1
1
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 06/13/2013
06/30/2016
Comments
Core indicator introduced at restructuring
(incl. %
achievement)
1
06/30/2016
Development of an institutional structure for DWASA’s decentralization
Indicator 10 : and an action plan for its implementation
Value
no
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 06/13/2013
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
yes
no
06/30/2016
06/30/2016
Not achieved. Indicator introduced at restructuring; a diagnostic and
options study for DWASA's decentralization was completed with Bank
executed funds; rated not achieved as not attributable to the project.
A new decentralized zonal management structure and action plan for its
Indicator 11 : implementation are approved by DWASA's Board of Directors
Value
no
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 06/13/2013
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Indicator 12 :
Value
yes
no
06/30/2016
06/30/2016
Not Achieved; indicator introduced at restructuring; Plan was completed
with Bank-executed funds, in close coordination with DWASA.
Following DWASA's preferred option for decentralized management,
detailed organogram was prepared; not yet approved by BoD
DWASA zonal office refurbished and equipped
0
1
6
xii
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 06/13/2013
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Indicator 13 :
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
Date achieved
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Indicator 14 :
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
Date achieved
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
06/30/2016
06/30/2016
Target surpassed; indicator introduced at restructuring; due to fund
reallocation a total of 6 zonal offices have been refurbished and equipped,
compared to the target of one zonal office
Length of sewage lines rehabilitated/extended (km)
0
30
12/12/2008
06/30/2013
This indicator was dropped at restructuring in June 2013 due to the
cancellation of sewerage investment
Volume of solid waste collected along the canals (tons)
0
20000
12/12/2008
06/30/2013
Indicator dropped at restructuring in June 2013; DWASA does not have
the monitoring systems or mandate to ensure collection
Increase in population in project area ward slums with access to safe
Indicator 15 : water
Value
0
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 12/12/2008
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
56000
49000
06/30/2013
06/30/2016
Indicator dropped at restructuring; some LIC investments were completed.
49000 LIC residents gained access to safe water supply as a result of
project activities.
Increase in population in project area peri-urban unions with access to
Indicator 16 : safe water
Value
0
124000
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 12/12/2008
06/30/2013
Comments
Indicator dropped at restructuring
(incl. %
achievement)
Indicator 17 : Increase in population in project area ward slums with access to improved
xiii
sanitation
Value
0
94000
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 12/12/2008
06/30/2013
Comments
Indicator dropped at restructuring
(incl. %
achievement)
Increase in population in project area peri-urban unions with access to
Indicator 18 : improved sanitation
Value
0
124000
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 12/12/2008
06/30/2013
Comments
Indicator dropped at restructuring
(incl. %
achievement)
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
No.
Date ISR
Archived
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
05/25/2009
07/29/2009
11/28/2009
05/26/2010
12/19/2010
07/10/2011
06/05/2012
12/31/2012
06/22/2013
10/09/2013
12/14/2013
06/22/2014
11/23/2014
06/10/2015
15
11/17/2015
16
02/02/2016
17
06/30/2016
DO
IP
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
Unsatisfactory
xiv
Actual
Disbursements
(USD millions)
0.75
0.75
3.30
3.22
5.61
5.61
8.42
15.49
15.49
22.04
22.04
27.82
40.03
44.76
58.34
65.19
71.39
H. Restructuring (if any)
ISR Ratings at
Amount
Board
Restructuring Disbursed at
Restructuring
Reason for Restructuring &
Approved
Restructuring
Date(s)
Key Changes Made
PDO Change DO
in USD
IP
millions
06/13/2013
11/23/2015
Y
N
U
MU
U
15.49
MU
58.34
The project was restructured
to scale-down investments
and focus on activities that
could be completed within an
additional 2.5 year period.
The restructuring also
increased project focus on
institutional strengthening
and capacity building
activities
A six-month extension was
required to complete crucial
investments (e.g. one of the
pumping stations) and other
ongoing activities
If PDO and/or Key Outcome Targets were formally revised (approved by the original approving
body) enter ratings below:
Outcome Ratings
Unsatisfactory
Against Original PDO/Targets
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Against Formally Revised PDO/Targets
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Overall (weighted) rating
xv
I. Disbursement Profile
xvi
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design
1.1 Context at Appraisal
1.
From 2000 to 2008, Bangladesh’s economy grew at 5.8 percent per annum. At the
same time, in 2008, about 40 percent of the population continued to live below US$1.25
per day. While majority of this population was in rural areas, at least 25 percent of the poor
population lived in Bangladesh’s urban areas. Urban poverty was further exacerbated by
rapid urbanization.
2.
Between 2000 and 2008, Bangladesh experienced faster urbanization than South
Asia as a whole (World Bank, 2015). In 2008, about 40 million people lived in urban areas
across the country, with about 15 million living in the Dhaka Metropolitan Area (DMA).
While Dhaka was the center for manufacturing, commerce and construction for the
country, the city’s rapid growth also led to considerable infrastructure and environmental
challenges.
3.
In 2005, 29 percent of Bangladesh’s urban population had access to piped water
services and 55 percent had access to other improved water sources, while access to
improved sanitation was 58 percent (JMP) 1. Dhaka was the only city with a water-borne
sewerage system that served about 20 percent of its population. The large majority of
households were not connected to the combined sewer system and either used septic tanks
or had no on-site facility in place at all. As a result, septic tank effluent and black water
discharged directly in the storm water canals and drains. This affected the drainage systems
and led to pollution of water sources and contamination of water supply. In the absence of
adequate planning and enforcement, the canals also became dumping areas for solid waste.
In 2008, only 26 out of Dhaka’s 43 canals (or khals) were functional.
4.
In 1996, the Government of Bangladesh adopted the Water Supply and Sewerage
Authority (WASA) Act. Under this Act, Dhaka WASA (DWASA) was assigned the
responsibility of providing water, sewerage and storm water drainage2 services in Dhaka.
As per the Act, DWASA’s management was answerable to a Board of Directors, which
included stakeholders appointed by the GoB. In order to increase DWASA’s autonomy and
improve operations, the GoB also approved various regulations and signed a Performance
Agreement with DWASA. Despite these steps, the increasing population, increased risk of
flooding due to inadequate drainage systems, and limited infrastructure resulted in critical
challenges for DWASA.
5.
The Dhaka Water Supply and Sanitation Project (DWSSP) was designed to address
some of the issues confronting DWASA. The Bank had a long history of supporting water
supply and sanitation infrastructure in Dhaka - financing four projects since the 1960s.
Despite a gap after the closure of the Fourth Water Supply and Sanitation project in 2002,
1
The latest JMP (2015) estimate for Bangladesh shows a slight improvement of 32 percent with piped services, and 55
percent with access to other improved water sources (urban). Urban sanitation access shows 58 percent improved access,
30 shared access, and 12 unimproved access (no open defecation).
2
Storm water drainage responsibilities are shared with Dhaka City Corporations (DCC). DCC is responsible for smaller
drainage pipes, while DWASA has responsibility for larger canals and some storm water pipes.
1
the Bank was able to prepare DWSSP bringing its experience and relevant sector
knowledge. DWSSP was also well aligned with the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS)
2006-2009 objectives of improving the governance and efficiency of infrastructure
services, including in the water sector.
1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as
approved)
6.
The PDO was to improve the sustainable delivery of stormwater drainage,
wastewater and water services by the Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority to the
population of Dhaka through:
a) The installation of selected stormwater pumping stations and the rehabilitation of
selected canals to help improve drainage and minimize urban flooding;
b) The rehabilitation, repair and expansion of priority investments in the city's sewerage
network and treatment plant to help improve the urban environment; and
c) Supporting DWASA's pilot expansion of water and sanitation services into selected
Dhaka slums to help increase services to the urban poor.
7.
Progress towards achieving the PDO were monitored through a set of indicators
linked to the PDO:
a) Water level and number of days of water logging in the eastern part of Dhaka;
b) The number of households with access to sewerage services; and
c) Increase in the number of people in project area ward slums with access to safe water
and improved sanitation.
1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and Reasons/Justification
8.
During the project mid-term review (MTR) in December 2012, the ratings for both
the Development Objective and Implementation Progress were assessed as
‘unsatisfactory’. This was mainly due to shortcomings in the design, lack of readiness, and
low capacity of the implementing agency. Thus, the project was restructured in June 2013
with an aim to scale-down the project scope, increase project period by 2.5 years, complete
ongoing works and technical assistance (TA) activities, and enhance DWASA’s capacity
to better plan for future investments in sanitation and drainage
9.
The revised PDO was to improve storm water drainage in select catchments in
Dhaka and to improve DWASA's planning capacity. To reflect the above changes and
to mark the Bank’s shift to core sector indicators in July 2009, previous PDO indicators
were dropped and the following were added:
a) Direct project beneficiaries (number), of which female (percentage)
b) Increase in permanent storm water pumping capacity
c) Increased capacity of rehabilitated drainage canals
d) Number of plans prepared and approved by DWASA’s Board of Directors
2
The intermediate outcome indicators were also revised at restructuring: seven were
dropped, four continued, and 12 new indicators were introduced (See Section F of Data
Sheet).
1.4 Main Beneficiaries
Original target beneficiaries.
10.
At appraisal, the target beneficiaries were defined broadly as people of Dhaka city
benefiting from the proposed investments in drainage, wastewater and water supply and
sanitation. Other intended beneficiaries were residents of Dhaka’s low-income
communities where water and sanitation services would be extended.
Revised target beneficiaries
11.
After restructuring the target beneficiaries were defined as 4 million people (of
which 50% female) living in the catchment areas of the project’s drainage canals and
stormwater pumping stations. DWASA was seen as intended beneficiary of the project’s
institutional capacity building programs.
1.5 Original Components (as approved)
12.
DWSSP had five components, which are summarized below.3
Component 1. Rehabilitation and Strengthening of Existing Sewerage System: US$63.8m4
(IDA US$52.4m). This component was to support the rehabilitation and strengthening of
the existing sewerage system, including the rehabilitation of lifting/pumping stations, the
rehabilitation and augmentation of the Pagla sewage treatment plant, the replacement of
trunk sewer mains and sewer lines, and expansion of branches to augment the coverage
area of the Pagla sewer basin. Purchase of sewer cleaning equipment and TA to improve
operation and maintenance (O&M) was also included. This component also included
support to develop a sewerage masterplan.
Component 2. Rehabilitation and Strengthening of Stormwater Drainage System:
US$80.3m (IDA US$75.9m). This component was to improve the stormwater drainage
system by installing two pumping stations at Rampura and Kamalapur sites to alleviate
periodic flooding in the central catchment area of Dhaka. The component supported
improving the hydraulic performance of 13 khals (canals) through re-excavation, reprofiling and protection. In addition, cleaning equipment for drains and TA for O&M were
included. The component also had support for solid waste management along khals
rehabilitated under the project and TA to formulate and implement institutional
arrangements for O&M. It also included the updating of the stormwater drainage master
plan for Dhaka.
Component 3. Support to the implementation of environment and social safeguards:
US$5.2m (IDA US$5.0 m). This component was to support the implementation of
environmental management and social safeguards activities, including Resettlement
3
At appraisal the US$ equivalent of the IDA credit was estimated at US$ 149 million, out of a total estimated project
costs of US$ 165.7m. The amounts are expressed in estimated US$ values at the time of appraisal and time of
restructuring.
4 Theo overall cost for all components includes contingencies – as indicated in the project appraisal document
3
Action Plans (RAP) for rehabilitation of selected canals and Environmental Management
Framework (EMF) for the project. It also included the provision of laboratory equipment
and chemicals, and TA to DWASA to improve water quality management and monitoring
activities.
Component 4. Support to service provision to Low Income Communities: US$8.7m (IDA
US$8.4m). This component was to support the piloting of several approaches for water and
sanitation service provision to low income communities and the strengthening of
DWASA’s capacity to deliver water and sanitation services to these communities.
Component 5. Project Management, M&E, Consultations and Communications: US$7.7m
(IDA US$7.3m). This component was to support TA for project implementation,
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and DWASA’s communications program. Project
implementation support included TA for engineering, financial, legal, environmental and
social M&E.
1.6 Revised Components
13.
A level-1 restructuring 5 took place in June 2013. The revised components are
described below. More details are included in Annex 2.
Component 1: Investment Planning in Sanitation: The original IDA credit was US$ 52.4
m, of which, US$49.3m was canceled. The new IDA amount was US$3.1m. The
component was significantly amended and the name was changed. The revised component
retained the development of Dhaka’s sewerage master plan and the preparation of
engineering designs and bidding documents for priority sewerage interventions identified
in the master plan. A diagnostic study related to fecal sludge management (FSM) in Dhaka
was added to better understand practices and suggest ways to improve services. Given the
significant delays in preparing the sewerage masterplan and associated bidding documents,
implementation was dropped.
Component 2: Rehabilitation and Strengthening of Stormwater Drainage System: The
original IDA credit was US$75.9m, of which US$15.4m was canceled. There are no major
changes under this component. As the actual cost of the activities was less than originally
estimated, part of the IDA credit was cancelled, and a part was allocated for (i) additional
canal rehabilitation (ii) cost-overruns for the stormwater pumping stations; and (iii)
updating of the Drainage Master Plan6.
Component 3: Support to Implementation of Environmental and Social Safeguards: The
original IDA credit was US$5.0m, of which US$2.7m was canceled. The new IDA amount
was US$2.3m. There were no major changes to this component. As the wastewater
treatment and sewerage investments under Component 1 were cancelled, the overall cost
was reduced.
5At
the beginning of the project, based on the then applicable exchange rate, the IDA Credit of SDR 94.8 million
equaled US$ 149 million. Due to variation in the SDR to US Dollar exchange rate, at restructuring, SDR 94.8 million
was US$ 141.3 million. Therefore, the project total in June 2013 was US$ 141.3 million.
6 A drainage impact modelling exercise has been included in the restructuring paper and RF, however, the legal
agreement for the restructured project does not mention this study explicitly.
4
Component 4: Support to Service Improvement Planning to Low Income Communities:
The original IDA credit was US$8.4m, of which US$6.9m was canceled. The new IDA
amount was US$1.5m. This component was significantly amended and the name was
changed. The original design and implementation approach encountered various challenges
(See Section 2.1). Thus, service provision activities in LICs were dropped and a TA to
prepare a Service Improvement Plan for LICs was added. The TA would include: (i) a
review of approaches; (ii) ways to mainstream service provision to LICs; and, (iii)
identifying DWASA’s institutional requirements to better serve LICs.
Component 5: Project Management and Institutional Capacity Building: The original IDA
credit was US$7.4m. There was an addition allocation of US$1.3m under the component,
bringing the IDA credit to US$8.6m. This component was significantly changed, including
its name. TA activities were added to assist DWASA in decentralizing operations,
including: i) developing an institutional structure and management instruments for
decentralization; ii) preparing an action plan for implementation; (iii) support for
equipping and refurbishing zonal offices; and, (iv) staff training.
1.7 Other significant changes
14.
The project had the following significant changes:
a) Level-1 Restructuring: In June 2013, a level 1 restructuring was completed. The
project PDO was revised and the results framework was updated to reflect this change.
The overall scope of the project was reduced as the sewerage and the LIC components
were amended. Institutional strengthening activities were added (See Section 1.6). In
order to complete the revised project scope, 49 percent of the IDA credit amount was
canceled and the project closing date was extended by 2.5 years, from June 30, 2013 to
December 31, 2015.
b) Time Extension: The closing date of the project was extended from December 31, 2015
to June 30, 2016 to allow additional time for completion of critical works.
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry
Soundness of background analysis
15.
Several lessons learned during previous engagements in Dhaka’s WSS sector were
included. Based on a review of previous sector engagements and overall Bank support, the
need for a long-term engagement with GoB and DWASA to sustain reforms for improved
service delivery was recognized. Learning from the difficulties of the fourth Dhaka Water
Supply and Sanitation Project, closed in 2002, to deliver on its institutional objectives, the
project design took a gradual approach and hence did not have an institutional focus in its
original development objective. Rather it was decided to address sector and policy risks
through a broader instrument, namely the Partnership Framework and Letter of Sector
Policy that were signed in 2007 between GoB and several development partners. As part
of the project design, a Performance Agreement between DWASA and GoB which
complemented the Partnership Framework was reinstituted as a means to reintroduce
performance assessments and implement key elements of the WASA Act. A drawback of
this approach was the non-legally binding nature of the Partnership Framework for the
5
project, although an annual audit of the performance Agreement was included as a project
covenant.
16.
Capacity strengthening activities under the project aimed to leverage the Policy
Letter, and support long term institutional development activities, using the Performance
Agreement as the major vehicle to assess progress. In addition, the framework provided
opportunities for greater cooperation between development partners, particularly the Bank
and the Asian Development Bank, on institutional strengthening. However, there were also
some gaps in the project design. The background analysis did not address the lack of
readiness of priority investments. In addition, difficulties in implementing the project in
densely populated low-income communities were underestimated, especially given the fact
that DWASA was new to delivering services to LICs at the start of the project7.
17.
The rationale for the Bank’s involvement was to strengthen Dhaka’s WSS sector.
This included: supporting operationalization of the WASA act; facilitating access to WSS
services in line with the National Policy for Safe Water Supply and Sanitation (1998); and
strengthening DWASA’s capacity to provide services to all customers, including LIC
customers.
Assessment of Project Design
18.
The Project Appraisal Document (PAD) proposed a phased approach: i) preparation
of masterplans, feasibility studies and further investments; (ii) implementation of priority
drainage and sewerage infrastructure, and iii) a phased expansion of services in LIC
through piloting and replication. The phased approach was a reasonable strategy, to ensure
incremental progress and long-term engagement. However, the implementation period for
the project was set at 4.5 years and the priority investments were not ready at the time of
effectiveness. Even though the results framework established links from activities to
outcomes, the targets were too ambitious. The tight timeline, complex design, and
ambitious targets led to significant implementation challenges8 (See Section 2.3).
19.
Although implementation arrangements were simple, with DWASA as sole
implementing agency, the ambitious design placed a heavy procurement load on the Project
Management Unit (PMU). The implementation agency did not have the capacity to or the
experience to meet the demands of the project. The design also did not address institutional
coordination with Dhaka City Corporations (DCC) and other public agencies, particularly
around drainage and solid waste management.
20.
For Component 4 (service provision for LICs), the project design proposed that
DWASA manage the construction, social mobilization and management of services for
LICs through Service Organizations (SOs). DWASA had limited experience in service
provision to LICs and the SOs were not qualified to handle such “hybrid’ contracts
(investments and social mobilization). In addition, some of the LICs selected for
interventions were on privately owned land, which affected access and implementation.
The design for sanitation service provision in LICs did not take into account existing
sanitation services. The proposed technical solutions were also not optimal for the densely
7
At project approval, DWASA only delivered services to LICs through intermediary NGOs.
For example by assuming that additional wastewater treatment capacity would be put in place by YR2, stormwater
pumping capacity in place by YR3, and new services operational in LICs by YR2.
8
6
populated LICs.
Adequacy of Government Commitment
Government commitment was high at the time of project preparation. In 1998, the
GoB put in place the National Policy for Safe Water Supply and sanitation to facilitate
access for all citizens to a basic level of water and sanitation services for all citizens. In
addition, in 2005, the Dhaka Water Supply Policy was formulated, which reiterated GoB’s
commitment to provide water supply services to LICs. At the time of preparation, GoB
indicated its commitment to the reform agenda by signing a Letter of Policy and
Framework Agreement between GoB and Development Partners – which provided a
framework to sustain institutional reforms in the long term and create avenues for
cooperation between development partners. Outside the project, GoB reinstated a five-year
Performance Agreement with DWASA, signed in 2008, which included performance
targets although it did not specify incentives or sanctions.
21.
Risk assessment and mitigation
22.
At the time of appraisal, the overall risk rating was “substantial”. Key risks were:
DWASA’s capacity limitations; weakening of GoB’s commitment to implement the
WASA Act; inadequate legislative and institutional oversight for the project; weak
financial management systems; limited capacity to respond to needs of LIC residents; weak
procurement capacity; and limited experience to implement resettlement actions.
23.
Most mitigation measures were appropriate, including: extensive financial
management and procurement training; the phasing of khal rehabilitation; intensive
capacity building of DWASA on resettlement; establishing an LIC team in DWASA; TA
support; and agreement on policy actions to sustain development.
24.
During implementation, some of the mitigation measures were less effective,
including: The Letter of Sector Policy and Partnership Framework to support institutional
development was non-binding and was not adhered to; GoB-DWASA’s Performance
Agreement was not regularly audited, and there were gaps in maintaining this agreement.
This affected DWASA’s accountability; and an international procurement advisor was not
hired, leading to delays.
25.
Some unforeseen risks also led to implementation delays including: the longer than
anticipated time needed to acquire land for the Kamalapur pumping station; and the shifting
of the location of Rampura station.
2.2 Implementation
26.
The project became effective on March 14, 2009. In December, 2012, after the
MTR, the implementation progress was rated as unsatisfactory until December 2013. After
restructuring in June 2013, the acceleration of implementation and the refocus of the
project on institutional measures took 12 months to take effect and only in June 2014 the
project was rated moderately satisfactory. During the last 7 months, the project was rated
unsatisfactory again for from Nov 2015 to June, 2016. Some reasons for implementation
delays are discussed below:
a) Slow Procurement: DWASA had no prior experience in executing the two-step
procurement process for the pumping stations. As a result, it took over 40 months to
7
procure the two pumping stations, leading to significant delays. The sewerage
masterplan and engineering designs for priority sewerage works took 24 months to
procure due to a variety of procurement issues. Slow government approvals for
procurement packages also contributed to delays.
b) Complex Project Design: The overall project timeline was tight and the targets were
too ambitious, which affected implementation progress (See Section 2.1).
c) Lack of Capacity: The PMU was understaffed and the capacity to manage contracts,
and financial and procurement issues was low, leading to delays. Building DWASA’s
capacity to implement the project took additional time.
d) Land Acquisition: Land acquisition for both the stormwater pumping stations required
more time that envisaged
e) Restructuring: The project was restructured in June 2013 in a number of key issues
were addressed: (i) the project developed a more strategic planning approach for both
sewerage and drainage; (ii) the project included provisions to prepare a comprehensive
approach for LIC service provision; (iii) technical assistance to assess DWASA’s
organizational set-up and management structure was added; (iv) almost half of the IDA
credit was cancelled; and, (v) the implementation period was extended by 2.5 years.
Subsequently, another level-2 restructuring was processed in December 2015 to extend
the project closing date by 6 months.
f) Exchange Rate Fluctuation: The Dollar to XDR exchange rate fluctuation led to
changes in the overall IDA credit amount, 9 which impacted implementation.
Committed activities, such as the IT packages under Component 5, could not be
implemented due to the change in the project amount.
2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization
27.
M&E design: The M&E design of the original project was comprehensive even
though the targets for some indicators were overambitious. The PDO on water logging was
also not clearly defined. A consulting firm was hired to monitor the project progress and
provide quarterly monitoring reports. After the 2012 restructuring, the results framework
was refined to reflect changes in the PDO (See Section 1.3 and Annex 2) and to align the
project to the Bank’s core sector indicators. The indicators related to the following were
dropped after restructuring: sewerage investments; LIC service provision; solid waste
collection around canals; extent of urban flooding; O&M of drainage and sewer systems.
PDO-level indicators for stormwater drainage and DWASA’s planning capacity were
added.
28.
M&E Implementation: Pre-restructuring, the Implementation Status and Results
Reports (ISRs) did not include information on all the indicators. At the MTR, DWASA
provided a comprehensive report assessing project results. This was used to define the
results framework for the restructured project. After restructuring, the ISRs consistently
included progress for each indicator. Through the project period, the PMU’s ability to
9
XDR 50.9 was US$76.0m at restructuring, and US$70.9m at project closing.
8
monitor the project improved significantly, and it shared detailed quarterly progress reports
with the Bank in a timely manner 10 . During the restructuring, DWASA agreed to
implement several TA activities, including: the low-income customer’s service
improvement plan; a decentralized institutional structure and action plan; zonal
management structure and action plan; drainage modeling exercise. After the restructuring
was approved, these activities were not included in the Government’s revised Development
Project Performa (DPP). The task team mobilized Bank-executed funds for these tasks,
however the RF was not formally adjusted and therefore several indicators are rated as not
achieved, as they cannot be attributed to the project.
29.
Utilization of M&E. After restructuring, M&E information was used to support
implementation. Consistent monitoring of the RF indicators in the ISRs helped to keep
focus on both infrastructure progress, as well as results of technical activities (including
those financed from Bank-executed funds). This focus helped i) ensure that institutional
activities were seen as an integral project result, ii) keep DWASA’s focus on progress of
civil works, and iii) address problems in a timely manner. In addition, the project developed
a drainage asset database, which will help DWASA in asset management and guide
drainage-related decision making.
2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance
30.
Environmental and Social Safeguards Compliance. There are no outstanding
environmental or social safeguards issues in the project.
31.
Environmental safeguards compliance. The project was appropriately classified
as Category B and triggered OP/BP/ 4.01 (Environmental Assessment). In response, an
Environmental and Social Management Framework was prepared and integrated into the
project. Limited environmental assessments were prepared for sub-projects as per Bank
guidelines. Civil works under the project were all in compliance with local legislations and
Bank policies. Compensation was provided for a case of non-compliance (trees felled on a
work site). An incident of land subsidence also occurred at the Kamlapur pumping station
site, however there were no injuries.
32.
Social safeguards compliance. The Bank’s operational policy on involuntary
resettlement (OP/BP/4.12) was triggered and in response DWASA prepared a Resettlement
Policy Framework, and subsequently prepared RAPs to ensure adequate compensation for
project affected households. Even though no private land was acquired for the project, the
two pumping stations affected 221 households and the khal rehabilitation affected 216
households. These were adequately compensated as per the RAPs. A complaint regarding
the partial demolition of a building on the Khilgaon-Bashabo canal right-of-way was
received. This issue was adequately resolved. DWASA also carried out a Social Impact
Assessment, including extensive stakeholder consultations. As a result of the project,
DWASA has developed adequate in-house capacity to address social safeguard issues.
Mainly due to the cancellation of the sewerage investments, the level of spending on
10
Although not all indicators reported on were adequately evidenced, for example the increased design capacity of the
rehabilitated khals.
9
environmental and social safeguards was much lower than originally foreseen (see Annex
1 and Annex 2).
Fiduciary compliance
33.
Procurement. Procurement was generally carried out in accordance with agreed
procedures. A Procurement Capacity and Risk Assessment was conducted at appraisal and
a Procurement Risk Mitigation Plan was developed. As per the plan, DWASA would
develop quarterly reports to monitor procurement performance, and contract an
International Procurement Specialist for the PMU. DWASA did provide quarterly M&E
reports after restructuring. An international procurement specialist could not be hired due
to lack of candidates, thus a local expert was contracted.
34.
Slow procurement affected project implementation, leading to significant delays
(See Section 2.2). For example, the contract amendment for the variation orders of the
pumping stations, which also required approval from the government, were delayed by
over 12 months. Significant delays occurred in the consultancy procurement for the
sewerage masterplan and engineering designs for priority investment. Due diligence was
required to validate the shortlisting process and other irregularities were encountered that
needed extra time to get resolved. Complaint handling was a major issue and overall
turnout period for advertising, evaluation and award took significant time. The PMU did
not have a technical expert to review complex bids, which necessitated extensive technical
support from the Bank, including the hiring of a drainage consultant using Bank-executed
funds.
35.
Financial Management (FM). Financial management was implemented
adequately, and there are no overdue or outstanding audits. However, there was no full
time FM specialist with the PMU, which led to some limitations including maintaining
books of accounts, and timely submission of Interim Unaudited Financial Reports. No
project specific FM was set up and DWASA’s accounts department largely handled project
accounting and disbursements. Since the project designated account was not managed
directly by the PMU, there were delays in reporting project expenditures.
36.
External project audit reports, conducted by Foreign Aided Projects Audit
Directorate (FAPAD), were of quality and submitted to the Bank in a timely manner. The
project complied with all fiduciary covenants during implementation. There are some
outstanding issues from various fiscal years. A final opinion by FAPAD on these issues
and the audit report for FY 2015-16 will be provided to the Bank by December 31, 2016.
2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
37.
Transition arrangements: Transition arrangements are summarized below:
a) Technical: newly built pumping stations, rehabilitated khals and drainage cleaning
equipment have been formally handed to the respective divisions/circles within
DWASA for O&M after relevant training was provided.
b) Financial: At this time, there is no clear plan and budget for O&M of newly
constructed assets.
c) Institutional: DWASA is currently carrying out a review of a new organogram and is
looking to set up a new sewerage directorate, however this has not yet been approved
10
by the DWASA’s board.
38. Future operation. The proposed Dhaka Sanitation Improvement Project (DSIP),
which is a follow-up operation, is currently being prepared. The project aims to improve
sanitation in selected catchments of Dhaka city, improve DWASA capacity to provide
sanitation services and reduce domestic wastewater pollution in and around Dhaka. The
detailed engineering design and tender documents for priority investments prepared under
DWSSP will allow for a faster implementation.
3. Assessment of Outcomes
3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
Relevance of Objectives: Substantial (before) and Substantial (after restructuring)
39.
Before restructuring, the PDO were relevant to the country’s development
objectives and the needs of Dhaka city. The GoB’s Perspective Plan 2012-2020 and the 7th
Five Year Plan articulate the government’s medium and long-term measures to improve
urban development, basic service provision, minimize risks from flooding, and enhance
environmental protection. In addition, the Dhaka Water Supply Policy (2005) confirmed
DWASA’s mandate to extend basic water supply and sanitation services to slums within
its service area. While the project objective was clearly aligned with government priorities,
it did not explicitly address strengthening of DWASA’s institutional capacity. Thus, the
relevance before restructuring is rated as substantial. After restructuring, the objectives
continued to be in-line with government priority to improve storm water drainage in Dhaka.
The project also aimed to improve DWASA’s planning capacity, which was ultimately
expected to improve service delivery in the city. As the PDO scope was narrowed, the
relevance after restructuring is substantial.
40.
The project, both before and after restructuring, remained substantially relevant to
the Bank’s priorities and development objectives. The Country Partnership Framework
(2016-2020) has three pillars: i) growth and competiveness, ii) social inclusion and iii)
climate and environment management. The project directly supports objectives under pillar
1 and 3, namely ‘Delivery of Basic Services in Urban and Rural Areas’, and ‘Improved
Water Resource Management for Climate Resilience’. After restructuring, the project also
focused on building DWASA’s capacity, which is aligned with the CPF aim to strengthen
institutions through activities embedded in Bank operations.
Relevance of Design and Implementation: Modest (before) and Substantial (after)
41.
Before restructuring, the relevance of the design was modest. The design was
relevant from the following perspectives: (i) The proposed infrastructure investments
focused on improving water and sanitation access for the poor residents, and on improving
necessary services in the city; and (ii) the implementation arrangements were relevant as
the project management responsibility was with DWASA, which also had the mandate for
water, sanitation and stormwater drainage services for Dhaka. However, There were
several shortcomings: i) tight timeline and overambitious targets, ii) weak institutional
coordination mechanism iii) design shortcomings for service delivery to LICs and
inadequate slum selection, and iv) reliance on the non-binding Partnership Framework for
11
DWASA’s institutional strengthening.
42.
After restructuring, the relevance of the design improved to substantial, due to the
following: (i) narrowing of the PDO and a focus on drainage investments that could be
realistically achieved within the project period; (ii) increased focus on DWASA’s
institutional strengthening; (iii) focus on understanding fecal sludge management practices
in Dhaka to comprehensively address sanitation in the long term; (iv) planning to improve
services in LICs; v) defining an action plan and management structure for DWASA’s
decentralization. Implementation arrangements for the restructured project were
appropriate as the mandate for stormwater drainage remained with DWASA. Even though
the overall design of the restructured project was relevant, it also included several new TA
activities, even though DWASA’s capacity to implement ongoing works and new TA
activities was limited.
3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives
43.
This section assess outcomes against project targets and objectives before and after
project restructuring.
Rating: Substantial (before restructuring) and Substantial (after restructuring)
Before restructuring:
PDO 1: Improve the sustainable delivery of stormwater drainage services (Substantial)
44.
The project put in place permanent storm water drainage capacity of 40 m3/s
through the full commissioning of Rampura (25 m3/s) and Kamalapur (15 m3/s) station
(original target 40 m3/s) before the closing date. The project has rehabilitated a total of 13
parts of drainage canals, covering a length of 20.89 km (formally revised target 20.855 km),
representing an estimated increase in discharge capacity of 250 m3/s (formally revised
target of 250 m3/s). This objective was intended to be measured through collection of
depths and duration of water logging. However, DWASA did not have a suitable
monitoring systems in place and due to fluctuating year-on-year precipitation, such
empirical data would have to be collected over a long time period. Hence, drainage impact
modeling (See Annex 3) is a good alternative and evidences the widespread reduction of
flood as a result of the project investments in Dhaka. Risks of khal siltation/clog-up and
pump breakdown due to inadequate O&M remain (See section 4).
PDO 2: Improve the sustainable delivery of wastewater services (Negligible)
45.
The project aimed to improve the sustainable delivery of wastewater services for
households in Dhaka, specifically those served by Pagla Sewage Treatment Plant (STP;
original PAD target from 50,853 to 57,000 households served, 280 km of sewer
rehabilitated, and Pagla STP capacity increased from 19,500 to 120,000 m3/day). These
improvements could not be realized and were canceled at the time of restructuring.
12
PDO 3: Improve the sustainable delivery of water services, especially in low-income
areas (Negligible)
46.
The project aimed to improve sustainable delivery and access to improved water
and safe sanitation in slum areas, targeting to reach 180,000 (water) and 218,000
(sanitation) people. These were not met, and the investments were canceled at the time of
restructuring.
After restructuring
PDO 1: Improve storm water drainage situation in select catchment of Dhaka
(Substantial)
47. The project resulted in improved storm water drainage in select catchments of
Dhaka. The stormwater pumping capacity target of 40 m3/day was met after the
commissioning of the Kamlapur and Rampura pumping stations. The khal rehabilitation
work for 13 canals was completed and their capacity increased by an estimated 250 m3/s
fulfilling the target (see Table 1). With Bank-executed funds, a drainage impact modelling
exercise was carried out for a one in ten year flood event assuming optimal O&M. It found
that the project investments will reduce the extent, depth and duration of waterlogging in
24 wards in Dhaka city and would positively impact around 3.6 million people (See Annex
3), of which 50 percent female. In case of partial pump failure and siltation of khals, 0.5
million people in Central Dhaka would not fully benefit from this flood reduction as a
result of project investments11. Nine focus groups discussions were held in the Rampura
catchment area along the rehabilitated Mohakhali canal. Respondents stated less severe
waterlogging during the heavy 2015 monsoon season when the Rampura pumping station
was operational (See section 3.6)12. As indicated in section 4, risks of khal siltation and
pump breakdown due to inadequate O&M remain.
Table 1. Improve storm water drainage: achievement of indicators.
Indicator
Number of direct project
beneficiaries (million)
Target
4.0
Achieved
3.6
Increase in permanent storm
water capacity
Increased capacity of
rehabilitated drainage canals
40 m3/s
40 m3/s
250 m3/s
250 m3/s
Yes
No (not
attributable)
Drainage modelling of impact of
the project’s khal rehabilitation
and stormwater pumping
Comment
PDO Indicator
PDO Indicator (after
restructuring)
Intermediate Outcome
Indicator; baseline in 2013
was 60 m3/s
Intermediate Outcome
Indicator; Completed but not
attributable as this was Bankexecuted
IWM, 2016. Flood Modelling of Dhaka City – Impact and Resilience of Storm Water Drainage Investments of Dhaka
Water Supply and Sanitation Project. See also annex 3 for a summary of results.
12 DWASA (2015) Drainage Impact Assessment Exercise – Report on Focus Groups Discussion conducted in two
Catchment Areas of Dhaka. A total of 18 FGD were conducted, however, nine FGDs took place in Kamalapur catchment
area before the station was operational. This qualitative evidence should be seen as complementary to the obtained results
from the drainage impact modelling.
11
13
PDO 2: Improve DWASA’s planning capacity (Modest)
48.
The restructured project focused on institutional strengthening measures, as well as
planning, feasibility and design studies. A total of four different plans were to be developed
and approved by DWASA’s Board. Table 2 provides an assessment of the indicators
achieved.
Table 2. Improve DWASA’s planning capacity: achievement of indicators
Indicators
No. of plans prepared &
approved by DWASA’s Board
of Directors (BoD)
Target
4
Achieved
2
A new sewerage masterplan is
approved by DWASA’s BoD
A new drainage masterplan is
approved by DWASA’s BoD
Diagnostic study on septage
management practices in
Dhaka
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
A Service Improvement Plan
for LICs is prepared (LICSIP)
Yes
No (not
attributable)
Development of an
institutional structure for
DWASA’s decentralization
and an action plan for its
implementation
A new decentralized zonal
management structure and
action plan for its
implementation are approved
by DWASA’s BoD
Yes
No (not
attributable)
Yes
No
Comment
PDO Indicator; Out 4 plans, 2
were prepared with Bankexecuted funds, and these plans
are not attributable to the project
Intermediate Outcome Indicator;;
Approved on September 30, 2014
Intermediate Outcome Indicator;
Approved on June 23, 2016
Intermediate Outcome Indicator;
Strategy and implementation plan
for non-networked sewer
prepared
Intermediate Outcome Indicator;
completed with Bank executed
funds; thus not attributable to the
project
Intermediate Outcome Indicator;
completed with Bank executed
funds; thus not attributable to the
project
Intermediate Outcome Indicator;
Not attributable to the project, as
this was Bank-executed. New
organizational structure prepared,
but not yet approved by BoD
49.
As indicated in Table 2, the LICSIP, the decentralization structure and action plan
and the zonal management structure and action plan are not attributable to the project as
these were executed by the Bank using WSP funds (See section 1.7 and 3.5). Thus, the
PDO outcome is rated Modest.
50.
The project also assessed DWASA’s financial aspects. Audited balance sheets for
FY11 – FY15 show that the ratio of current assets over current liabilities is above the
required threshold in the covenant, ranging from 2.05 to 3.13. DWASA’s income
statements show that a positive net income was maintained throughout the period, with
US$ 2 million (BDT 160 million) in FY15.
14
3.3 Efficiency
Rating: Substantial
51. The economic analysis looked at impacts from flooding that occur with and without
the project investments over the period of 2016-2030 for a one in ten year flood event (See
Annex 3). The ICR analysis takes into account the likely socio-economic changes in the
project area from 2016-2030. Scenarios with various discount rates are illustrated in
Annex 3, using discount factors ranging from 3, 6, 9 and 13 percent. A discount factor of
6 percent is confirm the latest World Bank Guidance note, while 13 percent was used at
appraisal13.
52. At appraisal, the economic analysis considered the benefits resulting from avoided
damage costs due to reduced flooding and avoided disruption in economic activities. The
Net Present Value (NPV) of project investments was estimated at US$ 23.1 million at a
13% discount rate.
53. At project closing, a similar economic analysis was carried out, however the
hydraulic and economic model used was more refined as it was developed for a recent
Bank publication 14 with support of the Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund.
Using a discount rate of 6 percent, the NPV of project investments was estimated to be
US$ 24.2 million between 2016 and 2030 and the EIRR 12.1 percent (the present value
of the investments and O&M costs was estimated at US$ 53 million; and the present value
of the accumulated avoided damage was estimated at US$ 77.1 million). Avoided
damages can almost equally be attributed to khal rehabilitation and pumping station
investments. The majority (82 percent) of avoided damages occur in Central Dhaka
catchment. Using a discount factor of 13 percent (as used during appraisal), the NPV of
the project investments turns negative to US$ -4.6 million. However, it is to be noted that
the model used to quantify the benefits at project closing was different compared to
appraisal (see Annex 3). Furthermore, externalities due to flood investments cannot be
fully captured in the model.
54. A financial analysis for the khal rehabilitation was not carried out at project closing
since the investments do not generate additional revenues to DWASA. However, an
average unit cost per meter khal rehabilitated under the project was calculated. A unit cost
analysis for the khal rehabilitation was difficult to perform, as benchmarking is
complicated by site-specific conditions like cross-sections and lining requirements. An
average unit costs per meter khal rehabilitated under the project was calculated for
different canal lining types and compared favorably with DWASA’s budget norms15.
55. Overall, the NPV is positive (at a 6% discount rate), EIRR is high, and unit cost for
khal rehabilitation was lower than DWASA norms, indicating high efficiency of
13
Word Bank Communications February 2016. (Fay, M., et al., 2016) Discounting Cost and Benefits in Economic
Analysis of World Bank Projects. Washington DC.
14
Dasgupta, Susmita; Zaman, Asif; Roy, Subhendu; Huq, Mainul; Jahan, Sarwar; Nishat, Ainun. (2015).
Urban Flooding of Greater Dhaka in a Changing Climate: Building Local Resilience to Disaster Risk.
Directions in Development--Environment and Sustainable Development; Washington, DC: World Bank.
15
Meter unit cost of khal rehab, for varying cross-sections range from US$ 1000-4000/m for RCC U-drains/retaining
walls and US$500-2000/m for Trapezoidal block lining. The values compare favorably with DWASA’s budget norms:
US$4500-5125/m for RCC U drains/retaining walls and US$3200/m for Trapezoidal block lining.
15
investments. Although it took longer than anticipated to implement the project, the
interventions will lead to long term net benefits due to the impacts on reducing flood
damage. Thus, overall efficiency is rated as Substantial.
3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
56. Before restructuring, the overall outcome rating is Unsatisfactory based on a
Substantial rating for relevance of objectives, a Modest rating for relevance of design and
implementation, a Substantial rating for efficiency, and a Modest rating for achievement
of PDO (efficacy). After restructuring, the overall outcome rating is Moderately
Unsatisfactory based on a Substantial rating for relevance of objectives, relevance of
design and implementation, efficiency, and a Modest rating for achievement of PDO.
Based on a weighted average as per the relevant disbursement amounts before and after
restructuring as indicated in Table 3, the overall Project Outcome is Moderately
Unsatisfactory.
Table 3. Calculation of outcome rating based on weighting
Relevance of Objectives
Relevance of
Design/Implementation
Efficacy (PDO achievement)
Efficiency
Disbursement amount
Weighting factor
Outcome rating
Prerestructuring
Substantial
Modest
Postrestructuring
Substantial
Substantial
Modest
Substantial
US$ 15 m
21 %
2
(Unsatisfactory)
Modest
Substantial
US$ 57 m
79 %
3 (Moderately
Unsatisfactory)
Overall
US$ 7216
100 %
2.8 rounded to 3
(Moderately
Unsatisfactory)
3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts
(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development
57.
Poverty Impacts: It is expected that the project will help improve overall quality
of life for all residents, including the poor, by reducing incidents of flooding and
waterlogging. In addition, project interventions resulted in water supply access for about
49,000 LIC residents. As a result of this work, DWASA’s capacity to provide water supply
services in LICs is also expected to improve.
58.
Gender and Social Development Impacts. The project did not report any specific
gender or social development impact, other than stating 50 percent of direct beneficiaries
are female, based on the 2015 Bangladesh country estimates of the World Bank. Water
16
At project closing (June 2016), the XDR exchange rate represented a total of US$ 71.8 (see Annex 1)
16
committees were established in LICs, to mobilize community contributions and ensure
regular fee collection for DWASA’s. These committees enhance social capital and are
instrumental in tackling issues and conflicts that may arise.
(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening
59.
Due to the Bank and other partners’ support, DWASA has developed an
understanding of its obligations to serve LICs. Through this project, DWASA has also
nurtured partnerships with local and international Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) to support interventions in LICs. Connections to LIC customers increased from
615 in 2013 to 3290 by August 2016, serving an estimated number of 545,617 residents.
The project demonstrated feasible water service delivery models. However, without
continued external support to its LIC unit and/or corporate budget prioritization, service
provision in these communities is unlikely to scale up rapidly17.
60.
DWASA is currently carrying out a review of a new organogram and is looking to
set up a new sewerage directorate, however this has not yet been approved by the
DWASA’s board.
3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops.
61.
DWASA commissioned 18 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) in selected areas of
Dhaka to gather empirical qualitative evidence of impacts of project interventions. All
selected sites were low lying, densely populated areas that were regularly affected by
floods. The participants included petty business owners, homemakers, heads of households,
teachers, and school administrators. Across all FGDs, respondents indicated that
inundation led to negative impacts, including: transportation issues; loss of school days;
loss of livelihood; and increased costs for home and business maintenance. In nine FGDs
conducted along the Mohakhali khal in the Rampura station sites, respondents reported less
severe waterlogging. Many participants also suggested a need for improved maintenance
of canals and sewers, and better coordination between agencies responsible for waste
management, city planning and drainage.
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome
Rating: Substantial
62.
The risk to development outcome is rated as Substantial for the following reasons:
a) Pumping station sustainability: Risk to sustainable and optimal operation of the
pumping stations are: (i) Adequacy of human and financial resources for O&M,
including preventive maintenance. In FY13, the O&M budget for the two pumping
stations (with temporary pumping capacity of 12 m3/s) was US$86,000. DWASA
has not yet increased O&M budget forecasts18 for the new assets. (ii) O&M training
17
8 of 16 LIC staff are financed by WSUP. Development of LIC services requires resources for customer service agents
for social mobilization and community grants for investments beyond the service connections. These costs are not yet
internalized.
18 A modest estimate of 1 percent of investment costs would require US$ 300,000 O&M budget. DWASA forecasted
17
for 20 DWASA staff was organized 18 months ago. The pumps have recently
become operational, and DWASA staff may need additional training to ensure
optimal operations. Moreover, complex repairs may have to be handled by
international experts.
b) Khal sustainability: DWASA procured drainage cleaning equipment under the
project and is also receiving TA on O&M for storm water drains from a Dutch
utility19. However, average budgets for O&M for all khals for last three FYs was
on US$ 1.9 million annually and for FY17, the budget has been reduced to US$ 0.9
million. Limited O&M budget and weak coordination with DCC in terms of solid
waste management can affect khal sustainability.
c) Execution of the sewerage and drainage masterplans: Successful
implementation of masterplans requires strong commitment from DWASA’s Board
and management to continue dialogue with relevant public agencies and
development partners. It requires broad support from all stakeholders, including
other agencies and the citizens. At this stage, consensus to implement the
masterplans is building. This is illustrated by the Government’s interest to engage
in a follow-up Bank operation that would use the recommendations of the
masterplans (the Dhaka Sanitation Improvement Project). However, it remains too
early to assess the sustainable use of these plans.
d) Integrated measures for improved drainage situation. In addition to putting in
place sustainable O&M arrangements for all drainage related infrastructure
(pumping stations, khals), sustaining the improved drainage situation requires
complementary investments along up and downstream parts of the drain canals to
stop encroachment and improve the hydraulic capacity of the entire system, and not
just isolated parts of the canals. It is not clear, if the prevention of encroachment
can be sustained in the longer term.
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5.1 Bank Performance
(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
63.
The Bank deployed a team with diverse technical skills to design and appraise the
project over a 3-year preparation period. The relevance of project objectives was
substantial and there was a clear focus on poverty through the LIC-component. A risk
assessment was carried out and mitigation measures were put in place. All relevant
safeguards were adequately addressed during design and appraisal. Fiduciary aspects were
informed by a capacity assessment in procurement and financial management and relevant
training measures and covenants were included to manage risk.
O&M budget for FY17 for two pumping stations is around US$ 150,000
19 This is separate from the Bank-supported project.
18
64.
The quality at entry was negatively affected by the following factors: (i) the
implementation timeline was tight at 4.5 years; (ii) additional work was needed on bidding
documents and feasibility studies for priority investments, which affected overall project
readiness; iii) the LIC component design had to be rethought in accordance with DWASA’s
capacity limitations and prior experience; and, v) additional capacity strengthening
activities were needed to ensure improved project management. Although the project
design deliberately did not include a large institutional component at entry, the MTR
showed that such measures could not be overlooked in order to strengthen DWASA’s
capacity for sustainable service delivery and focus on LICs.
(b) Quality of Supervision
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
65.
The Bank allocated sufficient budget and staff resources for the project. The task
team undertook regular implementation support missions and prepared detailed Aide
Memoires. Specialist consultants were proactively engaged to support the project. During
the initial project period, there were some weaknesses in M&E reporting (See Section 2.3),
which were addressed after the MTR. At MTR stage, the task team candidly assessed the
project, mobilized seasoned utility exerts to assist in an institutional diagnostics and
conducted a close dialogue with the client to address shortcomings. Based on this, a level1 restructuring was completed one month before the original closing date. Some of the
activities agreed at the time of the restructuring were not reflected in the Government’s
DPP, for example, the LICSIP and the institutional decentralization plan. The Bank,
however, swiftly mobilized Bank-executed trust funds for technical assistance to support
the institutional reform in close collaboration with DWASA. (See Section 2.3). The Bank
also closely followed the construction of pumping stations and khal rehabilitation through
regular field visits and documentation of progress. However, adequate transition and O&M
arrangements for the newly developed assets were not put into place.
66.
Supervision of fiduciary and safeguard aspects was adequate. Resettlement issues
were dealt with in a pro-active manner. The Bank successfully handled a complaint along
one of the rehabilitated khals by engaging regional safeguard support and in order to solve
the case an external mediator was brought in with Bank support.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
67.
With Moderately Unsatisfactory rating for Quality at Entry, and a Moderately
Satisfactory rating for Quality of Supervision, the overall Bank performance is rated
Moderately Unsatisfactory.
5.2 Borrower Performance
(a) Government Performance
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
68.
The Ministry of Local Government Rural Development and Co-operatives
(MoLGRDC) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF), Government of Bangladesh signed a
19
Partnership Framework in November 2007 with the Bank and other donors committing to
“address long-standing reform issues that have hampered effective operations, sound
financial management and good supply of services…” A Performance Agreement signed
between GoB and DWASA in 2008 was meant to reinstitute monitoring of performance
and the implementation of the provisions in the WASA Act. Although the Framework was
non-binding in nature, the absence of joint annual reviews of policy actions resulted in
limited policy level engagement. GoB and DWASA did not adhere to the annual audits of
the Performance Agreement, included as a covenant in the project, despite frequent
requests to do so in Aide Memoires, nor was the agreement continued after its expiry. This
hindered the assessment of DWASA’s progress towards becoming an autonomous service
delivery institution.
69.
Slow government decision, for example, the time taken to approve the contract
variations for the two pumping stations and the revised DPP, had a significant impacts on
project implementation.
(b) Implementing Agency Performance
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
70.
DWASA was the sole project implementing agency. DWASA put in substantial
effort to facilitate coordination with stakeholder in transfer of land for the pumping station
and consistently followed up with GoB ministries to ensure the all bureaucratic processes
were followed. DWASA also followed all Bank safeguards policies, helping resolve
resettlement issues effectively.
71.
Project progress was affected by DWASA’s limited technical capacity and chronic
understaffing to assess the adequacy and quality of studies, for e.g. the sewerage and
drainage master plan. The PMU was heavily burdened with complex procurement and
extensive handholding from the Bank was needed throughout the project period to ensure
that Bank’s policies were followed. The Bank team suggested increasing PMU staff and
hiring consultants for procurement, contract management, site supervision and FM.
However, this was not completed. Several institutional measures included at restructuring
and reflected in the legal agreements were not included in the revised DPP and hence could
not be financed under the project, affecting achievement of institutional development
objectives.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
72.
With a Moderately Unsatisfactory rating for Government Performance and a
Moderately Unsatisfactory rating for Implementing Agency Performance, the overall
Borrower performance is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory.
6. Lessons Learned
73.
Project Readiness. Realistic timelines, targets and readiness of designs are
necessary for large and complex infrastructure projects. This can help avoid a situation in
which the entire process from identification, feasibility, design, procurement and
construction has be completed within one project cycle. Therefore, to mitigate unnecessary
implementation delays, funds for the preparation of future investments studies and bidding
20
packages can be allocated within the project. DWSSP demonstrated this approach
successfully. After restructuring, long-term master plans, conceptual design, feasibility
studies, and bidding packages for the next round of priority investment were delivered. The
phasing of large infrastructure investments through various project cycles will be an
effective way to ensure that each project has a large amount of its infrastructure investments
ready at approval (design, bidding and land assignment), while preparing the detailed
documents for the next follow-on stage.
74.
Integrated urban planning. While integrated solutions for drainage, sanitation
and solid waste would be ideal, their complexity need to be balanced with the capacity of
the implementing agencies. With increasing emphasis on integrated urban solutions, future
project interventions would need to include some elements of integrated planning,
involving multiple institutions, while at the same time recognizing that implementation
may be less streamlined if many agencies are involved. The project could not address
integrated solutions well, as it positioned itself solely with DWASA and it did not engage
substantially with DCCs that are responsible for solid waste management and khal cleanup. The sewerage and drainage masterplans emphasize incentives for better coordination,
the need to delineate and rationalize mandates, and can provide a vehicle to gradually
implement such institutional changes, while building capacity of the various entities.
75.
Sustainability and institutional measures. Institutional measures along-side large
infrastructure projects cannot be left unaddressed to ensure sustainable services. Inadequate
utility performance is often a symptom of a lack of a proper institutional set-up. In this case,
the project did not address DWASA’s overall financial sustainability to ensure that
adequate financing arrangements were in place for O&M of pumping stations and regular
clean-up of the khals. Institutional measures would need to be accompanied with
monitoring of performance indicators and business incentives, as proposed in DWASA’s
new organizational structure that emphasizes decentralization of services.
76.
LIC service delivery. Service delivery to LICs is complex and requires
comprehensive planning, based on an understanding of slum types, existing conditions,
legal aspects, suitable technologies, and different service delivery models. The project
struggled to implement a “pilot and replicate” program for LIC areas due to complexities
in service delivery and the need to go beyond a “blue-print” service delivery model. A
strategic and comprehensive approach is articulated in the LICSIP and forms a solid
foundation for DWASA to expand services to LICs with support from development
partners and NGOs.
77.
Complementarity of Bank-executed funds for Technical Assistance. When
project activities include institutional measures, it is essential to ensure that Bank-executed
funds are not used to “substitute” activities that should be executed by the implementing
agency of the project. The Bank can provide complementary Bank-executed technical
assistance, while ensuring that core institutional activities linked to the project
development objective will be implemented the project implementation agency.
78.
Procurement. The procurement process needs be identified upfront and reflected
in the overall project work plan. A clear set of criteria should be developed to evaluate the
proposals and assess the strength of the vendors. The procurement process should be
decided based on the nature and complexity of works and should include an assessment of
21
various technology options. The two-stage bidding process used for the pumping stations
may not have been required if such upfront assessment of technologies had been carried
out. In addition, even though larger packages are desirable to avoid inefficiency, under this
project it was clear that for civil works with local tendering (such as for canal rehabilitation),
smaller packages were better suited to the capacity of local contractors.
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners
(a) Borrower/implementing agencies
79.
Annex 5 provides a summary of the Borrower’s ICR. The report provides a good
overview of the project design and assessment of its implementation. Findings are
generally consistent with this ICR, although there are some discrepancies in data and
ratings for outcome achievement and Bank and Borrower performance. The Borrower’s
evaluative comments highlighted that a long-term engagement combining investments and
TA is a suitable approach to strengthen DWASA’s capacity.
(b) Cofinanciers
NA
(c) Other partners and stakeholders NA
22
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing
Dhaka Water Supply and Sanitation Project – Credit Number – 4506-BD
(a) Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)
Appraisal
Revised
Percentage
Actual Estimate
Percentage
Estimate Estimate at
at
Components20*
(US$ m)
of Revised
(US$ m) Restructuring
Appraisal
(IDA)21
(% of IDA)
(IDA) (US$ m) (IDA)
(% of IDA)
Component 1: Investment
63.8
3.1
3.87
6%
102%
Planning in Sanitation
Component 2: Rehabilitation and
Strengthening of Storm Water
80.3
60.5
52.28
69%
86%
Drainage System
Component 3: Support to the
Implementation of Environmental
5.2
2.3
1.03
21%
45%
and Social Safeguards
Component 4: Support to Service
Improvement Planning in Low8.7
1.5
1.82
22%
121%
Income Communities
Component 5: Project
Management and Institutional
7.7
8.6
12.69
174%
148%
Capacity Building
165.7
76.0
70.9
48%
93%
Total Baseline Cost
Total Contingencies**
165.7
76.0
71.8
Total Project Costs
Front-end fee PPF
Front-end fee IBRD
165.7
76.0
71.8
Total Financing
** Contingencies were included in component estimates. Physical and price
contingencies at appraisal were US$ 19 million, and US$ 6 million after restructuring.
(b) Financing
Source of Type of CoFunds
financing
Borrower
IDA
Total
Appraisal
Estimate
(US$ millions)
16.70
149.0
165.7
Revised
Actual/latest Percentage Percentage of
Estimate
Estimate
at Appraisal
Revised
(US$ millions) (US$ millions)
NA
0.9
5%
NA*
76.0
70.9
51%
93%
43%
94%
76.0
71.8
* In the restructuring paper no counterpart funding is included to finance the restructured
project cost. The total use of GoB fund stands at BDT 70.0 million, or US$ 0.9 million.
20
Components 1, 4, and 5 were renamed after restructuring. This information is included in Section 1.2 and 1.3
At the beginning of the project, based on the then applicable exchange rate, the IDA credit of XDR 94.8 million was
US$ 149 million. Due to variation in the XDR-US Dollar exchange rate, XDR 94.8 million was US$ 141.3 million at
the time of restructuring. After cancellation and at the time of restructuring (June 2013), the project total was XDR 51
million or US$ 76 million. At project closing (June 2016), XDR 51 million was US$71 million.
21
23
Annex 2. Outputs by Component
Component 1: Investment Planning in Sanitation (actual IDA US$ 3.17 m)
(previously: rehabilitation and Strengthening of Existing Sewerage Systems)
Component 1 focused on the rehabilitation, repair and expansion of priority investments in
the city’s sewerage network and treatment plant to help improve the urban environment.
The start of activities under this component was considerably delayed, due to procurement
issues, lengthy GoB approvals, and debate on technical design issues. As a result, the
component was significantly amended at the time of restructuring and the name was
changed to Investment Planning in Sanitation (original IDA US$ 52.4 million was reduced
to US$ 3.1 million). At restructuring, it was determined that investments could not be
completed and were dropped. Instead the focus of shifted to support DWASA’s planning
capacity for wastewater investments.
DWASA prepared a sewerage master plan, which was endorsed by the Board on September
30, 2014.The plan identifies US$ 1.7 billion worth of investments for Dhaka city. Based
on the priority investments identified in the master plan, DWASA updated the bidding
documents for the eastern trunk sewer and rehabilitation/expansion of Pagla STP. In
addition, a comprehensive package of engineering designs and bidding documents for
wastewater treatment and sewerage investments in Mirpur and Uttara catchments, as well
as an overall diagnostic study on fecal sludge management (FSM) were prepared.
Table 2.1 below indicates the achievements of indicators that relate to the original and
revised component 1.
Table 2.1 Achievement of indicators relating to component 1
Indicators
A new sewerage masterplan is
approved by DWASA’s Board
of Directors
Diagnostic study on septage
management practices in Dhaka
baseline
no
target
yes
achieved Comment
yes
On September 30, 2014
no
yes
yes
Number of households with
access to sewer services
Length of sewer lines
rehabilitated/extended (km)
Number of sewer blockages
reported (no/km)
Volume of wastewater collected
and treated in Pagla (m3/day)
51,800
57,000
no
0
280
no
0.54
0.25
no
19,500
120,000
no
Diagnostic study and plan
for non-network sewer
(FSM) arrangements were
carried out
Indicator was dropped
after restructuring
Indicator was dropped
after restructuring
Indicator was dropped
after restructuring
Indicator was dropped
after restructuring
Component 2- Rehabilitation & Strengthening of Stormwater Drainage (actual IDA
52.3 m)
Component 2 represents the major infrastructure works under this project that aimed at
improving the drainage situation and reduce urban flooding. The component included (i)
construction of Rampura and Kamalapur stormwater pumping stations; (ii) khal
rehabilitation; (iii) storm water drainage cleaning equipment, and (iv) preparation of the
24
Drainage Master Plan.
Construction of Rampura and Kamalapur stormwater pumping stations
As per Bank guidelines, DWASA started a two‐stage bidding process for the pumping
station contracts. The procurement process took over 40 months. Contracts became
effective 11 months after the Bank’s no objection. Land transfer for Kamalapur station
(from Bangladesh Railways) required various approvals, further delaying physical works
till September 2013. Additional time was also required for approval of contract variation
orders. Rampura pumping station progressed faster and the Completion Certificate was
issued on January 7, 2015. During the warranty period, it was noted that the sluice gates
were not watertight. As a result, these were refurbished, and re-evaluated. Based on
successful testing, an Operational Acceptance Certificate was issued on June 29, 2016.
Most major works for the Kamlapur station were completed by June 2016, and the
Completion Certificate and Certificate of Operational Acceptance were signed on June 26,
2016, and June 30, 2016, respectively. The total permanent capacity of the two pumping
stations is 40 m3/s (25 m3/s for Rampura and 15 m3/s for Kamalapur). Both stations were
designed for a one in five year 2 day rainfall event and replace previous temporary pumping
capacity of 12 m3/s. A total of US$ 30.7 million was spent on the pumping stations.
Canal Rehabilitation
The component included the rehabilitation of selected drainage canals by re‐excavation,
re‐profiling, and protection and improvements of their banks. The objective was to
improve drainage flow and prevent encroachment, using a 2 day rainfall for a one in five
year return period. Some canals were dropped due to complex resettlement issues.
Ultimately, 13 sections with a total 20.89 km in length were rehabilitated, increasing
average design drainage with 250 m3/s drainage capacity (no individual canal values could
be provided) (see Table 2.2). A total of US$ 17.8 million was spent on canal rehabilitation.
Table 2.2. Details of khal rehabilitation
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Name of Canal
Khilgaon-Bashabo Khal
Shahjahanpur Khal
Gerani Khal
Shajadpur Khal
Kallayanpur Main Khal
Baunia Khal
Digun Khal
Mohakali khal
Abdullahpur Branch Khal
Sutivola Khal
Abdullahpur Khal
Segunbagicha Khal
Khilgaon-Bashabo (upstream)
Completed
Length
(m)
Avg. new design
discharge (m3/s)
Apr 2015
Jul 2015
Jun 2013
Dec 2015
Jun 2015
Jul 2012
Mar 2013
Aug 2013
Feb 2015
Dec 2015
Jun 2016
Jun2016
Dec 2015
1440
477
4005
1914
720
1030
3720
630
131.2
3180
3000
431
212.5
20,890.7
27.72
na
65.93
38.93
77.49
99.48
180.65
55.31
na
41.40
51.94
75.29
na
Total
25
Old design
discharge
(m3/s)
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
Stormwater Drainage Cleaning Equipment
Various drainage cleaning equipment were procured. The procured drainage equipment
included a mini-excavator, dump truck, tractor, jetting and suction machine, ten O&M
vehicles, and light maintenance equipment. The sub-component financed the installation
of gauges at 3 locations to monitor inundation.
Dhaka Drainage Master Plan
The Dhaka Drainage Master Plan was completed in August 2015. It was approved by the
Board by June 23, 2016 and disseminated to stakeholders. It includes both structural and
nonstructural aspects, although various non-structural issues are described in terms of
options and will need further agreements between relevant public agencies (such as DCC
and DWASA). As per the master plan, US$ 1.99 billion investment is required to improve
drainage across 13 management zones by 2040. To support asset management, a Storm
Water Drainage Management Database was established and staff were trained in the use of
this tool.
Table 2.3 Achievement of indicators relating to component 2
Indicators
Number of direct beneficiaries, of
which female 50 percent (million)
Increase in permanent storm water
drainage capacity (m3/s)
baseline
no
target
4.0
achieved
3.6
0
40
40
Increased capacity of rehabilitated
drainage canals (m3/s)
0
250
250
Length of storm water drainage canals
developed (km)
A new drainage master plan is
approved by DWASA’s BoD
Drainage modelling undertaken of the
impacts of i) khal rehabilitation and ii)
storm water station
0
20.80
20.89
no
yes
yes
no
yes
Water level and number of days of
waterlogging in eastern part of Dhaka
na
Volume of solid waste collected along
the canals (t)
0
26
Comment
Based on calculation
noted in annex 3
after restructuring,
this was a PDO-level
indicator
No comparison
between discharge
before and after
rehabilitation could
be found
Fully achieved.
Fully achieved
No (not
Completed but not
attributable) attributable to the
project, financed with
GFDRR funds
na
No
Indicator was
dropped after
restructuring
20,000
No
Indicator was
dropped after
restructuring
Component 3 Implementation of Environmental and Social Safeguards (actual IDA
US$ 1.02)
Environmental support
The environmental and safeguards program was defined in the PAD. The initial plan was
quite ambitious. It included: (i) the establishment of an environment unit (Circle) in
DWASA to support safeguards implementation in subprojects; and (ii) capacity
strengthening of the DWASA Central Lab. However, at restructuring, the project scope
was reduced, and these activities were dropped.
The following outputs and were achieved:

Implementation of the Environmental Management Framework was fully
implemented, including: (i) use of limited environmental assessments for the
preparation of the Environmental Management Plan in 12 sub ‐ projects; ii)
Environmental Impact Assessment for three of the larger projects; iii) testing of
excavated materials (in canals) for potentially harmful substances (they were found
to be free of toxic materials in significant concentrations)

Capacity Building on Environmental Management: the project was able to improve
the analytical and environmental management capacity of the DWASA Central lab,
through: i) procurement of laboratory equipment22 and chemicals, ii) provision of
vehicle and motorbike for sample collection, iii) providing training for staff in use
of newly procured equipment, Quality Assurance and Quality Control (QAQC) in
chemical analysis, and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), iv) water quality
assessment for Dhaka watershed, and v) international training.
All equipment was installed properly in DWASA Central Lab. DWASA lab staff stated
that not all reagents were procured, and thus some of the equipment is not yet in use.
DWASA lab staff are now able to take samples and analyze these as per agreed QAQC and
SOPs. Sampling frequency (around 250-300/month) is still restrained due to available
budget. The water quality assessment for Dhaka watershed produced water quality maps
for three quarters of a hydrological cycle. These maps can be used by DWASA to plan for
flood events.
Safeguard Support
During project preparation, DWASA undertook a Social Impact Assessment (SIA),
including extensive community/stakeholder consultations for each canal and for the storm
water drainage pumping stations. Resettlement Plans were prepared and implemented in
close coordination with the Bank team. The project built PMU capacity to handle complex
resettlement issues. These lessons were reflected in the revision of the Resettlement Policy
Framework. Complex khal rehabilitations were dropped 23 , to minimize the number of
PAHs. A total of 216 households were compensated along the khals and 225 households
received compensation (US$ 0.3 million). Table 2.4 indicates the achievements under this
22
A full listing of equipment has been provided in the ISRs.
In one of the khals eviction took place of an unknown number of people. A tracer study was expedited by DWASA.
However due to the risk that these studies are incomplete, this khal was dropped. A total of seven khals were dropped
due to complex resettlement issues
23
27
component.
Table 2.4 Achievement of indicators relating to component 3
baseline
no
Indicators
Number of project affected
households successfully
compensated
target
500
achieved Comment
441
This represents all
households that were
eligible for compensation
Component 4 Support Service Improvement Planning in Low-Income Communities
(actual IDA US$ 1.82 million)
The original component was expected to support pilot sub-projects in various low-income
communities (LIC) and focused on strengthening DWASA’s capacity to provide services
to LICs. At restructuring, the scope of the component was considerably reduced. The
restructured component focused on improving DWASA’s capacity to serve LIC residents.
The project financed three deep tube wells in six LICs and supported small value works to
connect LIC customers. As a result, about 49,000 people in six LICs gained access to legal
water supply (see Table 2.5). Table 2.6 indicates the achievements under this component.
Table 2.5. Access to water supply in LICs by the project
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
LICs
Persons
Households
Duaripara
Mollar Basti
Kallayanpur
Kalshi
Beguntila
City colony
Total
10,770
11,960
11,357
8,976
3,954
1,991
49,008
2,692
3,148
2,840
2,244
988
556
12,468
Total
Connections
101
123
180
118
60
70
652
Table 2.6. Achievement of indicators relating to component 4
Indicators
Service Improvement Plan for
LICs is prepared
Baseline
No
Increase in number of people
in project area ward slums
with access to safe water
0
Increase in number of people
in project area ward slums
with access to improved
sanitation
0
Target
Yes
Achieved
Comment
No (not
Completed but not
attributable) attributable to the project,
financed with WSP funds
180,000
NA
This indicator was
dropped at restructuring;
nevertheless
achievements were made
218,000
NA
This indicator was
dropped at restructuring
28
Component 5 Project Management & Institutional Capacity Building (actual IDA
US$ 12.7m)
At restructuring this component focused on institutional strengthening to position DWASA
as a stronger service delivery institution. An institutional assessment suggested that
decentralization would allow DWASA to deliver effective and efficient services. Through
Bank-executed resources, Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) facilitated the execution
of a diagnostic study and an option study to investigate appropriate decentralized
organizational structures, aimed to improve incentives for effective zonal management. An
implementation plan for its preferred decentralized organizational arrangement was
delivered, including a new organogram for DWASA, outline of job descriptions for key
positions, and revised salary structure. DWASA’s management and Board is currently
considering the proposal.24
Under this component, the repair, refurbishment and equipment for six zonal offices and
the existing training center was also executed.
Table 2.7 Achievement of indicators relating to component 5
Indicators
Annual statuary audits for
DWASA demonstrating
transparent and accountable
financial management
Development of an
institutional structure for
DWASA decentralization and
an action plan for its
implementation
A new decentralized zonal
management structure and an
action plan for its
implementation are approved
by DWASA’s BoD
DWASA Zonal Offices
refurbished and equipped
baseline
1
Target
4
no
yes
no
yes
No
0
1
6
24
Achieved
4
Comment
Indicator before
restructuring defined
qualitatively “no fiduciary
issues with project
funds”, which is achieved
No (Not
Completed but not
attributable) attributable as financed
with Bank executed funds
(WSP)
Proposed organigram was
developed with Bank
executed funds; proposal
not approved by DWASA
Board
Total of 6 zonal offices
have been refurbished and
equipped
See also Castalia (2015) Options Report of the Organizational Structure of DWASA. Three options were proposed
with increasing degree of autonomy at zonal level. DWASA’s preferred option was the “Integrated Zonal Management”.
This implies that each zone is organized under an administrative unit, headed by a Zonal Manager. This model strives to
improve collaboration between technical and commercial teams, minimize costs and optimize efficiency through
increased accountability at zonal level.
29
Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis
The project planned for investments in i) storm water drainage infrastructure, including
storm water pumping stations and canal rehabilitation, ii) sewerage investments, and iii)
water supply and sanitation investments in LICs. After restructuring the investments were
narrowed to drainage improvement. The economic analysis at appraisal stated that project
benefits would accrue from avoided damages to infrastructure, avoided disruption in
economic activities, and avoided environmental degradation and their associated costs to
the society. Using a damages impact model available at that time, it was estimated that the
NPV of incremental benefits was US$ 23.1 million at a 13 percent discount rate for a one
in five year flood event. The IRR of the project at appraisal was estimated at 17.2 percent.
It was estimated that a total investment of US$ 80 million would be required for the
drainage investments, including recurrent O&M costs.
This ICR economic analysis uses in principle the same avoided damages methodology,
however has benefitted from the development of recent hydraulic and economic damage
models with support of Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction for a series of recently
published World Bank reports on climate change and the impact of urban flooding in
Dhaka25. The ICR analysis uses the actual costs for the drainage investments, accounting
for US$ 47 million and reasonable estimates for recurrent O&M expenditures and includes
state-of-the-art i) hydraulic modelling to estimate the impact of the project investments on
urban flooding, and ii) analyses of avoided damages and the estimation of economic
benefits26. Other differences than the hydraulic and economic models used at appraisal and
at ICR are i) the return period used (at appraisal one in five year, at ICR one in ten years),
ii) discount factor (at appraisal 13 percent, at ICR 6 percent), and iii) the lifespan of NPV
calculations (at appraisal 30 years, at ICR fifteen years). A sensitivity analysis has been
carried out that uses discount factors of 3, 9 and 13 percent, the latter being used at
appraisal27.
Flood modelling
The objective of the study is to simulate the impact of project investments, particularly on
changes in flood depth and duration across the project area. In addition, the study also
aimed to simulate different O&M scenarios, demonstrating the need to maintain wellfunctioning drainage infrastructures and institutions. The location of project investments,
including for the pumping stations and the 13 canals, is indicated in Figure 3.2. The
25
Dasgupta, Susmita; Zaman, Asif; Roy, Subhendu; Huq, Mainul; Jahan, Sarwar; Nishat, Ainun. 2015. Urban Flooding
of Greater Dhaka in a Changing Climate: Building Local Resilience to Disaster Risk. Directions in Development-Environment and Sustainable Development;.Washington, DC: World Bank and World Bank (2015b). Climate and
disaster resilience of greater Dhaka area: a micro level analysis. Bangladesh development series; paper no. 32.
Washington, D.C. World Bank Group.
26 These are IWM (2016) Flood Modeling of Dhaka City – Part 2 Impact and Resilience of Storm Water Drainage
Investments of Dhaka Water Supply and Sanitation Project (DWSSP); and Roy, S. (forthcoming) The Impact of Storm
Water Drainage Investments by DWASA in Greater Dhaka Area – Estimation of Potential Damages Component and
Economic Analysis.
27 Discount rate of 6 percent is the current recommended practice as per the World Bank (2016) Discounting Costs and
Benefits in Economic Analysis of World Bank projects. The discount period used is conservatively estimated at 15 years,
while benefits may extend beyond this period but are not expected to contribute considerably due to the time value of
money.
30
modeling was done for a ten year flood event, applying a hydraulic inundation model with
existing drainage infrastructure and baseline conditions of 2010 for imperviousness of
surfaces and land-fill/topographic conditions. In addition, scenarios were simulated with
different O&M levels (e.g. siltation of canals due to lack of maintenance, fall-out of 1 or 2
pumps at monsoon peak).
Data for the improved khals cross sections and pumping station regime were collected from
DWASA and used to update the hydrodynamic model for the “with project” scenario.
Other boundary conditions are external water levels, inter-zonal flows and wastewater
flows. The modelling used the latest drainage models for four catchment zones: i) Central
Dhaka, ii) Kallyanpur, iii) Goranchatbari, and iv) eastern Dhaka. Results for flood depth
and duration comparing the “without” project” and the “with project” scenario for each of
different zones are summarized in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1. Summary of impact of project investments on flood depth and duration
Catchment
zone
Central Dhaka
Kallyanpur
Goranchatbari
Eastern Dhaka
Flood depth
Flood duration
Comment
Significant reductions in
flood extent and depth in
ward 24, 31, 32 and 75
Large to modest reduction
in average flood duration
in ward 21, 23, 24, 25, 26,
30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 37, 54,
55, 75, 76, 84, 85 (up to
25 hrs)
Includes two pumping
stations and three khals
rehabilitated
Mixed reduction/increase
in flood depth in ward 10,
13, 16, 4329
Slight decrease in
medium flood depth in
ward 15
No significant change in
flood extent and depth
No significant changes in
average flood duration
Slight decrease of average
flood duration in ward 4,
5 and 15
No significant change in
average flood duration
Overall flood depth
increase slightly in ward
22 and 5528
One khal was rehabilitated
Four khals were
rehabilitated
Five khals were
rehabilitated
The extent by which the khal rehabilitation helped to mitigate urban flooding in other
catchment areas is minor, mostly because: i) khals have only been improved partially (not
the whole system), and ii) the influence of the improvement is localized to the rehabilitated
area as the drainage system is controlled by downstream levels. Nevertheless, the canal
rehabilitation produced other benefits, such as the protection from encroachment, aesthetic
enhancement, and improvement of waste water flow in off-peak season.
Economic modelling
The economic modeling exercise estimates the reduction in monetary damages due to
project interventions by comparing the “without project” and “with project” scenario
results using 2016 socio-economic conditions. The monetary damage is estimated by
examining the direct and indirect impacts of flooding.
This is due to high initial water level at Hatirjheel retention area (not the case in the “without project” scenario)
In ward 10 and 43 (downstream of improved Kallyanpur canal) the area with low and medium flood depth is decreasing,
while area with high flood depth has increased. In ward 13 and 16 the reverse situation is found (upstream of the improved
canal section).
28
29
31
Flooding can affect buildings and property and lead disruption of livelihoods. The longer
duration of the flood can exacerbate the damage. While impacts like damage to property
and loss of income from flooding can be more easily quantified, it is often difficult to assign
monetary values to the socio-economic, environmental, and health impacts of flooding.
Wherever possible, the analysis tried to impute monetary values for these intangible
damages.
The analysis compared the economic impacts with and without project interventions from
a one in ten year flood event over a fifteen year period (2016-2030)30. Changes in the
valuation of damage between 2016 and 2030 are estimated using a 6 percent growth in
GDP, the average rate over the past decade. To assess the damage in real terms, all
economic data are based on 2016 prices and thus ignores any inflation that can occur by
2030. The analysis also takes into account the likely socioeconomic changes in the project
area during a 15 year period, which includes considerable uncertainties given Dhaka’s
rapid development. To determine the expected total damage between 2016 and 2030, the
cumulative damage between 2016 and 2030 is based on random assignment of 1-year to
10-year storms during each year.
Flood damage is split into two categories: direct damage and indirect damage - if time is a
primary factor for the estimates.
Direct Damage: This economic loss is primarily concerned with the damage to physical
capital from water submersion, and the depth of flooding is the primary determinant of
such damage. However, the degree of damage can also increase with the duration of
flooding of a given depth. The most common examples of damage to private resources are
buildings and property. Other losses include damage suffered by owners of transport
vehicles, and telecommunication and electric infrastructure. Publicly owned infrastructure
like roads, railways, water and sewerage facilities, etc. can be damaged.
Indirect Damage: The main determinant of such damage is the duration of the flooding
above a certain depth that can lead to disruption of normal activity over a period of time.
While majority of the loss in this category will occur during the flooding, some of the losses
can continue even after water recedes. The most significant component of this loss arises
from the loss of income due to the inability of people, businesses, and industries to carry
out their normal economic activity. The loss of resources covered under direct damage can
also prolong the total or partial loss of earning capacity even after flood water recedes.
Indirect damage can also occur from impacts on transport and communications
infrastructure. Indirect damage also arises from additional health care costs and reduced
income from higher morbidity (See Table 3.2).
30
While the economic lifespan of the investments are longer, the projection beyond fifteen year will add additional
uncertainty in the assumptions, and due to the time value of money will not contribute greatly to the overall damage
estimates.
32
Figure 3.1. Drainage investments done under the project
33
Table 3.2. Assessment of damages across sectors
Sector
Residential
Commercial
Industrial
Health
Roads
Transport
Railways
Direct Damage
Building, Property
Building, Property
Building, Machinery, Inventory
Infrastructure, Mortality
Infrastructure
Damage to vehicles
Infrastructure
Indirect damage
Loss of Income
Loss of Income
Loss of Income
Treatment costs, Morbidity
Travel Dislocation
Loss of Income
Travel Dislocation
Avoided damage estimates and affected beneficiaries
The accumulative damage for the period 2016-2030 for the different catchment areas is
indicated in Table 3.3. The largest damage reduction occurs in avoided income loss31 ,
followed by residential property and buildings. The cumulative damage reduction from
project implementation is around US$ 77.1 million.
The number of beneficiaries is the total (2016) population living in the wards where project
interventions are expected to have an impact (See Table 3.4). The total number of people
benefiting from project interventions is estimated to be around 3.6 million32.
Table 3.4. Estimated number of population (in million) affected by project investments
Total population in
catchment
Population positively
impacted
Population negatively
impacted33
Central
Dhaka
3.73
Kallyanpur
Goranchatbari
Total
5.16
Eastern
Dhaka
5.27
3.04
1.37
0.97
1.22
0.01
3.6
0.29
-
-
-
0.3
31
17.2
Income losses for Dhaka residents are estimated based on per capita GDP data as it reflects per capita income of
residents. The income loss computation is based on the number of people affected by flood multiplied by the lost work
days among them. The income loss also includes the loss suffered by migrant workers coming daily to Dhaka.
32 In the worst case maintenance scenario (2 pump failure, 30% siltation), five wards in Central Dhaka (w30, w31, w32,
w38, w75) will experience significant negative impact, with around 0.5 million people experiencing less than optimal
flood reduction due to the project investments
33 0.3 million people will experience an increase in flooding due to changes in the fixed water level at Hatirjheel
retention pond ( beyond the influence of the project)
34
Table 3.3. Accumulated Damage in Catchments for 2016-2030 (discount factor 6 percent)
Central Dhaka
Kallyanpur
Goranchatbari
Eastern Dhaka
without
with
avoided
Without
with
avoided
without
with
avoided
without
with
Residential
Building
43.4
32.0
11.4
33.1
29.8
3.3
9.5
9.3
0.2
820.6
820.5
0.1
Residential
Property
57.9
44.7
13.2
35.9
32.6
3.4
12.3
12.0
0.3
806.5
806.5
0.1
Commerce
9.4
5.6
3.8
3.1
2.9
0.2
2.1
2.1
0.1
219.6
219.6
0.0
Industry
24.1
17.8
6.3
8.3
7.8
0.5
5.6
5.4
0.1
602.5
602.5
0.0
Income
Loss
47.6
33.9
13.7
29.3
27.2
2.1
6.1
5.6
0.4
1480.2
1479.9
0.2
Health
29.3
23.0
6.3
8.8
8.3
0.5
10.9
10.8
0.2
51.5
51.5
0.0
Roads
7.5
3.2
4.4
6.7
6.3
0.3
2.4
2.3
0.1
332.4
332.4
0.0
Railways
1.3
0.7
0.5
0.8
0.7
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.0
33.1
33.1
0.0
Transport
13.0
9.1
3.9
17.7
16.6
1.1
9.0
8.7
0.3
1736.9
1736.8
0.0
Total
233.5
170.0
63.4
143.8
132.2
11.6
58.0
56.3
1.6
6083.5
6083.0
0.5
Cost Benefit Analysis and Ratios
The analysis also looked at the separate impacts of the two pumping stations, and the khal
rehabilitation, and showed that the pumping stations would account for US$ 42.3 million,
and the khal rehabilitation for avoided damages of US$ 34.8 million (Table 3.5).The
economic return from the project is based on the avoided damages from the project and the
initial investment costs and annual O&M costs under the project for 2016-2030. A total
investment of $48.5 million was used for the complete project ($30.7 million for
installation of two new pumps and $17.8 million for rehabilitation of the canals). Based on
past experience, the O&M costs for the two pumping stations were estimated at US$ 0.15
million annually and for the khals at US$ 0.31 million. The ratios are presented in Table
3.5.
Table 3.5. Results of Cost Benefit Analysis with discount factor of 6 percent
PV of
Investment
and O&M
(US$ m)
53.0
PV of
Avoided
Damages
(US$ m)
77.1
Net Present
Value
(US$ m)
24.2
Return on
Investment
1.46
Economic
Internal
Rate of
Return
12.1%
Pump Installation
32.2
42.3
10.2
1.32
9.9%
Canal Rehabilitation
20.8
34.8
14.0
1.67
15.7%
Total Project
35
avoided
The total project has a high ROI of 1.46 with a positive NPV of $ 24.2 million. The EIRR
is 12.1 percent. Both investments (pump installation and canal rehabilitation) show positive
returns. The damage estimates reveal that for a one in 10 year flood, project-related damage
savings from 2016-2030 exceed the investment made in the project. The EIRR of 12.1
percent reveals significant returns from the investment.
Sensitivity analysis for different discount factors
Table 3.6 summarizes the ratios, using different discount factors of 3, 9 and 13 percent (the
latter was used at appraisal). As can be seen, the EIRR slightly decreases from 12.1 percent
for a discount factor of 6 percent, to 10.9 percent with a higher discount factor of 9 percent
and the project continues to deliver net economic benefits.
Table 3.6 Ratios for situation with different discount factors
Discount
factor
3%
6%
9%
13%
PV of
Investment
and O&M
(US$ m)
54.0
53.0
52.2
51.5
PV of Avoided
Damages
(US$ m)
98.5
77.1
61.4
46.8
Net Present
Value
(US$ m)
44.5
24.2
9.2
-4.6
Return on
Investment
1.82
1.46
1.18
0.91
Economic
Internal Rate
of Return
13.3%
12.1%
10.9%
9.4%
Only at a much higher discount factors of 13 percent, used at appraisal, the net economic
benefits turn negative (NPV of minus 4.6 million) and the EIRR drops to 9.4 percent (below
the discount rate used of 13 percent).
36
Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes
(a) Task Team members
Names
Title
Unit
Responsibility/
Specialty
Lending
Supervision/ICR
Sudipto Sarkar
Josses Mugabi
Martin Gambrill
Fook Chuan Eng
Arif Ahamed
Nishtha Mehta
Burhanuddin Ahmed
Sheikh Naveed Uddin
Ahmed
Md. Akhtaruzzaman
Lead Water Supply and Sanitation
Specialist
Senior Water Supply and Sanitation
Specialist
Lead Water Supply and Sanitation
Specialist
Lead Water Supply and Sanitation
Specialist
Senior Water Supply and Sanitation
Specialist
Water and Sanitation Specialist
Consultant
Consultant
Shideh Hadian
Arvind Prasad Mantha
Ishtiak Siddiqi
Marghoob Bin Hussein
Zafrul Islam
Muhammed Riadul Islam
Sr Institutional Dev. Spec.
Lead Water and Sanitation
Specialist
Senior Infrastructure Economist
Financial Management Specialist
Senior Procurement Specialst
Senior Procurement Specialist
Lead Procurement Specialist
Procurement Analyst
Dr. M. Khaliquzzaman
Local Consultant ST
Tarak Sarker
Abu Ahmed Mansoor Kabir
Md Abul Fayez Khan
Lilian MacArthur
Abdul Motaleb
Fabio Pittaluga
Program Assistant
Program Assistant
Program Assistant
Program Assistant
Sr Water & Sanitation Spec.
Senior Social Development Spec
Soma Ghosh Moulik
Prakash Raghunath Sanglikar Local Consultant ST
Shyamal Sarkar
Consultant
Chau-Ching Shen
Kishor Uprety
Senior Finance Officer
Senior Counsel
37
GWADR TTL
GWADR TTL
GWASS TTL
GWADR TTL
GWADR Co-TTL
GWADR Team Member
GED06
SASHN HIS
GWASS
GWADR Team Member
GWADR Team Member
GGODR FM
GGODR Procurement
GGODR Procurement
GGODR Procurement
CMEAS Procurement
Environmental
GEN06
Safeguards
SACBD Team Member
GWASS Team Member
EDS12 Team Member
GSURR Team Member
GWASS Team Member
GSURR Social Safeguards
Technical
GWA06
Consultant
Technical
GWA06
Consultant
WFALN Finance
LEGAM Lawyer
(b) Staff Time and Cost
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
USD Thousands (including
No. of staff weeks
travel and consultant costs)
Stage of Project Cycle
Lending
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
Total:
Supervision/ICR
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
Total:
8.86
56.62
62.33
103.87
3.51
109.22
198.03
403.19
231.68
713.95
48.85
31.91
28.65
42.46
52.32
39.45
59.14
37.39
340.17
0.00
-0.33
0.00
0.00
162.24
115.24
130.91
205.91
233.10
172.28
252.47
239.56
1,511.38
38
Annex 5: Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR
1.1 Context at appraisal
Dhaka is the primary urban center in Bangladesh. Dhaka’s population is estimated at
around 12 million, comprising about one third of Bangladesh’s urban population. It is by
far the largest urban center in Bangladesh. In contrast, the second largest city in Bangladesh,
Chittagong, has a population of about four million. The preeminence of Dhaka as the
overwhelmingly largest urban center in Bangladesh is both a source of concern and
opportunity. The city provides livelihood options for millions of migrants that come from
rural areas in search of better opportunities to improve their living standards. Dhaka is
growing rapidly. Between 2000 and 2005, the city grew at an average rate of 4.4% per year.
It is estimated to be one of the fastest growing mega city in the world.
WSS service provision unable to meet demand growth. Much of the growth in the city has
been from migration of the rural population. Other contributing factors include natural
growth of population and expansion of new areas to the existing city limits. Dhaka attracts
private sector investments in manufacturing, commerce and construction due to availability
of labor pool and better quality of supporting infrastructure services. Extensive investment
in the past in urban infrastructure in Dhaka further influenced the growth of industrial and
commercial activities. However, the extraordinary growth in Dhaka’s population puts
pressure on utility service providers to meet the needs of its population.
DWASA is the sole authority for water and sewerage service provision. Dhaka Water
Supply and Sewerage Authority (DWASA) manages about 3462 kilometers of water
distribution network and 916 kilometers of sewerage networks. DWASA is responsible for
about 350,772 water and about 59,366 sewerage connections. It is estimated that only about
20% of the Dhaka City Corporation (DCC) area is covered by the sewerage network
(DWASA, Annual Report 2014-15).
DWASA lacks autonomy in practice. In practice DWASA’s autonomy is significantly
constrained. While the WASA Act (1996) provides for a multi-stakeholder Board of
Directors structure, the GOB retains the sole responsibility for the appointment of the
Board. There are no established rules or procedures for the appointment of the Board of
Directors providing for the systematic input of other stakeholders in this process. The Act
provides for GOB approval and involvement when the GOB provides financing or
guarantees to DWASA - which is the case in DWASA operations, particularly in
infrastructure development activities. Recently, implementing rules and regulations of the
WASA Act (1996) have been approved. Of the five Rules and Regulations, two have been
published in the National Gazette while three are pending final GOB approval. This is
expected to increase the functional autonomy of DWASA.
DWASA is responsible to provide WSS service to slums. The Dhaka Water Supply Policy
(2005) confirms DWASA’s mandate to extend basic water supply and sanitation services
to slums within its service area, to provide legal connections, and to introduce formal
billing and collections. Through this guideline, the GOB commits to 100% water supply
coverage to the urban poor of all slums. Nevertheless, DWASA faces an enormous
implementation challenge to ensure that all sections of the society, including the urban poor,
can access water and sanitation services.
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DWASA is unable to provide adequate sewerage services. Dhaka’s sewerage system has
deteriorated particularly due to the damage caused by the 2004 floods, which devastated
the functioning of the sewerage network of the city. The primary, secondary and tertiary
lines are partly or fully damaged, and the damage to the trunk sewer main to the Pagla
Sewerage Treatment Plant (PSTP) from the 2004 floods has contributed to the 50%
reduction in capacity utilization of the plant. Additionally, new treatment plants would
need to be constructed to expand the sewerage coverage for newly occupied areas
throughout the city.
Deteriorated sewerage systems adversely affect water quality. The pressure on Dhaka’s
sewerage system has sewerage system exacerbates the poor and deteriorating condition of
the water quality of the surrounding water bodies. Indiscriminate dumping of industrial
effluents, solid wastes and untreated sewage into the Buriganga, Balu, Turag and
Shitalakhya rivers continue to strain an already overburdened sewerage network and
treatment capacity. Though several agencies - Department of Environment, Institute of
Water Modeling (IWM) and Water Resources Planning Organization (WARPO) regularly monitor raw water quality, the lack of enforcement of acts, policies and guidelines
have aggravated the pollution in these water bodies. Water quality parameters of Dissolved
Oxygen (DO), Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD), and Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD)
exceed the permissible limits, particularly during the dry season between January and April,
making water unusable for any domestic purposes and for treatment by the Saidabad Water
Treatment Plant. The GOB has taken the initiative for surface water management on a
priority basis.
DWASA has also been given the mandate for major storm water drainage. The
responsibility for storm water drainage in Dhaka was transferred from the Dhaka City
Corporation (DCC) to DWASA in 1989 through an LGD circular and subsequently
included in the WASA Act (1996). Under this arrangement, the operations and
maintenance of 43 Khals (canals) and two associated drainage pumping stations
(Kalyanpur and Dholaikhal) came under the responsibility of DWASA. This comprises
about 350 km of the city’s storm water drainage system, which covers about 38% of the
DCC area, to drain out the flood water through natural canals into the adjoining rivers. It
should be noted that there are no separate provision for DWASA to be remunerated for the
cost of storm water drainage operations.
Inadequate storm water drainage poses significant costs to the city. Currently only 26
khals (canals) out of the former 43 canals are recognizable in Dhaka city, as the remaining
khals have been partially filled in. Illegal encroachment and its associated problems such
as maintenance difficulties and khal clogging is a significant issue in major khals.
Moreover, the functioning of the storm sewer system is hindered by sedimentation in the
storm water inlets caused by road carpeting materials and construction materials. Improper
maintenance of the inlets of storm sewers aggravates the scale of the problem. These
problems have resulted in continued frequent water logging in the city during the monsoon
seasons. During the 2004 floods, it was estimated that approximately US$6.3 million of
losses per day were sustained by businesses and residents during the 30 days when the city
was incapacitated by flooding.
Solid Waste Management in Dhaka. While DWASA is partly responsible for the storm
water drainage systems in Dhaka, solid waste management in Dhaka remains the
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responsibility of the Dhaka City Corporation (DCC). Inefficient solid waste management
in Dhaka adversely affects DWASA’s operations of the storm water drainage, particularly
in slum areas where solid and other wastes are frequently thrown into the canals.
1.2 Rationale for Bank involvement
The Primacy of Dhaka City and Dhaka’s Investment Needs. Dhaka is the preeminent
urban center of Bangladesh supporting the livelihood of about 12 million people. It has
historically attracted and is presently attracting large numbers of migrant workers from the
rural areas of Bangladesh. This trend has contributed largely to Dhaka being estimated as
one of the fastest growing megacity in the world. The recent population growth of about
4.4% per year is projected to continue, with the population projected to increase to about
21.6 million by 2025. Dhaka is the main commercial hub of Bangladesh and contributes
more than 20% of Bangladesh’s GDP (estimated at about US$61 billion in current terms
in 2006). The investment needs to provide services to Dhaka’s population are significant.
1.3 Implementation Strategy
The project sponsored interventions were expected to bring about public health and
environmental benefits, by improving delivery and quality of DWASA services
1.4 Project Development Objective (PDO) and Key Indicators:
The Original Project Development Objective was to “improve the sustainable delivery of
storm water drainage, waste water and water services by DWASA to the population of
Dhaka City through: (i) the installation of selected storm water pumping station and the
rehabilitation of selected canals to help improve drainage and minimize urban flooding;
(ii) the rehabilitation , repair and expansion of priority investments in the city’s sewerage
network and treatment plant to help improve the urban environment; (iii) supporting
DWASA’s pilot expansion of water and sanitation services into selected Dhaka slums to
help increase services to the urban poor”. The key outcome indicators of the development
objectives are the following:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Water level and number of days of water logging in the eastern part of Dhaka
Number of households with access to sewerage services
Increase in number of people in project area ward slums with access
1.5 Revised PDO
The project was restructured mid-June 2013 and the PDO also changed. The original
project was declared effective on March 17, 2009 but implementation suffered due to slow
disbursement. It was only 10.5 percent in four years, the closing date of the project being
on 30 June 2013. The project suffered the consequences of delays resulting from issues
related to its initial readiness and design (at appraisal, no detailed engineering designs were
ready, the consultancy assignments to prepare the detailed interventions had not been
procured, the LIC component had not been clearly conceived), start up delays and problems
with the procurement of key consultancies and civil works. Significant delays occurred
regarding (i) procurement of the sewage master plan consultancy, which included
identification, detailed design, preparation of bidding documents for priority sewerage and
wastewater treatment works (ii) the adoption of a complicated two-stage bidding process
for the two large storm water pumping stations, (iii) procurement of consultancy services
to prepare the drainage master plan, and (iv) the initial design of the LIC component. As a
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result following changes (restructure) in the project components were made: (i) reducing
the scope of activities under the sewerage and the LIC component (component 1 and 4),
(ii) incorporating additional DWASA institutional strengthening activities into the project
management component, (iii) cancelling US$65.34 million of the original IDA credit, (iv)
extending the closing date and (v) amending the PDO and results framework to correspond
with the revised project scope and extended project implementation period.
The revised PDO was stated as “to improve storm water drainage in Dhaka and to improve
DWASA’s capacity for investment planning and operations”. To reflect the above changes
in the PDO the results framework and its indicators were also adjusted as mentioned below.
(i) Number of direct project beneficiaries and percentage of female population;
(ii) Increase in permanent storm water pumping capacity
(iii) A new drainage master plan for Dhaka city is approved by DWASA’s Board of
Directors;
(iv) A new sewerage master plan for Dhaka city is approved by DWASA’s Board of
Directors;
(v) A new decentralized zonal management structure and action plan for the
implementation are approved by DWASA’s Board of Directors.
1.6 Main Beneficiaries
The primary target group was the local communities and in particular the poor and
vulnerable groups in the eastern part of Dhaka city. Total beneficiaries of two pump houses
and 13 rehabilitated canals are estimated at 3.6 million. This estimate is based on the
assumption of the catchment area of these infrastructure estimated at 105.28 km2 with a
density of population of 34,700/km2.
1.7 Status of Implementation Performance
The project has made good progress on all components.
Achievements and Progress update
(i) Component 1: Achievement and progress made by the close of implementation
period include (i) Dhaka Waste Water Management Master Plan has been approved
by DWASA’s Board; (ii) the priority sewerage and Sewerage Treatment Plant (STP)
designs identified in the Master Plan have been completed, and the corresponding
bidding documents were finalized;(iii) detailed engineering designs and bidding
documents for sewerage investments in the Uttara and Mirpur catchments were also
completed.
(ii) Component 2: The drainage master plan has been completed, finalized and
disseminated to key stakeholders. The final master plan was approved by DWASA’s
Board by project closing. The canal rehabilitation works have been completed; the
Rampura pumping station has been completed and commissioned. The contractor has
carried out the required refurbishment of all the sluice gates which were subsequently
tested by technical experts from the Bangladesh University of Engineering
Technology (BUET). There was no barrier to issue Operational Acceptance Certificate
(OAC) by DWASA for Rampura pump station.
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The delay in completion of the Kamalapur pumping station has led to the risk of project
closure with unfinished works. The delays in works implementation was due to delays
in import of pipe jacking instruments, slow progress in works implementation with
limited labor force, breakdown of major jacking equipment as well as required repair.
However, the contractor successfully installed four discharge pipe sections underneath
a busy road through pipe jacking method and completed all ancillary works by project
closure.
(iii)Component 3: Support to the Implementation of Environment and Social Safeguards:
Environmental Safeguards: Work on all the sub‐projects (i.e.13 canals and two
pumping stations) have been completed. The implementation of Environmental
Management Plan (EMP) in the sub‐projects did reasonably well. Some violations
were observed in the implementation of EHS provisions such as non‐universal use of
PPE by the workers, missing safety signs and barriers, and piling up of construction
debris.
Social Safeguards: Social safeguard issues under DWSSP were concerned with the
impacts resulted from displacement of people during recovery, re‐excavation and
other improvements implemented on 9 drainage canals. During preparation of DWSSP,
DWASA carried out Social Impact Assessment (SIA), including extensive
community/stakeholder consultations for the individual canals. In view of the potential
impacts as found in the SIA, DWASA prepared a Resettlement Policy Framework
(RPF) in April 2006 in accord with the principles and guidelines provided in the Bank’s
OP 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement. The RPF, which was cleared by the Bank,
provided the necessary bases to prepare Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) for
individual and/or batches of canals that were selected for improvement. There was no
need for private land acquisition. But the improvements on the 9 canals, as a whole,
affected 187 persons/households, of which 67 were encroachers who owned land
adjacent to the canals. Impacts on the encroachers were negligible and, according to
the RPF they were ineligible for any resettlement assistance.
(iv) Component 4: Support to Service Provision to Low Income Communities (LIC). The
original design of this component and the implementation approach envisaged
presented practical challenges which necessitated a reevaluation and change in scope.
The required planning and design to address these challenges demanded more time
and as a result service provision activities to LICs were dropped from the restructured
project and the associated cost, estimated at US$ 6.47 million, was canceled from the
IDA Credit. The name of this component was changed to Support to Service
Improvement Planning in Low‐Income Communities (Original component name:
Support to Service Provision to Low Income Communities; original IDA US$ 8.4
million; cancellation US$ 6.47 million; new IDA total US$ 1.5 million). The down‐
sized component included preparations of a Service Improvement Plan for LICs.
However, the study to prepare a Service Improvement Plan for low‐income customers
has been completed using Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) funds. DWASA also
continued to strengthen its existing Nongovernment Organization (NGO) partnerships
to serve the poor through implementation of small value works in selected LICs. As a
result of these partnerships, approximately 12,500 households across six LIC areas
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have access to legal water supply provided by DWASA through the project. Works
for installation of deep tube wells at selected LIC locations to supplement water supply
to these communities was also completed by project closure including completion of
pump house, installation of electric sub‐station, electricity connection and delivery
line installation.
(v) Component 5: Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E),
Consultations and Communications. A study to prepare an organizational
restructuring plan was undertaken using WSP funds and was completed. The repair
and refurbishment work for three zonal offices and the existing training center
completed and renovation work for three additional zonal offices was also completed.
DWASA completed preparations of the design and bid documents for a modern
training center. DWASA has completed procurement of computers and database
licenses. Unfortunately, the contracts of other key items to improve the utility’s
information and communication technology infrastructure namely servers and storage
systems as well as video‐conferencing services could not be fulfilled due to lack of
project funds. These contracts were cancelled before the project closing date.
1.8 Key Challenges
The major difficulty encountered in the implementation of the canal excavation was to
make part of these canals free from encroachers, and removal of excavated solid waste,
political conflict and resultant law and order situation. Delay of handing over of land by
the Bangladesh Railway for the construction of Kamalapur Pump house also hampered the
progress of the project implementation.
2 Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2.1
Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry
Use of Lessons in Project Design. The main lesson incorporated is the introduction of
decentralized service delivery approach, including community demand driven approach
with partial capital cost recovery and 100 percent O&M financing by the users that
unveiled the major shift from adopting a supply driven mode to a more demand driven and
decentralized service delivery approach.
Focus on Institutional Changes. The project objectives – especially after restructuring focused on the institutional strengthening that was needed to implement the project. The
project components represented a balance of institutional support, capacity building and
infrastructure development.
Government Commitment and Risks: GOB’s commitment and ownership to the reform
agenda remained firm throughout project implementation. The project design had
identified all the possible risks, which were “High”. Despite all measures proposed, the
actual implementation experienced problems and risks.
2.2
Implementation
Implementation was moderately satisfactory throughout the course of the project. The
PAD physical targets were not only fully achieved at the extended closing date of June
2016 and good progress was made on all components.
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2.3
Monitoring & Evaluation
The project was successful in institutionalizing the mechanism of information processing
and data analysis on MIS system developed by DWSSP. M&E capacity has been
developed during the project within DWASA.
2.4
Safeguard & Fiduciary Compliance
Social Safeguards: No lands were acquired involuntarily. Social safeguard issues under
DWSSP were concerned with the impacts resulted from displacement of people during
recovery, re‐excavation and other improvements implemented on the drainage canals.
During preparation of DWSSP, DWASA carried out Social Impact Assessment (SIA),
including extensive community/stakeholder consultations for the individual canals. In view
of the potential impacts as found in the SIA, DWASA prepared a Resettlement Policy
Framework (RPF) in April 2006 which provided the necessary bases to prepare
Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) for individual and/or batches of canals that were selected
for improvement.
Environmental Safeguards: The implementation of Environmental Management Plan
(EMP) in the sub‐projects were done reasonably well. Some violations were observed in
the implementation of EHS provisions such as non‐universal use of PPE by the workers,
missing safety signs and barriers, and piling up of construction debris.
2.5 Fiduciary Management: Fiduciary compliance was satisfactory throughout
implementation. Fund flow and expenditures monitoring were adequate. Financial
management reports were prepared in a timely manner throughout project implementation.
2.6 Procurement: Procurement was carried out in accordance with the agreed procedures.
Delays in decision making took plays due capacity constraints of the PMU officials.
2.7 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
The post completion operation is adequately addressed: Project design was adequate in
ensuring sustainability on all fronts: technical, financial and institutional. All the
infrastructure assets (pumping stations, canals, LIC water connections) have been
completed and commissioned and are being operated and maintained by DWASA.
Project’s sustainability prospects are good: Overall performance of DWASA in managing
the drainage, water and sanitation facilities has been excellent. The capacities created under
the project will continue to be available for the sector. GOB has now got a commitment of
World Bank to develop a new project for continued support.
3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
The project objectives remain highly relevant to current Government priorities. The sector
development framework aimed for total urban sanitation services throughout Bangladesh
by 2015. The Bangladesh Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) envisage 100%
coverage for access to safe drinking water in urban areas by 2015, and 86% access to
improved sanitation in urban areas by 2010. The scale and timeframe of the sector
development framework targets are slightly more ambitious than the MDGs. These various
sector targets
Represent a huge challenge to the Government of Bangladesh (GOB). In addition, the GOB
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targets to provide access to higher quality piped water supply to 70% of urban areas by
2010 and 90% by 2015. These targets now are included in Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs).
3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives the revised Project Development
Objective (PDO) was “to improve storm water drainage in Dhaka city and to improve
DWASA’s capacity for investment planning and operations”.
The project has achieved this PDO as all the result indicators recorded good achievements.
Key important result indicator of 20,885 m of storm water canals constructed/rehabilitated
has been fully achieved by re-excavating 13 canals. The indicator target to increase
discharge capacity of the rehabilitated 13 canals to 250m3/s has been achieved. The
indicator target to achieve 40 m3/s permanent storm water drainage capacity has been fully
achieved. The indicator target of a sewerage master plan and drainage master plan
approved by the Board have been fully achieved.
3.3 Achievement of Project Impact
The initial impact of the Kamalapur pump house in the catchment area was not visible to
the intended beneficiaries as it was not operational when beneficiaries were interviewed in
October 2015. In fact the incidence of water logging during the last monsoon got worse
due to heavy rainfall and the results of the beneficiary interviews can provide a good
baseline data for any drainage development impact analysis in future. Data on the depth
and duration of water logging in Kamalapur is consistent with the above statement.
Rampura catchment area presented a different picture as the operations of the Rampura
pump house continued throughout the monsoon and completion of the Mohakhali canal
rehabilitation activities resulted in positive impacts by reducing duration, depth and extent
of water logging in the catchment area. Loss of school days, loss of livelihoods and traffic
congestion were also reduced quite substantially.
4.1 Lessons learnt
(i) PMU staff should not only have commitment but they should have good management
skills, fully knowledgeable and be computer literate. If possible they should be given
training in areas which affects the progress of project implementation.
(ii) Loan should be made effective only when the initial readiness of the Executing
Agency is fully complied with.
(iii)The procurement process, including all the required steps and timeline, should have
been identified and needs to be considered in the total project work plan.
(iv) For small civil works such as canal rehabilitation, large packaging in case of local
tendering is not optimal and desirable. It has been observed that limited number of
capable local contractors is available to undertake large works in canals.
(v) Procurement packages of civil works should be considerably larger to avoid
engagement of insolvent and inefficient vendors.
(vi) Proposal evaluation should be thoroughly reviewed with set criteria to get a good
understanding of the strength of vendor to carry out the assignment.
46
(vii) PMU should have its own accounting section to improve financial management.
PMU should also have dedicated M&E section/focal point.
(viii) Procurement process needs to be decided based on the nature of works in particular
considering the complexity of the works involved, including veracity of alternative
technologies.
(ix) Communities should be made aware and involve in the maintenance work of canals
for sustainability of investment through engagement of NGOs.
(x) Communities should be regularly briefed about the project output and the expected
impact
(xi) PMU Coordination with Zonal Offices is a pre-requisite for expanding service
delivery to LICs since zonal offices are responsible for final delivery of services.
(xii) Understanding of existing legislative provisions in service provision is key e.g. on‐
site sanitation is not DWASA’s mandate which is also not covered under WASA Act
4.2 Looking forward
Since the project has achieved its goals, Government ensure to consolidate on the gains by
formulating a follow on project proposal which targets to sanitation sector improvement
issues.
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Annex 6. Comments of Co-Financers and Other Partner Stakeholders
Not Applicable
48
Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents
Project Appraisal Document for Bangladesh: Dhaka Water Supply and Sanitation Project,
dated October 31, 2008 (Report No: 44935-BD
Restructuring Paper for Bangladesh: Dhaka Water Supply and Sanitation Project, dated
June 13, 2013 (Report No: 78117-BD)
Aide Memoires, Implementation Status Reports
Project Progress Reports by Dhaka Water Supply and Sanitation Project – PMU
Borrower’s Evaluation Report, dated November 2016
IWM (2016) Flood Modeling of Dhaka City – Part 2 Impact and Resilience of Storm Water
Drainage Investments of Dhaka Water Supply and Sanitation Project (DWSSP)
Roy, S. (2016) The Impact of Storm Water Drainage Investments by DWASA in Greater
Dhaka Area – Estimation of Potential Damages Component and Economic Analysis
Dasgupta, Susmita; Zaman, Asif; Roy, Subhendu; Huq, Mainul; Jahan, Sarwar; Nishat,
Ainun. (2015). Urban Flooding of Greater Dhaka in a Changing Climate : Building Local
Resilience to Disaster Risk. Directions in Development--Environment and Sustainable
Development; Washington, DC: World Bank.
DWASA (2014) Sewerage Master Plan for Dhaka City
DWASA (2015) Low Income Customers Improvement Plan
DWASA (2015) Drainage Impact Assessment Exercise - Report on Focus Groups
Discussion conducted in Two Catchment Areas of Dhaka
DWASA (2016) Storm Water Drainage Master Plan for Dhaka City
Castalia (2015) Diagnostic Report of the organizational Structure of DWASA; and Options
Report of the Organizational Structure of DWASA
World Bank (2016) Strengthening Poor-Inclusive Urban Water Supply and Sanitation
Service Quality Information Systems in Bangladesh (P131951)
World Bank (2016) Country Partnership Framework for Bangladesh for the period FY16FY20. Report No. 103723-BD
World Bank (2015) Systematic Country Diagnostics for Bangladesh. More and better Jobs
to Accelerate Shared Growth and End Extreme Poverty
World Bank (2015b). Climate and disaster resilience of greater Dhaka area: a micro level
analysis. Bangladesh development series; paper no. 32. Washington, D.C. World Bank
Group.
World Bank (2011) Country Assistance Strategy for Bangladesh 2011-2014.
World Bank (2006) Country Assistance Strategy for Bangladesh 2006-2009. Report No.
35193
World Bank (2006) Bangladesh Country Assistance Strategy (2001-2005) Completion
49
Review. Independent Evaluation Group. Report No. 89106
Government of Bangladesh (2011) Perspective Plan 2010-2021 Making Vision 2021 a
Reality. Economic planning Commission
Government of Bangladesh (2015) The Seventh Five Year Plan FY16-FY20. Accelerating
Growth, Empowering Citizens. Economic Planning Commission
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MAP
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