MATJAZ:M:work:phenomenology:Cs and Thought:Transglobal Phenomenology
5.doc
Transglobal Phenomenology
Matjaž Potrč
Phenomenology is determined in respect to the environment that it involves. An
often-presupposed position is that of pure narrow phenomenology that restricts
phenomenology to private awareness, with full exclusion of external environment.
Several considerations though invite us to see environment as being involved into and
as constitutive for phenomenology. Local environment enters the stage first: René’s
fireplace shows phenomenological experiences forthcoming in a rich environment.
Global environment is the next move: new representationalism proposes environment
and community as constitutive for phenomenological experiences. We finish up with
two strong and apparently incompatible intuitions: phenomenology is narrow and
phenomenology involves environment in a constitutive manner. It is suggested that
there is a sensible way how to bring these intuitions together: the proposal of
transglobal phenomenology. Transglobal phenomenology starts with full endorsement
of environment’s constitutive role for qualitative experiences. Phenomenology thus
involves a rich and dynamical world and Dasein’s being-in-the-world, which is
already a characteristic of global phenomenology. This Dasein’s being-in-the-world,
though, is equivalent to the rich and dynamical world of a brain in a vat. The involved
environment that is constitutive for phenomenology is transglobal. This is certainly
not a position concerning phenomenology that excludes environment altogether, as is
the case with pure narrow phenomenology. It also does not involve just local
environment, as does René’s fireplace scenario. And again, it does not involve just the
whole global world, as does the Dasein’s being-in-the-world. In order to have a
relevant role in an account of phenomenology, environment has to be narrow, and this
it succeeds by being a transglobal environment. It turns out that transglobal
phenomenology is the only sensible account of phenomenology.
1. Phenomenology is determined in respect to the environment that it involves.
Phenomenology or phenomenological conscious experiences come with a certain
quality. They are the cases of qualitative experiencing of the red color of roses, of
what-it’s-like that is specific to the experiencing of pain.
What is the environment that is involved into phenomenology? This is the
question that we propose to tackle. On the one hand, environment seems to be
implicated in phenomenology in the following sense: phenomenological experiencing
of the red color of roses certainly is different from the experiencing of the green color
of leaves, or of the red color of tomatoes. But now, the environments comporting
roses are different from environments thriving with an abundance of ripe tomatoes. So
variations in environments determine phenomenological qualities of what we
experience. Despite that it is the case how phenomenological experiencing of a sunset
or of a spider determines the quality of related experiences, it may be argued that just
the external environment may not be enough for determining the specific nature of
phenomenology. Environments comporting roses, pains, leaves and tomatoes may be
matched simply by mental contents corresponding to these items or features. But
mental contents alone, functionally determined, may really not have anything to do
with phenomenology at all – the remark can go on. These contents, just as they stand,
1
do not necessarily comport any quality and any phenomenology.1 This is clearly
shown by my experience of pain, which is my private concern, its quality being whatit’s-like experience that is proper just to myself. But if this is a case from which
further conclusions as to the nature of phenomenology may be derived, then the
impact of the environment in the constitution of phenomenological qualitative
experiences seems to be nil. And indeed, we have stated what-it’s-like
phenomenological experiences in such a manner that in their specificity each concerns
private qualitative experiences accessible form the first-person perspective. The
environment then does not seem to have any constitutive sense in its support of
phenomenology.
The situation is now as follows. On the one hand the impact of the
environment upon forming of phenomenological experiences seems to be decisive.
Phenomenology of smelling a rose differs from phenomenological experience based
on noticing a spider in one’s vicinity. So environment seems to have some impact
upon phenomenology. But wait. On the other hand phenomenological experiences are
qualitative things, and they are proper in their quality just to the immediate
experiencer. So on one hand environment seems to have a decisive impact on
phenomenology, and on the other hand it does not seem to have any such impact. In
the following we will try to tackle this conundrum.
2. A strong presupposition is that of pure narrow phenomenology, the position that
restricts phenomenology to private awareness, with full exclusion of external
environment.
We start with the last mentioned position in respect to phenomenology, for the
following reason. Sensing red may be seen as something that is just a matter of
intentional content.2 Nothing is yet specified in respect to the conscious experience or
to what-it’s-like quality, so it seems, if just the intentional content of sensing red is
specified. The qualitative dimension of experiences succeeds though as one moves to
the private what-it’s-like phenomenology, to the fact that consciousness involves the
position of my subjective awareness. From this point of view, the qualitative
conscious experience of my sensing red involves substantially just my private
awareness, to the exclusion of external environment. Sensing red as a qualitative
experience also does not need to involve any external environment at all. If it would,
then we would not reach the specific area of phenomenology yet. Phenomenal
experiences are of the narrow, conscious quality involving character, and not of the
wide, external world involving character.
It seems sensible to claim that phenomenology or what-it’s-like qualitative
experiences are matters of my private awareness. The whole point of phenomenology
is namely that the experiences of red or of pain that I undergo are proper just to me
and not to other people. The what-it’s-like quality of my pain is just quality of the
pain that I entertain, whereas this experience is not accessible in this qualitative
dimension to anybody else than to myself. The what-it’s-like of being a bat is an
1
The whole setting of this paper endorses the opposite position, according to which
intentional mental states constitutively involve phenomenology, and
phenomenological experiences constitutively comport intentionality, such as is
directedness at the experiential space. (Horgan and Tienson 2002, Potrc 2002)
2
Intentional content may well be interpreted as being narrow itself, in opposition to
its covariational and teleological inspired renderings. This fact will become important
as we reach the position of transglobal environment.
2
experience proper to just this private inner world of a bat, no matter how much of
empathic effort I try to exercise: the bat’s experienced quality will stay out of my
reach. And similarly, the quality of my private experience as I feel the pain or smell a
rose is again proper just to myself. I can share its presence with other people, by
linguistically evoking it. But I cannot share my qualitative feeling and my first person
perspective with anybody else. You can get attentive in respect to it, but the specific
quality of my experience will forever escape you.
From such considerations, here comes a view of phenomenology that seems
appropriate: Phenomenology is private; it is proper to my point of view only, to the
private awareness. This means that I sense phenomenological experiences in such a
way that I am aware of them. I am aware of them as my experiences, and this
certainly does not apply to you, in respect to my experiences that is – myself being
again at loss in respect to the specific quality and to your private awareness
concerning your phenomenological experiences.
Let us call this sensibly sounding position about my qualitative experiences
that of pure narrow phenomenology. It is a position concerning phenomenology,
because it deals with conscious qualitative experiences. It is further a position that is
pure, i.e. it is purified of constitutive role exercised by the intentional content. No
matter what the variation in the intentional content is (roses, tomatoes, spiders, pains),
the real phenomenological dimension, according to this approach, gets restricted to
the quality of someone’s inner awareness. And this inner awareness is constitutive of
the first-person perspective. It is narrow phenomenology in the sense that it excludes
constitutive impact of the environment.
One can also say that the position of pure narrow phenomenology in respect to
environment consists in the following: it excludes environment as constitutive of
phenomenology. This seems an appropriate position as far as the nature of
phenomenology is concerned, because phenomenology or conscious experiences, as
we all know, have to do with first person perspective, being private to the one
entertaining those experiences.
In the following though, two presuppositions involved into pure narrow
phenomenology position will be submitted to the critical scrutiny:
(1) Environment should be excluded from a sensible account of
phenomenology. (Denial of environment’s role in phenomenology.)
(2) Phenomenological experiences are of atomistic nature. (Phenomenal
atomism.)
As far as presupposition (1) of pure narrow phenomenology position is
concerned, namely that environment should be excluded from an account of
qualitative experiences: we dedicate the rest of this exercise to its critical discussion.
We argue against (1), although we also endorse, in our own way, another
presupposition proper to pure narrow phenomenology:
(3) Phenomenology’s nature is narrow. (Phenomenology’s narrowness.)
Usually, and especially from the position of pure narrow phenomenology,
presuppositions (1) and (3) are seen as a tightly tied package deal: if environment has
no constitutive role for phenomenology (1), then it seems a sensible thing to suppose
that the nature of phenomenology is narrow (3). We will go for the denial of (1)
3
though, still keeping the presupposition (3) of pure narrow phenomenology.3 This
kind of combination seems strange and even contradictory at first sight, but we will
argue that such impression is tied to the specific position of pure narrow
phenomenology.
We will also oppose the presupposition (2) of pure narrow phenomenology,
namely the presupposition of phenomenal atomism. Some words need to be dedicated
to this one. The usual examples of phenomenological experiences, especially in the
way of how to approach them in the practice of analytic philosophy, involve atomistic
cases of phenomenological experiences, the cases that were just given: seeing red,
feeling pain. Did Mary learn something new as she exited white and black room for
the first time and as she experienced the qualitative sensation of a red flower? All
these examples tend to be atomistic in the following way: one concentrates just at one
red sensation, just at one experience of pain, isolated from all the rest of environment
in which such experiences use to happen. Isolating one such sensation, one then goes
on to analyze its quality.
The widespread endorsement of the presupposition (2) tends not to be seen as
important. But if one thinks for a while, one quickly discovers the following link with
the endorsement of the presupposition (1) while one adopts (2): If there is no
constitutive impact of environment in an account of phenomenology (1), then it is
natural to observe phenomenological experiences as atomistic (2). Why? Because
conceiving an occurrence of phenomenological experience of pain, or of red, as an
atomistic isolated event (2), exactly has the following consequence: no environment
(1) is involved into its constitution. Presupposition (2) though, even if it is linked to
(1), claims something different: phenomenal experiences appear as isolated events –
at least they tend to be presented as such isolated events.
The following summarizes position of pure narrow phenomenology:
(1), (2), (3).
We will go the following way though:
- (1), - (2), (3).
It immediately turns out to be important specifying how narrowness involved into (3)
can vary and still be conceived as narrowness, even if (1) and (2) are denied by our
approach. We will reach the variation in narrowness though by gradually putting
under question (1) extending the involved environment. So this is the to be pursued
schedule.
3. Several considerations though invite us to see environment as being involved into
phenomenology and as constitutive for phenomenology.
Pure narrow phenomenology, by its thesis (1), denies any constitutive role for
environment in an account of phenomenology, by embracing a basically private and
atomistic (2) nature account of it. It dawns on us thus that atomism (2) is crucial for
the pure narrow phenomenology inspired account of qualitative experiences.
3
All in staying with the presupposition (3) of pure narrow phenomenology, we will
integrate it into position of environmental narrow phenomenology.
4
But several positions are on the table denying atomism (2) in their account of
phenomenology. These are positions that gradually put into question presupposition
(1) by first involving local and then the global environment.
a. Local environment enters the stage first: René’s fireplace shows phenomenological
experiences forthcoming in a rich environment.
We first look at the example of René’s fireplace. This is no scholarly attempt to
provide an adequate historical and textual account of what Descartes carefully wrote.
So if you have such concerns we tell you that we actually describe a guy
Schmescartes, who fictionally happens to have some vicinity to the great historical
figure of philosopher Descartes. Just for our convenience, we go on and call our
Schmescartes with his finer sounding given name René.
So here is how it goes. In his book involving Meditations of philosophy, René
describes his experiences while sitting in a comfortable chair, next to the fireplace,
where the logs are burning, producing nice fire, warmth and illumination of the room.
He has a piece of candle nearby as well and mediates about the possibility of this
candle to melt if it would happen to get too close to the fireplace. Right, this is the
description of the situation, happening in vicinity of René’s fireplace.
We can immediately notice that René describes an environment that gives
place to various phenomenal experiences, such as feeling of comfortable warmth,
thinking about the candle. So in order to give an account of phenomenological
experiences, he describes them as happening in environment. We can also
immediately grasp that the very quality of these experiences constitutively depends
upon the environment in which they find themselves. The experienced phenomenal
feeling of warmth would be different if René would be sitting close to a heating
machine in a factory, or in the bus, although these would still be feelings of warmth.
Each of these, we may presume, would have another form of quality.
Anyway, we can notice that in order to describe phenomenal experiences,
René has to involve the environment, the one that we can call local environment. The
environment in question is local because it includes just the local vicinity of the
described fireplace setting. But it is of course a full environment, with rich choice of
things that happen in it. The description of such a local environment may be
dynamical because of the richness of features involved into it, although such an
environment is static in the following sense: it is true that fire is burning in the
fireplace, but there is a very restricted movement in such an environment.
What does René do then? Well, he thinks along the following lines: All the
things in this fireplace environment of mine may be just an illusion, produced by a
powerful systematically cheating daemon: all these logs, candle and chairs. So I need
a better start to stay with something I can rely on: mathematical truths seem to be
better of in this respect, so I will put my empirical local environment under
parentheses, in a methodological way. But wait, even mathematical truths may be
dubious. So, I better rely just on my inner awareness. “I think, therefore I am”, says
René then, reaching the position that we just described in the former paragraph as that
of pure narrow phenomenology. But notice that this position is not achieved in respect
to the pure phenomenal experiences, at least not in the case of our guy René
Schmescartes.
Before going on, we will assess René’s position in respect to presuppositions
(1), (2) and (3) of pure narrow phenomenology. We will also take a look at the
question where we still feel uncomfortable with René’s position.
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In respect to the presupposition (1) of pure narrow phenomenology position,
denial of environment’s role in phenomenology, we can state that René’s fireplace
setting provides decisive evidence against it. Although the fireplace in question
provides a quite restricted environment, it is a rich enough environment to put into
question the thesis that no environment is involved into phenomenology. There are
burning logs, chair, candle, and warmth and there is thought supporting setting around
René’s fireplace. So here environment certainly does not seem to be excluded from an
account of phenomenology. One can still claim that René is not interested in a
description of phenomenological experiences here, but just to description of his
immediate surroundings. To this we can reply that René uses the environment in order
to reach the rendering of phenomenology. Again one may retort to this that the “I
think therefore I am” just is the position of pure narrow phenomenology. To this we
say now that even if such is the case the phenomenology in question certainly needed
the basis of environment in order to be able to position itself upon the landscape at all.
But this means that phenomenology needs the environment (of René’s fireplace) in a
constitutive manner.
If it is the case that phenomenology needs the surrounding in question in a
constitutive manner, then phenomenological experiences cannot be of atomistic
nature, as it is presupposed by (2) of pure narrow phenomenology. Even René’s “I
think” reasoning could not have been forthcoming without the background of his
fireplace and of experiences that are bound to it, or again without some other
phenomenological experiences supporting background.
These are lessons of René’s fireplace example against the main
presuppositions of pure narrow phenomenology approach. But here are some
limitations in respect to this new position. First, it does not seem to be a sensible
manner to proceed if one would think environment restricted to René’s fireplace
setting. The burning logs, just to give an example, came out of the wood; the
carpenters’ work is implied into them, with all its richness and intricacy. One could
go on. The point is that René’s fireplace, ultimately, could not have existed without
the whole world of which it is a part.
The nature of phenomenology involved into René’s fireplace setting does not
seem to be narrow because of the rich narrow environment that is involved into it.
Compare presupposition (3) of pure narrow phenomenology position. Yet obviously
the result (“I think”) phenomenology tends to be narrow, and the way to achieve this
is through the systematical and methodological exclusion of each kind of empirical
content (involving such things as logs, chairs and blankets). But this seems to be
implausible if we think about it for a while. Therefore the task remains of securing the
kind of phenomenology that would encompass the empirical data of the environment
and their constitutive role for phenomenological experiences.
b. Global environment is the next move.
René did a fine job in persuading us that there is some constitutive role for
environment in an account of phenomenology. He introduced local environment, in a
quite persuasive manner, to this effect. Plenty of richness and dynamics of the local
environment already suffices to put into question presupposition (1) that no
environment should be forthcoming in an account of phenomenology. And local
environment already more than suffices to put into question presupposition (2) of
phenomenology’s atomistic nature. It is easy to see that each of the qualitative
experiences around the fireplace depends upon other features present there and upon
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the entire fireplace holistic setting. This means that the quality of experiences would
vary if the conditions in the room would vary. The quality of the phenomenal
experience of warmth would vary, for example, if at a certain moment a big bear
would enter the local environment around the fireplace.
But there are considerations to the effect now that local environment, such as
the one including just fireplace’s surrounding, is not enough for an appropriate
account of phenomenological experiences. So the next move can be made, namely
enlarging the environment in which phenomenological experiences really happen in
the global environment. We will first take a quick look at the new
representationalism, and then at its Wittgensteinian background.
i. New representationalism proposes environment and community as constitutive for
phenomenological experiences.
Position entitled as new representationalism claims the following:
(EC) Global environment, including community, is constitutive for
phenomenal qualitative experiences.
If I look at a tree, I may not notice some specific shade of brown, due to my
comparatively poor eyesight. Now a younger colleague comes around and makes me
attentive at the mentioned shade – which, following his intervention, I start to notice,
and which I start to subsequently phenomenologically experience. Thus,
phenomenology does not depend just upon the local environment; it constitutively
depends upon wider environment in which I happen to find myself.
Phenomenal experiences, due to their involvement into communication, may
constantly change and they may succeed from different angles. And as for their
community bound nature, they may be portrayed as the ambiguous element requiring
an interpretation.
A wider environment than just local one, in its impact upon phenomenology,
includes several aspects of the world, and not just the local environment.
ii. There are Wittgensteinian roots of environment and community figuring as
constitutive for phenomenology.
Our acquaintance Schmittgenstein is in the background of the just shortly introduced
position of new representationalism. He discussed private experiences, such as having
pain, or sensing blue color. We are persuaded that he used these in order to deny both
the (1) lack of environment in their constitution, and (2) atomism of
phenomenological experiences. This is understandable, for he was attentive at the rich
environment and at the constitutive role of community involved into this environment
as both shaping the qualitative experiences of phenomenology. He produced
arguments denying private approaches to things, so he must have appropriated the
whole world as his environment.
And why would one need to shift from local to global environment in an
account of phenomenological experiences? The answer is quite simple. Once as we
have realized that René introduced his fireplace, showing that local environment is
constitutive for phenomenology, it is not difficult to conclude that global environment
is constitutive for it as well. For fireplace is a part of the wider world without which it
would probably not be able to exist.
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We now need to briefly assess the just proposed global environment move in
respect to the pure narrow phenomenology and in respect to the local environment
positions. Global environment is certainly incompatible with pure narrow
phenomenology claim to the effect that environment has no role at all in an account of
phenomenology (1). For we now finish up with the wide environment including
community as being constitutive for phenomenology. What is the difference with the
local environment position in this respect? The answer is that we can construe the
original presupposition of pure narrow phenomenology position as
(1’) Any environment (including local environment) should be excluded from
a sensible account of phenomenology. (Denial of local environment’s role in
phenomenology.)
And we can construe local environment position presupposition as follows:
(1’’) Global environment should be excluded from a sensible account of
phenomenology. (Denial of global environment’s role in phenomenology.)
This means that René’s fireplace environment as a local environment may be
admitted as constitutive for phenomenology constitution. But this role cannot be
recognized for a wider environment. The rationale for this move can go as follows: If
I sense a specific quality, such as exactly this qualitative kind of warmth, in the
fireplace setting, this can be only because of considerations that are present inside this
specific setting, and not outside of it. Whatever happens in the marketplace, for
example, cannot have any impact upon my just discussed phenomenological
experiences.
The answer to this may be as follows though. The logs that are burning at the
fireplace were sold at the market. But this is not really the main point. I could not
have had the qualitative experiences of warmth, say, that I entertain right now, if I
would not have been a member of community in which I happen to find myself, and if
I would not be a member of community environment in the wide sense, including the
whole physical environment. This consideration now, if it is true, counts decisively
against the implicit presupposition (1’’) of local environment position. And it also
counts against the phenomenal atomism presupposition (2). Notice that already local
environment phenomenological constitution position has put (2) into question. Just
that it stayed with what may be called molecularism in respect to the constitution of
phenomenological experiences. This would practically mean that the quality of
phenomenological experiences in the fireplace setting depends just upon the limited
number of features present in this local environment (burning logs, chair, blanket,
candle, room) and not upon a myriad of potential additional features that are not
restricted to the local environment. But such molecularism should now be abandoned
in favor of the wider encompassing holism. The environment in the global approach
should not be necessarily understood as all encompassing physical surrounding. It is
rather better understood as environment and community encompassing surrounding.
So the very concept of environment needs some further specification from the global
perspective.
Environment is still of the one who has phenomenological experiences, that
of the experiencer. But from the global perspective the experiencer’s situation is best
described as that of being-in-the-world, of somebody who is involved into the world,
into the global environment and community. The one who is thus involved in the
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world is sometimes described by the kosher sounding name of Dasein, which is
perhaps best understood as an organism inhabiting the global environment. In
counterdistinction to ants or cows this may not only be an organism that has a
community, but one that is essentially recognized in community, and the normativity
into whish he is involved comports dimension of language. Now we can tell that
global environment really involves Dasein’s-being-in-the-world in the just described
sense. The essential point is that the rich situation of such a creature has a constitutive
impact on its phenomenological experiences. Each phenomenological experience is
constitutively mediated not just through the local environment, but much more
through the global environment. The warmth experience that I live through in the
fireplace environment is mediated through my overall wider community and
environment situation. In this manner both presuppositions (1) and (2) are denied not
just in respect to the position of pure narrow phenomenology, but also in respect to
local phenomenology. Global environment and holistic being-in-the-world are now
recognized as constitutive for phenomenological experiences.
4. We finish up with two strong and apparently incompatible intuitions:
phenomenology is narrow and phenomenology involves environment in a constitutive
manner.
We came to the conclusion now that phenomenology is constituted by environment,
first by local and then by the global one.
But there was a plausible intuition about phenomenological experiences, as we
started to discuss them, namely that phenomenology is narrow. Pure narrow
phenomenology position defends such a view, and it basically claims that no
environment at all is constitutive for phenomenology. This was the presupposition of
phenomenology’s narrowness (3).
We are now encountering two apparently incompatible intuitions in respect to
phenomenology: that environment is constitutively involved into phenomenology, and
that it is not involved into it at all. We may remind ourselves that we started our
discussion of how to introduce environment into an account of phenomenology as
opposed to the position of pure narrow phenomenology.
Despite that the two intuitions we are considering now appear
straightforwardly contradictory, each of these intuitions seems to be plausible to some
extent. The task consists now in finding a way out of this overall conundrum.
5. It is suggested that there is a sensible way of bringing these intuitions together: the
proposal of transglobal phenomenology.
In fact, it seems to us that there is a plausible way how to bring the two seemingly
incompatible positions together: the intuition that there is no environment involved
into constitution of phenomenology (pure narrow phenomenology), and the intuition
that environment is constitutively involved into phenomenology (local and then
global environment, encompassing our communicative address in community).
Our proposal may be called transglobal phenomenology. It is a proposal that
endorses both the role of environment (-(1)), of phenomenal holism (-(2)) and of
phenomenal narrowness (3):
-(1), - (2), (3)
The position thus stays with the constitutive narrowness. But given that the values of
(1) and (2) have changed, (3) will have to be interpreted, as we presume, in a different
9
manner than this is the case with the package deal offered by the pure narrow
phenomenology position.
Narrowness entering the stage now will be transglobal. This means that the
whole environment will be appropriated, but in a narrow manner. How should this be
possible?
a. Transglobal phenomenology starts with full endorsement of environment’s
constitutive role for qualitative experiences. Phenomenology thus involves a rich and
dynamical world and Dasein’s being-in-the-world.
First, transglobal phenomenology starts with full endorsement of the environment’s
constitutive role for qualitative experiences. We have seen this as we tackled the
setting of René’s fireplace, where the environment in which phenomenological
experiences happen is involved.
Phenomenological qualitative experiences, such as the qualitative feeling of
warmth, happen in a rich and dynamical local environment where René proceeds with
his meditation. Despite that this fireplace environment is local, we may call it, just for
our usage, René’s world – in the sense that this is the environment where he spends
most of his time. Now, René is an organism in the world. He is situated in his
environment. Such an organism, again, as we already mentioned, may be called
Dasein, and given that it has its world in the just indicated sense, we may speak about
Dasein’s being-in-the-world as constitutive for phenomenology.
b. This Dasein’s being-in-the-world, though, is equivalent to the rich and dynamical
world of a brain in a vat.
Now consider that René may be in the position of a brain in a vat. Even you, right
now, cannot dismiss this skeptical hypothesis fuelled possibility. It may be that a
malign demon is feeding you all the time impressions that you are here, that other
people are around, that you are in the room, in a house. But actually you happen to be
a brain in a vat, floating in a nutrient solution, all of your input and output ends being
switched to the working powerful computer feeding you all this information. You can
say: I will punch you on the nose, and you will yourself see that you certainly are not
a brain in a vat. But this does not prove that one of us is not brain in a vat either. For
all the experiences of pain and similar may again be fed to you by the powerful
computer, or by the daemon regulating the workings of this computer.
This then means that Dasein’s being-in-the-world, pure and simple, is
equivalent to the experiential position of a brain in a vat. This is what we call the
starting position of transglobal phenomenology. It is transglobal because it
encompasses more space than does the actual entire world: the position also includes
possible experiential worlds.
6. The involved environment which is constitutive for phenomenology is transglobal.
According to transglobal phenomenology position, the involved environment that is
constitutive for phenomenology is transglobal, i.e. it does not encompass just local
environment, and neither global actual environment of the world. It also encompasses
the possible experiential world.
a. This is certainly not a position concerning phenomenology that excludes
environment altogether, as is the case with pure narrow phenomenology.
Transglobal phenomenology is not a position that excludes environment altogether.
Pure narrow phenomenology attempted such a gesture. In opposition to this,
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environment is happily embraced, in its overwhelming range. The only thing that gets
put into question is the exclusivity of the actual environment, as this was the case with
pure narrow phenomenology position. But now as the environment becomes hugely
larger, it may be appropriated.
b. It also does not involve just local environment, as does the René’s fireplace
scenario.
Transglobal phenomenology does not involve just local environment, especially in the
sense of local actual environment, as this was the case with René’s fireplace. This
fireplace scenario would introduce no difference in treatment of narrowness that is
usual in the pure narrow phenomenology approach.
c. And again, it does not involve just the whole global world, as does the Dasein’s
being-in-the-world. In order to have a relevant role in an account of phenomenology,
environment has to be narrow, and this it succeeds by being a transglobal
environment.
Neither does transglobal phenomenology position involve the whole global world,
should it be understood as local actual agent’s world, or as the whole actual world
supporting experiences in an environment, such as Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Wide
external world as such does not support phenomenology, as it seems. In order that the
rich dynamical whole world would be able to exercise its impact upon
phenomenology, it should better be narrow. We agreed, namely, that narrowness is a
basic characteristic of phenomenology.
7. It turns out is that transglobal phenomenology is the only sensible account of
phenomenology, just because it is the only position that brings environment and
narrow scope together in a manner that is relevant for phenomenology.
Transglobal phenomenology provides environment, and it provides environment in a
narrow form. This is a position that respects both of our basic intuitions concerning
phenomenology: that it is narrow, and that it involves the world into its constitution.
We conclude that transglobal phenomenology is the only sensible account of
phenomenology, for it is the only position that brings environment and narrowness
together. It involves the world, and narrowness that constitutively engages this world.
An argument in support of the claim that transglobal phenomenology is the
only appropriate account of phenomenology goes like this, summarizing the above
dialectics. In respect to the involved environment, phenomenology may be construed
as being either without any environment – pure narrow phenomenology position – or
again as involving some environment. The involved environments may then be either
local, global or again transglobal. Pure narrow phenomenology would have difficulty
to account for variation in phenomenological qualities that seems essential for any
account of phenomenology. After all, the quality of roses-smelling experiences is
different from the phenomenal quality proper to spider-noticing experiences. One may
then propose variation in organism’s perceived environment to be responsible for the
corresponding changes. The first and naturally forthcoming environment as the
candidate that may be responsible for phenomenological qualitative variation is the
local environment. But variation in the local environment reveals itself as too
restricted in that its very condition depends upon the global environment. Global
environment encompasses the whole world proper to the experiencer, his being-inthe-world. Phenomenological qualitative experiences then depend upon the variation
in the global environment. But could this be the case? Didn’t we forget the essential
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characteristic of phenomenological qualitative experiences being narrow by tying
them too closely to the wide environmental conditions? The remedy for this worry
can be found by appropriating transglobal environment as constitutive for qualitative
phenomenological experiences. In this manner we retain variation in intentional
content that in several ways supports variation in the quality of phenomenological
experiences. We finish up by appropriating the whole world, the whole environment –
in a narrow form. This accords with the narrow account of intentional content that
still appropriates the whole world. Now we have the whole world as the environment
we are interested in, and it is narrow, thus appropriate for an account of qualitative
phenomenology. We finish up with environmental narrow phenomenology that is
capable to explain in a natural way variation in experienced phenomenological
quality. This position takes account of environmental variation in explanation of
qualitative phenomenological experiences, in opposition to pure narrow
phenomenology. By construing environment in a narrow manner, it overrides
incompatibility of either local or global wide environmental construal with the
essentially narrow quality of phenomenological experiences.
References
Henderson, D., Horgan, T. and Potrč, M. (Forthcoming). “Transglobal EvidentialismReliabilism”.
Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. (2002). “The Phenomenology of Intentionality and the
Intentionality of Phenomenology,” in D. Chalmers, ed. Philosophy of Mind:
Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.
Potrč, M. (1998). “From Chinese Room to Dasein in a Vat” Čarnijev zbornik. ZIFF.
Ljubljana: 459-67.
Potrč, M. (2002). “Intentionality of Phenomenology in Brentano”, in Horgan, T.,
Potrč, M. and Tienson, J. (eds.) Origins: The Common Sources of the Analytic
and Phenomenological Traditions. Spindel Conference 2001, Vol. XL,
Supplement, the Southern Journal of Philosophy: 231-67.
Potrč, M. (Forthcoming). “The Background and the Morphological Content”.
Wright, E. (1993). Ed. New Representationalisms. Avebury: Aldershot.
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