Gábor Forgács, Tihamér Margitay, Zsolt Ziegler
Dept. of Philosophy and the History of Science
1111 Budapest, Egry J. st. 1. E 610.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
www.filozofia.bme.hu
Naturalized Epistemology
Traditional (Cartesian) view of epistemology
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Epistemology concerns with foundations of knowledge (science).
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The task of philosophy (epistemology) is to give a response to sceptical
arguments and establish knowledge.
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This enterprise shouldn't rely upon empirical (scientific) knowledge, since
this would be beg the question.
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Do we have knowledge? What is knowledge? Philosophy gives the
answer, not science.
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Epistemology
Problems
1.
There may not many, but there are some consensual claims in
philosophy.
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2.
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Is there anybody, who sincerely believes in solipsism? (I'm the only existing
thing in the world.)
In science, we had had universally accepted theories, which turned to be
false later. Is there consensus in certain scientific theories? And even if
there is, what does consensus prove?
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Phlogiston-theory, geocentric world-view?
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Why do we prefer consensus to philosophical debate? (there is obviously no
scientific answer)
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How do you distinguish the current non-controversial and allegedly
correct theories which will turn to be false from other confirmed
theories which will not?
Epistemology
Conceptual analysis
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Approach to epistemological problems = conceptual analysis.
We have a naive view about knowledge or justification, and we would
like to have a proper definition of the notion.
Conceptual analysis is usually considered as an a priori enterprise.
Presupposition: We don't need to build on empirical sciences in
philosophical theories of knowledge.
A priori: independent from experience.
Epistemology
Autonomy of epistemology
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Epistemology (and philosophy) is autonomous disciple, because science
cannot establish itself.
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Philosophy differs essentially from science, its goal differs from empirical
science.
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Philosophy's job is to establish science by conceptual and doctrinal
„reduction”.
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According to Quine, this is the main reason in favour of a conception of
epistemology as an autonomous discipline.
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Epistemology
Is science irrelevant?
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But is science really irrelevant? It seems very unlikely.
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Cognitive science deals with human cognition as well.
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Biological, psychological theories provide important knowledge about us
(humans).
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Examples: human behaviour, ageing, how our organs work
Knowledge is something what humans have. Cognition is a process
which can be examined by means of scientific methods, like other
functions of brain.
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Epistemology
Goals of „traditional” epistemology
1)
Conceptual reduction /Justification/
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2)
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Meaningful scientific terms need to have a translation to terms which
directly refer to sense-data.
Doctrinal reduction /Truth/
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Scientific truths can be established by basic (atomic) sentences.
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Basic-sentences (protocoll sentences) are fundamental and evident
(unquestionable) and they support the scientific statements.
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These goals were connected with each other and the logicist program of
mathematics (reducing mathematics into logic).
Epistemology
Quine's critique
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The traditional project of epistemology has failed in both ways.
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The doctrinal side fails, as Hume showed in his discussion on induction.
There are no fundamental, unquestionable truths.
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The conceptual side fails due to the fact that a only a conjunction of
sentences can correlate with experience. The scientific terms cannot be
translated into sense-data, since there aren't exact translation rules.
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Therefore, we have no good reasons to accept the traditional conception
of epistemology.
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Epistemology has failed by its own standards. It's not a fruitful enterprise.
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Therefore, the autonomy of epistemology is unsupported.
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Epistemology
Quine's naturalized epistemology
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Since traditional philosophical analysis of knowledge fails, those who
wish to study knowledge ought to employ natural scientific methods.
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Scientific study of knowledge differs from philosophic study by focusing
on how humans actually acquire knowledge rather than speculative
analysis of knowledge.
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Traditional epistemology should be abandoned and replaced with the
methodologies of the natural sciences (psychology).
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This is the replacement (radical) naturalism.
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Epistemology
Epistemology as a part of psychology
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The efforts in order to show that we do in fact have knowledge are
useless. We must instead study the ways in which we form beliefs, i. e
study the psychological processes that take us from sensory
stimulations to beliefs about the world.
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Knowledge is a natural phenomenon, the outcome of a natural process
whereby sensory stimulation leads to theories about the world.
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Inputs: sensory stimulations ; Output: beliefs
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The scientist does the same: she has empirical observations and
forms a theory.
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The main question of epistemology: How can we form beliefs from
sensory stimulations? What is the relation between empirical evidence
(stimulation) and theory?
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Epistemology
Epistemology as a part of pyschology
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The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to
go on, ultimately in arriving at his picture of the world.
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If we are out simply to understand the link between observation and science, we
are well advised to use any available information, including that provided by the
very science whose link with observation we are seeking to understand.
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„Epistemology, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of
natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human
subject..
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The relation between the meager input and the torrential output is a relation that
we are prompted to study for somewhat the same reasons that always prompted
epistemology: namely, in order to see how evidence relates to theory, and in
what ways one's theory of nature transcends any available evidence...But a
conspicuous difference between old epistemology and the epistemological
enterprise in this new psychological setting is that we can now make free use of
empirical psychology.„ (Quine: Epistemology Naturalized)
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Epistemology
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Traditional Epistemology
Problems
Give a response to sceptical
arguments and establish
knowledge
Aims
Establish scientific
knowledge by conceptual
and doctrinal reduction. (JTB
account)
Methodology
Conceptual analysis
Normativity
The norms of logic and
reasoning
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Naturalized Epistemology
Epistemology
Quine’s programme
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Old epistemology – tried to construct natural science from sense-data
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New epistemology – is contained in natural science
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But the old containment remains valid too – we are studying how the human subject
of our study posits bodies and projects his physics from his data.
Epistemology
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Epistemology
Naturalized epistemology
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Naturalized epistemology is an approach to the theory of knowledge that
emphasizes the application of methods, results, and theories from the
empirical sciences.
It is opposed to the (a priori) conceptual analysis of epistemic notions.
The „armchair” theorizing is not enough.
According to naturalized epistemology we need to build on natural
sciences in order to have an adequate and complete theory of human
knowledge and cognition.
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Epistemology
Task
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 Groupwork:
Find reasons for and against relpacement
naturalism.
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Epistemology
Naturalized epistemology
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Naturalized epistemology is a collection of philosophic views concerned
with the theory of knowledge that emphasize the role of natural scientific
methods.
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There are different types of naturalized epistemology:
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1. Replacement (Radical) Naturalism
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2. Methodological Naturalism
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3. Cooperative Naturalism
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Epistemology
Replacement naturalism
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The most radical view about epistemology. There is no room for
traditional epistemology.
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It should be replaced by methods of empirical science (pyschology,
biology or sociology).
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Epistemology is a part of empirical science.
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The main epistemological question is descriptive: how do the humans
„produce” their beliefs (or knowledge) about the world?
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Therefore, philosophy is not an autonomous discipline. Science is the
only way of acquiring knowledge about the world.
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A lot of traditional philosophical questions are meaningless. The
meaningful (or fruitful) problems can be examined by scientific means.
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Epistemology
Methodological naturalism
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Scientific method is the only (or the best) way to acquire knowledge.
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Philosophy and science as engaged in essentially the same enterprise,
pursuing similar ends and using similar methods.
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They focuses on different questions, but they are continuous with each
other.
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The goal is to establish systematic knowledge about the natural world:
knowledge of laws and causal mechanisms, and to achieve this by
comparing synthetic theories with the empirical data.
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There are no essential differences between philosophy and science,
but some „traditional”, normative philosophical questions are still relevant
and meaningful.
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Epistemology
Cooperative naturalism
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„Weak” naturalism: Empirical results from cognitve psychology
concerning how we actually think and reason are useful for evaluating
normative epistemological questions.
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" ... the results from the sciences of cognition may be relevant to,
and may be legitimately used in the resolution of traditional
epistemological problems" (Susan Haack)
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Epistemology and science are different from each other, both of them
have their own methods and questions.
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But philosophy should appeal to empirical investigations (mainly biology
and cognitve pyschology), and philosophical theories must be coherent
with scientific worldview.
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Epistemology
A Critique of Replacement Naturalism
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Naturalistic epistemology is thus “contained” in psychology as a
subdiscipline.
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But there is a sense in which naturalistic epistemology “contains” the rest
of science: our theories and beliefs about the world, which constitute our
science, are part of „epistemology”.
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Realation between epistemology and science is not: the „fundament” and
„building”, but a mutual connection.
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Our epistemological theories must fit appropriately with the rest of our
scientific worldview. (see: holism)
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Epistemology
The problem of circularity
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The problem of circularity emerges at least at two levels.
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General problem: Using scientific methods in epistemology is question
begging.
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Our scientific theories are based on perceptual experience and inductive
(hypothetical) reasoning. The reliability of these cognitive mechanisms is
taken for granted.
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But the epistemological question is: Are the perception and inductive
reasoning reliable (justified)?
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We cannot legitimately appeal to psychological theories in
explaining perceptual knowledge.
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Epistemology
Quine's response
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This objection is dangerous only if we accept the foundationalist
program.
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But according to the naturalist, we don't need establish our knowledge
(we can't).
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Naturalist refuses sceptic's demand for an external validation of scientific
knowledge.
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To understand what knowledge is and how it is possible, it is necessary
to show how the phenomenon of knowledge fits into the rest of our
understanding of things.
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The result will not be certainty that our scientific theories are correct, but
we do not need that sort of certainty.
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Epistemology
The problem of circularity II.
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The psychologist's theories about cognition comes from a cognitive
process.
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The psychologist use scientific methodology, he doesn't follow the
epistemic rules of the people whom he examines. (members of a native
tribe)
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Why does the scientist follow these methodological rules, instead
of others? (for instance, telepathy or astrology)
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Why are scientific norms favoured?
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We use science, because if we apply scientific methodology we can
attain an adequate understanding of human knowledge /cognition. (begs
the question.)
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Epistemology
The problem of circularity II.
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The real problem is not the global scepticism, but: why do we use a
certain kind of methodology and theory in the naturalist project.
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Even if we presume that we have knowledge about the world, it is
legitimate to ask questions about the proper methodology.
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Why science and not telepathy? Why psychology and not history?
And which psychological theory? (Behaviourism? Psychoanalysis?)
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From the viewpoint of replacement naturalist we couldn't have answers.
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Epistemology
The problem of circularity II.
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Possible responses: Scientific claims are justified, reliable, because
science can make good predictions / scientific claims are falsifiable /
scientific theories „work”, confirmed by empirical evidence / best
available explanation of the observation, etc.
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But these claims are not scientific! These answers presuppose an extrascientific viewpoint from which the scientific methods and practice can be
judged.
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Problem is: naturalists know that science is the best way for acquiring
knowledge. But how can we know this?
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An extra-scientific (a philosophical) reflection of science cannot be
eliminated.
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Epistemology
Another objection
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Replacement thesis is inconsistent
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Replacement thesis is not a scientific claim. The premises of the
argument cannot be tested by empirical sciences.
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If epistemology is part of science, then every epistemological claim must
be a scientific hypothesis, which can be confirmed or disconfirmed by
empirical observations.
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R. T. itself doesn't describe any observable regularity nor explain a
cause-seeking why question of observable phenomena. R. T. doesn't
make predictions.
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But in this case, R.T is not scientific, therefore we build naturalism on a
presupposition which is not scientific.
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Epistemology
The Replacement Naturalist's response
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The R. T. is not testable by scientific methods, but R. T. is a good
inductive generalisation.
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From the fact that in philosophical epistemology we don't have a noncontroversial solution of the epistemological problems (and it is probable,
that in the future we will never have).
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On the other hand, we have non-controversial solutions of scientific
problems, therefore we have a good, inductive argument in favour of
scientific approach of epistemological problems.
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Epistemology
The problem of normativity
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The ideas of knowledge and justified belief are normative in the sense
that they include notions about what is right or wrong for a person to
believe.
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Though science might be able to tell us about how people do come to
believe as they do, it cannot tell us about how people should come by
their beliefs.
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Moreover, scientist has normative presuppositions in her descriptive
enterprise. Without some normative commitments, the scientific practice
would be impossible.
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Epistemology
Epistemology and evolutionary psychology
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A reductionist evolutionary view of rationality:
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Our cognitive mechanisms are justified /”reliable”, because they were
adapted to world.
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If the cognitive processes of humans wouldn't be „reliable”, (for instance
our perceptual beliefs were all false), then humans would have become
extinct.
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„Rationality” can be explained by purely evolutionary terms. We have
knowledge, because knowledge increases our capacity to survival
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Epistemology
Adaptation and rationality
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Problem: If merely adaptive value explains rationality, and irrational
beliefs can be adaptive as well, then we don't have a criterion to
distinguish rational / irrational, justified /unjustified.
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Superstitions, animistic religious faith of a native tribe are explained by
evolutionary theory.
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People believe in irrational things, because believing in such things has
an adaptive benefit (increases the cohesion of society, etc.).
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But „rational” cognitive methods, and mechanisms might have the same
kind of evolutionary explanation also. „Evolution” produced both rational
and irrational (justified and unjustified) beliefs.
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How do you know that science is rational and animism is not? From
evolutionary perspective we haven't sufficient reasons to think that
scientific theories are reliable, and animistic faith is not.
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Epistemology
Philosophy and science
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Replecement naturalist thesis has serious problems: circularity
problem, normativity problem, inconsistency.
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Methodological naturalism: philosophy and science have the same aims
and methods.
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This view can be criticised as well.
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The debate about naturalized epistemology is connected with the relation
between philosophy and science.
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Epistemology
„Paradigmatic” thinking
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Science: scientists accept the same methods, theories, problems,
concepts, use the same instruments, etc.
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In science, we don't ask certain questions. The norms and the universally
accepted statements of science are not being criticised by anybody.
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Kuhn: in „normal science” the scientists accept a paradigm
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Why do we use fMRi, instead of telepathy? How do know that
statistical methods are reliable? Do the neurons really exist? What
biology? What is the goal of biology? Is it worth to deal with
cognitive psychology?
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These questions are strange and not typical scientific questions.
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Epistemology
Critical thinking, „unrestricted” thinking
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In philosophy there aren't universally accepted claims or methods.
Theoretically everything (even the meaning of philosophy) can be and
have been criticised.
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Philosophy is an unrestricted discourse.
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What is philosophy? What is philosophy good for? What is proper
method of philosophy? - these are important questions of philosophy.
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Essential feature of philosophy: critical reflection to our presumptions,
and a critical reflection on philosophy itself.
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If we adopt a certain kind of methodology as unquestionable, then
philosophy will be „dogmatic”. If it cannot be criticised, then it couldn't be
turned out that it is false.
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Epistemology
Philosophy and science
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Critical reflection of science is inevitable. If the naturalist argues for
naturalised epistemology, or defends it from the objections, she makes
philosophical claims.
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It doesn't mean that philosophy is „better” then science, because
„paradigmatic” thinking is necessary for science.
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Philosophy and science have different tasks and methods.
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The point of philosophy is not to demonstrate non-controversial truths
about nature, but critically examine our concepts, presuppositions,
commitments and arguments.
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Epistemology
Conclusion: weak naturalism
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Cooperative (weak) naturalism is a plausible thesis: Empirical results
from cognitive psychology concerning how we actually think and reason
are useful for evaluating normative epistemological questions.
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Philosophy and science have different aims and methods, but they
should participate in a dialogue with each other.
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Philosophy should appeal to empirical investigations (mainly biology
and cognitive psychology), and philosophical theories must be coherent
with scientific world-view
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An epistemological (normative) reflection of methods and the theoretical
presuppositions of science is inevitable and useful for science as well.
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Epistemology