Modeling the Combined TerroristNarcotics Trafficker
Threat to National Security
Alexander Woodcock and Samuel Musa
National Defense University
Woodcock and Musa 2012
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Objectives
 Examine relationship between terrorism,
drug trafficking and policy making through
the development, implementation, and use
of a series of systems dynamics-based
models
 Provide the basis for future development of
a decision aid to support policy-makers in
combating the narco-terror threat
Woodcock and Musa 2012
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Models
 Narcotics, counter-narcotics, and trafficker double
agent model
 Policy cycle model to manage the trafficker double
agent conversion policies
 Prototype societal deprivation, affection,
disaffection, and advanced terrorist recruitment,
training, and narco-terrorist support model
 Entity security and terrorist activity models
 Violence generation model
 Policy cycle models to represent the management of
social violence and entity security policies
Woodcock and Musa 2012
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Outcomes
 Relationships between deprivation of key
resources to individuals and disaffection and
ultimate terrorist activity
 Attack of notional targets by teams of terrorists
 Deprivation of individuals leading to violence
which can lead to an increase in level of
perceived deprivation
 Dynamics of policy- making in response to
perceived needs
 Impact of corruption on policy- making
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Global Threats
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Western Hemisphere
 Tri border area of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina is key for converging threats
 TOC in Mexico makes US border vulnerable- Merida Initiative
 Columbia success against FARC but new groups are emerging
Afghanistan/Southeast Asia
 Insurgency in some areas is criminally driven
 Taliban ties to Latin American DTOs and Hezbollah established
Russia/Eurasia
 TOC networks establishing new ties to global DTOs
The Balkans
 TOC groups seizing control of key DTO routes
West Africa
 Major transit point for drug shipments to Europe and heroin to US
Asia/Pacific
 Significant human trafficking, threat to intellectual property and Illicit drug production
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Trends
 Crime-Terror –Insurgency Nexus
 29 of 63 DoJ Priority Organization Targets list are
associated with terrorist groups
 DEA claims that 19 foreign terrorist organizations have ties
with Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs)
 Expansion of Drug Trafficking
 Russia, China, Italy and Balkans are establishing ties to
drug producers to develop own distribution networks &
markets
 Latin American cartels are exploiting criminal organizations
in West Africa to move cocaine to Western Europe and the
Middle East. Also Afghan DTOs in collaboration with West
African groups smuggle heroin to Europe and U.S.
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U.S. Strategy to Combat Transnational
Organized Crime- July 2011
 Protect Americans and partners from TCO
 Help partner countries strengthen means to combat
TCO
 Break economic power of TCO and protect
strategic markets and US financial system
 Defeat criminal networks that pose threat to
national security through various means
 Build international consensus, multilateral
cooperation and public private partnerships to
defeat TCO
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New capabilities to combat TOC
 New executive Order to establish sanctions program to
block property and prohibit transactions
 Proposed legislative package to enhance authorities
available to combat TOC
 Presidential proclamation to deny US entry by
transnational criminal aliens
 Rewards program in obtaining TOC information
 Interagency Threat Mitigation Working Group to identify
threat and coordination to combat TOC
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Drug-Terrorism Alliances
 Drug trafficking organizations (DTO) in Colombia
and Venezuela and terrorist organization FARC of
Colombia were indicted for moving cocaine through
Liberia to Europe
 There is evidence that the FARC operating on the
Ecuadorian border has developed ties to the Sinaloa
cartel, which operates inside the Ecuadorian border
 It is also well known that West African criminal
syndicates cooperate in illicit smuggling operations
with Al Qaeda operatives in Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM)
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Drug-Terrorism Alliances
 Drug trafficking organizations (DTO) in Colombia
and Venezuela and terrorist organization FARC of
Colombia were indicted for moving cocaine through
Liberia to Europe
 There is evidence that the FARC operating on the
Ecuadorian border has developed ties to the Sinaloa
cartel, which operates inside the Ecuadorian border
 It is also well known that West African criminal
syndicates cooperate in illicit smuggling operations
with Al Qaeda operatives in Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM)
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Specific Cases
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Hezbollah group has been working with the Mexican drug cartels to use the
existing drug pipelines to penetrate the U.S. homeland
Two parallel terrorist networks growing in Latin America. One is operated by
Hezbollah, and another is managed by Qods operatives. These networks
cooperate to carry out various criminal activities including narcotics
smuggling
More than 80 operatives in at least 12 countries throughout the region with
greatest concern are regions of Brazil, Venezuela, and the Southern Cone
There have been several reports on Hezbollah’s financial ties to the contraband
center of the Tri-Border region of Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil, and the
contributions of the Lebanese diaspora on Isle Margarita and other locations
Operation Red Coalition began in May 2011 when an Iranian-American from
Corpus Christi, Texas, approached a DEA informant seeking the help of a
Mexican drug cartel to assassinate the Saudi ambassador. The IranianAmerican thought he was dealing with a member of the feared Zetas Mexican
drug organization, according to agents. This led to the arrest of the suspect on
October 11, 2011.
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Model-Based Analyses of Counter-narcotics Activities
Counter-Narcotics
Disruption Model
Double Agent
Conversion Model
Double Agent
Policy Cycle Model
Societal Deprivation, Disaffection,
Recruitment, Advanced Terrorist Training,
and Narco-Terrorist Support Model
Security Policy Cycle
Model
Entity Security and
Terrorist Activity Models
Social Policy Cycle
Model
Violence Generation
Model
Prototype model-based analyses of counter-narcotics activities
involved studies of the impact of creating double agents and of
the possible synergy of terrorist and trafficker activities.
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The Impact of Double Agent Conversion
Double Agent
Conversion Effort
Double Agent
Conversion
Narcotics Capture
Narcotics Detection
Effort
Narcotics Detection
A prototype model illustrates the processes involved in the conversion of
traffickers to double agents and use of the information that they provide to
identify and capture or disrupt illicit narcotics products
Conv Effrt
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Total (tons) Narcot Evnts Doubl Agnts Thresh Dep
3376
68
0
0
6448
129
70
7
8881
173
142
14.2
10936
214
205
20.5
13263
260
275
27.5
16332
319
357
35.7
18990
373
427
42.7
Impact of narcotics trafficker conversion efforts on the creation of trafficker
double agents
Woodcock and Musa 2012
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The Impact of Double Agent Conversion
Number and size of narcotics
disruptions without counter-narcotics
intelligence efforts. Some 3376 tons
are seized in 68 events during a
notional 360-day time period.
Modeling Actual Narcotics Capture Activities
Year Narco Seized
2008
264 tons
2009
274 tons
2010
194 tons
%
19.6
20.3
14.4
Threshold Total (2.0)
80.4
277 tons
79.7
291 tons
85.6
206 tons
Total (1.9)
263 tons
276 tons
196 tons
Total (1.8)
249 tons
262 tons
185 tons
Estimated cocaine shipments and actual cocaine seizures or
disruptions (Narco Seized) can be used to set parameters for the
random process model
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Policy Cycle Models can represent the impact of Counternarcotics policy-making
A Problem for Government
Stage I: Agenda Setting
Stage VI: Policy Termination
Stage II: Policy Formulation
Stage V: Policy Change
Stage III: Policy Implementation
Stage IV: Policy Evaluation
The Policy Cycle can involve actions that identify a problem for a
government, setting an agenda, and formulating, implementing
evaluating, changing and/or terminating a policy in order to address
identified problems (Modified after Lester and Stewart, 2000). A
modified Policy Cycle model provides a basis for assessing the impact
of corruption on counter-narcotics activities
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Assessing the impact of policy-making speed
on counter-narcotics activities
PCM Param Total (Tons) Doubl Agnts Thresh Dep
0
320
70
7
0.02
341
133
13.3
0.04
354
160
16
0.06
358
169
16.9
0.08
368
177
17.7
0.1
369
180
18
Increased rates of policy (PCM
Param) information transfer from 0
to 0.1 (10% per time step) increase
the amount of disturbed narcotics
shipments and number of converted
double agents (Doubl Agnts)
Assessing the impact of corruption
on counter-narcotics activities
Corrupt Lvl Total (Tons) Doubl Agnts Thresh Dep
0
369
180
18
0.01
339
111
11.1
0.02
331
91
9.1
0.03
330
84
8.4
0.04
327
78
7.8
0.05
327
78
7.8
Increased levels of corruption (Corrupt
Lvl) can off-set the impact of increased
policy information transfer rates, reducing
the amount of disturbed narcotics
shipments and the number of double
agents (Doubl Agnts).
Woodcock and Musa 2012
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Building and using combined terroristnarcotics trafficker Models
Societal Deprivation, Disaffection,
Recruitment, Advanced Terrorist Training,
and Narco-Terrorist Support Model
Security Policy Cycle
Model
Entity Security and
Terrorist Activity Models
Social Policy Cycle
Model
Violence Generation
Model
Insights gained from modeling the combined terrorist-narcotics
trafficker threat to national security can provide guidance to policy- and
decision-makers
Woodcock and Musa 2012
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Casualties
Affected
Violence & Casualty
Impact
Casualties
Disaffected
Policy Cycle Impact
Narco-Terrorist
Training Support
Recruitment of
Disaffected Individuals
Narco-Terrorist
Corruption Impact
Basic Terrorist
Training
Narco-Terrorist
Personnel
Advanced Terrorist
Training
Available Trained
Advanced Terrorists
Key activities of the Societal Deprivation, Affection, Disaffection,
Advanced Terrorist Recruitment, Training, and Narco-Terrorist
Support Model generate notional trained terrorists who are
available to undertake terrorist activities
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Model-generated numbers of notional
basic and advanced terrorists. In this
particular case some 574 basic
terrorists and 37 advanced terrorists
were produced
Traff Staff
50
100
150
200
Basic Terr
45
90
136
181
Adv Terr
5
9
14
19
Recrt Rte
0
0.0001
0.0005
0.001
Basic Terr
181
326
883
1579
Adv Terr
19
28
62
77
(a) Trafficker-supplied (Traff Staff)
personnel can train to become terrorists
with basic (Basic Terr) and advanced (Adv
Terr) training;
(b) Trafficker supplied personnel can be
combined with disaffected individuals
recruited from the general population
(Recrt Rte) to provide terrorists with basic
and advanced training
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The Violence Generation Model
Violence Sensitivity
Affection/Disaffection
Ratio Policy Concern
Affected
Deprivation
Satisfaction
Affected/Disaffected
Ratio
Violence Warning
Threshold
Violent Social Activity
Violence Multiplier
Disaffected
Enhanced Deprivation
Terrorist Casualty
Events
The Violence Generation Model calculates the level of violence based
on notional levels of affection and disaffection caused by deprivation
and satisfaction, social violence sensitivity, and the violence warning
threshold. Enhanced deprivation can be caused by feelings of insecurity
and threat due to violence and terrorist-generated casualties
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Model-generated output shows the production of violent activity (Violence) and AD
Concern output when the ratio of affected to disaffected individuals rises above the
AD POL Warn threshold. The AD Concern output triggers policy cycle-based
activities that generate instructions for creating a new policy (Soc New Pol)
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Terrorist Losses
Available Trained
Advanced Terrorists
Potential Terrorist
Events
Risk and Security
Assessments
Advanced Terrorist
Team Size
Actual Terrorist
Events
Security Investment
Security Level
Damage and
Casualties
Security Losses
Security Policy Actions
Entity Security and Terrorist Activity models calculate the level of
security based on security investment and losses. Security investment
levels can be increased due to government policy actions. Terrorist
events can take place when adequate advanced trained terrorists are
available and the security level is sufficiently low
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Impact of security investment and loss and terrorist
availability on terrorist outcomes
Team Size
1
2
3
4
5
6
Terr Evnts
26
13
9
7
6
5
Tot Casults
1396
727
418
342
290
281
Terrst Loss
26
26
27
28
30
30
Selected output from the Entity Security and Terrorist Activity Models
with a security investment rate of 0% per time step, an initial security
level of 100, and a security loss rate of 0.0004 (0.04% per time step).
Increasing the terrorist team size (Team Size) reduces the total number
of actual terrorist events (Terr Evnts) due to staffing considerations.
Smaller teams can become involved in a larger number of events and
may generate more total casualties (Tot Casults) and fewer terrorist
losses (Terrst Loss)
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Affection/DisaffectionRelated Policy Concern
Formulate and
Implement
Social Policy
Evaluate
Social Policy
Change
Social Policy
Corruption
Losses
New Social
Policy
Social Policy
Termination
A Social Policy Cycle Model for Violence Management
SecurityRelated Policy Concern
Formulate and
Implement
Security Policy
Corruption
Losses
Evaluate
Security Policy
Change
Security Policy
New Security
Policy
Security Policy
Termination
A Security Policy Cycle Model for Entity Security Management
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Violence Management
Social Policy Cycle parameters set
at 0.8 and corruption 0.0 generates
a single burst of violent activity
(Violence) when AF DF Ratio
exceeds AD POL Warn threshold
Setting the Social Policy Cycle
parameters at 0.8 and corruption
parameters at 0.04 generated
bursts of violent activity followed by
continuous violence due to an
inability of a government entity to
reduce disaffection to sufficiently
low levels caused by corruption
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Violence Management
Social policy cycle parameters set at 0.1
and corruption 0.0 generate a longer
period of violence compared with the
situation involving parameter values of
0.8 when the AF DF Ratio exceeds the
AD POL Warn threshold
Social policy cycle parameter values
0.1 and corruption 0.04 generated a
period of violent activity followed by
continuous violence
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Entity Security Management
PCM parms
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
Fin Sec Lvl
88.7
95.8
102
105
106.8
108
Tot Evnts
70
57
39
32
29
26
Act Evnts
27
25
21
16
15
13
Sec New Pol Tot Casult
0
1496
10.5
1358
16
1114
18
846
19
840
20
727
Impact of policy cycle parameter values (PCM parms) on security level (Fin
Sec Lvl), potential (Tot Events) and actual (Act Evnts) terrorist events and total
casualties (Tot Casult) with security political sensitivity (Sec Pol Sens) set at
0.2; security investment (Sec Invest) was set at 0.01; and corruption set at zero
Corrruption Fin Sec Lvl
0
108
0.02
94.8
0.04
91.7
0.06
90.6
0.08
90
0.1
89.6
Tot Evnts
26
50
64
65
66
66
Act Evnts
13
26
27
27
27
27
Sec New Pol Tot Casult
20
727
4
1396
1.8
1496
1
1496
0.7
1496
0.5
1496
Impact of policy cycle corruption (Corruption) on security level (Fin Sec Lvl),
potential (Tot Events) and actual (Act Evnts) events and total casualties (Tot
Casult) with security political sensitivity (Sec Pol Sens) set at 0.2, the security
investment (Sec Invest) set at 0.01, and the policy cycle parameters set at 0.1
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Toward an Integrated Model …
Affection
Violence & Casualty
Impact
Disaffection
Govt. Social Policy
Cycle Impact
Level of Violence
Recruitment Rate
Recruited Terrorists
Govt. Counter-Narco
Actions
Narco Support to
Terrorist Training
Trained Terrorists
Narco-Supplied
Terrorist Personnel
Available Terrorists
Terrorist Losses
Narco-Related
Security Losses
Target Security
Govt. Security Policy
Cycle Impact
Terrorist Event
Narco-Related
Corruption Impact
Security Assessment
Woodcock and Musa 2012
Casualties
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Looking forward, additional studies are needed to
assess the narcotics trafficker involvement in at
least the following activities
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Support to terrorist training; increased training capacity, increased rate of recruitment of
disaffected individuals.
Supply of trained terrorist personnel into the terrorist advanced training activities.
Security reduction impact of narcotics traffickers and impact of corruption on securityrelated protective measures.
Corruption impacts on policy implementation to prevent social deprivation and
disaffection.
Vulnerability generation and intelligence-related terrorist personnel deployment.
The authors believe that modeling these activities can
provide a deeper understanding of the relationship between
drug trafficking and terrorist activities as well as the role of
the policy-maker in countering these threats
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