Why Economics Is Not Yet a Science
Author(s): Alfred S. Eichner
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Jun., 1983), pp. 507-520
Published by: Association for Evolutionary Economics
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J
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICISSUES
Vol. XVII No. 2 June 1983
Why Economics Is Not Yet a Science
Alfred S. Eichner
In 1898, the Quarterly Journal of Economics published an essay by
ThorsteinVeblen entitled,"WhyIs EconomicsNot an EvolutionaryScience?"Whileone mightnot agreewith the answerVeblen gave, he must
at least be creditedwith having asked the right question.Today, more
thaneightyyearslater,the questionis even moreto the point.
The sameneoclassicaltheoryto whichVeblentook such exceptionremains dominant.The theory has been supplementedby a Keynesian
macroeconomics(quite differentfrom MaynardKeynes's own ideas),
and the resulting"neoclassicalsynthesis"has been considerablyrefined
by its translationinto mathematicsby John Hicks and Paul Samuelson,
but Veblen would have little difficultyrecognizingits core. It is pretty
muchthe same theorythat ruledin his day-though, of course,with the
rougheredgessmoothedover.
It is this theorythat now, eightyyears later, has become intellectually
bankrupt.Economictheorycan offerno solutionto the problemof inflation-except to stifle the very growth of output and employmentthat
shouldbe the firstconcernof economists.In this way the problemof inflation,annoyingas it may be, has been transformedinto the far more
seriousproblemof worldstagflation.Politiciansand the publicalike, imthatbringno relieffromthe malady
patientwithpolicyrecommendations
The author is Professor of Economics, Rutgers University, and Director, Center
for Economic and AnthropogenicResearch. This article was presentedat the Annual
Meeting of the Association for Evolutionary Economics, New York City, 28-30
December 1982.
507
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AlfredS. Eichner
but insteadseem only to make the problemworse, have begun to shun
the companyof economistsmuchas any man who cares about his intellectualreputationshunsthe companyof astrologers,elixir-promoters,
and
otherquacks.
Why,indeed,is economicsnot yet a science-in the sense of representing a bodyof knowledgethatgrowscumulativelyover timeand has something of value to teach men and womenof practicalaffairs?The answer
can be found, at least in part, by comparingthe epistemologyof economicswiththat of a true science.'
The Epistemological Rules of Science
It is a common errorto think of science as being characterizedby a
particularmethodology,or prescribedway of acquiringknowledge.However, a moment'sreflectionon the diversemethodologiespursuedby scientists, rangingfrom the highly abstract mathematicalmodels of the
theoreticalphysiciststo the carefullycontrolledlaboratoryexperiments
of the biologistsand the painstakingfield work of the geologists,should
sufficeto disabuseanyoneof that notion. Insteadwhat uniquelycharacterizesa scientificapproachis a certainepistemology,or way of validating
ideas.The modernworldis qualitativelydifferentfromall previouscivilizationsnot becausea certaingroupof savantsidentifiedas scientistshas
discovereda new way of addingto knowledge(thoughit has, indeed,developedan impressivearrayof new instrumentsfor accumulatingdata),
but ratherbecausethe membersof that confraternityhave evolved a set
of rulesfor discoveringwhatis false andtherebyavoidingnon-productive
lines of research.The set of rulesfor eschewingwhat is false is the epistemologyof science,andit involvesapplyinga seriesof tests to whatanyone may assertto be true.
One of these tests is the test of coherence.This test consistsof determiningwhetherthe conclusionsadducedfollowlogicallyfromthe assumptions made and thus whetherthe argumentsare internallyconsistent.At
one time, followingDescartes,it was believedthat this test was sufficient
to establishthe validityof any proposition.Economists,especiallythose
esteemedas theoristsby theircolleagues,by andlargestillbelievethis test
to be sufficient.Thatis why they tendto favorthe exclusiveuse of mathematics,a languageespeciallysuitedto logical analysis,along with mathematical"proofs."However,in the wake of David Hume'sargumentsas a
skeptic on behalf of empiricism,scientistsand philosophers(they were
not thendifferentiated)cometo recognizethatthe coherencetestwas only
necessary,not sufficient.In addition,a seriesof furthertests, empiricalin
Not Yet A Science
509
nature,was requiredto validateany proposition.Theseempiricaltests are
three-fold.
Thereis, first,the correspondencetest. This test consistsof determining whetherthe conclusionsfollowing from a theory are confirmedby
whatcan be observedempiricallyof the realworld.The greaterthe ability
of a theoryto anticipatewhatcan be observedempirically,the greaterthe
basis for believingthat the theory actuallycorrespondsin some way to
whathappensin the real world.
Thenthereis thecomprehensiveness
test. Thistest consistsof determining whetherthe theoryis able to encompassall the knownfacts pertaining to the class of phenomenaunderstudy.The more of these facts the
theoryis able to accountfor, the greaterthe confidenceone can have that
the theoryis comprehensive.A theorymay fail to meet the comprehensivenesstest for eitherof two reasons: (1 ) becausethe theory provides
no explanationfor certainempiricallyobservablephenomena,or (2) becausewhatis empiricallyobservedis, undercertaincircumstances,different from what the theory would lead one to expect. A theory unableto
meet the comprehensiveness
test, for eitherof thesereasons,is less likely
to be rejectedoutrightthan to be relegatedto the categoryof a special
case-with the importanceof that special case dependingon how commonly encounteredare the conditions,or assumptions,underwhichthe
theoryholds. In that event, the comprehensiveness
test consists of determiningunderwhatcircumstancesthe theoryremainsvalid.
Finally, there is the parsimonytest. This test consists of determining
whetherany particularelementin the constructionof a theory,including
one of its underlyingassumptions,is necessaryto accountfor what can
be observedempirically.To the extentthatthe elementcan be eliminated
withoutreducingthe theory'sexplanatorypower, it should be dropped
as being superfluous.In this way a theory is purgedof its metaphysical
elements,and subsequentinvestigatorsare not misledinto pursuingnonproductivelines of research.
All three of these tests are empirical.This can be seen more clearlyby
viewinga theoryas a systemof interrelatedideas.The inputsinto the system are the assumptions,or conditions,under which the ideas become
operative, and the output consists of the conclusions, or observable
effects,derivedfromthe theory.The internalstructure,meanwhile,is the
series of steps by which the conclusionsare obtainedfrom the assumptions. The correspondencetest, then, consists of checkingthe theory's
output,or conclusions,againstthe observablerealityto determineif they
are isomorphic;the comprehensivenesstest consists of checkingto see
whetherthere is not some part of the observablerealityleft unexplained
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Alfred S. Eichner
by the theory, requiring additional inputs, or assumptions, that make the
theory a special rather than a general one; and the parsimony tests consists of checking whether there is not some element of the theory, often
based on an input, or assumption, that can be dispensed with entirely in
explaining the observable reality. It is only by meeting all three of these
tests that a theory can be said to have been validated empirically.
Social scientists, in arguing that their theories should be accepted without necessarily having to meet all these tests, point out how difficult it is
for them to carry out empirical research. Many economists would be
among their number, noting that their subject matter does not lend itself
to laboratory experiments in which other things can be held constant, and
that a reliance on statistical analysis, the only feasible alternative, seldom
leads to conclusive results. These points, unfortunately all too true, are
nonetheless not a reason for relaxing the insistence on empirical validation of theory. If anything, they are a reason to insist on an even more
stringent test in the case of any social science theory. The theory must be
shown to make a difference to society, when translated into one or more
public policies, that will lead to certain clearly distinguishable results. The
policies must then be adopted and the predicted effect confirmed. This is
the praxis test of a social science theory. While it might be argued that this
is much too rigorous a test to insist that any theory meet, especially in the
social sciences, the present sorry state of economics is evidence of what
is likely to be the consequence when, despite its not having been validated
empirically in this or in any other way, a body of theory continues to remain at the core of a discipline.
The Empirical Validity of the Neoclassical Core
The neoclassical core of economic theory is little different from what
it was in Veblen's day. That core consists of four basic elements, or theoretical constructs: (1) a set of indifference curves for each and every
individual that when aggregated for all households represent the relative
preferences for any two or more goods by the society as a whole; (2) a
set of continuous, or smooth, isoquants for each and every good produced
that when taken together represent all the combinations of labor and other
inputs that can be used to produce those goods; (3) a set of positively
sloped supply curves for all the different firms and industries comprising
the enterprise sector, and (4) a set of marginal physical product curves
for all of the inputs used in the production process, not just the labor inputs but also, even more critically, the "capital" inputs. One or more of
these four elements is usually the basis for any microeconomic argument
Not Yet A Science
511
madeby economists,and any argumentthatrelieson at least one of these
fourtheoreticalconstructscan be regardedas "neoclassical."
What is most startlingabout these four theoreticalconstructsis that
despite theirvintage,they have yet to be empiricallyvalidatedby economists.The strongsuspicionsurroundsthem that ratherthan servingas
the basis for furtherwork in economics,they each representa source of
fundamentalerrorthatneedsto be correctedbeforeany scientificprogress
will be possiblewithinthe discipline.
The indifferencecurvesthat form the basis of the orthodoxtheory of
consumerdemandare suspectbecauseit has provenimpossibleto derive
a set of these curves from the availableempiricaldata [Mishan1961;
Blaug 1980, chap. 6]. The theoreticalconstructof indifferencecurvesis
thereforemetaphysicalin the same sense that unicorns,ghosts, and the
"vital force" once thoughtto animatehumanbeings are metaphysical:
thereis no empiricalevidencethat suchthingsactuallyexist.
The isoquantsunderpinningthe orthodox theory of productionare
equallysuspectand for the same reason: It has provenimpossibleto derive these curves from the availabledata on productionby individual
firms.The conceptof an isoquantis no less metaphysicalthan that of indifferencecurves.Indeed,the case againstisoquantsis even stronger.The
implicationof isoquants-namely, that firmsare able to producea given
quantityof output,even in the absenceof technicalprogress,by employing varyingcombinationsof labor and other inputs-is stronglycontradicted by the availableevidence.Empiricalinvestigationin a numberof
manufacturingindustrieshas shown that productionrequiresthe use of
labor, material,and other inputsin relativelyfixed combinations-until
such time as a new plant is built and/or new equipmentis installed,at
whichpoint a new fixedcombinationof inputswill be employed.
The purgingof indifferencecurvesand isoquantsfrom the theoretical
"toolkit"of economicson the groundsthat they are metaphysicalis fatal
to any neo-Walrasian(actually Hicks-Arrow-Debreu)general equilibrium model. While this world still leave the Marshallianpartialequilibriumtheoryunscathed,this variantof neoclassicaltheory,too, becomes
suspectonce we realizethat thereis no empiricalsupport,at least outside
agricultureand mining,for the positivelysloped supplycurve that is an
essentialhalf of Marshall'sfamousscissors.The positivelysloped supply
curveis based on two assumptions:(1) that firmsare pricetakersseeking to maximizetheir net revenuein the shortrun, and (2) that production is subjectto variableand, indeed,beyonda certainpoint, to decreasing returnsto scale.The availableevidencewouldseemto contradictboth
assumptions,at least insofaras the industrialsectoris concerned[Blaug
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Alfred S. Eichner
1980, chap. 7; Eichner 1976, chap. 2]. Firms in that sector are generally
price setters rather than price takers and long-term survival and expansion rather than short-run profit maximization would appear to be their
goal. Moreover, constant and even increasing returns to scale rather than
decreasing returns appear to be the rule. At least there is no evidence that
industrial firms encounter higher unit costs as they expand output [Johnston 1960; Walters 1963].
The marginal productivity analysis, the basis for the neoclassical theory
of income distribution, is immediately suspect because of the fixed technical coefficients that the evidence indicates characterize the production
process in at least the technologically most advanced sectors. With fixed
technical coefficients, inputs cannot be varied in the manner required to
make the marginal productivity theory applicable. The theory invites
further skepticism because "capital," the marginal productivity of which
is central to the argument, turns out to be another metaphysical concept
like indifference curves and isoquants. No one would deny the importance
of produced goods used as inputs in the production process. The problem
is that these capital inputs are heterogeneous, with no common physical
basis. This means they cannot be aggregated, as required by the inclusion
of the "capital stock," K, in the production function underlying the theory
of income distribution [Blaug 1980, chap. 9; Harcourt 1972]. Consequently the theory itself cannot be empirically validated. Indeed, the
theory is largely vacuous.
The four theoretical constructs discussed so far and found to lack empirical validity are important only insofar as the orthodox microeconomics
is concerned. This would seem to leave the orthodox macroeconomic
theory intact. However, the macro theory is based on the same micro
foundation and it is, to that extent, open to the same criticisms. Moreover,
the orthodox macro theory is predicated on two additional theoretical
constructs no less empirically suspect: the Hicks-Hansen LM-IS framework and the Phillips curve. Neither construct is able fully to meet the
correspondence test, let alone the praxis test.2
It will, of course, be argued that if all six of the theoretical constructs
just examined were to be purged from the economics textbooks, very little
would remain and what was left would lack coherence. This, however, is
not a sufficient reason to retain the six constructs-especially when there
is a readily available alternative.
The Alternative Paradigm
A comprehensive, and robust, alternative to the orthodox neoclassical
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513
theoryhas emergedin recentdecades.Thisnewparadigmhasbeentermed
post-Keynesian,both to indicateits intellectualroots and to suggestthe
need to go beyondKeynes'sown analysis.(It couldjustas well be termed
post-classical, post-Marxi!an,post-Marshallian,behavioralist,or even
neo-institutionalist.)To the principleof effectivedemandand the role
ascribedto money in The GeneralTheoryhave been added the growth
dynamicsof Roy Harrodand Johnvon Neumann,the productiontheory
of WassilyLeontief,the valuetheoryof Piero Sraffa,and the distribution
andpricingmodelsof MichalKalecki[Eichnerand Kregel1975; Eichner
1979]. It was Joan Robinson who, in The Accumulation of Capital
[1956], firstsucceededin synthesizingmanyof theseideaswithina single
coherentmodel, and it was Luigi Pasinettiwho more recently,in Structural Change and Economic Growth [1981], has succeeded in producing
an even broadersynthesis.
To each of the elementsof the neoclassicalsynthesispreviouslyidentified as being withoutempiricalvalidity,post-Keynesiantheory offers an
alternativeformulation,one yet to be discreditedon empiricalgrounds
andindeed,in severalcases,alreadywitha considerablebody of empirical
evidencebehindit. In placeof the metaphysicalindifferencecurvesunder..
lying the neoclassicaltheory of demand, post-Keynesiantheory starts
withthe priceand incomeelasticitiesthat economistsare actuallyable to
estimate.Basedon a substantialbody of researchgoingbackto Frederick
Engels'sworkin the nineteenthcentury,post-Keynesianeconomistsgen-.
erallyassumethat in an economyexpandingover time (albeit unevenly),
it is the incomeeffectsthat predominateover the relativeprice,or substitution, effects. The lack of substitutionpossibilitiesreflectsthe importance of social convention,and thus of acquiredtastes, in determining
each household'snormalconsumptionpattern.In a line of reasoningthat
can be tracedback to Veblen [1899], WesleyC. Mitchell[1937], James
S. Duesenberry[1949], and otherinstitutionalists,consumerpreferences
areviewedas beingthe resultof learnedsocialbehaviorratherthaninnate
at birthor in some other sense exogenousto the analysis.These prefer.
encesarelikelyto be modifiedover time,not justby advertisingand other
sellingtechniquesbut also, even more significantly,by the growthof income levels withineach of the socialgroups,or classes,thatcomprisethe
society, as an increasinglyaffluentlife style comes to be viewed as the
norm.Consumerpreferencesare, in this sense, lexicographicallyordered
[Canterbery1979].
However,it is on the supply side that post-Keynesiantheorydeparts
even more radicallyfrom the orthodoxmodels. As opposed to the isoquants,whichare the startingpoint for the analysisof production,such
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AlfredS. Eichner
as can be found in neoclassicalmodels,post-Keynesiantheorybegins by
positingthe priorexistenceof an A matrix,or set of laborand othertechnical coefficients,as a reflectionof the prevailingtechnology.It is the inverse of the A matrix,the so-calledLeontief inverse,that plays the key
rolein the long-termanalysisof both outputandprices.Usingthe inverse,
it is possibleto determinethe differentialeffecton each of the economy's
manyindustriesof a changein the compositionof finaldemand,and thus
the differentialeffectproducedby the unevengrowthof those industries.
The sameinversecan also be used, as part of the dual solution,to determinethe set of relativepricesthatmustprevailin the long termif each industryis to earn sufficientrevenuesto cover the cost of all requiredinputs, includingany additionsto the capital stock when the system is
expanding.
This theoryof the relativeprices that must prevailin the long term if
the systemis to reproduceitselfbecomesa theoryof absolutepricelevels,
in both the long term and the short,once a numerairein the form of the
wage rate is introduced.The wage rate, ratherthan being just another
price as in the Walrasiangeneralequilibriummodel, determinesall the
other value relationshipswithinthe system.Here post-Keynesiantheory
is careful to distinguishbetween the real wage-which consists of the
actual basket of consumptiongoods workerscan purchasewith the incomethey earn-and the moneywage.The latteris simplya nominalrate
of compensationand, as opposedto the real wage, dependson the bargainingstrengthof workersand otherfactorsextrinsicto the dynamicsof
the economic system [Piore 1979]. Indeed, this distinctionbetweenthe
real andthe moneywageunderliesthe post-Keynesiantheoryof inflation,
it being the growthof money wages in excess of the real wage as determinedby the growthof outputper workerthatnecessarilyleadsto an offsettingrise in the pricelevel [Weintraub1959; 1966].
The post-Keynesiantheoryof productionand pricessuggestsa specific
alternativeto the positivelysloped industrysupplycurve that forms the
basisfor orthodoxexplanationfor inflation.Firmsin the industrialsector
are assumedto be price settersratherthan price takers, and the prices
they set are the pricesdictatedby theircosts of productionplus a certain
margin,or markup. The markup, insteadof risingand fallingwith the
level of demand,tendsto remainfixedover the cycle, with the size of the
markup dependenton both the amountof externaldebtthat mustbe servicedas a resultof pastcapitalaccumulationandthe amountof internally
generatedfundsrequiredto financethe firms'plannedfuturecapitaloutlays. Whatthis line of argumentimpliesis that to the extentan industry
supplycurvecan even be said to exist [Wiles1956; R. Robinson 1961],
Not Yet A Science
515
it is, withinthe observablerange,perfectlyelastic ratherthan positively
sloped.
Withina post-Keynesianmodel, a set of macroeconomicconditions
primarilyexplainsthe distributionof income.This is in sharpcontrastto
the neoclassicaltheory, in which the explanationdepends on a set of
microeconomicrelationships-in particular,on the abilityof firmsto substituteone type of inputfor anotherat the margin.The most importantof
the macroeconomicfactors explainingthe distributionof income is the
growth of output per worker, itself largely the result of the technical
progressmade possibleby the applicationof science and other forms of
knowledgeto the problemof wrestinga materialexistencefrom a parsimoniousnaturalendowment.The otherdeterminantsof the incomedistributionare the rate of accumulationandthe propensityto consumeout
of non-wageincome (for example,profits). Otherthingsbeing equal, an
increasein the rate of accumulation(investment)and/or the propensity
to consumeby non-wagerecipientswill lead to a declinein labor'sshare
of nationalincome.
Whileit mightseem that the amountof consumptionout of non-wage
income, such as profits,is limited to any dividendspaid out and other
forms of rentierincome not reinvested,it actuallyencompassesa much
broaderset of incomeflows.The government,throughthe taxesit collects
from business,receivesa shareof all profits.Moreover,the foreignsuppliers of raw materials,throughany increasein the prices they charge,
can also siphonoff a shareof the profitsbeingearneddomestically.Thus
the shareof nationalincomegoingto workerswill be reduced,not justby
a higherrateof investmentbut also by an increasein the size of the public
sectorand by risingrawmaterialprices.Indeed,these severalfactors,togetherwitha wage patternthat,in a vain effortto offsetthe rise in prices,
exceedsthe growthof outputper worker,can be used to explainthe secular inflationof the last two decades.
Post-Keynesiantheorythus not only providesa specificalternativeto
each of the four elementsthat constitutethe microeconomiccore of neoclassicaltheory.It also offersa plausibleexplanationfor the secularinflation that has bedeviledthe world'sadvancedmarketeconomiessince the
end of WorldWar II-an explanationthat suggeststhe need for some
formof incomespolicyif countriesare to avoidthe stagflationthat results
when monetaryand fiscal policy are instead used to control inflation
[Eichner1980]. One could elaboratein much greaterdetail, both on the
points already covered and on the other elements of post-Keynesian
theory.Still, enoughhas been said to demonstratethat if economistsare
reluctantto abandonthe neoclassicaltheory in spite of its well-known
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AlfredS. Eichner
shortcomings,this is not becausethereis nothingbetterto take its place.
The explanationmust lie elsewhere.Indeed, it lies in the natureof economicsas a social system.
Economics as a Social System
Economicscan be viewedas a social systemin which a smallnumber
of economists,becauseof the position they occupy at the half dozen or
so leadinguniversities,exercisea disproportionateinfluencethroughthe
controlthey have over appointments,researchfunds,and accessto journals. Still, this is not what distinguisheseconomicsfrom the disciplines
consideredto be sciences. It is ratherthat this pyramidalstructureand
the power exercisedthroughit is used to supportand reinforcean ethos
opposedto science.In other words, the cultureof economicsas a social
systemis a non-scientificone. In part,thisis simplya reflectionof the economics profession'sintellectualheritage,its rootingin the anti-empiricist
traditionof the classicaleconomists.But it is also the resultof more recent developmentsin economics-in particular,the neoclassicalcounterrevolutionthat Keynesprovoked.
No soonerhad the Keynesianheresysurfacedthan it led to a response
thatwouldeffectivelycontainthe threatto the establishedway of thinking
in economicsposed by The GeneralTheory.First Hicks and then, even
more definitively,Samuelsonlaid the foundationsof a new "neoclassical
synthesis,"which,like the Thomasticsynthesissix centuriesearlier,could
serve to reconcilefaith with reason. One key aspect of this neoclassical
synthesishas alreadybeen touched on. This was the reformulationof
Keynes'sideasin sucha way that,takingthe formof the now conventional
LM-IS framework,it could serve as the macroeconomiccounterpartto
the older microeconomictheory,now transformedalong neo-Walrasian
lines. An even more significantaspectof the neoclassicalsynthesis,however,was its translationof all of economictheory,macroas well as micro,
into a more precisemathematicallanguage.
The reasonsfor this developmentare not entirelyclear. It could have
been that the ascendencyof those trainedin mathematics,at the expense
of those trainedin more historicalmethods,simply reinforcedthe longstandingpenchantof economistsfor purelydeductivemodesof analysiswhat Peter J. Wiles [1979-80], following Schumpeter,has termedthe
Ricardianvice. Or it could have been that, meetingwith so little success
in validatingempiricallythe key elementsof the neoclassicalsynthesis,
the theoristssimplyretreatedinto mathematicalformalism.Whateverthe
reason,the effecton economicsas a disciplinehas been disastrous.
Thereis firstthe continuedadherenceto a non-scientificepistemology
Not Yet A Science
517
encouragedby the mathematicizationof economics. Economists as a
group have adoptedthe view that formal, or mathematical,proofs are
sufficientto establishthe validityof a theoryratherthanjust beingnecessary.The insistencethatformalproofsare sufficienthas led to two further
violationsof scientificnorms.One is the sharpdistinctiondrawnin economics between "theorists,"those who employ formal (mathematical)
methods,and "applied"economists,those whose work is based on statistics and other means of analyzingdata. Thus it is common for the
"theorists"to set up theirmodels in such a way that the postulatedbehaviorruns counterto all that is known about actual economicsystems
withoutthis fact impugningeitherthe argumentor the economists'reputation. So sharp a distinctionbetweentheory and empiricalresearchis
unknownin the naturaland biologicalsciences,and for good reason.It
leads to an outpouringof uselesstheoriesthat waste the time and energy
of empiricalresearchers.The other violation of scientificnorms comes
withthe argumentthatthe purposeof theory,at least in economics,is not
to explainwhatactuallyhappensunderobservableconditionsbut rather
to determine,logically,the conditionsthat must be satisfiedif a certain
goal, to wit, the optimalallocationof resources,is to be satisfied.In this
way, the purposeof scienceis turnedon its head.
The objectionhere is not to the use of mathematics-or even to the
mathematicization
of economics.It is ratherto the misusethat has been
made of mathematicsin economics-and in particularto the way it has
been used to give a pseudo-scientificfagadeto a body of theorythat can
meet none of the empiricaltests by whicha scienceis distinguishedfrom
meresuperstitionor crudeideology.
Why economistsshould cling so tenaciouslyto the neoclassicalcore,
even being willingto sufferit in mathematicaltranslation,can easily be
understood.For one thing,the neoclassicalcore is the essentialglueholding the economicsprofessiontogether.It requiresthe use of a particular
type of languageand, no less important,a particulartype of metaphor
(the "market").Withoutthat languageandwithoutthatmetaphor,economists would have difficultycommunicatingwith one another,and thus
carryingout the everydaybusinessof economics,given the enormousdiversityof interestsand viewpointsamong them. No less important,the
neoclassicalcore (especially in mathematicaltranslation) serves as an
effectivemeansof raisingthe economicsprofessionabove the level of the
untutoredmasses-and at the same time insuringthat only those who
have come to acceptthe limitationsof economicsat the presenttime, including its non-scientificepistemologyand its empiricallyunvalidated
constructs,will be certifiedas competentin the subject.Thus it enables
the social systemrepresentedby the economicsprofessionto reproduce
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AlfredS. Eichner
itself withoutfundamentalchange.This role played by the neoclassical
core of economictheorycan be seen in the trainingeconomistsreceivea programof instructionthat, as it proceeds,makes the individualincreasinglyless ableto understandreal economicphenomena.
At everystagein the developmentof an economist,beginningwiththe
firstintroductorycourse,the neoclassicaltheoryservesas a screeningdevice to filterout the disbelieving.Usuallyjust an exposureto the subject
is sufficientto divert into other fields those hoping to understandeconomic and other social processes.The unrealisticnatureof the assumptions, proudlyproclaimed,are a clearwarningthat those seekingknowledge shouldsteerclear of the field. But some studentswill have teachers
who nonethelesssucceedin makingthe subjectappearrelevant-they are
mostlikelyto be membersof the facultyknownfor theirunorthodoxviewpoint-while other studentswill be so stronglymotivated,despite what
they are exposedto, that they will perseverein theirstudyof economics,
hopingthat more advancedcourses-or at least coursesat a more prestigious university-will finallyshed some light on the problemsthat attractedthemto economicsin the firstplace. All the same, long beforean
individualhas completeddoctoraltraining,he or she is likely to be faced
with a hardchoice.To win the praise,and support,of his or her teachers,
he or she will needto embracetheirperspective.In almosteverycase, this
means adopting a neoclassical frameworkfor analyzing problems in
economics.
The advantageto the economicsprofessionin using the neoclassical
core as a screeningdevice is clear enough. It enables the professionto
meetheadon anddefeatthe mostpotentchallengeto any orthodoxy-the
greaterskepticismof the youngermindsdrawnto the studyof the subject.
If in this way economicsbecomesa closed system of ideas, so muchthe
better for preservingthe position of those at the top of the profession
while still retainingthe appearanceof their being scientists.The disadvantage,however,is also considerable.The retentionof the neoclassical
core and the continuedinsistenceon its masteryas the prerequisitefor
being consideredcompetentin the field means that aside from driving
away many of the brighteryoung minds, economicscan never hope to
becomea science.
Economicsas a disciplinethereforehas a choice: It can retainthe neoclassical core of its theory or, alternatively,it can one day become a
science.
It cannothave it both ways.
Not Yet A Science
519
Notes
1. This is a condensed version of the title essay that appears in Eichner
[1983].
2. For a more extendeddiscussionof this point, see the originalversion of
this essay in Eichner [1983].
References
Blaug, Mark. 1980. The Methodology of Economics, Or How Economists
Think.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Canterbery,Ray. 1979. "Inflation,Necessities and DistributiveEfficiency."In
Essays in Post-Keynesian Inflation, edited by J. H. Gapinsky and C. E.
Rockwood, Jr. New York: Ballinger.
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