720 ILCS 5/16-1
Yel Flg
Formerly cited as IL ST CH 38 <paragraph> 16-1
Effective: January 01, 2006
West's Smith-Hurd Illinois Compiled Statutes Annotated Currentness
Chapter 720. Criminal Offenses
Criminal Code
Act 5. Criminal Code of 1961 (Refs & Annos)
Title III. Specific Offenses
+ Part C. Offenses Directed Against Property
+ Article 16. Theft and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
>>5/16-1. Theft
<section> 16-1. Theft.
(a) A person commits theft when he knowingly:
(1) Obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property of the owner;
or
(2) Obtains by deception control over property of the owner;
(3) Obtains by threat control over property of the owner;
or
or
(4) Obtains control over stolen property knowing the property to have
been
stolen or under such circumstances as would reasonably induce him to
believe
that the property was stolen; or
(5) Obtains or exerts control over property in the custody of any law
enforcement agency which is explicitly represented to him by any law
enforcement officer or any individual acting in behalf of a law
enforcement
agency as being stolen, and
(A) Intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit
of the
property; or
(B) Knowingly uses, conceals or abandons the property in such manner
as to
deprive the owner permanently of such use or benefit; or
(C) Uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing such use,
concealment
or abandonment probably will deprive the owner permanently of such
use or
benefit.
(b) Sentence.
(1) Theft of property not from the person and not exceeding $300 in
value is
a Class A misdemeanor.
(1.1) Theft of property not from the person and not exceeding $300 in
value
is a Class 4 felony if the theft was committed in a school or place of
worship or if the theft was of governmental property.
(2) A person who has been convicted of theft of property not from the
person
and not exceeding $300 in value who has been previously convicted of
any type
of theft, robbery, armed robbery, burglary, residential burglary,
possession
of burglary tools, home invasion, forgery, a violation of Section 4103,
4-103.1, 4-103.2, or 4-103.3 of the Illinois Vehicle Code [FN1]
relating to
the possession of a stolen or converted motor vehicle, or a violation
of
Section 8 of the Illinois Credit Card and Debit Card Act [FN2] is
guilty of
a Class 4 felony. When a person has any such prior conviction, the
information or indictment charging that person shall state such prior
conviction so as to give notice of the State's intention to treat the
charge
as a felony. The fact of such prior conviction is not an element of
the
offense and may not be disclosed to the jury during trial unless
otherwise
permitted by issues properly raised during such trial.
(3) (Blank).
(4) Theft of property from the person not exceeding $300 in value, or
theft
of property exceeding $300 and not exceeding $10,000 in value, is a
Class 3
felony.
(4.1) Theft of property from the person not exceeding $300 in value,
or theft
of property exceeding $300 and not exceeding $10,000 in value, is a
Class 2
felony if the theft was committed in a school or place of worship or
if the
theft was of governmental property.
(5) Theft of property exceeding $10,000 and not exceeding $100,000 in
value
is a Class 2 felony.
(5.1) Theft of property exceeding $10,000 and not exceeding $100,000
in value
is a Class 1 felony if the theft was committed in a school or place of
worship or if the theft was of governmental property.
(6) Theft of property exceeding $100,000 and not exceeding $500,000 in
value
is a Class 1 felony.
(6.1) Theft of property exceeding $100,000 in value is a Class X
felony if
the theft was committed in a school or place of worship or if the
theft was
of governmental property.
(6.2) Theft of property exceeding $500,000 in value is a Class 1
non-probationable felony.
(7) Theft by deception, as described by paragraph (2) of subsection
(a) of
this Section, in which the offender obtained money or property valued
at
$5,000 or more from a victim 60 years of age or older is a Class 2
felony.
(c) When a charge of theft of property exceeding a specified value is
brought,
the value of the property involved is an element of the offense to be
resolved
by the trier of fact as either exceeding or not exceeding the specified
value.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1961, p. 1983, <section> 16-1, eff. Jan. 1, 1962. Amended by Laws
1967,
p. 1802, <section> 1, eff. July 20, 1967; P.A. 77-2638, <section> 1,
eff.
Jan. 1, 1973; P.A. 78- 255, <section> 61, eff. Oct. 1, 1973; P.A. 79840,
<section> 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1975; P.A. 79-973, <section> 1, eff. Oct. 1,
1975;
P.A. 79-1454, <section> 16, eff. Aug. 31, 1976; P.A. 82-318, <section>
1, eff.
Jan. 1, 1982; P.A. 83-715, <section> 1, eff. July 1, 1984; P.A. 84950,
<section> 1, eff. July 1, 1986; P.A. 85-691, <section> 1, eff. Jan. 1,
1988;
P.A. 85-753, <section> 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988; P.A. 85-1030, <section>
2, eff.
July 1, 1988; P.A. 85-1209, Art. II, <section> 2-23, eff. Aug. 30,
1988;
P.A. 85-1296, <section> 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1989; P.A. 85-1440, Art. II,
<section> 2-9, eff. Feb. 1, 1989; P.A. 89-377, <section> 15, eff. Aug.
18,
1995; P.A. 91-118, <section> 5, eff. Jan. 1, 2000; P.A. 91-360,
<section> 5,
eff. July 29, 1999; P.A. 91-544, <section> 5, eff. Jan. 1, 2000; P.A.
92-16,
<section> 88, eff. June 28, 2001; P.A. 93-520, <section> 5, eff. Aug.
6, 2003
; P.A. 94-134, <section> 5, eff. Jan. 1, 2006.
FORMER REVISED STATUTES CITATION
Formerly Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, <paragraph> 16-1.
[FN1]
625 ILCS 5/4-103, 5/4-103.1, 5/4-103.2, 5/4-103.3.
[FN2]
720 ILCS 250/8.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
The words "or under such circumstances as would reasonably induce him
to
believe that the property was stolen" were inserted in subd. (a)(4) by
the
1967 amendment.
The amendment by P.A. 77-2638 was necessary to conform penalties under
this
section with the Unified Code of Corrections.
The 1973 Revisory Act, P.A. 78-255, stated in <section> 61 that in each
of the
sections enumerated therein, amended by two or more Public Acts of the
77th
General Assembly, the latest Public Act was based on and incorporated
all
prior amendments to that Section made by earlier Public Acts of the
77th
General Assembly.
P.A. 79-840 inserted "including retail theft" in subd. (e)(1).
P.A. 79-973 inserted the definition of "firearm"; inserted "other than
a
firearm" and "other than a theft of a firearm" in subd. (e)(1);
inserted a
new subd. (e)(2) relating to theft of a firearm and redesignated former
subd.
(e)(2) as (e)(3).
P.A. 79-1454, the 1976 Revisory Act, declared in its title that it
related to
nonsubstantive revision, renumbering or repeal of sections necessitated
by two
or more Acts enacted by the 79th General Assembly and of those sections
so
affected by two or more Acts enacted by the 78th General Assembly which
multiple amendment was not resolved by the 1974 Revisory.
P.A. 82-318, in subds. (e)(1) and (e)(3), increased the monetary amount
to
$300 from $150.
P.A. 83-715 deleted "by another" following "have been stolen" in subd.
(a)(4).
P.A. 84-950 added the third sentence to subd. (e)(1).
P.A. 85-691 rewrote the sentencing provisions which prior thereto read:
"(1) Theft of property, other than a firearm, not from the person and
not
exceeding $300 in value is a Class A misdemeanor. A second or
subsequent
offense after a conviction of any type of theft, including retail
theft, other
than theft of a firearm, is a Class 4 felony. A person convicted of
theft of
property, other than a firearm, not from the person and not exceeding
$300 in
value, who has been previously convicted of robbery, armed robbery,
burglary,
residential burglary or home invasion, is guilty of a Class 4 felony.
"(2) Theft of a firearm not from the person regardless of value is a
Class 4
felony. A second or subsequent such offense is a Class 3 felony.
"(3) Theft of property from the person or exceeding $300 is a Class 3
felony."
P.A. 85-753 added the sentencing provision for theft by deception.
P.A. 85-1003, <section> 1, which amended this section eff. July 1,
1988, was
repealed by P.A. 85-1030, <section> 1, eff. June 30, 1988.
P.A. 85-1030, redesignated provisions; in the subdivision relating to
sentencing, in provisions relating to theft of property from the
person,
inserted "not" following "person", inserted "or theft of property
exceeding
$300 and not exceeding $10,000", and deleted a sentence stating that
when a
charge of theft of property exceeding $300 in value was brought, the
value of
the property involved was an element of the offense to be resolved by
the
trier of fact; inserted provisions relating to theft of property
exceeding
$10,000 and theft of property exceeding $100,000; and added the
subdivision
providing that value of property is an element of the offense to be
resolved
by the trier of fact.
P.A. 85-1209, the First 1988 Revisory Act, provides in Art. II, for the
nonsubstantive revision or renumbering or repeal of certain sections of
Acts
of the 85th General Assembly through P.A. 85-1014, and corrects errors,
revises cross-references and deletes obsolete text in such sections.
P.A. 85-1296 made it a crime to obtain or exert control over property
in the
custody of any law enforcement agency which is explicitly represented
as being
stolen; deleted from sentencing provisions, "When a charge of theft of
property exceeding $300 in value is brought, the value of the property
involved is an element of the offense to be resolved by the trier of
fact as
either exceeding or not exceeding $300."; and added subsec. (c),
relating to
the resolution of value.
P.A. 85-1440, the First 1989 Revisory Act, provides in Art. II, for the
nonsubstantive revision, renumbering, repeal or rerepeal of certain
Acts both
amended and repealed by Acts of the 85th General Assembly and, where
successor
laws have been enacted, incorporates such amendments into successor
laws, and
corrects errors, revises cross-references and deletes obsolete text in
such
sections contained in P.A. 85-1015 through P.A. 85-1427.
P.A. 89-377, in subsec. (a), relocated subds. (A) to (C) so that they
follow
par. (5); and made nonsubstantive changes.
P.A. 91-118, in subd. (b)(2), in the first sentence, inserted crimes of
forgery, possession of a stolen or converted motor vehicle, and
violation of
Section 8 of the Illinois Credit Card and Debit Card Act.
P.A. 91-360, in subsec. (b), inserted subds. (1.1), (4.1), (5.1) and
(6.1)
relating to theft of property in a school or place of worship.
P.A. 91-544, in subsec. (a), deleted the last paragraph, which read,
"The term
'firearm' for the purposes of this Section has the meaning ascribed to
it in
Section 1.1 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act."; in subd.
(b)(1),
deleted ", other than a firearm," following "property"; in subd.
(b)(2), in
the first sentence, inserted "from the person and not" and deleted ",
other
than a firearm and not from the person," following "value"; changed
subd.
(b)(3) to "(Blank).", which had read, "Theft of a firearm not from the
person
regardless of value is a Class 4 felony. A second or subsequent such
offense
is a Class 3 felony."
P.A. 92-16, the First 2001 General Revisory Act, amended various Acts
to
delete obsolete text, to correct patent and technical errors, to revise
cross
references, to resolve multiple actions in the 91st General Assembly
and to
make certain technical corrections in P.A. 91-1 through P.A. 91-937.
P.A. 93-520, <section> 5, inserted "and not exceeding $500,000" in
subd.
(b)(6), and inserted subd. (b)(6.2).
P.A. 93-520 was filed without signature of the governor and became law
and
became effective August 6, 2003.
P.A. 94-134, <section> 5, in subds. (b)(1.1), (b)(4.1), (b)(5.1), and
(b)(6.1), added "or if the theft was of governmental property".
Prior Laws:
Laws 1819, pp. 214, 217, <section><section> 5, 11.
R.L.1827, pp. 134 to 154, <section><section> 62, 64, 65, 67, 70, 71,
108,
136, 141, 142.
Laws 1831, p. 111, <section><section> 31, 33.
Laws 1833, pp. 182 to 204, <section><section> 62 to 64, 66, 70, 71,
111,
138, 143.
R.S.1845, p. 139, <section> 13.
R.S.1845, pp. 160 to 176, <section><section> 62 to 64, 70, 71, 111,
141.
R.S.1845, p. 398, <section> 12.
Laws 1859, p. 154, <section> 2.
Laws 1861, p. 178, <section> 1.
Laws 1865, p. 106, <section> 1.
Laws 1867, p. 90, <section> 1.
Laws 1867, p. 159, <section> 1.
Laws 1867, 2nd Sp.Sess. p. 37, <section> 1.
Laws 1869, p. 95, <section> 1.
Laws 1869, pp. 112, 113, <section><section> 1, 6, 7.
Laws 1869, p. 262, <section><section> 1, 2.
R.S.1874, p. 348, div. 1, <section><section> 74 to 82, 93, 93a, 97a,
100,
103, 103a, 104 1/2 ,
138, 167, 167a, 168, 168a, 168b, 169 to 175, 179a to 179c, 204, 239 to
243.
Laws 1877, p. 85, <section><section> 1, 2.
Laws 1879, p. 113, <section> 2.
Laws 1879, p. 116, <section> 1.
Laws 1879, p. 117, <section> 1.
Laws 1891, p. 100, <section> 1.
Laws 1901, p. 144, <section> 1.
Laws 1903, p. 156, <section> 1.
Laws 1909, p. 178, <section> 1.
Laws 1915, p. 384, <section> 1.
Laws 1915, p. 385, <section> 1.
Laws
Laws
Laws
Laws
Laws
1917,
1917,
1919,
1921,
1921,
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
348,
352,
426,
401,
404,
<section> 1.
<section><section> 1, 2.
<section> 1.
<section><section> 1 to 3, 5.
<section> 1.
Laws
Laws
Laws
Laws
Laws
Laws
Laws
Laws
Laws
Laws
Laws
1925,
1927,
1929,
1933,
1937,
1945,
1947,
1951,
1953,
1957,
1959,
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
341, <section> 1.
404, <section> 1.
357, <section> 1.
477, <section> 1.
484, <section> 1.
678, <section> 1.
811, <section> 1.
180, <section> 1.
353, <section> 1.
1124, <section> 1.
1908, <section> 1.
Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section><section> 62, 207 to 218, 240 to
244,
246, 253, 254.1, 258, 262, 262a, 273, 290, 291, 301a, 354, 387 to 388b,
389,
393 to 400, 404a to 404c, 438, 492 to 496.
Ill.Rev.Stat.1949, ch. 38, <section> 397a, which was derived from
R.S.1874, p.
348, div. 1, <section> 172a; Laws 1942, First Sp.Sess., p. 7,
<section> 1,
and was repealed by Laws 1951, p. 180, <section> 1, prohibited the
stealing of
tires and the buying, receiving or aiding in the concealment of tires.
CROSS REFERENCES
Animals, procuring registration of by false pretenses, see 720 ILCS
210/1,
355/1.
Animals subject to theft, see 510 ILCS 60/1.
Armed robbery, see 720 ILCS 5/18-2.
Armed violence, see 720 ILCS 5/33A-2.
Bodily harm, hate crime, see 720 ILCS 5/12-7.1.
Burglary, see 720 ILCS 5/19-1.
Commission merchants, regulations in general, see 815 ILCS 370/1 et
seq.
Conspiracy, see 720 ILCS 5/8-2.
Criminal procedure, hearsay exceptions, elder adults, see 725 ILCS
5/11510.3.
Deception defined, see 720 ILCS 5/15-4.
Deceptive practices, see 720 ILCS 5/17-1.
Definitions, see 720 ILCS 5/15-1 et seq.
Deposit of city or village funds separately from treasurer's own
funds,
see 65 ILCS 5/3.1-35-50, 5/3.1-35-55.
False personation,
Judicial or governmental officials, see 720 ILCS 5/32-5.
Members of police, fraternal or veteran's organizations, see 720
ILCS
5/17- 2.
Representative of charitable organization, see 720 ILCS 5/17-2.
Form of charge, see 725 ILCS 5/111-3.
Formal defects in a charge, see 725 ILCS 5/111-5.
Health care workers, ineligibility to be hired by employers,
conviction
under this Section, see 225 ILCS 46/25.
Intimidation, see 720 ILCS 5/12-6.
Marriage, celebrating without authority, see 720 ILCS 5/32-6.
Obtain defined, see 720 ILCS 5/15-7.
Obtains control defined, see 720 ILCS 5/15-8.
Offender's interest in property, see 720 ILCS 5/16-4.
Owner defined, see 720 ILCS 5/15-2.
Permanent deprivation defined, see 720 ILCS 5/15-3.
Place of trial, see 720 ILCS 5/1-6.
Police, character of applicants, prior misdemeanor or Cannabis
Control Act
convictions, see 50 ILCS 705/6.
Police, decertification of officers, misdemeanor or Cannabis
Control Act
convictions, see 50 ILCS 705/6.1.
Probate, acting under letters secured by false pretenses, see 755
ILCS
5/23- 2.
Property defined, see 720 ILCS 5/15-1.
Property forfeiture of building used in commission of offense under
this
section, see 720 ILCS 5/37-1 et seq.
Retail theft, see 720 ILCS 5/16A-1 et seq.
Robbery, see 720 ILCS 5/18-1.
School funds, conversion of, see 105 ILCS 5/22-6.
Stolen property defined, see 720 ILCS 5/15-6.
Theft of labor or services, see 720 ILCS 5/16-3.
Threat defined, see 720 ILCS 5/15-5.
Value defined, see 720 ILCS 5/15-9.
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES
Alleging and proving a corporation as owner of stolen goods.
Ill.L.Rev. 436.
Attempt to steal from the person.
1916, 10
1916, 10 Ill.L.Rev. 596.
Confidence game as distinguished from false pretenses.
U.Chi.L.Rev.
724.
1940, 7
Confidence game in Illinois: Offenses commonly known as the confidence
game
and the element of confidence. Joseph J. Attwell, 1955, 49 Nw.U.L.Rev.
737.
Crimes by health care providers.
589.
Pamela H. Bucy, 1996 U.Ill.L.Rev.
Distinction between grand and petit larceny is utterly irrational and
unscientific. 1916, 10 Ill.L.Rev. 600.
Elements of a confidence game.
1951 U.Ill.L.F. 175.
Embezzlement by collection agent.
1957, 35 Chi.-Kent L.Rev. 157.
The five worst (and five best) American criminal codes. Paul H.
Robinson,
Michael T. Cahill, and Usman Mohammad, 95 Nw.U.L.Rev. 1 (2000).
Hotel clerk as not an innkeeper, agent, attorney, clerk or servant and
taking
guest's money as larceny and not embezzlement. 1921, 15 Ill.L.Rev.
535.
Intellectual property crimes. Breana C. Smith, Don Ly and Mary
Schmiedel, 43SPRING Am.Crim.L.Rev. 663 (2006).
Intellectual property crimes. Katherine Barr, Melissa Beiting, and Amy
Grzesinski, 40 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 771 (Spring 2003).
Intellectual property crimes. Onimi Erekosima & Brian Koosed, 41
Am.Crim.L.Rev. 809 (Spring 2004).
Intellectual property crimes. Sylvia N. Albert, Jason A. Sanders, and
Jessica
M. Mazzaro, 42-SPRING Am.Crim.L.Rev. 631 (2005).
Intellectual property--Rights under siege.
Raymond P.
Niro, 1973, 23 DePaul L.Rev. 361.
David A. Anderson and
Legislative politics and the criminal law.
1969, 64 Nw.U.L.Rev. 277.
New Class X Sentencing Law.
Marvin E. Aspen, 1978, 66 Ill.B.J. 344.
Presumed guilty: Curing the defects in the second degree murder
statute.
Larry R. Wells, 80 Ill.B.J. 230 (1992).
Relational concept in dead body cases.
1947, 42 Ill.L.Rev. 389.
Relationship between embezzlement and larceny in Illinois.
U.Ill.L.F.
715.
1949
Sale of mortgaged chattels as wilful and malicious injury to property
not
dischargeable in bankruptcy. 1966, 15 DePaul L.Rev. 474.
Sufficiency of indictment for larceny from a corporation.
Ill.L.Rev.
182.
Theft, law and society.
1910, 5
Jerome Hall, 1968, 54 A.B.A.J. 960.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Larceny k1 to 18, 86 to 89.
Westlaw Topic No. 234.
C.J.S. Larceny <section><section> 1(1, 2, 3, 4, 5), 2, 3(1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6,
7), 4 to 7, 9, 13 to 50, 82, 158 to 159.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR Library
15 ALR 4th 582, Adequacy of Defense Counsel's Representation of
Criminal
Client Regarding Appellate and Post-Conviction Remedies.
74 ALR 3rd 271, What Constitutes Larceny "From a Person".
18 ALR 3rd 259, Inconsistency of Criminal Verdict as Between Different
Counts
of Indictment or Information.
Encyclopedias
81 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 113, Identity Theft and Other Misuses of
Credit
and Debit Cards.
70 Am. Jur. Trials 435, The Defense of a Computer Crime Case.
Illinois Law and Practice Attorneys and Counselors <section> 46,
Offenses in
Exercise of Professional Functions.
Illinois Law and Practice Criminal Law <section> 35, Acts Requiring
Proof of
Different Fact or Element.
Illinois Law and Practice Criminal Law <section> 782, Inconsistent
Verdicts.
Illinois Law and Practice Criminal Law <section> 905, Decision of
Reviewing
Court -- Reduction of the Degree of Offense.
Illinois Law and Practice Criminal Law <section> 927, Evidence.
Illinois Law & Prac. Indict., Inform. & Compl. <section> 57, Previous
Convictions.
Illinois Law and Practice Minors <section> 117, Dispositional Orders.
Illinois Law & Prac. Receiving Stolen Property <section> 2, General
Considerations.
Illinois Law & Prac. Receiving Stolen Property <section> 3, Nature and
Elements of Offense.
Illinois Law & Prac. Receiving Stolen Property <section> 7, Trial.
Illinois Law & Prac. Receiving Stolen Property <section> 8, Sentence
and
Punishment.
Illinois Law & Prac. Receiving Stolen Property <section> 12, Weight and
Sufficiency.
Illinois Law and Practice Theft & Related Offenses <section> 3, Purpose
and
Scope of Revised Statutes.
Illinois Law and Practice Theft & Related Offenses <section> 7, Taking
of
Property; Unauthorized Control.
Illinois Law and Practice Theft & Related Offenses <section> 12,
Culpable
Mental State Required.
Treatises and Practice Aids
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.01, Definition of Theft by
Unauthorized Control of Property Not Exceeding $300 in Value.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.02, Issues in Theft by
Unauthorized
Control of Property Not Exceeding $300 in Value.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.03, Definition of Theft by
Unauthorized Control of Property Exceeding $300 in Value.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.04, Issues in Theft by
Unauthorized
Control of Property Exceeding $300 in Value.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.07, Definition of Theft of a
Firearm.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.08, Issues in Theft of a
Firearm.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.09, Definition of Theft from
the
Person.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.10, Issues in Theft from the
Person.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.11, Definition of Theft by
Unauthorized Control of Property Exceeding $10,000 in Value.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.12, Issues in Theft by
Unauthorized
Control of Property Exceeding $10,000 in Value.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.13, Definition of Theft by
Unauthorized Control of Property Exceeding $100,000 in Value.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.14, Issues in Theft by
Unauthorized
Control of Property Exceeding $100,000 in Value.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.15, Definition of Theft by
Deception
of Property Not Exceeding $300 in Value.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.16, Issues in Theft by
Deception of
Property Not Exceeding $300 in Value.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.17, Definition of Theft by
Deception
of Property Exceeding $300 in Value.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.18, Issues in Theft by
Deception of
Property Exceeding $300 in Value.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.19, Definition of Theft by
Deception
of Property Having a Value of $5,000 or More from a Victim 60 Years of
Age or
Older.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.20, Issues in Theft by
Deception of
Property Having a Value of $5,000 or More from a Victim 60 Years of Age
or
Older.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.21, Definition of Theft by
Threat--Misdemeanor.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.22, Issues in Theft by
Threat-Misdemeanor.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.23, Definition of Theft by
Obtaining
Control Over Stolen Property--Misdemeanor.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.24, Issues in Theft by
Obtaining
Control Over Stolen Property--Misdemeanor.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.74, Definition of Theft by
Control
of Property Represented as Stolen.
IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.75, Issues in Theft by
Control of
Property Represented as Stolen.
6 Illinois Practice Series <section> 18:41, Joinder of Offenses of the
Same
Acts or Transactions Connected Together or Constituting a Common Scheme
or
Plan.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IN GENERAL 1-190
EVIDENCE 191-290
VALUE OF PROPERTY 291-350
THEFT BY DECEPTION 351-440
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT 441-520
THEFT OF ENTRUSTED PROPERTY 521-590
THEFT FROM THE PERSON 591-640
RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY 641-740
I. IN GENERAL
<Subdivision Index>
Accomplice testimony, instructions 108
Accountability, elements of offense 21
Accountability, instructions 110
Acquittal, generally 129
Acts constituting theft 22-26
Acts constituting theft - In general 22
Acts constituting theft - Employees 24
Acts constituting theft - Officers of court 25
Acts constituting theft - Taking under agreement 23
Acts constituting theft - Utilities 26
Addiction, sentencing 154
Additional instructions 115
Admissibility of evidence, preservation of issue, review 159
Admonitions, guilty plea 70
Aggravating factors, criminal record, sentencing 145
Aggravating factors, generally, sentencing 144
Alibi, instructions 111
Amendment, indictment 59
Application and construction 4
Application, retroactive 5
Argument of counsel 79-82, 160
Argument of counsel - In general 79
Argument of counsel - Defendant's testimony 81
Argument of counsel - Name-calling 80
Argument of counsel - Preservation of issue, review 160
Argument of counsel - Statements of fact 82
Armed robbery, joinder and severance 67
Arrest, probable cause for 36
Associations, ownership, indictment 55
Battery, multiple convictions, same act 123
Burden of proof 85-93, 113
Burden of proof - In general 85
Burden of proof - Corpus delicti 86
Burden of proof - Deception 92
Burden of proof - Instructions 113
Burden of proof - Intent 91
Burden of proof - Ownership, corporate existence 89
Burden of proof - Ownership, generally 87
Burden of proof - Ownership, purpose of burden of proof 88
Burden of proof - Prior convictions 93
Burden of proof - Purpose of as to ownership 88
Burden of proof - Unauthorized control 90
Burglary distinguished 8
Burglary, included offenses 31
Burglary, joinder and severance 66
Burglary, multiple convictions, same act 124
Circumstantial evidence, instructions 112
Codefendants, sentencing 153
Competency to stand trial 76
Complaint 37-59, 161
Concurrent terms, sentencing 139
Confessions, instructions 106
Consecutive terms, sentencing 140
Consistency, verdict 118
Conspiracy, multiple convictions, same act 125
Construction and application 4
Control, unauthorized, burden of proof 90
Control, unauthorized, elements of offense 13
Control, unauthorized, indictment 48
Corporate existence, ownership, burden of proof 89
Corporate existence, ownership, elements of offense 18
Corporate existence, ownership, indictment 56
Corporate existence, ownership, variance 62
Corpus delicti, burden of proof 86
Counsel, effective assistance of 78
Counsel, remarks of 79-82, 160
Counsel, right to 77
Counsel, waiver, guilty plea 75
Counsel's argument, preservation of issue, review 160
Court officers, acts constituting theft 25
Credibility, instructions 109
Credibility of witnesses, fact questions 97
Credit, sentencing 155
Criminal record, sentencing 145
Criminal trespass to vehicle, included offenses 33
Deception, burden of proof 92
Defendant's testimony, argument of counsel 81
Defenses 27-29
Defenses - In general 27
Defenses - Intent 29
Defenses - Restitution 28
Definitions, instructions 100
Denial of probation, sentencing 143
Description of property, indictment 46
Description of property, variance 63
Discovery 34
Double jeopardy 128
Effective assistance of counsel 78
Election of offenses, indictment 39
Elements of offense 10-21
Elements of offense - In general 10
Elements of offense - Accountability 21
Elements of offense - Intent 16
Elements of offense - Ownership, corporate existence 18
Elements of offense - Ownership, generally 17
Elements of offense - Possession 11
Elements of offense - Prior offenses 20
Elements of offense - Taking 12
Elements of offense - Theft by threat 19
Elements of offense - Unauthorized control 13
Elements of offense - Value, felony theft 15
Elements of offense - Value, generally 14
Employees, acts constituting theft 24
Energy, acts constituting theft 26
Enhancement, generally, sentencing 150
Enhancement, time limit, sentencing 151
Enhancement, type of theft, sentencing 152
Entity capable of ownership, indictment 54
Evidence, admissibility, preservation of issue, review 159
Fact questions 94-98
Fact questions - In general 94
Fact questions - Credibility of witnesses 97
Fact questions - Identification of defendant 96
Fact questions - Intent 95
Fact questions - Possession of stolen property 98
Fact statements, argument of counsel 82
Factual basis, guilty plea 71
Felony theft, value, elements of offense 15
Fifth Amendment, argument of counsel 81
Form of verdict 119
Grand jury, indictment 38
Guilty plea 69-75, 132
Guilty plea - In general 69
Guilty plea - Admonitions 70
Guilty plea - Counsel, waiver 75
Guilty plea - Factual basis 71
Guilty plea - Jury trial, waiver 74
Guilty plea - Sentencing 132
Guilty plea - Voluntariness 72
Guilty plea - Withdrawal of guilty plea 73
Hearing, sentencing 133
Identification of defendant, fact questions 96
Included offenses
Included offenses - In general 30
Included offenses - Burglary 31
Included offenses - Criminal trespass to vehicle 33
Included offenses - Instructions 105
Included offenses - Robbery 32
Included offenses - Verdict 117
Indeterminate terms, sentencing 141
Indictment 37-59, 161
Indictment - In general 37
Indictment - Amendment 59
Indictment - Description of property 46
Indictment - Election of offenses 39
Indictment - Grand jury 38
Indictment - Lesser included offense 39.5
Indictment - Mental state, generally 49
Indictment - Mental state, intent 50
Indictment - Mental state, knowledge 51
Indictment - Names 44
Indictment - Number of offenses 43
Indictment - Ownership, corporate existence 56
Indictment - Ownership, generally 52
Indictment - Ownership, legal entity 54
Indictment - Ownership, legal title 53
Indictment - Ownership, unincorporated associations 55
Indictment - Preservation of issue, review 161
Indictment - Prior convictions 57
Indictment - Statutory citation 42
Indictment - Statutory language 41
Indictment - Surplusage 58
Indictment - Time and place 45
Indictment - Unauthorized control 48
Indictment - Value 47
Indictment - Venue 40
Instructions
Instructions - In general 99
Instructions - Accomplice testimony 108
Instructions - Accountability 110
Instructions - Additional instructions 115
Instructions - Alibi 111
Instructions - Circumstantial evidence 112
Instructions - Confessions 106
Instructions - Credibility 109
Instructions - Definitions 100
Instructions - Generally, review 167
Instructions - Included offenses 105
Instructions - Intent 102
Instructions - Ownership 101
Instructions - Possession of stolen property 103
Instructions - Preservation of issue, review 162
Instructions - Presumptions and burden of proof 113
Instructions - Reasonable doubt 114
Instructions - Self-incrimination 107
Instructions - Value 104
Intent, burden of proof 91
Intent,
Intent,
Intent,
Intent,
Intent,
Joinder
defenses 29
elements of offense 16
fact questions 95
instructions 102
mental state, indictment 50
and severance 65-68
Joinder and severance - In general 65
Joinder and severance - Armed robbery 67
Joinder and severance - Burglary 66
Joinder and severance - Robbery 68
Judge's remarks 83
Jurisdiction and venue 7
Jury trial, waiver, guilty plea 74
Knowledge, mental state, indictment 51
Legal entity, ownership, indictment 54
Legal title, ownership, indictment 53
Lesser included offense, indictment 39.5
Limitation of actions 35
Maximum term, sentencing 138
Mental state, generally, indictment 49
Mental state, intent, indictment 50
Mental state, knowledge, indictment 51
Minimum term, sentencing 137
Minors 169
Mitigating factors, sentencing 148
Motor vehicle, criminal trespass to, included offenses 33
Multiple convictions, same act 121-127
Multiple convictions, same act - In general 121
Multiple convictions, same act - Battery 123
Multiple convictions, same act - Burglary 124
Multiple convictions, same act - Conspiracy 125
Multiple convictions, same act - Official misconduct 127
Multiple convictions, same act - Robbery 126
Multiple convictions, same act - Theft offenses 122
Multiple counts of theft, sentencing 149
Multiple counts, verdict 120
Name-calling, argument of counsel 80
Names, indictment 44
New trial 130
Number of offenses, indictment 43
Officers of court, acts constituting theft 25
Official misconduct, multiple convictions, same act 127
Ownership, corporate existence, burden of proof 89
Ownership, corporate existence, elements of offense 18
Ownership, corporate existence, indictment 56
Ownership, corporate existence, variance 62
Ownership, generally, burden of proof 87
Ownership, generally, elements of offense 17
Ownership, generally, indictment 52
Ownership, generally, variance 61
Ownership, instructions 101
Ownership, legal entity, indictment 54
Ownership, legal title, indictment 53
Ownership, purpose of burden of proof 88
Ownership, unincorporated associations, indictment 55
Penalties, validity 3
Place and time, variance 64
Plain error, review 164
Possession, elements of offense 11
Possession of stolen property, fact questions 98
Possession of stolen property, instructions 103
Preemption 6
Preservation of issue, admissibility of evidence, review 159
Preservation of issue, argument of counsel, review 160
Preservation of issue, generally, review 158
Preservation of issue, indictment, review 161
Preservation of issue, instructions, review 162
Preservation of issue, value of property, review 163
Presumptions and burden of proof, instructions 113
Prior convictions as aggravating factor, sentencing 145
Prior convictions, burden of proof 93
Prior convictions, enhancement, type of theft, sentencing 152
Prior convictions, generally, sentencing 150
Prior convictions, indictment 57
Prior convictions, time limit, sentencing 151
Prior offenses, elements of offense 20
Probable cause for arrest 36
Probation, denial, sentencing 143
Probation, generally, sentencing 142
Property description, indictment 46
Property description, variance 63
Purpose of burden of proof, ownership 88
Reasonable doubt, instructions 114
Record, review 166
Remarks of judge 83
Re-opening of case 84
Restitution, defenses 28
Restitution, sentencing 156
Retroactive application 5
Review 157-168
Review - In general 157
Review - Instructions, generally 167
Review - Plain error 164
Review - Preservation of issue, admissibility of evidence 159
Review - Preservation of issue, argument of counsel 160
Review - Preservation of issue, generally 158
Review - Preservation of issue, indictment 161
Review - Preservation of issue, instructions 162
Review - Preservation of issue, value of property 163
Review - Record 166
Review - Sentencing 168
Review - Value of property, generally 165
Right to counsel 77
Robbery distinguished 9
Robbery, included offenses 32
Robbery, joinder and severance 68
Robbery, multiple convictions, same act 126
Self-incrimination, instructions 107
Sentencing 131-156, 168
Sentencing - In general 131
Sentencing - Addiction 154
Sentencing - Aggravating factors, criminal record 145
Sentencing - Aggravating factors, generally 144
Sentencing - Codefendants 153
Sentencing - Concurrent terms 139
Sentencing - Consecutive terms 140
Sentencing - Credit 155
Sentencing - Enhancement, generally 150
Sentencing - Enhancement, time limit 151
Sentencing - Enhancement, type of theft 152
Sentencing - Guilty plea 132
Sentencing - Hearing 133
Sentencing - Indeterminate terms 141
Sentencing - Maximum term 138
Sentencing - Minimum term 137
Sentencing - Mitigating factors 148
Sentencing - Multiple counts of theft 149
Sentencing - Probation, denial 143
Sentencing - Probation, generally 142
Sentencing - Restitution 156
Sentencing - Review 168
Sentencing - Statutory range 136
Sentencing - Value over $150 135
Sentencing - Value under $150 134
Sentencing - Violation of parole 146
Sentencing - Violation of probation 147
Severance and joinder 65-68
Statements of fact, argument of counsel 82
Statute of limitations 35
Statutory citation, indictment 42
Statutory language, indictment 41
Statutory range, sentencing 136
Stolen property, possession of, fact questions 98
Stolen property, possession of, instructions 103
Surplusage, indictment 58
Taking, elements of offense 12
Taking under agreement, acts constituting theft 23
Theft by threat, elements of offense 19
Theft offenses, multiple convictions, same act 122
Threat, theft by, elements of offense 19
Time and place, indictment 45
Time and place, variance 64
Time limit, enhancement, sentencing 151
Title, ownership, indictment 53
Type of theft, enhancement, sentencing 152
Unauthorized control, burden of proof 90
Unauthorized control, elements of offense 13
Unauthorized control, indictment 48
Unincorporated associations, ownership, indictment 55
Utilities, acts constituting theft 26
Vagueness, validity 2
Validity 1-3
Validity - In general 1
Validity - Penalties 3
Validity - Vagueness 2
Value, felony theft, elements of offense 15
Value, generally, elements of offense 14
Value, indictment 47
Value, instructions 104
Value of property, generally, review 165
Value over $150, elements of offense 15
Value over $150, sentencing 135
Value, preservation of issue, review 163
Value under $150, sentencing 134
Variance 60-64
Variance - In general 60
Variance - Description of property 63
Variance - Ownership, corporate existence 62
Variance - Ownership, generally 61
Variance - Time and place 64
Venue and jurisdiction 7
Venue, indictment 40
Verdict 116-120
Verdict - In general 116
Verdict - Consistency 118
Verdict - Form of verdict 119
Verdict - Included offenses 117
Verdict - Multiple counts 120
Violation of parole, sentencing 146
Violation of probation, sentencing 147
Voluntariness, guilty plea 72
Waiver of jury trial, guilty plea 74
Withdrawal of guilty plea 73
Witness credibility, fact questions 97
Witness credibility, instructions 109
1. Validity--In general
Subsection of theft statute defining theft as obtaining unauthorized
control
over property, and subsection of theft statute defining theft by
receiving
stolen property, were not separate offenses, and thus trial court's act
of
giving jury instruction on theft by receiving stolen property, when
defendant
was charged with theft by obtaining unauthorized control over property,
did
not violate defendant's due process rights. People v. Siverson, App. 3
Dist.2002, 267 Ill.Dec. 478, 333 Ill.App.3d 884, 776 N.E.2d 850, appeal
denied
272 Ill.Dec. 352, 202 Ill.2d 654, 787 N.E.2d 167. Constitutional Law k
268(11); Criminal Law k 29(10); Criminal Law k 814(20)
Section of theft statute which prohibits obtaining control over
property in
custody of law enforcement agency which is explicitly represented as
being
stolen is unconstitutional on its face as violative of due process,
since it
fails to require culpable mental state; section is not reasonably
related to
purpose of enabling law enforcement officers to conduct undercover
operations
to break up fencing operations, since it potentially subjects wholly
innocent
conduct to punishment. People v. Zaremba, 1994, 196 Ill.Dec. 632, 158
Ill.2d
36, 630 N.E.2d 797. Constitutional Law k 258(3.1); Receiving Stolen
Goods k
1
Statutory distinction between retail and simple theft did not
unconstitutionally deny defendant equal protection, though offenses
used
different property value thresholds, because different elements were
required
to prove retail theft as opposed to ordinary theft, and it was rational
for
legislature to distinguish between those who steal from retail
merchants and
those who steal from others, given increased vulnerability of retail
merchant
victims. People v. James, App. 4 Dist.1986, 102 Ill.Dec. 256, 148
Ill.App.3d
536, 499 N.E.2d 1036, appeal denied 106 Ill.Dec. 51, 113 Ill.2d 580,
505
N.E.2d 357.
Larceny k 2;
Constitutional Law k 250.1(2)
Legislature did not attempt to create crime of theft from the person by
way of
penalty portion of this section. People v. Thompson, App.1966, 75
Ill.App.2d
289, 221 N.E.2d 120. Larceny k 19
Legislature did not attempt to create crime of theft from person in
penalty
portion of this section rather than in descriptive portion, where
penalty
portion merely made distinctions between different grades of theft and
provided aggravated penalties for aggravated degrees and forms of
theft.
People v. Jackson, App.1966, 66 Ill.App.2d 276, 214 N.E.2d 316.
Larceny k 2
2. ---- Vagueness, validity
Theft statute imposing criminal liability for obtaining possession of
property
under circumstances that would reasonably induce defendant to believe
that
property was stolen was not unconstitutionally vague by permitting or
inviting
discriminatory enforcement by police; police did not approach defendant
until
they received call from defendant's girlfriend that property that had
been
reported stolen might be found at defendant's residence, and, once
confronted
with girlfriend's statement, defendant led police to stolen items and
explained that he purchased items valued at $1,250 for $380 from
individual on
street at 4 a.m., which circumstances would have induced him to believe
that
property was stolen. People v. Nelson, App. 3 Dist.2003, 271 Ill.Dec.
161,
336 Ill.App.3d 517, 784 N.E.2d 379, appeal denied 275 Ill.Dec. 80, 204
Ill.2d
676, 792 N.E.2d 311. Constitutional Law k 258(3.1); Receiving Stolen
Goods k
1
Theft statute imposing criminal liability for obtaining possession of
property
under such circumstances as would reasonably induce the defendant to
believe
that the property was stolen was not unconstitutionally vague; rather,
statute
gave defendant sufficient notice that his purchase of computer and
camera for
$380, which property had value of at least $1,250, from an individual
selling
items on the street at 4 a.m., and who refused to give the defendant a
receipt, involved obtaining possession of stolen property. People v.
Nelson,
App. 3 Dist.2003, 271 Ill.Dec. 161, 336 Ill.App.3d 517, 784 N.E.2d 379,
appeal
denied 275 Ill.Dec. 80, 204 Ill.2d 676, 792 N.E.2d 311. Constitutional
Law k
258(3.1); Receiving Stolen Goods k 1
This section is not unconstitutionally vague.
Dist.1975, 30 Ill.App.3d 859, 333 N.E.2d 582.
People v. Dziak, App. 2
This section is not infirm as establishing no standard by which a
defendant is
reasonably induced to believe that the property was stolen; term
"reasonable"
or "unreasonable" as applied to conduct supplies sufficient standards
by which
a defendant may regulate or guide his conduct. People v. Stadtman,
App. 4
Dist.1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 259, 304 N.E.2d 174, reversed 59 Ill.2d 229,
319
N.E.2d 813.
The term "unauthorized control" in this section was not
unconstitutionally
vague by failing to define what conduct was proscribed in view of
common-law
and statutory notions of deprivation of property which afforded
adequate
notice of type of conduct that was forbidden and any residual
indefiniteness
of section was eliminated by requirement of knowing violation. People
v.
Harden, 1969, 42 Ill.2d 301, 247 N.E.2d 404. Criminal Law k 13.1(2.5)
This section is not so vague, indefinite and uncertain as to be
unconstitutional. People v. Cleveland, App.1969, 104 Ill.App.2d 415,
244
N.E.2d 212, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 479, 396 U.S. 986, 24 L.Ed.2d
449,
rehearing denied 90 S.Ct. 899, 397 U.S. 929, 25 L.Ed.2d 109. Criminal
Law k
13.1(2.5)
Section 15-2 of former chapter 38 defining "owner" for purpose of
larceny
sections, and this section defining theft, are not repugnant or vague
as
establishing that owner can never be an offender. People v. Kamsler,
App.1966, 78 Ill.App.2d 349, 223 N.E.2d 237. Larceny k 2
Language of this section was sufficiently definite and certain where
crime was
explicitly described and penalties for the offense were clearly set
forth.
People v. Jackson, App.1966, 66 Ill.App.2d 276, 214 N.E.2d 316.
Criminal Law
k 13.1(2.5)
3. ---- Penalties, validity
Disparity in punishment between misdemeanor theft by deception of
property of
less than or equal to $300 and felony deceptive practices by issuance
of check
over $150 did not violate equal protection, where offenses involved
different
elements and theft offense was designed to protect ownership in goods,
whereas
deceptive practices offense was not tied to ownership of property but
addressed use of bad checks in transactional setting. People v. Petro,
App. 4
Dist.1989, 128 Ill.Dec. 883, 179 Ill.App.3d 1018, 535 N.E.2d 97.
Constitutional Law k 250.3(1); False Pretenses k 2
Legislative decision to punish deceptive practices exceeding $150 more
severely than theft by deception of property valued at equal amount did
not
violate due process where legislature could reasonably conclude that
there was
greater economic detriment to state and greater opportunity for
deceptive
practice than theft by deception. People v. Petro, App. 4 Dist.1989,
128
Ill.Dec. 883, 179 Ill.App.3d 1018, 535 N.E.2d 97. Constitutional Law k
270(1); False Pretenses k 2
Disparity in punishment between simple theft and retail theft statutes
did not
violate defendant's due-process protection where disparity was
reasonably
related to legislative determination that there was greater detriment
to
State's economy, along with greater opportunity for committing offense
of
retail theft as opposed to ordinary theft. People v. James, App. 4
Dist.1986,
102 Ill.Dec. 256, 148 Ill.App.3d 536, 499 N.E.2d 1036, appeal denied
106
Ill.Dec. 51, 113 Ill.2d 580, 505 N.E.2d 357. Constitutional Law k
258(3.1);
Larceny k 2
Enhanced penalty provision of this paragraph was not unconstitutional
on its
face. People v. Baldasar, App. 2 Dist.1981, 49 Ill.Dec. 589, 93
Ill.App.3d
168, 418 N.E.2d 443. Sentencing And Punishment k 1210
Use of an uncounseled misdemeanor with no imprisonment in a second
trial to
enhance a misdemeanor to a felony was unconstitutional and, although
court
could erase constitutional error by reducing conviction to a
misdemeanor,
defendant would be given a new trial. People v. Baldasar, App. 2
Dist.1981,
49 Ill.Dec. 589, 93 Ill.App.3d 168, 418 N.E.2d 443. Sentencing And
Punishment
k 1318; Criminal Law k 1181.5(9); Criminal Law k 1189
4. Construction and application
Criminal Code definition of theft was applied in construing a theft
provision
in auto insurance policy. Kelly v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
App. 3
Dist.1975, 34 Ill.App.3d 290, 339 N.E.2d 467. Insurance k 2706(1)
This section providing for enhanced penalty after a prior conviction of
any
type of theft was unambiguous and not subject to application of rule
that
enhanced penalty provisions are to be strictly construed. People v.
Ferrara,
App.1969, 111 Ill.App.2d 472, 250 N.E.2d 530, certiorari denied 90
S.Ct. 1815,
398 U.S. 927, 26 L.Ed.2d 89. Sentencing And Punishment k 1260
This section is sufficiently broad to cover any unauthorized taking or
control
of property, including circumstances which might amount to robbery.
People v.
Henderson, App.1966, 72 Ill.App.2d 89, 218 N.E.2d 795. Larceny k 1
This section which defines the two elements necessary to constitute a
theft, a
proscribed act and the requisite intent or knowledge, was broad enough
to
encompass all forms of theft including purse snatching and pocket
picking, and
did not conflict with <section> 1-3 of former chapter 38 providing that
no
conduct constitutes an offense unless it is described as an offense in
the
Code or in another state statute. People v. Jackson, App.1966, 66
Ill.App.2d
276, 214 N.E.2d 316. Criminal Law k 13(3); Larceny k 19
5. Retroactive application
Amendment to this paragraph establishing that fact of prior conviction
used to
elevate offense from misdemeanor to felony was not element of offense
and
could not be disclosed to jury during trial effected substantive change
and,
thus, did not apply retroactively to offense committed before effective
date
of amendment; amendment eliminated element of offense and could not be
said
to have only affected remedy, matter of procedure, or rule of evidence.
People v. Haywood, App. 3 Dist.1989, 131 Ill.Dec. 814, 183 Ill.App.3d
212, 538
N.E.2d 1370. Larceny k 2
Amendment to ch. 38, <paragraph> 16-1 which increased threshold between
misdemeanor and felony theft applied to defendant who was convicted of
theft
subsequent to effective date of the amendment even though the crime
occurred
before the amendment, in that the amendment affected sentencing only.
People
v. Jackson, 1984, 77 Ill.Dec. 113, 99 Ill.2d 476, 459 N.E.2d 1362.
Larceny k
2
6. Preemption
State's theft prosecution against defendant, based on his actions in
filing
fraudulent unemployment benefits claim with United States Railroad
Retirement
Board, was not expressly or implicitly preempted by penalty provision
of
Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act. People v. Lewis, App. 2
Dist.1998, 230
Ill.Dec. 438, 295 Ill.App.3d 587, 693 N.E.2d 916. Larceny k 2; States
k
18.63
7. Jurisdiction and venue
Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over state's theft
prosecution
against defendant, based on defendant's actions in filing fraudulent
unemployment benefits claim with United States Railroad Retirement
Board, even
if such prosecution required trial court to construe Railroad
Unemployment
Insurance Act. People v. Lewis, App. 2 Dist.1998, 230 Ill.Dec. 438,
295
Ill.App.3d 587, 693 N.E.2d 916. Criminal Law k 95
Although defendant, who allegedly had by means of deception exerted
unauthorized control over funds of University of Illinois Foundation
and
another corporation, wrote the unauthorized checks in Cook County,
venue in
prosecution for felony theft was proper in Champaign County where
vouchers
were completed in order to "cover" the checks with funds from the
Foundation.
People v. Parker, App. 4 Dist.1983, 69 Ill.Dec. 240, 113 Ill.App.3d
321, 447
N.E.2d 457.
Criminal Law k 112(7)
Theft may be prosecuted in any county in which defendant exerted
control over
property, but defendant may not be prosecuted for same theft in more
than one
county. People v. Rodgers, App. 2 Dist.1982, 62 Ill.Dec. 165, 106
Ill.App.3d
741, 435 N.E.2d 963. Criminal Law k 112(7)
Principles applicable to prosecutions for theft where stolen property
passes
through more than one county have applicability to prosecutions for
possession
of stolen vehicle where vehicle is possessed by defendant in more than
one
county. People v. Rodgers, App. 2 Dist.1982, 62 Ill.Dec. 165, 106
Ill.App.3d
741, 435 N.E.2d 963. Criminal Law k 112(7)
Where indicted coconspirator delivered motor vehicles to police agents
in
Illinois pursuant to a conspiracy entered into between coconspirator
and
defendant, the acts of coconspirator established jurisdiction of the
State of
Illinois to try defendant, who was physically located in Colorado at
the time,
for conspiracy to commit theft, and also established venue for
prosecution in
the county in which coconspirator delivered the stolen vehicles.
People v.
Pascarella, App. 3 Dist.1981, 48 Ill.Dec. 1, 92 Ill.App.3d 413, 415
N.E.2d
1285, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 403, 454 U.S. 900, 70 L.Ed.2d 217.
Criminal
Law k 97(.5); Criminal Law k 112(3)
Defendants, who were charged with theft of state
were
properly tried in county where they obtained and
such
monies. People v. Massarella, App. 1 Dist.1979,
Ill.App.3d
552, 400 N.E.2d 436, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d 799. Criminal Law k 108(1)
motor fuel tax monies,
exerted control over
36 Ill.Dec. 16, 80
855, 449 U.S. 1077, 66
Where complaint charged defendant with violation of <section> 16-3 of
former
chapter 38 providing that a person commits theft when he obtains
temporary use
of property, labor or services of another, which are available only for
hire,
by means of threat or deception, fact that the total bill for services
was
$463.76 did not bring prosecution under this section relating to theft
of
property exceeding $150 in value so that magistrate, which had no
authority to
enter judgment in cases wherein defendant could be sentenced to terms
in
penitentiary exceeding term of one year, had authority to enter
judgment, the
offense being punishable by period of no more than one year in a penal
institution other than the penitentiary. People v. Dillon, App.1968,
93
Ill.App.2d 151, 236 N.E.2d 411. Criminal Law k 94
Where indictment charged that defendant broke and entered "Office of
Internal
Revenue" with intent to steal money of United States but failed to
allege that
the building which defendant was charged with breaking and entering was
owned
either by the United States or by a citizen of Illinois, Illinois
courts were
not deprived of jurisdiction although prosecution affected the property
of the
United States. People v. Herzic, 1956, 9 Ill.2d 572, 138 N.E.2d 482,
certiorari denied 77 S.Ct. 673, 353 U.S. 914, 1 L.Ed.2d 668. Criminal
Law k
95
An information charging the larceny of one United States treasury note,
of the
denomination and value of $10, sundry United States treasury notes, of
the
denomination of $5 each, of the value of $10, sundry United States
treasury
notes, of the denomination of $2 each, of the value of $4; sundry
national
bank notes, of divers denominations, of the amount of $1, and
greenbacks,
gold, silver, nickel, and copper coins of the value in all, of $15,
"all of
said money and property of the value of $15," charged larceny of $40,
notwithstanding the quoted words, which are repugnant to the other
allegations, and charged an offense not within the jurisdiction of the
municipal court of Chicago. People ex rel. Melton v. Whitman, 1910, 90
N.E.
924, 243 Ill. 471. Larceny k 31
8. Burglary distinguished
This section differs from burglary section in that theft section
requires
proof of ownership while burglary section does not. People v.
McAllister,
App. 1 Dist.1975, 31 Ill.App.3d 825, 334 N.E.2d 885. Larceny k 40(2)
9. Robbery distinguished
Forcible taking of property is gravamen of robbery and serves to
distinguish
robbery from theft. People v. Sims, App. 3 Dist.1993, 185 Ill.Dec.
452, 245
Ill.App.3d 221, 614 N.E.2d 893, appeal denied 190 Ill.Dec. 906, 152
Ill.2d
575, 622 N.E.2d 1223. Robbery k 6
Forcible taking of property is gravamen of offense of robbery and
serves to
distinguish robbery from theft. People v. Saxon, App. 3 Dist.1992, 167
Ill.Dec. 1105, 226 Ill.App.3d 610, 588 N.E.2d 1235. Robbery k 6
Theft and robbery as defined in criminal code are two different crimes;
theft
requires knowledge that taking is unauthorized and intent to
permanently
deprive owner of use or benefit of property, while robbery requires no
similar
showing of intent. People v. McCarty, 1983, 67 Ill.Dec. 818, 94 Ill.2d
28,
445 N.E.2d 298. Robbery k 3
Difference between robbery and theft is absence of use of force or
intimidation in theft. People v. Patton, App. 3 Dist.1978, 17 Ill.Dec.
770,
60 Ill.App.3d 456, 376 N.E.2d 1099, affirmed 27 Ill.Dec. 766, 76 Ill.2d
45,
389 N.E.2d 1174. Robbery k 6; Robbery k 7
"Theft," element of which is actor's specific intent to permanently
deprive
victim of property, is not included offense of "robbery," which
requires no
such specific intent. People v. Yanders, App. 4 Dist.1975, 32
Ill.App.3d 599,
335 N.E.2d 801. Indictment And Information k 191(9)
The use of force or intimidation is the difference between theft and
robbery.
People v. Carlton, App. 1 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 743, 312 N.E.2d
744.
Robbery k 6; Robbery k 7
Where robbery is charged, there may be conviction of theft where
evidence
shows property was not taken by violence or intimidation; use of force
or
intimidation is difference between theft and robbery. People v.
Howell, App.
4 Dist.1973, 11 Ill.App.3d 391, 296 N.E.2d 760. Indictment And
Information k
191(9)
10. Elements of offense--In general
Person commits crime of theft when he knowingly obtains or exerts
unauthorized
control over property of owner and intends to deprive owner permanently
of use
of benefit of property. People v. Sims, 1975, 29 Ill.App.3d 815, 331
N.E.2d
178; People v. Dickerson, 1974, 21 Ill.App.3d 977, 316 N.E.2d 519,
reversed
on other grounds, 61 Ill.2d 580, 338 N.E.2d 184, on remand 41
Ill.App.3d 464,
353 N.E.2d 427; People v. Jordan, 1969, 115 Ill.App.2d 307, 252 N.E.2d
701;
People v. Smith, 1967, 90 Ill.App.2d 388, 234 N.E.2d 161.
The theft statute does not require proof that the offender was aware of
the
precise character of the property involved. People v. Moneyham, App. 2
Dist.2001, 257 Ill.Dec. 603, 323 Ill.App.3d 680, 753 N.E.2d 1229,
appeal
denied 261 Ill.Dec. 526, 197 Ill.2d 575, 763 N.E.2d 775. Larceny k
3(1)
Both possession and knowledge that property was stolen are essential
elements
of crime of theft. People v. Ward, App. 3 Dist.1980, 35 Ill.Dec. 662,
80
Ill.App.3d 253, 399 N.E.2d 728. Receiving Stolen Goods k 1
Gravamen of theft is obtaining or exerting unauthorized control over
property
of owner with intent permanently to deprive him of use or benefit
thereof.
People v. Shoemaker, App. 5 Dist.1975, 31 Ill.App.3d 724, 334 N.E.2d
347.
Larceny k 1
To constitute a single offense of theft, theft of lost or mislaid
property or
theft of labor or services or use of property, there must be a single
intention and design and the property obtained from same person or
various
property obtained from several persons having a common interest in such
property. People v. Adams, App. 4 Dist.1975, 26 Ill.App.3d 324, 325
N.E.2d 71.
Larceny k 1
Exerting unauthorized control over the property of another, and
intending to
deprive the owner permanently of the use of the property, are elements
of the
offense of "theft". People v. Cole, App.1971, 131 Ill.App.2d 980, 268
N.E.2d
882. Larceny k 1
"Larceny" was felonious stealing, taking, and carrying away of goods of
another with intent to permanently deprive owner of his property, and
did not
include taking of property with intent to use it temporarily and then
return
it to owner.
393.
Larceny k 1
People v. De Stefano, 1961, 23 Ill.2d 427, 178 N.E.2d
11. ---- Possession, elements of offense
Unlawful possession of property for purposes of this section may be
exclusive
and still be joint with another. People v. Nunn, App.1965, 63
Ill.App.2d 465,
212 N.E.2d 342. Larceny k 18
In order to have any probative value, possession of stolen property
must be
recent and exclusive. People v. Evans, 1962, 24 Ill.2d 11, 179 N.E.2d
657.
Larceny k 64(1)
To sustain conviction for larceny on theory of possession of recently
stolen
property, possession must be such as to indicate that defendant and not
some
one else took property. People v. Abrams, 1935, 196 N.E. 801, 360 Ill.
594.
Larceny k 64(4)
The crime of larceny is complete when the thief has taken complete
physical
control of the property so that there was a complete severance from the
possession of the owner. People v. Lardner, 1921, 133 N.E. 375, 300
Ill. 264.
Larceny k 17
There can be no larceny without a trespass, and no trespass unless
property
was in possession of person from whom it is charged to have been
stolen.
People v. Csontos, 1916, 114 N.E. 123, 275 Ill. 402. Larceny k 12
12. ---- Taking, elements of offense
Assuming defendant acted with requisite intent, his possession of
property of
another after it should have been returned to owner constituted theft.
People
v. Steinmann, App. 5 Dist.1978, 15 Ill.Dec. 411, 57 Ill.App.3d 887, 373
N.E.2d
757. Embezzlement k 11(1)
Crime of theft need not necessarily begin at the time of the original
taking,
but may exist at the time of the arrest; thus, a defendant may be
convicted
of theft even though his guilt of the initial taking is subject to
considerable doubt. People v. McIntosh, App. 5 Dist.1977, 6 Ill.Dec.
599, 48
Ill.App.3d 694, 363 N.E.2d 128. Receiving Stolen Goods k 1
The taking of articles with intent to steal, however brief defendant's
control
over them, may constitute theft. People v. Graydon, App. 4 Dist.1976,
38
Ill.App.3d 792, 349 N.E.2d 127. Larceny k 12
Any change of location whereby control of article is transferred from
true
owner to thief with intent to steal is sufficient "taking" as element
of crime
of larceny. People v. Baker, 1936, 6 N.E.2d 665, 365 Ill. 328. Larceny
k 17
Taking of articles of wearing apparel in store and carrying them from
one
floor to the next, and secreting them under coat of taker was exercise
of
complete and exclusive control over articles sufficient to constitute
"taking"
as element of larceny. People v. Baker, 1936, 6 N.E.2d 665, 365 Ill.
328.
Larceny k 17
The crime of larceny is complete when the thief has taken complete
physical
control of the property so that there was a complete severance from the
possession of the owner, though the goods had not yet been removed from
the
premises of the owner. People v. Lardner, 1921, 133 N.E. 375, 300 Ill.
264.
Larceny k 17
Larceny always includes the taking and conversion of property without
the
consent of the owner. Steward v. People, 1898, 50 N.E. 1056, 173 Ill.
464, 64
Am.St.Rep. 133.
To constitute larceny, there must be a taking from the actual or
constructive
possession of the owner. People v. Jenkins, 1919, 210 Ill.App. 42.
13. ---- Unauthorized control, elements of offense
To establish crime of theft, state must prove that defendant obtained
"unauthorized" control, however brief, over property of another with
intent to
permanently deprive owner of use and benefit thereof; fraudulent
intent
without proof of deprivation of owner's property is insufficient to
establish
crime of theft. People v. Murray, App. 1 Dist.1994, 203 Ill.Dec. 644,
262
Ill.App.3d 1056, 640 N.E.2d 303. Larceny k 1
Person commits "theft" by knowingly obtaining or exerting unauthorized
control
over property of owner. People v. Wiesneske, App. 1 Dist.1992, 175
Ill.Dec.
252, 234 Ill.App.3d 29, 599 N.E.2d 1266. Larceny k 1
Offense of "exerting unauthorized control" is not limited to taking of
property, and defendant can be found guilty of theft solely on basis of
exercising unauthorized control over property at time of arrest.
People v.
Alexander, App. 3 Dist.1981, 55 Ill.Dec. 213, 99 Ill.App.3d 810, 425
N.E.2d
1386, affirmed 66 Ill.Dec. 326, 93 Ill.2d 73, 442 N.E.2d 887. Larceny
k 27
"Theft" is taking of property without the owner's consent. People v.
Sims,
App. 1 Dist.1975, 29 Ill.App.3d 815, 331 N.E.2d 178. Larceny k 1
"Unauthorized control," within this section means control exercised
over
property of another without consent of owner. People v. Hoy, App. 1
Dist.1973, 12 Ill.App.3d 524, 299 N.E.2d 502.
For purposes of this section, concept of "unauthorized control" is
broad, even
though the word control has no legal or technical meaning distinct from
its
popular acceptation. People v. Bullock, App.1970, 123 Ill.App.2d 30,
259
N.E.2d 641.
For purposes of this section, to exert unauthorized control means
control
exercised over the property of another without the consent of the
owner.
People v. Bullock, App.1970, 123 Ill.App.2d 30, 259 N.E.2d 641.
There can be no larceny, where owner of property voluntarily parts with
possession. People v. Schueneman, 1926, 150 N.E. 664, 320 Ill. 127.
Larceny k
13
14. ---- Value, generally, elements of offense
Although value of stolen property is not material element of offense of
theft,
value must be set by jury so that defendant may properly be sentenced.
People
v. Davis, App. 5 Dist.1985, 94 Ill.Dec. 555, 140 Ill.App.3d 265, 488
N.E.2d
554. Larceny k 88
Value is not essential element of theft, but determines only whether
the theft
will be punished as felony or as misdemeanor; limiting People v.
Harden, 42
Ill.2d 301, 247 N.E.2d 404. People v. Jackson, 1984, 77 Ill.Dec. 113,
99
Ill.2d 476, 459 N.E.2d 1362. Larceny k 6
Value is a material element of offense of theft, and must be proven by
state.
People v. Edwards, App. 4 Dist.1974, 21 Ill.App.3d 354, 315 N.E.2d 91.
Larceny k 40(2)
Failure of State to prove value of property involved will not preclude
conviction of attempted theft of property of value not exceeding $150.
People
v. Sparks, App. 1 Dist.1972, 9 Ill.App.3d 470, 292 N.E.2d 447. Larceny
k 59
When place of punishment and its duration depend on value of property
stolen,
that value is material element of offense which must be specifically
found by
jury and incorporated in its verdict. People v. Harden, 1969, 42
Ill.2d 301,
247 N.E.2d 404. Larceny k 83
Value of property is an unimportant element of offense of theft when it
is
taken from the person. People v. Richardson, 1965, 32 Ill.2d 497, 207
N.E.2d
453. Larceny k 19
Value of property stolen was an essential element of larceny.
v.
Mieschke, 1934, 190 N.E. 285, 356 Ill. 263. Larceny k 6
People
15. ---- Value, felony theft, elements of offense
Value is a material element of the offense of felony theft which must
be
specifically found by the jury. People v. Pugh, App. 3 Dist.1975, 29
Ill.App.3d 42, 329 N.E.2d 425. Larceny k 23
Proof of sufficient value of property taken is an element in proof of
felony
theft, but only one of several elements. People v. Tompkins, App. 4
Dist.1975, 26 Ill.App.3d 322, 325 N.E.2d 83. Larceny k 23
16. ---- Intent, elements of offense
The element of intent in the crime of theft is the intent to deprive
the owner
permanently of the use or benefit of his property. People v. Hargrave,
1975,
29 Ill.App.3d 89, 329 N.E.2d 814; People v. Wilson, App.1974, 23
Ill.App.3d
457, 318 N.E.2d 767; People v. Woods, 1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 835, 308
N.E.2d 856
.
Proof of intention is essential element of offense of theft. People v.
DeBartolo, 1975, 24 Ill.App.3d 1000, 322 N.E.2d 251; Phelps v. People,
1870,
55 Ill.334.
Culpable mental states in preceding sections of theft statute could not
be
read into section of statute prohibiting obtaining control over
property in
custody of law enforcement agency which is explicitly represented as
being
stolen, since to do so would make mental state language in preceding
sections
meaningless surplusage. People v. Zaremba, 1994, 196 Ill.Dec. 632, 158
Ill.2d
36, 630 N.E.2d 797. Statutes k 223.2(8)
Although an attempt to steal may ordinarily be inferred when a person
takes
property of another, proof of existence of state of mind incompatible
with
intent to steal precludes finding of theft. People v. Falkner, App. 2
Dist.1978, 18 Ill.Dec. 339, 61 Ill.App.3d 84, 377 N.E.2d 824. Larceny
k 57
One cannot deprive someone permanently of use and benefit of his
property
without acting "knowingly as respects" this section. People v. Wilson,
App. 1
Dist.1973, 10 Ill.App.3d 48, 294 N.E.2d 1. Larceny k 3(1)
In order to constitute crime of larceny, there must be a felonious
intent and
a union of act and intent, and such intent may be inferred from
defendant's
act. People v. Hofman, App.1945, 62 N.E.2d 24, 326 Ill.App. 514.
Larceny k
3(1)
To make the taking of property larceny, it must be done with a
felonious
intent. Smith v. Shultz, 1838, 2 Ill. 490, 32 Am.Dec. 33.
A larcenous intent, that is, an intent to steal, is clearly an
essential
element in petit larceny, but a felonious intent seems neither a
necessary nor
an appropriate averment in an indictment or information in a
misdemeanor case.
People v. Waltyn, 1915, 191 Ill.App. 86.
17. ---- Ownership, generally, elements of offense
Ownership or some form of possessory interest in one other than
defendant is
essential element of offense of theft and must be alleged and proved.
People
v. Sims, 1975, 29 Ill.App.3d 815, 331 N.E.2d 178; People v. Traylor,
1975, 26
Ill.App.3d 687, 325 N.E.2d 383; People v. Geraci, 1974, 25 Ill.App.3d
191,
323 N.E.2d 48; People v. Pierce, 1974, 21 Ill.App.3d 770, 315 N.E.2d
584;
People v. Lewis, 1974, 18 Ill.App.3d 131, 309 N.E.2d 349.
Ownership is essential element of offense of theft, and must be alleged
and
proven. People v. Brady, 1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 834, 320 N.E.2d 150;
People v.
Horne, 1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 774, 312 N.E.2d 829; People v. Barrett,
1974, 20
Ill.App.3d 157, 312 N.E.2d 653; People v. Townsend, 1974, 17
Ill.App.3d 621,
308 N.E.2d 82; People v. Preston, 1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 924, 305 N.E.2d
190;
People v. Demos, 1971, 3 Ill.App.3d 284, 278 N.E.2d 89.
For purposes of theft statute, "owner" is person, other than defendant,
who
has possession of or any other interest in subject property, even
though such
interest or possession is unlawful, and without whose consent defendant
has no
authority to exert control over property. People v. Kotlarz, 2000, 250
Ill.Dec. 437, 193 Ill.2d 272, 738 N.E.2d 906. Larceny k 7
Proof that one other than accused either owns or has superior
possessory
interest in property allegedly stolen is essential element of offense
of
theft. People v. Karraker, App. 3 Dist.1994, 199 Ill.Dec. 259, 261
Ill.App.3d
942, 633 N.E.2d 1250. Larceny k 7; Larceny k 8
Beneficiaries of foundation from which trustee appropriated monies,
though not
in every case specifically identified by personal name in the
indictment,
constituted "owners" as that term is used in <paragraph> 16-1 of former
chapter 38; thus, funds converted by defendant to his personal use were
"owned
by another" within meaning of <paragraph> 16-1 of former chapter 38.
People
v. Lopez, App. 1 Dist.1984, 84 Ill.Dec. 730, 129 Ill.App.3d 488, 472
N.E.2d
867, appeal denied. Larceny k 7
Proof that someone other than defendant owns allegedly stolen property
is
essential element of offense of theft. People v. Mick, App. 5
Dist.1980, 42
Ill.Dec. 370, 86 Ill.App.3d 1022, 408 N.E.2d 1079. Larceny k 7
Ownership is a necessary element of offense of theft but is not a
necessary
element of the offense of retail theft. People v. Wynn, App. 1
Dist.1980, 40
Ill.Dec. 334, 84 Ill.App.3d 591, 406 N.E.2d 35. Larceny k 21
Proof that one other than accused either owns or has superior
possessory
interest in property allegedly stolen is essential element of offense
of
theft. People v. Cowan, App. 1 Dist.1977, 7 Ill.Dec. 201, 49
Ill.App.3d 367,
364 N.E.2d 362. Larceny k 7; Larceny k 8
Theft must be from entity legally capable of owning property. People
v. Sims,
App. 1 Dist.1975, 29 Ill.App.3d 815, 331 N.E.2d 178. Larceny k 7
In a prosecution for theft, ownership or some sort of superior
possessory
interest in one other than the defendant is an essential element of the
offense. People v. Drake, App. 1 Dist.1974, 20 Ill.App.3d 762, 314
N.E.2d 532
. Larceny k 7
Church qua unincorporated association is an entity capable of
possessing
property for purposes of this section. People v. Woods, App. 5
Dist.1973, 15
Ill.App.3d 221, 303 N.E.2d 562. Larceny k 8
"Theft" is an offense against possession and not necessarily against
legal
title. People v. Woods, App. 5 Dist.1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 221, 303
N.E.2d 562.
Larceny k 1
Gravamen of offense of theft is obtaining or exerting unauthorized
control
over property of the owner; identity of the owner is essential element
of the
offense. People v. Moyer, App.1971, 1 Ill.App.3d 245, 273 N.E.2d 210.
Larceny
k 1
Payee of allegedly stolen check had sufficient interest in check and
proceeds
to meet definition of "owner" of property under <section> 15-2 of
former
chapter 38. People v. Jones, App.1970, 123 Ill.App.2d 389, 259 N.E.2d
393.
Larceny k 32(1)
18. ---- Ownership, corporate existence, elements of offense
Corporate existence of a theft victim is not a material element of the
offense
of theft; to prove the offense, it need only be shown that someone
other than
the accused possessed or held an interest in the property and that the
accused
was unauthorized in exerting control over that property. In re W. S.,
1980,
42 Ill.Dec. 140, 81 Ill.2d 252, 408 N.E.2d 718. Larceny k 1
A licensed business is a legal entity capable of owning property which
may be
basis for a theft prosecution of an individual. People v. McAllister,
App. 1
Dist.1975, 31 Ill.App.3d 825, 334 N.E.2d 885. Larceny k 7
19. ---- Theft by threat, elements of offense
This section making it a "theft" to obtain by threat control over
property of
owner created offense which was generically classified as extortion for
purpose of "Travel Act" (18 U.S.C.A. <section> 1952). U. S. v.
Karigiannis,
C.A.7 (Ill.) 1970, 430 F.2d 148, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 143, 400
U.S. 904,
27 L.Ed.2d 141. Extortion And Threats k 25.1
Under this section providing that person commits theft when he
knowingly
obtains, by threat, control over property of owner and intends to
deprive
owner permanently of useful benefit of the property, there was theft
where
plaintiff demanded and received $25,000 from company in exchange for
information concerning location of engineering documents to which
company had
legal claim, even if plaintiff had no control over documents.
Stamatiou v. U.
S. Gypsum Co., N.D. Ill.1975, 400 F.Supp. 431, affirmed 534 F.2d 330.
Extortion And Threats k 25.1
Where plaintiff's conduct constituted violation of this section and
grand jury
had concluded that there was probable cause to believe that plaintiff's
conduct constituted extortion under federal criminal code, defendants
were
entitled to summary judgment against plaintiff on his claim for
malicious
prosecution though plaintiff asserted that summary judgment on probable
cause
issue would be inappropriate until he had had opportunity to take
further
discovery. Stamatiou v. U. S. Gypsum Co., N.D. Ill.1975, 400 F.Supp.
431,
affirmed 534 F.2d 330. Federal Civil Procedure k 2515
Purpose of this section providing that a person commits theft when he
knowingly obtains, by threat, control over property of owner and
intends to
deprive owner permanently of use or benefit of the property, is not to
determine validity of claims, but to prohibit individuals from
threatening to
withhold information or testimony unless property is given in exchange
for
information or testimony. Stamatiou v. U. S. Gypsum Co., N.D. Ill.1975,
400
F.Supp. 431, affirmed 534 F.2d 330. Extortion And Threats k 25.1
Although mere pretense of legal authority, for example, extortion by
threats
of prosecution, will not constitute robbery where there is no showing
of
force, if threat to accuse, arrest, or prosecute under such pretense of
authority is supplemented by force, actual or constructive, it is
sufficient
to support charge of robbery. People v. Denman, App.1966, 69
Ill.App.2d 306,
217 N.E.2d 457. Robbery k 6
20. ---- Prior offenses, elements of offense
Upon change of classification of offense pursuant to this paragraph
providing
that second or subsequent offense of theft of property not exceeding
$150 in
value after conviction of any type of theft other than theft of firearm
is
class 4 felony rather than misdemeanor, allegation and proof of prior
conviction becomes element of offense. People v. Wright, App. 4
Dist.1981, 54
Ill.Dec. 530, 98 Ill.App.3d 1089, 425 N.E.2d 42. Larceny k 23
21. ---- Accountability, elements of offense
Inference arising from unexplained exclusive possession of the fruits
of a
recent burglary or theft may be used to support a theory of guilt by
accountability. People v. Riley, App. 4 Dist.1981, 54 Ill.Dec. 474, 99
Ill.App.3d 244, 424 N.E.2d 1377. Burglary k 42(1); Larceny k 64(4)
Where a criminal act, such as a theft, is committed through the
instrumentality of an innocent agent, the person who induced the act is
a
principal. People v. Nunnley, App. 1 Dist.1975, 34 Ill.App.3d 4, 339
N.E.2d
537. Criminal Law k 62
Phrase "obtains or exerts control," in this section providing that a
person
commits theft when he knowingly obtains or exerts unauthorized control
over
property of owner, includes not only the taking of the property but
also the
carrying away, sale, or possession of the property; thus, a person
other than
the actor who initiates the wrongful asportation may be guilty of theft
under
this section. People v. Dziak, App. 2 Dist.1975, 30 Ill.App.3d 859,
333
N.E.2d 582. Larceny k 27
Under this section proscribing knowingly exerting unauthorized control
over
property, theft is not limited to theft in which only the actor who
initiates
the wrongful asportation is guilty of the offense, but includes the
wrongful
sale or conveyance of the property. People v. Petitjean, App.1972, 7
Ill.App.3d 231, 287 N.E.2d 137. Larceny k 27
This section is not limited to theft of property in which only the
actor who
initiates the wrongful asportation is guilty of the offense. People v.
Marino, 1970, 44 Ill.2d 562, 256 N.E.2d 770.
Application of this section is not limited to theft of property in
which only
actor who initiates wrongful asportation is guilty of offense but
applies
generally to person who knowingly obtains or exerts unauthorized
control over
property of owner, provided that act is accompanied by requisite mental
state.
People v. Nunn, App.1965, 63 Ill.App.2d 465, 212 N.E.2d 342. Larceny k
27
Where asportation relied on to make out larceny is committed by alleged
agent
of accused, agent must be free from criminal taint in commission of
alleged
offense. People v. Walker, 1935, 198 N.E. 353, 361 Ill. 482. Larceny
k 27
It is an essential element of larceny that the property of the owner
has been
wrongfully taken and carried away, or that the person accused of the
larceny
has knowingly abetted, aided, encouraged, and advised such wrongful
taking
before the actual theft of the property, or at the time thereof. Watts
v.
People, 1903, 68 N.E. 563, 204 Ill. 233.
22. Acts constituting theft--In general
In seeking to acquire by condemnation cemeteries within the Crab
Orchard Creek
Dam Project and removal of the bodies therefrom, the Federal government
was
not seeking authority to unlawfully encroach upon or invade the police
powers
of the state of Illinois or Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38,
<section><section> 354,
355 (repealed), and removal of the bodies pursuant thereto would not
violate
such laws. U.S. v. 2.74 Acres of Land in Williamson County, 1940, 32
F.Supp.
55. States k 4.16(1)
Evidence demonstrated that tenured teacher, who misappropriated
merchandise of
nonprofit organization for benefit of her unauthorized secondary
business by
falsely representing herself as agent of the city's public schools,
engaged in
conduct one might properly characterize as "immoral," perhaps even
"criminal,"
i.e., theft by deception, for purposes of statute providing that
conduct on
the part of a teacher or principal which is cruel, "immoral,"
negligent, or
"criminal" is deemed to be irremediable misconduct which is cause for
teacher's termination; teacher's later decision to donate her illgotten
merchandise did not negate the original "immoral" conduct teacher
engaged in
to acquire the merchandise. Ahmad v. Board of Educ. of City of
Chicago, App.
1 Dist.2006, 301 Ill.Dec. 800, 365 Ill.App.3d 155, 847 N.E.2d 810,
rehearing
denied. Schools k 147.40(1)
Criminal prosecution was not instituted to collect a debt, and thus
dentist's
conviction for theft for failing to complete dental work for which he
submitted specific claims and received payment was not barred because
there
was also a civil dispute over the defendant's dentistry practices.
People v.
Berke, App. 1 Dist.1992, 177 Ill.Dec. 667, 236 Ill.App.3d 322, 603
N.E.2d 737,
appeal denied 183 Ill.Dec. 24, 148 Ill.2d 645, 610 N.E.2d 1268.
Criminal Law
k 43
If corporation's agents knowingly falsified work reports and the
corporation
used such work reports to overcharge customers, the corporation could
be
prosecuted for misdemeanor theft. Milton v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,
App. 1
Dist.1981, 56 Ill.Dec. 497, 101 Ill.App.3d 75, 427 N.E.2d 829.
Corporations k
526
Defendant, who allegedly made double sales of property but who at no
time had
title to property was not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of theft by
deception of alleged purchaser's down payment on property without
disclosing
adverse claim to property supposedly sold to previous set of
purchasers.
People v. Jedlicka, App. 2 Dist.1980, 39 Ill.Dec. 865, 84 Ill.App.3d
483, 405
N.E.2d 844. False Pretenses k 7(1)
Defendant who failed to pay state taxes in compliance with the Use Tax
Act
(ch. 120, <paragraph> 439.1 et seq.) and the Retailers' Occupation Tax
Act
(ch. 120, <paragraph> 440 et seq.) could not be charged under this
paragraph.
People v. Buffalo Confectionery Co., 1980, 36 Ill.Dec. 705, 78 Ill.2d
447, 401
N.E.2d 546. Larceny k 1
Prosecution of public aid recipient for creating false impression that
she had
no income from her husband, when in fact she did have such income in
excess of
$150 in value, could be had only under fraud-penalty section of Public
Aid
Code (ch. 23, <section> 11-21) and not under this section. People v.
Brooks,
App. 3 Dist.1975, 33 Ill.App.3d 448, 338 N.E.2d 489, reversed 2
Ill.Dec. 726,
65 Ill.2d 343, 357 N.E.2d 1169. False Pretenses k 15
Defendants' deliberately smashing another's eyeglasses "permanently
deprived"
such person of the glasses within Criminal Code. People v. Bell, App.
1
Dist.1972, 9 Ill.App.3d 465, 292 N.E.2d 219. Larceny k 12
A combination of any one of acts enumerated in this section and any one
of
enumerated mental states describes prohibited offense of theft. People
v.
Cleveland, App.1969, 104 Ill.App.2d 415, 244 N.E.2d 212, certiorari
denied 90
S.Ct. 479, 396 U.S. 986, 24 L.Ed.2d 449, rehearing denied 90 S.Ct. 899,
397
U.S. 929, 25 L.Ed.2d 109. Larceny k 1
Larceny may be committed where legal process is fraudulently and
feloniously
used for the purpose of securing possession of the goods by the thief.
People
v. Frankenberg, 1908, 86 N.E. 128, 236 Ill. 408. Larceny k 14(1)
Where a person shifted the checks on certain trunks in the possession
of a
transportation company, by means of which the servants of the company
were
innocently led to further the criminal purpose of delivering the trunk
of
another to him, and he received and converted the same to his own use,
and
there was a felonious intent on his part to steal the property in the
trunk
throughout the entire scheme, he is guilty of larceny. Aldrich v.
People,
1906, 79 N.E. 964, 224 Ill. 622, 115 Am.St.Rep. 166, 8 Am.Ann.Cas. 284.
Larceny k 14(1)
One who obtains money from another on the pretense that he will bet it
for him
on a race, which he pretends to do, and converts the money to his own
use, is
guilty of larceny. Doss v. People, 1895, 41 N.E. 1093, 158 Ill. 660,
49
Am.St.Rep. 180. Larceny k 15(1)
Proof that defendant,
restoration of stolen
the money
for that purpose, and
is
sufficient to justify
v.
People, 1891, 28 N.E.
by falsely pretending that he could obtain the
property on payment of a certain sum, obtained
kept it, without restoring the stolen property,
a conviction of larceny of the money.
964, 138 Ill. 602.
Cantwell
Larceny k 14(1)
That defendant had taken dollar bill from floor and placed it in box
where it
was subsequently found, did not establish larceny, since even if
felonious
intent existed and defendant intended to steal bill when she left the
premises, at no time had it been taken from the premises, and therefore
it had
not been taken out of the possession of the owner. People v. Jenkins,
1919,
210 Ill.App. 42.
23. ---- Taking under agreement, acts constituting theft
Conclusion that taxpayers, who gave business associate certain
corporate stock
to sell for purpose of raising needed additional working capital for
the
corporation, which associate managed, who were promised that associate
would
replace stock with his own and that associate would try to induce
corporation
to issue convertible debentures, had not sustained a loss by theft,
i.e.,
embezzlement, under Illinois law when corporation, which received about
one-half of proceeds of sale of stock, when bankrupt and associate left
the
state without the debentures having been issued or stock or money
returned was
not clearly erroneous. Howard v. U. S., C.A.7 (Ill.)1974, 497 F.2d
1270.
Internal Revenue k 3442
Evidence that defendant came into possession of victim's automobile as
a
factor or agent engaged to sell or dispose of automobile for victim's
benefit
and which evidence justified finding that title to automobile remained
in
victim and that defendant feloniously converted automobile to his own
use
justified conviction for "larceny" as against contention that
automobile came
into defendant's possession by consent of victim and with intent that
title
should pass to defendant for purpose of making a resale. People v.
Moses,
1940, 31 N.E.2d 585, 375 Ill. 336. Larceny k 63
Where owner parts with both possession and title to goods, expecting
something
else in return, neither taking nor conversion is felonious. People v.
Goldberg, 1927, 158 N.E. 680, 327 Ill. 416.
Defendants committed "larceny," though they took hogs under agreement
to care
for them, if they subsequently converted hogs with intent to deprive
owner
thereof. People v. Davis, 1927, 157 N.E. 171, 326 Ill. 358. Larceny k
13
If defendants, setting up agreement that they should have one hog if
finding
hogs alive, and should care for them if finding them drowned, killed
them and
appropriated them to their own use, they were guilt of "larceny." If
defendants took possession of another's hogs under agreement with him
to care
for them if they should be drowned, but afterwards converted hogs to
their own
use, subsequent conversion related back, and made the taking and
conversion
larceny. People v. Davis, 1927, 157 N.E. 171, 326 Ill. 358.
Taking hogs was not larceny, if under agreement with owner.
Davis,
1927, 157 N.E. 171, 326 Ill. 358. Larceny k 13
People v.
Prosecuting witness was induced to go to the office of defendant, who
told him
he was sick, and insisted on making a physical examination, to which
witness
consented. After the examination, defendant falsely told him he was
affected
with various diseases; that the treatment had already begun, and would
have
to be settled for, demanding $150, but finally offering to take a draft
for a
less sum, and a note for the balance. Prosecutor indorsed the draft,
and
signed the note, and gave them to defendant, taking a prescription
which he
had filled at a drug store. He told the clerk at the drug store about
the
contract, saying his wife would not be pleased with it, and he was
afraid that
defendant would not carry it out. Defendant's taking of the draft was
not
larceny. Steward v. People, 1898, 50 N.E. 1056, 173 Ill. 464, 64
Am.St.Rep.
133. Larceny k 13
24. ---- Employees, acts constituting theft
Under Illinois law of retaliatory discharge, any reporting by employee
of
conduct constituting criminal offense of depriving persons of their
property
by means of deception could not be used by employer as reason for
employee's
termination even though he was otherwise an at-will employee. Bourbon
v.
Kmart Corp., C.A.7 (Ill.)2000, 223 F.3d 469. Labor And Employment k
777
In employee's Illinois law action alleging that employer terminated him
in
retaliation for supervisor's alleged charging of customers for
unnecessary
automobile repairs, it was not determinative that employer eventually
reimbursed those customers or that Attorney General refused to pursue
the
matter; all that mattered was that when employee reported the conduct,
he
reasonably believed his supervisor was engaged in unlawful activity.
Bourbon
v. Kmart Corp., C.A.7 (Ill.)2000, 223 F.3d 469. Labor And Employment k
778
Employee's reporting of his supervisor's alleged acts of charging
customers
for unnecessary automobile repairs was not causally linked to
employee's
termination, and he thus failed to establish prima facie retaliatory
discharge
case under Illinois law; employer stated that it terminated him because
he was
incompetent mechanic, employee offered no direct evidence that
reporting was
cause of termination, and close relation in time between reporting and
termination did not demonstrate pretext under burden-shifting method of
indirect proof. Bourbon v. Kmart Corp., C.A.7 (Ill.)2000, 223 F.3d
469. Labor
And Employment k 780
Under the Illinois law of retaliatory discharge, the element of
causation is
not met if the employer has a valid basis, which is not pretextual, for
discharging the employee. Bourbon v. Kmart Corp., C.A.7 (Ill.)2000,
223 F.3d
469. Labor And Employment k 773; Labor And Employment k 774
Illinois retaliatory discharge cases brought in federal court may be
analyzed
using the burden-shifting method presented in McDonnell Douglas.
Bourbon v.
Kmart Corp., C.A.7 (Ill.)2000, 223 F.3d 469. Labor And Employment k
861
If an employee establishes a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge
under
Illinois law, the employer must then articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the termination; the burden then shifts
back to
the employee to show that the employer's proffered reason is nothing
more than
a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Bourbon v. Kmart Corp., C.A.7
(Ill.)2000, 223 F.3d 469. Labor And Employment k 861
Despite defendant's attempts to show a tax fraud scheme by employer,
evidence
that defendant took employer's checks, endorsed them, and deposited
them in
his personal account was sufficient to support theft and forgery
convictions.
People v. Toellen, App. 3 Dist.1978, 23 Ill.Dec. 686, 66 Ill.App.3d
967, 384
N.E.2d 480. Forgery k 44(.5); Larceny k 55
Garage employee was not bailee, and theft of automobile by employee
constituted common-law larceny, and not larceny as bailee. People v.
Leggio,
1928, 161 N.E. 60, 329 Ill. 514. Larceny k 15(1)
Since state employees had custody of stock of goods in the warehouse of
the
Southern Illinois Penitentiary, taking of the goods by employees and
their
confederate constituted "larceny."
People v. Goldberg, 1927, 158
N.E. 680,
327 Ill. 416.
Taking of goods in warehouse by employees having custody thereof and
their
confederates constituted "larceny." People v. Goldberg, 1927, 158 N.E.
680,
327 Ill. 416. Larceny k 15(3)
Accused was manager of a company engaged in buying scrap paper and
selling it
to paper mills for paper stock. Five hundred pounds of scrap paper was
bought
of a firm engaged in addressing circulars and envelopes for other
concerns.
Forty stamped envelopes which it had for such purpose had been put in
the
waste paper, and an employee of accused upon sorting the paper turned
them
over to him, and he retained them, and used a few of them. The
envelopes
could have been used for the purpose for which accused bought the
paper, and
he was not aware that the stamps could be redeemed. He was not guilty
of
larceny. People v. Hoban, 1909, 88 N.E. 806, 240 Ill. 303, 16
Am.Ann.Cas. 226.
Larceny k 16
Agent may be guilty of obtaining money by false pretenses from his
principal.
Ochs v. People, 1888, 16 N.E. 662, 124 Ill. 399.
25. ---- Officers of court, acts constituting theft
Where an attorney, obtaining judgments on claims in his hands for
collection,
and procuring executions, under which chattels were levied on and
placed in a
warehouse, with knowledge of the satisfaction of the judgments, removed
the
chattels from the warehouse and appropriated them to his own use, a
finding
that the conversion was with a felonious intent, authorizing a
conviction of
larceny, was warranted. People v. Frankenberg, 1908, 86 N.E. 128, 236
Ill.
408. Larceny k 57
Where a constable, in conspiracy with a justice of the peace and a
collection
agent, seizes goods on a writ issued on a judgment for claims which had
been
paid, as shown by receipts filed with the justice but destroyed by him,
takes
the goods away, and afterwards conceals himself so as to prevent the
retaking
of the goods, which were afterwards found where they had been hidden by
the
justice and constable after a pretended sale, he is guilty of larceny.
Luddy
v. People, 1905, 76 N.E. 581, 219 Ill. 413. Larceny k 12
26. ---- Utilities, acts constituting theft
If accused attached wires to conductor belonging to another, and
wrongfully
took electrical energy, without its being measured by meter, energy
would be
sufficiently identifiable to make offense indictable under
Ill.Rev.Stat.1961,
ch. 38, <section> 387. People v. Menagas, 1937, 11 N.E.2d 403, 367
Ill. 330.
Larceny k 5
An occupant of a building lighted and heated by gas furnished through
meters
located in the building under a contract between him and a gas company,
who
removed the meters, and by rubber hose connections caused gas to pass
from the
service pipe in the building direct to the burners therein where it was
consumed for heating and lighting purposes, without being registered
was
guilty of larceny as defined by Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section>
387
(repealed), and not of the offense created by <section> 292 (repealed;
see,
now, ch. 111 2/3 , <section> 382), making it an offense for a person to
tamper
with gas meters. Woods v. People, 1906, 78 N.E. 607, 222 Ill. 293, 113
Am.St.Rep. 415, 6 Am.Ann.Cas. 736. Larceny k 5
27. Defenses--In general
The fact that owner of stolen property recovers it does not extinguish
the
offense of theft. People v. Gant, App.1970, 121 Ill.App.2d 222, 257
N.E.2d
181. Larceny k 26
Proof corporation's money was taken for unlawful purposes at order and
direction of president, would constitute no defense, and evidence with
respect
thereto inadmissible. People v. Schueneman, 1926, 150 N.E. 664, 320
Ill. 127.
Embezzlement k 43; Larceny k 52
The defense of an alibi, if certainly and satisfactorily established,
is
conclusive of defendant's innocence. People v. Blair, 1914, 107 N.E.
116, 266
Ill. 70. Criminal Law k 31
28. ---- Restitution, defenses
While the fact that defendant has made restitution is no defense to
charge of
theft, it is factor which is relevant in determining absence of
requisite
felonious intent. People v. Campbell, 1975, 28 Ill.App.3d 480, 328
N.E.2d
608; People v. Reans, 1974, 20 Ill.App.3d 1005, 313 N.E.2d 184.
Defendant's intention to restore property does not do away with
criminal
nature of transaction. People v. Reans, 1974, 20 Ill.App.3d 1005, 313
N.E.2d
184; People v. Williams, 1961, 23 Ill.2d 295, 178 N.E.2d 372.
That owner of stolen property recovers it, or is recompensed for his
loss,
does not extinguish offense which arises out of theft. People v.
Reans, 1974,
20 Ill.App.3d 1005, 313 N.E.2d 184; People v. Dean, 1926, 321 Ill.
128, 151
N.E. 505.
Testimony concerning defendant's repayment of funds was relevant in
theft
prosecution and should have been admitted. People v. Campbell, App. 5
Dist.1975, 28 Ill.App.3d 480, 328 N.E.2d 608. Larceny k 44
Restitution, promised or performed, is not defense to theft or forgery.
People v. Green, App.1966, 74 Ill.App.2d 308, 218 N.E.2d 840,
certiorari
denied 87 S.Ct. 2051, 387 U.S. 930, 18 L.Ed.2d 990, rehearing denied 88
S.Ct.
17, 389 U.S. 890, 19 L.Ed.2d 200. Forgery k 20; Larceny k 26
29. ---- Intent, defenses
Although intent to steal may ordinarily be inferred, proof of the
existence of
a state of mind incompatible with an intent to steal precludes a
finding of
theft. People v. Mogi, App. 1 Dist.1974, 21 Ill.App.3d 706, 315 N.E.2d
557.
Larceny k 57
If at time of the taking defendant was so insane, whether from
intoxication or
other cause, as to be incapable of forming the criminal intent to
steal, then
he was not guilty of petit larceny. People v. Herrin, App.1938, 15
N.E.2d
598, 295 Ill.App. 590. Criminal Law k 48; Criminal Law k 57
30. Included offenses--In general
Possession of stolen motor vehicle was not lesser-included offense of
theft;
statutory amendment, which imposed more severe penalty for possession
of
stolen motor vehicle than that imposed for felony theft, demonstrated
legislative intent to treat possession of stolen motor vehicle as
separate,
more serious offense and not as lesser-included offense. People v.
Smith,
App. 1 Dist.1987, 111 Ill.Dec. 167, 159 Ill.App.3d 156, 512 N.E.2d 71.
Indictment And Information k 191(5)
31. ---- Burglary, included offenses
Theft was not an included offense of residential burglary; charging
instrument, alleged that defendant knowingly and without authority
entered
dwelling place of others with intent to commit theft therein and did
not
outline or describe offense of theft. People v. Hamilton, App. 4
Dist.1996,
219 Ill.Dec. 301, 283 Ill.App.3d 854, 670 N.E.2d 1189, appeal allowed
222
Ill.Dec. 434, 171 Ill.2d 573, 677 N.E.2d 968, reversed 228 Ill.Dec.
189, 179
Ill.2d 319, 688 N.E.2d 1166. Indictment And Information k 191(2)
Theft was not lesser included offense of burglary, thus, defendant
charged
with burglary was not entitled to jury instruction on theft; unlike
burglary,
which required only intent to commit theft or other felony, crime of
theft was
not complete until perpetrator actually obtained or exerted
unauthorized
control over property of another. People v. Buress, App. 1 Dist.1994,
197
Ill.Dec. 19, 259 Ill.App.3d 217, 630 N.E.2d 1143, appeal allowed, cause
remanded 205 Ill.Dec. 548, 158 Ill.2d 555, 643 N.E.2d 839, on remand
210
Ill.Dec. 646, 274 Ill.App.3d 164, 653 N.E.2d 841. Indictment And
Information
k 191(2)
Theft was not lesser included offense of burglary, precluding defendant
who
was charged with burglary from being convicted of theft. People v.
Schmidt,
1988, 127 Ill.Dec. 816, 126 Ill.2d 179, 533 N.E.2d 898. Indictment And
Information k 171; Indictment And Information k 191(2)
Theft is not an included offense of burglary, and each has elements not
included in the other, so that multiple convictions of theft and
burglary can
be obtained. People v. McCreary, App. 2 Dist.1984, 79 Ill.Dec. 114,
123
Ill.App.3d 880, 463 N.E.2d 455. Criminal Law k 29(11)
Where defendant was charged
burglary, not
theft, but was found guilty
acquittal
on the burglary charge, but
offense of
burglary, trial court erred
People v.
Munoz, App. 1 Dist.1981, 57
624.
by information with the offense of
of theft, such a finding operated as an
since theft was not a lesser included
when it convicted defendant of theft.
Ill.Dec. 74, 101 Ill.App.3d 447, 428 N.E.2d
Indictment And Information k 189(7)
32. ---- Robbery, included offenses
Since theft requires proof of specific intent to deprive owner
permanently of
use or benefit of property, while robbery requires only proof of
general
intent, theft is not a lesser-included offense of robbery and, thus,
defendant
could not be convicted of theft when sole charge presented in
indictment was
armed robbery. People v. Jones, App. 5 Dist.1991, 160 Ill.Dec. 184,
217
Ill.App.3d 175, 576 N.E.2d 1138, appeal allowed 162 Ill.Dec. 499, 141
Ill.2d
551, 580 N.E.2d 125, reversed 172 Ill.Dec. 401, 149 Ill.2d 288, 595
N.E.2d
1071. Indictment And Information k 191(5)
33. ---- Criminal trespass to vehicle, included offenses
Criminal trespass to vehicle is not lesser included offense of theft;
theft
does not require proof of knowing and unauthorized entry of vehicle.
In re
J.A.J., App. 2 Dist.1993, 184 Ill.Dec. 41, 243 Ill.App.3d 808, 612
N.E.2d 917.
Indictment And Information k 191(1)
Criminal trespass to a vehicle is not lesser included offense of theft.
People v. Rainbolt, App. 5 Dist.1977, 9 Ill.Dec. 859, 52 Ill.App.3d
374, 367
N.E.2d 293. Indictment And Information k 191(5)
34. Discovery
Where defendants were charged with robbery and theft in connection with
allegedly taking a ring from a decoy police officer but the ring had
been lost
while being used in another decoy operation, failure of the prosecution
to
produce the ring did not amount to suppression of favorable evidence.
People
v. Houston, App. 1 Dist.1979, 30 Ill.Dec. 493, 74 Ill.App.3d 586, 393
N.E.2d
529. Criminal Law k 700(3)
State's failure to produce evidence that defendant charged with
receiving a
$300 check from the complaining witness for which defendant promised
but
failed to deliver a television set was arrested on two occasions
subsequent to
the initial arrest did not deny due process where there was no specific
request by the defense for records of subsequent arrests and there was
no
support for theory that defendant was attempting to deliver the
television set
when arrested. People v. Leonard, App. 4 Dist.1974, 18 Ill.App.3d 527,
310
N.E.2d 15. Constitutional Law k 268(5)
Refusal to order production of hand written report of expert witness,
who
testified that he had performed tests on crowbar seized from trunk of
defendants' automobile and that in his opinion marks on crowbar matched
scratch marks on lock system of burglarized store's door, for possible
use in
impeachment was error but did not require reversal in that defendants
guilt of
theft and burglary was shown beyond a reasonable doubt. People v.
Canaday,
1971, 49 Ill.2d 416, 275 N.E.2d 356. Criminal Law k 627.7(3);
Criminal Law k
1166(10.10)
35. Statute of limitations
Where complaint charging that defendant committed the offense of theft
over
$150 by deception was filed on April 25, 1980, and on July 7, 1980,
indictment
was returned charging that defendant, from June 1976 through June 1977,
committed the same offense, the prosecution of the offense was barred
by the
three-year period of limitations, since information or indictment was
necessary to charge defendant with felony offense, and thus the
complaint did
not commence the prosecution. People v. Herndon, App. 5 Dist.1982, 61
Ill.Dec. 73, 105 Ill.App.3d 167, 434 N.E.2d 10. Criminal Law k 157
Assuming police officer acted with requisite intent in the theft of
another's
gun, theft occurred only once, when officer first exerted unauthorized
control
over gun, and theft was not a continuing offense for statute of
limitations
purposes. People v. Steinmann, App. 5 Dist.1978, 15 Ill.Dec. 411, 57
Ill.App.3d 887, 373 N.E.2d 757. Criminal Law k 150
Extended statute of limitations (<paragraph> 3-6 of former chapter 38)
did not
apply to prosecution of police officer for theft of another's gun even
though
owner did not learn of officer's alleged unauthorized use of gun where
other
officers with legal duty to report offense had previously discovered
alleged
unauthorized use. People v. Steinmann, App. 5 Dist.1978, 15 Ill.Dec.
411, 57
Ill.App.3d 887, 373 N.E.2d 757. Criminal Law k 151.1
In theft prosecution, State had burden of proving application of
extended
statute of limitations. People v. Steinmann, App. 5 Dist.1978, 15
Ill.Dec.
411, 57 Ill.App.3d 887, 373 N.E.2d 757. Criminal Law k 327
In larceny prosecution, evidence must show that crime was committed
within
statutory period of limitations. People v. Kennedy, 1934, 190 N.E.
296, 356
Ill. 151. Criminal Law k 565
36. Probable cause for arrest
Police officers had probable cause to arrest travel agent for criminal
theft
under Illinois statute, thus defeating a <section><section> 1983 claim
for
unlawful arrest, where customer filed formal complaint with city police
department alleging that travel agent had her passport and refused to
return
it, officers went to agent's store and requested passport from him, and
he
admitted to having passport but refused to surrender possession.
Guzell v.
Hiller, N.D. Ill.1999, 74 F.Supp.2d 797, reversed 223 F.3d 518. Civil
Rights
k 1088(4)
Municipal police officers would have qualified immunity from liability
in
<section><section> 1983 action arising from their arrest of travel
agent for
theft of customer's passport, even if probable cause for arrest had
been
lacking; it was reasonable for officers to believe they had probable
cause to
make arrest after customer formal complaint with city police department
alleging that travel agent had her passport and refused to return it,
officers
went to agent's store and requested passport from him, and he admitted
to
having passport but refused to surrender possession. Guzell v. Hiller,
N.D.
Ill.1999, 74 F.Supp.2d 797, reversed 223 F.3d 518. Civil Rights k
1376(6)
Information provided by witness to police officers about theft did not
provide
probable cause to arrest defendant, where witness had no personal
knowledge of
theft and did not name defendant as person who committed theft but,
rather,
provided two other names. People v. Wead, App. 1 Dist.2005, 299
Ill.Dec. 488,
363 Ill.App.3d 121, 842 N.E.2d 227, appeal denied 303 Ill.Dec. 7, 218
Ill.2d
555, 850 N.E.2d 812.
Arrest k 63.4(12)
Officers, who were informed by manager and assistant manager of
trucking
terminal that there was an unusual circumstance consisting of a trailer
being
overloaded with seven cartons of merchandise, who observed that after
all of
the scheduled deliveries were made, defendant driver checked the area
to see
if anyone was watching and then took cartons from trailer and placed
them on
pickup truck, had probable cause to believe that a theft was being
committed;
in light of fact that officers had probable cause to make warrantless
arrest,
their simultaneous warrantless search of the immediate area, including
the
pickup truck, was valid. People v. Struhart, App. 1 Dist.1981, 48
Ill.Dec.
944, 93 Ill.App.3d 534, 417 N.E.2d 676. Arrest k 63.4(15); Arrest k
71.1(4.1)
In prosecution for armed robbery, home invasion, burglary and felonytheft,
defendant's motion to suppress evidence found in automobile and in
defendant's
dormitory room as fruits of illegal arrest was properly denied, where
officers
had received a report that a certain automobile blocked driveway at
approximate time of the offense, and 15 hours later an automobile
fitting the
description was seen parked near dormitory, and officer observed three
young
men loading items into the automobile, so that probable cause existed
for the
arrest. People v. Perry, App. 4 Dist.1980, 37 Ill.Dec. 170, 81
Ill.App.3d 422,
401 N.E.2d 1263, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 2313, 451 U.S. 983, 68
L.Ed.2d
839. Arrest k 63.4(12)
37. Indictment--In general
Indictment under "Travel Act" (18 U.S.C.A. <section> 1952) was not
defective
for failing to distinguish unlawful extortion as being either felony or
misdemeanor. U. S. v. Karigiannis, C.A.7 (Ill.)1970, 430 F.2d 148,
certiorari
denied 91 S.Ct. 143, 400 U.S. 904, 27 L.Ed.2d 141. Indictment And
Information
k 59
Claims by tire manufacturers that union groups and their affiliates
used bomb
threats, violence, threats and other illegal acts in violation of
Illinois,
Mississippi and Iowa extortion laws to force tire manufacturer into
giving
them money were sufficient to allege "racketeering activity" required
to state
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. Titan
Intern., Inc. v. Becker, C.D. Ill.2001, 189 F.Supp.2d 817. Racketeer
Influenced And Corrupt Organizations k 12
Where nothing that State could have changed in technical wording of
information would have produced valid charge of felony theft,
conviction
entered in such case exceeded statutory and constitutional authority
which
determine subject-matter jurisdiction of court in criminal case.
People v.
McCarty, 1983, 67 Ill.Dec. 818, 94 Ill.2d 28, 445 N.E.2d 298. Criminal
Law k
83
Where there were no findings of prejudice and there remained over 30
days
before 120-day rule would expire, it was an abuse of discretion for
trial
court not to have allowed State's motion to dismiss, on date set for
trial,
indictment charging defendant with receiving stolen property in order
to allow
State to reindict defendant and charge him with exerting or obtaining
unauthorized control over property of another. People v. Deems, App. 3
Dist.1979, 30 Ill.Dec. 250, 74 Ill.App.3d 543, 392 N.E.2d 1118,
affirmed in
part 43 Ill.Dec. 8, 81 Ill.2d 384, 410 N.E.2d 8, certiorari denied 101
S.Ct.
1378, 450 U.S. 925, 67 L.Ed.2d 355. Indictment And Information k 144.2
Where indictment fully apprised defendant of critical elements of
conspiracy
charged by alleging that defendant and timekeeper at county hospital
entered
into agreement pursuant to which timekeeper prepared false and
fraudulent
representations of amount of hours defendant worked so that defendant
could
receive paycheck in excess of amount to which he was lawfully entitled,
indictment was sufficient, despite allegation that indictment failed to
sufficiently describe type of theft which was object of alleged
conspiracy.
People v. Nickson, App. 1 Dist.1978, 16 Ill.Dec. 29, 58 Ill.App.3d 470,
374
N.E.2d 804. Indictment And Information k 71.4(3)
Where indictment charged that defendant agreed with coconspirator to
commission of offense of theft and alleged that coconspirator prepared
false
and fraudulent representations of amount of hours defendant worked and
submitted false representations so that defendant could receive
paycheck in
excess of amount to which he was lawfully entitled and where defendant
was
fully cognizant of coconspirator's employment status as timekeeper and
defendant premised his defense in part upon his assertion of submission
of
time-due slips to coconspirator for several disputed pay periods,
indictment
was sufficient, despite fact that indictment did not state capacity in
which
coconspirator prepared allegedly false representations. People v.
Nickson,
App. 1 Dist.1978, 16 Ill.Dec. 29, 58 Ill.App.3d 470, 374 N.E.2d 804.
Conspiracy k 43(7)
Complaint which alleged that defendant stole two Siamese cats which
were owned
by defendant's next door neighbors properly stated the elements of
theft.
People v. Barlow, App. 3 Dist.1976, 39 Ill.App.3d 544, 350 N.E.2d 554.
Larceny
k 32(1); Larceny k 34
That complaint which charged defendant with the misdemeanor theft of
two cats
may have been signed by a hostile neighbor did not warrant dismissal of
the
complaint. People v. Barlow, App. 3 Dist.1976, 39 Ill.App.3d 544, 350
N.E.2d
554. Larceny k 28(2)
Information charging that defendant with others committed offense of
petty
theft by knowingly obtaining unauthorized control of money belonging to
specified company and that she intended to permanently deprive owner of
its
property sufficiently set forth all elements necessary to constitute
offense
intended to be punished. People v. Howard, App.1963, 41 Ill.App.2d
128, 190
N.E.2d 3. Larceny k 28(1)
38. ---- Grand jury, indictment
Grand jury testimony that defendant told one grand jury witness what to
say
for police accident report and in claim for damages against truck
rental
company for alleged motor vehicle accident, and that another grand jury
witness cashed check from truck rental company for accident claim with
assistance of and under direction of defendant, was sufficient to show
that
defendant took part in planning and carrying out scheme to obtain money
from
truck rental company for alleged motor vehicle accident and, thus,
connected
defendant to theft charged in indictment. People v. Shaw, App. 1
Dist.1985,
88 Ill.Dec. 534, 133 Ill.App.3d 391, 478 N.E.2d 1142.
Information k 10.2(11)
Indictment And
Chapter 48, <paragraph> 640 providing that information obtained in
accordance
with Unemployment Insurance Act (ch. 48, <paragraph> 300 et seq.) shall
not be
used in any court in any action was violated when testimony based on
questionnaires completed by defendants and submitted to Department of
Labor
was presented to grand jury and, therefore, indictments charging
defendants
with felony-theft based on allegedly fraudulent receipt of unemployment
benefits were properly dismissed. People v. Ellis, App. 1 Dist.1984,
83
Ill.Dec. 398, 128 Ill.App.3d 180, 470 N.E.2d 524. Records k 31
It was permissible for trial court to determine probable cause as to
charge of
theft contained in criminal complaint and for grand jury to determine
probable
cause as to charges of theft and burglary contained in indictment
though both
determinations were based on same facts. People v. Hunt, App. 1
Dist.1975, 26
Ill.App.3d 776, 326 N.E.2d 164. Indictment And Information k 122(2)
39. ---- Election of offenses, indictment
Prosecutor did not abuse discretion in prosecuting defendant on six
counts of
theft by deception, even though he could have, instead, prosecuted
defendant
for lesser crime under Solicitation for Charity Act, absent any
contention by
defendant that the State failed to prove any elements of charged
offense.
People v. Knippenberg, App. 3 Dist.2001, 258 Ill.Dec. 978, 325
Ill.App.3d 251,
757 N.E.2d 667. Criminal Law k 29(10)
State had discretion to determine whether to prosecute defendant under
provision defining theft as obtaining control over stolen property
knowing
property to have been stolen or under provision defining theft as
knowingly
obtaining or exerting unauthorized control over property of owner.
People v.
Drake, App. 1 Dist.1987, 108 Ill.Dec. 809, 156 Ill.App.3d 425, 509
N.E.2d 505.
Criminal Law k 29(10)
39.5. ---- Lesser included offense, indictment
Computer fraud was not a lesser included offense of theft; theft
indictment
did not necessarily imply the element of accessing a computer. People
v.
Davis, App. 2 Dist.2004, 289 Ill.Dec. 395, 353 Ill.App.3d 790, 819
N.E.2d 1195
. Indictment And Information k 191(5)
40. ---- Venue, indictment
Notwithstanding fact that record demonstrated that taking of property
occurred
in Indiana, indictment for theft which alleged that defendant knowingly
exerted unauthorized control over quantity of copper wire with intent
to
permanently deprive the owner of the property charged an offense, and
where
defendant, by his plea of guilty, admitted to that offense there was no
jurisdictional infirmity, in situation where defendant and two other
persons
riding in a vehicle in Illinois were stopped for a traffic violation,
after
which a quantity of copper wire was discovered in the vehicle. People
v.
Cole, App.1971, 131 Ill.App.2d 980, 268 N.E.2d 882. Criminal Law k
105;
Larceny k 28(1)
Complaint alleging theft was not defective on ground that venue had not
been
properly alleged therein where body of complaint merely gave street
address at
which alleged theft occurred but there were numerous references to the
county
in which offense was committed in the caption and verification of the
complaint. People v. Smith, App.1967, 90 Ill.App.2d 388, 234 N.E.2d
161.
Indictment And Information k 86(2)
41. ---- Statutory language, indictment
Indictment framed in language of this section is sufficient. People v.
Cleveland, 1969, 104 Ill.App.2d 415, 244 N.E.2d 212, certiorari denied
90
S.Ct. 479, 396 U.S. 986, 24 L.Ed.2d 449, rehearing denied 90 S.Ct. 899,
397
U.S. 929, 25 L.Ed.2d 109; People v. Kamsler, 1966, 67 Ill.App.2d 33,
214
N.E.2d 562.
Indictment charging defendant with crime of theft, wrongful taking, was
not
void even though nature and elements described in charge corresponded
with
offense of obtaining or exerting unauthorized control over property of
lawful
owner while cited paragraph of theft statute related to receiving
stolen
property, since defendant was not prejudiced by miscitation because he
had
adequate notice of charge against him and was able to present defense
thereto.
People v. Gray, App. 4 Dist.1978, 18 Ill.Dec. 675, 61 Ill.App.3d 243,
377
N.E.2d 1311. Indictment And Information k 108
Fact that word "deprive" was inadvertently omitted after the word
"permanently" was not sufficient to invalidate complaint charging crime
of
theft. People v. Wilson, App. 1 Dist.1974, 22 Ill.App.3d 678, 318
N.E.2d 256.
Indictment And Information k 75(2)
Complaint, which charged that defendant "* * * on or about 17 Aug. 72
at Cook
County Ill. committed the offense of theft in that he knowingly
obtained
unauthorized control over property (to wit: wallet containing U.S.C.)
of Jeff
Green of the value of less than $150.00 with the intent to permanently
of the
use and benefit of said property in violation of Chapter 38 Section 16
1 A 1
Illinois Revised Statute * * *", was sufficient to apprise defendant as
to
nature of charge so as to enable him to prepare his defense and to
serve as a
bar to future prosecutions, and was not fatally defective because of
omission
of word "deprive." People v. Wilson, App. 1 Dist.1974, 22 Ill.App.3d
678, 318
N.E.2d 256. Indictment And Information k 75(2)
An indictment charging theft which involved same property, the same
owner, and
the same date, and three counts simply set forth separate sections of
this
section and in essence described three methods of proof of the same
offense
was sufficient to enable defendant to prepare a defense, to plead
jeopardy and
to apprise him of the offense with which he was charged and hence was
not
uncertain. People v. Aprile, App. 4 Dist.1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 461, 304
N.E.2d
642. Indictment And Information k 71.4(8)
Body of indictment framed in language of this section and section
defining
burglary, <section> 19-1 of former chapter 38, properly set forth the
nature
and elements of crime charged. People v. Stevenson, App.1969, 107
Ill.App.2d
441, 246 N.E.2d 309. Indictment And Information k 110(18)
Indictment, drafted in language of this section particularly charging
defendant with theft of certain sum of money from a named owner at a
particular time within limitations provided by <section> 3-5 of former
chapter
38, advised defendant with reasonable certainty of precise offense
charged,
including essential elements, adequately notified defendant of nature
and
cause of accusation against her and was sufficient. People v. Patrick,
1967,
38 Ill.2d 255, 230 N.E.2d 843. Indictment And Information k 110(18)
Indictment charging defendant with theft but not defining acts
constituting
theft was sufficient to apprise defendant of charge against him where
indictment was framed in language of this section. People v. Kamsler,
App.1966, 67 Ill.App.2d 33, 214 N.E.2d 562. Indictment And Information
k
110(15)
Indictment charging in language of statute the larceny of two rings was
sufficient on writ of error to review conviction on plea of guilty.
People v.
Taylor, 1945, 62 N.E.2d 683, 391 Ill. 11, certiorari denied 66 S.Ct.
333, 326
U.S. 784, 90 L.Ed. 476. Indictment And Information k 110(18)
Indictment charging larceny in language of statute was sufficient
without
specifically charging intent. People v. Gawlick, 1932, 183 N.E. 217,
350 Ill.
359. Indictment And Information k 110(18)
42. ---- Statutory citation, indictment
Statutory citation listed in complaint charging defendant with offense
of
theft, "Section 16-1a1," was inexact where <section> 16-1(a)(1) was
intended
but was not fatal to complaint in light of fact that complaint
sufficiently
described offense charged. People v. Wade, App.1970, 131 Ill.App.2d
415, 264
N.E.2d 898. Indictment And Information k 108
Indictment charging that between April 1, 1963 and April 21, 1965
defendant
committed theft in knowingly obtaining unauthorized control over money
belonging to corporation adequately stated and described nature and
elements
of offense and was not fatally defective for failing to cite statutory
provision alleged to have been violated. People v. Patrick, App.1966,
75
Ill.App.2d 93, 220 N.E.2d 243, affirmed 38 Ill.2d 255, 230 N.E.2d 843.
Indictment And Information k 108
Failure of criminal complaint which charged defendant with theft to
cite
statutory provision alleged to have been violated was error. People v.
Hill,
App.1966, 68 Ill.App.2d 369, 216 N.E.2d 212. Indictment And
Information k 108
An indictment was sufficient to charge extortion even if it did not
contain a
designation of the statute under which it was laid, where it specified
elements of the offense with sufficient particularity to apprise the
accused
of the crime charged and enable him to prepare his defense. People v.
Clemens, App.1964, 46 Ill.App.2d 363, 197 N.E.2d 482. Indictment And
Information k 71.4(1)
43. ---- Number of offenses, indictment
Separate convictions and sentences for home repair fraud and theft
violated
one-act, one-crime rule, even though home repair fraud did not require
exchange of money, where indictment on greater offense of theft set
forth the
main outline of lesser home repair offense. People v. Flynn, App. 2
Dist.2003, 275 Ill.Dec. 296, 341 Ill.App.3d 813, 792 N.E.2d 527.
Criminal Law
k 29(10)
Although defendant has possessed stolen vehicle in number of counties,
only
one offense of possession may be charged. People v. Rodgers, App. 2
Dist.1982, 62 Ill.Dec. 165, 106 Ill.App.3d 741, 435 N.E.2d 963.
Criminal Law
k 29(10)
Time involved did not automatically eliminate acts of felony theft from
category of comprehensive transaction; thus, it was not error to fail
to
dismiss indictment or to sever its counts. People v. Kinion, App. 3
Dist.1982, 61 Ill.Dec. 836, 105 Ill.App.3d 1069, 435 N.E.2d 533,
certiorari
denied 103 S.Ct. 1256, 460 U.S. 1014, 75 L.Ed.2d 484. Indictment And
Information k 129(2)
Any error in charging both theft by deception and theft by threat was
not
prejudicial where, although record contained no evidence that defendant
deceived anyone in obtaining unauthorized control over subject stereo
tapes,
only defendant's statement contradicted testimony of three eyewitnesses
that
defendant, while armed with a gun, entered their car and, on leaving
took a
case containing the tapes. People v. Williams, App. 5 Dist.1975, 31
Ill.App.3d 161, 333 N.E.2d 655. Criminal Law k 1172.4
Indictment charging theft committed within a specified two-year period
was not
insufficient on the ground that it was vague as to the number of
offenses
committed or duplicitous. People v. Patrick, 1967, 38 Ill.2d 255, 230
N.E.2d
843. Indictment And Information k 71.4(8); Indictment And Information
k
125(1)
44. ---- Names, indictment
An information, alleging that defendant stole "United States currency,
of the
value of Fourteen ($14.00) Dollars, the personal goods and property of"
named
person, was sufficient. People v. Pitron, App.1943, 51 N.E.2d 993, 320
Ill.App. 662. Larceny k 30(10)
In larceny prosecution the indictment must name definitely the articles
stolen, and proof must sustain the charge in the indictment. People v.
Hoffman, 1942, 45 N.E.2d 874, 381 Ill. 460. Larceny k 30(1); Larceny
k 40(6)
Name of person injured, if known, must be stated in indictments for
offenses
against persons or property. People v. Smith, 1930, 173 N.E. 814, 341
Ill.
649.
Finished product of manufacturer allegedly stolen may be described in
indictment by name given it by manufacturer or by name by which it is
commonly
designated. People v. Graves, 1928, 162 N.E. 839, 331 Ill. 268.
Larceny k
30(1)
In indictment, chattel may be described by name usually applied to it.
People v. Graves, 1928, 162 N.E. 839, 331 Ill. 268. Indictment And
Information k 103
45. ---- Time and place, indictment
Felony theft indictment, as filed on January 29, 1982, alleging that
between
January 1, 1979 and October 1980 defendant auto parts supplier billed
the
State Department of Administrative Services for vehicle parts that were
never
received or were received by state employees for their private use was
properly dismissed on limitations grounds for failure to show that
subject
acts were committed within the period of limitations or that defendant
committed a series of actions which resulted in the limitations period
commencing with the last act. People v. Toolen, App. 5 Dist.1983, 72
Ill.Dec.
41, 116 Ill.App.3d 632, 451 N.E.2d 1364.
87(4)
Indictment And Information k
Evidence concerning events which occurred in 1977 and 1978 was properly
received in prosecution for theft, notwithstanding that original and
amended
bills of particulars stated that occurrence described in indictment was
continuing offense beginning in 1975 and culminating in 1976, since
such
evidence was introduced to prove that defendant had committed crime
within
period specified in bill of particulars. People v. Simmons, App. 1
Dist.1982,
61 Ill.Dec. 282, 105 Ill.App.3d 402, 434 N.E.2d 435. Indictment And
Information k 176
Where indictment charged commission of burglary on November 12, which
was day
on which it was discovered, owners were on vacation at time, specific
time of
actual burglary was unknown to the People and caretaker had been in
house on
November 10 and found nothing wrong, and on November 12 defendant had
helped a
friend unload some of stolen articles from van observed near scene of
burglary, it was not error to deny request for bill of particulars
setting
forth time of commission of burglary. People v. Stadtman, App. 4
Dist.1973,
15 Ill.App.3d 259, 304 N.E.2d 174, reversed 59 Ill.2d 229, 319 N.E.2d
813.
Indictment And Information k 121.2(1)
Indictment, which stated name of store where alleged burglary and
larceny
occurred, and county wherein store was located, was sufficient to
inform
defendant of nature of charges against him and was not fatally
defective, on
ground that it failed to allege specific place of theft. People v.
Orndoff,
1968, 39 Ill.2d 96, 233 N.E.2d 378. Indictment And Information k 86(2)
If a single theft charge consists not of a single act but a series of
successive takings pursuant to single criminal intent and scheme, it
may not
be possible and it is not necessary to indicate with any more certainty
when
the offense was committed other than to allege that it was committed
between
certain dates. People v. Patrick, 1967, 38 Ill.2d 255, 230 N.E.2d 843.
Indictment And Information k 87(6)
Indictment charging crime of theft and alleging that the same was
committed
between April 1, 1963 and April 21, 1965 was not insufficient for
failure to
allege a specific date on which crime was supposed to have been
committed.
People v. Patrick, 1967, 38 Ill.2d 255, 230 N.E.2d 843. Indictment And
Information k 87(7)
Indictment for theft was not insufficient on theory that place of
offense was
not set out as definitely as could have been done. People v. Arnold,
App.1966, 76 Ill.App.2d 269, 222 N.E.2d 160. Indictment And
Information k
86(2)
Indictment charging defendant with obtaining unauthorized control of
money
belonging to corporation between April 1, 1963 and April 21, 1965
charged but
one offense of theft and was therefore not duplicitous. People v.
Patrick,
App.1966, 75 Ill.App.2d 93, 220 N.E.2d 243, affirmed 38 Ill.2d 255, 230
N.E.2d
843. Indictment And Information k 125(3)
Indictment charging defendant with theft in obtaining unauthorized
control of
money belonging to corporation between April 1, 1963 and April 21, 1965
conformed with requirement of <section> 111-3 of former chapter 38 that
time
and place of the offense be stated as definitely as possible and
charged
criminal offense. People v. Patrick, App.1966, 75 Ill.App.2d 93, 220
N.E.2d
243, affirmed 38 Ill.2d 255, 230 N.E.2d 843. Indictment And
Information k
87(2)
46. ---- Description of property, indictment
Variance between rings described in information and those proved to
have been
in defendant's possession was not fatal to conviction of felony theft
where
information correctly described property in question as rings,
correctly
stated date of burglary and victim's name, and defendant was not
prejudiced in
preparing his defense as accurate description of rings and information
would
not have affected his defenses, i.e., that he was not shown to have
entered
burgled home and that he lacked guilty knowledge. People v. George,
App. 5
Dist.1986, 95 Ill.Dec. 383, 140 Ill.App.3d 1001, 489 N.E.2d 1111.
Larceny k
40(6)
Indictment accusing petitioner of grand theft of "property" without
further
describing the property allegedly stolen was sufficient to give
sentencing
court jurisdiction and did not provide basis for habeas corpus relief.
People
ex rel. Dorsey v. Morris, App. 3 Dist.1976, 37 Ill.App.3d 632, 347
N.E.2d 175.
Habeas Corpus k 474; Larceny k 30(1)
Information charging that accused stole currency of the "U.S." was not
defective because of the use of the abbreviation, since the
abbreviation was
deemed to refer to the United States of America. People v. O'Campo,
App.1947,
71 N.E.2d 375, 330 Ill.App. 401. Larceny k 30(10)
Information charging that accused stole
was not
defective on ground that currency meant
no such
thing as 80 cents in paper money, since
and
coins. People v. O'Campo, App.1947, 71
Larceny
k 30(9)
80 cents in U.S. "currency",
paper money and that there was
currency means both paper money
N.E.2d 375, 330 Ill.App. 401.
Where exact information as to denominations of money stolen was not
available
to grand jury, indictment charging larceny of $400 good and legal money
of the
United States of the value of $400 belonging to a specified person and
in the
possession of another person as bailee was sufficient. People v.
Finch, 1946,
68 N.E.2d 283, 394 Ill. 183, certiorari denied 67 S.Ct. 298, 329 U.S.
786, 91
L.Ed. 673. Larceny k 30(8)
That one count of indictment charged larceny of "male" hog, and another
of
"barrow" hog, did not show separate offenses; "barrow" being castrated
or
male hog; and word "male" being used to denote sex and to distinguish
person
or animal so described as belonging to sex other than female sex.
People v.
McElvain, 1930, 172 N.E. 131, 341 Ill. 224. Indictment And Information
k
125(47)
Articles alleged to have been stolen should be described in indictment
with
such certainty as will enable court and jury to determine whether
evidence
offered in support of charge relates to property on which indictment is
founded, and thus prevent accused from being tried for offense other
than that
for which he was indicted, and to enable him to plead judgment in bar
of
another prosecution for same offense. People v. Graves, 1928, 162 N.E.
839,
331 Ill. 268.
An indictment describing the goods stolen as hogs, the goods and
chattels of
another, was not defective for failure to use the word "personal"
before the
words "goods and chattels," since it is well known that hogs are
personal
property, and the further description of goods and chattels dispelled
all
doubt. People v. Wallace, 1922, 135 N.E. 723, 303 Ill. 504. Larceny k
30(6)
A common-law indictment for the larceny of money, which merely
describes the
subject of the larceny as a certain number of dollars in lawful money
of the
government, of a stated value, is too indefinite, and an indictment
must
contain a description, so as to call to mind the particular coins and
bills,
and thus identify the things stolen, to identify the transaction
charged, and
to notify accused of the particular transaction; and this rule applies
where
the description is or may be known to the grand jury. People v. Hunt,
1911,
96 N.E. 220, 251 Ill. 446. Larceny k 30(8)
An indictment charging accused with the larceny of a cape states with
sufficient certainty the larceny of a shoulder wrap. Waller v. People,
1898,
51 N.E. 900, 175 Ill. 221. Larceny k 30(3)
Larceny indictment charging that property stolen was "two dollars in
U.S.
currency" was not substantially defective as against contention that
the
denominations of the bills or currency should have been described.
People v.
Greenberg, 1922, 222 Ill.App. 243, affirmed 302 Ill. 566, 135 N.E. 67.
47. ---- Value, indictment
Information charging the defendant with stealing United States currency
of a
stated value was sufficient. People v. Ristick, 1938, 292 Ill.App.
644, 11
N.E.2d 828; People v. Miller, 1938, 292 Ill.App. 643, 11 N.E.2d 827.
In prosecution for theft, indictments charging that defendant exerted
unauthorized control over three shotguns and rifle and over a Browning
12
gauge shotgun were sufficient to give defendant notice of offense
charged so
as to enable him to prepare his defense, as against contention that
State
charged theft of property having value in excess of $150, failing to
produce
any evidence tending to prove value and then sought instructions on
lesser
included offense of theft of firearms. People v. Ems, App. 3
Dist.1980, 37
Ill.Dec. 243, 81 Ill.App.3d 574, 401 N.E.2d 1336. Indictment And
Information
k 71.4(8)
All that is required to support charge of theft with regard to value of
stolen
item is that complaint show thing of value was stolen; complaint need
not
allege value of the stolen item. People v. Sparks, App. 1 Dist.1972, 9
Ill.App.3d 470, 292 N.E.2d 447. Larceny k 31
In delinquency proceeding, original complaint stating that minordefendant had
committed offense of theft exceeding $150 in value in violation of this
section sufficiently charged defendant with violation of the criminal
code.
People v. Hicks, App.1971, 131 Ill.App.2d 939, 267 N.E.2d 763. Infants
k 197
Indictment charging theft of "* * * a 19" General Electric Portable
television
and two Sony tape recorders, having a value exceeding One Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($150.00)," sufficiently described the chattels and
sufficiently
alleged value. People v. Stevenson, App.1969, 107 Ill.App.2d 441, 246
N.E.2d
309. Larceny k 30(1)
Indictment charging larceny was fatally defective, where it failed to
allege
the value of the goods stolen and failed to describe the goods in any
other
language than "divers goods and chattels" of named individual. People
v.
Meyers, 1947, 73 N.E.2d 288, 397 Ill. 286. Larceny k 30(1); Larceny k
31
Information charging the stealing of $4.50 was not defective because of
failure to allege the denominations of the money stolen. People v.
Wilson,
App.1944, 52 N.E.2d 826, 321 Ill.App. 304. Larceny k 30(8)
An information charging larceny of $1, good and legal money of the
United
States of America, of the value of $1, sufficiently described the
property
stolen. People v. Cohen, 1922, 135 N.E. 731, 303 Ill. 523. Larceny k
30(8)
Where the owner of stolen money is unable to particularly describe the
money,
the indictment may describe it as particularly as the testimony will
permit,
and allege that further particulars are unknown to the grand jury; but
this
rule cannot be invoked, where the particulars omitted from the
indictment are
within the knowledge of the grand jury, or may have been ascertained by
the
exercise of ordinary diligence. People v. Hunt, 1911, 96 N.E. 220, 251
Ill.
446. Larceny k 30(8)
In an indictment for the larceny of a note no greater particularity is
required than to state that a "note" was stolen, with proper averments
of
value and ownership. Young v. People, 1901, 61 N.E. 1104, 193 Ill.
236.
Larceny k 30(7)
48. ---- Unauthorized control, indictment
Theft indictment was not insufficient because it charged that defendant
knowingly exerted control over certain stolen property rather than
using the
statutory phrase "obtains control over stolen property," since
defendant was
not prejudiced by the use of "exert" rather than "obtains" in
indictment.
People v. Collins, App. 3 Dist.1977, 6 Ill.Dec. 296, 48 Ill.App.3d 643,
362
N.E.2d 1118. Receiving Stolen Goods k 7(1)
Method by which unauthorized control is obtained or exerted is
immaterial to a
charge under this section providing that a person commits theft when he
knowingly obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property of
owner, and a
charge under this section made in conjunction with one of the
enumerated
mental states would cover all forms of theft. People v. Dziak, App. 2
Dist.1975, 30 Ill.App.3d 859, 333 N.E.2d 582. Larceny k 12
Information charging offense of theft under $150 was not fatally
defective for
failure to allege that accused's acquisition of control over property
in
question was "unauthorized." People v. Miller, App. 5 Dist.1974, 24
Ill.App.3d 504, 321 N.E.2d 109. Larceny k 34
Typographical error in theft complaint whereby it was alleged that
defendant
knowingly obtained "authorized," rather than "unauthorized" control
over
United States currency intending to deprive the owner permanently of
the use
and benefit of such property did not render the complaint fatally
defective.
People v. Ramos, App. 1 Dist.1973, 14 Ill.App.3d 774, 303 N.E.2d 439.
Indictment And Information k 79
Where defendant's theft indictment merely charged that defendant
obtained
control over the property of another intending to deprive him
permanently of
its use or benefit, an act in itself not a crime since language used
encompassed possibility that owner could have voluntarily parted with
control
by gift, purchase or some other legal means, indictment was void on its
face,
trial court was without jurisdiction to convict, and defendant could
not be
waiver or consent confer such jurisdiction. People v. Stewart,
App.1971, 3
Ill.App.3d 699, 279 N.E.2d 53. Indictment And Information k 196(5);
Larceny k
28(1)
Failure to include word "unauthorized" before word "control" in
complaint
charging that defendants knowingly obtained control over 30-caliber
carbine
and riot helmet in trunk of police officer's vehicle was not
substantial
defect and did not render complaint fatally defective where complaint
stated
offense of theft sufficient for defendants to know nature and element
of
offense and to be able to prepare their defense. People v. Wade,
App.1970,
131 Ill.App.2d 415, 264 N.E.2d 898. Larceny k 34
Count of indictment which charged that defendant knowingly used and
concealed
property, brought under provision of this section that person commits
theft
when he knowingly obtains control over stolen property knowing property
to
have been stolen by another, which failed to charge obtaining control
was
fatally incomplete. People v. Nunn, App.1965, 63 Ill.App.2d 465, 212
N.E.2d
342. Larceny k 35
49. ---- Mental state, generally, indictment
Indictment for theft of jacket was sufficient, despite alleged failure
to
charge defendant with culpable state of mind, given that defendant
claimed to
be innocent purchaser, defendant did not intend to return jacket,
mental state
was included in jury instructions, and defendant was protected from
subsequent
prosecution for same offense. People v. Scott, App. 4 Dist.1996, 215
Ill.Dec.
347, 278 Ill.App.3d 468, 663 N.E.2d 97. Larceny k 29
A complaint which fails to allege the requisite mental state does not
charge
the offense of theft and is therefore fatally defective. People v.
Hargrave,
App. 5 Dist.1975, 29 Ill.App.3d 89, 329 N.E.2d 814. Larceny k 29
Information charging theft but failing to refer to any act indicating
mental
state or to the mental state of defendant is insufficient to charge the
crime
of theft. People v. Smith, App.1972, 7 Ill.App.3d 350, 287 N.E.2d 509.
Larceny k 29
In order to charge a theft, there must be alleged in the indictment
both an
act and a mental state of the defendant; and an indictment which fails
to
allege one of the mental states listed by this section or one of the
listed
acts indicating a mental state is fatally defective. People v. Hayn,
App.1969, 116 Ill.App.2d 241, 253 N.E.2d 575. Larceny k 29
50. ---- Mental state, intent, indictment
Failure of indictment charging robbery to expressly allege specific
intent as
required for conviction on lesser offense of theft, was not fatal to
the theft
conviction, where goal of permanently depriving victim of his money was
foundation of charge and evidence fully proved specific intent, in that
the
evidence showed that defendant stopped victim on the street, grabbed
victim's
wallet, took out the money, and abandoned the empty wallet in the
street.
People v. Rivers, App. 1 Dist.1990, 141 Ill.Dec. 133, 194 Ill.App.3d
193, 550
N.E.2d 1179, appeal denied 142 Ill.Dec. 886, 131 Ill.2d 565, 553 N.E.2d
400.
Indictment And Information k 188
Fact that complaint, which alleged that defendant had stolen
plaintiff's
gasoline with intent to deprive owner of use or benefit of such
property,
failed to allege that there was a "permanent" intent to deprive owner
of the
use or benefit did not require reversal of conviction, in view of fact
that
the defense was that defendant mistakenly believed that he had pumped
only $2
worth of gasoline and that record would bar subsequent prosecution for
same
offense. People v. Bohm, 1983, 69 Ill.Dec. 715, 95 Ill.2d 435, 448
N.E.2d 175
. Criminal Law k 1167(1)
Original complaint, which charged that defendant committed attempt
theft in
that he knowingly and without lawful authority attempted permanently to
deprive victim of a suede jacket, contained sufficient statement of
requisite
intent to commit theft and set forth substantial step toward commission
of
theft and therefore properly alleged elements of attempt theft. People
v.
Tiggs, App. 1 Dist.1976, 38 Ill.App.3d 72, 347 N.E.2d 389. Larceny k
28(1)
Convictions of codefendants on charges of theft were void where
indictment
failed to allege an intent to permanently deprive owner of use or
benefit of
property stolen. People v. Payne, App. 5 Dist.1975, 33 Ill.App.3d 713,
341
N.E.2d 735. Larceny k 29
Indictment which charged defendant with robbery and did not charge
defendant
with intent to permanently deprive victim of property taken was
insufficient
to charge defendant with offense of theft. People v. Yanders, App. 4
Dist.1975, 32 Ill.App.3d 599, 335 N.E.2d 801. Indictment And
Information k
191(9)
Although complaint purporting to charge defendant with offense of theft
recited that he obtained control over stolen property intending to
deprive the
owner of the use or benefit thereof, complaint was fatally defective
and
conviction obtained thereon was required to be reversed where complaint
failed
to charge defendant with essential element of the offense of theft, to
wit, an
intent to permanently deprive the owner of the use or benefit of the
property.
People v. Hargrave, App. 5 Dist.1975, 29 Ill.App.3d 89, 329 N.E.2d
814.
Criminal Law k 1167(1); Larceny k 29
Intent to commit theft may support forgery and theft charges involving
postal
money orders. People v. Butler, App. 4 Dist.1973, 12 Ill.App.3d 541,
298
N.E.2d 798. Forgery k 44(.5); Larceny k 55
Indictment for attempted theft, alleging that defendant intended to
deprive
owners of benefit of property, was insufficient for failure to allege
intention of depriving owners permanently. People v. Matthews,
App.1970, 122
Ill.App.2d 264, 258 N.E.2d 378. Larceny k 29
Subparagraphs (1), (2) and (3) of this section refer to intent required
to be
alleged under all subsecs., (a) through (d) and state's reliance in
indictment
upon language of subpars. (1), (2) and (3) did not require state to
allege
offense as defined in subsec. (d). People v. Green, App.1966, 74
Ill.App.2d
308, 218 N.E.2d 840, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 2051, 387 U.S. 930, 18
L.Ed.2d
990, rehearing denied 88 S.Ct. 17, 389 U.S. 890, 19 L.Ed.2d 200.
Embezzlement
k 26
Complaint which stated only that defendant without authority knowingly
entered
certain premises with the intent to commit a theft failed to spell out
the
proscribed act and intent required by this section and did not charge
offense
of theft. People v. Slaughter, App.1966, 67 Ill.App.2d 314, 214 N.E.2d
20.
Larceny k 28(1)
Information charging that defendant did wrongfully and unlawfully take,
steal
and carry away contrary to the statute, was sufficient, notwithstanding
it
failed to allege a felonious intent, since the word "steal" ex vi
termini
imports a felonious intent. People v. Waltlyn, 1915, 191 Ill.App. 86.
51. ---- Mental state, knowledge, indictment
Where information charging defendant with theft alleged that defendant
had
intent to permanently deprive owner of use and benefit of his property,
information sufficiently alleged knowledge element necessary to crime
of
theft. People v. Sherman, App. 2 Dist.1982, 65 Ill.Dec. 581, 110
Ill.App.3d
854, 441 N.E.2d 896. Larceny k 29
Failure to include word "knowingly" did not render fatally defective
count
charging that defendant committed the offense of theft and that he
exerted
unauthorized control over designated property of named owner, intending
to
deprive him of use or benefit of the property which was valued in
excess of
$150 in violation of this paragraph. People v. Castro, App. 1
Dist.1982, 65
Ill.Dec. 153, 109 Ill.App.3d 561, 440 N.E.2d 1008. Larceny k 29
Complaint alleging that defendant obtained control of property of the
victim
intending to deprive him permanently of use thereof was sufficient to
allege
requisite mental state for crime of theft despite failure to include
word
"knowingly" in allegations. People v. Betts, App. 1 Dist.1974, 17
Ill.App.3d
22, 307 N.E.2d 672. Larceny k 28(1)
Complaints charging that defendants committed the offense of theft in
that
they obtained unauthorized control over currency which was the property
of
another with the intent to deprive the other permanently of the use and
benefit of such property were not fatally defective for failure to
include the
word "knowingly." People v. Ramos, App. 1 Dist.1973, 14 Ill.App.3d
774, 303
N.E.2d 439. Larceny k 29
Complaint which alleged that defendants had committed offense of theft
in that
they had obtained unauthorized control over property with intent to
deprive
the owner of the use and benefit of the property was not fatally
defective for
failure to use the word "knowingly." People v. Reese, App. 1
Dist.1973, 11
Ill.App.3d 817, 298 N.E.2d 315. Larceny k 28(1)
Complaint which alleged that defendant committed offense of theft by
obtaining
unauthorized control over property of value less than $150 with intent
to
deprive owner permanently of its use and benefit but which failed to
allege
that defendant "knowingly" committed the theft was not fatally
defective,
where defense counsel made no objection to form of the complaint, and
testimony of eyewitness indicated that act in question was committed
knowingly. People v. Stallcup, App. 1 Dist.1973, 10 Ill.App.3d 153,
294
N.E.2d 21. Indictment And Information k 196(5)
Complaint which alleged specific intent on part of defendant to deprive
owner
permanently of use and benefit of his property was sufficient to charge
offense of theft and was not fatally defective for failure to use word
"knowingly." People v. Wilson, App. 1 Dist.1973, 10 Ill.App.3d 48, 294
N.E.2d
1. Larceny k 29
Information charging that defendant had "knowingly obtained or exerted
unauthorized control" over television set without any reference to an
act
indicating a mental state or to the mental state of defendant was
insufficient
to charge crime of theft. People v. Haynes, App.1971, 132 Ill.App.2d
1031,
270 N.E.2d 63. Larceny k 29
Theft indictment which, after alleging the act defendant purportedly
committed
("knowingly obtained control over six (6) American Express Company
money
orders"), failed to allege any mental state of the defendant or any
conduct of
the defendant indicating his mental state was insufficient to charge an
offense, notwithstanding the use of the work "knowingly", since that
word, as
used in the indictment, related to the act of the defendant in
receiving the
property and said nothing about his intent with regard to the property
after
he had received it. People v. Hayn, App.1969, 116 Ill.App.2d 241, 253
N.E.2d
575. Larceny k 29
Absence of word "knowingly" from indictment for entering building with
intent
to commit theft was fatal. People v. Leek, App.1964, 53 Ill.App.2d
453, 202
N.E.2d 868. Burglary k 19
52. ---- Ownership, generally, indictment
Indictment or information for theft must clearly allege rights of
possession
and ownership in someone or some entity other than the defendant.
People v.
Dayani, 1973, 16 Ill.App.3d 615, 306 N.E.2d 488; People v. Berndt,
1968, 101
Ill.App.2d 29, 242 N.E.2d 273; People v. Hill, 1966, 68 Ill.App.2d
369, 216
N.E.2d 212.
Ownership of property allegedly stolen is a necessary averment of an
indictment for theft; however, specific ownership of stolen property
in
person named in indictment is not necessary, so long as it is shown
that he
has some possessory interest in property at time of offense. People v.
Hooker, App. 1 Dist.1977, 11 Ill.Dec. 693, 54 Ill.App.3d 53, 369 N.E.2d
147.
Larceny k 7; Larceny k 32(2)
Indictment charging defendant with knowingly obtaining control over
certain
stolen property of a telephone company, even though it failed to allege
that
such property was stolen by person other than defendant, was sufficient
to
properly charge defendant with offense of theft by possession since
words "by
another" are necessarily implied in both indictment and in this section
from
which language of indictment was taken, and since no reasonable person
would
infer from such language that he was being accused of stealing property
himself. People v. Weiss, App. 5 Dist.1976, 34 Ill.App.3d 840, 341
N.E.2d 79.
Receiving Stolen Goods k 7(1)
Where complaint in prosecution for theft alleged that stolen property
was
owned by named person, identity of owners of store from which property
was
stolen was immaterial. People v. Preston, App. 1 Dist.1973, 15
Ill.App.3d
924, 305 N.E.2d 190. Larceny k 40(2)
Complaint charging that defendant committed offense of theft in that he
knowingly exerted unauthorized control over certain specified property
with
intent to deprive specified individual permanently of the use and
benefit of
the property was fatally defective in that it failed to contain
averment of
ownership of the property alleged to have been stolen. People v.
Snipe, App.
1 Dist.1973, 12 Ill.App.3d 1051, 299 N.E.2d 509. Larceny k 32(2)
Ownership of property allegedly stolen is a necessary averment which
must be
set forth in indictments with accuracy, and same certainty of
allegation is
required in criminal complaint. People v. Baskin, App.1969, 119
Ill.App.2d
18, 255 N.E.2d 42. Larceny k 32(1)
Allegation in criminal
deprive complainant of
considered
tantamount to averment
anyone
and although complaint
property
complaint that defendant intended to permanently
use and benefit of property could not be
that the allegedly stolen property was owned by
seemed to imply that complainant was owner of
in question, nothing short of specific allegation to that effect would
be
sufficient and conviction could not be sustained. People v. Baskin,
App.1969,
119 Ill.App.2d 18, 255 N.E.2d 42. Larceny k 32(1)
A three-count indictment charging defendant with burglary, and with two
counts
of theft was fatally defective in regard to third count of theft where
such
count did not contain an averment as to ownership or a reference to
either of
the other counts which would serve to incorporate, by reference, any
averment
of ownership contained in such other counts. People v. Berndt,
App.1968, 101
Ill.App.2d 29, 242 N.E.2d 273. Larceny k 32(2)
Ownership of property embezzled or stolen must be alleged with same
accuracy
as at common law, unless rule is modified by statute. People v. Cohen,
1933,
185 N.E. 608, 352 Ill. 380. Embezzlement k 30; Larceny k 32(1)
Ownership of property is essential averment in indictment for larceny.
People v. Smith, 1930, 173 N.E. 814, 341 Ill. 649. Larceny k 32(2)
53. ---- Ownership, legal title, indictment
Assuming that legal title to property allegedly stolen by defendant was
in
bishop, indictment alleging theft of property from a particular local
church
and that the church was the "owner" of the property was sufficient
where the
property was in the possession of such church. People v. Woods, App. 5
Dist.1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 221, 303 N.E.2d 562. Larceny k 32(1)
Theft indictment need not allege the legal titleholder as "owner" but
must
allege an entity capable of possession as "owner." People v. Woods,
App. 5
Dist.1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 221, 303 N.E.2d 562. Larceny k 32(1)
54. ---- Ownership, legal entity, indictment
In prosecution for theft, state must allege or prove ownership of
stolen
property in a person, corporation, or other entity capable of owning
property.
People v. Jones, 1972, 7 Ill.App.3d 183, 287 N.E.2d 206; People v.
Moyer,
1971, 1 Ill.App.3d 245, 273 N.E.2d 210.
Allegation that defendant had walked out of store without paying for
book and
that the book was owned by the "Co-op Bookstore" was insufficient to
allege or
to identify a legal entity capable of property ownership and would not
support
conviction of theft. People v. Lowe, App. 4 Dist.1974, 20 Ill.App.3d
1035,
313 N.E.2d 286. Larceny k 32(1)
Allegation that stolen currency was "the property of" a specified legal
entity
sufficiently alleged ownership of the property. People v. Cicchetti,
App.1971, 2 Ill.App.3d 535, 275 N.E.2d 661. Larceny k 32(1)
Information charging defendant with knowingly entering into building of
named
party doing business under trade name was sufficient to allege
ownership or
occupancy even though it imprecisely stated exact legal entity in which
ownership or occupancy reposed. People v. Viar, App.1971, 131
Ill.App.2d 983,
268 N.E.2d 872. Burglary k 22
Where defendant pled guilty to information charging him with knowingly
entering building of specified party doing business under trade name,
failure
to precisely state legal entity in which ownership or occupancy reposed
did
not render judgment void. People v. Viar, App.1971, 131 Ill.App.2d
983, 268
N.E.2d 872. Burglary k 22
Store manager's testimony that two persons "jointly owned" store from
which
property had been stolen was sufficient to support indictment alleging
ownership in a partnership. People v. Adams, App.1966, 70 Ill.App.2d
397, 217
N.E.2d 560. Indictment And Information k 10.2(11)
55. ---- Ownership, unincorporated associations, indictment
"Owner" or "person" from whom the theft of property is proscribed
includes an
unincorporated association. People v. Woods, App. 5 Dist.1973, 15
Ill.App.3d
221, 303 N.E.2d 562. Larceny k 7
Indictment alleging theft of property belonging to particular local
church was
not defective on theory that the church was only a building and not an
entity
that could own property; "church" within context of the indictment
denoted
not only the building which was the site of the theft but an
unincorporated
association of people constituting the congregation of such place of
worship.
People v. Woods, App. 5 Dist.1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 221, 303 N.E.2d 562.
Larceny
k 7
Where indictment charged defendant with theft of over 129 pairs of
trousers,
the property of named individual, and owner named in indictment
testified that
he was partner in store from which trousers were stolen and other
partner
testified that trousers were his or partnership property, owner named
in
indictment had right of possession or other interest in property and
ownership
of trousers was adequately established as alleged in indictment.
People v.
Dell, App.1966, 77 Ill.App.2d 318, 222 N.E.2d 357, certiorari denied 88
S.Ct.
73, 389 U.S. 826, 19 L.Ed.2d 81. Receiving Stolen Goods k 7(6)
An indictment charging larceny of property of an unincorporated body of
persons should allege the property as belonging to the individuals
composing
the company, and not as the property of the body. People v. Picard,
1918, 120
N.E. 546, 284 Ill. 588. Larceny k 32(4)
56. ---- Ownership, corporate existence, indictment
In prosecution for theft of jacket, state was not required to prove
that store
which owned the jacket was a corporation, though complaint alleged such
a
corporate existence. People v. Sykes, App. 1 Dist.1975, 30 Ill.App.3d
726,
333 N.E.2d 466. Larceny k 40(2)
Complaint, which as amended alleged that store was Illinois corporation
and
specifically apprised defendant of name and address of store and date
its
property was stolen, transcript of defendant's prosecution for theft,
and
opinion of Appellate Court would shield defendant from second
prosecution for
same offense of theft despite failure of State to formally prove
corporate
existence of store. People v. Sims, App. 1 Dist.1975, 29 Ill.App.3d
815, 331
N.E.2d 178. Larceny k 40(2)
Where, inter alia, store, which was unit in well-known chain of area
supermarkets, was referred to as owner of items defendant removed from
counter
and concealed on his person, tag bearing store's name was on each item,
defendant did not contend that merchandise was not store property and
in his
testimony acknowledged that it was, and defendant was protected from
double
jeopardy for theft of items for which he was convicted, material
allegations
in complaint charging theft were satisfied despite failure of State to
formally prove corporate existence of store. People v. Sims, App. 1
Dist.1975, 29 Ill.App.3d 815, 331 N.E.2d 178. Larceny k 40(2)
Theft complaint alleging that defendant stole the property of a certain
"company" adequately averred that the complainant was a corporate
entity
capable of owning property. People v. Lewis, App. 1 Dist.1973, 13
Ill.App.3d
688, 301 N.E.2d 159. Larceny k 32(6)
Where complaint for theft adequately informed defendant of charges
against him
and indicated that the owner of stolen property was a corporation doing
business as a drugstore at a particular address where he was arrested,
complaint although not using the actual corporate name of corporation
as given
in charter, established identity of owner beyond doubt and was
sufficient
against claim that complaint did not allege and state did not prove
ownership
of stolen property in a corporation capable of owning property. People
v.
Jones, App.1972, 7 Ill.App.3d 183, 287 N.E.2d 206. Larceny k 40(2)
Abbreviation "Inc." affixed as part of victim's name in theft
indictment
sufficiently alleged that the victim was a corporation and thus
described a
legal entity capable of owning the stolen property. People v.
Cicchetti,
App.1971, 2 Ill.App.3d 535, 275 N.E.2d 661. Larceny k 32(6)
Ownership of property must be proved as laid in an indictment for
larceny, and
the name of the owner of the stolen property becomes material to a
statement
of the offense in the indictment if known and must be proved as
alleged, and
where the ownership of the property is alleged to be in a corporation,
existence of the corporation is a material fact and must be proved.
People v.
Roach, App.1971, 1 Ill.App.3d 876, 275 N.E.2d 309. Larceny k 40(2)
Where criminal complaint which charged defendant with theft alleged
only that
goods were taken from discount store and failed to allege that discount
store
was a corporation, criminal complaint was deficient in that it failed
to
allege ownership of property stolen. People v. Hill, App.1966, 68
Ill.App.2d
369, 216 N.E.2d 212. Larceny k 32(6)
57. ---- Prior convictions, indictment
Where prior theft conviction elevates offense from misdemeanor to
felony, that
prior theft conviction is element of offense of felony theft which must
be
alleged and proved to trier of fact during evidentiary phase of trial.
People
v. Hicks, 1987, 115 Ill.Dec. 623, 119 Ill.2d 29, 518 N.E.2d 148.
Larceny k 23
Extended term sentence imposed on basis of aggravating factors, on
conviction
for burglary and theft was matter properly considered by court only at
time of
sentencing where grade and degree of offenses were not changed by
aggravating
factors under (<paragraph> 1005-5-3.2 et seq. of former chapter 38) and
thus
aggravating factors did not become elements of offenses which had to be
pleaded and proved. People v. Miller, App. 1 Dist.1980, 45 Ill.Dec.
810, 90
Ill.App.3d 422, 413 N.E.2d 143. Indictment And Information k 166
It was necessary to allege previous conviction in indictment in order
to
assess enhanced penalty for theft. People v. Ramey, App. 2 Dist.1974,
22
Ill.App.3d 916, 317 N.E.2d 143. Indictment And Information k 114
The trial court was without authority to strike from complaint which
alleged
theft and which also alleged a previous conviction for crime of theft
the
allegation of the previous conviction, as discretion as to which
offense can
and should properly be charged is left to the State's attorney. People
v.
Henry, App. 3 Dist.1974, 20 Ill.App.3d 73, 312 N.E.2d 719.
Constitutional Law
k 73
A prior offense had to be alleged in the indictment and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt to provide the basis for raising a misdemeanor to a
felony.
People v. Connell, App.1972, 6 Ill.App.3d 791, 286 N.E.2d 565.
Sentencing And
Punishment k 1380(2); Indictment And Information k 114
Since indictment charged previous thefts, the use of characterization
"felony
theft", while not necessary, did not deprive defendant of his
constitutional
right to be advised of nature and cause of accusation against him; at
worst,
use of word "felony" was surplusage and defendant was not prejudiced by
its
inclusion. People v. Weaver, 1968, 41 Ill.2d 434, 243 N.E.2d 245,
certiorari
denied 89 S.Ct. 2100, 395 U.S. 959, 23 L.Ed.2d 746. Criminal Law k
1167(1);
Indictment And Information k 119
That indictment which clearly set forth current charge of theft alleged
prior
theft convictions did not confound and confuse defendant in
ascertainment of
nature and cause of accusation against him and did not deprive him of
his
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the laws;
the
additional information concerning prior convictions informed defendant
of
applicability of recidivist punishment that the legislature had
provided.
People v. Weaver, 1968, 41 Ill.2d 434, 243 N.E.2d 245, certiorari
denied 89
S.Ct. 2100, 395 U.S. 959, 23 L.Ed.2d 746. Constitutional Law k
250.2(1);
Constitutional Law k 265; Indictment And Information k 114
Prior convictions for theft should not be alleged in an indictment, and
no
proof thereof should be received before conviction of current offense.
People
v. Kelly, App.1965, 66 Ill.App.2d 204, 214 N.E.2d 290. Criminal Law k
369.5;
Indictment And Information k 114
Though prior convictions for theft should not be alleged in an
indictment
charging theft, and though no proof thereof should be received before
conviction of current offense, it is still open to State to prove such
prior
crimes after conviction for purpose of enabling court to impose proper
statutory penalty. People v. Kelly, App.1965, 66 Ill.App.2d 204, 214
N.E.2d
290. Sentencing And Punishment k 94
Where second count of indictment did not allege that accused was over
age of
18 at time of three prior convictions of petty larceny refusal to quash
second
count was error. People v. Lund, 1943, 46 N.E.2d 929, 382 Ill. 213.
Indictment And Information k 114
58. ---- Surplusage, indictment
Where indictment charges all elements necessary to crime of theft,
other
matters unnecessarily added may be rejected as surplusage. People v.
Jordan,
App.1969, 115 Ill.App.2d 307, 252 N.E.2d 701.
Information k
119
Indictment And
59. ---- Amendment, indictment
Trial court's allowing State to amend indictment, on second day of
trial was
reversible error because amendment related to mental state of offense
and
defendant was not apprised of precise offense charged with sufficient
time to
prepare his defense. People v. Arbo, App. 3 Dist.1991, 157 Ill.Dec.
348, 213
Ill.App.3d 828, 572 N.E.2d 417, appeal denied 162 Ill.Dec. 494, 141
Ill.2d
545, 580 N.E.2d 120. Criminal Law k 1167(4); Indictment And
Information k
159(1); Indictment And Information k 159(2)
Where defendant did not argue that automobile was not, in fact, stolen,
and
defendant's theory of case was that evidence indicated that he had
never
entered such car or done any acts sufficient to render him accountable
for
acts of others, identity of owner of allegedly stolen automobile had no
bearing on his defense, and proof that individual, rather than
corporation,
owned automobile could not have surprised defense counsel nor hindered
defendant in preparing defense in that testimony had been elicited
three
months prior to trial that theft had been reported by individual;
thus,
amendment of information to change identity of owner from corporation
to
individual was proper. People v. Mick, App. 5 Dist.1980, 42 Ill.Dec.
370, 86
Ill.App.3d 1022, 408 N.E.2d 1079. Indictment And Information k 161(6)
Theft complaint which omitted the word "permanently" but which was
amended
before trial by the addition of the word "permanently" was sufficient
to
charge defendant with the crime of theft. People v. Smith, App. 1
Dist.1974,
23 Ill.App.3d 668, 320 N.E.2d 137. Larceny k 28(1)
Where felony charges of armed robbery were reduced to misdemeanor
charges of
theft and defendants did not object to such reduction, State was not
required
to comply with <section> 111-2 of former chapter 38 requiring all
prosecution
of felonies to be by indictment unless waived understandingly by the
accused.
People v. Rance, App. 1 Dist.1974, 21 Ill.App.3d 15, 315 N.E.2d 60.
Indictment
And Information k 3
Allowing state to amend theft complaints as to ownership did not
constitute
error, where defense counsel exhibited no surprise at the amendment and
there
was no showing that defendants were prejudiced. People v. Kilgore,
App. 1
Dist.1973, 16 Ill.App.3d 691, 306 N.E.2d 485. Indictment And
Information k
162
Complaint, which charged that defendant had committed offense of theft
and
that "he," which word was followed by name and address of codefendant,
obtained unauthorized control of certain property intending to
permanently
deprive owner of use and benefit of the property, was sufficient to
charge
defendant with crime of theft, and typographical error of inserting
codefendant's name after the word "he" did not mislead or prejudice
defendant
and was type of formal defect amendable under <section> 111-5 of former
chapter 38. People v. Kilgore, App. 1 Dist.1973, 16 Ill.App.3d 691,
306
N.E.2d 485. Indictment And Information k 81(1); Indictment And
Information k
162
Where forgery charge came via indictment, and theft charges were by
information, and first information failed to charge crime of theft, and
state's attorney requested leave to amend and when that was denied,
filed a
second information which correctly charged the crime, and first
information
was not dismissed and a general verdict of guilty as to theft returned
conviction as to flawed information must be reversed, but this did not
affect
conviction of theft premised on valid information. People v. Butler,
App. 4
Dist.1973, 12 Ill.App.3d 541, 298 N.E.2d 798. Criminal Law k 1167(1);
Criminal Law k 1186.1
Conviction of defendant charged with armed robbery, on his negotiated
plea of
guilty, of crime of theft of over $150 was not void for failure of
state to
amend indictment on its face, where indictment sufficiently charged the
criminal offense of armed robbery. People v. Howell, App. 4 Dist.1973,
11
Ill.App.3d 391, 296 N.E.2d 760. Indictment And Information k 191(9)
Court had authority to permit amendment, specifying name and ownership
of
stolen automobile, of delinquency petition charging that defendant had
committed offense of theft exceeding $150 value in violation of this
section
notwithstanding lack of reswearing of petitioner. People v. Hicks,
App.1971,
131 Ill.App.2d 939, 267 N.E.2d 763. Infants k 197
60. Variance--In general
Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendants' convictions for
conspiracy to
commit theft, even though there was some variance between proof at
trial and
specific allegations against defendants; language complained of was
unnecessary for valid indictment and was mere surplusage. People v.
Buffman,
App. 1 Dist.1994, 201 Ill.Dec. 351, 260 Ill.App.3d 505, 636 N.E.2d 783.
Conspiracy k 43(12); Conspiracy k 47(11)
Where it did not appear that defendant was misled in his defense or
exposed to
double jeopardy, variance between pleading and proof in prosecution for
theft
of property exceeding value of $150, if any, was not fatal. People v.
Jones,
App.1970, 123 Ill.App.2d 389, 259 N.E.2d 393. Larceny k 40(4)
Variance between indictment and "official statement of facts", signed
by
state's attorney and concurred in by trial judge, conformably to
provision of
Sentence and Parole Act (repealed), would not render fatally defective
an
indictment otherwise sufficient. People v. Saxton, 1948, 79 N.E.2d
601, 400
Ill. 257, certiorari denied 69 S.Ct. 25, 335 U.S. 835, 93 L.Ed. 387,
certiorari denied 70 S.Ct. 424, 338 U.S. 944, 94 L.Ed. 582. Criminal
Law k
1112
Accused could not be placed in jeopardy for burglary, an offense
carrying a
more severe sentence than larceny with which he was charged. People v.
Myler,
1940, 28 N.E.2d 83, 374 Ill. 72. Double Jeopardy k 21
61. ---- Ownership, generally, variance
Principles that material variance will invalidate guilty verdict and
that
purpose of charging instrument is to apprise accused of exact crime
charged
apply to requirement that ownership be alleged in prosecution of theft
offenses. People v. Puleo, App. 1 Dist.1981, 51 Ill.Dec. 859, 96
Ill.App.3d
457, 421 N.E.2d 367. Larceny k 32(2)
When purpose of allegation and proof of ownership have been realized
conviction for theft will not be defeated even by variance between
charge and
proof which does not prejudice accused. People v. Parker, App. 2
Dist.1979,
33 Ill.Dec. 21, 77 Ill.App.3d 536, 396 N.E.2d 97. Larceny k 40(9)
Variance between allegation in complaint that mother owned stolen
bicycles and
proof adduced at trial that her children owned the stolen bicycles was
not
fatal and did not require a new trial, where mother had interest in
stolen
bicycles, complaint and proof adduced in support thereof demonstrated
ownership of bicycles in someone other than defendant, variance did not
hinder
defendant in presenting his defense and an acquittal or conviction
under
charge would bar a subsequent prosecution for theft. People v. Tucker,
App. 1
Dist.1976, 35 Ill.App.3d 630, 342 N.E.2d 395. Criminal Law k 915
In theft prosecution, a fatal variance existed between the allegations
of the
complaint and the proof, where the complaint alleged that defendant
stole a
watch which was the property of named woman, whereas the woman
testified at
trial that the watch, which was taken from her home and which fit the
description of the one worn by defendant at the time of his arrest, was
the
property of her grandson. People v. Arenibar, App. 1 Dist.1974, 18
Ill.App.3d
67, 309 N.E.2d 273. Larceny k 40(9)
There was no fatal variance between indictment charging violation of
this
section and proof that defendants were apprehended immediately after
exerting
unauthorized control over property of drug company on premises of
codefendant
and they intended to deprive the company permanently of use and
benefits of
the property, even if codefendant would qualify as an owner for
purposes of
criminal code. People v. Marino, 1970, 44 Ill.2d 562, 256 N.E.2d 770.
Although legal title of diamond ring was in partnership, allegation
identifying stolen ring as owned by one partner sufficiently identified
property, and variance between allegation and proof of ownership was
harmless.
People v. Harden, 1969, 42 Ill.2d 301, 247 N.E.2d 404. Larceny k
40(10)
Ownership of property must be proved as laid in indictment for larceny.
People v. Smith, 1930, 173 N.E. 814, 341 Ill. 649. Larceny k 40(9)
Special ownership or interest in or possession of property, as on the
part of
a railroad having possession of a car labeled as that of another
railroad, is
sufficient to prove ownership as against a charge of variance in a
prosecution
for larceny therefrom. People v. Fitzgerald, 1921, 130 N.E. 720, 297
Ill. 264
. Larceny k 40(9)
Larceny being an offense against the owner of property, the owner's
name
becomes material to statement of the offense in an indictment, if
known, and
must be proved as alleged. People v. Csontos, 1916, 114 N.E. 123, 275
Ill.
402. Larceny k 40(9)
62. ---- Ownership, corporate existence, variance
Variance between theft complaint, which alleged that defendant had
stolen
gasoline from a corporation, and the proof that defendant had stolen
the
gasoline from service station did not require reversal of conviction,
in view
of fact that there was no indication that defendant was misled by the
variance
and that the record would bar subsequent prosecution for same offense.
People
v. Bohm, 1983, 69 Ill.Dec. 715, 95 Ill.2d 435, 448 N.E.2d 175. Criminal
Law k
1167(1)
There was no fatal variance between allegation of felony theft
indictment that
property belonged to "Eagle Foods, a corporation," and trial testimony
to the
same effect and stipulation that correct name of corporation was "Eagle
Discount Supermarkets, Mid-West Region, Lucky Stores, Inc." since
defendant
had full discovery of the state's evidence and knew what store he was
charged
with stealing from and, since given proof plus stipulation as to proper
name
of corporate owner, defendant was in no danger of double jeopardy and
defendant could have recourse to instant record in any subsequent
prosecution
for the same offense. People v. Cassman, App. 2 Dist.1975, 32
Ill.App.3d 456,
336 N.E.2d 85. Larceny k 40(9)
Where corporate name of victim of theft was changed prior to date of
theft but
corporate entity remained as owner of the merchandise in question,
variance
between name of victim in complaint and the evidence was not fatal.
People v.
Kaye, App.1969, 112 Ill.App.2d 141, 251 N.E.2d 306. Larceny k 40(9)
Fatal variance did not exist on ground that information charged
defendant with
theft of an individual's property and that proof showed that
corporation owned
the property, where information alleged that property had been stolen
from
designated name followed by "and Company". People v. Voleta, App.1965,
57
Ill.App.2d 279, 206 N.E.2d 737. Larceny k 40(9)
In prosecution for crime of petit larceny, variance between averments
that
property was owned by Charles V. Parker Company, a corporation, and
proof of
ownership in C. V. Parker Company, a corporation, was not fatal.
People v.
Herrin, App.1938, 15 N.E.2d 598, 295 Ill.App. 590. Larceny k 40(9)
63. ---- Description of property, variance
Where all items set out in indictment charging theft except five
diamond
stones and silver-place setting were included in evidence of goods
taken,
omission of the stones and silver did not affect validity of judgment
in theft
prosecution. People v. Jordan, App.1969, 115 Ill.App.2d 307, 252
N.E.2d 701.
Larceny k 40(6)
Charge of larceny of "money" is not proved by showing theft of checks.
People v. Kennedy, 1934, 190 N.E. 296, 356 Ill. 151. Larceny k 40(8)
Under indictment charging larceny of a certain amount of money, amount
stolen
need not be proved as charged in indictment. People v. Dempsey, 1918,
119
N.E. 333, 283 Ill. 342. Larceny k 40(8)
In an indictment for larceny, where the property was described as
United
States treasury notes, bank bills commonly called "national currency,"
and
bank bills called "greenbacks," and certain gold and silver coin, the
only
evidence as to the kind or value of the money was the testimony of the
prosecuting witness, who, to the question, "How much did you have?"
replied,
"130," and to the question, "In what denomination was the money?"
replied "Two
fifties and three tens." The evidence as to the property alleged to
have been
stolen was insufficient to support the indictment.
1896, 43
N.E. 1091, 161 Ill. 309. Larceny k 56
Vale v. People,
An indictment charging theft of national bank bills were supported by
evidence
that state bank bills were taken where it appeared that the witnesses
did not
know a national bank bill, and evidently meant bills issued by the
national
banks located in different states. Keating v. People, 1896, 43 N.E.
724, 160
Ill. 480. Larceny k 40(8)
An indictment charging
evidence that
a gold certificate and
taken,
and evidence that they
724,
160 Ill. 480. Larceny
theft of treasury notes was supported by
several silver certificates were among the bills
were genuine.
Keating v. People, 1896, 43 N.E.
k 40(8)
64. ---- Time and place, variance
Variances between informations charging theft and battery and evidence
produced at trial did not require reversal on reasonable doubt grounds;
information charging theft with prior burglary conviction stated
different
date for prior conviction than that proved at trial, and battery
information
charged defendant with striking victim with his fist, whereas evidence
at
trial showed only that he shoved and knocked victim to side as he ran
past
her. People v. Brown, App. 4 Dist.1987, 114 Ill.Dec. 955, 163
Ill.App.3d 976,
516 N.E.2d 1349. Criminal Law k 1167(1)
Where charging instrument alleged commission of theft by exertion of
unauthorized control "on or about" October 31, 1979, proof that
defendant
exerted unauthorized control on November 11, 1979, was not fatal to his
conviction. People v. Alexander, App. 3 Dist.1981, 55 Ill.Dec. 213, 99
Ill.App.3d 810, 425 N.E.2d 1386, affirmed 66 Ill.Dec. 326, 93 Ill.2d
73, 442
N.E.2d 887. Larceny k 40(5)
In case in which complaint alleged that felony theft was committed on
July 9,
1976, while evidence indicated that the offense may have been committed
on
either July 9, 1976, or on July 10, 1976, instruction that if a jury
found
that the crime charged was committed, the State was not required to
prove that
it was committed on the particular date charged did not improperly
prejudice
defendant. People v. Neumann, App. 3 Dist.1979, 31 Ill.Dec. 699, 76
Ill.App.3d 112, 394 N.E.2d 901. Criminal Law k 772(4)
Discrepancy between witness' trial testimony that charged theft
occurred on a
Friday and bill of particulars which stated that theft occurred on
April 19,
1966, which was a Tuesday, did not constitute a fatal variance and did
not
prejudice defendant who presented an alibi defense covering April 19,
1966,
where witness was unshaken in her testimony that the theft occurred on
April
19, 1966 and defense counsel effectively and thoroughly brought the
discrepancy to the attention of the jury. People v. Cassman, App.1972,
7
Ill.App.3d 786, 288 N.E.2d 667. Indictment And Information k 176
Where premises of store from which defendants allegedly took liquor
were
adequately identified in indictment and by evidence to show that
defendants
were aware of exact identity of premises involved and record adequately
established the premises, so that defendants would have recourse to
record to
establish a defense of prior jeopardy in subsequent prosecution for the
same
offense, failure of complaints to indicate that ownership of store was
in a
corporation or other business entity or any person did not work any
substantial injury upon defendants and did not result in fatal variance
between charges and proof. People v. Kaprelian, App.1972, 6 Ill.App.3d
1066,
286 N.E.2d 613, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 2730, 412 U.S. 918, 37
L.Ed.2d 144.
Criminal Law k 1167(1); Larceny k 40(9)
Fact that indictment alleged that theft occurred on March 20 and proof
showed
that alleged theft occurred the end of April and defendant had an alibi
defense prepared based on March 20 was not a material error. People v.
Fleming, App.1970, 121 Ill.App.2d 97, 257 N.E.2d 271. Indictment And
Information k 176
In prosecution for larceny of a safe, an instruction that to sustain a
conviction it was not necessary for prosecution to prove that offense
was in
fact committed on date alleged in indictment, but that it was
sufficient if it
was proved beyond a reasonable doubt to have been committed within
three years
before indictment was returned by grand jury, was proper where it
appeared
that actual larceny of safe might have been committed either on January
18,
1937, or on January 19 of that year. People v. Bote, 1942, 40 N.E.2d
55, 379
Ill. 245.
Criminal Law k 772(4)
65. Joinder and severance--In general
Series of acts committed by defendant, each of which might otherwise
constitute misdemeanor theft, may be charged as single felony when it
is
alleged that the acts were in furtherance of single intention and
design to
obtain property of single owner or several persons having common
interest in
such property; total value of the property taken will determine
whether the
theft constitutes misdemeanor or felony. People v. Brenizer, 1986, 95
Ill.Dec. 300, 111 Ill.2d 220, 489 N.E.2d 862. Indictment And
Information k
125(13)
Where defendant systematically converted funds from city over period of
years,
fact that she issued herself checks and on other occasions she issued
herself
cash was not fatal to indictment charging her with felony theft.
People v.
Kinion, App. 3 Dist.1982, 61 Ill.Dec. 836, 105 Ill.App.3d 1069, 435
N.E.2d
533, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 1256, 460 U.S. 1014, 75 L.Ed.2d 484.
Indictment And Information k 129(2)
In prosecution of two defendants for theft of property having a value
exceeding $150, trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion
for
severance on basis that evidence which allegedly tended to show other
crimes
by other defendant denied defendant a fair trial, in that the testimony
objected to could not be said to be prejudicial, and defendant's own
counsel
opened the door to inquiry on such matters. People v. Crowder, App. 2
Dist.1981, 54 Ill.Dec. 777, 99 Ill.App.3d 500, 425 N.E.2d 994.
Criminal Law k
622.7(8)
In prosecution of husband, wife and two sons on nine counts of theft
under
this paragraph the charges were sufficiently interrelated to justify
denial of
severance. People v. Mertens, App. 2 Dist.1979, 33 Ill.Dec. 206, 77
Ill.App.3d 791, 396 N.E.2d 595.
Although thefts alleged in two indictments apparently arose out of same
wave
of crime, such thefts were distinct acts and thus were not required to
be
joined in single prosecution under <paragraph> 3-3 of former chapter
38,
governing compulsory joinder of criminal offenses. People v. Johnson,
App. 2
Dist.1978, 20 Ill.Dec. 483, 63 Ill.App.3d 248, 380 N.E.2d 461.
Indictment And
Information k 130
Taking of one person's property at particular time and place was
different
offense from receiving stolen property of different person taken at
different
time and place, and, though charges were joined, trial court's refusal
to
enter judgment and sentence on first count of indictment did not in
effect
acquit defendants of charges on count one, and appeal by People was
authorized, and cause was remanded with directions that judgment of
conviction
as to count one be reinstated and sentence imposed. People v. Songer,
App. 3
Dist.1977, 6 Ill.Dec. 309, 48 Ill.App.3d 748, 362 N.E.2d 1131.
Criminal Law k
29(10); Criminal Law k 1024(1); Sentencing And Punishment k 540
Although only one offense was committed, there was no error in allowing
prosecution to proceed under two separate counts of theft over $150.
People
v. Cobetto, App. 5 Dist.1975, 32 Ill.App.3d 696, 336 N.E.2d 505,
affirmed in
part, reversed in part 6 Ill.Dec. 907, 66 Ill.2d 488, 363 N.E.2d 854.
Indictment And Information k 132(4)
Statutorily proscribing conduct of obtaining control over stolen
property
knowing that property to have been stolen by another is not a separate
offense, but is included within this section providing that a person
commits
theft when he knowingly obtains or exerts unauthorized control over
property
of the owner; and a person who violates former statute may be charged
and
convicted of violating latter statute. People v. Dziak, App. 2
Dist.1975, 30
Ill.App.3d 859, 333 N.E.2d 582. Indictment And Information k 191(5)
Theft offenses, which related to stolen vehicles found on land leased
by
defendant and which were all part of same general transaction, plan, or
scheme, could be charged in one indictment. People v. Key, App. 3
Dist.1975,
28 Ill.App.3d 637, 328 N.E.2d 914. Indictment And Information k 129(2)
While proof did not establish exact date that machines came into
defendant's
control, State could properly fix date on which sale of them took place
as
date on which defendant deceived purchaser and also date on which he
exerted
unauthorized control intending to deprive owner permanently of the use
of the
property; thus, the same act, the sale, was common element of proof of
offenses of theft by deception and theft by exertion of unauthorized
control
and that was sufficient to bring both counts within the same
comprehensive
transaction, allowing the different offenses with different victims to
be
tried together. People v. Petitjean, App.1972, 7 Ill.App.3d 231, 287
N.E.2d
137. Criminal Law k 622.7(2)
66. ---- Burglary, joinder and severance
Indictment may charge defendant with both burglary and larceny and he
may be
sentenced for both crimes following verdict of guilty. People v.
Griffin,
1949, 402 Ill. 247, 83 N.E.2d 746; People v. Saxton, 1948, 400 Ill.
257, 79
N.E.2d 601, certiorari denied 69 S.Ct. 25, 335 U.S. 835, 93 L.Ed. 387,
certiorari denied 70 S.Ct. 424, 338 U.S. 944, 94 L.Ed. 582.
Counts for burglary and larceny may be joined in one indictment.
People v.
Goodman, 1918, 283 Ill. 414, 119 N.E. 429; People v. Goodwin, 1914,
263 Ill.
99, 104 N.E. 1018.
Where each count of an indictment charging burglary and theft charged a
separate offense each count had to allege or incorporate by reference
to some
other count the averments necessary to charge an offense under the
pertinent
statute involved. People v. Berndt, App.1968, 101 Ill.App.2d 29, 242
N.E.2d
273. Indictment And Information k 98; Indictment And Information k 99
Indictment charging that defendant broke into restaurant building of
certain
person with intent to steal his property and that defendant
"feloniously and
burglariously stole, took and carried away" certain property consisting
of
certain amount of currency, cartons of cigarettes and boxes of cigars
alleged
essential elements of separate crimes of burglary and larceny, and
since the
two charges arose out of same transaction they were properly joined in
same
count. People v. Sellers, 1964, 30 Ill.2d 221, 196 N.E.2d 481.
Indictment And
Information k 129(2)
An indictment, alleging in several counts that defendants burglariously
broke
and entered a boat club's building with intent to steal such club's
property
therein and stole two named persons' guns while in building, was
sufficient as
against contention that it charged three separate offenses of burglary
and
larceny of each of such persons' property. People v. McMullen, 1948,
79
N.E.2d 470, 400 Ill. 253, certiorari denied 69 S.Ct. 16, 335 U.S. 831,
93
L.Ed. 384. Indictment And Information k 129(2)
A count for larceny may be joined in same indictment with count for
burglary,
and such offenses may be joined in same count. People v. Keene, 1945,
63
N.E.2d 509, 391 Ill. 305, certiorari denied 66 S.Ct. 900, 327 U.S. 801,
90
L.Ed. 1026.
67. ---- Armed robbery, joinder and severance
Information charging armed robbery adequately charged defendant with
theft as
lesser included offense; information charged that defendant took
victims'
property, and implicitly set forth that taking was done both with
knowledge
and with intent to permanently deprive victims of property. People v.
Jones,
1992, 172 Ill.Dec. 401, 149 Ill.2d 288, 595 N.E.2d 1071. Robbery k
17(1)
Defendant was not prejudiced by being improperly indicted and tried for
both
theft and armed robbery where state dismissed theft indictment and
judgment of
conviction was entered and sentence imposed only for offense of armed
robbery.
People v. Dudley, 1970, 46 Ill.2d 305, 263 N.E.2d 1, certiorari denied
91
S.Ct. 1386, 402 U.S. 910, 28 L.Ed.2d 651. Criminal Law k 1165(1)
68. ---- Robbery, joinder and severance
That defendant might have been indicted for crime of robbery rather
than theft
did not invalidate his conviction of crime of theft. People v.
Henderson,
App.1966, 72 Ill.App.2d 89, 218 N.E.2d 795. Criminal Law k 29(11)
An indictment may be so drawn as to charge in one and the same count
the
offense of robbery and also the offense of theft, and the defendant may
be
convicted of either offense, according as it may be shown by the
evidence, and
a description and value may be alleged and proved which would be
necessary in
a charge of theft but would be immaterial on a charge of robbery and
could be
rejected as surplusage on that charge. People v. Tolentino, App.1966,
68
Ill.App.2d 480, 216 N.E.2d 191. Indictment And Information k 119;
Indictment
And Information k 125(2); Indictment And Information k 191(5);
Indictment
And Information k 191(9)
An indictment may be so drawn as to charge in one count both robbery
and
larceny, and accused may be convicted of either offense, according as
it may
be shown by evidence, and a description and value may be alleged and
shown
which would be necessary in a charge of larceny but would be rejected
as
surplusage on a charge of robbery. People v. Keene, 1945, 63 N.E.2d
509, 391
Ill. 305, certiorari denied 66 S.Ct. 900, 327 U.S. 801, 90 L.Ed. 1026.
Indictment And Information k 119; Indictment And Information k 125(2);
Indictment And Information k 191(5); Indictment And Information k
191(9)
69. Guilty plea--In general
Where theft offense with which defendant was charged had never been
referred
to by name prior to entry of defendant's guilty plea, no questions had
been
asked of defendant concerning voluntariness of guilty plea, and record
from
plea hearing did not clearly reflect factual basis for guilty plea,
trial
court's failure to comply with rule governing acceptance of guilty
pleas was a
meritorious issue, and defense counsel's failure to raise such issue on
motion
to vacate judgment and withdraw pleas denied defendant effective
assistance of
counsel; therefore, defendant's guilty plea to theft charge would be
vacated
and order revoking defendant's probation on a basis of such guilty plea
would
be reversed. People v. Porter, App. 4 Dist.1978, 19 Ill.Dec. 173, 61
Ill.App.3d 941, 378 N.E.2d 788. Criminal Law k 273(4.1); Criminal Law
k
641.13(7)
Conviction based upon defendant's guilty plea to count of indictment
charging
him with theft from certain motel would be reversed where defendant
also pled
guilty to another count in same indictment charging him with burglary
of the
same motel. People v. Payne, App. 5 Dist.1975, 33 Ill.App.3d 713, 341
N.E.2d
735. Criminal Law k 1186.1
Defendant, who entered guilty plea to charge of theft over $150, and
who was
17 years of age at time of offense, was not denied equal protection of
the law
on theory that he was not afforded same protection under Juvenile Court
Act as
would be afforded a 17-year-old female defendant. People v. Robinson,
App. 4
Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 466, 319 N.E.2d 260. Constitutional Law k
224(5)
Where prosecutor advised court, in presence of defendant and his
counsel, that
defendant was charged with the offense of theft of an automobile having
a
value in excess of $150 from a certain automobile dealer, the defendant
was
adequately informed of the nature of the charge. People v. Unger, App.
2
Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 525, 318 N.E.2d 651. Criminal Law k 264
Fact that defendant pleaded guilty to information which was
insufficient to
charge crime of theft did not constitute waiver of such irregularity in
that
charge involved in an indictment or an information in a criminal case
is
jurisdictional. People v. Haynes, App.1971, 132 Ill.App.2d 1031, 270
N.E.2d
63. Indictment And Information k 196(5)
70. ---- Admonitions, guilty plea
In proceeding in which defendant pled guilty to felony theft charge,
any error
in failing to advise defendant of the minimum sentence for such offense
did
not warrant reversal, in light of fact that defendant, who was
represented by
counsel when guilty plea was negotiated and accepted, was not shown to
have
been actually unaware of the possible punishment and that trial court
advised
defendant that if his probation were revoked he "could be sent to
prison for
five years * * * [then] be required to serve one year of mandatory
court
supervision and * * * fined $10,000." People v. Hale, App. 5
Dist.1981, 51
Ill.Dec. 542, 96 Ill.App.3d 187, 420 N.E.2d 1100, certiorari denied 102
S.Ct.
1459, 455 U.S. 953, 71 L.Ed.2d 669. Criminal Law k 1166(3)
Where defendant entered negotiated guilty plea to crime of theft only
after
pretrial conference, defendant knew that he would receive sentence of
two to
two years and one day and defendant elected to be sentenced under the
law in
effect at time of crime rather than under the Unified Code of
Corrections, the
trial court was not required to admonish defendant that under the Code
his
minimum sentence, i.e., one to three years, could not exceed one third
of the
maximum, that imposition of a fine was not mandatory and that one
cannot be
imprisoned for failure to pay a fine because of financial inability.
People
v. Young, App. 1 Dist.1974, 25 Ill.App.3d 427, 323 N.E.2d 375.
Criminal Law k
264
Court's incorrect statement, that defendant, charged with burglary and
two
counts of theft, might be sentenced to maximum of 20 years and minimum
of six
years and four months, rather than six years and eight months, did not
render
defendant's guilty pleas invalid, where court referred to <section>
1005-8-1
of former chapter 38 providing that minimum sentence was not to be
greater
than one-third of maximum, which reference was not even required under
admonition rule ch. 110A, <section> 402, admonition was detailed and
complete,
and defendant's pleas were made voluntarily. People v. Dye, App. 4
Dist.1974,
23 Ill.App.3d 431, 319 N.E.2d 541. Criminal Law k 273.1(4)
Defendant's guilty pleas to burglary and theft charges were not invalid
on
theory that court failed to admonish defendant that consecutive
sentences
might be imposed for the offenses charged, where, under the facts,
consecutive
sentences could not be imposed. People v. Dye, App. 4 Dist.1974, 23
Ill.App.3d 431, 319 N.E.2d 541. Criminal Law k 273.1(4)
Guilty plea of defendant who was indicted on one count of burglary and
two
counts of theft under $150, was not invalid on ground that he was not
admonished that conviction for greater offense of burglary would
preclude
conviction on lesser theft offenses. People v. Woods, App. 4
Dist.1974, 23
Ill.App.3d 480, 319 N.E.2d 263. Criminal Law k 273.1(4)
Failure to admonish defendant, who had been informed that the maximum
sentence
for theft over $150 was ten years before entering plea of guilty, of
existence
of mandatory parole term written into every indeterminate sentence, was
not
error. People v. Robinson, App. 4 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 466, 319
N.E.2d
260. Criminal Law k 273.1(4)
Failure to inform defendant of sentencing alternative was not error,
where
defendant, before entering plea of guilty, had been informed that
sentence for
theft over $150 was one to ten years. People v. Robinson, App. 4
Dist.1974,
23 Ill.App.3d 466, 319 N.E.2d 260. Criminal Law k 273.1(4)
Trial court, in admonishing defendant before accepting her plea of
guilty to
charge of theft, was not required to inform defendant of <section>
1005-8-1 of
former chapter 38 providing for mandatory parole term. People v.
Wilson, App.
3 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 457, 318 N.E.2d 767. Criminal Law k 264
Fact that court inaccurately informed defendant that theft of property
in
excess of $150 was class four felony instead of a class three felony
could not
have misled, prejudiced, or influenced decision to enter into
negotiated plea
by defendant who actually received minimum sentence for class three
felony
whereas he had bargained for maximum sentence for class for felony.
People v.
Reynolds, App. 3 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 641, 312 N.E.2d 293.
Criminal Law k
273.1(2)
Failure of trial court to read indictment of relevant section of
Criminal Code
to accused, who pled guilty to theft of over $150 and who had been
given copy
of indictment at arraignment, and failure in any other way to attempt
to
inform accused of the essential elements of the offense, to inquire
into
accused's understanding of such elements and to determine whether any
force,
threats or promises, apart from plea agreement, were used to obtain
plea was
reversible error. People v. Johnson, App. 5 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d
433, 311
N.E.2d 754. Criminal Law k 264; Criminal Law k 273.1(4); Criminal
Law k
1167(5)
Appeal from conviction upon plea of guilty of burglary and theft over
$150 did
not show proper admonitions to defendant regarding waiver of right to
jury
trial and confrontation of witnesses against him or an adequate inquiry
into
voluntariness of the plea, and required reversal and remandment.
People v.
Smith, App. 5 Dist.1974, 18 Ill.App.3d 390, 309 N.E.2d 713. Criminal
Law k
1086.9
Even though court informed defendant at time of entry of guilty plea
that he
was charged with committing a theft over $150, where court did not read
information or further explain alleged offense and did not inform
defendant
that necessary element of crime charged was the intent to permanently
deprive
owner of property or in any way ascertain that defendant understood
that
element, trial court failed to comply with Ch. 110A, <section> 402,
requiring
court to determine that defendant understands nature of charge prior to
accepting guilty plea. People v. Woods, App. 5 Dist.1974, 17
Ill.App.3d 835,
308 N.E.2d 856. Criminal Law k 273.1(4)
Reading of criminal information to defendant and defendant's statement
that he
understood charge of theft over $150 did not constitute compliance with
Ch.
110A, <section> 402, requiring court to determine that defendant
understands
nature of charge prior to accepting his guilty plea, where reading of
information occurred four months prior to defendant's entry of guilty
plea at
time when defendant was not represented by counsel and where judge who
accepted guilty plea was not judge who had read information. People v.
Woods,
App. 5 Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 835, 308 N.E.2d 856. Criminal Law k
273.1(4)
71. ---- Factual basis, guilty plea
In prosecution for theft by deception, sufficient factual basis was
presented
to trial court for defendant's guilty plea by showing that he
established an
account with checks drawn on an account which had not contained any
funds
since 1981 and that he thereafter wrote a check on the account thus
established, to establish account at third bank, and then wrote six
checks on
the account at the third bank. People v. Young, App. 3 Dist.1985, 85
Ill.Dec.
375, 130 Ill.App.3d 117, 473 N.E.2d 974, appeal denied, certiorari
denied 106
S.Ct. 104, 474 U.S. 833, 88 L.Ed.2d 85. Criminal Law k 273(4.1)
State's attorney's statement that defendant knowingly exerted
unauthorized
control over certain person's property, consisting of currency with
value of
more than $150, with intent to deprive her permanently of use and
benefit of
the property, coupled with defendant's admission that those facts were
correct, demonstrated a sufficient factual basis for defendant's guilty
plea
to felony theft charge. People v. Hale, App. 5 Dist.1981, 51 Ill.Dec.
542, 96
Ill.App.3d 187, 420 N.E.2d 1100, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1459, 455
U.S.
953, 71 L.Ed.2d 669. Criminal Law k 273(4.1)
Police officer's testimony that steer which defendant allegedly killed
and
quartered was worth $250 was sufficient to establish a factual
foundation for
his felony theft plea, where the officer also testified that he had a
small
acreage, that he owned cattle of his own, and that his opinion as to
the value
of the steer was based on the value of his own cattle. People v.
Hummel, App.
4 Dist.1977, 7 Ill.Dec. 837, 48 Ill.App.3d 1002, 365 N.E.2d 122.
Criminal Law
k 273(4.1)
It was clear from testimony of defendant at time he entered his plea of
guilty
to theft charges and record as a whole that there was a factual basis
for
charges in compliance with this section. People v. Key, App. 3
Dist.1975, 28
Ill.App.3d 637, 328 N.E.2d 914. Criminal Law k 273(4.1)
State's recitation that two police officers would testify that they saw
defendant enter motel and come running back outside, that three
employees of
motel would identify defendant, and that additional evidence would show
that
defendant was going to break in and pick up a television set that had
originally been taken by a codefendant from a room and placed in
basement, and
defendant's counsel's statement that defendant was only involved in the
later
attempt to break in and pick up the television set, was sufficient to
establish a factual basis for defendant's plea of guilty to theft over
$150.
People v. Robinson, App. 4 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 466, 319 N.E.2d
260.
Criminal Law k 273(4.1)
Prosecutor's summary of evidence which he could present against
defendant who
was pleading guilty to theft was sufficient to furnish a factual basis
for the
plea even though it did not show specifically how the defendant
accomplished
the theft. People v. Wilson, App. 3 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 457, 318
N.E.2d
767. Criminal Law k 273(4.1)
Statement by prosecutor that, if there was trial with respect to case
of theft
in which defendant had entered plea of guilty, he would show that
defendant
obtained and exerted unauthorized control over a pantsuit with the
intent to
permanently deprive the owners of the use and benefit of the pantsuit
and that
defendant was not authorized at the time to obtain such property from
the
owner was sufficient to show defendant's intent and to show a factual
basis
for plea of guilty. People v. Wilson, App. 3 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d
457,
318 N.E.2d 767. Criminal Law k 273(4.1)
Where, at time of negotiated plea statement, in presence of defendant
and his
counsel, prosecutor stated that defendant, in fact, committed the
offense of
theft in stealing an automobile of the value of more than $150 from a
certain
automobile dealer, and neither defendant nor his counsel objected,
there was
shown a sufficient factual basis for defendant's plea of guilty.
People v.
Unger, App. 2 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 525, 318 N.E.2d 651. Criminal
Law k
273(4.1)
In prosecution for possession of controlled substance and theft, recent
unexplained possession of stolen drugs by defendant when considered in
conjunction with defendant's understanding and acquiescence to nature
of
charge, constituted substantial compliance, as respects theft charge,
with Ch.
110A, <section> 402; requiring that there be a factual basis to
support
charge. People v. Reynolds, App. 3 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 641, 312
N.E.2d
293. Criminal Law k 264; Criminal Law k 273(4.1)
Where defendant who was charged with theft over $150 stated that he and
his
friends used stolen automobile for joy riding and court relied entirely
upon
such statement to establish factual basis for defendant's guilty plea,
trial
court failed to comply with court rule requiring that trial court
determine
that there is a factual basis for guilty plea prior to accepting plea.
People
v. Woods, App. 5 Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 835, 308 N.E.2d 856. Criminal
Law k
273.1(4)
72. ---- Voluntariness, guilty plea
Defendant, who pled guilty to felony theft charge, was sufficiently
informed
of the nature of the charge where prosecutor, on being asked for a
factual
basis for the plea, stated that defendant knowingly exerted
unauthorized
control over currency in excess of $150 belonging to certain person
with
intent to permanently deprive her of the property. People v. Hale,
App. 5
Dist.1981, 51 Ill.Dec. 542, 96 Ill.App.3d 187, 420 N.E.2d 1100,
certiorari
denied 102 S.Ct. 1459, 455 U.S. 953, 71 L.Ed.2d 669. Criminal Law k
273(4.1)
Defendant's guilty pleas to embezzlement were voluntary; fact that
defendant
was unable to work out restitution in order to avoid being prosecuted
did not
render her pleas involuntary. People v. Lumley, App. 2 Dist.1979, 31
Ill.Dec.
761, 76 Ill.App.3d 221, 394 N.E.2d 1079. Criminal Law k 273.1(1)
Guilty pleas to charges of burglary and theft and possession of
marijuana were
voluntarily and understandingly entered by defendants where defense
counsel
individually stated plea agreements for each defendant in open court,
court
asked each defendant whether his understanding was that he would plead
guilty
and receive the stated sentences, and each defendant acknowledged
understanding of the agreement. People v. Payne, App. 5 Dist.1975, 33
Ill.App.3d 713, 341 N.E.2d 735. Criminal Law k 273.1(4)
Where in consideration for defendant's plea of guilty to burglary,
theft
charge was dismissed, and sentence of two to six years, with parole at
earliest possible date, was recommended, adequate consideration existed
for
guilty plea of defendant, who at time was on parole under sentence from
previous burglary conviction, even though defendant could not have been
convicted and sentenced on both theft and burglary charges, which arose
from
same conduct and involved same property, and thus defendant's plea was
not
induced by illusory bargain so as to violate ch. 110A, <section> 402
requiring
that guilty plea be intelligently and understandingly made. People v.
Edwards, App. 5 Dist.1975, 29 Ill.App.3d 625, 331 N.E.2d 342. Criminal
Law k
273.1(2)
Defendant, who stated he understood that he was charged with stealing a
color
television set from specified motor inn after judge had read to
defendant the
information charging the offense of theft over $150 and containing the
elements of the offense, and who made no objection during prosecutor's
recital
of defendant's criminal conduct and evidence that would be presented if
case
went to trial, understood nature of charge of theft over $150. People
v.
Robinson, App. 4 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 466, 319 N.E.2d 260.
Criminal Law k
273.1(4)
Record disclosed that defendant intelligently and articulately
responded to
court's inquiry regarding his knowledge of nature of reduced charge of
theft
which was presented to defendant in the simplest terms possible, rather
than
in technical terms. People v. Battie, App. 1 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d
806,
313 N.E.2d 203. Criminal Law k 264
Record established that defendant's plea
and
possession of a controlled substance was
neither
threats nor promises to induce the plea,
negotiations.
People v. Reynolds, App. 3 Dist.1974, 19
293.
Criminal Law k 273.1(5)
of guilty to charge of theft
voluntary and that there were
other than the plea
Ill.App.3d 641, 312 N.E.2d
73. ---- Withdrawal of guilty plea
Refusal of trial court to permit withdrawal of plea of guilty to charge
of
larceny after court set aside sentence imposed during term at which
original
sentence was entered in order to make correction in original sentence
was not
error.
Law k
274(9)
People v. De Rosa, 1935, 199 N.E. 267, 362 Ill. 161.
Criminal
74. ---- Jury trial, waiver, guilty plea
Record in prosecution for theft of property having value of less than
$150
sufficiently disclosed knowing and understanding waiver of right to
jury trial
where defendant was present when defense counsel twice stated in open
court
that jury was waived. People v. Addison, App. 1 Dist.1974, 19
Ill.App.3d 718,
312 N.E.2d 365. Jury k 29(6)
Record of proceedings at which defendant entered plea of guilty to
theft of an
automobile of a value of more than $150 established that defendant knew
of
right to a jury trial and knowingly and intelligently waived it.
People v.
Grant, App. 3 Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 963, 309 N.E.2d 68. Criminal
Law k
273.1(5)
In case wherein defendant had knowingly and understandingly waived jury
trial
on first theft charge, trial by jury was knowingly and understandingly
waived
on second theft charge when trial judge stated, "Plea not guilty, jury
waived?" and defense counsel in defendant's presence replied, "Yes,
your
Honor." People v. Townsend, App. 1 Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 621, 308
N.E.2d 82
. Jury k 29(6)
Where trial judge, after defendant stated that he wanted bench trial,
explained to defendant what jury trial consisted of and that by waiving
jury
defendant would be waiving right to have 12 people decide whether he
was
guilty or innocent, and defendant specifically stated that he
understood this,
there was knowing and understanding waiver of jury trial as to first
theft
charge. People v. Townsend, App. 1 Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 621, 308
N.E.2d 82
. Jury k 29(6)
In prosecution for conspiracy to obtain money and property by false
pretenses,
court's acceptance of a juror who acknowledged a long-standing fear of
closed
places, and denial to counsel of right to interrogate the juror, or
even to
disclose her name, were prejudicially erroneous under circumstances of
case
where lengthy deliberation would normally have been required to
consider
evidence and instructions of the court. People v. Kurth, 1966, 34
Ill.2d 387,
216 N.E.2d 154. Criminal Law k 655(1); Criminal Law k 1166.16;
Criminal Law
k 1166.22(1); Jury k 83(1); Jury k 131(4)
75. ---- Counsel, waiver, guilty plea
Fact that defendant, who pled guilty to theft and against whom a fine
was then
imposed, subsequently had his probation for burglary and attempt
burglary
offenses revoked on basis of the theft did not establish that defendant
had
been entitled to be represented by counsel in such proceeding in which
he pled
guilty, particularly in light of fact that the theft was established at
the
revocation hearing by evidence of guilt of such offense, rather than by
fact
that defendant had pled guilty. People v. Cangelosi, App. 1 Dist.1979,
25
Ill.Dec. 24, 68 Ill.App.3d 489, 386 N.E.2d 295. Criminal Law k 264
Defendant who was charged with misdemeanor theft and who was not
represented
by counsel nor advised of his right to counsel and who did not waive
that
right was denied his right to assistance of counsel. People v. Brooks,
App. 3
Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 974, 309 N.E.2d 42. Criminal Law k 641.2(3)
76. Competency to stand trial
In prosecution for burglary, felony theft, and misdemeanor theft,
defendant's
conduct in standing mute throughout proceedings did not suggest that,
by
reason of mental condition or any other reason, defendant could not
understand
nature of proceeding and could not assist counsel in his defense so as
to
bring into question defendant's competence to stand trial. People v.
Tessier,
App. 5 Dist.1984, 79 Ill.Dec. 452, 123 Ill.App.3d 984, 463 N.E.2d 1006,
certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 1205, 469 U.S. 1220, 84 L.Ed.2d 348.
Mental
Health k 432
In prosecution for burglary, felony theft, and misdemeanor theft, in
which
court on its own motion compelled hearing in which it attempted to
determine
if defendant understood consequences of his waiver of counsel,
carefully
explained law and its significance, and inquired of defendant's
appointed
counsel and sheriff as to defendant's ability to understand and
communicate,
defendant was given hearing on his competence to stand trial. People
v.
Tessier, App. 5 Dist.1984, 79 Ill.Dec. 452, 123 Ill.App.3d 984, 463
N.E.2d
1006, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 1205, 469 U.S. 1220, 84 L.Ed.2d 348.
Criminal Law k 625.10(4)
77. Right to counsel
Defendant sentenced to six months' probation and, as condition of
probation,
ordered to undergo psychological counseling after she was found guilty
of
retail theft of merchandise valued at less than $150, was statutorily
(ch. 38,
<paragraph> 113-3) entitled to court-appointed counsel. People v.
Morgese,
App. 2 Dist.1981, 50 Ill.Dec. 130, 94 Ill.App.3d 638, 418 N.E.2d 1124.
Criminal Law k 641.2(4)
Where penalty imposed against defendant found guilty of retail theft of
merchandise valued less that $150 was six months probation and, as
condition
of probation, ordered to undergo psychological counseling, defendant
did not
have constitutional right (U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 6) to court-appointed
counsel. People v. Morgese, App. 2 Dist.1981, 50 Ill.Dec. 130, 94
Ill.App.3d
638, 418 N.E.2d 1124. Criminal Law k 641.2(4)
Defendant's statements at sentencing hearing, that he didn't want to go
back
to prison, that if a prison sentence was to be imposed he wanted an
attorney,
and that he felt that counsel should not be necessary for sentencing on
petty
theft conviction, indicated that defendant did not make a knowing and
intelligent waiver of counsel for sentencing purposes. People v.
Schultz,
App. 2 Dist.1974, 21 Ill.App.3d 1086, 316 N.E.2d 183. Sentencing And
Punishment k 349
Counsel appointed to represent
was
given leave to withdraw, where
represented by
employed counsel, after a full
rights, and
cognizant of the penalty which
plea of
defendant on appeal of theft conviction
record showed that defendant,
explanation of his constitutional
might be imposed as the result of his
guilty, pleaded guilty and persisted in the plea, and sentence imposed
was not
unduly severe. People v. Jones, App.1966, 76 Ill.App.2d 20, 221 N.E.2d
510,
affirmed 38 Ill.2d 384, 231 N.E.2d 390. Criminal Law k 641.10(2)
78. Effective assistance of counsel
Defense counsel's conduct in asking defendant to disclose his entire
criminal
history to the jury constituted ineffective assistance and warranted
reversal
of defendant's theft conviction; there was a reasonable probability
that the
results of the proceeding would have different, absent counsel's
errors, given
evidence that the witnesses who testified against defendant were his
accomplices who were found in possession of stolen goods but had not
been
charged with any offense, and there was no evidence of defendant's
motive to
commit the crime. People v. Fletcher, App. 5 Dist.2002, 269 Ill.Dec.
180, 335
Ill.App.3d 447, 780 N.E.2d 365. Criminal Law k 641.13(6)
In prosecution for theft, defense counsel's failure to tender jury
instruction
on lesser offense of criminal trespass to motor vehicle did not
constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel; defense counsel's defense theory,
that
defendant had lawful authority to be in automobile which he took from
automobile dealership and retained overnight, was reasonable, and
essence of
crime of criminal trespass to motor vehicle is being in automobile
without
lawful authority. People v. Mabry, App. 3 Dist.1991, 165 Ill.Dec. 328,
223
Ill.App.3d 193, 584 N.E.2d 507. Criminal Law k 641.13(2.1)
Failure of defense counsel to object to state's instructions on theft
over
$150 and to submit instruction on misdemeanor theft could not be
considered
inadequate representation warranting reversal of convictions for
burglary and
theft where only evidence introduced on value which would support an
instruction was given by State. People v. Miller, App. 1 Dist.1980, 45
Ill.Dec. 810, 90 Ill.App.3d 422, 413 N.E.2d 143. Criminal Law k
641.13(2.1)
Under statute governing motions in arrest of judgment (<paragraph> 1162 of
former chapter 38), defense counsel's failure to make motion in arrest
of
judgment of convictions for burglary and theft, based on "obviously
defective"
information which allegedly did not specify theft over $150 or the
intent to
permanently deprive the victim of his property, did not constitute
ineffective
assistance where, when case was called, State moved to amend
information to
include additional count of burglary and one of theft of property of
value of
more than $150, defense counsel raised no objection, and motion was
granted.
People v. Miller, App. 1 Dist.1980, 45 Ill.Dec. 810, 90 Ill.App.3d 422,
413
N.E.2d 143. Criminal Law k 641.13(6)
Fact that appointed defense counsel for defendant, who was convicted of
theft
by deception, had previously successfully prosecuted defendant for
burglary
indicated existence of potential conflict of interest between defendant
and
counsel; such potential conflict required reversal of conviction,
absent any
waiver of defendant's right to other counsel. People v. Franklin, App.
3
Dist.1978, 18 Ill.Dec. 267, 60 Ill.App.3d 905, 377 N.E.2d 556, reversed
25
Ill.Dec. 809, 75 Ill.2d 173, 387 N.E.2d 685, on remand 29 Ill.Dec. 851,
73
Ill.App.3d 558, 392 N.E.2d 408. Criminal Law k 641.5(1); Criminal Law
k
1166.10(3)
Defendant charged with theft from person was not denied fair trial and
effective assistance of counsel because one prosecution witness advised
another not to discuss case with defendant's counsel, though witness
who so
advised was transit authority police officer and was therefore asserted
to be
an agent of the state. People v. Nunn, App.1970, 130 Ill.App.2d 86,
264
N.E.2d 786. Criminal Law k 641.12(1)
In prosecution for larceny of motor vehicle by defendant who
represented
himself before jury, record showed that defendant at least four times
prior to
trial and on day of trial was made fully aware of his right to counsel
and
that he knowingly refused such aid, and hence he could not complain of
any
failure of court to provide counsel to conduct his defense. People v.
Sinko,
1960, 21 Ill.2d 23, 171 N.E.2d 9, certiorari denied 81 S.Ct. 821, 365
U.S.
855, 5 L.Ed.2d 818. Criminal Law k 641.9
79. Argument of counsel--In general
Prosecutor's closing argument in burglary and theft prosecution that
five days
was time enough for defendant to have sold items that were allegedly
taken but
not found in defendant's apartment after arrest, was proper comment in
reply
to defense counsel's argument that because missing items were not found
in
defendant's apartment, complainant's allegation that defendant took the
items
was not credible. People v. Collins, App. 1 Dist.1992, 169 Ill.Dec.
730, 227
Ill.App.3d 670, 592 N.E.2d 217. Criminal Law k 726
Where, in prosecution for robbery, defendant herself tendered lesser
included
offense instructions and verdict forms on theft and urged jury in
closing
argument to find her guilty only of lesser included offense of theft,
defendant was estopped from contending that theft was not lesser
included
offense of robbery. People v. Morgan, App. 5 Dist.1976, 40 Ill.App.3d
711,
352 N.E.2d 444, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 2635, 431 U.S. 930, 53
L.Ed.2d 246.
Criminal Law k 1137(2)
Remarks of prosecutor in prosecution for burglary, theft and criminal
trespass
to a vehicle that while people were out working to support a family
defendant
was robbing their houses to support his habit, although not condoned,
could
not have been a material factor in defendant's conviction for criminal
trespass to vehicle in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt and
in view
of defendant's acquittal on two counts. People v. Klytta, App. 1
Dist.1974,
24 Ill.App.3d 472, 321 N.E.2d 323. Criminal Law k 1171.1(6)
In prosecution for theft over $150, statement by prosecutor that
defendant
failed to obtain testimony of certain witnesses because such witnesses
did not
exist was made in response to closing argument of defense counsel and
was not
improper. People v. Agans, App. 4 Dist.1974, 24 Ill.App.3d 64, 320
N.E.2d 25.
Criminal Law k 726
In prosecution for theft of property over $150, statement by prosecutor
in
closing argument that defendant and alleged accomplice "were in it
together"
and that they went to scene of crime and got "lay of land" and then
came back
and defendant then took cash register, was merely presentation of
prosecutor's
theory of case, which was supported by testimony of alleged accomplice.
People
v. Agans, App. 4 Dist.1974, 24 Ill.App.3d 64, 320 N.E.2d 25. Criminal
Law k
720(8)
In prosecution for theft of property over $150, statement, to which
defendant
did not object at trial or in motion for new trial, by prosecutor in
closing
argument that defendant, whose alleged accomplice had entered guilty
plea,
wanted jury trial for reasons known only to himself, did not constitute
plain
error although it did raise implication that everyone except defendant
realized that he was guilty. People v. Agans, App. 4 Dist.1974, 24
Ill.App.3d
64, 320 N.E.2d 25. Criminal Law k 1037.1(2); Criminal Law k 1064(6)
That prosecutor stated, in trial for
$150, that
he would not undertake to prove that
truck
which he was accused of stealing did
the
State sought to convict him upon the
property.
People v. Snow, App. 4 Dist.1974, 21
Receiving
Stolen Goods k 4
theft of property in excess of
the defendant physically stole the
not support defendant's claim that
evidence of receiving stolen
Ill.App.3d 873, 316 N.E.2d 216.
Remarks by prosecutor, in prosecution for theft by deception of more
than
$150, involving sale of insurance policies of nonexistent company, that
people
who had purchased insurance were driving their vehicles thinking they
had
insurance were not improper or prejudicial. People v. Decker, App. 1
Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 86, 311 N.E.2d 228. Criminal Law k 723(1)
Where evidence of defendant's guilt of theft of property of value of
over $150
was overwhelming, prosecutor's statement, in response to defendant's
query,
during cross-examination by prosecutor, as to how prosecutor knew that
defendant took the property, that "I know you did," was not
objectionable as
indicating prosecutor had private knowledge of defendant's guilt.
People v.
Eastland, App. 4 Dist.1973, 11 Ill.App.3d 271, 296 N.E.2d 363.
Criminal Law k
719(3)
Where there was evidence in theft prosecution that no fingerprints were
found
at the scene of the crime, it was permissible for the prosecutor to
theorize
that defendant wore gloves. People v. Marino, App.1972, 5 Ill.App.3d
778, 284
N.E.2d 54. Criminal Law k 720(8)
In prosecution for burglary and larceny, reading to jury by assistant
state's
attorney of statutory provisions covering punishment for burglary and
defining
crime of larceny was not error where statutory provisions were set out
in
instructions. People v. Bote, 1941, 33 N.E.2d 449, 376 Ill. 264.
Criminal Law
k 717
80. ---- Name-calling, argument of counsel
Fact that prosecutor in prosecution for felony-theft and fraudulent
conveyance
of land referred to defendant as "artist of deception" and "duke of
deception"
and interwove comments as to facts with references to typical operation
of
"deception artist" did not constitute plain error requiring reversal on
basis
that comment unfairly characterized defendant as habitual criminal,
despite
fact he had no prior convictions, where defendant was charged with a
number of
crimes, and jury could have reasonably inferred from argument that
prosecutor
was referring to crimes charged in indictment. People v. Jedlicka,
App. 2
Dist.1980, 39 Ill.Dec. 865, 84 Ill.App.3d 483, 405 N.E.2d 844.
Criminal Law k
1037.1(2)
In a prosecution for automobile theft, it is improper for prosecutor in
closing argument to refer to defendant as a professional automobile
thief
merely because of an admission of defendant to one prior conviction for
automobile theft. People v. Tyson, App.1970, 130 Ill.App.2d 140, 264
N.E.2d
403. Criminal Law k 722.3
81. ---- Defendant's testimony, argument of counsel
In prosecution for theft, prosecutor's comment during closing argument
asking
whether anyone had offered a reasonable explanation as to why the
merchandise
defendant possessed still bore "full" price tags was not calculated to
draw
attention to defendant's failure to testify, but was directed to draw
attention to defendant's failure to present any evidence of a
reasonable
explanation and, thus, such comment was within the bounds of proper
argument.
People v. Jones, App. 1 Dist.1981, 53 Ill.Dec. 43, 97 Ill.App.3d 619,
423
N.E.2d 235. Criminal Law k 721(3)
Prosecutor's remarks regarding failure of accused to explain how he
came in
possession of stolen vehicle did not constitute reversible error, where
prosecutor made clear to jury that no unfavorable inference was to be
drawn
simply because accused did not testify on his own behalf. People v.
Tate,
1970, 45 Ill.2d 540, 259 N.E.2d 791, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 944,
401 U.S.
941, 28 L.Ed.2d 222. Criminal Law k 1171.5
82. ---- Statements of fact, argument of counsel
Any error in prosecutor's closing argument in burglary and theft
prosecution
that five days was sufficient time in which defendant could have sold
items
that were allegedly taken but not found in defendant's apartment after
arrest,
was cured by trial court's instructions to jury that closing arguments
by
attorneys were not evidence and that any comments not based on evidence
presented should be disregarded. People v. Collins, App. 1 Dist.1992,
169
Ill.Dec. 730, 227 Ill.App.3d 670, 592 N.E.2d 217. Criminal Law k
730(8)
In view of overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt in prosecution
for rape,
aggravated kidnapping, theft and attempt to commit murder, prosecutor's
reference three times in closing argument to complaining witness as a
woman
"who had been taken away from her home by two men in the middle of the
night,"
instead of having left lounge to which she went and met some
coemployees after
finishing work was not so confusing as to require reversal. People v.
Weaver,
App. 1 Dist.1972, 8 Ill.App.3d 299, 290 N.E.2d 691. Criminal Law k
1171.3
83. Remarks of judge
Trial court did not undertake private investigation of facts in bench
trial
prosecution for automobile-related theft and theft of vehicle property
by
deception so as to violate due process when judge commented that there
was no
business necessity to advance money on repossessed automobiles; trial
court
considered testimony of automobile purchaser regarding his attempted
purchase
of automobile and of accomplice regarding preparation of stolen
automobile for
sale and merely remarked on suspiciousness of circumstances. People v.
Kaye,
App. 1 Dist.1994, 201 Ill.Dec. 450, 264 Ill.App.3d 369, 636 N.E.2d 882.
Constitutional Law k 268(8); Criminal Law k 255.3
In prosecution for theft of property having a value exceeding $150,
trial
court abused its discretion in finding that newspaper articles which
reported
that threats had been made on the lives of two police officers who had
testified at trial were not inflammatory, and in thus refusing to poll
the
jury to determine whether any juror had read either article. People v.
Crowder, App. 2 Dist.1981, 54 Ill.Dec. 777, 99 Ill.App.3d 500, 425
N.E.2d 994.
Criminal Law k 868
In prosecution for theft by deception in connection with fraudulent
claim for
workmen's compensation benefits, trial court's comments concerning
defendant's
commission of the offense for compensation reflected nothing more than
proper
consideration of nature and circumstances of the offense in determining
appropriate sentencing. People v. Wurster, App. 3 Dist.1980, 38
Ill.Dec. 702,
83 Ill.App.3d 399, 403 N.E.2d 1306. Sentencing And Punishment k 362
Trial court, in prosecution of defendants on one count of burglary and
two
counts of theft of property valued in excess of $150, did not overstep
its
statutory authority by noting that the State did not sufficiently
establish or
prove the fair market value of the stolen property as a legal reason
for
directing the verdict for defendants on the two counts of theft,
notwithstanding contention that the court implied its belief that
defendants
had in fact committed a theft and the jury was thereby influenced and
defendants prejudiced because intent to commit a theft was a necessary
element
in finding defendants guilty of burglary. People v. Davis, App. 2
Dist.1974,
19 Ill.App.3d 848, 312 N.E.2d 343. Criminal Law k 656(9)
Closing comments of judge, made at bench trial before entering judgment
finding defendant guilty of theft of automobile, that court was
confronted
with determination as to whether or not purported explanation was
sufficient
to overcome presumption of possession of recently stolen property and
that the
court had concluded it was not indicated that judge was fully cognizant
of
issues, burden of proof, and duty to determine credibility of witnesses
and
weight to be given their testimony and did not show that judge was
acting
under "erroneous assumption of law". People v. Jones, App.1969, 112
Ill.App.2d 464, 251 N.E.2d 293. Criminal Law k 656(1)
Comments concerning defendant's clothing made by trial court during
hearing on
mitigation and aggravation after defendant had been found guilty of
theft did
not indicate prejudice of trial court. People v. Henderson, App.1966,
72
Ill.App.2d 89, 218 N.E.2d 795. Criminal Law k 1166.22(2)
Trial court's comment on defendant's clothing during course of
defendant's
nonjury trial for theft, although improper did not constitute
reversible
error. People v. Henderson, App.1966, 72 Ill.App.2d 89, 218 N.E.2d
795.
Criminal Law k 655(1); Criminal Law k 1166.22(2)
In prosecution for petit larceny, record failed to disclose that
defendant had
been deprived of a fair trial on ground that court assumed dual role of
prosecutor and judge. People v. Talbert, App.1959, 23 Ill.App.2d 368,
163
N.E.2d 222. Criminal Law k 655(1)
In false pretenses prosecution, court's examination and crossexamination of
witnesses and accused and numerous colloquies with accused's counsel,
indicating court's belief in accused's guilt, required reversal, in
view of
conflicting evidence. People v. Scowley, 1933, 187 N.E. 415, 353 Ill.
330.
Criminal Law k 656(9)
84. Re-opening of case
In prosecution for theft of doughnuts and ham from food store, any
error in
permitting State to reopen direct examination after resting by calling
officer, who was not listed on State's list of witnesses furnished to
accused,
for purpose of establishing ownership of store was not prejudicial
where
ownership had been previously established. People v. Baer, App. 4
Dist.1974,
19 Ill.App.3d 346, 311 N.E.2d 418. Criminal Law k 1168(2)
Permitting State to reopen its case, in prosecution for theft of
doughnuts and
ham from food store, to make proof of corporate ownership of store did
not
prejudice accused. People v. Baer, App. 4 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d
346, 311
N.E.2d 418. Criminal Law k 1168(2)
Admission of stipulation, after close of state's case, as to corporate
existence of owner of allegedly stolen adding machine was not
reversible
error. People v. Woods, 1963, 26 Ill.2d 557, 188 N.E.2d 1, certiorari
denied
83 S.Ct. 1555, 373 U.S. 945, 10 L.Ed.2d 699. Criminal Law k 1168(2)
85. Burden of proof--In general
Theft requires proof that defendant knowingly obtained or exerted
unauthorized
control over property with intention to deprive owner permanently of
use or
benefit of property. People v. Jones, App. 5 Dist.1991, 160 Ill.Dec.
184, 217
Ill.App.3d 175, 576 N.E.2d 1138, appeal allowed 162 Ill.Dec. 499, 141
Ill.2d
551, 580 N.E.2d 125, reversed 172 Ill.Dec. 401, 149 Ill.2d 288, 595
N.E.2d
1071. Larceny k 1
Where State did not contend that defendant herself actually took
property that
was stolen but was participant in scheme to steal property, State was
required
to prove that defendant aided and abetted person or persons who
actually took
property. People v. Kostatinovich, App. 2 Dist.1981, 54 Ill.Dec. 114,
98
Ill.App.3d 611, 424 N.E.2d 864. Larceny k 27
State had burden of proving each element of offense of theft. People
v. Ward,
App. 2 Dist.1975, 31 Ill.App.3d 1022, 335 N.E.2d 57. Receiving Stolen
Goods k
8(1)
In larceny prosecution, state had burden not only to prove, beyond
reasonable
doubt, the commission of crime charged, but was further required to
prove in
same degree that defendant was person who committed it. People v.
Gold, 1935,
196 N.E. 729, 361 Ill. 23. Larceny k 41
Possession of stolen property immediately after it is stolen puts on
the
possessor the burden of proving that his is not a guilty possession.
Miller
v. People, 1907, 82 N.E. 391, 229 Ill. 376. Larceny k 41
86. ---- Corpus delicti, burden of proof
In larceny prosecution people must prove the corpus delicti, one
element of
which was that stolen heifers were lost to owners through a felonious
stealing. People v. Betts, 1937, 11 N.E.2d 942, 367 Ill. 499. Larceny
k
40(2)
That property was stolen must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
People v.
Boneau, 1927, 158 N.E. 431, 327 Ill. 194. Receiving Stolen Goods k
8(3)
In larceny prosecution, it was incumbent upon people to prove corpus
delicti
beyond reasonable doubt. People v. Burke, 1924, 145 N.E. 164, 313 Ill.
576.
Larceny k 56
In a prosecution for the larceny of hogs, it was incumbent on the
people to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the corpus delicti, which consists of
proof
that the hogs in question were lost to the owner, and that they were
lost to
him by a felonious stealing, taking, and driving away. People v.
Wallace,
1922, 135 N.E. 723, 303 Ill. 504. Larceny k 56
87. ---- Ownership, generally, burden of proof
Proving that there was in fact an actual owner who had a superior
possessory
interest is essential to proving the defendant guilty of theft; without
proof
of an identified owner, there is no real proof that the property was
stolen.
People v. Glisson, App. 5 Dist.2001, 257 Ill.Dec. 786, 324 Ill.App.3d
249, 754
N.E.2d 444, rehearing denied, appeal allowed 261 Ill.Dec. 524, 197
Ill.2d 570,
763 N.E.2d 773, affirmed in part, vacated in part 270 Ill.Dec. 57, 202
Ill.2d
499, 782 N.E.2d 251, on remand 296 Ill.Dec. 307, 359 Ill.App.3d 962,
835
N.E.2d 162. Larceny k 60
Specific ownership of property need not be proved in prosecution for
theft by
deception if it is shown that person named as victim in charging
instrument
had some possessory interest in the property at the time of the
offense.
People v. Puleo, App. 1 Dist.1981, 51 Ill.Dec. 859, 96 Ill.App.3d 457,
421
N.E.2d 367. False Pretenses k 49(1)
In prosecution for theft, state must allege and prove ownership of the
property stolen in one other than the accused. In Interest of W. S.,
App. 5
Dist.1979, 31 Ill.Dec. 226, 75 Ill.App.3d 1048, 394 N.E.2d 428,
reversed 42
Ill.Dec. 140, 81 Ill.2d 252, 408 N.E.2d 718. Larceny k 40(2)
In offense against property the allegation of ownership is essential
and must
be proven. People v. Cassman, App. 2 Dist.1975, 32 Ill.App.3d 456, 336
N.E.2d
85. Indictment And Information k 166
Where unchallenged complaint charged defendant with theft of property
belonging to discount store, stipulation stated that store was a
licensed
business, store's security officer testified that stolen items belonged
to
store and defendant testified that he never had possession of stolen
items,
State was not required to offer additional proof of corporate existence
of
store so as to establish that store was legal entity capable of owning
stolen
property and its failure to do so did not prejudice defendant. People
v.
McAllister, App. 1 Dist.1975, 31 Ill.App.3d 825, 334 N.E.2d 885.
Larceny k 60
In prosecution for theft, state must allege and prove ownership or some
form
of possessory interest by one other than defendant. People v. Ousley,
App. 1
Dist.1975, 25 Ill.App.3d 658, 324 N.E.2d 21. Larceny k 40(2)
In prosecution for theft state must allege and prove that theft was
from an
entity owning property. People v. Quinn, App. 1 Dist.1974, 19
Ill.App.3d 798,
313 N.E.2d 167. Larceny k 40(2)
Proof of ownership of entity as specifically named and set out in
indictment
charging theft does not have to be made in order to sustain a
conviction.
People v. Baer, App. 4 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 346, 311 N.E.2d 418.
Larceny k
40(2)
In prosecution for larceny of soy beans in which state contended that
soy
beans had been stolen from granary on farm of prosecuting witness,
state had
burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that prosecuting witness was
owner
of beans and that they had been taken from him by a felonious stealing,
taking
and hauling away. People v. Quinn, 1951, 103 N.E.2d 81, 411 Ill. 97.
Criminal
Law k 561(2)
88. ---- Ownership, purpose of burden of proof
Allegation and proof of ownership are essential in theft prosecution in
order
to establish all material elements of offense and to protect defendant
against
possibility of double jeopardy. People v. Irons, App. 5 Dist.1976, 39
Ill.App.3d 993, 350 N.E.2d 754. Indictment And Information k 71.4(8);
Larceny
k 32(2)
Reasons for proving ownership of property in an offense involving
property is
to protect the defendant against double jeopardy. People v. Cassman,
App. 2
Dist.1975, 32 Ill.App.3d 456, 336 N.E.2d 85. Indictment And
Information k 166
Purpose of requirement in this section, that ownership of stolen
property be
proved, is to assure that it was neither abandoned nor owned by accused
and
that it was taken from one who was owner. People v. McAllister, App. 1
Dist.1975, 31 Ill.App.3d 825, 334 N.E.2d 885. Larceny k 40(2)
Reasons for requiring allegation and proof of corporate existence when
property has been stolen from a corporation are to establish that
defendant
was not owner of property, to protect defendant against double jeopardy
and to
inform defendant of charge against him. People v. McAllister, App. 1
Dist.1975, 31 Ill.App.3d 825, 334 N.E.2d 885. Larceny k 40(2)
Complaint charging theft or attempted theft must allege the ownership
of
property so that defendant may plead either former acquittal or
conviction
under indictment or complaint in event of subsequent prosecution for
same
offense; this requirement is to protect defendant against double
jeopardy, an
important constitutional right, and is not merely a technical rule.
People v.
Lonzo, App. 1 Dist.1973, 16 Ill.App.3d 503, 306 N.E.2d 614, reversed 59
Ill.2d
115, 319 N.E.2d 481. Larceny k 32(2)
Requirement that ownership of property alleged to have been stolen be
alleged
and proved is to safeguard accused against double jeopardy. People v.
Insolata, App.1969, 112 Ill.App.2d 269, 251 N.E.2d 73. Larceny k 40(2)
89. ---- Ownership, corporate existence, burden of proof
In prosecution for theft, State must allege and prove ownership of
stolen
property in someone other than the accused, but if stolen property is
allegedly owned by corporation, proof of its legal existence is
necessary to
secure conviction, and such proof may be through introduction of
corporate
charter, by evidence establishing prima facie case of corporate
existence, or
through oral testimony in absence of contrary evidence. People v.
Puleo, App.
1 Dist.1981, 51 Ill.Dec. 859, 96 Ill.App.3d 457, 421 N.E.2d 367.
Criminal Law
k 567; Larceny k 40(2)
In prosecution for theft, where prosecution asserts that owner of
property is
corporation, legal existence of corporation is material element which
must be
proved. People v. Ousley, App. 1 Dist.1975, 25 Ill.App.3d 658, 324
N.E.2d 21.
Larceny k 40(2)
When it is alleged that owner of property stolen is corporation, legal
existence of corporation is material fact which must be proven. People
v.
Geraci, App. 1 Dist.1974, 25 Ill.App.3d 191, 323 N.E.2d 48. Larceny k
40(2)
Where it is alleged, in prosecution for theft, that owner is a
corporation,
its legal existence as a corporation is a material fact which must be
proved.
People v. Pierce, App. 1 Dist.1974, 21 Ill.App.3d 770, 315 N.E.2d 584.
Larceny
k 40(2)
Where it is alleged that owner of stolen property is a corporation,
legal
existence of corporation is material fact which must be proved. People
v.
Lewis, App. 1 Dist.1974, 18 Ill.App.3d 131, 309 N.E.2d 349. Larceny k
40(2)
In a prosecution for theft, the State must allege and prove ownership
or some
form of superior possessory interest by one other than the defendant,
and
where it is alleged that the owner is a corporation, the legal
existence of
the corporation is a material fact to be proved. People v. Ruiz, App.
1
Dist.1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 1047, 305 N.E.2d 653. Larceny k 40(2)
Where ownership of stolen property is alleged to be in a corporation,
the
legal existence of the corporation is a material fact and must be
proved.
People v. Gordon, 1955, 5 Ill.2d 91, 125 N.E.2d 73. Larceny k 40(2)
90. ---- Unauthorized control, burden of proof
State, rather than accused, has burden to prove accused's exercise of
"unauthorized" control over victim's property, as well as all other
elements
of the offense of theft, beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Miller,
1974,
24 Ill.App.3d 504, 321 N.E.2d 109; People v. Stallcup, 1973, 10
Ill.App.3d
153, 294 N.E.2d 21.
Fact that theft of radios from city park district was not recent was
irrelevant to inference arising from defendant's possession of stolen
property
in prosecution for unauthorized possession of property. People v.
Obrochta,
App. 2 Dist.1986, 102 Ill.Dec. 958, 149 Ill.App.3d 944, 500 N.E.2d
1059,
appeal denied 108 Ill.Dec. 422, 114 Ill.2d 554, 508 N.E.2d 733.
Receiving
Stolen Goods k 8(3)
In prosecution for theft of property exceeding $150 in value, State was
only
required to prove that defendants exerted unauthorized control over
property
of owner, which it did, despite defendants' contention that State had
to prove
origin of stolen merchandise as well as ownership, to prove the
particular
place where stolen merchandise had been taken as well as proving who
owned it.
People v. Parker, App. 2 Dist.1979, 33 Ill.Dec. 21, 77 Ill.App.3d 536,
396
N.E.2d 97. Larceny k 40(2)
Under this section providing that a person commits theft when he
knowingly
obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property of owner, the
State need
only prove that the defendant did knowingly obtain or exert
unauthorized
control over the property and that defendant intended to permanently
deprive
the owner of the property's use or benefit. People v. Dziak, App. 2
Dist.1975, 30 Ill.App.3d 859, 333 N.E.2d 582. Larceny k 40(2)
To sustain a theft conviction, the prosecution must establish that
defendant
exerted unauthorized control through possession of property intending
to
permanently deprive owner of its use. People v. Marshall, App. 1
Dist.1974,
24 Ill.App.3d 82, 320 N.E.2d 475. Larceny k 40(2)
To establish the crime of theft, it must be shown that there was
unauthorized
control over the object of the theft and that the taking and conversion
of the
property was without consent of the owner; it does not include the
taking of
property with intent to use it temporarily and then return it to the
owner.
People v. Fragale, App.1971, 2 Ill.App.3d 992, 276 N.E.2d 139. Larceny
k 13
91. ---- Intent, burden of proof
A charge of theft may be established by proving that the accused
knowingly
exerted unauthorized control over the property of another, with the
intent to
permanently deprive the owner of its benefits. People v. Vasser, App.
1
Dist.2002, 264 Ill.Dec. 498, 331 Ill.App.3d 675, 770 N.E.2d 1194,
appeal
denied 271 Ill.Dec. 940, 201 Ill.2d 609, 786 N.E.2d 198. Larceny k
3(4)
Although intent to steal may ordinarily be inferred when person takes
property
of another, proof of existence of state of mind incompatible with
intent to
steal precludes finding of theft. People v. Baddeley, App.1969, 106
Ill.App.2d 154, 245 N.E.2d 593. Larceny k 57
To convict defendant of theft evidence must establish beyond reasonable
doubt
that defendant intended to deprive owner permanently of the use or
benefit of
property. People v. Jones, App.1968, 99 Ill.App.2d 364, 240 N.E.2d
776.
Larceny k 57
In prosecution for larceny, it is incumbent on State to prove that
person
alleged to have committed crime took property in question from the
owner
thereof with felonious intent. People v. Galluzzo, App.1959, 22
Ill.App.2d
174, 159 N.E.2d 510. Larceny k 41
The felonious intent involved in larceny is the intent to deprive the
owner
permanently of his property and such intent must be proved beyond a
reasonable
doubt. People v. Galluzzo, App.1959, 22 Ill.App.2d 174, 159 N.E.2d
510.
Larceny k 3(1);
Larceny k 57
92. ---- Deception, burden of proof
In prosecution for theft by deception, State was required to prove only
that
defendant knowingly created false impression which he himself did not
believe
to be true when he wrote checks in question. People v. Young, App. 3
Dist.1985, 85 Ill.Dec. 375, 130 Ill.App.3d 117, 473 N.E.2d 974, appeal
denied,
certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 104, 474 U.S. 833, 88 L.Ed.2d 85. False
Pretenses
k 6
93. ---- Prior convictions, burden of proof
Statute authorizing enhanced penalty for second or subsequent offense
of theft
of firearm is triggered only by prior conviction of theft of firearm,
not
merely by existence of evidence that defendant previously committed
theft of
firearm. People v. Risch-Defina, App. 2 Dist.1996, 219 Ill.Dec. 473,
284
Ill.App.3d 1, 671 N.E.2d 387, appeal denied 222 Ill.Dec. 433, 171
Ill.2d 572,
677 N.E.2d 967. Sentencing And Punishment k 1286
Prior conviction for theft is essential element of crime of felony
theft when
offense has been enhanced from misdemeanor to felony due to prior
conviction,
and prior conviction must be proved before trier of fact prior to
finding of
guilt or innocence on felony theft charge. People v. Hicks, App. 5
Dist.1986,
103 Ill.Dec. 710, 150 Ill.App.3d 242, 501 N.E.2d 1027, appeal allowed
108
Ill.Dec. 421, 114 Ill.2d 549, 508 N.E.2d 732, affirmed 115 Ill.Dec.
623, 119
Ill.2d 29, 518 N.E.2d 148. Larceny k 23
Existence of prior theft conviction is not required to be proved to
trier of
fact before subsequent theft conviction is later enhanced from
misdemeanor to
felony. People v. Davis, App. 5 Dist.1985, 94 Ill.Dec. 555, 140
Ill.App.3d
265, 488 N.E.2d 554. Larceny k 88
Defendant could be convicted of felony theft under $300 without state's
proving his prior theft conviction to the jury. People v. Flatt, App.
3
Dist.1985, 91 Ill.Dec. 669, 136 Ill.App.3d 881, 483 N.E.2d 1304.
Larceny k 23
A prior conviction is no longer an element of the offense of felony
theft
under this paragraph, but only a factor to be considered in sentencing;
therefore, the Appellate Court would not hesitate to apply the
presumption
that defendant, whose name was identical to that of an individual who
had pled
guilty to theft in Macon County, was the person who had been previously
convicted of theft. People v. Stanley, App. 4 Dist.1983, 72 Ill.Dec.
173, 116
Ill.App.3d 532, 452 N.E.2d 105. Names k 14
In order to subject an accused to enhanced punishment under this
paragraph, a
prior theft conviction must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but it
need
not be alleged in the charging instrument and proof need not be adduced
at
trial. People v. Stanley, App. 4 Dist.1983, 72 Ill.Dec. 173, 116
Ill.App.3d
532, 452 N.E.2d 105. Sentencing And Punishment k 1371; Sentencing And
Punishment k 1380(2); Sentencing And Punishment k 1365
Conviction of and punishment for class 4 offense of subsequent theft
could
only have been imposed if prior theft conviction was charged and proved
at
trial. People v. Depper, App. 4 Dist.1980, 44 Ill.Dec. 421, 89
Ill.App.3d 135,
411 N.E.2d 543. Sentencing And Punishment k 1371
It is not incumbent upon defendants to deny accuracy of evidence of
prior
convictions where increased penalty for subsequent offense is sought,
they are
clothed with presumption of innocence and presumption applies to fact
of
former conviction. People v. Kurtz, App.1967, 89 Ill.App.2d 171, 232
N.E.2d
139. Sentencing And Punishment k 1377
Where there was no evidence to identify defendants convicted of theft
as same
persons named in authenticated copies of records of prior convictions,
trial
court erred in imposing penalty permissible only on proof of a
subsequent
conviction. People v. Kurtz, App.1967, 89 Ill.App.2d 171, 232 N.E.2d
139.
Sentencing And Punishment k 1381(6)
94. Fact questions--In general
In criminal prosecution, jury had right to consider evidence in light
of their
own knowledge and observation in the affairs of life. People v.
Rogers, 1959,
16 Ill.2d 175, 157 N.E.2d 28.
Criminal Law k 862
Where proof of corpus delicti is in dispute in larceny prosecution,
issue
raised is thereby for jury to determine. People v. Rogers, 1959, 16
Ill.2d
175, 157 N.E.2d 28. Larceny k 68(1)
Whether defendant was guilty of larceny of hog under conflicting
evidence was
for jury. People v. McElvain, 1930, 172 N.E. 131, 341 Ill. 224.
Larceny k
68(1)
95. ---- Intent, fact questions
In trial for theft, requisite mental state may be deduced by trier of
facts
from facts and circumstances surrounding alleged criminal act. People
v.
Campbell, App. 5 Dist.1975, 28 Ill.App.3d 480, 328 N.E.2d 608. Larceny
k 44
Right to believe or disbelieve testimony of defendant as to existence
of
requisite felonious intent to commit theft is prerogative of jury.
People v.
Campbell, App. 5 Dist.1975, 28 Ill.App.3d 480, 328 N.E.2d 608. Larceny
k
68(2)
Whether defendant who is accused of theft had felonious intent to
permanently
deprive owner of use or benefit of stolen property is question for
jury.
People v. Campbell, App. 5 Dist.1975, 28 Ill.App.3d 480, 328 N.E.2d
608.
Larceny k 68(2)
In theft prosecution, required mental state may be deduced by trier of
fact
from facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged criminal act.
People v.
Graham, App. 5 Dist.1975, 27 Ill.App.3d 408, 327 N.E.2d 261. Larceny k
57
Whether defendant whom police found standing on lawn chair with his
head and
shoulders through window of room of prosecuting witness had intended to
commit
theft and burglary or rape were jury questions. People v. King,
App.1971, 2
Ill.App.3d 870, 275 N.E.2d 918. Burglary k 45
Whether defendant who had been intoxicated had had intent to commit
theft in
residence of another at time of his entry was jury question, in
prosecution
for burglary with intent to commit theft. People v. Wooff, App.1970,
120
Ill.App.2d 225, 256 N.E.2d 881. Burglary k 45
In prosecution for larceny of boat, wherein defense was that defendants
left
their automobile as security for boat and that payment by son-in-law of
one of
defendants to release the automobile was in full payment for the boat,
issue
of bailment and whether defendants rented boat with fixed intention of
not
returning it were for jury. People v. Herring, 1947, 71 N.E.2d 682,
396 Ill.
364. Larceny k 68(2)
96. ---- Identification of defendant, fact questions
If sufficiency of identification of stolen property is in issue,
ultimate
determination as to weight and credibility of evidence rests with trier
of
fact and, absent abuse of discretion, such finding will stand. People
v.
Puleo, App. 1 Dist.1981, 51 Ill.Dec. 859, 96 Ill.App.3d 457, 421 N.E.2d
367.
Criminal Law k 1159.5
97. ---- Credibility of witnesses, fact questions
When proof of elements of offense of theft, that someone other than
accused
held interest in allegedly stolen property and that accused exerted
unauthorized control over that property, is in dispute, jury must
determine
credibility of witnesses and weight to be accorded their testimony.
People v.
Loveless, App. 3 Dist.1981, 48 Ill.Dec. 804, 93 Ill.App.3d 293, 417
N.E.2d 206
. Larceny k 68(1)
Crime of theft is offense which reflects adversely on person's honesty
and
integrity and thus relates directly to his credibility. People v.
Rudolph,
App. 1 Dist.1977, 8 Ill.Dec. 544, 50 Ill.App.3d 559, 365 N.E.2d 930.
Witnesses
k 345(2)
Where evidence, in prosecution for theft was conflicting and could not
be
reconciled, it was duty of trial court in bench trial to determine
credibility
of witnesses and weight to be given their testimony. People v. Grant,
App. 1
Dist.1975, 30 Ill.App.3d 725, 332 N.E.2d 469.
Criminal Law k 255.2
Questions of whether victim of assault and theft misidentified
defendant's
hair color and whether victim would have been able to observe his
assailant
while being beaten with a belt since victim was also struggling with
juvenile
for car keys were for resolution by the trial judge, as trier of fact.
People
v. Chambers, App. 1 Dist.1974, 22 Ill.App.3d 677, 318 N.E.2d 266.
Criminal
Law k 260.11(5)
Security guard's testimony in theft prosecution that he saw defendant
select
and put on belt and saw him put dog collar under his jacket, that
defendant
left without paying for such items, and that, when brought back into
store by
guard, defendant ran and threw such items, together with defendant's
testimony
that he purchased the items and his production of a cash register
receipt,
presented an issue of credibility for resolution, in a bench trial, by
the
trial court. People v. Ruiz, App. 1 Dist.1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 1047, 305
N.E.2d
653. Criminal Law k 260.11(5)
While it was apparent in prosecution for petty theft that an accomplice
witness expected and actually received a reduction in sentence as a
result of
his testimony implicating defendant, it was duty of trier of fact,
aware of
accomplice's expectations, to determine credibility of accomplice.
People v.
Spence, App.1971, 133 Ill.App.2d 171, 272 N.E.2d 739. Criminal Law k
742(2)
Fact that defendant, charged with theft but who claimed that he had
been
innocent bystander, was first seen with hat and gloves but was not
wearing
those items when he arrived at police station only raised question of
credibility for jury. People v. Bambulas, 1969, 42 Ill.2d 419, 247
N.E.2d
873, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 480, 396 U.S. 986, 24 L.Ed.2d 450.
Larceny k
68(1)
Whether or not the defendant, charged with theft, was merely an
innocent
bystander on his way home from work, attracted to the premises, at
which he
was arrested, by the confusion, or was the truck driver seen reaching
into the
truck after it had stopped was a question of credibility for the jury.
People
v. Bambulas, 1969, 42 Ill.2d 419, 247 N.E.2d 873, certiorari denied 90
S.Ct.
480, 396 U.S. 986, 24 L.Ed.2d 450. Larceny k 68(1)
Weight to be given circumstantial evidence of defendant's active
participation
with coindictee in committing theft from the person and question of
credibility to give to opposing witnesses was for trial court as trier
of fact
without jury. People v. Wright, App.1968, 99 Ill.App.2d 377, 240
N.E.2d 698.
Criminal Law k 260.11(5)
Credibility of defendant who alleged that decedent had given him
articles that
defendant was alleged to have stolen was question for trier of fact.
People
v. Styles, App.1966, 75 Ill.App.2d 481, 220 N.E.2d 885. Criminal Law k
742(1)
Whether accomplice or defendant truthfully testified as to content of
conversations concerning defendant's culpability in consenting to
storage of
stolen property in his barn was for jury to determine. People v.
Sanders,
App.1966, 75 Ill.App.2d 422, 220 N.E.2d 487. Criminal Law k 742(1)
In prosecution for larceny from the person it was within province of
jury to
determine weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses. People v.
Morgan,
1960, 20 Ill.2d 437, 170 N.E.2d 529. Criminal Law k 742(1); Larceny k
68(1)
Weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses are primarily and
peculiarly
within the province of the jury. People v. Baker, 1959, 16 Ill.2d 364,
158
N.E.2d 1. Criminal Law k 741(1)
In prosecution for larceny, tried without jury, credibility of
defendant's
accomplice's testimony was for trial court. People v. Officer, 1957,
10
Ill.2d 203, 139 N.E.2d 773. Criminal Law k 260.11(5)
98. ---- Possession of stolen property, fact questions
Whether defendant's explanation for his possession of stolen property
is
deemed reasonable is primarily a question of fact for trier of fact,
and if
trier of fact does not believe story, possession is considered not
explained
and presumption of defendant's guilt of theft is still valid. People
v.
Sherman, App. 2 Dist.1982, 65 Ill.Dec. 581, 110 Ill.App.3d 854, 441
N.E.2d 896
. Larceny k 68(3)
Whether a defendant's possession of stolen goods at a particular time
is too
remote to permit the inference that he had stolen the goods at an
earlier time
is a question of fact. People v. Jones, App. 1 Dist.1981, 53 Ill.Dec.
43, 97
Ill.App.3d 619, 423 N.E.2d 235. Larceny k 68(3)
Where a defendant attempts to explain his possession of recently stolen
property, it is the jury's function to determine his credibility.
People v.
Lanzotti, App. 4 Dist.1978, 18 Ill.Dec. 905, 61 Ill.App.3d 451, 378
N.E.2d 369
. Larceny k 68(3)
In prosecution for theft of two typewriters, although defendant offered
an
explanation for his possession at trial, any explanation offered was
required
to be one which trier of fact finds to be reasonable, and acceptance or
rejection of the explanation was for trier of fact. People v. Tribett,
App. 1
Dist.1977, 12 Ill.Dec. 492, 54 Ill.App.3d 777, 370 N.E.2d 115. Larceny
k
64(6)
Evidence generated jury question as to exclusive possession of subject
property by defendant, who was charged with theft of over $150, who had
control of van used in transporting stolen goods and who carried such
goods
into trailer in which defendant had a bedroom. People v. Stadtman,
App. 4
Dist.1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 259, 304 N.E.2d 174, reversed 59 Ill.2d 229,
319
N.E.2d 813. Receiving Stolen Goods k 9(1)
Question of whether possession of stolen property was recent enough to
raise a
presumption of guilt is for jury. People v. Hyde, App.1968, 97
Ill.App.2d 43,
239 N.E.2d 466. Larceny k 68(3)
Question whether defendant possessed stolen paint brushes, knowing them
to be
stolen, and intended to deprive owner of them was for trial judge in
theft
prosecution. People v. Voleta, App.1965, 57 Ill.App.2d 279, 206 N.E.2d
737.
Criminal Law k 260.11(5)
Where items such as coins, cigarettes, cigars and whiskey are the
proceeds of
a larceny or robbery, their identity as being those in possession of
accused
must necessarily be drawn from other facts satisfactorily proved and
question
of identity of property is ordinarily one of fact for jury's
determination.
People v. Weaver, 1959, 18 Ill.2d 108, 163 N.E.2d 483. Larceny k
40(2);
Larceny k 68(1); Robbery k 20; Robbery k 26
In prosecution for burglary and larceny, instruction that recent and
unexplained possession of stolen property by defendant, if evidence so
showed,
tended to establish his guilt, and was sufficient of itself to
authorize a
conviction unless inference of guilt thereby raised was overcome by
other
facts and circumstances in evidence so as to raise in minds of jury a
reasonable doubt of such guilt, was not erroneous because possession of
alleged stolen property by defendant was seven days after alleged
burglary,
and weight of evidence was a question of fact for consideration of
jury.
People v. Mathews, 1950, 92 N.E.2d 147, 406 Ill. 35. Burglary k 45;
Burglary
k 46(7); Larceny k 68(1); Larceny k 77(1)
Where an accused offers evidence in explanation of his possession of
stolen
property shortly after a theft, it is for jury to determine not only
whether
explanation made is true or false, but also whether it is sufficient to
rebut
the presumption of guilt. People v. Kreisler, 1942, 45 N.E.2d 653, 381
Ill.
453. Larceny k 68(3)
Whether possession of stolen radio in room of accused six weeks after
its
theft was a "recent possession" sufficient to warrant conviction, in
absence
of evidence or circumstances tending to overcome presumption of guilt
raised
thereby, was question of fact for trial court sitting without a jury.
People
v. Malin, 1939, 24 N.E.2d 349, 372 Ill. 422. Criminal Law k 255.2
Jury has right to consider explanation offered by defendant for
possession of
stolen property. People v. Lehner, 1927, 157 N.E. 211, 326 Ill. 216.
Larceny
k 68(3)
The weight to be given recent possession of stolen property as an
incriminating circumstance is a question of fact and not of law.
People v.
Deluce, 1908, 86 N.E. 1080, 237 Ill. 541. Criminal Law k 741(6)
99. Instructions--In general
Trial court's refusal of instruction on theft did not require reversal
of
armed robbery conviction, where defendant was not so prejudiced as to
affect
outcome of verdict. People v. McClellan, App. 1 Dist.1992, 175
Ill.Dec. 476,
232 Ill.App.3d 990, 600 N.E.2d 407, appeal denied 180 Ill.Dec. 155, 147
Ill.2d
633, 606 N.E.2d 1232, habeas corpus denied 1995 WL 645642. Criminal
Law k
1173.2(4)
Instruction on reputation evidence was not relevant in prosecution for
felony
theft in which defendant, who asserted defense of insanity, admitted
the
thefts. People v. Parker, App. 4 Dist.1983, 69 Ill.Dec. 240, 113
Ill.App.3d
321, 447 N.E.2d 457. Criminal Law k 776(1)
In prosecution for felony theft in which defendant asserted insanity
defense
and in which question of penalty was never raised during closing
argument,
trial court did not err in refusing to give optional portion of
Illinois
pattern jury instruction that can only be given when issue of
punishment is
raised in final arguments nor did trial court err in giving non-IPI
instruction authorizing jury of consequences of verdict of not guilty
by
reason of insanity. People v. Parker, App. 4 Dist.1983, 69 Ill.Dec.
240, 113
Ill.App.3d 321, 447 N.E.2d 457. Criminal Law k 790; Criminal Law k
805(1)
Where defendant was jointly tried for battery and theft and was
convicted for
each offense, error in jury instruction on battery required reversal of
both
convictions and new trial. People v. Looney, App. 1 Dist.1977, 5
Ill.Dec. 18,
46 Ill.App.3d 404, 361 N.E.2d 18. Criminal Law k 1186.1
In prosecution for theft of property valued in excess of $150,
unresponsive
testimony by jailer that accused told "how many different jails he had
been in
and how they had done it in various places he had been in" was error,
but such
error, combined with giving of instruction that "abnormality manifested
only
by repeated criminal, or otherwise antisocial conduct, is not mental
disease
or a mental defect," did not require reversal where accused admitted
taking
truck and relied on defense of insanity and jury was admonished to
disregard
such testimony and only accused referred to it thereafter. People v.
Fontaine, App. 5 Dist.1975, 28 Ill.App.3d 450, 328 N.E.2d 685.
Criminal Law k
369.5; Criminal Law k 1169.5(3)
Fact that element of possession is in controversy is not a basis for
refusing
to give jury instruction on recent possession of stolen goods. People
v.
Barber, App. 2 Dist.1974, 20 Ill.App.3d 977, 313 N.E.2d 491. Larceny k
77(1)
Jury instruction, which contained pertinent portion of this section was
proper. People v. Green, App.1966, 74 Ill.App.2d 308, 218 N.E.2d 840,
certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 2051, 387 U.S. 930, 18 L.Ed.2d 990,
rehearing
denied 88 S.Ct. 17, 389 U.S. 890, 19 L.Ed.2d 200. Criminal Law k 808.5
In larceny prosecution, instruction that jury had right to consider
fact that
defendant had been contradicted by other witnesses without mention of
corroborative evidence was not reversible error where jury could not
have been
misled in view of other instructions. People v. Baker, 1936, 6 N.E.2d
665,
365 Ill. 328. Criminal Law k 823(13)
Instruction on weight to be given defendant's evidence should state
that jury
may consider fact, if such is fact, that defendant has been
contradicted or
corroborated by other witnesses, and instruction that jury had right to
consider fact, if such was the fact, that defendant had been
contradicted by
other witnesses was improper. People v. Baker, 1936, 6 N.E.2d 665, 365
Ill.
328. Criminal Law k 758
Refusal of instruction of defendant in larceny prosecution which was
fully
covered in so far as it correctly presented law by other instructions
given
was not error. People v. Baker, 1936, 6 N.E.2d 665, 365 Ill. 328.
Criminal
Law k 829(1)
Instructions in statutory language on embezzlement and larceny, charged
in
indictment, were proper.
Ill.
430. Criminal Law k 808
People v. Colegrove, 1930, 174 N.E. 536, 342
Instructions in prosecution for larceny must be considered together.
People
v. Bundy, 1926, 154 N.E. 900, 324 Ill. 190. Criminal Law k 822(1)
100. ---- Definitions, instructions
Where trial court gave instruction defining the crime of attempt theft
and
specifically requiring the amount involved to be a sum in excess of
$150,
there was no error in the instructions by giving of instruction which
purported to give the jurors the issues in connection with the crime of
attempt theft and which did not include the element of sum in excess of
$150.
People v. Bradley, App. 1 Dist.1973, 12 Ill.App.3d 783, 299 N.E.2d 99.
Criminal Law k 822(6)
Once trial court gave instruction defining crimes of theft and criminal
damage
to property and essential elements to be proved to sustain either
charge,
court had no further responsibility to instruct jury as to specific
definitions of "knowingly" or "intent," and failure to do so did not
constitute a denial of fundamental justice. People v. Wick, App.1970,
125
Ill.App.2d 297, 260 N.E.2d 487. Criminal Law k 800(2)
Instruction that possession of recently stolen property is "prima
facie"
evidence of guilt, without explanation of meaning of "prima facie," is
improper. People v. Lawson, 1933, 184 N.E. 606, 351 Ill. 457.
Criminal Law k
800(5)
Instruction defining larceny in words of this section was not
erroneous.
People v. Nevin, 1931, 175 N.E. 797, 343 Ill. 597. Criminal Law k
808.5
101. ---- Ownership, instructions
Defendant was not entitled to non-Illinois Pattern Instruction (IPI)
that
essential element to offense of theft was proof that someone other than
defendant owned allegedly stolen property, where IPIs given by trial
court
covered same subject matter by instructing that to sustain charge of
theft,
State was required to prove that complainants were owners of property
in
question and by instructing as to credibility of witnesses. People v.
Collins, App. 1 Dist.1992, 169 Ill.Dec. 730, 227 Ill.App.3d 670, 592
N.E.2d
217.
Criminal Law k 829(3)
An instruction, although not clearly drawn, was not misleading in
stating that
property stolen may be averred in an indictment to be the property of
either
the real owner or any person having special property in it as bailee.
People
v. Walinsky, 1921, 132 N.E. 757, 300 Ill. 92. Larceny k 73
Where the title to the stolen goods is disputed, an instruction which
assumes
that they belonged to the person named as owner in the indictment is
erroneous. Hix v. People, 1895, 41 N.E. 862, 157 Ill. 382. Criminal
Law k
761(6)
102. ---- Intent, instructions
Where, in larceny prosecution, considerable portion of defendant's
testimony
was taken up with evidence of his drinking and intoxication, and two
other
witnesses who testified for him limited their testimony to such fact,
state
was entitled to an instruction that voluntary drunkenness was no
defense to
crime of larceny. People v. Rogers, 1959, 16 Ill.2d 175, 157 N.E.2d
28.
Criminal Law k 774
103. ---- Possession of stolen property, instructions
In prosecution for theft, sufficient evidence was presented that
merchandise
in defendant's possession was recently stolen from department store
and,
therefore, trial court properly gave instruction permitting the jury to
infer
defendant's guilt from his unexplained possession of recently stolen
goods.
People v. Jones, App. 1 Dist.1981, 53 Ill.Dec. 43, 97 Ill.App.3d 619,
423
N.E.2d 235. Larceny k 77(2)
Trial court's instruction allowing jury to infer defendant's guilt from
his
unexplained possession of recently stolen goods was applicable and did
not
improperly emphasize defendant's silence, where the evidence
established that
defendant possessed recently stolen property and no plausible
explanation for
such possession consistent with innocence was presented. People v.
Jones,
App. 1 Dist.1981, 53 Ill.Dec. 43, 97 Ill.App.3d 619, 423 N.E.2d 235.
Larceny k
77(2)
Even though trial court charged jury in issues instruction that
knowledge that
property was stolen must be proven by state in order to obtain theft
conviction for receipt of stolen property, defendant was prejudiced by
instruction to jury that they could infer that defendant obtained
possession
by theft if he had "exclusive possession of recently stolen property,
and
there was no reasonable explanation of his possession," in that
instruction
informed jury that conviction could be returned solely upon basis of
recent,
exclusive possession of stolen property which was not reasonably
explained,
thereby excluding knowledge element from consideration. People v.
Moats, App.
3 Dist.1980, 44 Ill.Dec. 451, 89 Ill.App.3d 194, 411 N.E.2d 573.
Receiving
Stolen Goods k 9(2)
In prosecution for theft, instruction that if jury found that defendant
had
exclusive possession of recently stolen property and there was no
reasonable
explanation of his possession, jury might infer that defendant obtained
possession of the property by theft was proper. People v. Ward, App. 3
Dist.1980, 35 Ill.Dec. 662, 80 Ill.App.3d 253, 399 N.E.2d 728.
Receiving
Stolen Goods k 9(2)
Where defendant's explanation of his possession of stolen television
set was
at odds with much of the State's evidence, and evidence of his
possession of
missing set shortly after its removal from premises in question was key
link
in proof of his guilt of burglary and theft after previous theft
conviction,
trial court properly instructed jury as to inference of guilt which it
could
imply from defendant's unexplained possession of recently stolen
property.
People v. Hainline, App. 4 Dist.1979, 32 Ill.Dec. 843, 77 Ill.App.3d
30, 395
N.E.2d 1224. Burglary k 46(7); Larceny k 77(1)
In prosecution for burglary and theft of property having a value of
more than
$150, in-court identification of items found in locked truck to which
defendant possessed a key was sufficient to connect them with those
missing
from store so as to warrant exclusive possession instruction. People
v. Gan,
App. 4 Dist.1979, 31 Ill.Dec. 409, 75 Ill.App.3d 72, 394 N.E.2d 611.
Larceny
k 77(3)
Where there was evidence that stolen property was found in the back of
a squad
car in which defendant had ridden but there was no evidence as to
limited
access to the automobile, instruction on the inference to be drawn from
exclusive possession of recently stolen property should not have been
given.
People v. Modlin, App. 4 Dist.1979, 30 Ill.Dec. 350, 74 Ill.App.3d 387,
393
N.E.2d 5. Larceny k 77(2)
In view of evidence that defendant was both present at the time that
ring was
stolen from the jewelry store and that defendant was later in exclusive
possession of the stones from the ring, trial court properly gave
accountability instruction and instruction on the inference to be drawn
from
the exclusive possession of recently stolen goods. People v. Lanzotti,
App. 4
Dist.1978, 18 Ill.Dec. 905, 61 Ill.App.3d 451, 378 N.E.2d 369.
Criminal Law k
792(1); Larceny k 77(2)
Evidence of exclusive possession of goods at issue by defendant is not
necessary to warrant giving of pattern jury instruction on recent and
unexplained possession of stolen goods. People v. Barber, App. 2
Dist.1974,
20 Ill.App.3d 977, 313 N.E.2d 491. Larceny k 77(3)
Instruction on presumption arising from unexplained possession of
recently
stolen property was proper where defendant was charged with theft of
items in
his possession and not with receiving stolen property. People v.
Spera, App.
2 Dist.1973, 10 Ill.App.3d 305, 293 N.E.2d 656. Larceny k 77(1)
Giving of people's instruction to effect that if jury found that
defendant had
exclusive possession of recently stolen property and there was no
reasonable
explanation of his possession, jury could infer that defendant obtained
possession by burglary or by theft or both was not error in prosecution
for
burglary and theft. People v. Poe, 1971, 48 Ill.2d 506, 272 N.E.2d 28,
certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 292, 404 U.S. 942, 30 L.Ed.2d 256. Burglary
k
46(7); Larceny k 77(1)
Where, although stolen property was found in codefendant's automobile
when
defendant was not present, defendant was tried as accomplice of
codefendant,
and codefendant explained his possession of property, giving of
instruction
that the exclusive unexplained possession of stolen property soon after
a
theft may be considered as tending to prove guilt of person in whose
possession it was found was not prejudicial to defendant. People v.
Carter,
App.1968, 91 Ill.App.2d 380, 234 N.E.2d 53. Criminal Law k 1172.2
Giving of instruction as to effect of defendant's unexplained
possession of
portion of stolen property was justified, in view of evidence
establishing
defendant's presence at scene of crime and that shortly thereafter he
was in
possession of portion of property stolen. People v. Clements, 1963, 28
Ill.2d
534, 192 N.E.2d 923, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 501, 375 U.S. 979, 11
L.Ed.2d
424. Larceny k 77(3)
In grand larceny prosecution, an instruction that, if jury believed
beyond
reasonable doubt that property described in indictment was stolen and
shortly
thereafter was in the exclusive possession of accused, such exclusive
possession if unexplained warranted a conviction, was not erroneous.
People
v. Bardell, 1944, 58 N.E.2d 24, 388 Ill. 482. Larceny k 77(1)
In prosecution for burglary, larceny, and receiving and aiding in
concealing
stolen liquor, it was error to instruct that possession of stolen
property
soon after theft imposed upon defendant the burden of explaining such
possession and that such possession was sufficient to authorize
conviction
unless the presumption was overcome by sufficient evidence, without
limiting
such instructions to the larceny count, though such instructions did
not
improperly assume that liquor found in defendant's possession was part
of the
stolen property in controversy. People v. Grizzle, 1942, 44 N.E.2d
917, 381
Ill. 278. Criminal Law k 673(2)
In prosecution for grand larceny in which defendant claimed to have
bought
stolen goods from third party, instruction that recent and unexplained
possession of stolen property soon after theft tends to establish guilt
of
larceny of person in whose possession it was found was reversible
error, as it
ignored defense of how defendant happened to have possession of stolen
property soon after taken, and assumed defendant's possession was not
explained. People v. Himstedt, 1941, 37 N.E.2d 165, 377 Ill. 498.
Criminal
Law k 1172.6
Where defendant, in whose possession stolen property was found, has
explained
possession, it is improper to instruct that possession of recently
stolen
property is prima facie evidence of guilt. People v. Lawson, 1933, 184
N.E.
606, 351 Ill. 457. Larceny k 77(4)
In larceny prosecution, if proof tends to establish possession,
instruction
regarding inference of guilt arising from unexplained possession of
recently
stolen property may be given, regardless of whether defendant has
denied
possession or not. People v. Stone, 1932, 181 N.E. 648, 349 Ill. 52.
Larceny
k 77(3)
Instruction that unexplained possession of recently stolen property
authorized
conviction, not justified by evidence, was prejudicial. People v.
Cope, 1929,
166 N.E. 925, 335 Ill. 466. Criminal Law k 1172.6; Larceny k 77(3)
In a prosecution for larceny, an instruction that recent and
unexplained
possession of stolen property by the accused was sufficient to
authorize
conviction, unless overcome by other evidence raising a reasonable
doubt of
guilt, was faulty in not limiting the possession to a time soon after
the
commission of guilt therefrom to be "overcome" by other evidence,
instead of
"explained" by other evidence. People v. Flynn, 1922, 135 N.E. 101,
302 Ill.
549. Larceny k 77(1)
An instruction that if stolen property was found in defendants'
exclusive
possession the jury would be warranted in finding them guilty of
burglary and
larceny unless the possession was satisfactorily explained was
erroneous,
where the goods were found in defendants' possession at least 25 days
after
the theft, as the court should have submitted to the jury the effect of
such
possession as evidence. People v. Kubulis, 1921, 131 N.E. 595, 298
Ill. 523.
Larceny k 77(1)
In prosecution for larceny, instruction, stating the correct rule as to
the
possession of stolen property soon after the commission of an offense,
did not
mislead the jury, though words "robbery" or "burglary," which did not
apply to
the case, were used. People v. Clement, 1918, 121 N.E. 213, 285 Ill.
614.
Larceny k 77(2)
An instruction that defendant's possession of a buggy, alleged to have
been
stolen, recently after the commission of the offense, "unsatisfactorily
accounted for," was prima facie evidence that defendant committed the
offense
was erroneous as assuming that defendant's explanation of his
possession was
unsatisfactory. Miller v. People, 1907, 82 N.E. 391, 229 Ill. 376.
Criminal
Law k 761(6)
Where, in a prosecution for the larceny of several hogs, it appeared
that they
were driven from their owner's inclosure by two parties other than
defendant,
and placed in defendant's yard without his knowledge, the hogs were not
in
defendant's possession in such a sense as to render applicable an
instruction
that the possession of stolen property soon after the theft is prima
facie
evidence that the possessor is guilty of the wrongful taking. Watts v.
People, 1903, 68 N.E. 563, 204 Ill. 233. Larceny k 64(8)
On a trial for theft, an instruction that the possession of recently
stolen
property is prima facie evidence of guilt, unless other evidence raises
a
reasonable doubt thereof, was not objectionable, as assuming that the
property
was stolen, where instructions for defendant left the question whether
it was
stolen or not to the jury. Keating v. People, 1896, 43 N.E. 724, 160
Ill. 480
. Criminal Law k 761(11)
104. ---- Value, instructions
Where evidence was overwhelming that defendants, whose convictions for
felony
theft in separate trials were consolidated on appeal, had stolen
property
whose value greatly exceeded $150, defendants did not suffer any
prejudice
from failure of trial courts to include in jury instruction or guilty
verdict
from a requirement that the jury must find the value of the property to
have
been over $150. People v. Tannenbaum, 1980, 47 Ill.Dec. 714, 82 Ill.2d
177,
415 N.E.2d 1027. Criminal Law k 1172.1(3)
105. ---- Included offenses, instructions
Alleged theft of oranges from church was separate offense, committed
after
burglary offense was completed, and therefore, defendant charged with
burglary
on basis of accountability was not entitled to lesser included offense
instruction on theft, in view of codefendant's testimony that
defendant's
involvement in transporting oranges and selling them to store
originated and
occurred entirely after burglary offense was completed. People v.
Chandler,
App. 1 Dist.1995, 214 Ill.Dec. 942, 278 Ill.App.3d 212, 662 N.E.2d 508,
appeal
denied 216 Ill.Dec. 6, 166 Ill.2d 545, 664 N.E.2d 643. Criminal Law k
795(2.35)
Armed robbery defendant was not entitled to jury instruction on
lesser-included offense of theft given that no jury could rationally
find
defendant guilty of theft. People v. Smith, App. 1 Dist.1995, 210
Ill.Dec.
749, 274 Ill.App.3d 84, 653 N.E.2d 944, appeal denied 214 Ill.Dec. 329,
164
Ill.2d 578, 660 N.E.2d 1278. Criminal Law k 795(2.75)
Under "charging instrument" approach to instructing on lesser included
offenses, defendant charged with burglary of store was entitled to
theft
instruction, where information alleged that defendant knowingly entered
premises of store without authorization and with specific intent to
commit
theft inside, and evidence established crime of theft, in that it
proved what
it alleged in its information; namely, that defendant exerted
unauthorized
control over coins and currency owned by store and admitted that he put
the
money in his pockets. People v. Buress, App. 1 Dist.1995, 210 Ill.Dec.
646,
274 Ill.App.3d 164, 653 N.E.2d 841. Criminal Law k 795(2.35)
Even if instruction on lesser included offense of theft was required by
evidence, refusal to give instruction was harmless error and did not
warrant
reversal of felony-murder conviction based on underlying offense of
armed
robbery where evidence was so clear and convincing that jury could not
reasonably have found defendant not guilty of armed robbery; note was
found
in defendant's bedroom, written by defendant before crime, outlining
plan to
rob convenience store and shoot victim, defendant's fingerprints were
found on
stereo taken from victim's car, and gun used to kill victim belonged to
defendant's mother. People v. Taylor, App. 5 Dist.1992, 174 Ill.Dec.
628, 233
Ill.App.3d 461, 599 N.E.2d 174, appeal denied 180 Ill.Dec. 156, 147
Ill.2d
635, 606 N.E.2d 1233. Criminal Law k 1173.2(4)
Felony-murder defendant, whose alleged predicate offense was armed
robbery,
was not entitled to instruction on theft as lesser included offense of
armed
robbery absent evidence which would support theft conviction; though
defendant claimed that jury could have found that money was taken only
as an
afterthought following shooting, he testified at trial that no money
was taken
and note written by defendant before crime unequivocally demonstrated
that
defendant went to store to rob victim. People v. Taylor, App. 5
Dist.1992,
174 Ill.Dec. 628, 233 Ill.App.3d 461, 599 N.E.2d 174, appeal denied 180
Ill.Dec. 156, 147 Ill.2d 635, 606 N.E.2d 1233. Criminal Law k
795(2.75)
Refusal to instruct on issues in theft by unauthorized control along
with the
charged offense of residential burglary with intent to commit a theft
was
reversible error, where, even though there was no inherent relationship
between the crimes of residential burglary and theft, proof of the
offense
charged required proof of specific intent and evidence adduced would
support a
conviction of theft. People v. Dace, 1984, 83 Ill.Dec. 573, 104 Ill.2d
96,
470 N.E.2d 993. Criminal Law k 795(2.35); Criminal Law k 1173.2(4)
Failure to instruct on lesser included offense of misdemeanor theft or
element
of value in offense of felony theft could have been grave error if
evidence
had been closely balanced in prosecution for felony theft; however,
where
evidence on element of value was not close and was uncontradicted,
defendant
waived any objection to instructions or verdict form given,
notwithstanding
that jury was not instructed on issue of value of property and only
general
verdict of guilty was returned. People v. Clark, App. 4 Dist.1979, 29
Ill.Dec. 313, 73 Ill.App.3d 85, 391 N.E.2d 576. Criminal Law k 1038.2
106. ---- Confessions, instructions
Failure to instruct jury that defendant's alleged verbal admissions,
which
might have supported theft conviction, should be received with caution
was not
prejudicially erroneous where jury, in convicting defendant only of
criminal
trespass to vehicle, chose either to disbelieve content of defendant's
alleged
statement or to believe testimony of defendant at trial in which he
denied
making any oral confession, and thus in fact received alleged verbal
admissions of defendant with caution. People v. Johnson, App.1968, 102
Ill.App.2d 443, 243 N.E.2d 310. Criminal Law k 1173.3
107. ---- Self-incrimination, instructions
Instruction that unexplained exclusive possession of recently stolen
property
may yield presumption of guilt did not improperly require defendant to
testify. People v. Whittaker, 1970, 45 Ill.2d 491, 259 N.E.2d 787.
Criminal
Law k 393(1)
Instruction as to presumption of guilt arising from exclusive
possession of
stolen goods shortly after crime, unless explained, does not exert
unconstitutional pressure on defendant to testify and, where jury is
instructed that possession is not conclusive, does not deprive
defendant of
determination of his case by jury. People v. Burris, App.1969, 116
Ill.App.2d
79, 253 N.E.2d 628, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 71, 400 U.S. 835, 27
L.Ed.2d 67
. Criminal Law k 759(4)
108. ---- Accomplice testimony, instructions
Where the State's case rested on the absence of a satisfactory
explanation for
defendant's possession of stolen goods and where, apart from
defendant's
admission that he found some items in vicinity of burglarized store,
proof
that defendant possessed the items was based entirely on the testimony
of
defendant's wife, who had agreed to testify for the prosecution in
exchange
for the State's promise to drop charges against her which arose from
the same
alleged offense, it was plain error for the trial court to refuse to
instruct
the jury on accomplice testimony. People v. Barker, App. 4 Dist.1979,
34
Ill.Dec. 96, 78 Ill.App.3d 686, 397 N.E.2d 552. Criminal Law k 1038.2
Where defendant and companion were in joint possession of recently
stolen
property, companion could have been charged with theft and possibly
burglary;
however, in light of nonincriminating character of companion's
testimony and
absence of any direct proof of her motive to testify falsely defendant
could
not complain that refusal to give instruction concerning accomplice
testimony
resulted in reversible error. People v. Clark, App. 4 Dist.1979, 29
Ill.Dec.
313, 73 Ill.App.3d 85, 391 N.E.2d 576. Criminal Law k 1173.2(6)
Pattern jury instruction on accomplice testimony was properly refused
in
burglary and theft prosecution wherein there was no evidence that
witness was
accomplice. People v. Drysdale, App. 5 Dist.1977, 9 Ill.Dec. 137, 51
Ill.App.3d 667, 366 N.E.2d 394. Criminal Law k 780(2)
109. ---- Credibility, instructions
Fact that officer testified that, when arrested, defendant had said
that he
was "helping one of the other persons move the stuff," but officer did
not
earlier remember or record such statement in police report was merely
collateral to issue of defendant's guilt or innocence of theft; thus,
trial
court properly refused to give tendered instruction on prior
inconsistent
statements and conduct. People v. Castro, App. 1 Dist.1982, 65
Ill.Dec. 153,
109 Ill.App.3d 561, 440 N.E.2d 1008. Criminal Law k 785(11)
110. ---- Accountability, instructions
In prosecution for theft of property exceeding $150 in value, no error
occurred in giving supplemental jury instruction that if two people
steal $150
they are both guilty of theft in that amount, without also instructing
jury on
issue of accountability, where trial court offered to give
accountability
instruction to which defendants' counsel objected and State was
proceeding
against both defendants as principals as arresting officer testified
both were
seen carrying bags containing garments. People v. Parker, App. 2
Dist.1979,
33 Ill.Dec. 21, 77 Ill.App.3d 536, 396 N.E.2d 97. Criminal Law k
863(1)
Giving of instruction in prosecution for theft which stated, in
language of
<section> 5-2 of former chapter 38, that a person is legally
accountable for
conduct of another when, either before or during commission of an
offense, and
with intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits,
aids,
abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other persons, in planning of
commission of the offense, was not error where evidence raised issue of
whether defendant was a participant in any part of the crime. People v.
Hyde,
App.1968, 97 Ill.App.2d 43, 239 N.E.2d 466. Criminal Law k 808.5
111. ---- Alibi, instructions
It was not error in burglary and theft prosecution to refuse defense
request
for instructions on alibi. People v. Poe, 1971, 48 Ill.2d 506, 272
N.E.2d 28,
certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 292, 404 U.S. 942, 30 L.Ed.2d 256. Criminal
Law k
775(2)
In theft prosecution, wherein defense presented defense of alibi,
instruction
that "in order to maintain it, it is incumbent on the defendant" to
support
such defense by facts and circumstances as are sufficient when
considered in
connection with all other evidence to create in minds of jury
reasonable doubt
of truth of charge was erroneous since instruction spoke in language of
burden
of proof and ran counter to basic notion that defendant's guilt must be
established beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Hazen, App.1969, 104
Ill.App.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 424. Criminal Law k 775(3)
Instruction on alibi in larceny prosecution was error and prejudicial
as
intimating doubt of sufficiency of alibi other than veracity of
witnesses,
where evidence of alibi covered entire time of offense. People v.
Lacey,
1930, 171 N.E. 544, 339 Ill. 480. Criminal Law k 1172.2
Instruction on burden to establish alibi was erroneous as confining
consideration to proof of alibi and evidence to establish guilt.
People v.
Lacey, 1930, 171 N.E. 544, 339 Ill. 480. Criminal Law k 815(5)
112. ---- Circumstantial evidence, instructions
Testimony by assistant manager of store from which retail theft
occurred that
he saw defendant take the goods was direct evidence of the theft so
that
instruction on circumstantial evidence was not required. People v.
Modlin,
App. 4 Dist.1979, 30 Ill.Dec. 350, 74 Ill.App.3d 387, 393 N.E.2d 5.
Criminal
Law k 814(17)
Where direct evidence was presented in prosecution for theft that the
property
was stolen, that property was found in defendant's house and that
burglars who
stole the property delivered it to defendant's home, trial court
properly
refused to instruct on circumstantial evidence. People v. Collins,
App. 3
Dist.1977, 10 Ill.Dec. 116, 51 Ill.App.3d 993, 367 N.E.2d 504.
Criminal Law k
814(17)
In larceny prosecution, instruction that circumstantial evidence is
legal
evidence was proper as against contention that evidence was all direct
since
intent may always be proved by circumstantial evidence. People v.
Baker,
1936, 6 N.E.2d 665, 365 Ill. 328. Criminal Law k 814(2)
113. ---- Presumptions and burden of proof, instructions
It was reversible error in theft prosecution to instruct jury that
defendant
"shall be presumed" to have possessed goods with intention of retaining
them
without paying full retail value if State proved predicate facts, as
presumed
fact would not necessarily flow beyond reasonable doubt from predicate
facts.
People v. Flowers, App. 4 Dist.1985, 89 Ill.Dec. 312, 134 Ill.App.3d
324, 480
N.E.2d 198. Criminal Law k 1172.2; Larceny k 77(1)
Instruction on burden to establish alibi was erroneous as shifting
burden of
proof to defendant. People v. Lacey, 1930, 171 N.E. 544, 339 Ill. 480.
Criminal Law k 778(5)
Instruction that presumption of innocence is not to aid guilty was
proper,
though defendants admitted theft of property not designated in
indictment.
People v. Bundy, 1926, 154 N.E. 900, 324 Ill. 190. Criminal Law k
778(4)
On trial for larceny it was not error to modify an instruction that
when a man
has lived past middle life with a good reputation among his neighbors,
and
with an apparently honorable record, and has a wife and grown family,
and
occupies and has occupied positions of trust and confidence in the
community,
the evidence to convict him on such a crime as charged should be clear,
and,
if these things were true of the defendant, the jury should give them
weight;
as the instruction assumed defendant's good reputation, while the
evidence was
conflicting, and the fact that he had a wife and family was not
entitled to
any weight in determining his guilt. Young v. People, 1901, 61 N.E.
1104, 193
Ill. 236. Criminal Law k 782(1)
Where, in a trial for larceny from a bank, the defendant's theory, as
stated
in his instructions, was that the money might have been made away with
by the
cashier, it was proper to instruct the jury, in substance that the law
presumes the character of the cashier was good, and the jury should so
consider it unless there was evidence in the case showing the contrary;
and
that in considering the question whether he, as the custodian of the
money of
said bank, acted as an honest man would act, under similar
circumstances, when
larceny was discovered, the jury might consider such presumption raised
by the
law of his good character for honesty, together with any facts and
circumstances in evidence tending to show that he made no disposition
of the
missing money. Carroll v. People, 1891, 27 N.E. 18, 136 Ill. 456.
Criminal
Law k 776(4)
An instruction that defendant must "satisfactorily" explain his recent
possession of stolen property is erroneous; such burden of proof not
being
incumbent on him. Hoge v. People, 1886, 6 N.E. 796, 117 Ill. 35.
Larceny k 41
114. ---- Reasonable doubt, instructions
In prosecution wherein defendant was convicted of felony theft,
instruction
was deficient in failing to state that State was required to prove
beyond
reasonable doubt that defendant exerted unauthorized control over
property in
question, but error was harmless on record and thus defendant by
failing to
raise issue until appeal waived right to raise the same. People v.
Carlyle,
App. 5 Dist.1979, 25 Ill.Dec. 544, 69 Ill.App.3d 14, 387 N.E.2d 1.
Criminal
Law k 1038.1(4); Larceny k 75(1)
Where proof of guilt of theft was circumstantial, trial court should
have
instructed the jury that it should not find defendants guilty unless
facts and
circumstances proved excluded every reasonable theory of innocence;
however,
such error did not require reversal of convictions in view of
compelling
nature of evidence of defendants' guilt. People v. Uselding, App. 4
Dist.1976, 39 Ill.App.3d 677, 350 N.E.2d 283. Criminal Law k 784(1);
Criminal Law k 1173.2(5)
Instruction that reasonable doubt which jury was permitted to entertain
to
authorize acquittal must be as to guilt of accused on whole evidence
and not
as to any particular fact not essential and material to constitute
charged
offense, viewed in light of instruction defining theft in language of
this
section and the instructions as a whole which gave jury elemental facts
constituting charged crime, was not prejudicially erroneous. People v.
Ferrara, App.1969, 111 Ill.App.2d 472, 250 N.E.2d 530, certiorari
denied 90
S.Ct. 1815, 398 U.S. 927, 26 L.Ed.2d 89. Criminal Law k 822(16)
In theft prosecution, giving instruction that jury might consider proof
of
guilt established beyond reasonable doubt if jury believed material
allegations in indictment had been proved was reversible error for
failure to
give additional instruction stating what the material allegations were.
People v. Hazen, App.1969, 104 Ill.App.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 424.
Criminal Law k
789(3); Criminal Law k 1173.2(2)
Error in instruction on reasonable doubt in larceny prosecution was not
reversible error in view of other instructions on presumption of
innocence.
People v. Baker, 1936, 6 N.E.2d 665, 365 Ill. 328. Criminal Law k
1172.2
115. ---- Additional instructions
Answer to question asked by jury in prosecution for felony-theft and
fraudulent conveyance of land as to whether it was legal to use one
person's
down payment on unrelated expenses and answer to jury question seeking
advice
in case unanimous decision could not be made on charge and/or charges
were
within trial judge's discretion, and there was no error in declining to
further instruct thereon. People v. Jedlicka, App. 2 Dist.1980, 39
Ill.Dec.
865, 84 Ill.App.3d 483, 405 N.E.2d 844. Criminal Law k 863(1)
Trial court in prosecution for theft by deception properly refused to
advise
further in answer to question asked by jury, which inquired whether
deception
must have occurred at time defendant obtained checks from five
different
persons for whom defendant contracted to build house intending not to
perform,
where trial court admonished jury to follow instruction given, and
admonition
should have in fact dispelled any confusion jury may have had about
whether
they could consider acts at any later time during entire contractual
time
period. People v. Jedlicka, App. 2 Dist.1980, 39 Ill.Dec. 865, 84
Ill.App.3d
483, 405 N.E.2d 844. Criminal Law k 863(2)
116. Verdict--In general
In prosecution for theft by deception and conspiracy, evidence that
defendant
lived at same address as wife and family at time they were receiving
public
aid, although the contrary was reported to the Department of Public
Aid, that
defendant failed to correct the Department's false information
regarding
family's income, and that defendant knew that his wife was receiving
aid based
on such false information, was sufficient to warrant jury finding of
guilt of
theft by deception but not guilty of conspiracy, and thus, defendant's
claim
that jury, in acquitting defendant on one charge and in convicting him
on
other charges, returned compromise verdict was based on mere
speculation.
People v. Peebles, App. 1 Dist.1984, 80 Ill.Dec. 427, 125 Ill.App.3d
213, 465
N.E.2d 539. Conspiracy k 47(1); Criminal Law k 878(3); False
Pretenses k
49(1)
In prosecution for theft of garbage containers, testimony of foreman of
jury
that, after jury had arrived at their verdict, a juror questioned
whether
defendant could have loaded garbage containers on trailer which was
allegedly
used to transport them and foreman told such juror that he had measured
garbage containers when, in fact, he had not done so, would not be
received to
impeach guilty verdict. People v. DeBartolo, App. 2 Dist.1975, 24
Ill.App.3d
1009, 322 N.E.2d 258. Criminal Law k 957(3)
Where a defendant was convicted of burglary and theft and trial court
sentenced defendant without specifying either of the two counts, such
sentence
was proper as the verdict of the jury on two counts arising out of the
same
transaction has the same effect as a general verdict of guilty. People
v.
Stevenson, App.1969, 107 Ill.App.2d 441, 246 N.E.2d 309. Sentencing
And
Punishment k 532
Where an indictment charges a defendant with larceny, the value of the
property stolen is not required to be proved as charged in the
indictment, and
a verdict or finding that the value of the money or property stolen is
over
fifteen dollars without definitely fixing the value supports a judgment
and
sentence of imprisonment in the penitentiary. People v. Nelson, 1948,
77
N.E.2d 171, 399 Ill. 132. Larceny k 40(6); Larceny k 83
While larceny by a bailee and larceny by embezzlement constituted
separate
offenses under Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section><section> 207, 394
(repealed), and evidence of one offense would not support a conviction
on a
count charging the other offense, in a prosecution where indictment
consisting
of three counts charged larceny as bailee of automobile, larceny by
embezzlement as agents, and simple larceny, a general finding of guilty
of
larceny was sufficient if evidence warrants a conviction under any
count.
People v. Moses, 1940, 31 N.E.2d 585, 375 Ill. 336. Larceny k 82
Where evidence showed defendant's guilt of both burglary and larceny,
he
cannot complain because he was convicted of larceny only. People v.
Lawson,
1928, 160 N.E. 125, 328 Ill. 602. Criminal Law k 1175
117. ---- Included offenses, verdict
Evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of lesser-included
offense of
theft of property under $300 and, thus, Appellate Court would reduce
degree of
defendant's conviction to that offense in light of insufficiency of
evidence
to support conviction for theft of property from person; defendant
removed
victim's purse from her shopping cart in store when she was several
feet away,
looking in another direction, and at time when she was unaware of
theft.
People v. Sims, App. 3 Dist.1993, 185 Ill.Dec. 452, 245 Ill.App.3d 221,
614
N.E.2d 893, appeal denied 190 Ill.Dec. 906, 152 Ill.2d 575, 622 N.E.2d
1223.
Criminal Law k 1184(3);
Larceny k 65
Attempted theft was not a lesser-included offense of attempted
burglary, and
indictment for the latter could not support conviction of the former.
People
v. Melmuka, App. 1 Dist.1988, 123 Ill.Dec. 344, 173 Ill.App.3d 735, 527
N.E.2d
982. Indictment And Information k 191(2)
Theft conviction merged with armed robbery conviction where both
offenses were
based on single act of taking victim's van and its contents. People v.
Thomas, App. 1 Dist.1987, 114 Ill.Dec. 746, 163 Ill.App.3d 670, 516
N.E.2d
901, appeal denied 119 Ill.Dec. 395, 119 Ill.2d 572, 522 N.E.2d 1254.
Criminal
Law k 30
Offense of theft is not an included offense of robbery, in that theft
requires
a specific intent or mental state to deprive owner permanently of the
use or
benefit of the property, while robbery does not require such specific
intent,
and thus defendant's conviction of theft could not stand where he was
charged
by information with the offense of robbery. People v. Kimble, App. 1
Dist.1980, 46 Ill.Dec. 413, 90 Ill.App.3d 999, 414 N.E.2d 135.
Indictment And
Information k 191(9)
Where information alleging theft charged defendant with knowingly
obtaining
unauthorized control of vehicle valued in excess of $150 with intent to
permanently deprive owner of it and where information upon which
conviction of
possession of stolen motor vehicle was based alleged that defendant was
in
possession of vehicle knowing it to be stolen, elements to show less
serious
charge of possession of stolen motor vehicle were contained within more
serious offense of theft, which contained additional elements of intent
to
deprive owner of property and vehicle's value, and thus trial court
erred in
convicting defendant of possession of stolen motor vehicle in addition
to
convicting defendant of theft. People v. Johnson, App. 1 Dist.1978, 21
Ill.Dec. 791, 64 Ill.App.3d 1018, 382 N.E.2d 85. Criminal Law k 29(10)
Where indictment charged defendant with theft in excess of $150, where
jury
was given option of finding defendant either guilty of theft or not
guilty
under specific instructions and not by general reference to indictment,
and
where the issues instruction specifically required State to prove that
value
of tires was more than $150 and no instruction was tendered or given as
to any
lesser included offense, any possibility that jury might have found
defendant
guilty of lesser offense or any ambiguity in jury's verdict was
eliminated,
despite fact that form of verdict did not specify and value. People v.
DeBartolo, App. 2 Dist.1975, 24 Ill.App.3d 1000, 322 N.E.2d 251.
Larceny k 82
Where jury convicted defendant on both theft and robbery counts which
arose
from same acts, it was error to enter judgment on theft count, which
was the
lesser included offense. People v. Broadnax, App. 2 Dist.1974, 23
Ill.App.3d
68, 318 N.E.2d 499. Criminal Law k 29(11)
Where a single, continuous struggle for saw began inside apartment
where
complaining witness was working and ended shortly thereafter on street,
and
defendant's attack on complaining witness on the street was directed at
obtaining control over the saw, offense of aggravated battery and
offense of
theft of the saw arose out of same conduct, and were not separate and
unrelated crimes, thus judgment of conviction could be entered only on
more
serious offense, aggravated battery. People v. Hardy, App. 1
Dist.1974, 19
Ill.App.3d 718, 312 N.E.2d 359. Criminal Law k 29(10)
118. ---- Consistency, verdict
Jury's guilty verdicts in theft prosecution were legally inconsistent
in that
it found both that defendant knew property was stolen and that
defendant did
not in fact know that property was stolen; evidence introduced by state
at
trial, coupled with manner in which state charged defendant, indicated
that
state was seeking single conviction for theft, state was proceeding on
theory
of defendant being actual thief, or, in the alternative, that he had
committed
theft by possession of stolen property, and defendant could not be
actual
thief and, at the same time, possess merely a reasonable belief that
property
was stolen. People v. Price, App. 3 Dist.2005, 292 Ill.Dec. 153, 356
Ill.App.3d 223, 825 N.E.2d 741, appeal allowed 298 Ill.Dec. 387, 216
Ill.2d
722, 839 N.E.2d 1034, reversed 302 Ill.Dec. 762, 221 Ill.2d 182, 850
N.E.2d
199. Criminal Law k 878(4)
Jury verdicts convicting school district superintendent of compound
offense of
official misconduct while acquitting him of predicate offense of theft
were
legally inconsistent; jury could have convicted defendant of official
misconduct only if it believed that he had committed theft of property
over
$300 in value, and jury acquitted defendant of precisely such theft.
People
v. Klingenberg, 1996, 216 Ill.Dec. 813, 172 Ill.2d 270, 665 N.E.2d
1370,
rehearing denied. Criminal Law k 878(4)
Conviction of school district superintendent for official misconduct
could not
stand as matter of law, where superintendent was acquitted of predicate
offense of theft in same proceeding; legally inconsistent verdicts
were
unreliable, as jury convicted defendant of one crime while rejecting
essential
element needed to support the conviction by acquitting him of predicate
offense. People v. Klingenberg, 1996, 216 Ill.Dec. 813, 172 Ill.2d
270, 665
N.E.2d 1370, rehearing denied. Criminal Law k 878(4)
Jury's finding of guilty on eight counts of theft by deception did not
necessarily mean that jury had rejected defense theory that uncle had
intended
to make gift of funds in checking account by adding defendant's name to
account so that not guilty verdicts on five additional thefts counts
for
different time periods would be consistent under additional defense
theories;
rather, verdicts could have been legally inconsistent. People v.
Wright, App.
5 Dist.1993, 180 Ill.Dec. 461, 239 Ill.App.3d 738, 607 N.E.2d 355,
appeal
denied 186 Ill.Dec. 393, 151 Ill.2d 576, 616 N.E.2d 346. Criminal Law
k
878(4)
Jury verdicts of guilty on eight counts of theft by deception and not
guilty
on five additional counts for same crime during different time periods
could
not be explained as consistent on basis of uncle's alleged grant of
authority
to defendant to write checks on uncle's account during periods for
which not
guilty verdicts were returned, in light of uncles' clear mental
incapacitation
during period for which not guilty verdict was returned and his lucid
mental
capability during period for which guilty verdict was returned. People
v.
Wright, App. 5 Dist.1993, 180 Ill.Dec. 461, 239 Ill.App.3d 738, 607
N.E.2d
355, appeal denied 186 Ill.Dec. 393, 151 Ill.2d 576, 616 N.E.2d 346.
Criminal
Law k 878(4)
Jury reasonably could have found defendant guilty of eight counts of
theft by
deception consistent with finding him not guilty of same crime in five
additional counts, if jury believed that state had satisfied its burden
of
proving that checks on uncle's account written by defendant were not
for
uncle's benefit only with regard to checks written to specific vendors
or
during period in which uncle was clearly mentally incapacitated and,
thus,
verdicts were not legally inconsistent even if logically inconsistent
and
based on jury lenity. People v. Wright, App. 5 Dist.1993, 180 Ill.Dec.
461,
239 Ill.App.3d 738, 607 N.E.2d 355, appeal denied 186 Ill.Dec. 393, 151
Ill.2d
576, 616 N.E.2d 346. Criminal Law k 878(4)
Trial court's finding that defendant was guilty of theft was not
affected by
its conclusion that defendant was not guilty of burglary of apartment,
where
to prove theft State was not required to show that defendant actually
took
items from apartment, but only that defendant exerted unauthorized
control
over property, and requisite intent could be inferred from surrounding
facts
and circumstances. People v. Ortiz, App. 1 Dist.1988, 121 Ill.Dec. 2,
170
Ill.App.3d 1083, 524 N.E.2d 1050. Criminal Law k 255.4
If exactly the same facts or testimony were presented at trial relating
to
both defendants, one of whom was found guilty and the other not guilty,
the
verdicts would be inconsistent and a reasonable doubt as to the guilt
of the
convicted defendant would still exist. People v. Smith, App. 1
Dist.1974, 25
Ill.App.3d 155, 323 N.E.2d 100. Criminal Law k 877
In view of fact that offense of theft would be completed upon exerting
of
unauthorized control over property of victim with intent to deprive him
permanently of it without regard to whether the property had originally
been
taken by force from owner's person or presence or whether great bodily
harm
had been done to victim, verdict of not guilty on robbery and
aggravated
battery charges was not inconsistent with guilty verdict on theft
charge so as
to require reversal of the theft conviction. People v. Havener, App. 4
Dist.1973, 13 Ill.App.3d 312, 300 N.E.2d 43. Criminal Law k 878(4)
Fact that jury, which had sufficient evidence before it to find
defendant
guilty of both burglary and theft, did not find defendant guilty of
burglary
did not mean that charge of theft which was proven could not stand;
verdict
of not guilty of burglary and verdict of guilty of theft were not
inconsistent. People v. Lamb, App. 5 Dist.1972, 10 Ill.App.3d 935, 295
N.E.2d
257. Criminal Law k 878(4)
119. ---- Form of verdict
Verdict form for theft charges, which was applicable IPI criminal
instruction
and which was proffered by state, without objection by defendants, was
sufficient. People v. Massarella, App. 1 Dist.1979, 36 Ill.Dec. 16, 80
Ill.App.3d 552, 400 N.E.2d 436, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 855, 449
U.S.
1077, 66 L.Ed.2d 799. Criminal Law k 847
General verdict form finding defendant "Guilty of Theft" without any
specific
reference even to a felony count of the indictment could not, in the
context
of a record where a misdemeanor theft count had been stricken without
the
jury's knowledge, preclude ambiguity as to the meaning of the verdict;
instead, the record demonstrated that the jury was presented no
occasion for
making a finding on the probative value of the State's value evidence
and the
verdict, therefore, would support only a conviction for misdemeanor
theft,
even though the State's value evidence was undisputed. People v. Pugh,
App. 3
Dist.1975, 29 Ill.App.3d 42, 329 N.E.2d 425. Larceny k 82
If the issues instruction sets out all the elements of felony theft
charge,
including the matter of value, and properly directs the jury that in
order to
return a verdict of guilty they must find affirmatively on the
proposition
that the state has met its burden of proof on each of those essential
elements
including that the property taken had a value in excess of $150, then a
general verdict reciting only that "we, the jury, find defendant
guilty" is
acceptable to sustain a conviction for felony theft. People v. Pugh,
App. 3
Dist.1975, 29 Ill.App.3d 42, 329 N.E.2d 425. Larceny k 82
Where the jury is properly instructed with respect to the elements of
an
indictment charging theft of property of the value of more than $150,
then a
general verdict which finds defendant guilty in the manner and form
charged in
the indictment is sufficient to eliminate ambiguity as to the meaning
of the
verdict, and no further finding of value in the verdict is required.
People
v. Pugh, App. 3 Dist.1975, 29 Ill.App.3d 42, 329 N.E.2d 425. Larceny k
83
120. ---- Multiple counts, verdict
Where defendant, in one act, simultaneously exerts control over several
different items of stolen property, he or she is properly charged with
only
one theft. People v. Timmons, App. 2 Dist.1992, 174 Ill.Dec. 616, 233
Ill.App.3d 591, 599 N.E.2d 162. Criminal Law k 29(10)
Defendant was guilty of only one count of theft where defendant took
two
different pistols from same gun shop, on same date, and at nearly same
time.
People v. Timmons, App. 2 Dist.1992, 174 Ill.Dec. 616, 233 Ill.App.3d
591, 599
N.E.2d 162. Criminal Law k 29(10)
Defendant could be convicted of both theft by deception and criminal
breach of
fiduciary duty in connection with each of several checks issued to him
even
though he contended that each taking of a check constituted a single
act; act
of receiving another's property by deception was distinguishable from
act of
conversion of fiduciary monies, neither crime was included offense of
the
other, and trial court specifically held in its judgment and sentence
order
that breach of fiduciary duty convictions merged with theft by
deception
convictions. People v. Lambert, App. 4 Dist.1990, 141 Ill.Dec. 932,
195
Ill.App.3d 314, 552 N.E.2d 300, appeal denied 144 Ill.Dec. 262, 132
Ill.2d
550, 555 N.E.2d 381. Criminal Law k 29(10)
Separate convictions for robbery and theft arising out of same physical
act
are improper. People v. Walker, App. 3 Dist.1989, 138 Ill.Dec. 610,
191
Ill.App.3d 382, 547 N.E.2d 1036.
Criminal Law k 29(11)
Defendant could only be convicted of one count of theft for stealing
property
belonging to two different owners from single residence; although
property
came from different rooms and may have required multiple trips to getaway
car, defendant's acts were not separable with respect to time or place
or
owners' separately owned property. People v. Fuentes, App. 3
Dist.1988, 122
Ill.Dec. 780, 172 Ill.App.3d 874, 527 N.E.2d 152, appeal denied 128
Ill.Dec.
894, 123 Ill.2d 562, 535 N.E.2d 405. Criminal Law k 29(10)
Two theft counts in indictment, which charged defendant with knowingly
obtaining and exerting unauthorized control over property and obtaining
control over property either knowing it had been stolen or under
circumstances
which would have reasonably induced him to believe that it was stolen,
merely
charged same transaction in different forms and thus trial court
properly
submitted to jury only forms for general verdict of guilty or not
guilty of
theft. People v. Josephine, App. 1 Dist.1987, 117 Ill.Dec. 394, 165
Ill.App.3d
762, 520 N.E.2d 745. Criminal Law k 798.5
In light of disparate sentencing treatment and proof requirements for
offenses
of theft of firearm and theft of property valued in excess of $150,
defendant
could be convicted of both crimes arising out of same incident where he
exerted unauthorized control over firearm and over other property
valued in
excess of $150. People v. Holliday, App. 5 Dist.1983, 70 Ill.Dec. 882,
115
Ill.App.3d 141, 450 N.E.2d 355. Criminal Law k 29(10)
In light of fact that defendant's convictions for offenses of theft and
robbery arose out of same physical act of defendant's alleged
accomplice,
defendant's conviction for less serious offense of theft was vacated.
People
v. Sherman, App. 3 Dist.1980, 42 Ill.Dec. 871, 87 Ill.App.3d 937, 409
N.E.2d
486. Criminal Law k 29(11)
Defendant could be convicted of both theft and burglary arising out of
the
same conduct where concurrent sentences were imposed. People v. Frey,
App. 5
Dist.1977, 8 Ill.Dec. 45, 50 Ill.App.3d 437, 365 N.E.2d 283. Criminal
Law k
29(11)
Where only difference between two counts of indictment charging
conspiracy to
commit theft was specific subsection of this section alleged to have
been
violated, and both counts involved same transaction, counts were not so
diametrically opposed and mutually exclusive as to have required as
least
eight verdict forms for purpose of finding separately for each
defendant on
each count. People v. Wurbs, App. 4 Dist.1976, 38 Ill.App.3d 360, 347
N.E.2d
879. Criminal Law k 798.5
Even though burglary and misdemeanor theft involve different elements
of
proof, where both charges are based on same course of conduct and where
objective, purpose, or motivation of defendant remains unchanged
throughout
course of conduct, there can be but one conviction. People v. Gibson,
App. 2
Dist.1975, 30 Ill.App.3d 555, 333 N.E.2d 549. Criminal Law k 29(11)
Where defendant entered victim's apartment for purpose of committing
theft and
there was no deviation from this purpose, motivation or objective
during
defendant's course of conduct, defendant could not be convicted of both
burglary and misdemeanor theft and misdemeanor theft conviction had to
be
vacated even though there was no sentence imposed on misdemeanor or
theft
conviction. People v. Gibson, App. 2 Dist.1975, 30 Ill.App.3d 555, 333
N.E.2d
549. Criminal Law k 29(10)
Where defendant was charged with both theft of under $150 and burglary
as a
result of his having taken items from a home, trial court, although
properly
imposing only one sentence, erred in entering judgments upon both jury
verdicts as both offenses arose from the same conduct and transaction
and were
not independently motivated. People v. Johnson, App. 4 Dist.1974, 25
Ill.App.3d 976, 323 N.E.2d 777. Sentencing And Punishment k 532;
Criminal
Law k 29(11)
Judgment, in prosecution of defendant for one count of burglary and two
counts
of theft under $150 arising from same incident, sufficiently complied
with
Supreme Court holding that where several counts of an indictment are
based on
a single act of the defendant, there can be only one conviction, where
the
mittimus in the cause recorded judgment only on the burglary. People
v.
Woods, App. 4 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 480, 319 N.E.2d 263. Criminal
Law k
29(11)
Where act constituting theft was not independently motivated or
otherwise
separable from the act constituting burglary, court erred in entering
judgment
of conviction on theft charge. People v. Grotti, App. 3 Dist.1974, 20
Ill.App.3d 75, 312 N.E.2d 717. Criminal Law k 29(11)
In prosecution arising from incident in which defendant was found to be
passenger in a stolen automobile in which were found items taken in
burglary
of a gift shop, convictions for both theft of the automobile and
burglary of
the gift shop would be sustained since they were independently
motivated and
separable in point of time, place and victim and did not arise from
either
identical conduct or a single act, and since any connection between the
two
was purely coincidental. People v. Beall, App. 4 Dist.1972, 8
Ill.App.3d 739,
290 N.E.2d 410. Criminal Law k 29(11)
Where defendant was charged in three counts with larceny as bailee,
embezzlement, and larceny of six checks, and it appeared at the trial
that the
conversion of each of the six checks was a separate transaction, the
court
could have required the prosecution at the close of the evidence to
elect on
which check conviction would be asked. People v. Jasiecki, 1921, 133
N.E.
281, 301 Ill. 23. Criminal Law k 678(1)
121. Multiple convictions, same act--In general
Sentence on charge of theft of property having value in excess of $300
was
vacated where defendant was charged with both State benefits fraud when
more
than $300 is obtained and theft, was convicted of only State benefits
fraud,
yet was sentenced on both charges, which arose from the same physical
acts,
and the record showed no affirmative finding of guilt as to the theft
charge.
People v. Powell, App. 4 Dist.1990, 145 Ill.Dec. 278, 199 Ill.App.3d
291, 556
N.E.2d 896. Criminal Law k 1181.5(1)
Convictions and sentences for both armed violence and predicate
burglary and
theft could not be imposed. People v. Felton, App. 2 Dist.1982, 64
Ill.Dec.
442, 108 Ill.App.3d 763, 439 N.E.2d 1107. Criminal Law k 29(9);
Sentencing
And Punishment k 532
Defendant was not improperly convicted and subjected to concurrent
sentences
for both unlawful possession of a controlled substance and theft of the
same
controlled substance, since theft and unlawful possession were multiple
offenses which arose from a series of closely related acts that were
not
included within each other. People v. Noascono, App. 5 Dist.1980, 36
Ill.Dec.
300, 80 Ill.App.3d 921, 400 N.E.2d 720. Criminal Law k 29(10)
Test of whether single course of conduct constitutes multiple criminal
offenses is whether conduct is separable or whether the criminal
offenses are
distinct and independently motivated. People v. Vaini, App. 3
Dist.1975, 33
Ill.App.3d 246, 337 N.E.2d 234. Criminal Law k 29(1)
Where criminal offense is one act, fully completed at same time and
place, it
is but one crime, however many different kinds of property may be
stolen.
People v. Vaini, App. 3 Dist.1975, 33 Ill.App.3d 246, 337 N.E.2d 234.
Larceny
k 1
Where theft of property belonging to different owners is committed at
same
place and same time, there is but one offense. People v. Vaini, App. 3
Dist.1975, 33 Ill.App.3d 246, 337 N.E.2d 234. Larceny k 1
Where defendant was convicted of burglary of a gift shop as well as
possession
of burglary tools and theft of goods from the gift shop, and a single
two to
five-year sentence was imposed, and where sentence imposed upon either
of the
latter two offenses would appropriately be less than the burglary
sentence,
conviction and sentence for the latter two offenses would be reversed.
People
v. Beall, App. 4 Dist.1972, 8 Ill.App.3d 739, 290 N.E.2d 410. Criminal
Law k
1186.1
Where defendant was sentenced for both forgery and theft arising out of
same
transaction, only the greater sentence should have been imposed, though
the
sentence were to run concurrently. People v. Rose, App.1972, 7
Ill.App.3d
374, 287 N.E.2d 195.
Sentencing And Punishment k 532
122. ---- Theft offenses, multiple convictions, same act
Computer fraud offense and theft offense were based on separate acts
and,
thus, conviction for both offenses did not violate one-act, one-crime
rule;
defendant committed computer fraud by representing himself as another
while
using a computer to complete online application forms to obtain a
credit card,
and he committed theft by accepting credit card and using it to obtain
over
$12,000 worth of merchandise and financing. People v. Davis, App. 2
Dist.2004, 289 Ill.Dec. 395, 353 Ill.App.3d 790, 819 N.E.2d 1195.
Criminal
Law k 29(10)
Possession of stolen motor vehicle was not lesser included offense of
theft,
so that ch. 95 1/2 , <paragraph> 4-103 providing for greater punishment
for
possessing stolen motor vehicle than that provided in theft statute
[ch. 38,
<paragraph> 16-1] did not violate due process. People v. Ferguson,
App. 1
Dist.1990, 149 Ill.Dec. 422, 204 Ill.App.3d 146, 561 N.E.2d 1118,
appeal
denied 151 Ill.Dec. 387, 135 Ill.2d 561, 564 N.E.2d 842.
Constitutional Law k
270(1); Indictment And Information k 191(.5); Receiving Stolen Goods
k 10
Where both of defendant's convictions of theft by deception and felony
theft
by concealment were carved from same act, one conviction could not
stand.
People v. Morrissey, App. 3 Dist.1985, 89 Ill.Dec. 232, 133 Ill.App.3d
1069,
479 N.E.2d 1238. Criminal Law k 29(10)
In theft prosecution, evidence that defendant knowingly exercised
unauthorized
control over three automobiles, with intent permanently to deprive
owners of
use or benefit of them, simultaneously on date well after their initial
disappearance, was a single physical act, from which more than one
offense
could not be carved, absent evidence that defendant either purchased
such
automobiles knowing them to be stolen, or that he stole them himself.
People
v. Minor, App. 5 Dist.1983, 71 Ill.Dec. 857, 115 Ill.App.3d 1046, 451
N.E.2d
1011. Criminal Law k 29(10)
Since both offenses of theft over $150 and retail theft arose from same
physical act, only the judgment of conviction for theft over $150 could
stand,
even though defendant was only sentenced for one offense. People v.
Heidorn,
App. 2 Dist.1983, 70 Ill.Dec. 439, 114 Ill.App.3d 933, 449 N.E.2d 568.
Criminal Law k 29(10)
Defendant could not be convicted of both felony theft of boat and
felony theft
of boat trailer where defendant committed a single physical act in
taking
trailer with boat on it. People v. Depner, App. 2 Dist.1980, 44
Ill.Dec. 902,
89 Ill.App.3d 689, 411 N.E.2d 1368. Criminal Law k 29(10)
Defendant's convictions for theft of a specific automobile and
possession of
same vehicle knowing it to be stolen were based upon a single act and
only one
sentence should have been imposed, i. e., sentence for the greater
offense of
theft. People v. Lindsey, App. 1 Dist.1979, 25 Ill.Dec. 952, 69
Ill.App.3d
493, 387 N.E.2d 828. Sentencing And Punishment k 532
Action of defendant in simultaneously exerting unauthorized control
over
several different items of stolen property belonging to two owners
constituted
only a single offense for which only one sentence could be imposed, and
thus,
where defendant had been charged by separate information with two
counts of
felony theft, had entered pleas of guilty, and had been sentenced to
from one
and one half to seven years' imprisonment on each judgment of
conviction,
judgment of conviction and sentence imposed thereon for one of the
informations would be vacated. People v. Jackson, App. 3 Dist.1978, 21
Ill.Dec. 34, 64 Ill.App.3d 159, 380 N.E.2d 1210. Sentencing And
Punishment k
532
123. ---- Battery, multiple convictions, same act
Where battery with which defendant was charged was only incidental to
theft
which occurred when defendant allegedly seized complainant by the neck,
forced
him against wall and removed his billfold, defendant could not be
convicted
and sentenced for battery in addition to conviction and sentence for
theft.
People v. Murrell, 1975, 60 Ill.2d 287, 326 N.E.2d 762. Criminal Law k
29(10)
Where conduct which constituted battery and theft constituted but a
single
transaction, it was error to sentence defendant for both offenses, and
sentence imposed on battery charge was vacated. People v. Watson, App.
1
Dist.1974, 18 Ill.App.3d 38, 309 N.E.2d 382. Criminal Law k 1184(4.1)
Where defendant's conduct in knocking victim to ground was force used
to gain
possession of her purse, conduct which constituted both offense of
theft and
offense of battery was part of single transaction and only one sentence
could
be imposed. People v. Zayas, App. 1 Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 390, 308
N.E.2d
147. Sentencing And Punishment k 532
Where both articles which defendant was charged with stealing from
mailbox
were initially located in same mailbox, defendant's conduct in taking
both
constituted one act, and he could be sentenced upon only one theft
charge.
People v. Townsend, App. 1 Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 621, 308 N.E.2d 82.
Sentencing And Punishment k 532
Where defendant knocked complainant to the ground in order to steal his
wallet, money and watch, it was improper for trial court to impose
sentence on
battery conviction in addition to sentence on theft conviction. People
v.
Spratt, App. 1 Dist.1973, 12 Ill.App.3d 1037, 299 N.E.2d 520.
Sentencing And
Punishment k 532
In absence of evidence indicating that conduct of defendant and
codefendant in
knocking victim to ground was other than to effectuate theft of coin
purse
from victim, such conduct constituted but a single transaction and
would
support only a single sentence, for theft, and thus sentence imposed
upon
battery conviction would be vacated. People v. Redding, App. 1
Dist.1973, 12
Ill.App.3d 150, 298 N.E.2d 238. Sentencing And Punishment k 532
124. ---- Burglary, multiple convictions, same act
Fact the jury acquitted defendant on burglary charge did not
collaterally
estop jury from finding him guilty of misdemeanor theft. People v.
Barker,
App. 4 Dist.1979, 34 Ill.Dec. 96, 78 Ill.App.3d 686, 397 N.E.2d 552.
Judgment
k 751
Theft is not an included offense of burglary and, hence, although
charges of
theft and burglary may arise out of the same conduct, conviction for
both may
stand. People v. Baker, App. 4 Dist.1978, 14 Ill.Dec. 427, 57
Ill.App.3d 401,
372 N.E.2d 438. Indictment And Information k 191(2)
Defendants who were guilty of unauthorized entry with intent to commit
theft
of chemical cans and actual theft of cans could be convicted only of
burglary
and not both burglary and theft. People v. Uselding, App. 4 Dist.1976,
39
Ill.App.3d 677, 350 N.E.2d 283. Criminal Law k 29(11)
Unauthorized entry with intent to commit a theft and actual theft
constitute
two offenses arising out of same conduct. People v. Uselding, App. 4
Dist.1976, 39 Ill.App.3d 677, 350 N.E.2d 283. Criminal Law k 29(11)
In prosecution for burglary and two counts of theft, trial court erred
in
entering separate judgment of conviction and sentence on one of theft
offenses
when property which was subject of that theft was same property as that
involved in burglary. People v. Travelstead, App. 5 Dist.1976, 36
Ill.App.3d
119, 343 N.E.2d 183. Criminal Law k 29(11); Sentencing And Punishment
k 532
When burglary and theft arise out of same act or same conduct, without
independent motivation for theft, judgment of conviction and sentence
can only
be entered on burglary offense, it being more serious of two offenses;
furthermore, application of that rule cannot be avoided by bringing
theft
charge under "theft by reception" portion of section. People v.
Travelstead,
App. 5 Dist.1976, 36 Ill.App.3d 119, 343 N.E.2d 183. Criminal Law k
29(11);
Sentencing And Punishment k 532
When burglary and theft result from same conduct, defendant cannot be
convicted and sentenced for both offenses. People v. Payne, App. 5
Dist.1975,
33 Ill.App.3d 713, 341 N.E.2d 735. Criminal Law k 29(11)
Where defendant entered victim's dwelling for purpose of committing
theft and
did not deviate from such purpose, motivation, or objectives during
entire
course of conduct which resulted in defendant's convictions for both
burglary
and theft, there could be but one conviction even though burglary and
theft
involved different elements of proof; thus, conviction for lesser
offense of
theft was reversed and vacated. People v. Pavone, App. 2 Dist.1975, 31
Ill.App.3d 1013, 335 N.E.2d 45. Criminal Law k 1187
Where charges of burglary and theft of property having a value in
excess of
$150 arose out of the same transaction, conviction was to be only for
the
greater offense, i.e., burglary; hence, theft conviction would be
vacated.
People v. Bartels, App. 2 Dist.1975, 30 Ill.App.3d 551, 333 N.E.2d 457.
Criminal Law k 29(11)
Where defendant committed burglary by entering without authority
building
which housed an automobile dealership with intent to commit a theft
therein
and while inside building committed a theft under $150 by taking a
pistol and
a theft over $150 by taking a truck, both thefts were part of same
course of
conduct as burglary so that convictions and sentences for the thefts
had to be
vacated. People v. Sifers, App. 5 Dist.1975, 29 Ill.App.3d 428, 331
N.E.2d 589
. Criminal Law k 29(11); Sentencing And Punishment k 532
Where burglary and theft result from same conduct and involve same
property, a
defendant cannot be convicted and sentenced for both offenses. People
v.
Edwards, App. 5 Dist.1975, 29 Ill.App.3d 625, 331 N.E.2d 342. Criminal
Law k
29(11)
Conviction of theft of property exceeding $150 in value would be
vacated in
that it was a lesser included offense arising from single act for which
defendant was convicted and sentenced for burglary. People v.
Schubert, App.
2 Dist.1975, 28 Ill.App.3d 599, 329 N.E.2d 23. Criminal Law k 1187
Since offenses of burglary and theft in instant case were part of same
transaction and were not independently motivated, theft convictions
would be
reversed. People v. Miller, App. 4 Dist.1975, 27 Ill.App.3d 788, 327
N.E.2d
253. Criminal Law k 1186.1
Where theft charged was the objective of burglary, which was also
charged, and
arose from a single course of conduct, it was improper to convict and
sentence
defendant for theft, the less serious of the two offenses. People v.
Bryant,
App. 5 Dist.1975, 27 Ill.App.3d 288, 327 N.E.2d 186.
29(11);
Sentencing And Punishment k 532
Criminal Law k
Theft conviction could not stand where there was also a burglary
conviction
inasmuch as both counts were founded on single act, not independently
motivated or otherwise separable. People v. McNeal, App. 4 Dist.1974,
21
Ill.App.3d 431, 315 N.E.2d 668. Criminal Law k 29(11)
Where jury convicted defendant of burglary and theft over $150, based
on a
single act, trial court should have entered judgment upon only one of
those
convictions. People v. Gentry, App. 4 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 861,
312
N.E.2d 441. Criminal Law k 29(11)
When larceny and burglary are committed at the same time, it will be
concluded
that the person who committed the larceny also committed the burglary,
and
whatever goes to show one to be guilty of the larceny equally evidences
his
guilt of the burglary. People v. Bush, App. 1 Dist.1973, 14 Ill.App.3d
932,
303 N.E.2d 760. Burglary k 41(1)
Where acts constituting burglary and theft were not independently
motivated or
otherwise separable, conviction on burglary charge precluded conviction
on
theft charge. People v. Dunham, App. 4 Dist.1973, 13 Ill.App.3d 784,
300
N.E.2d 328. Double Jeopardy k 143
Judgment of conviction should have been entered against defendant only
on
charge of burglary rather than on charges of both burglary and theft
where
both offenses related to burglary of, and theft from, the same office
building. People v. McGuire, App. 4 Dist.1973, 13 Ill.App.3d 68, 299
N.E.2d
761. Criminal Law k 29(11)
Defendant could not properly be convicted and sentenced on theft
charges where
the property which was the subject of those charges was also the
subject of
burglary charges on which he was convicted and sentenced. People v.
Staggs,
App. 5 Dist.1973, 12 Ill.App.3d 339, 297 N.E.2d 621. Criminal Law k
29(11);
Sentencing And Punishment k 532
As record revealed that defendant was convicted of knowingly and
without
authority entering hardware store with intent to commit theft and, once
inside, having taken fishing gear and electrical appliances, and as
there was
no indication that the acts constituting the burglary were
"independently
motivated or otherwise separable" from the conduct which constituted
the
theft, it was improper to sentence defendant on both the theft and
burglary
convictions. People v. Street, App. 4 Dist.1973, 11 Ill.App.3d 243,
296
N.E.2d 606. Sentencing And Punishment k 532
Indictment may charge defendant with both burglary and larceny and he
may be
sentenced for both crimes following verdict of guilty. People v.
Saxton,
1948, 79 N.E.2d 601, 400 Ill. 257, certiorari denied 69 S.Ct. 25, 335
U.S.
835, 93 L.Ed. 387, certiorari denied 70 S.Ct. 424, 338 U.S. 944, 94
L.Ed. 582.
Indictment And Information k 125(2)
A conviction of offense pleaded in indictment for burglary and theft of
personal property in burglarized building did not permit imposition of
penalties as for distinct offenses, but defendant was not prejudiced by
imposition of concurrent sentences to penitentiary for one year to life
for
burglary and one to 10 years for larceny. People v. McMullen, 1948, 79
N.E.2d
470, 400 Ill. 253, certiorari denied 69 S.Ct. 16, 335 U.S. 831, 93
L.Ed. 384.
Sentencing And Punishment k 532; Criminal Law k 1177
Where defendant was indicted for larceny and burglary for the same
transgression, and neither count of the indictment was nolle prossed,
and
defendant pleaded "guilty as charged in the indictment," and the court
did not
find defendant guilty of any specific offense, but sentenced him to
imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of from one to 14 years,
sentence
was erroneous, and such provision could not be treated as surplusage,
and
defendant was entitled to have the judgment order correctly entered.
People
v. Meyers, 1947, 73 N.E.2d 288, 397 Ill. 286. Sentencing And
Punishment k
1022; Criminal Law k 995(3)
125. ---- Conspiracy, multiple convictions, same act
Defendant was not entitled to new sentencing hearing following his
convictions
for theft and conspiracy to commit theft even though convictions for
conspiracy were vacated where record did not indicate that court
considered
improper conspiracy convictions even though mittimus reflected that
defendant
had been sentenced on both theft and conspiracy. People v. Griffin,
App. 1
Dist.1982, 68 Ill.Dec. 778, 113 Ill.App.3d 184, 446 N.E.2d 1175.
Sentencing
And Punishment k 2260
It was improper for defendant to be convicted of both theft and
conspiracy to
commit theft since defendant could not be convicted of both inchoate
offense
and principal offense. People v. Griffin, App. 1 Dist.1982, 68
Ill.Dec. 778,
113 Ill.App.3d 184, 446 N.E.2d 1175. Conspiracy k 28(3)
Defendant, who was convicted of theft and conspiracy to commit theft,
should
have been sentenced for only substantive offense of theft rather than
for both
offenses. People v. Lombardi, App. 1 Dist.1973, 13 Ill.App.3d 754, 301
N.E.2d
70. Sentencing And Punishment k 520(3)
126. ---- Robbery, multiple convictions, same act
Defendant's conviction for theft over $150 should be vacated since it
arose
from same physical act as armed robbery conviction. People v. Jones,
App. 4
Dist.1982, 64 Ill.Dec. 346, 108 Ill.App.3d 880, 439 N.E.2d 1011.
Criminal Law
k 29(11)
The armed robbery count and the theft count of information were founded
on a
single act of defendant concerning robbery of an art gallery so that
court
erred in entering judgment and imposing sentence for the theft charge,
thus
requiring that theft conviction be vacated. People v. Kosanovich, App.
1
Dist.1979, 26 Ill.Dec. 231, 69 Ill.App.3d 748, 387 N.E.2d 1061.
Sentencing
And Punishment k 537; Criminal Law k 29(11)
127. ---- Official misconduct, multiple convictions, same act
Charges against township supervisor for official misconduct, and theft,
were
based on the same act, so that official misconduct conviction violated
one-act, one-crime rule and could not stand, where both counts of
indictment
were based on acts of supervisor in allegedly converting "certain
checks and
money . . . having a total value in excess of $100,000.00";
supervisor's
knowledge of wrongdoing as a public official was neither a physical
act, nor
an outward manifestation capable of supporting a different offense.
People v.
Moshier, App. 3 Dist.2000, 245 Ill.Dec. 740, 312 Ill.App.3d 879, 728
N.E.2d
822. Criminal Law k 29(10)
Vacation of defendant's official misconduct convictions was required
where
convictions were based on same physical acts as defendant's theft
convictions.
People v. Arbo, App. 3 Dist.1991, 157 Ill.Dec. 348, 213 Ill.App.3d
828, 572
N.E.2d 417, appeal denied 162 Ill.Dec. 494, 141 Ill.2d 545, 580 N.E.2d
120.
Criminal Law k 29(10)
Where defendant was charged with official misconduct and with
conspiracy to
commit theft and where charge was that defendant knowingly accepted
compensation for overtime work which he failed to perform, acts of
defendant
involving knowing acceptance of compensation for overtime work which he
failed
to perform were identical with his acts and conduct in obtaining
control over
property of owner by deception with intent permanently to deprive owner
thereof, and thus conviction and sentence for official misconduct, the
lesser
of the two offenses, would be vacated. People v. Nickson, App. 1
Dist.1978,
16 Ill.Dec. 29, 58 Ill.App.3d 470, 374 N.E.2d 804. Criminal Law k
29(10)
Where township employee's convictions for theft and official misconduct
arose
out of same acts, both convictions could not stand and judgment and
sentence
on misdemeanor theft conviction would be reversed. People v. Hajostek,
App. 3
Dist.1977, 7 Ill.Dec. 46, 49 Ill.App.3d 148, 363 N.E.2d 1208. Criminal
Law k
29(5.5); Sentencing And Punishment k 532
128. Double jeopardy
Double jeopardy would not bar retrial if court declined to accept
substantive
terms of plea agreement to theft on remand after appellate court found
sufficient evidence to support guilty verdict. People v. Allen, App. 4
Dist.2004, 287 Ill.Dec. 23, 351 Ill.App.3d 599, 815 N.E.2d 426,
rehearing
denied. Double Jeopardy k 107.1
Defendant's prosecution for theft of lamps was barred by statute
prohibiting
convictions for both inchoate and principal offense where defendant was
previously convicted of theft in another state for unlawfully
possessing lamps
in that state. People v. Levan, App. 3 Dist.1996, 221 Ill.Dec. 14, 285
Ill.App.3d 347, 674 N.E.2d 807. Double Jeopardy k 143
Conduct state sought to prove in prosecution for possession of
controlled
substance with intent to deliver was not same conduct which state
sought to
prove in first prosecution for possession of stolen property consisting
of
electronic scale, even though state used electronic scale as evidence
to
establish intent to deliver element of drug charge, where trial court
stated
that it did not consider or rely on evidence of scale or prior
conviction in
convicting defendant on drug charges, state did not prosecute
defendants in
second prosecution possessing scale but used evidence of scale as proof
of
essential element of drug offense, and scale was not only evidence of
intent
to deliver but mere overlap of proof. People v. Astorga, App. 2
Dist.1993,
184 Ill.Dec. 462, 245 Ill.App.3d 124, 613 N.E.2d 779, appeal denied 190
Ill.Dec. 895, 622 N.E.2d 1212. Double Jeopardy k 146
Offense of possession of stolen property and offense of possession with
intent
to deliver controlled substances clearly did not have same statutory
elements
nor was one lesser included offense of another so as to bar prosecution
for
drug offense following defendants' guilty pleas to possession of stolen
property offense. People v. Astorga, App. 2 Dist.1993, 184 Ill.Dec.
462, 245
Ill.App.3d 124, 613 N.E.2d 779, appeal denied 190 Ill.Dec. 895, 622
N.E.2d
1212. Double Jeopardy k 146; Indictment And Information k 191(.5)
Action against defendant would be dismissed on appeal, after reversal
for
defendant denied effective assistance of counsel, where defendant could
not be
retried for greater offense without violating right against double
jeopardy or
on lesser offense because limitations period had expired. People v.
Brocksmith, App. 3 Dist.1992, 178 Ill.Dec. 536, 237 Ill.App.3d 818, 604
N.E.2d
1059, appeal allowed 183 Ill.Dec. 864, 149 Ill.2d 653, 612 N.E.2d 516,
affirmed 205 Ill.Dec. 113, 162 Ill.2d 224, 642 N.E.2d 1230. Criminal
Law k
1187
After convictions were entered on reinstated charges of armed violence
predicated on theft of motor vehicle and theft of motor vehicle,
judgment
could be entered on charge of armed violence, notwithstanding argument
that
because defendant had already been convicted and sentenced for theft
over $300
which resulted from same physical act of theft of automobile,
conviction of
theft of motor vehicle was barred; single prosecution was brought
against
defendant in which she was charged with two offenses based on single
physical
act, and had defendant not caused one of charges to be dismissed, she
would
have been convicted of both but judgment and sentence would have been
entered
only on conviction for theft of motor vehicle which would have served
as
predicate for judgment on charge of armed violence. People v. Tripp,
App. 5
Dist.1991, 153 Ill.Dec. 811, 208 Ill.App.3d 1006, 567 N.E.2d 769,
appeal
denied 159 Ill.Dec. 115, 139 Ill.2d 603, 575 N.E.2d 922. Double
Jeopardy k
143
Illinois prosecution of defendant for knowingly obtaining unauthorized
control
over the property or another was barred, under <paragraph> 3-4 of
former
chapter 38 prohibiting reprosecution after a former prosecution
predicated on
same facts, following Colorado adjudication of delinquency for same
conduct,
notwithstanding that car was stolen in Illinois and thereafter driven
to
Colorado, as the terms "obtain" and "exert" within meaning of both
Colorado
and Illinois statutes (C.R.S.1973, 18-4-409 and <paragraph> 16-1 of
former
chapter 38), which punish the act of "obtaining or exercising control,"
are
interchangeable and do not denote different theories of prosecution.
People
v. Poliak, App. 2 Dist.1984, 79 Ill.Dec. 706, 124 Ill.App.3d 550, 464
N.E.2d
304. Double Jeopardy k 185
Where record included exact address from which it was alleged that
automobile
was stolen and vehicle identification number appeared in both
informations and
several reports of proceedings, defendant was amply protected from
subsequent
prosecution for same offense, and therefore, amendment of the
information at
trial to change name of owner of allegedly stolen automobile was
permissible.
People v. Mick, App. 5 Dist.1980, 42 Ill.Dec. 370, 86 Ill.App.3d 1022,
408
N.E.2d 1079. Indictment And Information k 161(6)
Where dismissal of indictment and apparent acquittal of defendant on
charge of
receiving stolen automobile was a pretrial matter without any evidence
being
presented, such dismissal should not bar a subsequent prosecution of
defendant
on charge of exerting or obtaining unauthorized control over an
automobile
which was the property of another; therefore, second indictment of
defendant
did not violate double jeopardy clause and should not have been
dismissed.
People v. Deems, App. 3 Dist.1979, 30 Ill.Dec. 250, 74 Ill.App.3d 543,
392
N.E.2d 1118, affirmed in part 43 Ill.Dec. 8, 81 Ill.2d 384, 410 N.E.2d
8,
certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 1378, 450 U.S. 925, 67 L.Ed.2d 355. Double
Jeopardy k 88.1
Unproven possibility that funds drawn by drafts in question in
proceeding in
which defendant former claims adjuster was convicted of theft and
conspiracy
had not been owned by insurance company alleged to be the victim, but,
rather,
by some other interrelated corporate entity, did not involve any
serious
danger of defendant being placed in double jeopardy. People v. Rance,
App. 1
Dist.1979, 25 Ill.Dec. 295, 68 Ill.App.3d 639, 386 N.E.2d 566. Double
Jeopardy k 182
Determination by trial court in prosecution for theft that State had
not
proven defendant's intent with respect to such theft did not decide
question
of ultimate fact in subsequent prosecution for earlier theft; thus,
prosecution for earlier theft was not barred by collateral estoppel.
People
v. Johnson, App. 2 Dist.1978, 20 Ill.Dec. 483, 63 Ill.App.3d 248, 380
N.E.2d
461. Judgment k 751
Where defendant burglarized building and took car from within in
Winnebago
County and was, five days later, found in Cook County in possession of
car,
defendant's conviction for theft for having knowingly obtained control
of
stolen property would not bar prosecution for burglary in Winnebago
County.
People v. Simpson, App. 2 Dist.1977, 12 Ill.Dec. 208, 54 Ill.App.3d
504, 369
N.E.2d 915. Criminal Law k 29(11)
Indictment which charged that defendant had taken property of a named
corporation was sufficient to allege a right of possession in someone
other
than defendant and did not hinder defendant in the preparation of his
defense
or allow him to be prosecuted a second time for the same offense, even
though
the record showed no relationship between such corporation and the
hotel from
which the evidence showed defendant had taken the money. People v.
Dayani,
App. 1 Dist.1973, 16 Ill.App.3d 615, 306 N.E.2d 488. Indictment And
Information k 71.4(8)
Requirement that indictment or criminal complaint specifically allege
name of
person or the property injured is founded on protection of right of
accused
against double jeopardy, and is a substantial requirement and not mere
technical rule. People v. Baskin, App.1969, 119 Ill.App.2d 18, 255
N.E.2d 42.
Indictment And Information k 101
Primary purposes of requirement that ownership be alleged in indictment
for
theft prosecution are to enable accused to prepare for trial and to
plead an
acquittal or conviction in bar of subsequent prosecution for same
offense.
People v. Harden, 1969, 42 Ill.2d 301, 247 N.E.2d 404. Larceny k 32(2)
Indictment charging theft must identify person owning property or
property
involved to enable defendant to plead either former acquittal or
conviction
under the indictment in event of a second prosecution for the same
offense in
order to protect defendant against double jeopardy. People v. Tassone,
1968,
41 Ill.2d 7, 241 N.E.2d 419, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 1318, 394 U.S.
965, 22
L.Ed.2d 567. Larceny k 32(2)
129. Acquittal, generally
Failure to find that separate crime of theft from the person had been
committed when adjudication of guilt of robbery was made operated as an
acquittal on former count. People v. Thomas, App. 2 Dist.1983, 75
Ill.Dec. 1,
119 Ill.App.3d 464, 456 N.E.2d 684. Criminal Law k 878(3)
On trial for larceny and receiving stolen property, a conviction on the
latter
charge, without finding on the larceny count, acquitted accused of
larceny.
People v. Lardner., 1920, 129 N.E. 697, 296 Ill. 190. Criminal Law k
878(3)
130. New trial
Applications for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence
are not
regarded with favor and must be closely scrutinized, and in order to
justify a
new trial the newly discovered evidence must be conclusive and not
merely
cumulative, and it must appear that the new evidence will probably
change the
result if a new trial is granted. People v. Ilich, App. 1 Dist.1974,
25
Ill.App.3d 334, 323 N.E.2d 509. Criminal Law k 938(1)
A mere allegation based on hearsay evidence was insufficient to
constitute the
"conclusive" evidence needed to support a motion for new trial of
defendant
who was convicted of theft of a bicycle valued at less than $150, on
ground
that the party who actually stole the bicycle was discovered by the
police and
his name was not submitted to the defendant, where defendant did not
present
the name of any witness who could testify in support of his statement,
nor did
he suggest that a further proceeding would bring forward evidence to
support
his allegations. People v. Ilich, App. 1 Dist.1974, 25 Ill.App.3d 334,
323
N.E.2d 509. Criminal Law k 938(1)
The phrase "newly discovered evidence" as ground for new trial refers
to
exculpatory evidence. People v. Ilich, App. 1 Dist.1974, 25 Ill.App.3d
334,
323 N.E.2d 509. Criminal Law k 938(2)
Newly discovered evidence introduced by defendant, who was convicted of
theft
of tires from corporation, was not such that judgment would likely be
different on a retrial, where fact that two tires with certain brand
numbers
of the corporation were seen on a corporation vehicle 15 days after
defendant's conviction, and that a third tire with corporation's brand
was on
corporation tractor in parking lot more than two months after
conviction,
which tires had the same identifying numbers as those found on
defendant's
tractor, was not evidence of such a conclusive nature as to produce a
different result on retrial. People v. Drake, App. 1 Dist.1974, 20
Ill.App.3d
762, 314 N.E.2d 532. Criminal Law k 945(2)
Where state depended on accused's exclusive possession of stolen dog
soon
after it was stolen, to sustain conviction of larceny, and accused's
defense
was founded principally on explanation of such possession, instruction
that
recent and unexplained possession of property soon after theft was
committed
tended to establish guilt of the person in whose possession it was
found was
misleading and prejudicial necessitating new trial since instruction
might
have caused jury to assume that possession was unexplained, and that
possession in and of itself was sufficient to authorize conviction.
People v.
Browning, App.1939, 23 N.E.2d 736, 302 Ill.App. 297. Criminal Law k
761(2);
Criminal Law k 1172.3
As regards right to new trial, evidence, in prosecution for larceny of
cow,
that witness saw accomplice transporting cow stolen was not cumulative.
People
v. Lacey, 1930, 171 N.E. 544, 339 Ill. 480. Criminal Law k 941(2)
State calling witnesses in larceny prosecution who defendant did not
know
before trial would testify, cannot claim defendant seeking new trial
lacked
diligence in not obtaining witnesses before trial. People v. Lacey,
1930, 171
N.E. 544, 339 Ill. 480. Criminal Law k 939(2)
Where evidence of witness of defendant in larceny prosecution regarding
conversation overheard between accomplice and defendant was usable only
to
impeach testimony of accomplice, it could not be basis of new trial.
People
v. Lacey, 1930, 171 N.E. 544, 339 Ill. 480. Criminal Law k 942(1)
131. Sentencing--In general
It would be presumed that in enacting penalty provision for theft,
General
Assembly considered different factors from those it considered when it
enacted
penalty provision for burglary. People v. Steppan, 1985, 85 Ill.Dec.
495, 105
Ill.2d 310, 473 N.E.2d 1300. Constitutional Law k 48(4.1)
In imposing sentence upon defendant convicted of theft with prior theft
conviction, trial court committed formal, but not reversible, error in
not
specifically offering defendant opportunity to make statement
personally prior
to imposition of sentence, where counsel was present during sentencing
hearing
and spoke at length on defendant's behalf, and defendant did not
request
opportunity to speak. People v. Hobbs, 1981, 56 Ill.Dec. 363, 86
Ill.2d 242,
427 N.E.2d 558. Sentencing And Punishment k 357; Criminal Law k 1177
Defendant, who was convicted of theft over $150 and theft under $150,
and who
elected to be sentenced under 1973 Unified Code of Corrections
(<paragraph>
1001-1-1 et seq. of former chapter 38) was not improperly required to
elect
sentencing either under laws that existed at time of his offenses or
under law
in effect after 1977 amendment to the Code. People v. Galati, App. 2
Dist.1979, 30 Ill.Dec. 708, 75 Ill.App.3d 860, 393 N.E.2d 744.
Sentencing And
Punishment k 22
Where proceedings clearly indicated that defendant entered pleas of
guilty to
felony theft counts as well as to other counts of armed robbery and
armed
violence, and such pleas were accepted, the court properly found
defendant
guilty on all counts and properly convicted and sentenced him thereon,
even
though no judgment of conviction was entered specifically on the felony
theft
charges. People v. Jones, App. 4 Dist.1979, 29 Ill.Dec. 342, 73
Ill.App.3d
99, 391 N.E.2d 767. Sentencing And Punishment k 407
Sentencing judge did not improperly consider two misdemeanor theft
convictions
as being felony, in view of court's comments as a whole and its
observing that
misdemeanor theft convictions had to be set forth separately and
charged to
constitute felony, though trial court did comment that "two thefts
under $150
technically become the equivalent of a felony." People v. Banks, App.
2
Dist.1978, 17 Ill.Dec. 76, 59 Ill.App.3d 774, 375 N.E.2d 1360.
Sentencing And
Punishment k 95
The Code of Corrections governs the sentence imposed in cases pending
on
appeal. People v. Snow, App. 4 Dist.1974, 21 Ill.App.3d 873, 316
N.E.2d 216.
Sentencing And Punishment k 18
Imposition of sentence, with resultant loss of civil rights, against
defendant
convicted upon four counts of burglary and three counts of theft was
neither
cruel, unusual nor disproportionate to the offense. People v. Pardo,
1970, 47
Ill.2d 420, 265 N.E.2d 656, appeal dismissed 91 S.Ct. 2179, 402 U.S.
992, 29
L.Ed.2d 158, rehearing denied 91 S.Ct. 2260, 403 U.S. 941, 29 L.Ed.2d
721.
Sentencing And Punishment k 645; Sentencing And Punishment k 1486;
Sentencing And Punishment k 1498
A statute authorizing a more severe punishment to be inflicted upon one
convicted of a second or subsequent offense is highly penal, hence such
a
statute should be strictly construed and should not be extended in its
application to cases which do not, by the strictest construction, come
under
the provisions of the statute. People v. Lund, 1943, 46 N.E.2d 929,
382 Ill.
213. Sentencing And Punishment k 1213
132. ---- Guilty plea, sentencing
In prosecution for burglary, possession of burglary tools and
misdemeanor-theft in which defendant was sentenced only on burglary
conviction, if, on remand, factual hearing on withdrawal of guilty
pleas is
found against defendant, lower court must enter proper sentences on
defendant's conviction for possession of burglary tools and
misdemeanor-theft.
People v. Dean, App. 5 Dist.1978, 18 Ill.Dec. 784, 61 Ill.App.3d 612,
378
N.E.2d 248. Criminal Law k 1192
Under record disclosing that although defendant had held a steady job
for four
years and was currently working on two full-time jobs and was the sole
means
of support for his wife and child, he had prior convictions and was
brought
before the courts-martial three times while in the military, imposition
of
minimum penitentiary sentence of one to three years following
conviction on
plea of guilty to class three felony of theft from person whom record
showed
he physically attacked was not an abuse of discretion. People v.
Marshall,
App. 3 Dist.1975, 30 Ill.App.3d 17, 331 N.E.2d 566. Larceny k 88
Where defendant was sentenced to nine to ten years for escape, ten to
15 years
for burglary, ten to 15 years for armed robbery, and one to five years
for
each of the remaining counts of kidnapping and of theft in excess of
$150, and
where defendant knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty to the
offenses
charged, Appellate Court would modify the sentences which appeared to
be
unduly severe, by vacating the sentences for theft and for kidnapping.
People
v. Baker, App. 5 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 425, 311 N.E.2d 713.
Criminal Law k
1183
In view of defendant's prior history and nature and circumstances of
offense,
sentence of two to six years' imprisonment on defendant's plea of
guilty to
indictment charging theft of over $150 was not excessive. People v.
Rakas,
App. 5 Dist.1974, 18 Ill.App.3d 441, 309 N.E.2d 705. Larceny k 88
Where, on plea of guilty to theft by deception, State's attorney
promised not
to oppose application for probation but, during probation hearing, one
of
State's attorneys actively opposed probation nonetheless, there was
error, and
judgment was reversed and case remanded to allow defendant to plead
anew.
People v. Story, App. 5 Dist.1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 94, 303 N.E.2d 504.
Criminal
Law k 273.1(2); Criminal Law k 1181.5(1)
In interest of justice the four to ten-year sentence imposed on the
22-year-old defendant following conviction, on plea of guilty, to
charges of
burglary and theft, which was his first conviction of a felony, would
be
reduced to two to six years. People v. Coy, App.1972, 7 Ill.App.3d
807, 288
N.E.2d 547. Criminal Law k 1183
Consideration of all of circumstances surrounding record of 19-year-old
defendant who entered plea of guilty to burglary and theft, committed
after a
beer drinking episode with other boy, disclosed that interest of
justice would
be best served by reducing sentence from four to ten years in
penitentiary to
a minimum of two years and a maximum of six years. People v. Krouse,
App.1972, 7 Ill.App.3d 754, 288 N.E.2d 543. Criminal Law k 1183
Where defendant was convicted on one count of theft in excess of $150
and
sentenced to not less than two nor more than ten years in state
penitentiary
and later entered plea of guilty to another count of theft in excess of
$150
and a like sentence was imposed, both sentences to run concurrently,
and
evidence showed that defendant was involved in a stolen automobile
transaction
and that criminal activity involved some substantial degree of
sophistication,
the sentence imposed was not excessive. People v. Thornton, App.1972,
6
Ill.App.3d 158, 284 N.E.2d 296. Larceny k 88
That defendant, who had been charged with armed robbery and with theft
of less
than $150, entered into plea bargain whereby he pleaded guilty to
theft, and
agreed to one to two-year sentence, and that when state offered to
amend theft
count to state that theft was from person of certain individual,
defense
counsel stated that he thought count was sufficient as it was, did not
estop
defendant from obtaining relief from one to two-year sentence in light
of this
section to effect that person first convicted of theft of property not
from
person and not exceeding $150 could not be imprisoned for more than one
year.
People v. Talbot, App.1971, 2 Ill.App.3d 922, 274 N.E.2d 123. Criminal
Law k
1137(2)
Where indictment charged defendant with burglary and larceny and, upon
his
plea of guilty, he was sentenced to term of not less than 15 or more
than 20
years' imprisonment, defendant was found guilty not of a single but of
two
substantive offenses, and sentence was not improper on the ground that
there
was no such crime as "burglary and larceny". People v. Saxton, 1948,
79
N.E.2d 601, 400 Ill. 257, certiorari denied 69 S.Ct. 25, 335 U.S. 835,
93
L.Ed. 387, certiorari denied 70 S.Ct. 424, 338 U.S. 944, 94 L.Ed. 582.
Burglary k 49; Larceny k 86
Where defendant pleaded guilty to indictment charging in first and
third
counts larceny of an automobile of the value of $635, and in fourth
count with
larceny of a motor vehicle without any reference to the value thereof,
court
was authorized to enter judgment of guilty of larceny of a motor
vehicle and
sentence defendant to the penitentiary for a period of one to twenty
years,
over objection that first and third counts charged grand larceny.
People v.
Winston, 1946, 69 N.E.2d 691, 395 Ill. 263. Larceny k 88
Under plea of guilty to larceny, trial court had no discretion as to
extent of
punishment, since <section> 388a of former chapter 38 (repealed)
provided
penalty. People v. De Rosa, 1935, 199 N.E. 267, 362 Ill. 161. Larceny
k 88
133. ---- Hearing, sentencing
Fact that defendant, who was not allowed to make statement before he
was
sentenced, received maximum six-year term for theft of five bottles of
whiskey
with prior theft conviction required remand for new sentencing hearing.
People
v. Hobbs, App. 4 Dist.1980, 46 Ill.Dec. 14, 90 Ill.App.3d 587, 413
N.E.2d 454,
vacated 56 Ill.Dec. 363, 86 Ill.2d 242, 427 N.E.2d 558. Criminal Law k
1181.5(8)
134. ---- Value under $150, sentencing
Sentence of one year for theft under $150 was not authorized. People
v. Lowe,
App. 5 Dist.1975, 28 Ill.App.3d 883, 330 N.E.2d 590. Larceny k 88
Sentence to 12 months for theft under $150, a class A misdemeanor, was
in
excess of that authorized by <section> 1005-8-3 of former chapter 38,
this
requiring remand for reimposition of sentence. People v. Kimsey, App.
4
Dist.1975, 27 Ill.App.3d 506, 327 N.E.2d 363. Criminal Law k
1181.5(8);
Larceny k 88
One-year sentence imposed for theft of property of value less than $150
exceeded the maximum provided for a class A misdemeanor which might be
any
term less one year. People v. Johnson, App. 1 Dist.1975, 27 Ill.App.3d
529,
327 N.E.2d 135. Larceny k 88
A sentence of 90 days in jail and a fine of $100 upon conviction of
theft of
property valued at less than $150, criminal damage to property, and
driving
without a license was not an abuse of discretion, where trial judge had
benefit of a presentence investigation report as well as opportunity to
observe the defendant, and the sentence was well within statutory
limitations.
People v. Ilich, App. 1 Dist.1974, 25 Ill.App.3d 334, 323 N.E.2d 509.
Automobiles k 359; Larceny k 88
Theft of property not exceeding $150 in value was Class A misdemeanor,
and
Appellate Court reduced sentences from one year to 364 days. People v.
McLilly, App. 1 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 682, 312 N.E.2d 302. Criminal
Law k
1183; Larceny k 23
Sentence of one year in state penal farm imposed as result of
negotiated plea
of guilty to three offenses of theft of property not in excess of $150
in
value was not excessive. People v. Oliver, App. 2 Dist.1974, 19
Ill.App.3d
549, 311 N.E.2d 788. Larceny k 88
Where Unified Code of Corrections became effective during pendency of
appeal
from conviction for theft of property not exceeding $150 in value,
sentence of
one year in house of corrections would be reduced to term of 364 days.
People
v. Preston, App. 1 Dist.1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 924, 305 N.E.2d 190.
Criminal Law
k 1184(4.1)
135. ---- Value over $150, sentencing
Concurrent sentences of not less than one year and eight months and not
more
than five years for burglary and theft over $150 and for separate
burglary
were not excessive in view of fact that defendant had been convicted of
two
separate offenses occurring nine days apart and had committed two more
offenses while free on appeal bond. People v. Taylor, App. 5
Dist.1975, 25
Ill.App.3d 4, 322 N.E.2d 567. Burglary k 49
Where defendant was convicted of theft over $150 and was sentenced to
four to
eight years and Unified Code of Corrections went into effect while
defendant's
appeal was pending, defendant's sentence would be reduced to minimum
period of
32 months and a maximum period of eight years so as to comply with
Unified
Code provision that minimum sentence should not exceed one-third of the
maximum. People v. DeBartolo, App. 2 Dist.1975, 24 Ill.App.3d 1009, 322
N.E.2d
258. Criminal Law k 1184(5)
Sentence of from two to six years for theft of property over $150, to
run
consecutively with any time served by defendant for violation of parole
on
previous conviction for armed robbery, was not excessive. People v.
Agans,
App. 4 Dist.1974, 24 Ill.App.3d 64, 320 N.E.2d 25. Larceny k 88
Sentence of minimum of two years' imprisonment and maximum of six years
upon
conviction of theft of property exceeding $150 in value was not
excessive and
conformed to requirements of Unified Code of Corrections. People v.
Harris,
App. 2 Dist.1974, 21 Ill.App.3d 265, 315 N.E.2d 156. Larceny k 88
Sentences of two to ten years for theft in excess of $150, were not
excessive.
People v. Brezezinski, App. 1 Dist.1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 509, 305 N.E.2d
32.
Larceny k 88
Sentences of from four to eight years for theft of more than $150
violated
<section> 1005-8-1 of former chapter 38 which provided that, for such
crimes,
minimum term could not be greater than one-third of maximum term, and
minimum
should be reduced to conform to the section. People v. Brezezinski,
App. 1
Dist.1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 509, 305 N.E.2d 32. Criminal Law k 1184(4.1)
Where defendant was convicted of theft of property, having value in
excess of
$150, from the person, a Class 3 felony under United Code of
Corrections and
this section which limits maximum term of imprisonment for such felony
to ten
years and minimum to not greater than one-third of maximum term, the
minimum
term of five years imposed was excessive. People v. Evans, App. 1
Dist.1973,
12 Ill.App.3d 1036, 299 N.E.2d 364. Larceny k 88
Where defendant was convicted of theft of property, having value in
excess of
$150, from the person and sentenced to maximum of ten years'
imprisonment, he
had previously been convicted of larceny or theft six times, four
misdemeanors
and two felonies, and he had been parole violator, minimum term of
three years
and four months would not be excessive. People v. Evans, App. 1
Dist.1973, 12
Ill.App.3d 1036, 299 N.E.2d 364. Larceny k 88
136. ---- Statutory range, sentencing
Four-month sentence for theft committed by first offender was not
excessive.
People v. Smith, App. 1 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 668, 320 N.E.2d 137.
Larceny
k 88
Where Supreme Court decision invalidating defendant's prior conviction
of
possession of marijuana was filed long prior to defendant's conviction
and
sentence for theft and trial judge did not mention marijuana conviction
nor
indicate that any weight or consideration was given thereto in imposing
sentence for theft, sentence, which was within applicable statutory
limits,
would not be disturbed. People v. Lewis, App. 1 Dist.1974, 18
Ill.App.3d 131,
309 N.E.2d 349. Criminal Law k 1181.5(9)
Sentence of two to six years for conviction of theft was not excessive
despite
fact that the presentence report included defendant's prior conviction
for
possession of marijuana, a misdemeanor, which was, in effect, voided by
Illinois Supreme Court's McCabe decision, since there was nothing in
the
record to indicate that the trial court gave any attention to
defendant's
background in arriving at the sentence imposed, since the sentence was
within
the limits prescribed by statute, since it did not depart from the
fundamental
law and its spirit and purpose and since it was proportioned to the
nature of
the offense. People v. Watts, App.1972, 8 Ill.App.3d 47, 288 N.E.2d
651.
Larceny k 88
Sentence of one to three years was not excessive for conviction of
defendant
for theft and robbery. People v. Marshall, App.1972, 6 Ill.App.3d 224,
285
N.E.2d 541. Larceny k 88; Robbery k 30
Where trial court had heard evidence in aggravation and mitigation, and
sentences for theft and violation of bail bond were within statutory
limits,
sentences were not excessive. People v. Barbee, App.1971, 133
Ill.App.2d 322,
273 N.E.2d 238. Sentencing And Punishment k 34
Imposition of sentence of from three to ten years upon defendant whose
probation on charge of theft was revoked was within limits prescribed
by
legislature and did not constitute abuse of court's discretion. People
v.
Garkus, App.1969, 105 Ill.App.2d 426, 245 N.E.2d 653. Sentencing And
Punishment k 2038
Sentence of two years, which was within limits prescribed by this
section for
conviction for theft of property from person, and which required
defendant to
serve two years' time in addition to seven years he had left on old
sentence,
was not improper. People v. Harris, App.1967, 81 Ill.App.2d 427, 226
N.E.2d
434. Larceny k 88
Prison sentence of three to ten years for theft and forgery was not
excessive.
People v. Green, App.1966, 74 Ill.App.2d 308, 218 N.E.2d 840,
certiorari
denied 87 S.Ct. 2051, 387 U.S. 930, 18 L.Ed.2d 990, rehearing denied 88
S.Ct.
17, 389 U.S. 890, 19 L.Ed.2d 200. Embezzlement k 52; Forgery k 51
A defendant who was sentenced before new criminal code reducing from
five to
one year the maximum penalty for each offense involved became effective
was
not entitled on motion, made while appeal was pending and after new
code
became effective, to reduction of sentence to maximum provided by new
code.
People v. Hansen, 1963, 28 Ill.2d 322, 192 N.E.2d 359, certiorari
denied 84
S.Ct. 664, 376 U.S. 908, 11 L.Ed.2d 608, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct.
665, 376
U.S. 910, 11 L.Ed.2d 608. Sentencing And Punishment k 17(3)
Where defendant, serving a sentence of one to ten years for grand
larceny, on
reversal of original sentence, was resentenced by court to a term of
one to
ten years with order that maximum sentence under Sentence and Parole
Act
(repealed), see now Unified Code of Collections be ten years, further
order
that minimum be three years and that minimum be considered served did
not
prejudice defendant's rights for failure to reduce maximum by three
years,
since effect of sentence was that defendant was commencing his fourth
year of
ten-year term and that termination date was correspondingly advanced.
People
v. Green, 1946, 68 N.E.2d 263, 394 Ill. 173, certiorari denied 67 S.Ct.
299,
329 U.S. 786, 91 L.Ed. 674. Criminal Law k 1192
137. ---- Minimum term, sentencing
Where trial court refused probation and imposed minimum sentence on
defendant
convicted of theft on basis of examination of defendant's employment
history,
criminal record, and defendant's prior probation, such sentence was
amply
supported and was not abuse of discretion. People v. Dortch, App. 4
Dist.1978, 21 Ill.Dec. 649, 64 Ill.App.3d 894, 381 N.E.2d 1193.
Sentencing
And Punishment k 31
Maximum aggregate minimum sentences which could be imposed against
accused,
who was convicted of armed robbery, theft and unlawful restraint, was
eight
years. People v. Scott, App. 1 Dist.1974, 20 Ill.App.3d 880, 314
N.E.2d 671.
Sentencing And Punishment k 643
Under the Unified Code of Corrections, sentence imposing term of two to
five
years in the penitentiary for theft was excessive insofar as the
minimum was
concerned. People v. Woods, App. 5 Dist.1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 221, 303
N.E.2d
562. Larceny k 88
138. ---- Maximum term, sentencing
Where defendant failed to present any mitigating circumstances tending
to
confirm a likelihood of his rehabilitation, imposition of maximum
sentence of
eight years for offense of theft, which was within ten-year maximum,
would be
affirmed. People v. Bell, App. 1 Dist.1974, 18 Ill.App.3d 130, 309
N.E.2d 344
. Larceny k 88
Under all facts and circumstances, the imposition of concurrent maximum
sentences of one year on each of the three charges of theft, unlawful
use of
weapons and failure to produce firearm owner's identification card was
excessive with respect to 26-year-old defendant whose only prior
criminal
record was that he had been placed on probation for one year on two
charges of
simple assault, and the sentences would be reduced to terms of six
months
each. People v. Thompson, App. 1 Dist.1973, 12 Ill.App.3d 807, 299
N.E.2d 76.
Criminal Law k 1183
A sentence of five to ten years for attempted theft was not in excess
of
punishment authorized, nor a denial of due process on theory the
sentence
constituted a more severe punishment for attempt than for completed
crime of
grand theft, in view of fact that <section> 8-4 of former chapter 38
under
which defendant was sentenced provided for punishment of not more than
14
years for forcible felony attempt, and in view of fact penalty imposed
did not
in fact exceed maximum punishment of one to ten years authorized for
completed
crime of grand theft. People v. Rhodes, 1967, 38 Ill.2d 389, 231
N.E.2d 400.
Constitutional Law k 270(1); Larceny k 88
139. ---- Concurrent terms, sentencing
Imposition of sentences of four years for burglary and three years for
each of
two offenses of theft with prior theft conviction, with all sentences
to be
served concurrently, was warranted, where defendant had been on
probation for
approximately one month on theft charge when he committed one of the
theft
offenses, he was on bond on that charge when he committed burglary and
the
second theft offense, defendant refused to volunteer for drug treatment
after
asking for it, and defendant admitted he was supporting a $100 per day
cocaine
and heroin addiction prior to his incarceration, but would not disclose
source
of drugs. People v. Jones, App. 4 Dist.1986, 96 Ill.Dec. 469, 142
Ill.App.3d
51, 491 N.E.2d 515, appeal denied. Sentencing And Punishment k 1404;
Sentencing And Punishment k 1421
Sentences of six years for burglary, four years for felony theft, and
300 days
for misdemeanor theft, to be served concurrently, were not excessive
though
offenses involved little property damage and no violence, where
defendant
provided no information as to his character or history, had no home
address,
and did not express remorse for his crimes. People v. Tessier, App. 5
Dist.1984, 79 Ill.Dec. 452, 123 Ill.App.3d 984, 463 N.E.2d 1006,
certiorari
denied 105 S.Ct. 1205, 469 U.S. 1220, 84 L.Ed.2d 348. Burglary k 49;
Larceny
k 88
Trial court which stated that justice would be served by the sentences
imposed
and that a sufficient deterrent would be effected by imposition of the
same
sentences which defendant had received for other convictions of
burglary and
theft, with the sentences running concurrently, adequately specified
the basis
for defendant's sentence. People v. Riley, App. 4 Dist.1981, 54
Ill.Dec. 474,
99 Ill.App.3d 244, 424 N.E.2d 1377. Sentencing And Punishment k 373
Concurrent sentences of nine to 15 years on aggravated assault and
theft
charges did not conform to statutory requirements and would be
modified.
People v. Ballay, App. 1 Dist.1975, 30 Ill.App.3d 741, 332 N.E.2d 762.
Sentencing And Punishment k 532
Where charges of burglary and theft both arose out of the same conduct,
trial
court was directed to vacate concurrent sentence on theft charge.
People v.
Kaminski, App. 2 Dist.1975, 30 Ill.App.3d 180, 332 N.E.2d 182.
Criminal Law k
1181.5(1)
The concurrent sentences of two to six years' imprisonment on each of
defendant's two convictions of theft were excessive and would be
reduced to
the statutory minimum of one year and a maximum of three years, where
the
record failed to reflect that the trial judge considered any other
evidence
pertaining to aggravation and mitigation except the statements
regarding what
was considered by the State in requesting the sentence that was
subsequently
imposed, and where the judge set forth no reasons for imposing a
minimum
sentence in excess of the minimum required by statute. People v.
Sullivan,
App. 5 Dist.1975, 28 Ill.App.3d 913, 329 N.E.2d 855. Criminal Law k
1184(4.1); Larceny k 88
Sentences of six months for unlawful use of weapons and 60 days for
theft to
run concurrently were not excessive in light of defendant's prior
conviction
for unlawful use of weapons. People v. Reese, App. 1 Dist.1974, 22
Ill.App.3d
806, 317 N.E.2d 711. Larceny k 88; Weapons k 17(8)
Concurrent sentence of from one to three years for defendant convicted
of one
count of theft and two counts of forgery was not excessive. People v.
Kuknyo,
App. 1 Dist.1974, 21 Ill.App.3d 790, 315 N.E.2d 657. Forgery k 51;
Larceny k
88
Concurrent sentences of from two to five years on each of four courts
of theft
by deceptively obtaining control over another's property were not
excessive
despite defendant's lack of previous criminal record. People v.
Cassman,
App.1972, 7 Ill.App.3d 786, 288 N.E.2d 667. False Pretenses k 54
Where charges of burglary and theft resulted from the same conduct,
defendant
should not have been convicted and sentenced on both charges, even
though the
sentences were designated to run concurrently, and the conviction and
sentence
on the lesser charge would be reversed. People v. Myles, App.1971, 2
Ill.App.3d 955, 275 N.E.2d 691. Criminal Law k 29(11); Sentencing And
Punishment k 532
Where hearing in aggravation and mitigation after plea of guilty full
covered
facts leading up to defendant's arrest, sentence of 30 days on each of
5
misdemeanor offenses, including theft, accepting liquor as a minor,
reckless
driving, transportation of an open liquor container, and fleeing or
attempting
to elude a police officer, to be served concurrently, was not
inappropriate.
People v. Richardson, 1969, 43 Ill.2d 318, 253 N.E.2d 420. Automobiles
k 359;
Intoxicating Liquors k 242; Larceny k 88; Obstructing Justice k 21
Where defendant was convicted of burglary and theft based on same
conduct and
trial court sentenced him on each count with the sentences to run
concurrently, the sentences were improper as concurrent sentences for
crimes
arising out of same conduct are improper and conviction of lesser crime
must
be reversed. People v. Stevenson, App.1969, 107 Ill.App.2d 441, 246
N.E.2d 309
. Sentencing And Punishment k 604; Sentencing And Punishment k 532
Penitentiary sentence of five to ten years for burglary and larceny, to
run
consecutively to, and not concurrently with, sentence of one year to
life
previously imposed on defendant, was within legal limits provided by
statute.
People v. Troesch, App.1965, 57 Ill.App.2d 466, 206 N.E.2d 468.
Burglary k 49;
Larceny k 88
A conviction of offense pleaded in indictment for burglary and theft of
personal property in burglarized building did not permit imposition of
penalties as for distinct offenses, but defendant was not prejudiced by
imposition of concurrent sentences to penitentiary for one year to life
for
burglary and one to 10 years for larceny. People v. McMullen, 1948, 79
N.E.2d
470, 400 Ill. 253, certiorari denied 69 S.Ct. 16, 335 U.S. 831, 93
L.Ed. 384.
Sentencing And Punishment k 532; Criminal Law k 1177
A judgment sentencing defendant to county jail for one year on his plea
of
guilty of theft and ordering that sentence commence at expiration of
his
one-year sentence in another case "and be served cumulatively
(concurrently)
thereafter", sufficiently imposed consecutive sentences of one-year
imprisonment for different offenses. People v. Pitron, App.1943, 51
N.E.2d
993, 320 Ill.App. 662. Sentencing And Punishment k 1065
140. ---- Consecutive terms, sentencing
Imposition of consecutive terms of imprisonment on 21-year-old
defendant
convicted of four counts of theft involving nonviolent, consensual
transactions with four retail establishments was abuse of discretion
and
sentences would be modified and reduced to concurrent terms. People v.
Griffin, App. 1 Dist.1982, 68 Ill.Dec. 778, 113 Ill.App.3d 184, 446
N.E.2d
1175. Criminal Law k 1184(4.1); Sentencing And Punishment k 597
Imposition of sentences of two to six years upon conviction of burglary
and
theft with those sentences to run consecutively to a four-year sentence
imposed in another state was not an abuse of discretion in view of the
fact
that defendant had been convicted for burglary and theft of a motor
vehicle,
had been convicted of burglary, theft, and escape in another state, and
had
been convicted of burglary and criminal damage to property in Illinois.
People v. Presley, App. 4 Dist.1979, 24 Ill.Dec. 414, 67 Ill.App.3d
894, 385
N.E.2d 181. Sentencing And Punishment k 633
Where defendant originally received sentences of three years and four
months
to ten years each for felony theft and felony escape, to run
consecutively,
but it was determined on prior appeal that verdict as to theft would
support
only a conviction for misdemeanor theft, it was improper on remand to
increase
the sentence for felony escape to term of five to 20 years, to run
concurrently with a sentence of 364 days for misdemeanor theft, where
the
increase in the escape sentence was not based on defendant's conduct
occurring
after the original sentence, even though the total sentence on
resentencing
was not thereby increased. People v. Cunitz, App. 5 Dist.1978, 16
Ill.Dec.
913, 59 Ill.App.3d 701, 375 N.E.2d 1020. Double Jeopardy k 116
Sentence of one to two and one-half years' imprisonment, to be served
consecutively to sentence previously imposed upon defendant in theft
prosecution, was not excessive or the result of improper consideration
of
possible use of perjured testimony in defendant's trial. People v.
Boone,
App. 3 Dist.1977, 12 Ill.Dec. 869, 55 Ill.App.3d 83, 370 N.E.2d 673.
Larceny k
88
Since the imposition of consecutive sentences derived in substantial
part from
the trial court's misapprehension as to the effect of jury's theft
verdict and
its erroneous belief that it supported a felony conviction and
sentence, the
imposition of consecutive sentences on weapons and theft convictions
was
inappropriate. People v. Pugh, App. 3 Dist.1975, 29 Ill.App.3d 42, 329
N.E.2d
425. Sentencing And Punishment k 585
Consecutive one-year sentences on two theft convictions of defendant,
who was
22 years of age and was involved in, or seeking to become involved in,
a drug
abuse program and who had been convicted of theft five times
previously, were
not excessive. People v. Sykes, App. 1 Dist.1973, 10 Ill.App.3d 657,
295
N.E.2d 323. Larceny k 88
Where second theft of item from automobile in parking lot was separate
and
distinct, even though closely related in time and space, from first
theft of
another item from another another automobile in same lot, such offenses
did
not arise out of same conduct, and it was not error to sentence
defendant for
each offense with the sentences to run consecutively. People v. Sykes,
App. 1
Dist.1973, 10 Ill.App.3d 657, 295 N.E.2d 323. Sentencing And
Punishment k 605
Where conduct of attempted murder was separate from conduct in other
charged
offenses, of which defendant was convicted, consisting of rape,
aggravated
kidnapping and theft, consecutive sentence was properly imposed on the
attempt
to commit murder charge. People v. Weaver, App. 1 Dist.1972, 8
Ill.App.3d
299, 290 N.E.2d 691. Sentencing And Punishment k 606
141. ---- Indeterminate terms, sentencing
Imposition of one to three-year indeterminate prison term on conviction
for
theft or property having value not exceeding $150, second offense,
rather than
sentence to periodic imprisonment, was not erroneous. People v.
Wilder, App.
4 Dist.1977, 6 Ill.Dec. 7, 48 Ill.App.3d 13, 362 N.E.2d 436. Sentencing
And
Punishment k 1416
Sentences to indeterminate terms of three and one-half to ten years on
each of
eight counts of indictment charging theft, all sentences to run
concurrently,
were not excessive. People v. Carlisle, App. 4 Dist.1972, 8 Ill.App.3d
742,
290 N.E.2d 272. Larceny k 88
Where a judgment committed a defendant to the penitentiary for an
indeterminate period and until discharged according to law, the
indeterminate
period stated in the judgment was the indeterminate period provided by
statute
for the offense of which defendant was convicted. People v. Stacey,
1939, 24
N.E.2d 378, 372 Ill. 478. Sentencing And Punishment k 1127
142. ---- Probation, generally, sentencing
Imposing sentence of six months' probation, rather than order
supervision,
for conviction of theft under $300 by 17-year-old high school
was not
abuse of discretion. People v. Daniels, App. 4 Dist.1985, 89
763,
134 Ill.App.3d 911, 481 N.E.2d 314, appeal denied. Larceny k
of
student
Ill.Dec.
55
Sentence of a probationary term of 36 months imposed on defendant
convicted of
theft over $150 was improper as exceeding the statutory limits, and
therefore
the term of probation would be reduced to 30 months. People v.
McKiness, App.
2 Dist.1982, 60 Ill.Dec. 908, 105 Ill.App.3d 92, 433 N.E.2d 1146.
Larceny k 88
It was permissible for trial court to impose sentence upon defendant of
periodic imprisonment as condition of probation for theft conviction
and
indeterminate penitentiary sentence for perjury conviction. People v.
Massarella, App. 1 Dist.1979, 36 Ill.Dec. 16, 80 Ill.App.3d 552, 400
N.E.2d
436, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 855, 449 U.S. 1077, 66 L.Ed.2d 799.
Sentencing And Punishment k 1976(2); Perjury k 41
Where court in denying defendant's application for probation and
imposing
sentence upon conviction of theft arising out of misconduct in elected
office
considered fact that defendant had previously been convicted of five
counts of
official misconduct and where defendant's prior convictions were
subsequently
reversed, cause should be remanded for resentencing and reconsideration
of
application for probation. People v. Campbell, App. 5 Dist.1975, 28
Ill.App.3d 480, 328 N.E.2d 608. Criminal Law k 1181.5(8)
Under Unified Code of Corrections (<section> 1001-1-1 et seq. of former
chapter 38) which was applicable to defendants' appeals from
convictions of
theft, split sentences of one-year probation with first 60 days in the
House
of Corrections were illegal and 60-day imprisonment term imposed on
each
defendant had to be reversed and stricken from record. People v.
Rance, App.
1 Dist.1974, 21 Ill.App.3d 15, 315 N.E.2d 60. Sentencing And
Punishment k
1936; Criminal Law k 1184(4.1)
Sentence, upon guilty plea to misdemeanor theft, to three-year
probation with
condition that first year be spent in state penal farm was not
improper, where
the one-year period of incarceration was not beyond maximum prescribed
for
misdemeanor theft, and period of probation was not necessarily related
to the
maximum penalty. People v. Watland, App.1972, 4 Ill.App.3d 845, 281
N.E.2d
435. Sentencing And Punishment k 1976(2)
Where defendant convicted of petit theft for taking of battery from
automobile
was 21 years old with prior record consisting of a single arrest which
resulted in court supervision for one year, sentence of 90 days should
be
modified to sentence of one year's probation. People v. McClinton,
App.1972,
4 Ill.App.3d 253, 280 N.E.2d 795. Criminal Law k 1183
Where incarceration of defendant would, in view of his trans-sexual
condition,
be of no help in his rehabilitation, two to five-year sentence in
penitentiary
upon conviction of theft would be reduced to three years' probation.
People
v. Steadman, App.1972, 3 Ill.App.3d 1047, 280 N.E.2d 17. Criminal Law
k 1183
143. ---- Probation, denial, sentencing
Evidence of defendant's prior criminal history, the need to protect
society,
the need not to deprecate the seriousness of defendant's conduct in
committing
burglary and theft, and the fact that the criminal conduct was not due
to
circumstances unlikely to reoccur was sufficient to support denial of
probation. People v. Porter, App. 4 Dist.1980, 38 Ill.Dec. 913, 83
Ill.App.3d
720, 404 N.E.2d 337. Sentencing And Punishment k 1856; Sentencing And
Punishment k 1844; Sentencing And Punishment k 1872(1)
In prosecution for burglary and two thefts, trial judge, who considered
circumstances of offenses, history and health of defendant, as shown in
presentence report and argument of counsel, and need for correctional
treatment of defendant, who continued sentencing hearing for 17 days to
adequately consider effect that defendant's poor health would have on
disposition of case, and who also gave proper consideration to term of
periodic imprisonment and conditional discharge as alternative
dispositions of
case, in addition to considering probation, did not abuse his
discretion in
denying defendant's petition for probation. People v. Travelstead,
App. 5
Dist.1976, 36 Ill.App.3d 119, 343 N.E.2d 183. Sentencing And
Punishment k
1856; Sentencing And Punishment k 1844; Sentencing And Punishment k
1876
Trial court did not abuse its discretion or use or consider improper
evidence
in making determination that probation should be denied to defendant
following
conviction for theft of property under $150 and burglary. People v.
Grotti,
App. 3 Dist.1974, 20 Ill.App.3d 75, 312 N.E.2d 717. Sentencing And
Punishment
k 1844; Sentencing And Punishment k 1900; Sentencing And Punishment k
1856
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying probation to
defendant,
who was convicted of theft and who had been arrested and charged with
another
crime 11 days after arrest on theft charge, notwithstanding federal
probation
officer having 15-year acquaintance with defendant and his family
testified
that defendant had no criminal record, had been attending college for
about
one year and was 20 years of age. People v. Stadtman, App. 4
Dist.1973, 15
Ill.App.3d 259, 304 N.E.2d 174, reversed 59 Ill.2d 229, 319 N.E.2d 813.
Sentencing And Punishment k 1872(3)
Where defendant was charged by indictment for second violation of this
section
and her guilty plea was result of negotiations in which plea was given
in
exchange for dismissal of other charges pending, denial of probation
was not
abuse of discretion. People v. Davis, App. 4 Dist.1973, 13 Ill.App.3d
870,
301 N.E.2d 325. Sentencing And Punishment k 1872(3); Sentencing And
Punishment k 1887
Notwithstanding testimony indicating that defendant charged with theft
of
funds coming into her possession as village clerk did not constitute
danger to
society, that there was little likelihood that she would commit another
offense and that incarceration was not necessary for rehabilitation,
record
sustained trial court's denial of motion for probation. People v.
Brasmer,
App. 3 Dist.1972, 9 Ill.App.3d 70, 291 N.E.2d 520. Sentencing And
Punishment
k 1902
Although trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying probation
to
defendant, who was convicted of theft over $150, and who had prior
burglary
conviction and other minor convictions, sentence of three to seven
years would
be reduced to one to five years in light of testimony at hearing in
aggravation and mitigation indicating that his past unstable family
life had
been corrected and he was equipped with a skill and job opportunities.
People
v. Byrd, App.1972, 4 Ill.App.3d 358, 280 N.E.2d 461. Criminal Law k
1183
144. ---- Aggravating factors, generally, sentencing
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing ten-year sentence
for
armed violence and four-year sentence for theft where defendant
committed
theft of valuable paintings by taking advantage of his employee status
and
where defendant was armed during exchange of money for paintings.
People v.
Pace, App. 1 Dist.1981, 55 Ill.Dec. 658, 100 Ill.App.3d 213, 426 N.E.2d
983.
Assault And Battery k 100; Larceny k 88
Statute providing that receipt of compensation by defendant for
commission of
offense may be considered as an aggravating factor in imposing sentence
is
inapplicable where defendant receives payment by sharing in proceeds of
crime
such as burglary or theft but, rather, is applicable only when
defendant
receives remuneration to commit an offense, and thus first defendant,
who was
convicted of burglary, and second defendant, who was convicted of theft
of
property having value in excess of $150 were entitled to vacation of
their
sentences, which had been enhanced under statute. People v. Conover,
1981, 50
Ill.Dec. 638, 84 Ill.2d 400, 419 N.E.2d 906. Sentencing And Punishment
k 71;
Sentencing And Punishment k 136
Absent finding of factors indicating that extended term was
appropriate,
defendant could not be sentenced to term of seven years' imprisonment
for
theft. People v. Housby, App. 3 Dist.1980, 38 Ill.Dec. 47, 82
Ill.App.3d 537,
403 N.E.2d 62, affirmed and remanded 50 Ill.Dec. 834, 84 Ill.2d 415,
420
N.E.2d 151, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 160, 454 U.S. 845, 70 L.Ed.2d
131.
Larceny k 88
Sentence of three to nine years for conspiracy to commit theft, seven
counts
of forgery, two counts of attempt theft and two counts of theft was not
excessive, where codefendant not only devised and practiced scheme to
defraud
various banks and steal from numerous individuals, but she also
actively
recruited others to join her, and her attitude was shown by her
statement to a
party involved that "anyone who says crime does not pay is a fool";
fact that
she was a college graduate and had been gainfully employed could be
considered, but did not mandate probation or a reduction of sentence.
People
v. Collins, App. 1 Dist.1979, 26 Ill.Dec. 165, 70 Ill.App.3d 413, 387
N.E.2d
995. Conspiracy k 51; Forgery k 51; Larceny k 88
Where defendant convicted of felony theft had two prior convictions for
deceptive practices, was on probation at time offense was committed,
and used
gun to threaten elderly victim in order to obtain $4,500, sentence of
two to
six years for such conviction was fully justified by record. People v.
Shelton, App. 3 Dist.1975, 33 Ill.App.3d 871, 338 N.E.2d 585.
k 88
Larceny
145. ---- Aggravating factors, criminal record, sentencing
Where defendant was charged with class 4 felony provision of this
paragraph,
trial judge in sentencing defendant was required to look not only at
act of
theft as charged, but also at fact that prior thefts had been committed
by
defendant. People v. Smith, App. 2 Dist.1982, 66 Ill.Dec. 22, 110
Ill.App.3d
286, 442 N.E.2d 294. Sentencing And Punishment k 94
Where trial court did note that defendant was accused of theft of one
bottle
of liquor, but also noted that defendant had extensive record,
presentence
report and its addendum indicated that in past 20 years defendant had
been
convicted of 18 crimes, of those prior convictions, ten were for theft,
four
were for burglary, one was for robbery, and one was for attempted
murder,
defendant admitted to long and extensive history of drug abuse and that
at
time of report he was using heroin daily, sentence of three years,
which was
within statutory limit, was not excessive. People v. Smith, App. 2
Dist.1982,
66 Ill.Dec. 22, 110 Ill.App.3d 286, 442 N.E.2d 294. Sentencing And
Punishment
k 1416
Three-year sentence for felony theft was reasonable in view of
defendant's
previous burglary conviction. People v. Dewaele, App. 3 Dist.1981, 54
Ill.Dec. 126, 98 Ill.App.3d 636, 424 N.E.2d 876. Larceny k 88
Where trial court considered facts that defendant had prior convictions
for
robbery and armed robbery and that defendant failed to appear at trial
and at
his sentencing hearing, trial court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing
defendant to three to nine years after conviction for possession of a
stolen
vehicle and theft. People v. Gray, App. 1 Dist.1981, 52 Ill.Dec. 364,
96
Ill.App.3d 757, 422 N.E.2d 45. Larceny k 88; Receiving Stolen Goods k
10
Concurrent sentences to imprisonment of five and three years for theft
and
violation of bail bond were not excessive where record reflected that
defendant had three prior felony convictions.
1980, 47
Ill.Dec. 732, 83 Ill.2d 424, 415 N.E.2d 1045.
88
People v. Robinson,
Bail k 97(4);
Larceny k
Eight-year sentence for theft imposed on defendant under extended term
statute
(<paragraph> 1005-8-2 of former chapter 38) was not inappropriate,
where
defendant had adjudication of juvenile delinquency, was convicted of
aggravated assault and sentenced to two years' probation with one year
in
prison, was convicted of theft after serving time and served five years
in
jail, and less than two months after his release was arrested for
present
crime and convicted. People v. Mays, App. 3 Dist.1980, 35 Ill.Dec. 652,
80
Ill.App.3d 340, 399 N.E.2d 718. Sentencing And Punishment k 1416
Imposition of sentence of three to nine years' imprisonment upon
conviction of
burglary and theft of property having a value of more than $150 was not
an
abuse of discretion, nor was such sentence excessive, even though trial
court
considered defendant's poor work record, where court also considered
that
defendant had previously been convicted for another burglary, that
offense of
which defendant was convicted was committed while defendant was on
probation,
that defendant's conduct did not indicate that he had become
rehabilitated
during his probationary period, and that sentence was necessary to
deter
criminal activity and protect public. People v. Gan, App. 4 Dist.1979,
31
Ill.Dec. 409, 75 Ill.App.3d 72, 394 N.E.2d 611. Burglary k 49; Larceny
k 88
Sentence of five to ten years for theft and criminal trespass to a
vehicle was
not too severe on theory that trial court sentenced defendant on basis
of his
record and not for crime in question, and sentence was within
discretion of
trial judge. People v. Moore, App.1970, 130 Ill.App.2d 266, 264 N.E.2d
582.
Larceny k 88; Trespass k 91
Sentence of defendant, who had record of previous convictions, for term
of
four to ten years for theft from the person was not excessive. People
v.
Dorsey, App.1968, 92 Ill.App.2d 15, 236 N.E.2d 11. Larceny k 88
146. ---- Violation of parole, sentencing
Sentence of five to ten years for theft of over $150 was not excessive,
where
defendant was on parole when theft was committed and where he had
committed
previous felonies. People v. Hangebrauck, App.1972, 6 Ill.App.3d 563,
286
N.E.2d 16. Larceny k 88
147. ---- Violation of probation, sentencing
Sentence of probation based on charge
could be
collaterally attacked where charge of
assertedly
enhanced to felony due to defendant's
People
v. McCarty, 1983, 67 Ill.Dec. 818, 94
Criminal Law
k 1556
of felony theft was void and
Class A misdemeanor theft was
prior armed robbery conviction.
Ill.2d 28, 445 N.E.2d 298.
Where defendant could not have been convicted of felony theft for
offense
committed, order of probation based upon such conviction was void and
two-year
prison sentence based on revocation of such probation was likewise of
no
effect. People v. McCarty, 1983, 67 Ill.Dec. 818, 94 Ill.2d 28, 445
N.E.2d
298. Sentencing And Punishment k 2005
Resentencing was not warranted after defendant was sentenced to term of
three
years' imprisonment on felony theft conviction after he had been found
in
violation of his probation 30 days after he was originally sentenced.
People
v. Newell, App. 1 Dist.1982, 61 Ill.Dec. 196, 105 Ill.App.3d 330, 434
N.E.2d
349. Sentencing And Punishment k 2250
Imposition of three years incarceration for theft, following revocation
of
four-year probationary term, was not abuse of discretion. People v.
Randolph,
App. 1 Dist.1981, 54 Ill.Dec. 143, 98 Ill.App.3d 696, 424 N.E.2d 893,
certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 128, 459 U.S. 857, 74 L.Ed.2d 110.
Sentencing And
Punishment k 2032
Sentence of two years' imprisonment, on revocation of probation for
felony
theft, was not excessive, in light of the circumstances of the offense
and
defendant's prior record for thefts. People v. Hale, App. 5 Dist.1981,
51
Ill.Dec. 542, 96 Ill.App.3d 187, 420 N.E.2d 1100, certiorari denied 102
S.Ct.
1459, 455 U.S. 953, 71 L.Ed.2d 669. Sentencing And Punishment k 2032
Sentence of two to six years' imprisonment for possession of stolen
vehicle,
which was imposed after revocation of defendant's probation, was in
excess of
statutory maximum. People v. Speight, App. 1 Dist.1979, 27 Ill.Dec.
934, 72
Ill.App.3d 203, 389 N.E.2d 1342. Sentencing And Punishment k 2038
Two to six-year prison sentence imposed on defendant, who was convicted
for
offense of theft from the person for theft of change purse which was
stipulated to contain 50 cents and rosary although amount involved
could have
been much greater, who had previously been convicted of theft and
battery and
placed on one-year probation, who had been sentenced for violation of
probation, who had been convicted and fined for attempted theft, who
had been
convicted and sentenced for attempted theft, who was 21 years old, had
dropped
out of high school, dropped out of vocational training program, had
quit one
job and had been fired from another one was not excessive; such
sentence was
within statutory limits, and trial judge indicated factors he had
considered
in imposing sentence higher than the minimum. People v. Ruffin, App. 1
Dist.1977, 5 Ill.Dec. 49, 46 Ill.App.3d 448, 361 N.E.2d 49. Larceny k
88
Sentence of not less than two years nor more than eight years in the
penitentiary for violation of probation which had been granted for
theft
conviction was not excessive. People v. Bennett, App. 1 Dist.1975, 25
Ill.App.3d 557, 323 N.E.2d 454. Sentencing And Punishment k 2032
Where at age of 17 defendant was first convicted of burglary and was
given
probation, defendant violated probation about seven months later and
was
sentenced to penitentiary for one to ten years and in following tenyear
period was convicted of four more offenses, sentence of two to four
years on
conviction of theft would not be reduced. People v. Wrona, App.1972, 7
Ill.App.3d 1, 286 N.E.2d 370. Larceny k 88
Record was sufficient to show that sentence of from two to ten years,
imposed
for theft on defendant who violated his probation, was in keeping with
reasonable standards for the offense. People v. Cole, App.1971, 131
Ill.App.2d 980, 268 N.E.2d 882. Sentencing And Punishment k 2032
Where defendant was convicted of attempted robbery committed while he
was on
probation for theft from person and sentenced to serve five to nine
years,
concurrent sentence of five to nine years on theft charge upon
revocation of
probation was not excessive. People v. Allen, App.1971, 131 Ill.App.2d
332,
266 N.E.2d 712. Larceny k 88
Sentence of one to ten years in penitentiary imposed on defendant, who
was
convicted of aggravated battery and theft while on probation for
voluntary
manslaughter, was not excessive. People v. Riojas, App.1970, 126
Ill.App.2d
152, 261 N.E.2d 553. Sentencing And Punishment k 2032
Sentence of not less than 3 years nor more than 10 years imposed,
following
revocation of probation, for first unaggravated offense of theft was
excessive
and warranted reduction to not less than 26 months nor more than 10
years in
view of defendant's record which was sufficient to grant him probation
in
first instance, the possibility of rehabilitation, and absence of
showing that
time already served was not adequate punishment. People v. Dotson,
App.1969,
111 Ill.App.2d 306, 250 N.E.2d 174. Criminal Law k 1183
148. ---- Mitigating factors, sentencing
Sentence of five years' imprisonment imposed following defendant's
theft
conviction, which was based on his conversion of over $100,000 in
township
funds while serving as township supervisor, was not excessive, where
sentencing range was five to fourteen years, and trial court considered
defendant's lack of criminal record, time spent in public office, and
deteriorating health, and specifically stated that but for defendant's
poor
health it may have considered a stiffer sentence. People v. Moshier,
App. 3
Dist.2000, 245 Ill.Dec. 740, 312 Ill.App.3d 879, 728 N.E.2d 822.
Larceny k 88
Where record affirmatively demonstrated aggravating factors sufficient
to
justify sentence of four years for felonies of forgery and theft over
$150, a
sentence slightly more than minimum for these Class 3 felonies, and
since
trial court recited, in general terms, factors upon which it relied in
arriving at sentence, there was no error in procedure used,
notwithstanding
defendant's claim that trial court did not consider appropriate
mitigating
factors. People v. Morris, App. 4 Dist.1982, 62 Ill.Dec. 372, 106
Ill.App.3d
689, 435 N.E.2d 1344. Sentencing And Punishment k 58
Sentence of two years' imprisonment imposed upon defendant who stole
some
$15,000 from her employer, who had made restitution by taking a loan
from the
parents of the man she planned to marry, who was living with and
pregnant by
the man she planned to marry, who had previously taken money from
another
employer and made restitution, with result that there was no
prosecution, and
who did not show any remorse for her actions was not abuse of
discretion.
People v. Makes, App. 2 Dist.1981, 59 Ill.Dec. 1, 103 Ill.App.3d 232,
431
N.E.2d 20. Larceny k 89
Sentencing objectives of public protection, serving ends of justice and
preventing deprecation of seriousness of conduct, and restoring
offender to
useful citizenship would better be served by imposition of three-year
sentence, rather than five-year sentence upon defendant who was
convicted of
theft of an automobile having value in excess of $150 and who was 19
years old
on date of theft, in light of defendant's youth, his steady employment
prior
to offense, and his single, nonviolent prior offense. People v. Mick,
App. 5
Dist.1980, 42 Ill.Dec. 370, 86 Ill.App.3d 1022, 408 N.E.2d 1079.
Larceny k 88
Sentence of 12 days in house of correction imposed upon conviction of
theft of
property less than $150 in value was not an abuse of discretion, even
though
defendant lacked prior record and was steadily employed. People v.
McKinnie,
App. 1 Dist.1977, 13 Ill.Dec. 350, 55 Ill.App.3d 433, 371 N.E.2d 45.
Larceny
k 88
Where seventeen-year-old defendant, who had never been convicted of
crime, who
admittedly had a poor environment, who showed remorse for his offense,
and who
had applied for night school education program and a position in a manpower
training course in auto mechanics was sentenced to from three to nine
years
for felony theft in which neither violence nor vandalism was involved,
sentence was excessive and would be reduced to minimum of one year and
a
maximum of four years. People v. Towns, App.1971, 3 Ill.App.3d 710,
279
N.E.2d 60. Criminal Law k 1183
149. ---- Multiple counts of theft, sentencing
Sentence of five years' imprisonment for conviction on 157 counts of
felony
theft was not excessive in light of fact that defendant was employed in
a
position of trust at time he stole nearly $600,000. People v. Parker,
App. 4
Dist.1983, 69 Ill.Dec. 240, 113 Ill.App.3d 321, 447 N.E.2d 457.
Larceny k 88
Where defendant's convictions of 142 counts of forgery arose from
distinct
acts requiring different elements of proof, but five of the ten counts
of
theft for which defendant was convicted were under one section of this
paragraph and the other five were under another section of this
paragraph, and
the two sections did not undertake to create separate and distinct
offenses,
but rather, to create a single offense of theft which could be
performed in a
number of ways, five of defendant's theft convictions would be vacated,
but
cause would not be remanded for resentencing, since it did not appear
that the
five vacated theft convictions had any bearing on the sentences of the
other
147 counts which remained. People v. Einstein, App. 1 Dist.1982, 62
Ill.Dec.
285, 106 Ill.App.3d 526, 435 N.E.2d 1257. Criminal Law k 29(10);
Sentencing
And Punishment k 532
Sentence of three years and four months to ten years' imprisonment on
each of
142 counts of forgery and five counts of theft of which defendant was
convicted was not excessive, in view of the serious and continuing
nature of
defendant's conduct and the magnitude of the forgery and theft
offenses.
People v. Einstein, App. 1 Dist.1982, 62 Ill.Dec. 285, 106 Ill.App.3d
526, 435
N.E.2d 1257. False Pretenses k 54; Forgery k 51
Record in prosecution in which defendant was convicted of theft over
$150 and
of theft under $150 and received sentence of two to six years in
penitentiary
supported conclusion that the sentencing followed statutory
requirements in
determining rehabilitation potential of defendant and did not indicate
that
trial judge, in effect, sentenced defendant for additional offense of
perjury
despite judge's comment that she doubted truthfulness of defendant's
testimony
and that she had low tolerance for perjury. People v. Galati, App. 2
Dist.1979, 30 Ill.Dec. 708, 75 Ill.App.3d 860, 393 N.E.2d 744.
Sentencing And
Punishment k 113
Sentences of five to eight years on plea of guilty to three indictments
for
burglary, two indictments for theft and indictment for unlawful use of
weapons, which sentences were to run concurrently, were not excessive.
People
v. Rodrigquez, App.1970, 126 Ill.App.2d 231, 261 N.E.2d 762. Burglary
k 49;
Larceny k 88; Weapons k 17(8)
Prohibition against sentencing of a defendant for more than one offense
resulting from same conduct did not preclude conviction of defendant,
who
received single sentence for theft of property of a value under $150
under
count one of indictment on ground that his conviction under another
count
charging the same theft after prior conviction of armed robbery arose
out of
the same conduct. People v. Ferrara, App.1969, 111 Ill.App.2d 472, 250
N.E.2d
530, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 1815, 398 U.S. 927, 26 L.Ed.2d 89.
Criminal
Law k 29(10)
150. ---- Enhancement, generally, sentencing
Enhancement provision for recidivism in theft statute allowing state to
charge
misdemeanor theft with a prior conviction as a felony did not violate
defendant's constitutional rights to trial by jury or due process under
Apprendi, where defendant was given notice in indictment and prior
conviction
was not disclosed to jury; prior conviction was obtained at proceedings
with
substantial procedural safeguards, was not an essential element of the
underlying criminal offense, and did not relate to commission of the
underlying offense. People v. Ligons, App. 4 Dist.2001, 259 Ill.Dec.
689, 325
Ill.App.3d 753, 759 N.E.2d 169, appeal denied 262 Ill.Dec. 623, 198
Ill.2d
602, 766 N.E.2d 243. Indictment And Information k 113; Jury k 34(7);
Sentencing And Punishment k 1210
Evidence did not establish that defendant's offense was improperly
enhanced
from misdemeanor to felony based on his prior convictions, although
prosecutor
noted at sentencing hearing that defendant was eligible for extended
term due
to prior convictions; there was no indication that defendant was
sentenced
under enhancement section, theft of property of more than $300 value
was
class-3 felony, and defendant's sentence to term of 30 months was
therefore
proper. People v. Richardson, App. 1 Dist.1988, 120 Ill.Dec. 217, 169
Ill.App.3d 781, 523 N.E.2d 1128. Criminal Law k 1126
Prior out-of-state conviction could be used to enhance misdemeanor
theft
conviction to felony. People v. Hall, App. 5 Dist.1986, 99 Ill.Dec.
644, 145
Ill.App.3d 873, 495 N.E.2d 1379, appeal denied. Larceny k 23
In prosecution for theft with prior conviction, trial court erred
reversibly
in considering defendant's prior felony theft conviction both to make
his
present misdemeanor offense a felony and to impose sentence of six
years.
People v. Meyer, App. 4 Dist.1982, 66 Ill.Dec. 396, 110 Ill.App.3d 673,
442
N.E.2d 957. Sentencing And Punishment k 1351; Criminal Law k 1177.5(1)
In prosecution for felony of theft with prior theft conviction, prior
felony
conviction could not be used to enhance present theft charge from
misdemeanor
to felony and also to extend penalty. People v. Hobbs, 1981, 56
Ill.Dec. 363,
86 Ill.2d 242, 427 N.E.2d 558. Sentencing And Punishment k 1351
In prosecution for theft, failure to allege and prove at trial
defendant's
prior theft conviction that formed basis for extended sentence was not
error
where defendant was completely apprised of charges against him, and
prior
conviction, although it increased the sentence, did not increase grade
or
degree of offense. People v. Mays, App. 3 Dist.1980, 35 Ill.Dec. 652,
80
Ill.App.3d 340, 399 N.E.2d 718. Sentencing And Punishment k 1371;
Sentencing
And Punishment k 1361
Prior conviction for possession of marijuana in violation of statute
which was
later held unconstitutional could not be considered in imposing
sentence for
theft. People v. Lewis, App. 1 Dist.1974, 18 Ill.App.3d 131, 309
N.E.2d 349.
Sentencing And Punishment k 1336
One convicted of theft of property not exceeding $150 in value should
be given
a sentence of not less than one nor more than five years, where he had
previously been convicted of grand theft and petty theft. People v.
Kelly,
App.1965, 66 Ill.App.2d 204, 214 N.E.2d 290. Larceny k 88
151. ---- Enhancement, time limit, sentencing
In order to invoke enhanced penalty provision of this section relating
to
theft of property not exceeding $150 in value there is no limit on the
period
of time between the two convictions, but the enhanced penalty may not
be
imposed unless the first conviction is alleged in the indictment and
proved at
trial. People v. Scott, App. 1 Dist.1976, 36 Ill.App.3d 304, 343 N.E.2d
517,
affirmed 12 Ill.Dec. 174, 68 Ill.2d 269, 369 N.E.2d 881, certiorari
granted 98
S.Ct. 2817, 436 U.S. 925, 56 L.Ed.2d 767, affirmed 99 S.Ct. 1158, 440
U.S.
367, 59 L.Ed.2d 383. Indictment And Information k 166
This section providing for enhanced penalty for conviction of theft
after a
prior conviction of any type of theft does not limit time of occurrence
of
prior offense. People v. Ferrara, App.1969, 111 Ill.App.2d 472, 250
N.E.2d
530, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 1815, 398 U.S. 927, 26 L.Ed.2d 89.
Sentencing
And Punishment k 1296
152. ---- Enhancement, type of theft, sentencing
Defendant convicted of stealing two guns worth over $300 each was
properly
sentenced for Class 3 felony under statute which provides that theft of
property exceeding $300 in value is Class 3 felony, even though another
statute makes theft of a firearm "regardless of value" a Class 4
felony;
statute reflects intent of legislature to punish theft of firearms more
severely than ordinary property, even if value of firearm taken does
not
exceed $300, but permits theft of firearm valued at more than $300 to
be
charged as Class 3 felony. People v. Timmons, App. 2 Dist.1992, 174
Ill.Dec.
616, 233 Ill.App.3d 591, 599 N.E.2d 162. Larceny k 23
Enhancement provisions of <paragraph> 16-1 of former chapter 38 dealing
with
theft of property did not provide any statutory authority for
enhancement of
theft of labor or services or use of property to a felony offense and,
thus,
defendant could not have been convicted for felony theft for failing to
pay
driver of taxi cab. People v. Sierra, App. 2 Dist.1984, 78 Ill.Dec.
245, 122
Ill.App.3d 822, 461 N.E.2d 1079. Larceny k 5
"Robbery" as defined by legislature is not a "type of theft" for
purposes of
enhancement of misdemeanor theft to felony theft, but is separate crime
against property. People v. McCarty, 1983, 67 Ill.Dec. 818, 94 Ill.2d
28, 445
N.E.2d 298. Larceny k 23
Term "offense," as it is used in this paragraph, does not include
municipal
ordinance violations, and legislature did not intend that prior
violations of
municipal ordinances be included within meaning of phrase "conviction
of any
type of theft" as that phrase is used in statute making second or
subsequent
theft offense after conviction of any type of theft a Class IV felony.
People
v. Rogers, App. 2 Dist.1980, 42 Ill.Dec. 191, 86 Ill.App.3d 1092, 408
N.E.2d
769. Sentencing And Punishment k 1260
Absent indication that prior conviction of defendant for burglary
involved any
theft, it could not be determined whether such prior conviction of
defendant,
who was subsequently convicted, after guilty plea, of theft of sum of
less
than $150, and who was sentenced to one to two years' imprisonment, was
for a
type of theft within this section providing that sentence in excess of
one
year for offense of theft of sum of less than $150 was permissible only
if
defendant had previously been convicted of such offense or of any type
of
theft. People v. Talbot, App.1971, 2 Ill.App.3d 922, 274 N.E.2d 123.
Sentencing And Punishment k 1260
Prior conviction for armed robbery constituted conviction for "any type
of
theft" within this section providing that person who is convicted of
theft
after a prior conviction of any type of theft shall be imprisoned in
penitentiary from one to five years. People v. Ferrara, App.1969, 111
Ill.App.2d 472, 250 N.E.2d 530, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 1815, 398
U.S. 927,
26 L.Ed.2d 89. Sentencing And Punishment k 1416
153. ---- Codefendants, sentencing
Imposition of three-year sentence on defendant for felony theft while
codefendant who pled guilty to burglary was given only 30 months'
probation
was justifiable on basis that defendant participated in the offense to
a
relatively greater degree than did codefendant as well as on factor of
defendant's lesser rehabilitative potential in view of more serious
past
criminal record and relative maturity of the defendant. People v.
Dewaele,
App. 3 Dist.1981, 54 Ill.Dec. 126, 98 Ill.App.3d 636, 424 N.E.2d 876.
Sentencing And Punishment k 56
Where defendant had previously pleaded guilty to burglary and was still
on
probation of such offense at time of alleged theft of automobile,
defendant
could have been sentenced under extended term sentencing provisions,
and
therefore, fact that defendant was sentenced to imprisonment when
another
participant in alleged crime pleaded guilty to same offense and was
sentenced
to probation and ordered to pay restitution was not disparity which
would
warrant reduction of defendant's sentence. People v. Mick, App. 5
Dist.1980,
42 Ill.Dec. 370, 86 Ill.App.3d 1022, 408 N.E.2d 1079. Criminal Law k
1184(4.1)
Where defendant provided transportation to car lot from which
automobile was
allegedly stolen and away from wreck of such automobile, provided
gasoline
that permitted his venture to continue, and was oldest of threesome
involved
in alleged crime, defendant's conduct was not significantly less
culpable for
offense than that of another participant for purposes of determining
whether
his sentence was excessive, even though one of the other participants
had key
to automobile and the other drove the automobile. People v. Mick, App.
5
Dist.1980, 42 Ill.Dec. 370, 86 Ill.App.3d 1022, 408 N.E.2d 1079.
Sentencing
And Punishment k 56
In proceeding in which defendant's bench trial was conducted
simultaneously
with defendant's jury trial on charges of theft and conspiracy, fact
that
codefendant was acquitted did not require vacating of jury's guilty
verdict,
in light of fact that jury and trial judge operated as separate triers
of fact
and heard different evidence as to the codefendant and defendant.
People v.
Rance, App. 1 Dist.1979, 25 Ill.Dec. 295, 68 Ill.App.3d 639, 386 N.E.2d
566.
Criminal Law k 877
That accused, who had a substantial prior record including probation
violations, received sentence of two to six years for theft of property
exceeding $150 while, with regard to his codefendants who did not have
a
criminal record, one of such codefendants received six-month sentence
with
work release and five years' probation and another codefendant received
one to
three-year sentence did not deny accused equal protection. People v.
Smeathers, App. 2 Dist.1975, 26 Ill.App.3d 1027, 325 N.E.2d 411.
Constitutional Law k 250.3(1)
In prosecution for conspiracy, theft and forgery, where defendant was
mastermind behind scheme in question and most active participant,
stealing
purchase orders, forging signatures and selling stolen goods and
codefendant
was involved in but one step of the scheme, court's granting
codefendant
probation and sentencing defendant on his pleas of guilty to concurrent
terms
of two to six years was not error, and sentence imposed on defendant
who had
no prior criminal record was not excessive. People v. Blumenthal,
App.1971, 1
Ill.App.3d 189, 273 N.E.2d 668. Sentencing And Punishment k 67;
Sentencing
And Punishment k 56
Bare allegation that codefendants received lesser punishment was
insufficient
to justify a reduction of defendant's sentence of one year for petty
other
facts which would entitle defendant to a lesser sentence, and was
silent as to
any evidence which may have been considered by trial court either in
aggravation or mitigation. People v. Spence, App.1971, 133 Ill.App.2d
171,
272 N.E.2d 739. Criminal Law k 1183
Sentence of from four to six years for theft was not abuse of
discretion,
notwithstanding that defendant's companions who pleaded guilty were
given
sentences of from two to four years, where defendant's sentence was
within the
limits prescribed by law and trial judge did not imposed more severe
sentence
on defendant than on his companions merely because defendant insisted
on jury
trial. People v. Hill, App.1965, 58 Ill.App.2d 191, 206 N.E.2d 269.
Larceny k
88
154. ---- Addiction, sentencing
Trial court in prosecution for burglary, possession of burglary tools,
and
theft of $150 did not abuse its discretion or act arbitrarily in
determining
that defendant was not an addict and not entitled to treatment under
the
Dangerous Drug Abuse Act. People v. Benedetto, App. 2 Dist.1981, 57
Ill.Dec.
489, 102 Ill.App.3d 10, 428 N.E.2d 1169. Chemical Dependents k 18
155. ---- Credit, sentencing
In burglary prosecution, sentence of six to 18 years was not excessive,
but
defendant was entitled to credit upon his sentence for time spent on
probation. People v. Wilhite, App. 1 Dist.1974, 18 Ill.App.3d 792, 310
N.E.2d
651. Burglary k 49; Sentencing And Punishment k 2041
156. ---- Restitution, sentencing
For purposes of determining whether employee who embezzled money from
her
employer was collaterally estopped from challenging in subsequent civil
suit
the amount of damages suffered by victim, restitution was material
issue in
prior criminal prosecution for felony theft of more than $10,000 even
though
exact amount of money embezzled was not an element of the offense
charged.
Benedick v. Mohr, App. 5 Dist.1992, 175 Ill.Dec. 440, 233 Ill.App.3d
903, 600
N.E.2d 63, appeal denied 183 Ill.Dec. 15, 148 Ill.2d 639, 610 N.E.2d
1259.
Judgment k 648
Employee had full and fair opportunity to, and actually did, litigate
propriety and amount of restitution in criminal prosecution for felony
theft
of more than $10,000, for purposes of determining whether she was
collaterally
estopped from challenging amount of damages in employer's subsequent
civil
suit. Benedick v. Mohr, App. 5 Dist.1992, 175 Ill.Dec. 440, 233
Ill.App.3d
903, 600 N.E.2d 63, appeal denied 183 Ill.Dec. 15, 148 Ill.2d 639, 610
N.E.2d
1259.
Judgment k 648
In prosecution for theft and robbery, restitution to victim could be
ordered
with sentence of imprisonment. People v. Sherman, App. 3 Dist.1980, 42
Ill.Dec. 871, 87 Ill.App.3d 937, 409 N.E.2d 486. Sentencing And
Punishment k
2132
157. Review--In general
Where State filed appeal from both suppression of evidence and
dismissal
orders, in prosecution for theft over $150, trial court's action in
dismissing
cause was contrary to directive under <paragraph> 114-12 of former
chapter 38
that, where defendant's motion to suppress evidence is granted, court
"shall
terminate the trial" unless State files a written notice that there
will be no
interlocutory appeal of suppression order. People v. Dennison, App. 5
Dist.1978, 18 Ill.Dec. 756, 61 Ill.App.3d 473, 378 N.E.2d 220.
Criminal Law k
394.6(5)
Where no judgment of conviction was entered on jury verdicts which
found
defendants guilty of theft, no issues regarding the theft counts of
indictment
were properly before reviewing court on appeal. People v. Whittaker,
1970, 45
Ill.2d 491, 259 N.E.2d 787. Criminal Law k 1134(8)
Reviewing court was not bound by state's confession of error as to
disposition
of case on appeal from conviction for theft. People v. Puleo,
App.1966, 71
Ill.App.2d 173, 218 N.E.2d 41. Criminal Law k 1186.6
Defendant could not complain that he was found guilty of theft from one
victim
only and not guilty of theft from a second victim merely because the
record
also would have justified a finding of guilty of theft from the second
victim.
People v. Tolentino, App.1966, 68 Ill.App.2d 480, 216 N.E.2d 191.
Criminal
Law k 1175
Where record contains evidence upon which a finding of theft may be
made, the
fact that the evidence would have justified the court in finding the
defendant
guilt of robbery was not a matter of which the defendant could
complain.
People v. Tolentino, App.1966, 68 Ill.App.2d 480, 216 N.E.2d 191.
Criminal Law
k 1175
Reviewing court can only assume that jury followed court's instructions
to
disregard certain remarks of counsel. People v. DiLella, App.1964, 52
Ill.App.2d 403, 202 N.E.2d 77. Criminal Law k 1144.15
To set aside jury's verdict in criminal case where record contains no
error of
law, it is necessary that reviewing court be convinced that the verdict
is
contrary to weight of evidence. People v. Gold, 1935, 196 N.E. 729,
361 Ill.
23. Criminal Law k 1159.2(2)
Where defendant was stranger to both identifying witnesses, court in
reviewing
evidence was required to consider and weigh attendant circumstances,
together
with probability or improbability of an adequate opportunity for
definite
identification. People v. Gold, 1935, 196 N.E. 729, 361 Ill. 23.
Criminal Law
k 1159.5
158. ---- Preservation of issue, generally, review
Issue whether defendant had been erroneously convicted and sentenced
for two
counts of felony theft arising from single physical act of towing away
a boat
and trailer would be considered on appeal, despite defendant's failure
to
raise such issue in his posttrial motion. People v. Depner, App. 2
Dist.1980,
44 Ill.Dec. 902, 89 Ill.App.3d 689, 411 N.E.2d 1368. Criminal Law k
1044.2(1)
In prosecution for theft of property over $150 in value wherein
defendant made
posttrial motion based on alleged variance between evidence adduced at
trial
and essential elements stated in indictment, evidence was not so
closely
balanced that issue of credibility and veracity of State's chief
witness was
properly reviewable in absence of preservation below. People v.
Starnes, App.
5 Dist.1980, 44 Ill.Dec. 219, 88 Ill.App.3d 1141, 411 N.E.2d 125.
Criminal Law
k 1044.2(1)
In prosecution for theft of motor vehicle and possession of altered
credit
card, trial of defendant on both charges notwithstanding severance
orders
entered 18 and 12 months prior to trial did not prejudice defendant
where
defendant did not raise issue as to severance until after substantial
evidence
had been presented, even though defendant himself had made motion to
sever,
and jury found defendant not guilty of credit card offense. People v.
Daniels, App. 2 Dist.1979, 31 Ill.Dec. 704, 76 Ill.App.3d 103, 394
N.E.2d 906.
Criminal Law k 620(7)
Argument made by defendant on his motion to vacate and withdraw his
plea of
guilty to two counts of felony-theft, that is, that sentences imposed
were
excessive, necessarily included issue raised on appeal from denial of
motion,
that is, that trial court erred in entering judgments of conviction and
sentencing defendant on two counts of felony theft where both offenses
arose
out of the same physical act and both violated this paragraph, and thus
defendant's appeal would be considered despite allegation by State that
defendant failed to preserve issue raised on appeal due to his failure
to
present issue in his motion to vacate and to withdraw his plea of
guilty.
People v. Jackson, App. 3 Dist.1978, 21 Ill.Dec. 34, 64 Ill.App.3d 159,
380
N.E.2d 1210. Criminal Law k 1044.2(1)
Where the court, outside jury's presence, struck all the indictment's
theft
counts except the one charging a class 3 felony involving value in
excess of
$150, where the cause was thereafter submitted to the jury without any
instruction that the only theft count remaining for consideration was
for
felony theft, and where the verdict form submitted did not specify that
it was
for a finding as to felony theft, defendant did not waive the objection
to
being sentenced for a felony by any failure to object to the verdict
form or
to offer one of his own. People v. Pugh, App. 3 Dist.1975, 29
Ill.App.3d 42,
329 N.E.2d 425. Criminal Law k 894
Defendant's right to appeal from offense of having knowingly
intentionally and
unlawfully obtained unauthorized control over property having a value
of less
than $150 was not affected by fact that he had paid fine imposed for
offense.
People v. Lessen, App.1970, 123 Ill.App.2d 1, 259 N.E.2d 613. Criminal
Law k
1026.10(6)
Variance between proof of ownership of stolen property and allegation
thereof
in indictment could not be raised for first time in reviewing court.
People
v. Oswald, 1930, 172 N.E. 819, 340 Ill. 434. Criminal Law k 1032(7)
159. ---- Preservation of issue, admissibility of evidence, review
In prosecution for theft of property exceeding $150 in value,
defendants had
waived objection that a photograph taken of merchandise at scene and
admitted
into evidence depicted article of clothing along with three allegedly
stolen
items which store detective was unable to identify as having been taken
from
store and thereby injected prejudicial evidence of another crime, since
defendants at no time objected, requested deletion of fourth article,
asked
for cautionary instruction, or raised issue in their posttrial motion.
People
v. Parker, App. 2 Dist.1979, 33 Ill.Dec. 21, 77 Ill.App.3d 536, 396
N.E.2d 97.
Criminal Law k 698(1); Criminal Law k 824(8); Criminal Law k
1044.2(1)
In prosecution for theft of property exceeding $150 in value, hearsay
testimony of store detective to effect that items were missing from
inventory
sheet was not objected to at trial, and thus claim of error was waived.
People v. Parker, App. 2 Dist.1979, 33 Ill.Dec. 21, 77 Ill.App.3d 536,
396
N.E.2d 97. Criminal Law k 698(1)
On appeal from bench trial for theft, the defendant was not entitled to
complain of the admission of hearsay testimony which incriminated him
and
which was elicited by defense counsel. People v. Durham, App. 1
Dist.1974, 23
Ill.App.3d 737, 320 N.E.2d 144. Criminal Law k 1137(5)
Where defendant in prosecution for theft of coat to which tag was
attached
according to store clerk made no objection to testimony as to content
of tag,
which was not on coat when it was produced in court, best evidence
issue was
waived. People v. Banks, App. 1 Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 512, 308
N.E.2d 247.
Criminal Law k 698(1)
Where there was an independent basis for in-court identification of
defendant
as person who was observed by two credible witnesses for approximately
three
minutes as he robbed a well-lit store, use of plain error doctrine to
consider
issue of admissibility of identification testimony, which was allegedly
tainted by a suggestive pretrial showup but to which no objection was
raised
at trial, was not justified. People v. Harris, App. 1 Dist.1973, 12
Ill.App.3d 42, 298 N.E.2d 196. Criminal Law k 1036.1(7)
Defendant, who failed to object, in theft prosecution, to his brother's
statement that allegedly stolen paint brushes belonged to defendant,
waived
his right to complain about its admission. People v. Voleta, App.1965,
57
Ill.App.2d 279, 206 N.E.2d 737. Criminal Law k 698(1)
In prosecution for larceny from person, there was no prejudicial error
resulting from testimony of complainant as to the fact that he had
complained
to police officers immediately after larceny where there was no
objection to
this testimony and on cross-examination defendant's counsel asked
complaining
witness several questions along the same line. People v. Cox, 1960, 20
Ill.2d
458, 170 N.E.2d 531. Criminal Law k 1036.1(3.1); Criminal Law k
1169.2(6)
Where, in larceny prosecution, defendant failed to object and thereby
to
obtain ruling of trial court as to admissibility of testimony of
general claim
agent of cartage company and exhibits, Supreme Court was precluded from
examining question on review. People v. Trefonas, 1956, 9 Ill.2d 92,
136
N.E.2d 817. Criminal Law k 1036.1(1)
160. ---- Preservation of issue, argument of counsel, review
Where defendant made posttrial motion in prosecution for theft of
property
over $150 in value arguing an allegedly fatal variance between evidence
adduced at trial and essential elements stated in indictment with
considerable
specificity, arguments concerning sufficiency of proof in respect to
credibility and veracity of State's chief witness could not be raised
on
appeal. People v. Starnes, App. 5 Dist.1980, 44 Ill.Dec. 219, 88
Ill.App.3d
1141, 411 N.E.2d 125. Criminal Law k 1043(3)
Defendant, who failed to raise at trial or at posttrial motion issue
that
prosecution misled jury into believing that it was unnecessary to prove
that
defendant intended to permanently deprive victims of their property in
order
to find defendant guilty of theft, waived claim on appeal. People v.
Jedlicka, App. 2 Dist.1980, 39 Ill.Dec. 865, 84 Ill.App.3d 483, 405
N.E.2d 844
. Criminal Law k 1028; Criminal Law k 1044.2(1)
In light of fact that defendant's objection, in prosecution for felonytheft
and fraudulent conveyance of land, to prosecutor's comment on failure
of
defendant to produce owner of one piece of property allegedly
fraudulently
conveyed and any subcontractors to testify at trial on defendant's
theory that
he was unable to perform on various contracts to construct homes on
pieces of
property due to his inability to obtain financing and because of
various
building problems with subcontractors was sustained and claim of error
was not
included in defendant's posttrial motion, any possible prejudice
resulting
from comment was not elevated to consideration as plain error. People
v.
Jedlicka, App. 2 Dist.1980, 39 Ill.Dec. 865, 84 Ill.App.3d 483, 405
N.E.2d 844
. Criminal Law k 1044.2(1)
Defendant who failed to object to State's reference to prior marijuana
offense
conviction waived any error caused thereby. People v. Lewis, App. 1
Dist.1974, 18 Ill.App.3d 131, 309 N.E.2d 349. Criminal Law k 728(2)
161. ---- Preservation of issue, indictment, review
Complaint for shoplifting which alleged that defendant stole "various
articles
of men's clothing" could not be objected to for first time on appeal on
asserted ground that it failed to apprise defendant of the offense
charged.
People v. Sabri, App. 2 Dist.1977, 6 Ill.Dec. 104, 47 Ill.App.3d 962,
362
N.E.2d 739. Criminal Law k 1032(5)
Where defendant had not moved to quash complaint until after state had
rested
its case in prosecution for theft and at time of motion complainant had
already sworn in open court to all facts alleged therein, defects, if
any,
existing in verification of complaint had been waived. People v.
Smith,
App.1967, 90 Ill.App.2d 388, 234 N.E.2d 161. Indictment And
Information k
196(4)
Accused in criminal prosecution for larceny of notes could not urge for
first
time in Supreme Court that indictment against him was void for
repugnancy in
that it contained contradictory allegations as to whom notes were
payable.
People v. Franklin, 1953, 114 N.E.2d 661, 415 Ill. 514. Criminal Law k
1032(5)
162. ---- Preservation of issue, instructions, review
Failure of defendant to object, at conference on jury instructions, to
trial
court's failure to instruct jury to make finding as to value of
posthole
digger, and that a value in excess of $150 was an element of the
offense of
theft over $150 constituted a waiver of the issue on appeal. People v.
McKiness, App. 2 Dist.1982, 60 Ill.Dec. 908, 105 Ill.App.3d 92, 433
N.E.2d
1146. Criminal Law k 1038.2
Defendant waived objection to jury instruction regarding elements of
crime of
theft by deception which failed to include element that accused must
have
intended to permanently deprive owner of use or benefit of the property
where
defendant made no objection at trial to the form of the instruction,
the four
instructions relating to theft made jury amply aware of the fact that
to
convict for any count of theft state had to prove defendant intended to
permanently deprive the owner of the use or benefit of the property and
question whether defendant intended to permanently deprive owner of use
or
benefit of property was not at issue. People v. Baugh, App. 1
Dist.1981, 52
Ill.Dec. 485, 96 Ill.App.3d 946, 422 N.E.2d 166. Criminal Law k 847
In prosecution for theft of more than $150, where defense counsel did
not
object to pattern instruction which did not require a finding as to
value of
the property, did not properly object to the guilty verdict form which
was
tendered, also lacking any reference to or requirement as to value, and
did
not file or present any posttrial motion on the issue, defendant failed
to
preserve any error for review. People v. Tannenbaum, 1980, 47 Ill.Dec.
714,
82 Ill.2d 177, 415 N.E.2d 1027. Criminal Law k 1038.1(4); Criminal
Law k
1044.1(1)
In prosecution for theft of property valued at more than $150, where
defense
counsel did not object to instructions tendered by the State which did
not
refer to the element of value, did not tender alternate instructions
containing the element of felony value, and did not mention the issue
of proof
of value during argument on motions for directed verdict, or during
defense
counsel's closing argument, defendant did not properly preserve any
error for
review. People v. Tannenbaum, 1980, 47 Ill.Dec. 714, 82 Ill.2d 177, 415
N.E.2d
1027. Criminal Law k 1038.1(4); Criminal Law k 1038.3
Where defendant did not tender instruction defining theft, in
prosecution for
burglary with intent to commit theft, and he raised no objection to any
instructions given or to absence of theft instruction in his posttrial
motion,
any error in instructions was waived. People v. Wooff, App.1970, 120
Ill.App.2d 225, 256 N.E.2d 881. Criminal Law k 824(1); Criminal Law k
1038.1(6); Criminal Law k 1038.2
163. ---- Preservation of issue, value of property, review
Issue of whether defendant could have been sentenced as a felon even if
value
of over $150 was not shown would not be considered on appeal, where
this issue
was not raised in trial court. People v. Cobetto, App. 5 Dist.1975, 32
Ill.App.3d 696, 336 N.E.2d 505, affirmed in part, reversed in part 6
Ill.Dec.
907, 66 Ill.2d 488, 363 N.E.2d 854. Criminal Law k 1028
Where defendant, indicted for theft of property of value exceeding
$150, did
not object to form of verdict during conference on instructions and his
contention that verdict erroneously failed to include finding that
value of
property was in excess of $150 was not raised in posttrial motion, the
question was not preserved for appeal. People v. Eastland, App. 4
Dist.1973,
11 Ill.App.3d 271, 296 N.E.2d 363. Criminal Law k 1040; Criminal Law
k
1044.1(1)
In prosecution for receiving stolen fur coats, accused who did not
object to
form of question propounded to furrier as to value of each coat could
not
question admissibility of such proof. People v. Johnston, 1943, 46
N.E.2d
967, 382 Ill. 233. Criminal Law k 1036.6
164. ---- Plain error, review
Appellate Court would not review under plain error doctrine issue of
whether
defendant's guilty plea to theft was rendered involuntary by trial
court's
alleged failure to admonish defendant before he pled guilty that he
could
receive consecutive sentences for theft charges and for prior offenses
for
which he had been on Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC)
probation;
trial court made no misleading statements during plea proceedings, and
when
judge sentenced defendant to TASC probation at prior sentencing
hearing, judge
warned defendant that he could receive up to 21 years for first eight
cases,
whereas he ended up receiving 12 years' imprisonment for all nine
cases.
People v. Startz, App. 3 Dist.2000, 245 Ill.Dec. 743, 312 Ill.App.3d
863, 728
N.E.2d 825, appeal denied; judgment vacated 246 Ill.Dec. 911, 189
Ill.2d 699,
731 N.E.2d 760, on remand 277 Ill.Dec. 903, 321 Ill.App.3d 1064, 797
N.E.2d
250. Criminal Law k 1031(4)
Failure to make inquiry as to legal basis for enhancement of Class A
misdemeanor theft to felony theft because of defendant's prior armed
robbery
conviction was error affecting substantial rights of defendant such
that
whether there was factual basis for charge would remain open for
review.
People v. McCarty, 1983, 67 Ill.Dec. 818, 94 Ill.2d 28, 445 N.E.2d 298.
Criminal Law k 273(4.1)
Where inquiry into theft victim's selection of pictures of two of the
three
assailants from police station photographic display was initiated by
defense
on cross-examination but victim's testimony that he picked out pictures
other
than defendant's was elicited by State on re-direct, permitting police
officer
to then testify that victim had selected defendant's picture
constituted plain
error requiring reversal, notwithstanding want of objection at trial;
in
questioning police officer about the selection, the State was
endeavoring to
rehabilitate its case, rather than to rebut defense evidence, even
though this
meant impeaching its own witness. People v. Hanson, App. 1 Dist.1973,
10
Ill.App.3d 593, 295 N.E.2d 120. Criminal Law k 1036.2; Witnesses k
401
165. ---- Value of property, generally, review
On appeal of judgment admitting defendant to probation on condition
that he
pay restitution to owner of stolen automobile, National Automobile
Dealers
Association "Blue Book" showing wholesale value of automobile would not
be
considered where it was not part of record. People v. James, App. 1
Dist.1975, 25 Ill.App.3d 533, 323 N.E.2d 424. Criminal Law k 1128(2)
Supreme Court would take judicial notice that semitrailer truck with
one lot
of merchandise had a value of over $150, so that defendant, who
allegedly
stole the truck, could be found guilty of felony theft. People v.
Tassone,
1968, 41 Ill.2d 7, 241 N.E.2d 419, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 1318, 394
U.S.
965, 22 L.Ed.2d 567. Criminal Law k 304(1)
A conviction for receiving stolen goods will not be reversed for
insufficiency
of the evidence to support the jury's finding of the value of the silk,
where
the amount stolen was shown without objection that separate
transactions
should be considered as separate offenses, and without request to
require the
state to elect, and the testimony showed that the value received on
each of
two occasions was sufficient to constitute grand larceny. People v.
Schallman, 1920, 129 N.E. 569, 295 Ill. 560. Criminal Law k 1036.8;
Receiving Stolen Goods k 8(3)
166. ---- Record, review
Although defendant's misdemeanor theft conviction, which defendant
contended
was erroneously admitted in his prosecution for armed robbery, was
defendant's
second conviction for offense of theft, Supreme Court would assume that
such
conviction was for a misdemeanor despite existence of this paragraph
stating
that second offense after a conviction of any type of theft is a
felony;
Supreme Court would not inquire into matters which were dehors the
record.
People v. Spates, 1979, 32 Ill.Dec. 333, 77 Ill.2d 193, 395 N.E.2d 563.
Criminal Law k 1144.12
Notwithstanding claim that no employee of store from which property had
been
taken had testified at defendant's trial for petty theft, Appellate
Court was
bound by report of proceedings which had been certified as true and
correct by
trial court and which indicated that employee had testified by
identifying
property taken and value thereof. People v. Spence, App.1971, 133
Ill.App.2d
171, 272 N.E.2d 739. Criminal Law k 1111(4)
Record on appeal from conviction for theft failed to reveal any
comments by
either state or court which would so prejudice accused as to require
reversal
of her conviction. People v. Adams, App.1969, 106 Ill.App.2d 396, 245
N.E.2d
904. Criminal Law k 1166.22(1); Criminal Law k 1171.1(2.1)
Where no record was made of hearing on probation petition after
defendant
pleaded guilty to theft of property not exceeding $150 in value,
reviewing
court was unable to determine whether denial of defendant's petition
for
probation or sentence imposed by the trial court of six months at state
farm
was an abuse of discretion and reviewing court would remand cause for
further
proceedings. People v. Whiting, App.1967, 87 Ill.App.2d 167, 230
N.E.2d 885.
Criminal Law k 1189
Where only common-law record was before Appellate Court, Appellate
Court could
not say that penalty imposed on defendant for stealing 80 cents, of one
year
in the house of correction and a fine of $100 was too severe or that he
was
denied an opportunity to prepare his defense. People v. O'Campo,
App.1947, 71
N.E.2d 375, 330 Ill.App. 401. Criminal Law k 1090.7; Criminal Law k
1090.15
167. ---- Instructions, generally, review
Where defendant at instructions conference objected strenuously to
State's
instructions which informed jury that offense of theft included offense
of
criminal trespass to vehicle, and only after court overruled his
objections to
such instructions did defense counsel tender his instruction setting
forth
propositions that must be proved to sustain charge of criminal trespass
to
vehicle, which instruction was necessary if jury were to be properly
instructed as to elements of offense, defendant was not estopped from
raising
issue on appeal that criminal trespass to vehicle was not lesser
included
offense of theft because he tendered issues instruction on criminal
trespass.
People v. Rainbolt, App. 5 Dist.1977, 9 Ill.Dec. 859, 52 Ill.App.3d
374, 367
N.E.2d 293. Criminal Law k 1137(8)
In prosecution for theft and aggravated battery of a police officer,
the
evidence of defendant's guilt was so overwhelming that, even though
instruction referring to resisting arrest was erroneous, it was
harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Watts, App.1972, 8 Ill.App.3d 47,
288
N.E.2d 651. Criminal Law k 1172.1(2)
168. ---- Sentencing, review
Although when defendant was sentenced for predicate offenses of
burglary and
felony theft, judgment should have been entered and sentence imposed
only for
more serious offenses, i.e., armed violence in which predicate burglary
and
thefts were alleged to have been committed while armed with category
one
weapons, Appellate Court was not permitted to vacate lesser offenses in
order
to remand for sentencing on greater. People v. Felton, App. 2
Dist.1982, 64
Ill.Dec. 442, 108 Ill.App.3d 763, 439 N.E.2d 1107. Criminal Law k
1181.5(8)
Trial court in prosecution for burglary and theft improperly considered
defendant's receipt of proceeds in imposing sentence, and thus cause
was
remanded for resentencing. People v. Gardner, App. 5 Dist.1982, 60
Ill.Dec.
951, 105 Ill.App.3d 103, 433 N.E.2d 1318. Sentencing And Punishment k
136;
Criminal Law k 1181.5(8)
Defendant's well-taken assertion that all of her convictions on counts
of
theft and official misconduct pertaining to unauthorized or deceptive
control
of authorizations to purchase food stamp cards allegedly used to
illegally
obtain food stamps were based on her allegedly using her position with
State
Department of Public Aid to alter authorization cards and to use such
cards to
obtain food stamps, that she could not be convicted of two or more
offenses
arising from same conduct, and that she was thus entitled to vacation
of ten
counts of theft and four counts of official misconduct necessitated
remand for
resentencing as to remaining counts where Appellate Court was not
convinced
that total number of convictions may not have influenced imposition of
two to
six-year term of sentenced imprisonment. People v. Walton, App. 1
Dist.1981,
50 Ill.Dec. 387, 94 Ill.App.3d 903, 419 N.E.2d 495. Criminal Law k
1181.5(8)
Where record revealed that defendant was indicted and then convicted on
two
counts of theft for each of four authorizations to purchase food stamp
cards,
under rule that defendant may not be convicted for two or more offenses
arising out of same act, four counts of theft had to be vacated, and
since
Appellate Court was not convinced that total number of counts did not
have any
effect on trial court, cause had to be remanded for resentencing.
People v.
Walton, App. 1 Dist.1981, 50 Ill.Dec. 387, 94 Ill.App.3d 903, 419
N.E.2d 495.
Criminal Law k 1181.5(8)
Where trial judge had considered two offenses of armed robbery and
theft
separately and sentenced defendant separately on each count, even
though armed
robbery and theft counts had been founded on a single act of defendant,
Appellate Court would not remand for resentencing on armed robbery
conviction
by reason of alleged taint of the invalid theft conviction. People v.
Kosanovich, App. 1 Dist.1979, 26 Ill.Dec. 231, 69 Ill.App.3d 748, 387
N.E.2d
1061. Criminal Law k 1181.5(8)
Where record showed that trial judge carefully examined possibility of
imposing sentence of periodic imprisonment after defendant's conviction
for
theft of more than $150, but had instead imposed term of imprisonment
of from
one to three years, there was no basis for remanding to trial judge for
reconsideration of possibility of periodic imprisonment. People v.
McGee,
App. 2 Dist.1977, 7 Ill.Dec. 120, 49 Ill.App.3d 205, 364 N.E.2d 107.
Criminal
Law k 1181.5(8)
Consideration of appeal from revocation of probation, following
subsequent
conviction for other offenses, and sentence together with counsel's
motion for
leave to withdraw because there were no grounds for a meritorious
appeal
disclosed that the 18-month to 4-year sentence was appropriate to the
offenses
of burglary and theft and that there was no error. People v. Heinz,
App.1972,
7 Ill.App.3d 519, 288 N.E.2d 18. Criminal Law k 1077.1(2)
Fact that evidence in prosecution for theft of property exceeding $150
in
value failed to show that property exceeded $150 in value was not
ground for
reversal of judgment insofar as it found defendant guilty of theft, and
Appellate Court on appeal, instead of reversing judgment, would reduce
punishment imposed by trial court. People v. Kelly, App.1965, 66
Ill.App.2d
204, 214 N.E.2d 290. Criminal Law k 1183; Criminal Law k 1186.1
Inclusion, in sentence to indeterminate term of one to ten years'
imprisonment
for grand larceny, of advisory recommendation as to minimum and maximum
limits
of duration of imprisonment, did not necessitate remandment of cause
with
direction to enter proper sentence where minimum and maximum limits of
imprisonment contained in advisory recommendation coincided with
penalty
prescribed by law for grand larceny. People v. Rawls, 1945, 62 N.E.2d
438,
390 Ill. 476, certiorari denied 66 S.Ct. 476, 326 U.S. 791, 90 L.Ed.
480.
Criminal Law k 1188
Where trial court in mistaken belief that indictment charged larceny of
a
motor vehicle instead of grand larceny which required allegation and
proof of
value sentenced accused to penitentiary for indeterminate term of one
to
twenty years on his plea of guilty and accused had served more than
maximum
term for grand larceny, the cause would not be remanded upon reversal
of trial
court's judgment. People v. Brown, 1943, 48 N.E.2d 953, 383 Ill. 287.
Criminal Law k 1188
Defendant cannot assign error on a judgment sentencing him to
imprisonment for
petit larceny without a fine, the punishment not being of a different
kind
from that which the statute prescribes, and more favorable to
defendant.
People v. Goodman, 1923, 228 Ill.App. 494.
169. Minors
Modification of juvenile's dispositional order to include a limitation
on the
period of her commitment to a period of time that was not greater that
the
maximum sentence for an adult who committed misdemeanor theft was
required;
juvenile's initial disposition order committed her "for an
indeterminate
term," and statute prohibited a juvenile from being committed to the
Department of Corrections for a period of time in excess of that period
which
an adult could be committed for the same act. In re K.S., App. 5
Dist.2004,
290 Ill.Dec. 941, 354 Ill.App.3d 862, 822 N.E.2d 526, appeal denied 294
Ill.Dec. 3, 214 Ill.2d 533, 830 N.E.2d 3. Infants k 230.1
II. EVIDENCE
<Subdivision Index>
Accomplice testimony, admissibility 214
Accomplice testimony, generally, sufficiency 257
Accomplice testimony, uncorroborated, sufficiency 258
Accountability, generally, sufficiency 268
Accountability, presence, sufficiency 269
Admissibility 206-229
Admissibility - In general 206
Admissibility - Accomplice testimony 214
Admissibility - Admissions 211
Admissibility - Chain of possession 216
Admissibility - Circumstantial evidence 209
Admissibility - Confessions 210
Admissibility - Cross-examination 213
Admissibility - Cure of error 229
Admissibility - Documentary evidence 225
Admissibility - Exhibits 227
Admissibility - Hearsay testimony 215
Admissibility - Identification 217
Admissibility - Other acts 218
Admissibility - Other crimes, generally 219
Admissibility - Other crimes, harmless error 220
Admissibility - Other crimes, intent 221
Admissibility - Other crimes, modus operandi 222
Admissibility - Photographs 226
Admissibility - Prior convictions, generally 223
Admissibility - Prior convictions, impeachment 224
Admissibility - Rebuttal evidence 228
Admissibility - Relevance 208
Admissibility - Search and seizure 207
Admissibility - Statements of co-defendants 212
Admissions, admissibility 211
Admissions and confessions, sufficiency 252
Alibi, sufficiency 265
Cash and checks, possession of stolen property 204
Chain of possession, admissibility 216
Circumstantial evidence, admissibility 209
Circumstantial evidence, generally, sufficiency 232
Circumstantial evidence, intent, sufficiency 236
Co-defendants' statements, admissibility 212
Common scheme or design, sufficiency 260
Confessions, admissibility 210
Confessions and admissions, sufficiency 252
Corporate existence, employee testimony, sufficiency 242
Corporate existence, generally, sufficiency 241
Corpus delicti, sufficiency 233
Credibility of witness, sufficiency 255
Cross-examination, admissibility 213
Cure of error, admissibility 229
Defendant's statements, admissibility 211
Description of property, sufficiency 245
Documentary evidence, admissibility 225
Employee testimony, corporate existence, sufficiency 242
Evidence, sufficiency of, possession of stolen property 205
Exclusive and unexplained possession, possession of stolen property
199
Exclusive possession, possession of stolen property 200
Exhibits, admissibility 227
Eyewitness, sufficiency 251
Failure to pay, sufficiency 261
Flight, sufficiency 264
Guilt, inference of, possession of stolen property 193
Guilt, inference of, rebuttal, possession of stolen property 194
Guilt, presumption of, possession of stolen property 195
Harmless error, other crimes, admissibility 220
Hearsay, sufficiency 253
Hearsay testimony, admissibility 215
Identification, admissibility 217
Identification of defendant, generally, sufficiency 247
Identification of defendant, number of witnesses, sufficiency 248
Identification of defendant, officer testimony, sufficiency 249
Identification of defendant, opportunity to observe, sufficiency 250
Impeachment, prior convictions, admissibility 224
Inference of guilt, generally, possession of stolen property 193
Inference of guilt, rebuttal, possession of stolen property 194
Intent, circumstantial evidence, sufficiency 236
Intent, generally, sufficiency 235
Intent, other crimes, admissibility 221
Joint possession, possession of stolen property 197
Knowledge, sufficiency 234
Missing property, sufficiency 246
Modus operandi, admissibility 222
Motor vehicles, ownership, sufficiency 243
Number of witnesses, sufficiency 256
Other acts, admissibility 218
Other crimes, generally, admissibility 219
Other crimes, harmless error, admissibility 220
Other crimes, intent, admissibility 221
Other crimes, modus operandi, admissibility 222
Ownership, corporate existence, employee testimony, sufficiency 242
Ownership, corporate existence, generally, sufficiency 241
Ownership, generally, sufficiency 238
Ownership, motor vehicles, sufficiency 243
Ownership, possessory interest, sufficiency 240
Ownership, statement of, sufficiency 239
Photographs, admissibility 226
Possession, exclusive, possession of stolen property 200
Possession, generally, possession of stolen property 196
Possession, joint, possession of stolen property 197
Possession of stolen property 191-205
Possession of stolen property - In general 191
Possession of stolen property - Cash and checks 204
Possession of stolen property - Exclusive and unexplained
possession
199
Possession of stolen property - Exclusive possession 200
Possession of stolen property - Inference of guilt, generally
193
Possession of stolen property - Inference of guilt, rebuttal
194
Possession of stolen property - Joint possession 197
Possession of stolen property - Possession, generally 196
Possession of stolen property - Presumption of guilt 195
Possession of stolen property - Prima facie evidence 192
Possession of stolen property - Recent possession 198
Possession of stolen property - Sufficiency of evidence 205
Possession of stolen property - Time of possession 203
Possession of stolen property - Unexplained possession,
explanation
offered
202
Possession of stolen property - Unexplained possession,
generally 201
Possession, recent, possession of stolen property 198
Possession, time of, possession of stolen property 203
Possession, unexplained and recent, possession of stolen property 199
Possession, unexplained, explanation offered, possession of stolen
property
202
Possession, unexplained, generally, possession of stolen property 201
Possessory interest, ownership, sufficiency 240
Presence, accountability, sufficiency 269
Presumption of guilt, possession of stolen property 195
Prima facie evidence, possession of stolen property 192
Prior convictions, generally, admissibility 223
Prior convictions, impeachment, admissibility 224
Prior convictions, sufficiency 267
Property description, sufficiency 245
Rebuttal evidence, admissibility 228
Rebuttal, inference of guilt, possession of stolen property 194
Rebuttal testimony, sufficiency 259
Receipts, sufficiency 262
Recent possession, possession of stolen property 198
Relevance, admissibility 208
Reputation of accused, sufficiency 266
Search and seizure, admissibility 207
Statement of ownership, sufficiency 239
Statements of co-defendants, admissibility 212
Statements of defendant, admissibility 211
Sufficiency 205, 230-269
Sufficiency - In general 230
Sufficiency - Accomplice testimony, generally 257
Sufficiency
Sufficiency
Sufficiency
Sufficiency
Sufficiency
Sufficiency
Sufficiency
Sufficiency
Sufficiency
-
Accomplice testimony, uncorroborated 258
Accountability, generally 268
Accountability, presence 269
Alibi 265
Circumstantial evidence, generally 232
Common scheme or design 260
Confessions and admissions 252
Corpus delicti 233
Credibility of witness 255
Sufficiency - Description of property 245
Sufficiency - Eye witness 251
Sufficiency - Failure to pay 261
Sufficiency - Flight 264
Sufficiency - Hearsay 253
Sufficiency - Identification of defendant, generally 247
Sufficiency - Identification of defendant, number of witnesses
248
Sufficiency - Identification of defendant, officer testimony
249
Sufficiency
observe 250
Sufficiency
Sufficiency
Sufficiency
Sufficiency
Sufficiency
Sufficiency
testimony 242
Sufficiency
Sufficiency
Sufficiency
Sufficiency
Sufficiency
Sufficiency
- Identification of defendant, opportunity to
-
Intent, circumstantial evidence 236
Intent, generally 235
Knowledge 234
Missing property 246
Number of witnesses 256
Ownership, corporate existence, employee
-
Ownership,
Ownership,
Ownership,
Ownership,
Ownership,
Possession
corporate existence, generally 241
generally 238
motor vehicles 243
possessory interest 240
statement of 239
of stolen property 205
Sufficiency - Prior convictions 267
Sufficiency - Rebuttal testimony 259
Sufficiency - Receipts 262
Sufficiency - Reputation of accused 266
Sufficiency - Taking 237
Sufficiency - Unauthorized control 244
Sufficiency - Use of force 263
Sufficiency - Venue 231
Sufficiency - Victim's testimony 254
Taking, sufficiency 237
Time of possession, possession of stolen property 203
Unauthorized control, sufficiency 244
Unexplained possession, explanation offered, possession of stolen
property
202
Unexplained possession, generally, possession of stolen property 201
Use of force, sufficiency 263
Venue, sufficiency 231
Victim's testimony, sufficiency 254
Witness credibility, sufficiency 255
191. Possession of stolen property, evidence--In general
Recent, exclusive and unexplained possession of stolen property soon
after the
theft gives rise to presumption of guilt and is sufficient to authorize
a
conviction. People v. Kreisler, 1943, 381 Ill. 453, 45 N.E.2d 653;
People v.
Himstedt, 1941, 377 Ill. 498, 37 N.E.2d 165.
The recent, unexplained, and exclusive possession of stolen property
soon
after the theft is sufficient to authorize a conviction. People v.
Phelps,
1945, 388 Ill. 618, 58 N.E.2d 615; People v. Sanders, 1934, 357 Ill.
610, 192
N.E. 697.
Exclusive, unexplained possession of recently stolen property is
sufficient to
sustain a conviction for theft. People v. Arthur, App. 1 Dist.1973, 12
Ill.App.3d 738, 295 N.E.2d 586. Larceny k 64(1)
Evidence was insufficient to sustain conviction for larceny of heifers
which
disappeared from prosecuting witness' pasture and were found in
defendant's
pasture, notwithstanding defendant permitted another to sell heifers in
order
to pay debt to defendant. People v. Betts, 1937, 11 N.E.2d 942, 367
Ill. 499.
Larceny k 64(7)
192. ---- Prima facie evidence, possession of stolen property,
evidence
Possession of recently stolen property is prima facie evidence of guilt
of
possessor, unless possession is explained so as to raise reasonable
doubt of
guilt. People v. Mizzano, 1935, 196 N.E. 439, 360 Ill. 446; People v.
Adamek, 1933, 188 N.E. 743, 354 Ill. 551.
Recent possession of stolen property is prima facie evidence of guilt
and will
warrant a conviction, unless attending circumstances or other evidence
so far
overcome the presumption as to raise a reasonable doubt of accused's
guilt.
People v. Knight, 1923, 308 Ill. 182, 139 N.E. 47; Miller v. People,
1907,
229 Ill. 376, 82 N.E. 391.
Exclusive possession of property recently stolen is prima facie
evidence that
the possessor committed the larceny. People v. Bush, App. 1 Dist.1973,
14
Ill.App.3d 932, 303 N.E.2d 760. Larceny k 64(4)
Possession of stolen property soon after its theft affords evidence of
guilt
and may be sufficient to create a prima facie case. People v. Smith,
App.1969, 107 Ill.App.2d 267, 246 N.E.2d 880. Larceny k 64(1)
Possession of recently stolen property is prima facie evidence of guilt
unless
it is explained so as to suggest reasonable doubt, but possession must
be
recent, unexplained, personal and exclusive. People v. Henkel,
App.1965, 60
Ill.App.2d 331, 208 N.E.2d 107. Burglary k 42(1)
Possession of recently stolen property is prima facie evidence of guilt
and is
sufficient to warrant conviction unless possession is explained in such
manner
as at least to raise reasonable doubt of guilt, but the possession must
be
exclusive, though it may be joint, and it must be recent. People v.
Litberg,
1952, 108 N.E.2d 468, 413 Ill. 132. Larceny k 64(1); Larceny k 64(4)
193. ---- Inference of guilt, generally, possession of stolen
property,
evidence
Evidence of recent, exclusive, and unexplained possession of recently
stolen
property by accused, either singly or jointly with others, may give
rise to
inference of guilt of theft. People v. McCracken, App. 1 Dist.1993,
185
Ill.Dec. 284, 244 Ill.App.3d 318, 614 N.E.2d 418, appeal allowed 190
Ill.Dec.
902, 152 Ill.2d 571, 622 N.E.2d 1219, affirmed 203 Ill.Dec. 451, 159
Ill.2d
463, 639 N.E.2d 1270; People v. Johnson, App. 1 Dist.1978, 21 Ill.Dec.
791,
64 Ill.App.3d 1018, 382 N.E.2d 85.
The recent, exclusive and unexplained possession of stolen property by
an
accused person in and of itself gives rise to an inference of guilt
which may
be sufficient to sustain a conviction in absence of other facts and
circumstances which leave in mind of jury a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt.
People v. Ward, 1975, 31 Ill.App.3d 1022, 335 N.E.2d 57; People v.
Holt,
1972, 7 Ill.App.3d 646, 288 N.E.2d 245; People v. Christeson, 1970,
122
Ill.App.2d 192, 258 N.E.2d 142; People v. Styles, 1966, 75 Ill.App.2d
481,
220 N.E.2d 885; People v. Robinson, 1961, 23 Ill.2d 27, 177 N.E.2d
132;
People v. Weaver, 1960, 18 Ill.2d 108 163 N.E.2d 483; People v. Nixon,
1953,
414 Ill. 125, 111 N.E.2d 116; People v. Leving, 1939, 371 Ill. 448, 21
N.E.2d
391.
If unexplained, recent and exclusive possession of stolen property
after a
theft, robbery or burglary gives rise to an inference of guilt which
may be
sufficient to sustain a conviction unless there are facts and
circumstances
which leave in mind of trier of fact a reasonable doubt of guilt.
People v.
Stock, 1974, 56 Ill.2d 461, 309 N.E.2d 19; People v. Hanson, 1968, 97
Ill.App.2d 338, 240 N.E.2d 226; People v. Hawkins, 1963, 27 Ill.2d
339, 189
N.E.2d 252.
Recent, exclusive and unexplained possession of stolen property gives
rise to
an inference of guilt of theft. People v. Quick, 1973, 15 Ill.App.3d
300, 304
N.E.2d 143; People v. Bucnis, 1950, 405 Ill. 568, 92 N.E.2d 158.
Where it was evident that the trier of fact inferred from the presence
of the
burglary proceeds in defendant's residence that defendant had committed
theft
in that he had exerted unauthorized control over the complainant's
property,
but the State did not introduce other corroborating evidence, the
defendant
could not be convicted of theft by the use of an inference. People v.
Munoz,
App. 1 Dist.1981, 57 Ill.Dec. 74, 101 Ill.App.3d 447, 428 N.E.2d 624.
Larceny
k 41
Direct proof of guilty knowledge and intent is not necessary to sustain
a
theft conviction; those elements may be inferred from all facts and
circumstances of the case, including a defendant's recent, exclusive,
and
unexplained possession of stolen property. People v. Lanzotti, App. 4
Dist.1978, 18 Ill.Dec. 905, 61 Ill.App.3d 451, 378 N.E.2d 369. Larceny
k 57;
Larceny k 64(1)
In a prosecution for theft, the recent, exclusive and unexplained
possession
of stolen property by an accused person in and of itself gives rise to
an
inference of guilt which, in the absence of contrary facts and
circumstances,
may be sufficient to sustain a conviction. People v. Tribett, App. 1
Dist.1977, 12 Ill.Dec. 492, 54 Ill.App.3d 777, 370 N.E.2d 115. Larceny
k
64(1)
In considering the effect of the inference resulting from recent and
unexplained possession of stolen property, the status of a passenger
may be
distinguished from that of the driver on the basis of the driver's
control of
the car and its contents. People v. Smith, App. 1 Dist.1974, 25
Ill.App.3d
155, 323 N.E.2d 100. Larceny k 64(1)
Inference of guilt flowing from the unexplained possession of recently
stolen
property is not in violation of a defendant's rights under
U.S.C.A.Const.
Amend. 5 as applied under U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14. People v. Street,
App. 4
Dist.1973, 11 Ill.App.3d 243, 296 N.E.2d 606. Constitutional Law k
266(7)
Miranda decision with respect to right to be silent when in custody
does not
make inference of guilt arising from unexplained possession of recently
stolen
property unjustifiable or incompetent. People v. Hayes, App.1971, 133
Ill.App.2d 885, 272 N.E.2d 423. Larceny k 64(1)
Exclusive and unexplained possession of recently stolen property may,
by
itself, raise an inference that defendant obtained possession of the
property
by theft. People v. McKibbins, App.1970, 128 Ill.App.2d 175, 263
N.E.2d 131.
Larceny k 64(4); Larceny k 64(6)
Unexplained possession of recently stolen property gives rise to an
inference
of guilt which may be sufficient to sustain a conviction for theft.
People v.
Boulahanis, App.1964, 50 Ill.App.2d 440, 200 N.E.2d 372. Larceny k
64(1)
194. ---- Inference of guilt, rebuttal, possession of stolen property,
evidence
Inference of defendant's culpable state of mind arising from exclusive
and
unexplained possession of recently stolen property may be rebutted with
explanation by defendant. People v. Nivens, App. 2 Dist.1992, 177
Ill.Dec.
901, 239 Ill.App.3d 1, 603 N.E.2d 1275. Larceny k 64(6)
Recent, exclusive and unexplained possession of stolen property by
accused
gives rise to inference of guilt, absent other facts and circumstances
which
leave in mind of jury a reasonable doubt. People v. Barnes, 1963, 26
Ill.2d
563, 188 N.E.2d 7. Larceny k 64(1)
Recent possession of stolen goods after a theft is sufficient to
warrant
conviction of larceny unless the attending circumstances or other
evidence, so
far overcome the presumption it raises as to create a reasonable doubt
of
defendant's guilt, but the possession must be such as to show that
defendant
or the joint possessors took the property and that it was not taken by
some
one else. People v. Strutynski, 1937, 12 N.E.2d 628, 367 Ill. 551.
Larceny k
64(4)
The exclusive unexplained possession of recently stolen property may
raise an
inference of guilt sufficient to authorize a conviction of larceny in
absence
of other evidence raising a reasonable doubt of guilt. People v.
Betts, 1937,
11 N.E.2d 942, 367 Ill. 499. Larceny k 64(1)
195. ---- Presumption of guilt, possession of stolen property,
evidence
Mere association with stolen article is not necessarily possession of
it, and
before any presumption can arise from possession it must be shown that
the
person accused is actually in possession. People v. Davis, 1966, 69
Ill.App.2d 120, 216 N.E.2d 490; People v. Barnes, 1924, 311 Ill. 559,
143
N.E. 445.
If possession of stolen property is soon after commission of crime and
is
unexplained there is presumption, not of law but of fact, and of much
force,
that one in possession committed larceny. People v. Baynes, App. 5
Dist.1980,
43 Ill.Dec. 761, 87 Ill.App.3d 1000, 410 N.E.2d 894, reversed 58
Ill.Dec. 819,
88 Ill.2d 225, 430 N.E.2d 1070. Larceny k 64(1)
Exclusive and recent possession of stolen property is sufficient to
raise a
presumption of guilt unless possession is established in such a manner
as to
raise a reasonable doubt of guilt. People v. Stickler, App. 4
Dist.1975, 31
Ill.App.3d 977, 334 N.E.2d 475. Larceny k 64(1)
Presumption of guilt arising from exclusive and recent possession of
stolen
property is sufficient to permit conviction of larceny. People v.
Stickler,
App. 4 Dist.1975, 31 Ill.App.3d 977, 334 N.E.2d 475. Larceny k 64(1)
The presumption that the possessor of recently stolen property is the
thief is
an inference which the jury may be permitted to draw based on human
experience
and common sense from known events or circumstances. People v. Barber,
App. 2
Dist.1974, 20 Ill.App.3d 977, 313 N.E.2d 491. Larceny k 64(1)
The possession of stolen property creates no presumption of guilt.
People v.
Barbaro, 1946, 69 N.E.2d 692, 395 Ill. 264. Larceny k 64(1)
Presumption of fact arises as to defendant's guilt of larceny if
defendant's
possession of stolen property soon after commission of crime is
unexplained
and corpus delicti is proved beyond reasonable doubt. People v.
Garkus, 1934,
192 N.E. 653, 358 Ill. 106. Larceny k 64(1)
If the possession of stolen property is recent after the theft, and
there is
no circumstance or other evidence to rebut the presumption or create a
reasonable doubt, the fact of possession will warrant a conviction.
People v.
Wilson, 1921, 131 N.E. 609, 298 Ill. 257. Larceny k 64(1)
196. ---- Possession, generally, possession of stolen property,
evidence
In prosecution of husband, wife and two sons for theft under this
paragraph,
evidence was sufficient for jury on issue whether each defendant
constructively possessed stolen property and on issue whether the
defendants
knowingly possessed such property with intent to permanently deprive
its
owners of its use or benefit. People v. Mertens, App. 2 Dist.1979, 33
Ill.Dec. 206, 77 Ill.App.3d 791, 396 N.E.2d 595. Criminal Law k
622.7(2)
Proof of possession by the defendant is the key if the inference from
possession of recently stolen property is to be made. People v.
Modlin, App.
4 Dist.1979, 30 Ill.Dec. 350, 74 Ill.App.3d 387, 393 N.E.2d 5. Larceny
k 64(8)
Even though defendants were never seen or found in possession of stolen
chemical cans, evidence showing, inter alia, that defendants were only
persons
who could have exercised control over cans was sufficient to sustain
their
theft convictions. People v. Uselding, App. 4 Dist.1976, 39 Ill.App.3d
677,
350 N.E.2d 283. Larceny k 55
Possession of stolen goods may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
People
v. Davis, App.1966, 69 Ill.App.2d 120, 216 N.E.2d 490. Larceny k 64(8)
In order that an inference of guilt may be drawn from possession of
goods
recently stolen, it must be shown that there was an actual personal
possession
on the part of the accused either singly or jointly with others acting
in
concert with him. People v. Phelps, 1944, 58 N.E.2d 615, 388 Ill. 618.
Larceny k 64(1)
In order that an inference of guilt may be drawn from possession of
goods
recently stolen, where corpus delicti is proven, it must be shown that
there
is an actual personal possession on part of accused, either singly or
jointly,
with others acting in concert with him and that that possession is
exclusive
in him or those acting in the concert with him. People v. Kulig, 1939,
25
N.E.2d 73, 373 Ill. 102. Larceny k 64(1)
To warrant an inference of guilt from possession of good recently
stolen, it
must be shown that there was an actual personal possession on part of
accused
charged with larceny, either singly or jointly with others acting in
concert
with him, and such possession must be shown to be exclusive, although
it may
still be a joint possession. People v. Strutynski, 1937, 12 N.E.2d
628, 367
Ill. 551. Larceny k 64(8)
Mere possession of goods under suspicious circumstances is insufficient
to
necessitate explanation of possession, in absence of evidence of
larceny.
People v. Maruda, 1924, 145 N.E. 696, 314 Ill. 536. Larceny k 41
That an inference of guilt may be shown from possession of goods
recently
stolen, it must be shown that there is an actual personal possession on
the
part of the accused, either singly or jointly, with others acting in
concert
with him, and that that possession is exclusive in him or those acting
in
concert with him. People v. Barnes, 1924, 143 N.E. 445, 311 Ill. 559.
197. ---- Joint possession, possession of stolen property, evidence
Evidence established that defendant had at least constructive and joint
possession of stolen property on premises on which others resided and
that he
committed grand theft, even though his sister testified that only she
and her
father lived in house where defendant was arrested and that three or
four
other families lived in another house, and even though defense witness
testified that she lived with defendant at another address; all stolen
property, except all-terrain vehicle, snowmobiles, and backhoe, were
recovered
from building in which defendant was arrested; police officer
identified
defendant's sister and father as only other persons in house from which
stolen
property was recovered; and mail addressed to defendant was delivered
to
mailbox for the house. People v. Hammond, App. 1 Dist.1990, 143
Ill.Dec. 599,
196 Ill.App.3d 986, 554 N.E.2d 534. Larceny k 64(4)
If circumstances show that a defendant possessed recently stolen
property
either singly or jointly with others, the inference that he is guilty
of theft
of the property is warranted and exclusiveness of possession is not
rebutted
merely by showing another's presence. People v. Barber, App. 2
Dist.1974, 20
Ill.App.3d 977, 313 N.E.2d 491. Larceny k 64(4)
Within rule that evidence of recent, exclusive and unexplained
possession of
stolen goods is evidence of theft, exclusive possession can be joint
and under
some circumstances can be sufficient to convict. People v. Hayes,
App.1971,
133 Ill.App.2d 885, 272 N.E.2d 423. Larceny k 64(4)
Where possession of stolen property is joint, it is presumed that all
in
possession are guilty of theft. People v. Donald, App.1971, 132
Ill.App.2d
598, 270 N.E.2d 85. Larceny k 64(4)
Possession of stolen property, shared jointly with others, is
sufficient to
raise inference of guilt of theft of such property. People v. Curtis,
App.1969, 116 Ill.App.2d 298, 254 N.E.2d 87. Larceny k 64(4)
Joint possession with others may be exclusive within rule that evidence
of
recent, exclusive and unexplained possession of stolen goods after a
theft is
sufficient evidence to convict. People v. Hyde, App.1968, 97
Ill.App.2d 43,
239 N.E.2d 466. Larceny k 64(4)
Joint possession satisfies requirement of rules of evidence of theft.
People
v. Moore, App.1966, 76 Ill.App.2d 326, 222 N.E.2d 95. Larceny k 64(4)
Evidence of recent, exclusive and unexplained possession of stolen
property by
accused, either singly or jointly with others, may, of itself, raise
inference
of guilt, absent other facts and circumstances which leave in minds of
jury a
reasonable doubt as to guilt. People v. Reynolds, 1953, 27 Ill.2d 523,
190
N.E.2d 301. Larceny k 64(1)
An accused's possession of stolen property may be jointly with another
and
still be exclusive so as to give rise to inference of guilt from
possession of
goods recently stolen. People v. Phelps, 1944, 58 N.E.2d 615, 388 Ill.
618.
Larceny k 64(4)
The possession of stolen goods, to warrant an inference of guilt, must
be
exclusive, though it may be joint, and it must be recent. People v.
Malin,
1939, 24 N.E.2d 349, 372 Ill. 422. Burglary k 42(1)
198. ---- Recent possession, possession of stolen property, evidence
To warrant an inference of guilt from possession of stolen goods, the
possession must be exclusive and recent, and determination of recent
possession is ordinarily a question of fact for the trier of fact.
People v.
Jones, App. 1 Dist.1981, 53 Ill.Dec. 43, 97 Ill.App.3d 619, 423 N.E.2d
235.
Larceny k 64(1); Larceny k 68(3)
In prosecution for theft of two typewriters, evidence disclosing that
defendant had been apprehended with the typewriters one day after the
theft
was determined made defendant's possession "recent" and evidence
disclosing
that defendant had been driver and sole passenger of automobile in
which he
was stopped established defendant's possession of items as "exclusive."
People v. Tribett, App. 1 Dist.1977, 12 Ill.Dec. 492, 54 Ill.App.3d
777, 370
N.E.2d 115.
Larceny k 64(3);
Larceny k 64(4)
Possession of stolen property soon after larceny is evidence of guilt,
and
warrants conviction, unless explained or doubt of guilt exists. People
v.
Graves, 1928, 162 N.E. 839, 331 Ill. 268. Burglary k 42(1)
Possession of property recently stolen is evidence that possessor is
thief.
People v. Maruda, 1924, 145 N.E. 696, 314 Ill. 536. Larceny k 64(1)
199. ---- Exclusive and unexplained possession, possession of stolen
property, evidence
The exclusive and unexplained possession of recently stolen property is
evidence of theft. People v. Spera, 1973, 10 Ill.App.3d 305, 293
N.E.2d 656;
People v. Bullion, 1921, 299 Ill. 208, 132 N.E. 577.
Possession of recently stolen property, to give rise to presumption of
guilt,
must be exclusive and unexplained. People v. Lawson, 1933, 351 Ill.
457, 184
N.E. 606; People v. Blades, 1928, 329 Ill. 182, 160 N.E. 190.
Where theft of various items of property has been shown, unexplained
exclusive
possession of part of property stolen by an accused also gives rise to
inference that accused stole all of the property. People v. Depper,
App. 4
Dist.1980, 44 Ill.Dec. 421, 89 Ill.App.3d 135, 411 N.E.2d 543. Larceny
k
64(1)
From the totality of circumstantial evidence presented against
defendant,
including the fact that he was admittedly exercising exclusive control
over a
stolen automobile with spurious license plates and on obviously altered
VIN
plate, defendant was proved to have been in exclusive possession of a
recently
stolen automobile, and his explanation was insufficient to raise a
reasonable
doubt of guilt. People v. McIntosh, App. 5 Dist.1977, 6 Ill.Dec. 599,
48
Ill.App.3d 694, 363 N.E.2d 128. Larceny k 64(6)
Exclusive possession of recently stolen property is sufficient to raise
a
presumption of guilt and is sufficient to warrant a conviction for
theft,
unless possession is explained in such a manner as to raise a
reasonable doubt
of guilt. People v. White, App.1968, 99 Ill.App.2d 270, 240 N.E.2d
342.
Larceny k 64(1)
200. ---- Exclusive possession, possession of stolen property,
evidence
If the place where stolen property is found is such that another person
could
have had access thereto as well as the accused, it cannot be said that
the
stolen property was in accused's exclusive possession and the
circumstance of
possession would not be evidence of the accused's guilt. People v.
Bynum,
1973, 12 Ill.App.3d 825, 299 N.E.2d 150; People v. Davis, 1966, 69
Ill.App.2d
120, 216 N.E.2d 490.
In order to establish recent, exclusive possession of stolen property
so as to
raise an inference of guilt of theft, it must be established that the
possession was exclusive in the accused so as to indicate that he and
not
someone else took the property. People v. Bynum, 1973, 12 Ill.App.3d
825, 299
N.E.2d 150; People v. Davis, 1966, 69 Ill.App.2d 120, 216 N.E.2d 490.
Due process precludes conviction for theft on basis of exclusive
possession
absent corroborating evidence. People v. McCracken, App. 1 Dist.1993,
185
Ill.Dec. 284, 244 Ill.App.3d 318, 614 N.E.2d 418, appeal allowed 190
Ill.Dec.
902, 152 Ill.2d 571, 622 N.E.2d 1219, affirmed 203 Ill.Dec. 451, 159
Ill.2d
463, 639 N.E.2d 1270. Constitutional Law k 266(7)
Constructive possession is enough to convict for theft, but if place
where
goods were found is equally accessible to others who were capable of
having
committed theft, an inference of defendant's guilt cannot be made from
that
fact alone. People v. Ridley, App. 1 Dist.1978, 17 Ill.Dec. 150, 59
Ill.App.3d 164, 376 N.E.2d 43. Larceny k 64(4)
If the place where stolen goods were found was accessible to others
capable of
stealing besides defendant, then inference of guilt cannot be drawn
against
defendant though the fact is entitled to consideration and
consideration with
other facts in the case. People v. Robbins, App. 3 Dist.1974, 21
Ill.App.3d
317, 315 N.E.2d 198. Larceny k 64(4)
Fact that officer of corporation, who discovered tires which belonged
to
corporation on defendant's tractor, did not instantaneously remove the
tires
from such tractor when he discovered the corporation's brand and serial
number, did not negate the fact that the tires were found on the
tractor which
defendant admitted that he owned and which was within his exclusive
possession
and control. People v. Drake, App. 1 Dist.1974, 20 Ill.App.3d 762, 314
N.E.2d
532. Larceny k 64(8)
Defendant who was with two other persons in automobile in which stolen
telephone was found was in "exclusive possession" of the stolen
telephone
within rule that a defendant's recent, exclusive and unexplained
possession of
the proceeds of the burglary gives rise to an inference of guilt which,
absent
other facts and circumstances which leave reasonable doubt, is
sufficient to
sustain a conviction. People v. Umphers, App.1971, 133 Ill.App.2d 853,
272
N.E.2d 278. Burglary k 42(1)
Rule regarding inference of guilt from recent, exclusive and
unexplained
possession of stolen property had no application in absence of proof
that
defendant, while in apartment of friends, was in exclusive possession
of
stolen property or had joint possession with others. People v.
Robinson,
1961, 23 Ill.2d 27, 177 N.E.2d 132. Larceny k 64(4)
Exclusive possession must be proved before rule that recent, exclusive
and
unexplained possession of stolen property by an accused person in and
of
itself gives rise to an inference of guilt which may be sufficient to
sustain
a conviction in absence of other facts and circumstances can be
invoked, but
joint possession with another can be exclusive possession within the
rule.
People v. Wheeler, 1955, 5 Ill.2d 474, 126 N.E.2d 228. Larceny k 64(4)
Evidence that defendant had asked whether he could store some stock
with
witness, that later defendant came back with some man unknown to
witness, who
brought five automobile tires in through the back door, and that
subsequently
the tires were proved to have been recently stolen, was sufficient to
show
that defendant was in the exclusive possession of the stolen tires.
People v.
Phelps, 1944, 58 N.E.2d 615, 388 Ill. 618. Larceny k 64(4)
Evidence establishing that defendant had exclusive possession of hogs
which
were recently stolen from another is sufficient to authorize conviction
for
larceny, unless explanation offered, together with other facts and
circumstances, is sufficient to create a reasonable doubt of guilt.
People v.
Lehner, 1929, 167 N.E. 20, 335 Ill. 424.
Accused's possession of stolen articles must be exclusive to warrant
inference
of guilt. People v. Powloski, 1924, 142 N.E. 551, 311 Ill. 284.
Robbery k
23(3)
The possession of recently stolen property to be sufficient to raise an
inference of guilt of theft must be exclusive in the sense that it is
personal
and inconsistent with an independent possession by others. People v.
Sturdyvin, 1922, 137 N.E. 593, 306 Ill. 138. Larceny k 64(4)
Recent unexplained possession of stolen goods must be exclusive to
warrant
conviction. People v. Ascey, 1922, 136 N.E. 766, 304 Ill. 404.
Burglary k
42(2)
201. ---- Unexplained possession, generally, possession of stolen
property,
evidence
Possession of stolen property, proceeds of burglary or larceny, soon
after
commission of offense, is evidence of guilt of person or persons in
whose
possession it is found and is sufficient to warrant conviction unless
such
possession is explained or unless there appears from all evidence a
reasonable
doubt of defendant's guilt. People v. Garrett, 1969, 113 Ill.App.2d
63, 251
N.E.2d 749; People v. Bennett, 1954, 3 Ill.2d 357, 121 N.E.2d 595.
Unexplained possession of recently stolen property is sufficient to
infer
guilt of theft; therefore, the State was not required to show how, and
when
defendant feloniously broke into warehouse and removed property in
order to
prove theft. People v. Loveless, App. 3 Dist.1981, 48 Ill.Dec. 804, 93
Ill.App.3d 293, 417 N.E.2d 206. Larceny k 64(1)
Recent unexplained exclusive possession of stolen property by an
accused may
be considered by a trier of fact as an inference that he stole the
property.
People v. Depper, App. 4 Dist.1980, 44 Ill.Dec. 421, 89 Ill.App.3d 135,
411
N.E.2d 543. Larceny k 64(1)
Where defendants were charged with theft by possession, as opposed to
original
burglaries, there was no need for inference of theft arising from
unexplained
possession of recently stolen property, and question of recent
possession was
therefore inapplicable in prosecution for theft. People v. Mertens,
App. 2
Dist.1979, 33 Ill.Dec. 206, 77 Ill.App.3d 791, 396 N.E.2d 595. Larceny
k
40(1)
The exclusive and unexplained possession of property recently stolen
from
store raised inference that defendant had obtained possession of
property by
theft. People v. Smith, App. 1 Dist.1977, 9 Ill.Dec. 169, 51 Ill.App.3d
87,
366 N.E.2d 426. Larceny k 64(1)
Recent, exclusive and unexplained possession of stolen property may of
itself
raise an inference of guilt sufficient to authorize a conviction in the
absence of any other evidence which would create a reasonable doubt as
to the
defendant's guilt. People v. Smith, App. 1 Dist.1974, 25 Ill.App.3d
155, 323
N.E.2d 100. Larceny k 64(1)
Recent, exclusive and unexplained possession of stolen property is
sufficient
to support a conviction for theft, absent facts and circumstances
raising a
reasonable doubt as to guilt. People v. Banks, App.1971, 2 Ill.App.3d
401,
276 N.E.2d 64. Larceny k 64(1)
Evidence, in prosecution for burglary and theft, established exclusive
possession of recently stolen property without explanation by both
defendants.
People v. Christeson, App.1970, 122 Ill.App.2d 192, 258 N.E.2d 142.
Burglary
k 42(1); Larceny k 64(4)
Presumption of guilt is one of fact arising from accused's unexplained
possession of recently stolen property where corpus delicti has been
proved.
People v. Smith, App.1969, 107 Ill.App.2d 267, 246 N.E.2d 880. Larceny
k
64(1)
Evidence of recent possession of stolen property is evidence of guilt
sufficient to warrant conviction unless possession is explained.
People v.
Griffin, App.1964, 48 Ill.App.2d 148, 198 N.E.2d 115. Larceny k 64(1)
Mere unexplained possession of stolen property is not alone sufficient
to
authorize a presumption of larceny, but to give rise to such
presumption, the
possession must also be exclusive, as well as recent and unexplained.
People
v. Phelps, 1944, 58 N.E.2d 615, 388 Ill. 618. Larceny k 64(4)
The presumption of guilt arising from the unexplained possession of
property
recently stolen, when corpus delicti is proven, is not an arbitrary one
and is
not conclusive. People v. Kulig, 1939, 25 N.E.2d 73, 373 Ill. 102.
Larceny k
64(2)
Unexplained possession of recently stolen goods is evidence of larceny
and of
burglary, if burglary was committed at time articles were stolen.
People v.
Hein, 1924, 145 N.E. 654, 315 Ill. 76. Burglary k 42(1); Larceny k
64(1)
Where the possession soon after the commission of a theft is
unexplained,
there is a presumption, not of law, but of fact, and of much force,
that the
one in possession committed the larceny, and, if the corpus delicti has
been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, such presumption may justify a jury
in
finding the defendant guilty. People v. Sturdyvin, 1922, 137 N.E. 593,
306
Ill. 138. Larceny k 64(2)
202. ---- Unexplained possession, explanation offered, possession of
stolen
property, evidence
Even though defendant elected not to testify in trial court, his
defense and
argument must be judged by rule that one who chooses to explain his
possession
of stolen property must offer a reasonable story or be judged by its
improbabilities. People v. Moore, 1978, 19 Ill.Dec. 15, 61 Ill.App.3d
694,
378 N.E.2d 516; People v. McIntosh, 1977, 6 Ill.Dec. 599, 48
Ill.App.3d 694,
363 N.E.2d 128.
Where a defendant found in exclusive possession of stolen property,
attempts
to explain it, he must tell a reasonable story or be adjudged by its
improbabilities. People v. Punyko, 1973, 9 Ill.App.3d 1052, 293 N.E.2d
672;
People v. Moore, 1970, 130 Ill.App.2d 266, 264 N.E.2d 582; People v.
Smith,
1969, 107 Ill.App.2d 267, 246 N.E.2d 880.
Defendant who chooses to explain possession of stolen property in order
to
rebut inference of guilt must offer reasonable story or be judged by
its
improbabilities. People v. McCracken, App. 1 Dist.1993, 185 Ill.Dec.
284, 244
Ill.App.3d 318, 614 N.E.2d 418, appeal allowed 190 Ill.Dec. 902, 152
Ill.2d
571, 622 N.E.2d 1219, affirmed 203 Ill.Dec. 451, 159 Ill.2d 463, 639
N.E.2d
1270. Larceny k 64(6)
In probation revocation hearing, state proved by preponderance of
evidence
that defendant committed offense of theft, based on evidence that
defendant
was in possession of recently stolen property and defendant's
explanation,
that he traded drugs for property, which created reasonable inference
that
defendant knew property was stolen. People v. McCracken, App. 1
Dist.1993,
185 Ill.Dec. 284, 244 Ill.App.3d 318, 614 N.E.2d 418, appeal allowed
190
Ill.Dec. 902, 152 Ill.2d 571, 622 N.E.2d 1219, affirmed 203 Ill.Dec.
451, 159
Ill.2d 463, 639 N.E.2d 1270. Sentencing And Punishment k 2021
Evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty of felony theft
beyond
reasonable doubt; defendant's vehicle was observed near burglarized
home
within minutes of report of break-in, vehicle appeared to be stopped
for no
reason, items later identified as those missing from home were stacked
in rear
seat of vehicle in plain view; and jury could reasonably infer that,
contrary
to defendant's postarrest statements, it was unlikely that passenger in
vehicle had run up to defendant's vehicle carrying television, removal
of
which from car required two policemen. People v. Tyson, App. 2
Dist.1985, 92
Ill.Dec. 712, 137 Ill.App.3d 912, 485 N.E.2d 523. Larceny k 64(7)
A defendant who chooses to explain his possession of stolen property
must
offer a reasonable story or be judged by its improbabilities. People
v.
Daniels, App. 2 Dist.1983, 69 Ill.Dec. 291, 113 Ill.App.3d 523, 447
N.E.2d 508
. Larceny k 64(6)
In prosecution of husband, wife and two sons for theft under this
paragraph,
defendants' explanation for their possession of many of items in
question did
not support their contention that their guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable
doubt. People v. Mertens, App. 2 Dist.1979, 33 Ill.Dec. 206, 77
Ill.App.3d
791, 396 N.E.2d 595.
In prosecution for theft of two typewriters, court did not err in
rejecting
defendant's explanation of possession of typewriters as unreasonable,
where
defendant's explanation at trial differed substantially from accounts
that he
gave to two police officers on two separate occasions and his trial
testimony
was partially contradicted by defense witness who allegedly arranged
for
defendant to acquire the automobile he was driving. People v. Tribett,
App. 1
Dist.1977, 12 Ill.Dec. 492, 54 Ill.App.3d 777, 370 N.E.2d 115. Larceny
k
64(6)
When defendant elects to explain his possession of stolen property,
trying to
exonerate himself, he must tell a reasonable story or be judged by its
improbabilities. People v. Ward, App. 2 Dist.1975, 31 Ill.App.3d 1022,
335
N.E.2d 57. Larceny k 64(6)
Under circumstances that person from whom defendant claimed he
purchased fan
recently stolen in burglary of barber shop did not have any straight
razors,
comb and brush such as were found on defendant's person, defendant's
testimony
explaining his possession of the property did not raise reasonable
doubt of
his guilt of the burglary. People v. Bush, App. 1 Dist.1973, 14
Ill.App.3d
932, 303 N.E.2d 760. Burglary k 41(1)
Possession of stolen property was not "explained" so as to eliminate
presumption of guilt arising from exclusive possession of stolen
property
shortly after commission of burglary, though defendant offered
explanation,
unless the jury believed defendant's explanation. People v. Burris,
App.1969,
116 Ill.App.2d 79, 253 N.E.2d 628, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 71, 400
U.S.
835, 27 L.Ed.2d 67. Burglary k 42(4)
Testimony that defendant refused to answer questions as to how he came
into
possession of recently stolen television sets was admissible on issue
of guilt
of theft and, under the circumstances, such testimony was not
inadmissible
under general rule that refusal of a defendant to make a statement is
not
relevant. People v. Boulahanis, App.1964, 50 Ill.App.2d 440, 200
N.E.2d 372.
Criminal Law k 407(1)
Recent, exclusive and unexplained possession of stolen property may in
itself
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and it is within province of trier
of
fact to disbelieve defendant's explanation of his possession. People
v.
Garrett, App.1964, 49 Ill.App.2d 296, 200 N.E.2d 7. Larceny k 64(1);
Larceny
k 68(3)
203. ---- Time of possession, possession of stolen property, evidence
Possession of stolen property soon after commission of offense is
sufficient
to convict unless explained. People v. Rogers, 1959, 16 Ill.2d 175,
157
N.E.2d 28; People v. Brown, 1927, 325 Ill. 307, 156 N.E. 369.
Evidence that accused was in possession of stolen property at any time
after
larceny is admissible even though possession is not sufficiently recent
or
exclusive to raise presumption that accused was the thief. People v.
Robbins,
App. 3 Dist.1974, 21 Ill.App.3d 317, 315 N.E.2d 198. Larceny k 64(3);
Larceny k 64(4)
Taking of articles and concealment, if determined to be done with
intention of
stealing or depriving owner of use or benefit of property, however
brief, may
constitute theft, and circumstance that defendant has not as yet
reached area
of checkout counter where articles must be paid for will not prevent a
finding
and conviction of crime of theft. City of Joliet v. Gregorec, App. 3
Dist.1973, 12 Ill.App.3d 998, 299 N.E.2d 356. Larceny k 21
Recent, unexplained and exclusive possession of stolen property affords
evidence of guilt. People v. Punyko, App. 1 Dist.1973, 9 Ill.App.3d
1052, 293
N.E.2d 672. Larceny k 64(1)
"Recent possession," within rule providing that it is evidence of guilt
if
accused is found in recent possession of stolen property, may be as
long as 25
days from time of theft. People v. Smith, App.1969, 107 Ill.App.2d
267, 246
N.E.2d 880. Larceny k 64(3)
Recent and unexplained possession of stolen goods is sufficient to
convict one
of larceny. People v. DeFilippis, 1966, 34 Ill.2d 129, 214 N.E.2d 897.
Larceny k 64(1)
The presumption of guilt arising from possession of recently stolen
property
does not assume any certain time to be recent, but as practical matter,
as
time between theft and possession is enlarged, necessity for additional
evidence arises, and ordinarily, question of whether possession is
recent
enough to raise presumption is for trier of fact, although in extreme
cases it
may become matter of law. People v. Litberg, 1952, 108 N.E.2d 468, 413
Ill.
132. Larceny k 64(3); Larceny k 68(3)
Recent, exclusive and unexplained possession of stolen property shortly
after
a theft gives rise to a presumption of guilt and is sufficient to
sustain a
conviction of larceny. People v. Finch, 1946, 68 N.E.2d 283, 394 Ill.
183,
certiorari denied 67 S.Ct. 298, 329 U.S. 786, 91 L.Ed. 673. Larceny k
64(1)
Time is an important element to be considered in determining recency of
possession of stolen goods, but it is not the only one and the
circumstances
and character of the goods, their salability, and whether they are
cumbersome
or easily portable must also be considered. People v. Malin, 1939, 24
N.E.2d
349, 372 Ill. 422. Burglary k 42(1)
Possession of stolen goods must be so recent as to indicate that
possessor
must have taken them. People v. Judycki, 1922, 134 N.E. 134, 302 Ill.
143.
Burglary k 42(1)
Possession of stolen property so long after the theft as to give fair
opportunity for honest acquirement thereof is slight evidence of guilt.
People
v. Bullion, 1921, 132 N.E. 577, 299 Ill. 208. Larceny k 64(4)
204. ---- Cash and checks, possession of stolen property, evidence
Evidence, including evidence that defendant was arrested in open
possession of
items reported to have been taken from apartment, that search of his
person
disclosed that he was also in possession of check stolen from apartment
and
belonging to complainant, and that defendant was apprehended short
distance
from apartment short time after incident occurred, sustained conviction
of
theft. People v. Carr, App. 1 Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 533, 308 N.E.2d
206.
Larceny k 55
Evidence that checks which were recovered from defendant had been in an
envelope, taken in theft, which contained over $5,000 in cash and
checks
sustained defendant's conviction for theft of checks and currency in
excess of
$150, even though checks found on defendant totaled only $60. People
v.
Dayani, App. 1 Dist.1973, 16 Ill.App.3d 615, 306 N.E.2d 488. Larceny k
65
Evidence that defendant was on duty in vault area with access to vault
during
period in which monies delivered for deposit to vault were stolen and
that
checks which were stolen during the period were found in defendant's
possession sustained defendant's conviction for theft. People v.
Dayani, App.
1 Dist.1973, 16 Ill.App.3d 615, 306 N.E.2d 488. Larceny k 64(7)
Evidence that defendant attempted to sell Liberty Bonds night after
they were
stolen and made false statements concerning his possession of them, was
sufficient to sustain conviction for burglary and larceny. People v.
Weisman., 1920, 129 N.E. 689, 296 Ill. 156. Burglary k 42(3)
205. ---- Sufficiency of evidence, possession of stolen property,
evidence
Defendant's possession of stolen television would support his theft
conviction
either as a principal or under accountability doctrine because his act
of
transporting television represented an act aiding and abetting
commission of
offense by possession. People v. Smith, App. 2 Dist.1984, 80 Ill.Dec.
223,
124 Ill.App.3d 914, 464 N.E.2d 1206. Larceny k 64(1)
Evidence that defendant was present in automobile when items were taken
from
apartment, that defendant had indicated to others that he had stolen
them and
that the items were found in defendant's possession less than three
months
after the theft was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for
burglary
and felony theft. People v. Riley, App. 4 Dist.1981, 54 Ill.Dec. 474,
99
Ill.App.3d 244, 424 N.E.2d 1377. Burglary k 42(3); Larceny k 64(7)
Evidence that defendant was present with another person at a jewelry
store on
the day that a ring was taken from the jewelry store and that defendant
submitted the stones to another jeweler to have the stones placed in
another
ring was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for theft despite
defendant's contention that the stones from the ring had been given to
him by
the person who was in the store with him. People v. Lanzotti, App. 4
Dist.1978, 18 Ill.Dec. 905, 61 Ill.App.3d 451, 378 N.E.2d 369. Larceny
k
64(6)
Evidence showing, inter alia, that defendant bumped into complaining
witness
on the side where she kept her purse, that she shortly thereafter
noticed her
wallet was missing and that defendant was found in possession of
woman's
wallet was sufficient to establish defendant's guilt of theft and the
revocation of his probation. People v. Reese, App. 1 Dist.1976, 37
Ill.App.3d
820, 347 N.E.2d 451. Sentencing And Punishment k 2021
In prosecution for theft, evidence that defendant was found inside
department
store's premises prior to opening for day's business and was unable to
produce
sales receipt for property in his possession supported finding that
defendant
had obtained unauthorized control of the property. People v. Austin,
App. 1
Dist.1974, 25 Ill.App.3d 174, 323 N.E.2d 128. Larceny k 62(1)
In theft prosecution, evidence was sufficient to sustain finding that
defendant was connected with stolen property was sufficient to sustain
conviction despite contention that theft conviction could not stand
without
production of specific stolen items. People v. DeBartolo, App. 2
Dist.1975,
24 Ill.App.3d 1009, 322 N.E.2d 258. Larceny k 55
If the jury is required to speculate as to whether a defendant had
possession
of stolen goods which would be a circumstance of his guilt, it would be
unreasonable to draw an inference of guilt based on the speculation.
People
v. Barber, App. 2 Dist.1974, 20 Ill.App.3d 977, 313 N.E.2d 491.
Larceny k
64(8)
Conviction of defendant for theft of motorcycle engine was supported by
evidence that defendant was found in possession of engine with
falsified
manufacturer's identification number and that engine's real
identification
number was identical with that of engine which had been stolen from
rightful
owner. People v. Lewis, App. 1 Dist.1974, 20 Ill.App.3d 161, 313
N.E.2d 170.
Larceny k 64(5)
Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction, of theft of a slab of
meat
having value of $20, of defendant who drove automobile to scene of the
theft
during early morning hours and was in control of such automobile which
contained recently stolen goods in open view. People v. Arthur, App. 1
Dist.1973, 12 Ill.App.3d 738, 295 N.E.2d 586. Larceny k 64(1)
Evidence was sufficient to support conviction of theft of property
having a
value of less than $150 against defendants who were observed by witness
to
emerge from store, where witnesses had seen one defendant take bottles
from
shelf, and place the bottles under front seat of automobile, and who
were
arrested with liquor bottles, with marking similar to those used in
store,
concealed under their clothing and who could produce no sales receipts.
People
v. Kaprelian, App.1972, 6 Ill.App.3d 1066, 286 N.E.2d 613, certiorari
denied
93 S.Ct. 2730, 412 U.S. 918, 37 L.Ed.2d 144. Larceny k 64(7)
Where defendant was observed by department store security guard
assisting
second youth in removing records from store by placing albums in
shopping bag
held by other youth, fact that second youth was not apprehended and
records
taken not produced was immaterial in proving defendant guilty of theft.
People
v. Hasty, App.1970, 127 Ill.App.2d 330, 262 N.E.2d 292. Larceny k 55
Evidence in prosecution for theft established that defendant's brother
lived
in apartment in which property allegedly stolen by defendant was found
and
that brother had at least equal rights with defendant to use and
occupation of
the apartment. People v. Voleta, App.1965, 57 Ill.App.2d 279, 206
N.E.2d 737.
Criminal Law k 394.6(4)
Evidence that defendant took hand bags from a showcase in a store and
put them
in the pocket of his overcoat, which he was carrying on his arm, and
then laid
the overcoat down on another showcase some distance away from where he
got the
bags, and left it there, shows that the commission of larceny was
completed,
so that a verdict convicting of attempt only was unsupported by the
evidence.
People v. Lardner, 1921, 133 N.E. 375, 300 Ill. 264. Larceny k 66
206. Admissibility, evidence--In general
In proceeding wherein defendant, who had permit authorizing him to take
railroad's "one-half ties, more or less," was convicted of misdemeanor
theft
of whole ties, permitting railroad employee, who had no detailed
recollection
of her conversation with defendant, to testify that employee usually
informed
applicants that she was not able to issue permits authorizing taking of
whole
ties was harmless error, in view of defendant's thorough impeachment of
employee and in view of fact that there was sufficient other evidence
on which
jury could have based its verdict. People v. West, App. 2 Dist.1981,
57
Ill.Dec. 701, 102 Ill.App.3d 50, 429 N.E.2d 599. Criminal Law k
1169.1(2.1)
Consumer who is familiar with stolen property or property of similar
nature is
competent to testify as to property's value, in prosecution for felony
theft,
and inexperience associated with consumer status goes toward weight of
evidence, not its competency. People v. Langston, App. 5 Dist.1981, 51
Ill.Dec. 532, 96 Ill.App.3d 48, 420 N.E.2d 1090. Criminal Law k 452(1)
In prosecution of husband, wife and two sons for theft under this
paragraph,
fact that there existed a few allegedly stolen items that crime victims
were
unable to identify at trial did not prejudice defendants where there
was only
small number of unidentified items involved and instruction was given
that
jurors should consider only evidence admitted by trial court. People
v.
Mertens, App. 2 Dist.1979, 33 Ill.Dec. 206, 77 Ill.App.3d 791, 396
N.E.2d 595.
In burglary and theft prosecution, admission of testimony of State's
chief
prosecution witness, who was close fried of defendant, that she was
upset
because she knew defendant would be violently mad when he found
policemen at
her apartment where stolen goods were found, that she knew defendant
would
probably beat her up and that he had done it before, even if error, was
not of
magnitude to warrant reversal and remand for new trial. People v.
Schubert,
App. 2 Dist.1975, 28 Ill.App.3d 599, 329 N.E.2d 23. Criminal Law k
1169.1(6)
The best evidence rule is that the highest degree of proof of which the
case
from its nature is susceptible must, if accessible, be produced.
People v.
Poindexter, App. 1 Dist.1973, 18 Ill.App.3d 436, 305 N.E.2d 400.
Criminal Law
k 398(1)
In prosecution for theft, evidence that defendant had been unemployed
for
three months prior to robbery, was behind in his rent, and had borrowed
money,
but that immediately after robbery, he made loan payment, paid rent,
and
purchased merchandise was admissible notwithstanding source of money
was not
traced. People v. Bixler, 1971, 49 Ill.2d 328, 275 N.E.2d 392,
certiorari
denied 92 S.Ct. 1500, 405 U.S. 1066, 31 L.Ed.2d 796. Larceny k 50;
Robbery k
23(1)
Where the People, in cross-examination of defendant, had placed before
the
jury insinuations that defendant had tried to alibi concerning
possession of
stolen telephone when apprehended by police, thus exploding defendant's
story
that he was so intoxicated that he did not know what had transpired,
subsequent objection by the People to defendant's proper attempt to
give
explanation was error, but such error was harmless where record
contained
sufficient competent evidence of establish defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v. Umphers, App.1971, 133 Ill.App.2d 853, 272
N.E.2d
278. Criminal Law k 361(1); Criminal Law k 1170(1)
Possession on basis of which convictions of defendants, charged with
burglary
and theft, could be obtained and enhanced was sufficient to give each
of them
standing to move for suppression of evidence alleged to have been
unlawfully
seized. People v. DeFilippis, 1966, 34 Ill.2d 129, 214 N.E.2d 897.
Criminal
Law k 394.5(2)
It is primarily for trial court to protect defendant from evidence more
inflammatory than probative and court has discretion in that matter.
People
v. DiLella, App.1964, 52 Ill.App.2d 403, 202 N.E.2d 77. Criminal Law k
338(7)
In prosecution for larceny of building materials, and garden cart,
testimony,
by cement contractor and his employees who had been working near
defendant's
building lot and who saw him unloading lumber from truck, which was
susceptible of construction that defendant was unloading lumber missing
from
complaining witness' lot onto pile in which complaining witness located
material stolen from him, was admissible. People v. Grundeis, 1952,
108
N.E.2d 483, 413 Ill. 145. Larceny k 50
Possession of keys and locks was admissible in prosecution for larceny
from
pay telephone. People v. Burke, 1924, 145 N.E. 164, 313 Ill. 576.
Larceny k
50.5
Where the proof of larceny is circumstantial, proof that the defendant
had an
opportunity to put the stolen goods in the place where they were found
is not
rendered incompetent as incriminating evidence by proof that other
persons,
also, had such opportunity, since that circumstance merely weakens the
probative force of the evidence. Padfield v. People, 1893, 35 N.E.
469, 146
Ill. 660. Larceny k 50
Where, in a trial for larceny of a diamond ring, the evidence shows
that while
defendants were in the store of the prosecuting witness the ring was
stolen,
and an imitation diamond ring substituted for it, jewelry containing
similar
imitation diamonds, afterwards found in defendants' possession, is
admissible
in evidence for the purpose of showing that defendants had the means of
committing the crime charged. Gindrat v. People, 1891, 27 N.E. 1085,
138 Ill.
103. Larceny k 50.5
207. ---- Search and seizure, admissibility, evidence
Fact that application for search warrant stated that materials to be
seized
were believed to constitute evidence of offense of theft of services
but
defendant was indicted for theft of property over $150 in value was not
a
fatal variance requiring that search warrant be quashed. People v.
Dahl, App.
4 Dist.1982, 66 Ill.Dec. 49, 110 Ill.App.3d 295, 442 N.E.2d 321.
Searches And
Seizures k 191
Where it was admitted that items that police were searching for were
large
items of railroad property, yet it was clear from inventory of items
seized
that police seized countless items, large and small, and none of listed
items
in search warrant were small enough to fit in back of a television set,
search
pursuant to warrant permitting seizure of "any and all items of stolen
railroad property," which resulted in seizure of CB transceiver from
back of
television set, was unacceptable in its scope and intensity, and thus
evidence
as to transceiver should have been suppressed in prosecution of
defendant for
theft of transceiver valued at less than $150. People v. Harmon, App.
4
Dist.1980, 46 Ill.Dec. 27, 90 Ill.App.3d 753, 413 N.E.2d 467. Searches
And
Seizures k 148
Where in early morning hours police chief found landfill gate out of
place and
noticed defendant's vehicle traveling back and forth on landfill road,
subsequently officer was advised that five thefts had occurred in the
area and
had reason to believe that defendant and passenger in his vehicle were
involved, passenger confessed and implicated defendant and confession
was
corroborated by physical evidence found on landfill road, passenger's
information as to defendant's car and address were verified, the
officer's
search of defendant's automobile and subsequent arrest were valid,
irrespective and independent of finding that warrant under which search
was
conducted was invalid. People v. Pierce, App. 5 Dist.1980, 44 Ill.Dec.
326,
88 Ill.App.3d 1095, 411 N.E.2d 295. Arrest k 63.4(9); Searches And
Seizures
k 60.1
Search warrant calling for search of defendants' home for "elephant
tusks,
handguns, rifles, and shotguns" was not overly broad and did not leave
too
much discretion to officers executing it so as to be violative of
Illinois and
Federal Constitutions where affidavits in support of the warrant made
it clear
that such weapons were stolen and also contained alleged admissions of
some of
the defendants to such effect and picture of the elephant tusks, and
the
search was to be limited to premises of defendants' home, which
allegedly
contained the stolen items. People v. Mertens, App. 2 Dist.1979, 33
Ill.Dec.
206, 77 Ill.App.3d 791, 396 N.E.2d 595. Searches And Seizures k 125
Where police, who were investigating an alleged conspiracy to commit
theft,
were not absolutely certain that codefendant was not in apartment at
time of
their entry, police had a right to search for her on premises, and,
under
circumstances, police officer, who discovered five checks in the open
on floor
while searching bedroom for codefendant, could reasonably have believed
such
checks constituted evidence of a crime, and thus such officer did not
exceed
his authority under arrest warrant by seizing such checks, which later
proved
to be stolen from mail. People v. Collins, App. 1 Dist.1979, 26
Ill.Dec. 165,
70 Ill.App.3d 413, 387 N.E.2d 995. Searches And Seizures k 49
In prosecution for theft of two wrought iron lawn chairs worth less
than $150,
defendants' motion to suppress should have been granted as to discovery
of
lawn chairs, where police officer's finding of lawn chairs upon his
warrantless entry onto defendants' premises and search of their shed
was not a
search incident to an arrest because search preceded arrest and, while
probable cause existed to obtain a warrant, such probable cause without
more
justification did not allow warrantless entry because facts did not
reveal any
exigent circumstances such as hot pursuit, protection of life of
another or
probability of removal or destruction of evidence. People v. Grogan,
App. 2
Dist.1978, 20 Ill.Dec. 507, 63 Ill.App.3d 711, 380 N.E.2d 485.
Criminal Law k
394.4(9)
In prosecution for theft of property having a value less than $150 from
resident of university dormitory, officer's testimony that search of
accused's
apartment revealed a key to her former residence in adjoining dormitory
was
admissible for purpose of impeaching her testimony, on direct
examination,
that she did not have such key, though the search had assertedly been
an
illegal warrantless search. People v. Hearn, App. 4 Dist.1976, 34
Ill.App.3d
919, 341 N.E.2d 129. Witnesses k 406
Where there appeared on the face of affidavit in support of application
for
search warrant not only facts indicating that defendant stole the
questioned
articles but assertion that other stolen articles had been discovered
in
defendant's former residence, magistrate had sufficient information to
conclude that there was probable cause to believe that the stolen items
in
question could be found in defendant's present apartment. People v.
Marino,
App.1972, 5 Ill.App.3d 778, 284 N.E.2d 54. Searches And Seizures k 114
Evidence was sufficient to sustain trial court's findings that
evidence,
consisting of boxes of goods purportedly stolen, obtained by police,
who
entered premises of defendants, charged with burglary and theft,
arrested them
and seized the boxes without a search warrant was product of an illegal
search
and seizure. People v. DeFilippis, 1966, 34 Ill.2d 129, 214 N.E.2d
897.
Criminal Law k 394.6(4)
Where officer lawfully stopping automobile to inquire into its
ownership
observed quantity of merchandise in car, evidence of such merchandise
was
admissible in larceny prosecution against driver, since no search was
involved; "search" implying an invasion and quest with some sort of
force,
either actual or constructive. People v. Marvin, 1934, 193 N.E. 202,
358 Ill.
426. Criminal Law k 394.4(2)
On a trial for larceny, the fact that imitation jewelry similar to that
substituted for stolen jewelry by defendants was taken from their room
by a
police officer without authority of law, and without any warrant or
order of
court does not render it inadmissible in evidence. Gindrat v. People,
1891,
27 N.E. 1085, 138 Ill. 103. Criminal Law k 394.4(10)
208. ---- Relevance, admissibility, evidence
Testimony that petty cash receipts were missing during period prior to
dates
covered by indictment charging school district employee with taking
money from
petty cash was properly admitted because testimony was relevant
background
information and tended to show pattern of missing receipts over the
years.
People v. Arbo, App. 3 Dist.1991, 157 Ill.Dec. 348, 213 Ill.App.3d 828,
572
N.E.2d 417, appeal denied 162 Ill.Dec. 494, 141 Ill.2d 545, 580 N.E.2d
120.
Criminal Law k 372(5)
In prosecution which resulted in conviction of burglary and theft over
$300,
evidence of defendant's possession of CB radio stolen from car parked
next to
burglarized home was relevant to show absence of mistake and to
establish
defendant's intent and knowledge. People v. Ellison, App. 2 Dist.1984,
81
Ill.Dec. 222, 126 Ill.App.3d 985, 466 N.E.2d 1024. Criminal Law k 370;
Criminal Law k 371(6)
In prosecution of husband, wife and two sons for theft under this
paragraph
evidence of defendants' possession of stolen property was necessary
element of
crime charged and was also relevant to element of guilty knowledge and
intent,
and thus evidence of such possession was properly admitted even without
showing that it was recently stolen. People v. Mertens, App. 2
Dist.1979, 33
Ill.Dec. 206, 77 Ill.App.3d 791, 396 N.E.2d 595.
Objection to testimony of corporate officer, in prosecution for theft
of
corporation's tires, that defendant's tractor was leased to
corporation, and
that corporation had in the past been beset by thefts of tires from its
vehicles, should have been sustained, as should have objection by
defendant on
relevancy grounds to testimony concerning prior thefts of tires, but
admission
of such testimony was not prejudicial to defendant where record did not
reveal
that the court, in bench trial, relied upon such testimony in any way.
People
v. Drake, App. 1 Dist.1974, 20 Ill.App.3d 762, 314 N.E.2d 532. Criminal
Law k
260.11(6); Larceny k 43
Admission, over objection, of testimony of assistant security manager
of store
from which defendant allegedly had stolen a coat that such manager was
bonded
in his new employment for a merchant patrol service, was not
prejudicial
error. People v. Ferrara, App.1969, 111 Ill.App.2d 472, 250 N.E.2d
530,
certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 1815, 398 U.S. 927, 26 L.Ed.2d 89. Criminal
Law k
1169.1(4)
Proof corporation's money was taken for unlawful purposes at order and
direction of president would constitute no defense, and evidence with
respect
thereto was inadmissible. People v. Schueneman, 1926, 150 N.E. 664,
320 Ill.
127. Embezzlement k 43; Larceny k 52
Where, in a prosecution for burglary and larceny of a carriage, it was
claimed
that defendant stole the carriage and hauled it to his home hitched
behind
another vehicle, evidence that on the night of the offense a witness
passed a
team drawing two carriages, one behind the other, coming from the place
where
the buggy was taken toward defendant's home, but that witness would not
tell
who or how many persons were in the front carriage, was admissible.
Miller v.
People, 1907, 82 N.E. 391, 229 Ill. 376. Larceny k 50
209. ---- Circumstantial evidence, admissibility
Evidence of defendant's possible nonexclusive access to the area from
which
stolen items were removed, evidence of defendant's nonexclusive access
to the
area where the stolen items were found, and evidence that defendant was
in
possession of a bottle cap, which was not unique, which fit an uncapped
bottle
which had been stolen from the store was insufficient to sustain
defendant's
conviction for theft. People v. Modlin, App. 4 Dist.1979, 30 Ill.Dec.
350, 74
Ill.App.3d 387, 393 N.E.2d 5. Larceny k 64(1)
In larceny case where evidence is circumstantial and there is no
evidence
connecting accused with crime charged, exhibits found in neighborhood
of home
of the accused are not admissible in evidence, but where the
circumstances
have some tendency to connect the evidence to the crime in question, it
is
admissible. People v. Robbins, App. 3 Dist.1974, 21 Ill.App.3d 317,
315
N.E.2d 198. Larceny k 51(1)
Circumstantial evidence is competent evidence to prove offense of theft
from
the person. People v. Wright, App.1968, 99 Ill.App.2d 377, 240 N.E.2d
698.
Larceny k 61
210. ---- Confessions, admissibility, evidence
Evidence sufficiently corroborated defendants' confessions to theft to
permit
consideration of corroborating evidence and confessions in determining
whether
corpus delicti for felony theft had been established; scene discovered
by
restaurant owner corresponded to events described by defendants in
their
confessions concerning theft of cash from restaurant, and time of theft
corresponded to time testified to by defendants. People v. Furby,
1990, 150
Ill.Dec. 534, 138 Ill.2d 434, 563 N.E.2d 421, on remand 169 Ill.Dec.
360, 228
Ill.App.3d 1, 591 N.E.2d 533. Criminal Law k 535(2)
Evidence supported trial court's determination that no promises of
leniency
had been made and that defendant's confession was made voluntarily,
even
though defendant was in fact charged with misdemeanor theft when
evidence
allegedly would have supported a felony theft charge. People v.
Neumann, App.
3 Dist.1979, 31 Ill.Dec. 699, 76 Ill.App.3d 112, 394 N.E.2d 901.
Criminal Law
k 531(3)
In prosecution for burglary and theft of property having a value of
more than
$150, admission of defendant's statement to police officer that he was
driver
of truck in which merchandise from store was found, which statement was
inadmissible due to State's failure to disclose its existence during
discovery, was not prejudicial to defendant as being sole basis for
exclusive
possession instruction, in view of fact that defendant possessed key to
locked
truck, and, thus, was not reversible error. People v. Gan, App. 4
Dist.1979,
31 Ill.Dec. 409, 75 Ill.App.3d 72, 394 N.E.2d 611. Criminal Law k
1169.12
Evidence, in theft prosecution, supported finding that incriminating
statements given by both defendants to Illinois authorities were made
after
knowing and voluntary waiver by defendants of constitutional rights,
despite
initial refusal by defendants to sign waiver forms in Missouri, where
they
were arrested. People v. Patton, App. 5 Dist.1975, 33 Ill.App.3d 923,
339
N.E.2d 22. Criminal Law k 414
It was within province of trial court as trier of fact in theft
prosecution to
disbelieve testimony of defendant and believe contrary testimony of
police
officers regarding whether or not defendant asserted his right to
remain
silent and requested lawyer prior to giving incriminating statement to
officers. People v. Patton, App. 5 Dist.1975, 33 Ill.App.3d 923, 339
N.E.2d 22
. Criminal Law k 414
Where only direct evidence linking defendant to crime of theft was
defendant's
unlawfully obtained confession, admission of said confession into
evidence was
not harmless error beyond reasonable doubt. People v. Riszowski, App.
1
Dist.1974, 22 Ill.App.3d 741, 318 N.E.2d 10. Criminal Law k 1169.12
In prosecution for larceny, testimony of confession by defendants when
apprehended was admissible when there was no evidence of brutality,
long and
protracted interrogation by police, threats of intimidation or promises
of
immunity made to defendants at any time while under arrest. People v.
Jedynak, 1941, 37 N.E.2d 335, 377 Ill. 621. Criminal Law k 517(2)
211. ---- Admissions, admissibility, evidence
Testimony by friend of defendant as to the substance of a conversation
in
which defendant indicated that he had stolen the goods in question
demonstrated an admission by defendant of his participation in the
crimes.
People v. Riley, App. 4 Dist.1981, 54 Ill.Dec. 474, 99 Ill.App.3d 244,
424
N.E.2d 1377. Criminal Law k 406(1)
State met its burden of showing that injuries sustained by defendant,
who was
convicted of theft, while in custody were not result of police
brutality, in
that defendant told emergency room worker of prior neck injury and
admitted
that he injured himself upon falling in his cell; thus, statement of
defendant, which was allegedly given as result of police brutality,
that he
received certain stolen items in exchange for help in starting truck,
was
admissible. People v. Moats, App. 3 Dist.1980, 44 Ill.Dec. 451, 89
Ill.App.3d
194, 411 N.E.2d 573. Criminal Law k 412(4)
Letter sent by defendant to theft victim stating that defendant would
return
the stolen money in return for victim's dropping the prosecution was
not
rendered inadmissible by fact that the letter contained a suicide
threat.
People v. Dayani, App. 1 Dist.1973, 16 Ill.App.3d 615, 306 N.E.2d 488.
Criminal Law k 408
Letter written by defendant to victim of theft which stated that all of
the
stolen money was out of the country and that the only way to recover it
would
be to drop the prosecution of defendant had great probative value and
was
admissible as evidence of an attempt to settle the criminal charge.
People v.
Dayani, App. 1 Dist.1973, 16 Ill.App.3d 615, 306 N.E.2d 488. Criminal
Law k
408
In theft prosecution, defendant's testimony that he bought the items in
question at store and production of cash register receipt allegedly
representing the purchase of such items constituted an admission that
the
items were the property of the store as alleged in the indictment.
People v.
Ruiz, App. 1 Dist.1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 1047, 305 N.E.2d 653. Larceny k
60
Permitting police officer to testify that store security officers had
shown
him jacket which they said, in defendant's presence, that defendant had
taken
was not prejudicial error on theory that such testimony created unfair
inference that defendant's silence following the making of such
statement in
his presence showed guilt, where defendant stated on cross-examination
that he
did protest while he was in police station. People v. Ferrara,
App.1969, 111
Ill.App.2d 472, 250 N.E.2d 530, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 1815, 398
U.S. 927,
26 L.Ed.2d 89. Criminal Law k 1169.2(6)
Attendant circumstances under which alleged admissions of guilt were
made by
defendant charged with murder and theft raised serious doubts as to
whether
admissions were voluntary or procured by pressure of hope or fear or
other
undue means, so that murder conviction was reversed and new trial
ordered.
People v. Styles, App.1966, 75 Ill.App.2d 481, 220 N.E.2d 885.
Criminal Law k
409(3); Criminal Law k 1189
Testimony of an officer to the effect that defendant declined to answer
questions as to how he came into possession of recently stolen
television sets
was proper rebuttal of testimony of defendant to the effect that he did
not
remember telling the officer that he would not answer any more
questions after
he had answered concerning his name, address and marital status.
People v.
Boulahanis, App.1964, 50 Ill.App.2d 440, 200 N.E.2d 372. Criminal Law
k
683(1)
Testimony that a defendant when asked how he had come into possession
of
recently stolen television sets said nothing except that it was worth
five
grand if interrogating officer got defendant out was admissible, not
only as a
basis for inference of defendant's guilt of theft, but as an admission
and as
evidence of an attempt to bribe. People v. Boulahanis, App.1964, 50
Ill.App.2d 440, 200 N.E.2d 372. Criminal Law k 406(5); Larceny k 50
212. ---- Statements of co-defendants, admissibility, evidence
In prosecution for burglary and felony theft, testimony that one
defendant
stated that he had stolen items in particular city because he had been
locked
up there the week before was admissible as evidence of defendant's
motive; in
any case, any error was harmless because evidence of guilt was
overwhelming.
People v. Banks, App. 3 Dist.1979, 27 Ill.Dec. 365, 70 Ill.App.3d 1045,
389
N.E.2d 177. Criminal Law k 371(12); Criminal Law k 1169.11
Statements made by one codefendant to another, concerning defendant's
planning
of theft being made in furtherance of common purpose, were admissible
against
defendant, though made in his absence. People v. Levy, 1932, 184 N.E.
223,
351 Ill. 110. Criminal Law k 423(2)
213. ---- Cross-examination, admissibility, evidence
Limitation on felony theft defendant's attempt to cross-examine VCR
owner
concerning fair market value of VCR on date it was stolen constituted
reversible error; State was required to establish that VCR had fair
cash
market value in excess of $300 on date of theft in order to obtain
felony
theft conviction, and owner's testimony that he purchased VCR five
months
before theft for $499, marked down from $650, was not so overwhelming
that
defendant suffered no prejudice as result of improper restriction of
his
cross-examination. People v. Josephine, App. 1 Dist.1987, 117 Ill.Dec.
394,
165 Ill.App.3d 762, 520 N.E.2d 745. Criminal Law k 1170.5(5);
Witnesses k
268(13)
Trial court improperly forbid defendant to cross-examine witnesses
about their
own involvement in a possible welfare fraud scheme during defendant's
prosecution for theft of welfare monies where witnesses, who were under
investigation for same kind of offense with which defendant was
charged, had
potential motive for testifying favorably to the State, despite the
facts that
no charges had been brought against the witnesses and that no promises
of
leniency had been made by the State. People v. Baugh, App. 1
Dist.1981, 52
Ill.Dec. 485, 96 Ill.App.3d 946, 422 N.E.2d 166. Witnesses k 372(2)
In prosecution for conspiracy, theft, and theft by deception,
prohibiting
cross-examination of prosecution witness about alleged offers to have
criminal
charges dropped in return for payment of several thousand dollars was
prejudicially erroneous as to defendant who allegedly manipulated and
destroyed business records so that co-defendant could receive
merchandise
without being billed. People v. Pizzi, App. 1 Dist.1981, 50 Ill.Dec.
30, 94
Ill.App.3d 415, 418 N.E.2d 1024. Criminal Law k 1170.5(1)
In felony theft prosecution arising from defendant employee's alleged
theft of
rent payments handled by her in her employment, defendant's attempt to
show
interest, bias or motive on part of complainant employer in that
insurance
claim for lost funds could not be made before criminal prosecution was
brought
was proper subject of cross-examination of complainant and preclusion
of such
questioning was prejudicial error. People v. Thompson, App. 1
Dist.1979, 31
Ill.Dec. 220, 75 Ill.App.3d 901, 394 N.E.2d 422. Criminal Law k
1170.5(1);
Witnesses k 372(2)
It was improper for trial court to prevent defendant from crossexamining a
security guard who was the State's major witness against the defendant
as to
whether he had reported the defendant's alleged attempted theft on the
day
that it occurred and whether he had seen the defendant after the date
of the
incident on the grounds that those matters had not been dealt with on
direct
examination. People v. Davis, App. 1 Dist.1979, 26 Ill.Dec. 886, 70
Ill.App.3d 454, 388 N.E.2d 887. Witnesses k 269(4)
Error in not allowing defendant who was charged with theft to crossexamine
witnesses concerning return of money after witnesses had testified on
direct
as to defendant's receipt of money was not prejudicial, where other
witnesses,
including defendant, testified as to return of money. People v.
Campbell,
App. 5 Dist.1975, 28 Ill.App.3d 480, 328 N.E.2d 608. Criminal Law k
1170.5(5)
In prosecution of defendants, a man and a woman, for theft, it was not
improper to ask daughter of woman defendant on cross-examination
whether male
defendant had spent the night in her home with her mother over
objections of
defendants that question was irrelevant and prejudicial and beyond
scope of
cross-examination. People v. Somerville, App.1967, 88 Ill.App.2d 212,
232
N.E.2d 115, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 81, 393 U.S. 823, 21 L.Ed.2d 94.
Witnesses k 269(2.1); Witnesses k 270(2)
Question asked by defendant's counsel to eye witness concerning whether
description he had given of defendant in a written statement at time of
lineup
was same description he had given police at time of theft should have
been
permitted, but sustaining objection to question was not substantial
error,
where defense counsel at no time contended that he had proof that the
two
statements were contradictory or inconsistent. People v. Davis,
App.1966, 70
Ill.App.2d 419, 218 N.E.2d 3. Criminal Law k 1170(1)
In view of testimony of officer of transit authority that he saw
defendant
remove wallet from sleeping passenger on elevated train, officer's
testimony
on cross-examination that he could not see lower portion of passenger's
body
and did not know what pocket wallet was taken from went only to
credibility of
his testimony. People v. Cool, 1962, 26 Ill.2d 255, 186 N.E.2d 254.
Larceny k
61
Cross-examination of defendant in larceny prosecution as to aliases
other than
those under which defendant was indicted was improper and objections
thereto
should have been sustained. People v. Baker, 1936, 6 N.E.2d 665, 365
Ill. 328
. Criminal Law k 338(7)
214. ---- Accomplice testimony, admissibility, evidence
Although trial court erred in preventing defendant from cross-examining
two
witnesses concerning their own involvement in welfare fraud scheme in
defendant's prosecution for theft of welfare monies, error was not
violation
of defendant's constitutional right of confrontation where on
cross-examination one of the witnesses ended up contending that she did
not
live with other witness during time defendant lived in apartment below
theirs,
cross-examination demonstrated that one witness had argued with
defendant and
husband on several occasions concerning defendant's children and a
credible
witness testified on behalf of defendant that both witnesses had bad
reputations for telling the truth. People v. Baugh, App. 1 Dist.1981,
52
Ill.Dec. 485, 96 Ill.App.3d 946, 422 N.E.2d 166. Criminal Law k 662.7
Defendant was not prejudiced by trial court's error in preventing her
from
cross-examining two witnesses concerning their involvement in welfare
fraud
scheme during her prosecution for theft of welfare funds where
defendant was
acquitted of most of the specific charges relating to time she was
living in
apartment below the witnesses; defendant was allowed to bring forth
substantial evidence concerning credibility of the two witnesses and
there was
other evidence presented to show that defendant's husband was living
with her
in the apartment, in violation of welfare rules. People v. Baugh, App.
1
Dist.1981, 52 Ill.Dec. 485, 96 Ill.App.3d 946, 422 N.E.2d 166.
Criminal Law k
1170.5(1)
In proceeding in which defendant was convicted of theft of property
having
value of more than $150, admission of accomplice's testimony in regard
to plan
under which defendant would get and keep attendant's attention at gas
pumps
while accomplice would enter station and take the money and permitting
prosecutor to refer to such "routine" during opening and closing
argument was
not error, in that such testimony and argument pertained to a common
scheme or
design which was common both to defendant and accomplice. People v.
Mosley,
App. 3 Dist.1980, 39 Ill.Dec. 547, 84 Ill.App.3d 62, 404 N.E.2d 1138.
Criminal
Law k 372(5)
The testimony of an accomplice is to be received with suspicion and
acted upon
with caution, but such considerations go to weight of evidence and
credibility
of witness. People v. Neukom, 1959, 16 Ill.2d 340, 158 N.E.2d 53.
Criminal
Law k 508(9)
Great latitude is to be permitted in the cross-examination of an
accomplice,
and a defendant may properly inquire into any motives that may have
influenced
an accomplice to offer himself as a witness in behalf of prosecution.
People
v. Baker, 1959, 16 Ill.2d 364, 158 N.E.2d 1. Witnesses k 278;
Witnesses k
372(1)
In prosecution for larceny of steel, there was no error or undue
prejudice in
permitting an accomplice to testify that he had confessed to the crime.
People
v. Baker, 1959, 16 Ill.2d 364, 158 N.E.2d 1. Criminal Law k 508(1)
Testimony of people's witness in larceny case was not incompetent on
ground he
had been jointly indicted with defendant, where indictment against him
had
been nollied before trial. People v. McElvain, 1930, 172 N.E. 131, 341
Ill.
224. Criminal Law k 508(6)
Cross-examination to ascertain what accomplice, testifying he was to
receive
portion of proceeds from sale of cow stolen, did with check received,
or
whether arrangement existed, was not error. People v. Lacey, 1930, 171
N.E.
544, 339 Ill. 480. Witnesses k 278
Where accomplice testified attempting to shift main burden to defendant
in
larceny prosecution, defendant could ascertain by cross-examination not
unduly
limited motive of testimony. People v. Lacey, 1930, 171 N.E. 544, 339
Ill.
480. Witnesses k 372(2)
215. ---- Hearsay testimony, admissibility, evidence
Automobile delivery manager convicted of theft was not prejudiced by
erroneous
admission of spread sheet summarizing payments received from customers,
even
though spread sheets were based in part upon hearsay statements of
customers,
since conviction was supported by evidence of defendant's admissions
and of
documents for 20 customers who were victims of defendant's lapping
scheme.
People v. Wiesneske, App. 1 Dist.1992, 175 Ill.Dec. 252, 234 Ill.App.3d
29,
599 N.E.2d 1266. Criminal Law k 1169.1(10)
Accountant's testimony that petty cash receipts were missing from petty
cash
envelopes was not inadmissible hearsay in prosecution of school
district
employee for taking petty cash, inasmuch as accountant's testimony was
not
offered to prove truth of matters asserted in receipts. People v.
Arbo, App.
3 Dist.1991, 157 Ill.Dec. 348, 213 Ill.App.3d 828, 572 N.E.2d 417,
appeal
denied 162 Ill.Dec. 494, 141 Ill.2d 545, 580 N.E.2d 120. Criminal Law
k
419(2)
In prosecution for theft of automobile, statement by car owner that his
uncle,
who had cosigned for car, did not give permission to defendant to use
car was
hearsay, but admission of statement was harmless in that uncle did not
own car
and could not authorize use of car, and there was sufficient competent
evidence that defendant was unauthorized to use the car. People v.
Woods,
App. 1 Dist.1980, 40 Ill.Dec. 146, 84 Ill.App.3d 938, 405 N.E.2d 1238.
Criminal Law k 419(1.5); Criminal Law k 1169.1(9)
In prosecution for theft of automobile, statements by car dealer, with
whom
owner had left car for servicing, that defendant was not employee of
car
dealership and that no employee of dealership had given defendant
permission
to remove car from premises did not constitute hearsay in that
statements were
based on dealer's own personal knowledge. People v. Woods, App. 1
Dist.1980,
40 Ill.Dec. 146, 84 Ill.App.3d 938, 405 N.E.2d 1238. Criminal Law k
419(2.35)
In prosecution for theft by deception in connection with fraudulent
claim for
workmen's compensation benefits, any error committed by trial court in
admitting hearsay testimony as to number of times defendant wife had
called
witness at residence of witness' mother was rectified by court's
instruction
to the jury to disregard the testimony. People v. Wurster, App. 3
Dist.1980,
38 Ill.Dec. 702, 83 Ill.App.3d 399, 403 N.E.2d 1306. Criminal Law k
1169.5(5)
In prosecution for theft of property exceeding $150 in value, error, if
any,
in admitting hearsay testimony of store detective to effect that items
were
missing from inventory sheet could have been cured if such testimony
had been
objected to at trial, since State could have laid proper foundation to
bring
such testimony within business records exception to hearsay rule, and
it was
no answer to claim, as defendants did, that failure to object was
excused
because State failed to produce inventory sheet in response to a
subpoena.
People v. Parker, App. 2 Dist.1979, 33 Ill.Dec. 21, 77 Ill.App.3d 536,
396
N.E.2d 97. Criminal Law k 1036.5
Testimony of special agent for railroad that he obtained replacement
costs of
damaged copper wire from railroad's communication department and amount
of
scrap value from detective on junk and freight squad of city police
department
was properly admitted, over hearsay objection, in prosecution for theft
and
criminal damage to property to establish value of wire, but, in any
event, any
hearsay objection was met where defendant was given opportunity to and
did
cross-examine agent. People v. Brown, App.1970, 125 Ill.App.2d 336,
261
N.E.2d 11. Criminal Law k 419(4); Criminal Law k 1169.2(6)
Fact that state improperly asked police officer whether defendant,
charged
with theft, had been interested in making bond at police station, to
which
question an objection was promptly sustained, did not constitute
prejudicial
error. People v. Ferrara, App.1969, 111 Ill.App.2d 472, 250 N.E.2d 530,
certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 1815, 398 U.S. 927, 26 L.Ed.2d 89. Criminal
Law k
1171.8(1)
Exclusion of evidence as to conversation between accused and her
employer at
police station at which time employer purportedly urged accused to
plead
guilty so that she could remain in his employ and pay back stolen
funds, if
erroneous, was not so prejudicial as to constitute reversible error.
People
v. Adams, App.1969, 106 Ill.App.2d 396, 245 N.E.2d 904. Criminal Law k
1170(1)
In theft prosecution, wherein law enforcement officer was permitted to
testify, over objection, as to contents of radio message he received
immediately prior to his arrest of defendant, and same officer further
testified as to his conversation with another law enforcement officer
concerning identify of defendant, and second officer later testified
that
complaining witness upon viewing defendant after his arrest nodded his
head in
response to prearranged signal which related to identity of defendant,
such
evidence was inadmissible as hearsay. People v. Hazen, App.1969, 104
Ill.App.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 424. Criminal Law k 419(3)
In larceny prosecution, hearsay testimony regarding nature of
statements made
by deceased owner of allegedly stolen mortgages was inadmissible.
People v.
Colegrove, 1930, 174 N.E. 536, 342 Ill. 430. Criminal Law k 419(10)
Statements by bank president, charged with larceny of mortgages, made
to
others in bank before visiting owner of mortgages, who died before
trial, were
inadmissible as self-serving. People v. Colegrove, 1930, 174 N.E. 536,
342
Ill. 430. Criminal Law k 413(1)
216. ---- Chain of possession, admissibility, evidence
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting petty cash
receipts and
testimony about those receipts in prosecution of school district
employee for
theft of petty cash where evidence adequately connected receipts with
the
crime and it was unlikely that receipts were substantially changed
since time
of seizure. People v. Arbo, App. 3 Dist.1991, 157 Ill.Dec. 348, 213
Ill.App.3d 828, 572 N.E.2d 417, appeal denied 162 Ill.Dec. 494, 141
Ill.2d
545, 580 N.E.2d 120. Criminal Law k 436(1); Larceny k 43
Even if introduction of ham into evidence in prosecution for theft of
ham was
error on ground that State had not shown a continuous chain of
possession,
error was harmless, in that there was no requirement that the stolen
property
be introduced and there was testimony that ham had been stolen. People
v.
Baer, App. 4 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 346, 311 N.E.2d 418. Criminal
Law k
1169.1(10)
In prosecution for theft
possession was
not shown with regard to
hint of
tampering or impeachment
App. 4
Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d
of ham, even though perfect chain of
stolen ham, such ham was admissible, absent
of testimony of witnesses.
346, 311 N.E.2d 418.
People v. Baer,
Criminal Law k 404.75
Where, in prosecution for theft, there is no evidence or claim of
tampering,
with regard to item purportedly stolen, and witness' positive
identification
of such item is not impeached, witness' testimony and item itself are
admissible, even if there is no perfect chain of possession shown.
People v.
Baer, App. 4 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 346, 311 N.E.2d 418. Criminal
Law k
404.75
In absence of any indication or suggestion of substitution, alteration
or
other form of tampering with exhibit, reasonable protective techniques
are
sufficient and showing of unbroken chain of possession is unnecessary.
People
v. Banks, App. 1 Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 512, 308 N.E.2d 247.
Criminal Law k
404.30
In larceny prosecution in which officer testified that coat alleged to
have
been stolen from department store by defendant was taken to police
custodian
and inventoried, and coat was identified by police officer and store
clerk, it
was unnecessary to show unbroken chain of possession of coat itself.
People
v. Banks, App. 1 Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 512, 308 N.E.2d 247.
Criminal Law k
404.75
In absence of any indication or suggestion of substitution, alteration
or
other form of tampering, protective techniques employed by police in
preserving items found in search of trunk of automobile by maintaining
key to
trunk in sole and exclusive possession of arresting officer and turning
keys
over to sheriff, who placed items in
remained
until trial, were sufficient to make
admissible, as
against contention that there was no
People v.
Wrona, App.1972, 7 Ill.App.3d 1, 286
locker in his office where they
cartons and their contents
proper chain of possession.
N.E.2d 370.
Criminal Law k 404.36
Where each garment admitted in prosecution for theft from ladies'
apparel
store was capable of being identified upon sight and were so
identified, proof
of chain of possession was unnecessary to establish admissibility.
People v.
Thompson, App.1971, 133 Ill.App.2d 184, 273 N.E.2d 30. Criminal Law k
404.70
In prosecution for theft, fact that state did not show what happened to
stolen
watch after it was taken from complaining witness did not prejudice
defendant.
People v. Gant, App.1970, 121 Ill.App.2d 222, 257 N.E.2d 181. Larceny
k 55
In prosecution for larceny of fish from river live box, two flathead
catfish,
which prosecution witnesses testified had been marked for
identification
purposes and placed in live box and were among those sold by defendants
to
fish dealer and had been preserved and were in same condition as when
identified and recovered, were properly identified and were admissible
as
relevant, competent, and material to issue raised by defendants'
testimony
that they had sold only channel catfish. People v. Meyers, 1952, 105
N.E.2d
746, 412 Ill. 136, certiorari denied 74 S.Ct. 433, 347 U.S. 906, 98
L.Ed. 1065
. Criminal Law k 404.75
Admitting exhibits containing property allegedly stolen from
burglarized
drugstore was not error, in view of evidence that property exhibited
was same
property as that stolen. People v. Rembowicz, 1929, 167 N.E. 797, 335
Ill.
604. Criminal Law k 404(4)
217. ---- Identification, admissibility, evidence
In prosecution for burglary and felony theft, police agent's statement
that he
knew defendants before he purchased stolen goods from them while
working at
undercover fencing operation was material and relevant to his
identification
of them, as well as to common design and plan, and was admissible in
evidence
despite any possible implication that agent knew defendants from prior
business transaction in connection with fencing operation. People v.
Banks,
App. 3 Dist.1979, 27 Ill.Dec. 365, 70 Ill.App.3d 1045, 389 N.E.2d 177.
Criminal Law k 369.15; Criminal Law k 372(14)
218. ---- Other acts, admissibility, evidence
Accountant's testimony that petty cash receipts were missing, that she
could
not account for all funds placed in petty cash and that she could not
tell if
there were any funds missing did not imply prior misconduct on part of
school
district employee charged with stealing petty cash. People v. Arbo,
App. 3
Dist.1991, 157 Ill.Dec. 348, 213 Ill.App.3d 828, 572 N.E.2d 417, appeal
denied
162 Ill.Dec. 494, 141 Ill.2d 545, 580 N.E.2d 120. Criminal Law k 374
In proceeding in which defendant was convicted of burglary and theft of
cattle
and in which prosecutor asked accomplice, during direct examination "*
* *
how the defendant happened to come up with the idea of stealing feeder
cattle," accomplice's uninvited response that "* * * I've known that
[defendant's] done it before" did not involve reversible error, in
light of
fact that such response was stricken, that jury was instructed to
disregard it
and that there was circumstantial evidence tending to corroborate
accomplice's
testimony. People v. Miller, App. 2 Dist.1981, 50 Ill.Dec. 211, 94
Ill.App.3d
725, 419 N.E.2d 78. Criminal Law k 1169.11
219. ---- Other crimes, generally, admissibility, evidence
In a prosecution for larceny, evidence of the commission of other
distinct
offenses disconnected with the crime charged is inadmissible. Bishop
v.
People, 1902, 194 Ill. 365, 62 N.E. 785; Gillespie v. People, 1899,
176 Ill.
238, 52 N.E. 250.
In prosecution for burglary and felony theft, testimony concerning
undercover
police agent's questioning defendants as to whether they got stolen
property
at the same place as a particular lawn mower did not necessarily
suggest
commission of some other crime, particularly in view of fact that
defendants
responded negatively to agent's question. People v. Banks, App. 3
Dist.1979,
27 Ill.Dec. 365, 70 Ill.App.3d 1045, 389 N.E.2d 177. Criminal Law k
374
In defendant's trial for stealing one ring from a particular jeweler,
evidence
of his theft of another ring from the same jeweler was admissible.
People v.
Lanzotti, App. 4 Dist.1978, 18 Ill.Dec. 905, 61 Ill.App.3d 451, 378
N.E.2d 369
. Criminal Law k 369.2(6)
In prosecution for armed robbery, burglary and theft, evidence of
defendant's
complicity in noncharged burglary was properly admitted as bearing on
motive
and identification where evidence showed that defendant and accomplice
had
engaged in such burglary by mistake, believing that house was house
which they
later entered and which was involved in charged crime; fact that
evidence of
prior burglary might also have incidentally enhanced credibility of
accomplice
witness did not make that evidence improper. People v. Graves, App. 3
Dist.1977, 13 Ill.Dec. 192, 54 Ill.App.3d 1027, 370 N.E.2d 1219.
Criminal Law
k 369.15; Criminal Law k 371(12)
In theft prosecution, testimony by security guard to effect that he
recognized
defendant from "prior engagements" was not so suggestive of prior
criminality
as to be inadmissible. People v. Boone, App. 3 Dist.1977, 12 Ill.Dec.
869, 55
Ill.App.3d 83, 370 N.E.2d 673. Criminal Law k 369.5
Evidence as to prior burglary committed at oil plant which owned
chemical cans
was admissible in prosecution charging theft of chemical cans for
purposes of
proving ownership of cans and proving that defendants' exertion of
control
over cans was unauthorized. People v. Uselding, App. 4 Dist.1976, 39
Ill.App.3d 677, 350 N.E.2d 283. Criminal Law k 369.2(6)
Defendant's statements, made to police officer who was questioning her
about
involvement in confidence game, that "she wasn't very good at this" was
admissible to establish defendant's identity as one of the perpetrators
of the
crime even though it also tended to show that she had committed other
crimes.
People v. Ward, App. 1 Dist.1976, 37 Ill.App.3d 960, 347 N.E.2d 381,
certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 1680, 430 U.S. 983, 52 L.Ed.2d 378.
Criminal Law k
369.15
In trial of defendant for possession of marijuana and theft, where
testimony
concerning defendant's prior possession and use of marijuana would have
proven
nothing other than his propensity to commit offense with which he was
charged,
admission of such testimony was prejudicial error, notwithstanding
contention
that later dismissal of marijuana possession charge cured any prejudice
with
regard to theft charge. People v. Stadtman, 1974, 59 Ill.2d 229, 319
N.E.2d
813. Criminal Law k 369.2(7); Criminal Law k 1169.11
Admission of testimony concerning theft from one victim was not error
at trial
for theft from another victim, where both victims were sleeping
passengers in
the same elevated transit car and evidence of theft from former was
part of
continuing narrative of theft from latter. People v. Johnson, 1966, 34
Ill.2d
202, 215 N.E.2d 204. Criminal Law k 369.2(7)
In prosecution for larceny of several suits of men's clothing recently
stolen
from a particular store, evidence that other suits recently stolen from
another store were found commingled with suits for the larceny of which
accused was on trial in rear compartment of automobile in accused's
possession
was admissible though tending to establish accused's guilt of a
distinct
offense. People v. Kasallis, 1943, 52 N.E.2d 209, 385 Ill. 158.
Criminal Law
k 369.5
In prosecution for larceny of coat from certain company, admitting
evidence of
theft and attempted theft from two other stores within hour or two of
charged
offense was prejudicial error. People v. Gawlick, 1932, 183 N.E. 217,
350
Ill. 359. Criminal Law k 1169.11
220. ---- Other crimes, harmless error, admissibility, evidence
Although other crimes evidence linking defendant to drugs found in gas
station
was inadmissible in prosecution of defendant for felony theft of gas
station
where he worked, its admission was harmless error because there was
nothing in
record to support a finding that this other crimes evidence was
considered by
trial court and materially affected outcome of case; trial court did
not refer
to testimony concerning drugs during its decision. People v. Vasser,
App. 1
Dist.2002, 264 Ill.Dec. 498, 331 Ill.App.3d 675, 770 N.E.2d 1194,
appeal
denied 271 Ill.Dec. 940, 201 Ill.2d 609, 786 N.E.2d 198. Criminal Law
k
1169.11
Error, if any, in admitting evidence of defendant's prior theft
conviction in
prosecution for theft with prior theft conviction was harmless beyond
reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, App. 4 Dist.1982, 65 Ill.Dec.
620, 109
Ill.App.3d 1076, 441 N.E.2d 935. Criminal Law k 1177.5(2)
In prosecution of husband, wife and two sons for theft under this
paragraph,
references to possible burglaries, which prosecution contended were
properly
admitted to show knowledge or intent, were insufficient to warrant
reversal of
defendants' conviction even if erroneous. People v. Mertens, App. 2
Dist.1979, 33 Ill.Dec. 206, 77 Ill.App.3d 791, 396 N.E.2d 595.
In prosecution for theft of property exceeding $150 in value,
circumstances
did not call for excuse of defendants' waiver of contention that a
photograph
taken of merchandise at scene and admitted into evidence depicted
article of
clothing along with three allegedly stolen items which store detective
was
unable to identify as having been taken from store and thereby injected
prejudicial evidence of another crime, where inference that fourth item
was
stolen from another store did not appear to have substantially
prejudiced
defendants, and, in any event, defendants shared responsibility for
emphasizing such inference. People v. Parker, App. 2 Dist.1979, 33
Ill.Dec.
21, 77 Ill.App.3d 536, 396 N.E.2d 97. Criminal Law k 698(1)
In view of overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt of theft from one
automobile, admission of evidence that defendant had broken into
another
automobile on the same day, even if erroneous, would not require
reversal.
People v. Kristovich, App. 2 Dist.1975, 32 Ill.App.3d 979, 336 N.E.2d
772.
Criminal Law k 1169.2(3)
Even assuming that remark was made by prosecutor in opening statement
in
prosecution for theft, which concerned itself with another crime, of
which
statement there was no evidence in the record, such statement did not
constitute reversible error since evidence of other crime served to
place
defendant in proximity to time and place of original offense and aided
in
establishment of his identity. People v. Hyde, App.1968, 97 Ill.App.2d
43,
239 N.E.2d 466. Criminal Law k 1171.2
Where prosecution's witness testified that he obtained trousers from
defendant
charged with their theft for purpose of sale and prosecution asked
whether
witness in past had been requested to sell anything for defendant and
witness
replied, over objection, that defendant had requested him to sell rings
and
watches, and objection was then sustained and jury advised to disregard
testimony, question and answer were improper but prompt admonition to
jury to
disregard exchange cured error. People v. Dell, App.1966, 77
Ill.App.2d 318,
222 N.E.2d 357, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 73, 389 U.S. 826, 19 L.Ed.2d
81.
Criminal Law k 369.9; Criminal Law k 1169.5(2)
221. ---- Other crimes, intent, admissibility, evidence
Evidence of two other crimes committed by defendant charged with
residential
burglary and theft was admissible to show intent, where defendant in
all three
crimes secured admittance to homes of elderly residents under guise of
performing home repairs, using that as opportunity to commit theft.
People v.
Miller, App. 1 Dist.1993, 193 Ill.Dec. 799, 254 Ill.App.3d 997, 626
N.E.2d
1350. Criminal Law k 371(2); Criminal Law k 371(6)
Where defendants denied knowledge that items in their possession were
stolen,
the State properly introduced, in prosecution of husband, wife and two
sons
for theft under this paragraph, evidence of allegedly stolen items not
listed
in indictment to support its theory that knowledge and intent could
reasonably
be inferred from quantity of stolen goods in defendants' home. People
v.
Mertens, App. 2 Dist.1979, 33 Ill.Dec. 206, 77 Ill.App.3d 791, 396
N.E.2d 595.
Criminal Law k 370; Criminal Law k 371(2)
Where defendant was charged with felony theft for making purchases of
diamond
ring and silverware and then falsely reporting checkbook to have been
stolen,
evidence that defendant also purchased certain china, though not
charged in
indictment, was relevant to issue of defendant's intent, for it tended
to show
existence of common scheme or plan. People v. Maxon, App. 3 Dist.1976,
35
Ill.App.3d 670, 341 N.E.2d 479. Criminal Law k 371(3); Criminal Law k
372(9)
In prosecution for larceny by embezzlement, evidence of similar
offenses
allegedly committed within a two year period prior to acts of which
defendant
was charged, and in the course of one continuous period of relationship
between defendant and victim, was admissible as bearing on intent.
People v.
Clark, 1956, 9 Ill.2d 46, 137 N.E.2d 54, certiorari denied 77 S.Ct.
559, 352
U.S. 1002, 1 L.Ed.2d 546, rehearing denied 77 S.Ct. 717, 353 U.S. 931,
1
L.Ed.2d 725. Criminal Law k 371(2)
222. ---- Other crimes, modus operandi, admissibility, evidence
Evidence of two other crimes committed by defendant who was charged
with
residential burglary and theft was admissible to establish identity
through
modus operandi, where each crime involved theft of cash from elderly
woman who
lived alone, and in each case same three persons entered apartment
under guise
of doing some kind of repair work. People v. Miller, App. 1 Dist.1993,
193
Ill.Dec. 799, 254 Ill.App.3d 997, 626 N.E.2d 1350. Criminal Law k
369.15
In prosecution for theft, testimony of police investigator and credit
card
investigator about prior arrest of defendant was proper since it
related to
identification and arrest of defendant and was evidence of defendant's
modus
operandi. People v. Griffin, App. 1 Dist.1982, 68 Ill.Dec. 778, 113
Ill.App.3d 184, 446 N.E.2d 1175. Criminal Law k 369.15; Criminal Law
k
372(9)
In proceeding in which defendant was convicted of theft of property
having
value of more than $150, accomplice's testimony in regard to plan under
which
defendant would get and keep attendant's attention at gas pumps while
accomplice would enter station and take the money was not within the
modus
operandi exception to general rule against admission of evidence of
other
crimes, in light of fact that defendant was otherwise identified as
perpetrator of the charged offense and that it did not appear that such
evidence was utilized to establish modus operandi. People v. Mosley,
App. 3
Dist.1980, 39 Ill.Dec. 547, 84 Ill.App.3d 62, 404 N.E.2d 1138.
Criminal Law k
369.2(6)
In theft and forgery prosecution, evidence concerning other alleged
forgeries
and thefts by defendant from his employer would have been admissible to
show
modus operandi. People v. Toellen, App. 3 Dist.1978, 23 Ill.Dec. 686,
66
Ill.App.3d 967, 384 N.E.2d 480. Criminal Law k 372(5); Criminal Law k
372(12)
223. ---- Prior convictions, generally, admissibility, evidence
Introduction of proof of defendant's prior burglary conviction
warranted
reversal of defendant's convictions for theft by possession of over
$300 and
theft by possession--subsequent offense felony because prior conviction
was
not element of offenses and evidence connecting defendant to offenses
was
purely circumstantial and depended on contradicting statements of
witness.
People v. Shelton, App. 4 Dist.1990, 151 Ill.Dec. 249, 205 Ill.App.3d
471, 564
N.E.2d 226, appeal denied 156 Ill.Dec. 567, 137 Ill.2d 670, 571 N.E.2d
154.
Criminal Law k 369.9; Criminal Law k 1169.11
Defendant's prior residential burglary conviction was not element of
offense
of theft, and therefore could not be disclosed to jury; thus, State
properly
waited until sentencing to introduce evidence of defendant's prior
residential
burglary conviction conviction. People v. Williams, App. 3 Dist.1989,
138
Ill.Dec. 501, 191 Ill.App.3d 119, 547 N.E.2d 668. Criminal Law k 369.5
Armed robbery conviction used to elevate defendant's misdemeanor theft
charge
to felony was element of offense which had to be alleged and proven to
trier
of fact, under version of this paragraph in effect at time offense was
committed. People v. Haywood, App. 3 Dist.1989, 131 Ill.Dec. 814, 183
Ill.App.3d 212, 538 N.E.2d 1370. Larceny k 23; Larceny k 28(4)
Before defendant was convicted of theft with prior theft conviction, it
was
proper for State to introduce evidence of prior conviction during trial
where
defendant did not stipulate that he had prior theft conviction. People
v.
Collins, App. 4 Dist.1982, 65 Ill.Dec. 620, 109 Ill.App.3d 1076, 441
N.E.2d
935. Sentencing And Punishment k 1379(2)
Defendant was not proved guilty of theft as a felony where prosecution,
by
entering into stipulation to fact that defendant had prior conviction
for
retrial theft which was never brought to attention of jury, and by
refraining
from introducing evidence of prior conviction in its case-in-chief,
failed to
protect its record. People v. Wright, App. 4 Dist.1981, 54 Ill.Dec.
530, 98
Ill.App.3d 1089, 425 N.E.2d 42. Criminal Law k 661; Sentencing And
Punishment k 1381(3)
Appropriate way to present evidence of prior theft conviction of
defendant,
who offered to stipulate to such conviction, was for trial court to
take
judicial notice of one of defendant's prior theft convictions and to
inform
jury that it could consider such prior conviction as part of evidence
and that
it would subsequently receive instruction informing it how such
information
was to be limited. People v. Hobbs, App. 4 Dist.1980, 46 Ill.Dec. 14,
90
Ill.App.3d 587, 413 N.E.2d 454, vacated 56 Ill.Dec. 363, 86 Ill.2d 242,
427
N.E.2d 558. Sentencing And Punishment k 1376
In theft prosecution, no error occurred in denying defendant's motion
in
limine requesting partial jury waiver on issue of prior theft
conviction.
People v. Hobbs, App. 4 Dist.1980, 46 Ill.Dec. 14, 90 Ill.App.3d 587,
413
N.E.2d 454, vacated 56 Ill.Dec. 363, 86 Ill.2d 242, 427 N.E.2d 558.
Jury k
29(1)
Portion of witness' statement referring to defendant's conviction for
offense
of mail fraud was inadmissible in prosecution for theft by deception in
view
of fact there was no evidence of underlying facts of defendant's prior
conviction and defendant's practice of "fronting" corporations as
referred to
by witness, standing alone, could not serve to demonstrate that prior
crime
was substantially similar to offense at issue. People v. Friedman,
1980, 38
Ill.Dec. 141, 79 Ill.2d 341, 403 N.E.2d 229. Criminal Law k 374
In prosecution under indictment charging accused with larceny, wherein
second
count, purporting to charge prior offenses, was defective, admission,
under
the first count, of evidence of three prior convictions of petty
larceny was
error. People v. Lund, 1943, 46 N.E.2d 929, 382 Ill. 213. Criminal
Law k
369.5
224. ---- Prior convictions, impeachment, admissibility, evidence
Evidence of defendant's prior misdemeanor theft conviction was properly
admitted against him in burglary and theft prosecution even though
prior
conviction was punishable by imprisonment for less than one year;
theft was
crime involving dishonesty, and trial judge specifically instructed
jury to
consider evidence only insofar as it may affect defendant's credibility
and
not as evidence of guilt of charged offense. People v. Collins, App. 1
Dist.1992, 169 Ill.Dec. 730, 227 Ill.App.3d 670, 592 N.E.2d 217.
Witnesses k
337(16)
In theft prosecution, trial court properly balanced impeachment value
of
defendant's prior convictions of tampering with an automobile against
the
possible prejudice to defendant, and did not abuse its discretion in
permitting use of such convictions for impeachment. People v. Minor,
App. 5
Dist.1983, 71 Ill.Dec. 857, 115 Ill.App.3d 1046, 451 N.E.2d 1011.
Witnesses k
337(23)
In prosecution for burglary and theft of a residence, trial court
correctly
admitted evidence of defendant's prior conviction of burglary and theft
of a
residence for purposes of impeachment where court was aware of
potential for
prejudice and considered various applicable factors. People v. Garlin,
App. 5
Dist.1981, 57 Ill.Dec. 147, 101 Ill.App.3d 716, 428 N.E.2d 697.
Witnesses k
337(25)
Where defendant, in prosecution for burglary of restaurant and theft of
under
$150, had admitted his 1967 burglary conviction in course of his direct
testimony, trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing into
evidence
defendant's 1970 burglary conviction in that exclusion of evidence of
1970
conviction would have had effect of leaving jury with impression that
defendant had maintained clean record since his first conviction.
People v.
Franz, App. 2 Dist.1977, 11 Ill.Dec. 483, 54 Ill.App.3d 550, 368 N.E.2d
1091.
Witnesses k 337(29)
In prosecution for attempt armed robbery and murder, trial court did
not abuse
its discretion in refusing to prohibit State's use of three prior
misdemeanor
theft convictions of defendant for impeachment purposes. People v.
Rudolph,
App. 1 Dist.1977, 8 Ill.Dec. 544, 50 Ill.App.3d 559, 365 N.E.2d 930.
Witnesses
k 337(9)
In theft prosecution, admission of theft conviction, which reflected
adversely
on defendant's credibility, occurring four years earlier was not abuse
of
discretion. People v. Graham, App. 5 Dist.1975, 27 Ill.App.3d 408, 327
N.E.2d
261. Witnesses k 337(28)
In prosecution for burglary and theft of $150, which took place on June
29,
1972, admission of evidence of 1969 conviction for burglary and theft
did not
deprive defendant of a fair trial. People v. Gentry, App. 4 Dist.1974,
19
Ill.App.3d 861, 312 N.E.2d 441. Criminal Law k 369.2(6)
225. ---- Documentary evidence, admissibility, evidence
Documents from insurer's file, including loss report filled out by
adjuster,
group estimate prepared by adjuster, total loss and salvage evaluation
form,
sight draft, and mileage odometer statements, were admissible as
business
records in theft prosecution involving scheme to obtain money from
truck
rental companies for alleged accidents involving damaged car for which
insurer
had already paid claim to previous owner. People v. Shaw, App. 1
Dist.1985,
88 Ill.Dec. 534, 133 Ill.App.3d 391, 478 N.E.2d 1142. Criminal Law k
436(3)
Testimony of manager of division of corporation, in prosecution for
theft of
an electric typewriter, that numbers on typewriter removed from trunk
of
automobile used by defendants matched numbers on bill of sale which was
not
produced, nor was nonproduction explained, was not competent evidence
of
ownership of the typewriter. People v. Poindexter, App. 1 Dist.1973,
18
Ill.App.3d 436, 305 N.E.2d 400. Criminal Law k 400(7)
Where title to personal property is in issue, and it appears that the
title is
evidenced by a bill of sale or other similar written instrument, the
writing
is the best evidence and parol evidence is that admissible unless the
instrument is lost or its absence is otherwise satisfactorily
explained.
People v. Poindexter, App. 1 Dist.1973, 18 Ill.App.3d 436, 305 N.E.2d
400.
Criminal Law k 400(7)
In prosecution for larceny of cattle, duplicate of original sales
account
showing sale of cattle by commission firm for defendant's account, was
admissible as primary evidence. People v. Stone, 1932, 181 N.E. 648,
349 Ill.
52. Criminal Law k 398(1)
In prosecution for larceny of cattle, duplicate slips of commission
firm
showing purchase of cattle from defendant were admissible as original
documents. People v. Stone, 1932, 181 N.E. 648, 349 Ill. 52. Criminal
Law k
398(1)
In prosecution for larceny of cattle, duplicate transfer slip made by
cattle
checker for stockyard company was admissible as primary evidence of
delivery
of cattle by defendant and consignment to commission firm. People v.
Stone,
1932, 181 N.E. 648, 349 Ill. 52. Criminal Law k 398(1)
In prosecution for larceny of client's draft, bank ledger sheet showing
accused deposited draft to accused's account, contrary to client's
instruction, and showing withdrawals, was admissible. People v. Nevin,
1931,
175 N.E. 797, 343 Ill. 597. Embezzlement k 41
226. ---- Photographs, admissibility, evidence
In prosecution for theft and criminal damage to property, admission of
police
officer's testimony that witness had identified defendant on day of
trial by
picking photograph of defendant out of group of five, was reversible
and
prejudicial error warranting new trial in that clear object of
introducing
police testimony was to strengthen and, thus, to corroborate witness's
in-court identification of defendant. People v. Brown, App. 1
Dist.1974, 25
Ill.App.3d 377, 323 N.E.2d 379. Criminal Law k 339; Criminal Law k
421(6);
Criminal Law k 1169.1(5)
In prosecution for theft and criminal damage to property, sustaining
objection
to State's redirect examination as to photographic identification of
defendant
was proper where, on cross-examination, witness' response concerning
photographs was volunteered and not responsive to questions, and
defense
counsel asked no questions concerning such identification. People v.
Brown,
App. 1 Dist.1974, 25 Ill.App.3d 377, 323 N.E.2d 379. Witnesses k
288(2)
Failure, in criminal prosecution in which two stolen television sets
were
introduced and photographs of all 13 stolen sets were admitted into
evidence,
to introduce all stolen sets was not error. People v. Canaday, 1971,
49
Ill.2d 416, 275 N.E.2d 356. Criminal Law k 661
In prosecution for larceny of soil pipe from storage area adjoining
parking
lot from which defendant was seen driving his truck prior to his
arrest,
photographs, which police officer testified as truly and correctly
portraying
scene of parking area on date in question, were admissible in evidence,
even
though police officer also gave a verbal description of scene. People
v.
Rogers, 1959, 16 Ill.2d 175, 157 N.E.2d 28. Criminal Law k 438(4)
227. ---- Exhibits, admissibility, evidence
Police officer who knew that fraudulent rolls of coins were being sold
locally, and who had received police radio dispatch that citizen had
observed
two white males acting suspiciously with rolls of coins in glove
compartment
of Dodge Polaris having a certain license plate number, had reasonable
grounds
to believe that occupants of Dodge Polaris bearing that number were
involved
in coin scheme and to arrest them, and burglary tools and other items
found in
later search of car pursuant to warrant were lawfully seized and
admissible in
prosecution for possession of burglary tools and theft. People v.
Evans, App.
2 Dist.1975, 32 Ill.App.3d 865, 336 N.E.2d 792. Arrest k 63.4(11);
Criminal
Law k 394.4(12)
Where two witnesses testified to seeing defendant put his hand in purse
of
woman, who testified that when she left purse at table in lounge she
had
between $35 and $40 in bills in it, one witness testified that
defendant took
something from the purse, looked at it and put it in his pocket, and
when
defendant was arrested, shortly after discovery that money had been
taken,
defendant had $35 in his pants pocket in bills and all the other bills
he had
were in his billfold, the currency found in pocket was properly
received in
evidence in prosecution for theft. People v. Pappani, App. 4
Dist.1973, 12
Ill.App.3d 428, 299 N.E.2d 153. Criminal Law k 404.75
Where officer positively identified both sets of keys as those taken
from
defendant's automobile and from rest room trash can, both sets of keys
were
admissible in evidence in prosecution for possession of burglary tools
and
misdemeanor theft. People v. Oliver, App.1970, 129 Ill.App.2d 83, 262
N.E.2d
597. Criminal Law k 404.36
Admitting, over objection, testimony of state witness that state's
exhibit No.
2 was a note and memorandum attached to outside of sack, containing
allegedly
stolen jacket marked state's exhibit No. 1, and permitting witness to
read
such note was proper to refute inference, raised by defense counsel's
cross-examination designed to impeach witness' identification of
jacket, that
there had been any confusion or substitution of particular jacket
alleged to
have been stolen. People v. Ferrara, App.1969, 111 Ill.App.2d 472, 250
N.E.2d
530, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 1815, 398 U.S. 927, 26 L.Ed.2d 89.
Witnesses k
413
Defendant accused of theft and conspiracy to commit theft by breaking
arm of
coconspirator and then pushing coconspirator into side of automobile
and
collecting $3,000 in settlement of fraudulent claim was not prejudiced
by
exhibition to jury of scar on coconspirator's arm. People v. Radford,
App.1967, 87 Ill.App.2d 308, 232 N.E.2d 100. Criminal Law k 1169.1(10)
Defendant was not prejudiced by evidence pertaining to slip of paper
found on
person of defense witness' wife where prosecutor withdrew exhibit and
court
instructed jury to disregard evidence. People v. DiLella, App.1964, 52
Ill.App.2d 403, 202 N.E.2d 77. Criminal Law k 1169.5(2)
In prosecution for larceny of accessories from stolen automobile where
a
diagram was used by arresting officer to illustrate and clarify
testimony of
officer, use of diagram, which was not refuted, did not prejudice
defendant.
People v. Hayes, 1960, 20 Ill.2d 319, 169 N.E.2d 760. Criminal Law k
1170.5(1)
On a trial for theft of a roll of money, the identification by the
prosecuting
witness of a roll of paper, with a single bill wrapped around it, used
to
replace the roll taken, was properly allowed. Keating v. People, 1896,
43
N.E. 724, 160 Ill. 480. Larceny k 43
228. ---- Rebuttal evidence, admissibility, evidence
In larceny prosecution, state's attorney was properly permitted to
testify as
a witness for the state in rebuttal of testimony by defendant as to
what the
state's attorney had told defendant in connection with his giving
statement
with regard to transactions which were basis of larceny prosecution.
People
v. Knox, App.1967, 90 Ill.App.2d 149, 234 N.E.2d 128. Witnesses k 68
229. ---- Cure of error, admissibility, evidence
If, in prosecution for theft, admission of defendant's testimony
linking him
with his brother, who was the individual who actually took victim's
money in
theft, was error, it was harmless, as the judge sitting without a jury
was
presumed to recognize incompetent evidence and disregard it. People v.
Smith,
App. 1 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 668, 320 N.E.2d 137. Criminal Law k
260.11(6)
Refusal to permit defendant, who was charged with theft of tires, to
testify
that general manager of corporation whose tires were stolen viewed
defendant's
receipt for tires prior to trial did not constitute reversible error,
where
such testimony was merely corroboration of evidence that defendant
purchased
certain tires, and where, moreover, receipts for purchase of nine tires
by
defendant were introduced into evidence. People v. Drake, App. 1
Dist.1974,
20 Ill.App.3d 762, 314 N.E.2d 532. Criminal Law k 1170(2)
230. Sufficiency, evidence--In general
Evidence was sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt,
defendant's
guilt of theft. People v. Miller, 1975, 27 Ill.App.3d 788, 327 N.E.2d
253;
People v. Voleta, 1965, 57 Ill.App.2d 279, 206 N.E.2d 737; People v.
Baker,
1959, 16 Ill.2d 364, 158 N.E.2d 1.
Testimony of department store's loss prevention manager that, based on
his
examination of computer-generated records, store had not been paid for
coat
allegedly purchased by defendant with stolen credit card, was
insufficient to
support theft conviction; computer-generated record did not contain
indicia
of fraud testified to by manager, and manager conducted no other
investigation
concerning fraudulent nature of defendant's transaction. People v.
Murray,
App. 1 Dist.1994, 203 Ill.Dec. 644, 262 Ill.App.3d 1056, 640 N.E.2d
303.
Larceny k 55
Clear and convincing evidence supported finding that employee of
Illinois
Department of Public Aid (IDPA) was discharged from her employment for
violating theft statute by knowingly failing to forward at least eight
child
support checks to IDPA as required as condition for receiving public
aid
benefits; employee had signed public aid benefits application which
included
agreement to forward all child support payments. Killingsworth v.
Finne, App.
1 Dist.1993, 182 Ill.Dec. 116, 241 Ill.App.3d 1027, 609 N.E.2d 650,
appeal
denied 186 Ill.Dec. 382, 151 Ill.2d 565, 616 N.E.2d 335. Officers And
Public
Employees k 72.63
Evidence that defendant was unwilling to return stolen purse until she
was
offered reward and that defendant refused to identify herself when
talking to
complaining witness by telephone was sufficient to support conclusion
that
defendant had intent to permanently deprive purse owner of its use or
benefit
at time she received possession thereof. People v. Block, App. 2
Dist.1989,
132 Ill.Dec. 772, 184 Ill.App.3d 135, 540 N.E.2d 512. Receiving Stolen
Goods
k 8(4)
Where only difference in evidence, which related to defendant's
purchase of
allegedly stolen items, between defendant and codefendant in theft
prosecution
could not support conviction of defendant, failure of trial court to
convict
codefendant raised reasonable doubt as to guilt of defendant and
required
reversal of defendant's conviction. People v. Perez, App. 1 Dist.1980,
38
Ill.Dec. 457, 82 Ill.App.3d 1007, 403 N.E.2d 688. Criminal Law k 877
Where only difference in evidence between defendant and codefendant in
theft
prosecution was that defendant purchased allegedly stolen items for $50
and
codefendant did not purchase such items and there was no evidence to
cause a
reasonable person to believe that the property had been stolen, the
difference
was not sufficient to support the conviction of defendant and the
failure to
convict codefendant raised a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt.
People
v. Perez, App. 1 Dist.1980, 38 Ill.Dec. 457, 82 Ill.App.3d 1007, 403
N.E.2d
688. Receiving Stolen Goods k 8(3)
In prosecution for theft, testimony that exhibits were shotguns and
rifle was
sufficient to show beyond reasonable doubt offenses of theft of
firearms, as
charged, as against contention that evidence did not establish that
devices in
question met requirement of <paragraph> 83-1.1 of former chapter 38 of
being
designed to expel projectile or projectiles by action of explosion,
expansion
of gas or escape of gas. People v. Ems, App. 3 Dist.1980, 37 Ill.Dec.
243, 81
Ill.App.3d 574, 401 N.E.2d 1336. Receiving Stolen Goods k 8(3)
Evidence, in burglary and theft prosecution for breaking into
automobiles, was
sufficient to sustain conviction for theft of property not exceeding
$150 in
value. People v. Schubert, App. 2 Dist.1975, 28 Ill.App.3d 599, 329
N.E.2d 23
. Larceny k 65
Evidence which included, inter alia, defendant's uncontradicted
testimony that
he was arrested by police officer as he passed burglarized grocery
store en
route to visit a friend and testimony that at time of apprehension
defendant
had a laceration in palm of his right hand was insufficient to sustain
defendant's conviction for attempted theft and criminal damage to
property.
People v. Davis, App. 1 Dist.1975, 27 Ill.App.3d 288, 326 N.E.2d 470.
Larceny
k 66; Malicious Mischief k 9
Defendant did not sustain burden of showing that judge abused his
discretion
in ruling that jury deliberations were not contaminated by furnishing
of soup
and beverage cups which contained printed legend including, inter alia,
"Lock
Out Crime" and "Never Give a Burglar an Even Break," where no juror
felt that
his or her verdict was in any way influenced by the legends and the
legends
were general statements of a kind which jurors would see and read in
course of
their common experience and did not deal specifically with defendant,
who was
charged with theft. People v. DeBartolo, App. 2 Dist.1975, 24
Ill.App.3d
1000, 322 N.E.2d 251. Criminal Law k 858(1)
In prosecution for theft, conviction would not be reversed on grounds
that
State failed to prove defendant's age and that jury verdict contained
no
finding as to age, where proof of defendant's age was not an element of
offense of theft and defendant did not raise his age as an affirmative
defense. People v. DeBartolo, App. 2 Dist.1975, 24 Ill.App.3d 1000, 322
N.E.2d
251. Criminal Law k 1186.1
Evidence showing that defendant entered drug store and put a bottle of
pills
in his coat pocket and proceeded to check out counter using the lane
where he
could go directly out of the store and as he was leaving the check out
lane he
was stopped by police officer and he still had container of pills in
his
possession was more than sufficient to determine defendant was guilty
of theft
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Thompson, App. 1 Dist.1973, 12
Ill.App.3d 807, 299 N.E.2d 76. Larceny k 64(1)
Evidence as to theft of money from pocket of prosecuting witness by one
who
had allegedly robbed victim's brother four days previously was so
improbable
as to raise reasonable doubt that such theft occurred and was
insufficient to
sustain conviction for theft. People v. Chambliss, App.1966, 69
Ill.App.2d
459, 217 N.E.2d 422. Larceny k 55
Test as to sufficiency of evidence to convict is whether evidence
proves that
crime was committed and that accused committed it. People v. Franklin,
1953,
114 N.E.2d 661, 415 Ill. 514. Criminal Law k 562
Evidence was sufficient to show that an attorney feloniously converted
goods
levied on under executions issued on judgments procured by him on
claims in
his hands for collection, justifying a conviction of larceny,
notwithstanding
the conflict in the evidence. People v. Frankenberg, 1908, 86 N.E.
128, 236
Ill. 408. Larceny k 63
Where, in a prosecution for the larceny of a suit of clothes from a
house
where defendant and others were working, a witness testified that he
was
working in the house when defendant left with another man, and that
defendant
had a big bundle under his arm in an old coat, which he placed on the
seat of
a wagon in which the two drove off, and that, after hearing of the
theft, he
and another person went to the place where defendant had gone, and
found the
bundle containing the stolen clothes in the wagon, the party who was
with
defendant testified that he got his coat for him, and that he had
nothing but
his own coat and vest, and that he placed these on the seat of the
wagon, when
they drove off, defendant, in his own behalf, testified that he did not
take
the clothes, and gave substantially the same account as his witness, it
was
also shown that defendant's coat and vest were found on the wagon seat,
while
the suit of clothes was wrapped in an old coat, and eight witnesses
testified
to defendant's good character, evidence did not justify a verdict of
guilty.
McMahon v. People, 1887, 11 N.E. 883, 120 Ill. 581. Larceny k 64(6)
231. ---- Venue, sufficiency, evidence
In prosecution for theft of property exceeding $150 in value, proof
that
defendants exerted control over property in question in certain county
was
sufficient to establish venue in such county, despite defendants'
contention
that proof that items were taken from particular store owned by owner
was
necessary to establish venue in such county. People v. Parker, App. 2
Dist.1979, 33 Ill.Dec. 21, 77 Ill.App.3d 536, 396 N.E.2d 97. Criminal
Law k
564(1)
232. ---- Circumstantial evidence, generally, sufficiency
Elements of theft may be proven by circumstantial evidence. People v.
Austin,
1974, 25 Ill.App.3d 174, 323 N.E.2d 128; People v. Thomas, 1972, 9
Ill.App.3d
384, 292 N.E.2d 153.
Circumstantial evidence is legal evidence and where it is strong and
convincing in character it is sufficient to warrant conviction for
larceny.
People v. Stevenson, 1969, 107 Ill.App.2d 441, 246 N.E.2d 309; People
v.
Wright, 1968, 99 Ill.App.2d 377, 240 N.E.2d 698; People v. Finch,
1946, 394
Ill. 183, 68 N.E.2d 283, certiorari denied 67 S.Ct. 298, 329 U.S. 786,
91
L.Ed. 673.
In prosecution for larceny, circumstantial evidence could be used to
prove
corpus delicti. People v. Gawlick, 1932, 350 Ill. 359, 183 N.E. 217;
People
v. Graves, 1928, 331 Ill. 268, 162 N.E. 839.
Intent and unauthorized control can be proved by circumstantial
evidence in
theft prosecution. People v. Stell, App. 3 Dist.1992, 165 Ill.Dec.
907, 223
Ill.App.3d 531, 585 N.E.2d 638. Larceny k 55; Larceny k 57
Circumstantial evidence, including complaining witness' testimony that
her
purse was on floor by her desk at time it disappeared, was sufficient
to
support conclusion that purse was stolen rather than lost or mislaid;
evidence that purse disappeared from area under complaining witness'
control
raised strong inference of theft. People v. Block, App. 2 Dist.1989,
132
Ill.Dec. 772, 184 Ill.App.3d 135, 540 N.E.2d 512. Receiving Stolen
Goods k
8(3)
Circumstantial evidence in prosecution for conspiracy and theft was
insufficient to sustain conviction of defendant who allegedly received
merchandise without being billed, since evidence did not exclude
reasonable
conclusion that defendant paid employee, in ordinary course of business
for
all merchandise he received. People v. Pizzi, App. 1 Dist.1981, 50
Ill.Dec.
30, 94 Ill.App.3d 415, 418 N.E.2d 1024. False Pretenses k 49(1)
Proof of superior property interest in allegedly stolen property and
exercise
of unauthorized control over that property as elements of offense of
theft may
be established by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. People v.
Loveless, App. 3 Dist.1981, 48 Ill.Dec. 804, 93 Ill.App.3d 293, 417
N.E.2d 206
. Larceny k 60
Evidence that while vehicle was parked by liquor store defendant was
observed
standing by it and that while cash register was open defendant asked
attendant
to give him a bottle of wine and dropped some coins behind counter and
requested attendant to pick them up for him, at which time someone
removed
over $600 in $20 bills from cash register, with $600 in $20 bills found
on
individual who was occupying the vehicle was insufficient to convict
defendant
of theft. People v. Bentley, App. 3 Dist.1980, 42 Ill.Dec. 915, 87
Ill.App.3d
1033, 409 N.E.2d 530. Larceny k 55
Circumstantial evidence including showing that defendant was the
operator of
automobile which matched description of the one at the scene of the
crime,
that he possessed the blue tennis shoes with white stripes and the
green army
fatigue jacket, both no different from those worn by perpetrators, and
that he
was in possession of spoils of the offense sustained conviction of
armed
robbery, home invasion, burglary and felony-theft. People v. Perry,
App. 4
Dist.1980, 37 Ill.Dec. 170, 81 Ill.App.3d 422, 401 N.E.2d 1263,
certiorari
denied 101 S.Ct. 2313, 451 U.S. 983, 68 L.Ed.2d 839. Burglary k 42(1);
Larceny k 64(1); Robbery k 24.25
In prosecution for theft, intent on part of defendant to permanently
deprive
owner of property may seldom be proved by direct evidence and therefore
must
be deduced from acts committed and circumstantial evidence. People v.
Mays,
App. 3 Dist.1980, 35 Ill.Dec. 652, 80 Ill.App.3d 340, 399 N.E.2d 718.
Larceny
k 57
Facts and circumstances surrounding crucial events leading to
conviction of
police officer for theft of gun, which he maintained had been given to
him,
created grave doubt as to officer's guilt, and thus conviction could
not be
sustained. People v. Steinmann, App. 5 Dist.1978, 15 Ill.Dec. 411, 57
Ill.App.3d 887, 373 N.E.2d 757. Embezzlement k 44(1)
Evidence showing, inter alia, that cash found at defendant's apartment
was of
same denominations as stolen money, that defendant had access to
premises from
which cash was taken and was alone there at times and that defendant
admitted
taking the money was sufficient to sustain theft conviction. People v.
Grasty, App. 2 Dist.1975, 30 Ill.App.3d 811, 333 N.E.2d 493. Larceny k
55
Conviction of theft can be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone
if
character of such evidence convinces trier of facts of defendant's
guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. People v. Agans, App. 4 Dist.1974, 24
Ill.App.3d 64,
320 N.E.2d 25. Larceny k 55
Defendant's intent to permanently deprive owner of the use and benefit
of
property can be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding
the
alleged criminal act. People v. Pierce, App. 1 Dist.1974, 21
Ill.App.3d 770,
315 N.E.2d 584. Larceny k 41
In prosecution for theft of property in value over $150, circumstantial
evidence established guilt of defendant beyond reasonable doubt with
respect
to money taken from parking meters in municipal parking lot. People v.
Edwards, App. 4 Dist.1974, 21 Ill.App.3d 354, 315 N.E.2d 91. Larceny k
65
Essential elements of an offense may be proved by circumstantial
evidence.
People v. Lewis, App. 1 Dist.1974, 18 Ill.App.3d 131, 309 N.E.2d 349.
Criminal
Law k 552(1)
Defendant's intent to deprive owner of use and benefit of property can
be
inferred from facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged criminal
act.
People v. Carr, App. 1 Dist.1973, 16 Ill.App.3d 76, 305 N.E.2d 554.
Larceny k
41
Where property in automobile was stolen, and driver and passenger in
automobile containing stolen property were arrested near burglary, and
burglarized house had markings that could have been made by pliers in
burglary
kit of defendants, and possession of property in automobile in which
defendants were riding was unexplained, convictions of passenger of
automobile
for burglary, possession of burglary tools, and theft were justified.
People
v. Ricketson, App.1970, 129 Ill.App.2d 365, 264 N.E.2d 220. Burglary k
41(9);
Burglary k 42(1); Larceny k 64(1)
Unauthorized control over stolen property may be proved by
circumstantial
evidence. People v. Bullock, App.1970, 123 Ill.App.2d 30, 259 N.E.2d
641.
Larceny k 63
233. ---- Corpus delicti, sufficiency, evidence
Evidence corroborating defendant's confession to crimes of residential
burglary, theft, and criminal damage to property was sufficient to
establish
corpus delicti; drawers in living room and bedrooms were open and
personal
papers and clothing scattered, valuables within house had been moved,
VCR,
checkbook, and cash were missing, and front window pane was broken.
People v.
Stevens, App. 4 Dist.1989, 136 Ill.Dec. 433, 188 Ill.App.3d 865, 544
N.E.2d
1208. Criminal Law k 535(2)
State failed to prove that money missing from restaurant had been
unlawfully
taken, and that defendants were connected to missing money, as was
required
for convictions for theft; although evidence supported determination
that
some criminal activity had taken place, people other than defendants
had
access to money, and those people were not called to testify, and
amount of
money which defendants allegedly received from theft did not match
amount
restaurant owner stated had been taken. People v. Furby, App. 2
Dist.1989,
130 Ill.Dec. 804, 181 Ill.App.3d 872, 537 N.E.2d 1133, appeal allowed
136
Ill.Dec. 595, 127 Ill.2d 626, 545 N.E.2d 119, reversed 150 Ill.Dec.
534, 138
Ill.2d 434, 563 N.E.2d 421, on remand 169 Ill.Dec. 360, 228 Ill.App.3d
1, 591
N.E.2d 533. Larceny k 56
Evidence in theft prosecution was sufficient to sustain conviction;
defendant, a deliveryman, admitted that he left stolen bacon at a
market and
that he was going to that location later in order to collect the money;
moreover, defendant's confession was corroborated by other evidence,
including
testimony of private detective who followed defendant on his rounds.
People
v. Stepteau, App. 1 Dist.1986, 96 Ill.Dec. 542, 142 Ill.App.3d 400, 491
N.E.2d
821. Larceny k 55
While it was true that record of net sales on tape of cash register of
store
on night of theft was essential to a determination of whether money was
missing from register, it was proper for trial court to consider both
register
tape and balance sheet in concluding that a crime had been committed;
proof
independent of defendant's statements was not required, the test being
whether
the whole evidence proved the fact a crime was committed. People v.
Murphy,
App. 3 Dist.1978, 22 Ill.Dec. 562, 65 Ill.App.3d 935, 382 N.E.2d 1260.
Criminal Law k 409(6.1)
Though proof beyond reasonable doubt that property was taken without
authorization is a part of corpus delicti of offense of theft, such
element
need not necessarily be established by direct evidence. People v.
Miller,
App. 5 Dist.1974, 24 Ill.App.3d 504, 321 N.E.2d 109. Larceny k 56
Where testimony of assistant pastor proved the breaking and entering
into
church rectory and the loss of funds, and pastor identified defendant
as being
illegally in the rectory at the time of the occurrence, state
sufficiently
proved corpus delicti of the crime of theft against defendant
notwithstanding
that there was no showing that other agents of the church had not
lawfully
taken the money, that the money was found in the possession of the
accused, or
that a witness saw the accused take the money. People v. Williams,
App.1966,
75 Ill.App.2d 342, 221 N.E.2d 28. Larceny k 56
Although mere naked uncorroborated confession is insufficient to
convict,
corpus delicti need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt by evidence
aliunde
confession or admissions of accused. People v. Franklin, 1953, 114
N.E.2d
661, 415 Ill. 514. Criminal Law k 535(2)
Corpus delicti need not be established by evidence other than that
which tends
to connect accused with crime, and same evidence may be used to prove
both
guilt and existence of crime. People v. Franklin, 1953, 114 N.E.2d
661, 415
Ill. 514. Criminal Law k 535(2)
In prosecution for larceny of three notes having total value of $2500,
evidence, including confession of accused which was amply corroborated,
established corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt. People v.
Franklin, 1953,
114 N.E.2d 661, 415 Ill. 514. Criminal Law k 535(2)
Evidence that tavern window had been forced open at night, and liquor
and
other merchandise had been removed from tavern and partly loaded in
automobile
outside tavern, established corpus delicti of burglary and larceny.
People v.
Wilson, 1944, 56 N.E.2d 630, 387 Ill. 563. Burglary k 41(2); Larceny k
56
In prosecution for larceny of department store merchandise, evidence
that
shoplifter's boxes were found in codefendant's automobile and that
large
quantities of similar department store articles were stuffed into
cardboard
boxes, and that none of the articles had been wrapped in packages by
stores
making the sales was sufficient to prove "corpus delicti" of offense
charged,
without considering admissions by defendants and to sustain conviction.
People
v. Feeley, 1940, 29 N.E.2d 593, 374 Ill. 402. Larceny k 56
In prosecution for larceny of heifer, corpus delicti could be proved by
circumstantial evidence, but fact that heifers were in defendant's
pasture
soon after they disappeared from owner's pasture was not of itself
enough to
prove heifers had been stolen or that defendant had any connection with
alleged offense. People v. Betts, 1937, 11 N.E.2d 942, 367 Ill. 499.
Larceny
k 56
Corpus delicti of larceny of hog was properly established by testimony
of
witness originally indicted jointly with defendant; testimony being
corroborated. People v. McElvain, 1930, 172 N.E. 131, 341 Ill. 224.
Criminal
Law k 511.1(9)
In a prosecution for stealing hogs, evidence that defendants loaded
into a
truck the same number of hogs as were subsequently missed from a field
near
by, and that the hogs were of the same weight as those in the field,
and of
the same color as some of those in the field, without any further proof
that
the hogs loaded in the truck were those taken from the field, is
insufficient
to prove the corpus delicti of the larceny of the hogs beyond a
reasonable
doubt. People v. Wallace, 1922, 135 N.E. 723, 303 Ill. 504. Larceny k
56
234. ---- Knowledge, sufficiency, evidence
Defendant could have requisite mental state for theft, even if she did
not
know that victim's vinyl jacket contained the credit card she was
charged with
stealing, so long as she knowingly obtained or exerted unauthorized
control
over the jacket and intended to deprive the owner permanently of its
use.
People v. Moneyham, App. 2 Dist.2001, 257 Ill.Dec. 603, 323 Ill.App.3d
680,
753 N.E.2d 1229, appeal denied 261 Ill.Dec. 526, 197 Ill.2d 575, 763
N.E.2d
775. Larceny k 3(4)
In proceeding wherein defendant, who had permit authorizing him to take
railroad's "one-half ties, more or less," was convicted of misdemeanor
theft
of whole railroad ties, evidence sufficiently established that
defendant did
not have a bona fide belief that he was entitled to take whole ties.
People
v. West, App. 2 Dist.1981, 57 Ill.Dec. 701, 102 Ill.App.3d 50, 429
N.E.2d 599.
Larceny k 57
In theft prosecution, evidence relating to defendant's purchase of
allegedly
stolen items was insufficient to establish that defendant knowingly
obtained
control over stolen items knowing items to have been stolen or obtained
control under such circumstances as would have reasonably induced
defendant to
believe items were stolen. People v. Perez, App. 1 Dist.1980, 38
Ill.Dec.
457, 82 Ill.App.3d 1007, 403 N.E.2d 688. Receiving Stolen Goods k 8(3)
In theft prosecution, necessary element of knowledge that items were
stolen
was established by defendant's extensive criminal record at an early
age,
including several convictions for drug offenses and burglary
convictions,
witness' testimony that he sold several guns, chain saw and tools to
defendant
for only $300 to $400, testimony that defendant and his partner
occasionally
gave .22- caliber rifles to anyone purchasing high caliber guns, and,
additionally, that defendant, when asked by officers to lock his dog
up,
released dog in house and ran down basement stairs and thereafter was
in front
of storage closet with large, heavy door, wherein items of stolen
property
were found. People v. Ems, App. 3 Dist.1980, 37 Ill.Dec. 243, 81
Ill.App.3d
574, 401 N.E.2d 1336. Receiving Stolen Goods k 8(4)
Guilty knowledge may be established by proof that the accused actually
knew
the property was stolen or may be inferred from all the facts and
circumstances which would induce belief in the mind of a reasonable
person
that the property was stolen and which would be sufficient to induce in
the
mind of the accused a like belief. People v. Althide, App. 3
Dist.1979, 27
Ill.Dec. 428, 71 Ill.App.3d 963, 389 N.E.2d 240. Receiving Stolen
Goods k
8(1)
Where juvenile probationer admitted to court that he had received 250
pairs of
shoelaces but had only paid for ten, admission was sufficient for court
to
conclude that juvenile should have known that the items had been stolen
when
he "bought" them and provided a sufficient factual basis for conclusion
that
juvenile had violated Criminal Code. In Interest of Fields, App. 1
Dist.1977,
5 Ill.Dec. 343, 46 Ill.App.3d 1028, 361 N.E.2d 666. Infants k 176
In theft prosecution, evidence was sufficient to sustain finding that
defendant knowingly obtained control over stolen tires with intention
to
deprive owner permanently of their use and benefit, despite contention
that
there was no proof of felonious intent because owner's employee made
"sale" to
defendant and there was no showing that they were coconspirators.
People v.
DeBartolo, App. 2 Dist.1975, 24 Ill.App.3d 1000, 322 N.E.2d 251.
Larceny k 57
Where the only evidence connecting defendant with stolen property was
that
defendant occupied a bedroom adjoining rear porch on which property was
found
and where defendant had equal access to the porch with several other
persons
residing in the house, such evidence was not sufficient to sustain
defendant's
conviction for theft in the absence of any direct evidence showing that
defendant had ever seen the stolen property or was aware of its
presence on
the back porch. People v. Marshall, App. 1 Dist.1974, 24 Ill.App.3d
82, 320
N.E.2d 475. Larceny k 64(4)
Evidence was sufficient to support conviction of petit theft against
defendant
who took battery from a recently stolen automobile, which defendant
claimed he
thought was abandoned but which had ignition on at time of taking of
battery,
and who concealed battery which he had appropriated. People v.
McClinton,
App.1972, 4 Ill.App.3d 253, 280 N.E.2d 795. Larceny k 65
Knowledge that property was stolen may be established by proof of
circumstances that would cause reasonable man to believe that property
had
been stolen but possession alone, even if exclusive, is insufficient to
establish that defendant knew that property was stolen when he received
it.
People v. Baxa, 1971, 50 Ill.2d 111, 277 N.E.2d 876. Receiving Stolen
Goods k
8(4)
Where there was no proof that defendant knew that goods in vehicle were
stolen, evidence that when defendant was arrested he was riding as
passenger
in vehicle which contained merchandise which had been stolen the
preceding
evening was insufficient to sustain conviction for theft. People v.
Baxa,
1971, 50 Ill.2d 111, 277 N.E.2d 876. Larceny k 64(1)
Evidence sustained conviction, of theft of property, of defendant who
was
operating and in control of vehicle in which recently stolen
merchandise was
found in boxes on seat and who had knowledge of contents of such boxes.
People
v. Banks, App.1971, 2 Ill.App.3d 401, 276 N.E.2d 64. Larceny k 64(7)
235. ---- Intent, generally, sufficiency, evidence
Defendant's conviction of theft was supported by evidence, which
established
that he took unauthorized control over one victim's automobile and
another
victim's purse, and proved that he acted with requisite mental states.
People
v. Jones, 1992, 172 Ill.Dec. 401, 149 Ill.2d 288, 595 N.E.2d 1071.
Larceny k
55
Even if defendant intended to turn gun over to police at time he was
arrested,
such intent did not preclude finding that defendant was guilty of
theft, where
defendant retained gun for over ten months before allegedly attempting
to turn
it over to police. People v. Davis, App. 2 Dist.1988, 119 Ill.Dec.
697, 169
Ill.App.3d 1, 523 N.E.2d 165, appeal denied 125 Ill.Dec. 225, 122
Ill.2d 582,
530 N.E.2d 253. Larceny k 3(1)
In prosecution for theft, evidence that defendant never informed
copayees of
insurance company's draft that he endorsed check and then deposited it
in his
own personal checking account supported finding that defendant intended
to
permanently deprive copayees of their property and to sustain
conviction.
People v. Martin-Trigona, App. 1 Dist.1982, 67 Ill.Dec. 291, 111
Ill.App.3d
718, 444 N.E.2d 527. Larceny k 57
Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant knowingly obtained
control of
$800 of victim's money with intent to keep that money, as required to
support
conviction for theft by deception; defendant, while posing as attorney,
was
paid $300 retainer fee and given $500 to bond person out of jail, but
defendant never bonded anyone out of jail and never returned money.
People v.
Dupree, App. 1 Dist.2003, 275 Ill.Dec. 551, 339 Ill.App.3d 512, 793
N.E.2d 31,
habeas corpus dismissed 2003 WL 21506827, appeal denied 281 Ill.Dec.
84, 205
Ill.2d 603, 803 N.E.2d 488. Larceny k 55
State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly exerted
unauthorized control over bicycle of another, and that defendant
intended to
keep the bicycle, depriving the owner of its use or benefit. People v.
Dziak,
App. 2 Dist.1975, 30 Ill.App.3d 859, 333 N.E.2d 582. Receiving Stolen
Goods k
8(3)
Connection between acts committed and intent required to commit thefts
charged
was clearly inferrable from circumstances as shown in record of
proceedings
wherein defendant entered his pleas of guilty to charges. People v.
Key, App.
3 Dist.1975, 28 Ill.App.3d 637, 328 N.E.2d 914. Criminal Law k
273(4.1)
Evidence showing, inter alia, that defendant, sanitary district
official,
cashed checks intended to serve as payment from village for rental of
equipment from district and that defendant did not attempt to return
money to
village until after audit of village's account disclosed irregularity
of
payments to defendant justified jury's finding that defendant possessed
requisite intent to deprive sanitary district of funds to sustain theft
conviction. People v. Campbell, App. 5 Dist.1975, 28 Ill.App.3d 480,
328
N.E.2d 608. Embezzlement k 44(2)
Evidence was insufficient to establish intent to commit theft, in
prosecution
for breaking and entering home with intent to commit theft. People v.
Hunter,
App. 1 Dist.1973, 14 Ill.App.3d 879, 303 N.E.2d 482. Burglary k 41(3)
A person by his one act may intend to deprive owner permanently of the
use of
his property, may do so by knowingly using, concealing the property,
and may
use and conceal the property knowing the owner may probably be deprived
of its
use or benefit. People v. Spera, App. 2 Dist.1973, 10 Ill.App.3d 305,
293
N.E.2d 656. Larceny k 1
While act of defendant, after reading instructions for a model airplane
he
wished to buy and learning that a kit (battery and fuel) was needed to
operate
airplane, violated store rules by placing kit inside of box containing
airplane, evidence, including defendant's testimony that he did not see
any
sign or hear any announcement warning customers not to open boxes and
that he
did not notice if cashier opened box and looked inside as he was
writing out a
check for payment of items, failed to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that
defendant intended to permanently deprive store of its property and
commit
theft. People v. Lessen, App.1970, 123 Ill.App.2d 1, 259 N.E.2d 613.
Larceny
k 57
Evidence, under all counts of indictment for theft, that defendant
concealed
settlement of personal injury suit from his client and deposited
proceeds in
his personal account, was sufficient to prove intent to defraud.
People v.
Green, App.1966, 74 Ill.App.2d 308, 218 N.E.2d 840, certiorari denied
87 S.Ct.
2051, 387 U.S. 930, 18 L.Ed.2d 990, rehearing denied 88 S.Ct. 17, 389
U.S.
890, 19 L.Ed.2d 200. Embezzlement k 44(2)
Fact that defendant stood ready to return proceeds to his client was in
no way
probative of his intent to defraud client at time he took proceeds from
personal injury suit and deposited them in his own personal account.
People
v. Green, App.1966, 74 Ill.App.2d 308, 218 N.E.2d 840, certiorari
denied 87
S.Ct. 2051, 387 U.S. 930, 18 L.Ed.2d 990, rehearing denied 88 S.Ct. 17,
389
U.S. 890, 19 L.Ed.2d 200. Embezzlement k 44(2)
The evidence established that defendant accused of theft had the
requisite
criminal knowledge or intent. People v. Hill, App.1965, 58 Ill.App.2d
191,
206 N.E.2d 269. Larceny k 57
A specific demand for money is not necessary to prove intent to commit
theft.
People v. Bonner, App.1963, 43 Ill.App.2d 42, 192 N.E.2d 568. Larceny
k 57
In prosecution of truck owner for stealing estray hogs, evidence that,
after
truck owner was informed hogs belonged to another, he paid others to
assist
him to load hogs in truck and took them away, was sufficient to show
truck
owner's intention to steal the hogs. People v. Waggoner, 1944, 58
N.E.2d 553,
388 Ill. 468, certiorari denied 67 S.Ct. 127, 329 U.S. 768, 91 L.Ed.
661.
Larceny k 57
To constitute "larceny by conversion" of goods found or of stray
animals,
there must be at time of finding an intent to deprive the owner of his
property. People v. Betts, 1937, 11 N.E.2d 942, 367 Ill. 499. Larceny
k 16
Intent in larceny case is not shown by possession alone. People v.
Schueneman, 1926, 150 N.E. 664, 320 Ill. 127. Larceny k 57
236. ---- Intent, circumstantial evidence, sufficiency
In trial for theft, intent may and often must be proved by facts and
circumstances surrounding alleged criminal act. People v. Sims, 1975,
29
Ill.App.3d 815, 331 N.E.2d 178; People v. Bell, 1972, 9 Ill.App.3d
465, 292
N.E.2d 219.
Intent necessary for conviction of theft may be proved by facts and
circumstances surrounding the alleged criminal act. People v. Ida,
1973, 14
Ill.App.3d 407, 302 N.E.2d 713; People v. Thompson, 1973, 12
Ill.App.3d 807,
299 N.E.2d 76; People v. McClinton, 1972, 4 Ill.App.3d 253, 280 N.E.2d
795.
Where the object of a theft is a purse, wallet, or similar container, a
natural inference arises that the offender acted with the intent to
deprive
the owner of its contents, whatever they might be; it is not necessary
that
the offender knew in advance what the contents were to be responsible
for
their theft. People v. Moneyham, App. 2 Dist.2001, 257 Ill.Dec. 603,
323
Ill.App.3d 680, 753 N.E.2d 1229, appeal denied 261 Ill.Dec. 526, 197
Ill.2d
575, 763 N.E.2d 775. Larceny k 3(1)
Since an intent to permanently deprive an owner of his property can
seldom be
proved by direct evidence, such intent may be deduced, or inferred, by
jury
from acts committed and circumstances in evidence. People v. Falkner,
App. 2
Dist.1978, 18 Ill.Dec. 339, 61 Ill.App.3d 84, 377 N.E.2d 824. Larceny
k 41
Requisite mental state for theft may be deduced by the trier of fact
from the
facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged criminal act. People
v.
Brown, App. 1 Dist.1977, 13 Ill.Dec. 890, 56 Ill.App.3d 348, 371 N.E.2d
982.
Larceny k 3(1)
An inference of intent to permanently deprive as material element of
burglary
offense may be made by act of taking another's property; however, any
evidence offered to rebut such an inference must be relevant and
material to
issue of intent. People v. Gischer, App. 5 Dist.1977, 9 Ill.Dec. 264,
51
Ill.App.3d 847, 366 N.E.2d 521. Burglary k 29
Circumstances at time of defendant's apprehension, including fact that
defendant had only one dollar on his person and had been seen stuffing
store
merchandise worth $30.54 into his trousers, signified defendant's
intent to
steal. People v. Sims, App. 1 Dist.1975, 29 Ill.App.3d 815, 331 N.E.2d
178.
Larceny k 57
If defendant took linen off bed of hotel room and drapes off windows of
room
where hotel employee found defendant, then he exerted unauthorized
control
over that property and the necessary intent could be inferred from the
nature
of the overt conduct and surrounding circumstances to convict defendant
of
theft. People v. Smith, App.1967, 90 Ill.App.2d 388, 234 N.E.2d 161.
Larceny
k 41
237. ---- Taking, sufficiency, evidence
Defendant's conduct in snatching money from in front of victim who was
sitting
at bar in tavern constituted theft of property from the person, even
though
victim was not touching the money at the time it was taken. People v.
Pierce,
App. 4 Dist.2006, 304 Ill.Dec. 969, 367 Ill.App.3d 203, 854 N.E.2d 311,
appeal
allowed 222 Ill.2d 592. Larceny k 19
Evidence that manager of drug store saw a hand reaching over the
pharmacy
counter and taking a bottle of pills, that the manager followed the
person
down the aisle, that the person, identified as defendant, ran out of
the
store, that two men, one of whom was defendant, were observed running
from the
store, and that the other man entered an automobile and placed a
bottle, which
"sounded like pills shaking" into the glove compartment, and later
rendezvoused with the defendants, was sufficient to sustain defendant's
conviction for retail theft. People v. Modlin, App. 4 Dist.1979, 30
Ill.Dec.
350, 74 Ill.App.3d 387, 393 N.E.2d 5. Larceny k 55
Commission of a theft was not proven by either direct or circumstantial
evidence in case in which complainant testified that she had a dollar
bill in
her pocket at the time she was attacked by defendant and that she did
not give
him permission to take that bill, but in which there was no testimony
that
defendant actually took it or any other testimony as to what happened
to it
other than defendant's denial that he took it. People v. Roston, App.
1
Dist.1973, 14 Ill.App.3d 386, 302 N.E.2d 466.
Larceny k 62(1)
That property is taken from owner's possession without his knowledge or
consent is evidence of larceny. People v. Maruda, 1924, 145 N.E. 696,
314
Ill. 536. Larceny k 56
238. ---- Ownership, generally, sufficiency, evidence
Ownership element of theft was not established, precluding conviction
for
misdemeanor theft, absent evidence that business from which he
allegedly took
scrap aluminum was even missing any aluminum. People v. Taylor, App. 3
Dist.1991, 152 Ill.Dec. 216, 207 Ill.App.3d 206, 565 N.E.2d 749.
Larceny k 60
Keeping in mind relaxation of rules governing proof of ownership
necessary in
theft and burglary cases, evidence supported theft conviction despite
defendant's testimony at his trial on charges of murder, armed robbery,
theft
and concealment of homicidal death, that owner of money taken had been
shot
and was already dead when the money was taken. People v. Wright, App.
3
Dist.1982, 64 Ill.Dec. 833, 109 Ill.App.3d 137, 440 N.E.2d 385.
Larceny k 60
Where evidence in theft prosecution failed to prove ownership of
allegedly
stolen article in one other than defendant, it was insufficient to
support
defendant's conviction. People v. Cowan, App. 1 Dist.1977, 7 Ill.Dec.
201, 49
Ill.App.3d 367, 364 N.E.2d 362. Larceny k 60
Defendant by producing receipt from store and claiming legal title to
items
through purchase from store thereby admitted that they had been legal
property
of store and proved ownership of property in someone other than
defendant, in
prosecution for theft. People v. Geraci, App. 1 Dist.1974, 25
Ill.App.3d 191,
323 N.E.2d 48. Criminal Law k 409(5)
State established beyond a reasonable doubt that allegedly stolen
automobile
tire actually belonged to the complaining witness, where the
complaining
witness identified three of his tires as having been found within car
owned by
lady who testified, where he also testified clearly and directly that
the
fourth tire was identical to the other three, where police officer
testified
that defendant was engaged in working with a lug wrench on the fourth
tire and
was thus exercising dominion or possession over it and where possession
of two
ignition keys also linked defendant to the three remaining stolen
tires, each
of which conformed exactly to the one described in the theft complaint.
People
v. Brady, App. 1 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 834, 320 N.E.2d 150. Larceny
k 60
Evidence, in prosecution for theft, established, beyond a reasonable
doubt,
ownership of allegedly stolen property, and that defendant took
unauthorized
control over said property with intent to permanently deprive owner of
the use
and benefit thereof. People v. Pierce, App. 1 Dist.1974, 21 Ill.App.3d
770,
315 N.E.2d 584. Larceny k 60; Larceny k 62(1)
Testimony of supermarket security guard that package of meat had a
price tag
was not sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
supermarket did
in fact own the allegedly stolen meat. People v. Horne, App. 1
Dist.1974, 19
Ill.App.3d 774, 312 N.E.2d 829. Larceny k 60
In theft prosecution, evidence that defendant was arrested while
carrying from
a particular address a colored television set of a particular brand
with a
mark on it as if it had been repaired, that resident of such address
found on
the same day that his television set meeting such description had been
stolen,
and that later that evening he went to police garage where he recovered
his
set was sufficient to establish ownership of the set which defendant
had in
his possession. People v. Barrett, App. 1 Dist.1974, 20 Ill.App.3d
157, 312
N.E.2d 653. Larceny k 60
Fact that stolen check was payable to someone other than complainant
did not
alter fact of ownership of check in complainant where complainant had
drawn
check, had it in her possession at the time of theft, and could have
disposed
of it as she wished prior to delivery to payee. People v. Carr, App. 1
Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 533, 308 N.E.2d 206. Larceny k 7
In prosecution for theft, evidence was sufficient to prove beyond
reasonable
doubt that items taken were owned by prosecuting witness. People v.
Preston,
App. 1 Dist.1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 924, 305 N.E.2d 190. Larceny k 60
In theft prosecution, evidence permitted finding that suitcase which
defendant
took from interline conveyor belt linking one airline's terminal to
other
airlines had been bailed to first airline, and that requisite ownership
had
been demonstrated for purposes of theft prosecution. People v. Demos,
App.1971, 3 Ill.App.3d 284, 278 N.E.2d 89. Larceny k 60
Where a person had the general property in goods seized under execution
against another, and the judgment was satisfied, he became entitled to
the
immediate possession thereof, and had such ownership as would support
an
indictment for larceny against one stealing them while in custody of
the law
under the execution subsequent to the satisfaction of the judgment.
People v.
Frankenberg, 1908, 86 N.E. 128, 236 Ill. 408. Larceny k 7
239. ---- Ownership, statement of, sufficiency, evidence
Testimony by security manager of owner of goods was sufficient to
establish
ownership in prosecution for theft of the goods. People v. Moore, App.
1
Dist.1988, 122 Ill.Dec. 332, 172 Ill.App.3d 325, 526 N.E.2d 591.
Larceny k 60
Where mother of children who owned stolen bicycles negotiated with
defendant
either for return of bicycles or for the payment to her of their value,
mother
could be considered as the owner of the stolen property for purposes of
this
section. People v. Tucker, App. 1 Dist.1976, 35 Ill.App.3d 630, 342
N.E.2d
395. Larceny k 40(9)
Defendant's testimony that he had never had possession of allegedly
stolen
items and never touched them negated any right to their possession or
ownership on his part for purposes of determining whether he was guilty
of
offense of theft. People v. McAllister, App. 1 Dist.1975, 31
Ill.App.3d 825,
334 N.E.2d 885. Larceny k 60
Store security officer's testimony that defendant took clothing items
belonging to store was sufficient to prove store's ownership of items
for
purposes of establishing offense of theft. People v. McAllister, App.
1
Dist.1975, 31 Ill.App.3d 825, 334 N.E.2d 885. Larceny k 60
In prosecution for theft from mailbox, prosecuting witness' testimony
identifying exhibit as type of box she normally received from
particular
sender, her testimony that she was expecting shipment of various
cosmetics in
August of 1972, which she never received, and testimony of neighbor
identifying same exhibit as box she observed in prosecuting witness'
mailbox
and as same box she saw defendant and several other boys ripping open
and as
same box which her son retrieved and which was subsequently turned over
to
police department and United States Postal Inspection Service
sufficiently
established ownership as essential element of offense. People v.
Townsend,
App. 1 Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 621, 308 N.E.2d 82. Larceny k 60
In view of testimony of security guard for department store that he saw
defendant coming down elevator when he took a pair of trousers from
under a
coat and dropped them on floor and was then arrested as he attempted to
leave
store and the trousers with a tag bearing the name of the store and
price
which were introduced in evidence, circumstantial evidence was
sufficient to
support conclusion in prosecution for attempted theft, that trousers
were
owned by department store. People v. Watkins, App. 1 Dist.1973, 16
Ill.App.3d
541, 306 N.E.2d 504. Larceny k 60
Where there is no proof to the contrary, mere statement of ownership of
chattel is sufficient. People v. Gordon, 1955, 5 Ill.2d 91, 125 N.E.2d
73.
Larceny k 32(1)
Proof that a man bought some hogs intending to sell them again, and to
share
the profits with another man, together with whom he had formerly bought
hogs,
but with whom he had no general partnership, does not show joint title
in the
two to the first-mentioned hogs, where it is not shown that the other
man
assented to their purchase. Hix v. People, 1895, 41 N.E. 862, 157 Ill.
382.
Larceny k 60
240. ---- Ownership, possessory interest, sufficiency, evidence
In prosecution for theft, proof of special ownership, or interest, or
possession of the property, is sufficient as against a defendant
charged with
a larceny of the property. People v. Williams, 1966, 75 Ill.App.2d
342, 221
N.E.2d 28; People v. Dunsworth, App., 1944, 56 N.E.2d 52.
Special ownership or interest in or possession of property is
sufficient to
prove ownership as against a party charged with larceny of such
property.
People v. Trefonas, 1956, 9 Ill.2d 92, 136 N.E.2d 817; People v. Rife,
1942,
316 Ill.App. 1, 44 N.E.2d 74, affirmed 382 Ill. 588, 48 N.E.2d 367.
Where it was reasonably believed that company had legal claim to
documents,
and plaintiff demanded and received $25,000 from company in exchange
for
information concerning location of the documents, there was theft,
under this
section, even if company did not have perfect title to the documents.
Stamatiou v. U. S. Gypsum Co., N.D. Ill.1975, 400 F.Supp. 431, affirmed
534
F.2d 330. Extortion And Threats k 25.1
Defendant was not guilty, within this section, of exerting unauthorized
control over two parcels of property of which he allegedly made double
sales,
where at no time did he have title to such property, and thus none of
the
alleged victims ever acquired any interest in the property which he
could have
stolen. People v. Jedlicka, App. 2 Dist.1980, 39 Ill.Dec. 865, 84
Ill.App.3d
483, 405 N.E.2d 844. Larceny k 7
In prosecution for theft or attempted theft, ownership or some sort of
superior possessory interest in one other than defendant is an
essential
element of offense; the essential elements may be proven by
circumstantial
evidence. People v. Watkins, App. 1 Dist.1973, 16 Ill.App.3d 541, 306
N.E.2d
504. Larceny k 7; Larceny k 60
In establishing ownership of property stolen, it is sufficient to
demonstrate
some possessory interest in property at time of offense, such as agency
or
bailment. People v. Demos, App.1971, 3 Ill.App.3d 284, 278 N.E.2d 89.
Larceny
k 7
Evidence in prosecution for theft supported finding that store from
which
merchandise was taken had lawful possession of the merchandise. People
v.
Kaye, App.1969, 112 Ill.App.2d 141, 251 N.E.2d 306.
Larceny k 60
Specific ownership of stolen property in person named in indictment is
not
necessary if it is shown that he has some possessory interest in
property at
time of offense. People v. Dell, App.1966, 77 Ill.App.2d 318, 222
N.E.2d 357,
certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 73, 389 U.S. 826, 19 L.Ed.2d 81. Larceny k 7
Proof was adequate to establish ownership of property allegedly stolen
by
defendant where assistant pastor of church testified as to finding $700
and
$400 missing after pastor had struggled in church rectory with a man he
identified as defendant, and defendant had stipulated that the rectory
in
question was property of the Catholic Bishop, and it could be fairly
inferred
that the custody and control of stolen funds rested with the pastor.
People
v. Styles, App.1966, 75 Ill.App.2d 481, 220 N.E.2d 885.
Where a person had the general property in goods seized under execution
against another, and the judgment was satisfied, he became entitled to
the
immediate possession thereof, and had such ownership as would support
an
indictment for larceny against one stealing them while in custody of
the law
under the execution subsequent to the satisfaction of the judgment.
People v.
Frankenberg, 1908, 86 N.E. 128, 236 Ill. 408. Larceny k 7
241. ---- Ownership, corporate existence, generally, sufficiency,
evidence
In passing upon sufficiency of State's proof, in theft prosecutions
concerning
alleged taking of items from corporation, of corporate existence of the
owner
of stolen property, a court should base its finding upon "significant
rights"
of the defendants, and, in applying the rule requiring proof of
corporate
existence, courts must be guided by practical and substantial reasons
for the
requirement. People v. Watts, App. 2 Dist.1979, 32 Ill.Dec. 252, 76
Ill.App.3d 791, 395 N.E.2d 199. Criminal Law k 567
Stipulation which stated that discount store was a business licensed to
do
business in state established that store was a corporation and thus a
legal
entity capable of owning alleged stolen property for purposes of
establishing
offense of theft. People v. McAllister, App. 1 Dist.1975, 31
Ill.App.3d 825,
334 N.E.2d 885. Stipulations k 14(10)
If ownership of property is alleged to be in corporation, legal
existence of
corporation is material fact and must be proven in prosecution for
theft in
order to, inter alia, adequately inform defendant of charges against
him and
to protect him from possible double jeopardy. People v. Sims, App. 1
Dist.1975, 29 Ill.App.3d 815, 331 N.E.2d 178. Larceny k 40(2)
In prosecution for theft, use of term "company" in name of owner of
property
in question connotes corporate existence. People v. Austin, App. 1
Dist.1974,
25 Ill.App.3d 174, 323 N.E.2d 128. Corporations k 32(3)
Where it is alleged that the owner of property is a corporation, legal
existence of corporation is a material fact which must be proven in
prosecution for theft and corporate existence may be shown by
introduction of
corporation charter, by proof of user, and by testimony of witness with
knowledge of the fact. People v. Jones, App.1972, 7 Ill.App.3d 183,
287
N.E.2d 206. Corporations k 32(3); Larceny k 40(2)
Failure to prove ownership of allegedly stolen automobile battery and
the
legal existence of corporation named in the information as the owner
required
reversal of conviction for theft of property under the value of $150.
People
v. Roach, App.1971, 1 Ill.App.3d 876, 275 N.E.2d 309. Larceny k 40(2)
Evidence establishing the larceny of property in the custody of a
certain
company was sufficient proof of ownership of property, although the
title
thereto was in another corporation or person. People v. Sumoski,
App.1945, 63
N.E.2d 138, 326 Ill.App. 597. Larceny k 60
242. ---- Ownership, corporate existence, employee testimony,
sufficiency,
evidence
Evidence was sufficient to establish that banquet center where
defendant
worked, and from which cash had been taken, was cognizable business
entity, as
would support felony theft charge against defendant; co-owners
testified that
they owned center through corporation. People v. Devine, App. 1
Dist.1998,
229 Ill.Dec. 796, 295 Ill.App.3d 537, 692 N.E.2d 785. Larceny k 55
While the corporate existence of the owner of allegedly stolen property
may be
shown by oral testimony, the person so testifying must have personal
knowledge
of that fact. In re W. S., 1980, 42 Ill.Dec. 140, 81 Ill.2d 252, 408
N.E.2d
718. Criminal Law k 567
In theft prosecution concerning alleged taking of items from retail
store,
testimony by assistant manager of the store giving inexact version of
name of
corporation owning the store was sufficient to prove that owner of the
stolen
property was corporation as alleged in information. People v. Watts,
App. 2
Dist.1979, 32 Ill.Dec. 252, 76 Ill.App.3d 791, 395 N.E.2d 199.
Criminal Law k
567
In prosecution for theft, testimony of witness who had been employee of
owner
of property taken for 30 years was sufficient to establish corporate
existence
of owner. People v. Ousley, App. 1 Dist.1975, 25 Ill.App.3d 658, 324
N.E.2d
21. Criminal Law k 567
In prosecution for theft, where complaint alleged ownership of property
in
question in a named company, "a Corporation," store detective testified
that
he was an agent of the company, that he had personal knowledge that
company
was licensed to do business in State of Illinois, and that property in
question was owned by the company, and defendant did not adduce
evidence in
his own behalf, State proved beyond reasonable doubt that company was
corporation licensed to do business in Illinois and that it owned
property in
question. People v. Austin, App. 1 Dist.1974, 25 Ill.App.3d 174, 323
N.E.2d
128. Corporations k 32(11); Larceny k 60
In prosecution for theft of garbage containers from disposal company in
which
disposal company was alleged to be corporation, testimony by disposal
company's business manager that the company was in fact a corporation
was
sufficient to establish corporate existence. People v. DeBartolo, App.
2
Dist.1975, 24 Ill.App.3d 1009, 322 N.E.2d 258. Criminal Law k 567
In prosecution for theft in which ownership of stolen property was
alleged to
be in department store, "a corporation," testimony of department
store's
security officers that to the best of their knowledge the department
store was
a corporation was sufficient, in the absence of contrary evidence, to
prove
corporate existence. People v. DeBartolo, App. 2 Dist.1975, 24
Ill.App.3d
1000, 322 N.E.2d 251. Criminal Law k 567
Proof was sufficient to show that stolen tires were property of
corporation,
where officer of corporation testified that tires were owned by the
corporation and were wrongfully on defendant's tractor, and where fact
that
the tires bore corporation's brand numbers and were on defendant's
tractor was
corroborated by police officer. People v. Drake, App. 1 Dist.1974, 20
Ill.App.3d 762, 314 N.E.2d 532. Larceny k 60
Testimony of complaining witness who was a security guard for
department
store, that department store was a corporation and that he saw
defendant pick
up items from display counter in hardware department of store and place
them
in bag and leave store without paying for items was sufficient to prove
that
department store was a corporation and that it owned goods taken by
defendant
and to support defendant's conviction of theft. People v. Lewis, App.
1
Dist.1974, 18 Ill.App.3d 131, 309 N.E.2d 349. Larceny k 60
In theft prosecution, testimony of security guard as complaining
witness
indicating that the word "Incorporated" appeared on his checks, on
outside of
store, and on store's stationery, and using the abbreviation, "Inc." in
referring to his employer was sufficient to prove that the alleged
victim of
the theft was an Illinois corporation. People v. Ruiz, App. 1
Dist.1973, 15
Ill.App.3d 1047, 305 N.E.2d 653. Larceny k 60
243. ---- Ownership, motor vehicles, sufficiency, evidence
There was insufficient evidence to support theft conviction; State
provided no
evidence that anhydrous ammonia in defendant's car belonged to someone
other
than defendant. People v. Glisson, App. 5 Dist.2001, 257 Ill.Dec. 786,
324
Ill.App.3d 249, 754 N.E.2d 444, rehearing denied, appeal allowed 261
Ill.Dec.
524, 197 Ill.2d 570, 763 N.E.2d 773, affirmed in part, vacated in part
270
Ill.Dec. 57, 202 Ill.2d 499, 782 N.E.2d 251, on remand 296 Ill.Dec.
307, 359
Ill.App.3d 962, 835 N.E.2d 162. Larceny k 60
In prosecution for theft in excess of $150 and possession of burglary
tools,
all essential elements of offenses were proved beyond a reasonable
doubt,
despite defendant's contentions that State's evidence failed to
overcome his
evidence, which presented an innocent explanation for his presence at
scene of
crime, and failed to establish ownership of stolen vehicle. People v.
Scarpelli, App. 2 Dist.1980, 37 Ill.Dec. 913, 82 Ill.App.3d 689, 402
N.E.2d
915, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 1357, 450 U.S. 915, 67 L.Ed.2d 340,
rehearing
denied 101 S.Ct. 2009, 451 U.S. 933, 68 L.Ed.2d 319. Burglary k 41(9);
Larceny k 65
In prosecution for theft and possession of stolen vehicle, evidence
failed to
convincingly establish ownership of automobile allegedly stolen by
defendant,
requiring reversal of conviction. People v. Hope, App. 1 Dist.1979, 25
Ill.Dec. 919, 69 Ill.App.3d 375, 387 N.E.2d 795. Larceny k 60
In prosecution for theft and possession of stolen vehicle, officer's
testimony
that he was "informed" that automobile driven by defendant was owned by
dealer
was not sufficient to establish dealer's ownership, in absence of any
evidence
concerning reliability of officer's information. People v. Hope, App.
1
Dist.1979, 25 Ill.Dec. 919, 69 Ill.App.3d 375, 387 N.E.2d 795. Larceny
k 60
244. ---- Unauthorized control, sufficiency, evidence
Fact that trial court erroneously relied on inapplicable decision in
convicting defendant of theft by exerting unauthorized control over
property
did not require reversal of conviction where it was clear from findings
that
trial court believed that defendant had exerted unauthorized control
over
property and evidence was sufficient to support such a conclusion and
where
evidence also supported conclusion that defendant had acted knowingly
and
intentionally. People v. Ortiz, App. 1 Dist.1988, 121 Ill.Dec. 2, 170
Ill.App.3d 1083, 524 N.E.2d 1050. Criminal Law k 1134(6)
Evidence supported finding that defendant obtained control over all
stolen
property located under blanket in alley, rather than only of $277
microwave he
assisted in carrying, so as to support conviction for felony, rather
than
misdemeanor, theft, based on value of property. People v. Richardson,
App. 1
Dist.1988, 120 Ill.Dec. 217, 169 Ill.App.3d 781, 523 N.E.2d 1128.
Larceny k 65
Finding that theft defendant exercised unauthorized control over stereo
and
intended to permanently deprive store of it was sufficiently supported
by
evidence that defendant attempted to leave store without paying for
stereo,
and responded to security guard by throwing box containing stereo at
him and
running out door, knocking incoming customer to side of door as he did
so.
People v. Brown, App. 4 Dist.1987, 114 Ill.Dec. 955, 163 Ill.App.3d
976, 516
N.E.2d 1349. Larceny k 55; Larceny k 57
Conviction for theft of city park division radios was sufficiently
supported
by evidence defendant had unauthorized possession of radios, fled from
police
when chased, and attempted to dispose of bag containing radios while
being
pursued. People v. Obrochta, App. 2 Dist.1986, 102 Ill.Dec. 958, 149
Ill.App.3d 944, 500 N.E.2d 1059, appeal denied 108 Ill.Dec. 422, 114
Ill.2d
554, 508 N.E.2d 733. Larceny k 64(7)
In felony theft prosecution, State met its burden of establishing that
defendant exerted unauthorized control over property to commit theft by
presenting testimony that only money which defendant was authorized to
receive
from city was her paycheck, which was issued biweekly and defendant,
who was
city accountant, manipulated city cash journal. People v. Kinion, App.
3
Dist.1982, 61 Ill.Dec. 836, 105 Ill.App.3d 1069, 435 N.E.2d 533,
certiorari
denied 103 S.Ct. 1256, 460 U.S. 1014, 75 L.Ed.2d 484. Larceny k 55
Where defendant was apprehended while exerting unauthorized control
over
victim's property, which he was reportedly selling, it could be
inferred that
he intended to deprive victim permanently of use and benefits of the
property,
and thus proof was sufficient to sustain theft conviction. People v.
Johnson,
App. 2 Dist.1981, 52 Ill.Dec. 338, 96 Ill.App.3d 1123, 422 N.E.2d 19.
Larceny
k 64(1)
Evidence that 15 witnesses gave defendants' money as "downpayments" for
homes
on lots which defendants showed them, that defendants never owned nor
had any
option to purchase the lots, and that defendants converted the money to
their
own use was sufficient to sustain convictions for conspiracy and theft.
People
v. Hamilton, App. 1 Dist.1977, 12 Ill.Dec. 394, 54 Ill.App.3d 581, 370
N.E.2d
17. Conspiracy k 47(11); Larceny k 55
Where unauthorized control of property of another by defendant is
admitted,
intent to permanently deprive owner of the property may be inferred
from facts
and circumstances surrounding the alleged criminal act. People v.
Greeson,
App. 3 Dist.1975, 28 Ill.App.3d 94, 327 N.E.2d 605. Larceny k 41
That defendant had store merchandise in his possession and had passed
check-out counter was sufficient to show unauthorized control, in
prosecution
for theft, even though defendant was still in store when stopped by
security
agent. People v. Cortez, App. 1 Dist.1975, 26 Ill.App.3d 829, 326
N.E.2d 232.
Larceny k 62(1)
Defendant, who, inter alia, was found in basement of apartment building
wearing two-piece bathing suit belonging to another, was in course of
exerting
permanent, unauthorized control over property of another which
constitutes
theft, and thus, coupled with his unlawful entry into building, was
guilty of
burglary. People v. Kneller, App. 2 Dist.1975, 25 Ill.App.3d 935, 323
N.E.2d
469. Burglary k 42(3)
Where property is found in a place where another person could have had
access
thereto as well as defendant, property is not in the exclusive
possession of
defendant for purposes of sustaining conviction of defendant for theft
based
upon circumstantial evidence of possession. People v. Marshall, App. 1
Dist.1974, 24 Ill.App.3d 82, 320 N.E.2d 475. Larceny k 64(4)
Evidence in prosecution for theft supported finding that defendant
obtained
unauthorized control over property of victims with intent to
permanently
deprive them of it. People v. Beatty, App.1972, 7 Ill.App.3d 939, 288
N.E.2d
724. Larceny k 55
Evidence, including evidence that defendant sold beagles belonging to
complaining witness to third persons, sustained conviction of theft.
People
v. Daugherty, App.1971, 1 Ill.App.3d 290, 274 N.E.2d 109. Larceny k 55
Evidence, including testimony of neighbor that defendant led three
codefendants to garage and opened it for them, established that
defendant
exercised control over contents of garage which included stolen drugs.
People
v. Marino, App.1968, 95 Ill.App.2d 391, 238 N.E.2d 256. Receiving
Stolen
Goods k 8(3)
Evidence showing that defendants were caught moving from a garage into
a truck
cases of drugs which had been stolen from drug company clearly
established
that defendants were exerting control over property of another within
meaning
of this section. People v. Marino, App.1968, 95 Ill.App.2d 369, 238
N.E.2d
245, affirmed 44 Ill.2d 562, 256 N.E.2d 770. Receiving Stolen Goods k
8(3)
If it appears that taker kept goods as his own until apprehension, such
fact
has material bearing on questions whether taker had felonious intent to
steal
and whether taker intended to return goods. People v. Heaton, 1953,
112
N.E.2d 131, 415 Ill. 43. Larceny k 64(1)
245. ---- Description of property, sufficiency, evidence
Defendant's guilt of residential burglary and theft under $300 was
proved
beyond reasonable doubt; buyer of stolen video cassette recorder
testified
that defendant and his brother sold recorder to him, recorder was
properly
identified and admitted into evidence, sale occurred within 24 hours
after
burglary, defendant was acquainted with victim's house, and witness
identified
defendant's brother's automobile as similar to automobile that was
driving on
street by victim's house at time of burglary. People v. Cathers, App.
4
Dist.1989, 140 Ill.Dec. 893, 194 Ill.App.3d 318, 550 N.E.2d 1018,
appeal
denied 144 Ill.Dec. 260, 132 Ill.2d 548, 555 N.E.2d 379, certiorari
denied 111
S.Ct. 267, 498 U.S. 903, 112 L.Ed.2d 223. Burglary k 42(3)
Evidence that missing goods and goods sold by defendant carried same
manufacturer's serial number almost conclusively demonstrated that the
properties were one and the same. People v. Loveless, App. 3
Dist.1981, 48
Ill.Dec. 804, 93 Ill.App.3d 293, 417 N.E.2d 206. Larceny k 58
In prosecution of husband, wife and two sons for theft under this
paragraph,
failure to establish ownership of some of items allegedly stolen was
not
sufficient reason to challenge finding by jury of credibility of
identification as to other items. People v. Mertens, App. 2 Dist.1979,
33
Ill.Dec. 206, 77 Ill.App.3d 791, 396 N.E.2d 595.
Not all crime victims can be expected to have positive proof of
ownership of
their property, like sales slips and serial numbers, and thus failure
to
identify property by way of serial number is not necessarily fatal to
State's
case in theft prosecution. People v. Mertens, App. 2 Dist.1979, 33
Ill.Dec.
206, 77 Ill.App.3d 791, 396 N.E.2d 595. Larceny k 58
In prosecution for theft of property from salvage yard of a value of
over
$150, notwithstanding some confusion as to actual weight of material
taken,
testimony of salvage yard owner, who owned three salvage yards and was
engaged
in the business of buying and selling scrap metal and recognized the
material
as being taken from his salvage yard, was sufficient to establish value
of
stolen property. People v. Greene, App. 2 Dist.1977, 8 Ill.Dec. 795,
50
Ill.App.3d 872, 365 N.E.2d 1181. Larceny k 59
When elements of crime of theft are established beyond reasonable doubt
as to
any one of items of "property" listed in indictment, conviction for
theft is
warranted. People v. Jordan, App.1969, 115 Ill.App.2d 307, 252 N.E.2d
701.
Larceny k 40(2)
In prosecution for larceny of three notes with a total value of $2500,
witness' testimony fully disclosing and accurately describing notes
allegedly
stolen, established beyond reasonable doubt identity of notes referred
to in
indictment. People v. Franklin, 1953, 114 N.E.2d 661, 415 Ill. 514.
Larceny k
58
On trial for larceny of spare automobile tire, it is not essential that
tire
be identified by proof of serial number.
N.E.
414, 342 Ill. 244. Larceny k 58
People v. Miller, 1930, 174
Proof of possession of property of same kind and description as
recently
stolen property, without explanation, is sufficient to identify
property so
found as property taken. People v. Penn, 1930, 173 N.E. 86, 340 Ill.
535.
Larceny k 64(5)
Evidence was sufficient to identify stolen hog found in defendant's
possession, authorizing instructions on presumptions arising from
possession
of stolen property immediately after theft. People v. McElvain, 1930,
172
N.E. 131, 341 Ill. 224. Larceny k 77(3)
In prosecution under an indictment charging larceny of treasury notes
of
various stated denominations and bank bills of various denominations of
the
amount of $18, testimony of prosecuting witness that the amount of
money taken
was $18 was not a sufficient description of the money to prove larceny
of the
money described in the indictment. People v. Harris, 1922, 135 N.E.
75, 302
Ill. 590. Larceny k 40(8)
When an indictment for the larceny of money described the same as
lawful money
of the United States of the value of $55, and alleged that a more
particular
description was unknown to the grand jury, and the prosecutor testified
that
the money stolen consisted of five $10 bills and a $5 bill, and stated
that he
so testified before the grand jury, and there was no evidence that the
grand
jury was unable to obtain a particular description of the money, the
state
failed to prove the averment that a more particular description was
unknown,
necessitating a discharge of accused from prosecution under the
indictment,
subject to the right of the state to try him under a new indictment.
People
v. Hunt, 1911, 96 N.E. 220, 251 Ill. 446. Indictment And Information k
184
246. ---- Missing property, sufficiency, evidence
Evidence that defendant was employee charged with administering
restitution
fund, that she made no deposits for a five-month period and that
approximately
$8,000 was missing was insufficient to support conviction for theft,
especially in absence of evidence that defendant had made any large
purchases
or deposited more money in her personal bank account than she and her
husband
received as earnings and absent evidence that she went on any elaborate
vacations or upgraded her standard of living in any way, plus fact that
defendant had excellent reputation in the community for being truthful
and
honest. People v. Frig, App. 3 Dist.1981, 55 Ill.Dec. 877, 100
Ill.App.3d
602, 426 N.E.2d 1251. Embezzlement k 44(6)
Evidence of shortages of receipts was sufficient for jury to find that
defendant, a clerk in apartment house office when shortages occurred,
was
guilty of felony theft. People v. Thompson, App. 1 Dist.1979, 31
Ill.Dec.
220, 75 Ill.App.3d 901, 394 N.E.2d 422. Larceny k 55
Evidence indicating that a minimum of $265.82 was missing from cash
register
of store on night of theft was sufficient to sustain conviction of
theft of
property despite claim that State failed to prove that value of
property was
in excess of $150. People v. Murphy, App. 3 Dist.1978, 22 Ill.Dec.
562, 65
Ill.App.3d 935, 382 N.E.2d 1260. Larceny k 59
Fact that no identifiable proceeds of theft were found on defendant
does not
necessarily raise reasonable doubt of guilt. People v. Hughes, App. 1
Dist.1977, 13 Ill.Dec. 346, 55 Ill.App.3d 359, 371 N.E.2d 41. Larceny
k 55
Evidence supporting defendant's conviction of theft of motorcycle frame
was
not insufficient merely because of variance in final digit in vehicle
identification number on frame found in defendant's possession as
compared
with that on allegedly stolen frame. People v. Lewis, App. 1
Dist.1974, 20
Ill.App.3d 161, 313 N.E.2d 170. Larceny k 64(5)
In prosecution for theft of coat from department store, testimony of
store
clerk and officer was sufficient to prove necessary elements of theft,
without
necessity for introduction of coat itself. People v. Banks, App. 1
Dist.1974,
17 Ill.App.3d 512, 308 N.E.2d 247. Larceny k 55
Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction of defendant, who
allegedly
entered jewelry store with two associates, questioned clerk about
watches, and
obscured clerks' view of a diamond case from which merchandise was
later found
to be missing, of theft. People v. McNear, App. 4 Dist.1974, 16
Ill.App.3d
1055, 308 N.E.2d 200. Larceny k 55
Evidence, including evidence that trousers and wallet of occupier of
house
were found in place other than where they had been left and that money
was
missing, was sufficient to sustain conclusion that defendant entered
home with
intent to commit theft. People v. Mueller, App.1971, 131 Ill.App.2d
10, 268
N.E.2d 454, affirmed in part, reversed in part 54 Ill.2d 189, 295
N.E.2d 705,
certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 549, 414 U.S. 1044, 38 L.Ed.2d 335. Burglary
k
41(3)
Where defendant was identified by assistant pastor as the stranger with
whom
he struggled in the church rectory, and loss of church funds was
discovered
immediately thereafter, in the absence of other proof it was a fair
inference
that defendant's purpose in entering the rectory was theft. People v.
Williams, App.1966, 75 Ill.App.2d 342, 221 N.E.2d 28. Larceny k 57
That goods are missing does not establish larceny, in absence of proof
of
circumstances. People v. Maruda, 1924, 145 N.E. 696, 314 Ill. 536.
Larceny k
56
In a prosecution for larceny from a railroad car, a conviction
be
sustained, where it was not shown that the goods alleged to be
had ever
been in any car on the railroad or had ever been stolen; mere
that
defendants were found with such goods near a car and ran when
discovered being
insufficient. People v. Geister, 1919, 124 N.E. 530, 289 Ill.
Larceny k
64(7)
cannot
stolen
proof
249.
On prosecution for the larceny of certain wire, where it was claimed
that the
stolen wire was sold to a second-hand dealer, but there was no evidence
as to
the nature of the wire sold, or whether it was the same, or of the same
kind,
as that alleged to have been stolen, the evidence identifying the
stolen
property was insufficient to support a conviction.
1902, 62
N.E. 785, 194 Ill. 365. Larceny k 58
Bishop v. People,
Where, in a trial for larceny, the evidence showed that the money
alleged to
have been stolen disappeared from the bank at noon, when only the
cashier was
present; that when the other officers left the bank for dinner the
door into
the cashroom was locked; that when they returned it was open, and a
screwdriver, bought that day by defendant, was lying on the floor;
that the
bolt of the lock was scratched; that defendant and other men, all
strangers
in the town, were in the bank during the officers' absence; that
defendant
and the other men all left town that afternoon; and that defendant,
when
arrested, escaped, evidence was sufficient to justify conviction,
though the
cashier was not called as a witness. Carroll v. People, 1891, 27 N.E.
18, 136
Ill. 456. Larceny k 55
247. ---- Identification of defendant, generally, sufficiency,
evidence
Determination that defendant charged with residential burglary and
theft was
guilty beyond reasonable doubt was not precluded by irritable and
cantankerous
nature of identification witness. People v. Miller, App. 1 Dist.1993,
193
Ill.Dec. 799, 254 Ill.App.3d 997, 626 N.E.2d 1350. Burglary k 41(6);
Larceny
k 55
Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for
residential
burglary, theft (under $300), and aggravated criminal sexual assault;
defendant's fingerprints were found in immediate vicinity of crime
under such
circumstances as to establish that they were impressed at time offense
was
committed, defendant was in vicinity of crime at time of offense,
defendant's
dress matched description of assailant, defendant had same
denominations of
money which assailant stole, victim and defendant had same strain of
gonorrhea
after assault, disease victim testified she did not have prior to
assault, and
analysis of seminal matter and hair found at victim's house, while not
conclusive, revealed that defendant could not be eliminated as
assailant.
People v. Smith, App. 5 Dist.1993, 185 Ill.Dec. 641, 245 Ill.App.3d
712, 614
N.E.2d 1326, appeal allowed, vac 189 Ill.Dec. 449, 152 Ill.2d 576, 620
N.E.2d
417. Burglary k 41(6); Larceny k 55; Rape k 51(7)
Mere fact that three weeks elapsed between incident giving rise to
theft
charge and time victim again saw defendant on street, identified
defendant as
one of his attackers, and caused defendant's arrest did not raise a
doubt
about identification which was otherwise positive and credible. People
v.
Morales, App. 1 Dist.1974, 22 Ill.App.3d 653, 318 N.E.2d 96. Criminal
Law k
566
Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction of theft despite claim as
to
validity of identification testimony. People v. Morales, App. 1
Dist.1974, 22
Ill.App.3d 653, 318 N.E.2d 96. Larceny k 55
Identification testimony was sufficient to sustain conviction for
theft,
though defendant gave directly conflicting testimony; credibility and
weight
were for trial court's determination. People v. Quinn, App. 1
Dist.1974, 19
Ill.App.3d 798, 313 N.E.2d 167. Criminal Law k 566
Fact that victim of battery and theft could not identify defendant did
not
operate to cast serious doubts on accuracy or veracity of those who
could.
People v. Tripp, App. 1 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 200, 311 N.E.2d 168.
Criminal
Law k 566
Evidence was sufficient to support theft conviction of defendant who
was
identified as man who ran off with victim's purse and who was found in
possession of stolen money. People v. Gardner, App. 1 Dist.1973, 16
Ill.App.3d 62, 305 N.E.2d 587. Criminal Law k 566
Identification and alibi evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction
for
theft of property not exceeding $150 in value. People v. Sykes,
App.1969, 110
Ill.App.2d 91, 249 N.E.2d 121. Criminal Law k 566; Criminal Law k 572
Evidence including disclosure that defendant identified as driver of
truck,
was seen reaching into truck after it had stopped and was arrested at
scene
where stolen property was being moved into house from truck sustained
conviction for theft. People v. Bambulas, 1969, 42 Ill.2d 419, 247
N.E.2d
873, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 480, 396 U.S. 986, 24 L.Ed.2d 450.
Larceny k
55
Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction of burglary and theft
where
there was testimony that defendant was seen driving automobile out of
alley
without lights two blocks from store which had been recently
burglarized and
automobile contained stolen merchandise. People v. Stevenson,
App.1969, 107
Ill.App.2d 441, 246 N.E.2d 309. Burglary k 42(3); Larceny k 64(7)
Evidence, including testimony as to identification, and as to an $800
value on
stolen goods, was sufficient to sustain conviction of defendant for
grand
theft. People v. Davis, App.1968, 94 Ill.App.2d 86, 236 N.E.2d 423.
Larceny k
65
Where conviction of a defendant rests on identification which is
doubtful,
vague or uncertain, and which does not produce an abiding conviction of
guilt
to a moral certainty, it should be reversed. People v. Gold, 1935, 196
N.E.
729, 361 Ill. 23. Criminal Law k 1159.5
While identification and whereabouts of defendant at time crime was
committed
are questions for jury, yet where from entire record there is a
reasonable
doubt of defendant's guilt, judgment of conviction will not be
permitted to
stand. People v. Gold, 1935, 196 N.E. 729, 361 Ill. 23. Criminal Law
k
1159.5
248. ---- Identification of defendant, number of witnesses,
sufficiency,
evidence
Identification testimony of witnesses was sufficient to sustain
conviction for
felony theft; although 78-year-old victim of scam did not
unequivocally
identify defendant, neighbor's identification of defendant, both from
photographic lineup and at trial, was very clear and unequivocal.
People v.
DePue, App. 3 Dist.1992, 171 Ill.Dec. 295, 229 Ill.App.3d 615, 593
N.E.2d 1115
. Larceny k 55
In prosecution in absentia for theft with prior theft conviction, fact
that no
one testified that person pictured in People's exhibit was same
individual who
had previously been arraigned was immaterial where three witnesses
identified
person pictured in photograph as individual they had seen arrested or
prosecuted in previous theft case. People v. Collins, App. 4
Dist.1982, 65
Ill.Dec. 620, 109 Ill.App.3d 1076, 441 N.E.2d 935. Sentencing And
Punishment
k 1381(6)
Identification of defendant by complaining witness in prosecution for
theft
was sufficient to sustain defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
People
v. Walls, App. 1 Dist.1974, 21 Ill.App.3d 194, 315 N.E.2d 83. Criminal
Law k
566
Theft defendant's guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
considering
maid's positive identification of defendant as the person she saw take
television set from room at inn, and considering fact that defendant's
license
plates were on the automobile into which the stolen television set was
loaded.
People v. Savaiano, App. 1 Dist.1973, 10 Ill.App.3d 666, 294 N.E.2d
740.
Criminal Law k 566
249. ---- Identification of defendant, officer testimony, sufficiency,
evidence
Evidence, including identification testimony of officer, sustained
convictions
of two defendants of armed robbery, theft and unlawful restraint.
People v.
Scott, App. 1 Dist.1974, 20 Ill.App.3d 880, 314 N.E.2d 671. False
Imprisonment k 44; Larceny k 55; Robbery k 24.15(2)
Evidence supported conclusion of trial court that officer who arrested
defendant had had sufficient opportunity to positively identify
defendant as
the offender, in prosecution for misdemeanor theft. People v. Huey,
App. 1
Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 245, 307 N.E.2d 767. Criminal Law k 566
Where police officer's testimony in theft prosecution revealed that
alley was
well lighted and that he had a clear view of defendant as he passed
through
the beam of his headlights and alongside squad car, and when defendant
and
another suspect were brought to the scene of the crime, defendant only
was
identified by the officer as the one involved, and identification was
positive
and officer's testimony remained consistent throughout his crossexamination,
officer's identification was not insufficient on theory that he did not
have
adequate opportunity to observe the men as they ran from the alley.
People v.
Evans, App.1969, 112 Ill.App.2d 146, 251 N.E.2d 324. Criminal Law k
566
250. ---- Identification of defendant, opportunity to observe,
sufficiency,
evidence
Where theft victim had ample opportunity to observe defendant and to
identify
him as one of his attackers, and lights in hallway at time of incident
were
good and victim had no trouble seeing defendant because he looked at
him
during course of incident, which took two or three minutes, trial court
could
properly believe testimony of victim over and above alibi testimony of
defendant and his witnesses. People v. Morales, App. 1 Dist.1974, 22
Ill.App.3d 653, 318 N.E.2d 96. Criminal Law k 572
Evidence was sufficient to support conviction of theft against
defendant who
was identified both by store owner and her employee as person who
entered
store, produced a gun and announced a robbery which took approximately
three
minutes, notwithstanding that trial judge was allegedly under
misapprehension
as to distance to scene of robbery from defendant's place of
employment.
People v. Harris, App. 1 Dist.1973, 12 Ill.App.3d 42, 298 N.E.2d 196.
Robbery
k 24.40
Unreliability, going to weight of identification testimony, would stem
from
such facts as elapsed time between crime and identification,
contradictory
opinions among identifying witnesses, sufficient opportunity on part of
witnesses to observe the one acting, proof of good reputation on the
part of
the accused, and the existence of a reliable alibi. People v. Walker,
App.1964, 54 Ill.App.2d 365, 204 N.E.2d 141. Criminal Law k 566
251. ---- Eyewitness, sufficiency, evidence
Clerk's eyewitness identification of defendant as shoplifter supported
conviction, even though she gave conflicting reports to police as to
height of
perpetrator and clothes he was wearing. People v. Henderson, App. 5
Dist.1992, 173 Ill.Dec. 213, 232 Ill.App.3d 230, 596 N.E.2d 837.
Larceny k 55
Evidence which included testimony of two eyewitnesses to defendant's
theft of
two Siamese cats was sufficient to prove defendant guilty of the theft
beyond
a reasonable doubt. People v. Barlow, App. 3 Dist.1976, 39 Ill.App.3d
544,
350 N.E.2d 554. Larceny k 55
Evidence that, inter alia, defendants and another man were seen
breaking into
basement window of home from which turntable was stolen was sufficient
to
sustain theft convictions. People v. Jones, App. 1 Dist.1975, 28
Ill.App.3d
175, 328 N.E.2d 336. Burglary k 41(1)
Evidence supported robbery and theft conviction of defendant who was
positively identified by eyewitnesses at showup, lineup, and trial.
People v.
Broadnax, App. 2 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 68, 318 N.E.2d 499. Larceny
k 55;
Robbery k 24.40
Identification testimony of checkout clerk, who testified that after
she first
saw defendant it was about three minutes before he got into her
checkout line,
that it was a minute or two before he talked to her, and that defendant
was in
store approximately five minutes more, was sufficient to sustain
verdict of
guilty in prosecution for robbery and theft. People v. Broadnax, App.
2
Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 68, 318 N.E.2d 499. Criminal Law k 566;
Robbery k
24.40
Testimony of police officers to effect that defendant attempted to take
wallet
and watch from police officer feigning sleep in early hours of morning
in
subway station was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for
theft.
People v. Reese, App. 1 Dist.1974, 22 Ill.App.3d 806, 317 N.E.2d 711.
Larceny
k 55
Stolen property need not be introduced in evidence in a theft case, in
that a
conviction for theft can rest solely on testimony of witnesses who saw
the
theft. People v. Baer, App. 4 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 346, 311 N.E.2d
418.
Criminal Law k 661
Positive identification of defendant as perpetrator of theft by witness
who
had adequate opportunity to observe perpetrator while standing face to
face
with him at a distance of three or four feet for several minutes was
sufficient to sustain conviction of theft despite contention that the
witness
had described perpetrator to police officers as having goatee and that
defendant had a mustache but no goatee on date of the theft. People v.
Arroyo, App. 1 Dist.1974, 18 Ill.App.3d 187, 309 N.E.2d 804. Criminal
Law k
566
Defendant's conviction of theft was supported by evidence that
defendant was
clearly observed, under highly suspicious circumstances, at time of
theft
while ransacking boxes in warehouse of company from which adding
machine was
stolen, that defendant was seen fleeing with admittedly guilty
codefendant and
another man; that investigation of automobile license plate number
supplied
to police led them to father of codefendant; and that missing adding
machine
was found in basement of building where codefendant and father resided.
People v. Burson, App. 1 Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 559, 308 N.E.2d 200.
Larceny k 64(7)
Where testimony of proprietor of restaurant which was robbed was
positive and
credible and he stated that he was able to observe defendant, whom he
had seen
in restaurant on prior occasions, for several minutes during robbery
under
adequate lighting conditions, testimony was sufficient to support
defendant's
conviction for theft. People v. Betts, App. 1 Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d
22,
307 N.E.2d 672. Larceny k 49
Evidence that defendant took wallet from undercover police officer
feigning
intoxication on bench on train platform was sufficient to support
conviction
of theft. People v. McCowns, App. 1 Dist.1973, 16 Ill.App.3d 694, 306
N.E.2d
472. Larceny k 55
Identification of defendant by eye witness, who had a good vantage
point and
an adequate opportunity for observing defendant at time theft took
place, who
later was able to identify defendant in a lineup of several men, and
whose
description and information enabled police to trace defendant and led
directly
to defendant's arrest a few hours after the theft, was not so vague and
uncertain as to be insufficient to sustain a conviction. People v.
Davis,
App.1966, 70 Ill.App.2d 419, 218 N.E.2d 3. Criminal Law k 566
Minor variations between defendant's weight and height as described by
eye
witness to police and as given in police arrest slip and stated by a
defense
witness did not destroy the credibility of the witness, but only went
to the
weight to be given his testimony. People v. Davis, App.1966, 70
Ill.App.2d
419, 218 N.E.2d 3. Criminal Law k 566
252. ---- Confessions and admissions, sufficiency, evidence
Evidence, including defendant's admission that she took money from
townhome
association while serving on its board to pay for her father's medical
bills
and townhome association financial statement that did not list any
compensation paid to defendant for her services, was sufficient to
support,
conviction of theft. People v. Lombardi, App. 2 Dist.1999, 238
Ill.Dec. 323,
305 Ill.App.3d 33, 711 N.E.2d 426, appeal denied 242 Ill.Dec. 146, 185
Ill.2d
650, 720 N.E.2d 1101. Larceny k 62(1)
Evidence that defendant confessed to participating in theft of cash
from
restaurant, together with evidence confirming defendant's accounts of
manner
in which crime was committed, was sufficient to support felony theft
convictions. People v. Furby, 1990, 150 Ill.Dec. 534, 138 Ill.2d 434,
563
N.E.2d 421, on remand 169 Ill.Dec. 360, 228 Ill.App.3d 1, 591 N.E.2d
533.
Criminal Law k 538(3)
Evidence, in prosecution for theft of property of value exceeding $150,
including defendant's admission that he took jumper cables, was
sufficient to
support conviction. People v. Depper, App. 4 Dist.1980, 44 Ill.Dec.
421, 89
Ill.App.3d 135, 411 N.E.2d 543. Larceny k 65
Defendant's statements to police though intended by him to be
exculpatory,
constituted admissions which were insufficient in themselves to prove
that he
committed theft of property having a value in excess of $150, but
notwithstanding same, and assuming arguendo that cash register tape
compiled
by defendant was an admission by him of amount of money for which he
was
responsible as cashier, admissions were sufficiently corroborated by
other
evidence in record to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that crime was
committed
and that defendant committed it. People v. Murphy, App. 3 Dist.1978,
22
Ill.Dec. 562, 65 Ill.App.3d 935, 382 N.E.2d 1260. Criminal Law k
409(6.1)
Mere admissions of a defendant are insufficient by themselves to prove
necessary corpus delicti in a prosecution for theft of property having
a value
in excess of $150. People v. Murphy, App. 3 Dist.1978, 22 Ill.Dec.
562, 65
Ill.App.3d 935, 382 N.E.2d 1260. Larceny k 56
253. ---- Hearsay, sufficiency, evidence
Evidence, consisting of hearsay testimony by general manager of
cleaning
company that he was informed by telephone of breaking into and taking
of
clothing from one of company's stores and by police officer that he
received
information the clothing would be found in certain house and that
occupant of
such house told him defendant and accomplice had stolen the clothing
and
consisting of accomplice's out-of-court accusation to such officer that
defendant was the thief, was insufficient to sustain conviction for
theft.
People v. Sanders, App.1971, 133 Ill.App.2d 403, 273 N.E.2d 740.
Larceny k 55
254. ---- Victim's testimony, sufficiency, evidence
Victim's testimony that he saw defendant pick his vinyl jacket up from
the
floor of apartment bedroom and place it in her clothing and that
shortly after
defendant left apartment, he determined that his vinyl jacket was
missing was
sufficient to establish that defendant was the person who took victim's
property, as required for conviction for theft, even if defendant
remained in
apartment for some time after she was observed placing the jacket in
her
clothing, victim did not see defendant leave apartment with jacket, two
other
people were in apartment at same time, and defendant returned to
apartment
next day. People v. Moneyham, App. 2 Dist.2001, 257 Ill.Dec. 603, 323
Ill.App.3d 680, 753 N.E.2d 1229, appeal denied 261 Ill.Dec. 526, 197
Ill.2d
575, 763 N.E.2d 775.
Larceny k 62(1)
Victim's testimony by itself was sufficient to convict defendant of
robbery
and theft from person, notwithstanding testimony of three alibi
witnesses.
People v. Graham, App. 2 Dist.1989, 128 Ill.Dec. 777, 179 Ill.App.3d
496, 534
N.E.2d 1382. Larceny k 55; Robbery k 24.40
Positive and unwavering testimony of photographer
defendant's
removal of film from camera and refusal to return
to
sustain defendant's conviction of theft of film.
1
Dist.1978, 22 Ill.Dec. 87, 65 Ill.App.3d 167, 382
k 55
relative to
film was sufficient
People v. Abney, App.
N.E.2d 407.
Larceny
Evidence, in theft prosecution in which it was alleged that defendant
and two
others stole money from a victim at night on a lighted street corner in
a
transaction which consumed about five minutes, was sufficient to
establish the
guilt of the defendant who was identified by the victim. People v.
Smith,
App. 1 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 668, 320 N.E.2d 137. Larceny k 55
Where, in prosecution for theft, victim's in-court identification of
defendant
was positive and was untainted by allegedly suggestive showup and
witness
testified that he saw the defendant as he approached with two others
and
walked alongside the victim for five minutes at night under good
lighting, the
identification did not constitute "plain error" requiring reversal.
People v.
Smith, App. 1 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 668, 320 N.E.2d 137. Criminal
Law k
1036.1(7)
Where complaining witness' testimony at trial was positive and credible
and
took place only one day after the offense and where complaining witness
had
been able to observe defendants for six minutes on the day of the
theft, fact
that complaining witness thought that one of the defendants had a
mustache and
the other had a scar but was unsure which of the two had those
characteristics
did not preclude finding that defendants were guilty of theft beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v. Parker, App. 1 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d
666, 320
N.E.2d 53. Criminal Law k 566
Evidence in theft prosecution of defendant who was positively
identified by
victim was sufficient to sustain convictions. People v. Doss, App. 1
Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 57, 308 N.E.2d 3. Robbery k 24.40
Robbery victim who had opportunity to view defendant twice on day of
robbery,
once for a period of two to three minutes from a distance of 1 1/2 feet
and
who identified defendant as he walked past store where robbery had
occurred
six days after robbery had sufficient opportunity to observe defendant
to form
independent origin for in-court identification. People v. Blocker,
App. 1
Dist.1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 902, 305 N.E.2d 321. Criminal Law k 339.10(9)
Victim's positive, credible testimony that defendant was man who robbed
and
shot him was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of theft and
battery
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Johnson, App. 1 Dist.1973, 15
Ill.App.3d
741, 305 N.E.2d 208. Robbery k 24.40
Victim's sure and unwavering identification of defendant as one of her
assailants was sufficient to sustain conviction of theft. People v.
Lewis,
App. 1 Dist.1973, 12 Ill.App.3d 500, 299 N.E.2d 500. Criminal Law k
566
Where victim had seen defendant before theft which took place in broad
day-light, her identification of defendant two days later when he came
into
store where she worked was not so doubtful as to vitiate conviction.
People
v. Turner, App.1970, 121 Ill.App.2d 205, 257 N.E.2d 186. Criminal Law
k 566
Evidence sustained theft and assault convictions of defendant who was
identified by victim notwithstanding victim failed to include
defendant's
goatee in description given to police. People v. Johnson, App.1970,
121
Ill.App.2d 97, 257 N.E.2d 121. Criminal Law k 566
Discrepancy in height, weight, color of hair and complexion given by
complaining witness to police of man to whom he had given his
automobile keys
and actual height, weight, etc., of defendant charged with theft of
automobile
by deception, together with other supportive testimony, created
reasonable
doubt as to identity of guilty person, although complaining witness
identified
defendant at trial, but persisted in describing defendant as he had in
report
to police. People v. Brown, App.1966, 73 Ill.App.2d 448, 220 N.E.2d
92.
Criminal Law k 566
255. ---- Credibility of witness, sufficiency, evidence
In prosecution for theft and retail theft, there was no abuse of
discretion on
the part of trial court in excluding examination of a witness, a store
employee, concerning possible civil lawsuits for false arrest since any
testimony concerning such a suit would have been speculative and
uncertain,
and trial court did permit examination of witness as to whether he had
any
interest in outcome of trial and whether he received any additional
compensation for making an arrest. People v. Heidorn, App. 2
Dist.1983, 70
Ill.Dec. 439, 114 Ill.App.3d 933, 449 N.E.2d 568. Witnesses k 372(2)
Evidence, including defendant's wife's testimony that she found top of
her
previously empty refrigerator full of meat with certain person's name
on it
and that wife and defendant took outer wrappings off meat and evidence
corroborating wife's testimony, was sufficient, despite attempt to
impeach
wife, to sustain defendant's theft conviction. People v. Rettig, App.
3
Dist.1980, 44 Ill.Dec. 7, 88 Ill.App.3d 888, 410 N.E.2d 1099. Larceny
k 55
Testimony of handwriting expert that, in her opinion, defendant
executed
forged signature sustained conviction for theft and forgery though she
was
employed by Chicago police department, such consideration being matter
for
trier of fact to weigh in regard to her credibility. People v. Hoover,
App. 1
Dist.1980, 43 Ill.Dec. 195, 87 Ill.App.3d 743, 410 N.E.2d 195.
Criminal Law k
494
In prosecution for robbery and theft arising from taking of ring from
decoy
police officer, officer's failure to mention at preliminary hearing the
use of
any force did not render officer's testimony at trial so improbable as
to
raise a doubt as to defendants' guilt, and if there was conflict
between
officer's preliminary hearing testimony and his trial testimony, it was
for
jury to resolve such conflict. People v. Houston, App. 1 Dist.1979, 30
Ill.Dec. 493, 74 Ill.App.3d 586, 393 N.E.2d 529. Criminal Law k 553
Trial court sitting as a trier of fact had responsibility of evaluating
the
credibility of defendants' explanation in order to determine whether it
sufficiently rebutted presumption of guilt so as to raise a reasonable
doubt.
People v. Brisbon, App. 3 Dist.1975, 26 Ill.App.3d 268, 324 N.E.2d 644.
Larceny k 64(6)
The weight of witnesses' testimony in criminal case tried without jury
is for
trial court to determine, and it judgment will not be disturbed by
Supreme
Court where there is no more than a conflict in evidence. People v.
Officer,
1957, 10 Ill.2d 203, 139 N.E.2d 773. Criminal Law k 260.11(3.1)
256. ---- Number of witnesses, sufficiency, evidence
Conviction for theft can be sustained by positive testimony of single,
credible witness. People v. Puleo, App. 1 Dist.1981, 51 Ill.Dec. 859,
96
Ill.App.3d 457, 421 N.E.2d 367. Larceny k 55
Positive testimony of single credible witness may be sufficient to
sustain
conviction of theft. People v. Abney, App. 1 Dist.1978, 22 Ill.Dec.
87, 65
Ill.App.3d 167, 382 N.E.2d 407. Larceny k 55
Testimony of two witnesses implicating defendant, as corroborated by
testimony
of police officer, was sufficient to sustain conviction of theft of
property
valued in excess of $150 and of unlawful possession of a motor vehicle.
People
v. Goudy, App. 1 Dist.1976, 36 Ill.App.3d 301, 343 N.E.2d 619.
Automobiles k
355(10); Larceny k 65
Evidence consisting only of testimony of store security guard who
observed
defendant removed ticket from store merchandise and leave store without
paying
for merchandise, contradicted by defendant, was sufficient to sustain
theft
conviction. People v. Murray, App. 1 Dist.1974, 22 Ill.App.3d 684, 318
N.E.2d
52. Larceny k 55
Positive and credible identification testimony by a single witness who
testified that during incident he was able to get clear look at
defendant when
defendant hit him in the face was sufficient to sustain conviction for
theft.
People v. Walls, App. 1 Dist.1974, 18 Ill.App.3d 1075, 311 N.E.2d 202.
Criminal Law k 566
Positive and credible identification by one eyewitness to crime was
sufficient
to justify conviction even though defendant had asserted an alibi.
People v.
Blocker, App. 1 Dist.1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 902, 305 N.E.2d 321. Criminal
Law k
566
257. ---- Accomplice testimony, generally, sufficiency, evidence
Evidence, including testimony of two accomplices that defendant had
participated in a burglary and that a number of items of personal
property
were removed to defendant's house, was sufficient to sustain a
conviction for
either residential burglary with intent to commit a theft or theft.
People v.
Dace, 1984, 83 Ill.Dec. 573, 104 Ill.2d 96, 470 N.E.2d 993. Burglary k
41(1);
Larceny k 55
In prosecution for burglary and theft, evidence including testimony of
accomplice was sufficient to convict. People v. Crane, App. 5
Dist.1976, 34
Ill.App.3d 850, 341 N.E.2d 97. Burglary k 41(1); Larceny k 55
Evidence including, inter alia, testimony of unindicted accomplice that
defendant made arrangements to dispose of stolen camper and made plans
to
participate in transfer and testimony of police officers corroborating
accomplice's testimony in part was sufficient to prove guilty knowledge
and
intention to permanently deprive owner of use of camper and thus to
sustain
theft conviction. People v. Ward, App. 2 Dist.1975, 31 Ill.App.3d
1022, 335
N.E.2d 57. Receiving Stolen Goods k 8(3); Receiving Stolen Goods k
8(4)
Notwithstanding defendant's argument that possession of recently stolen
coins
in his lap in car with no attempt to conceal them, in view of testimony
of
indicted codefendant, did not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence
both as to defendant's guilty knowledge and intent, evidence sustained
conviction of theft. People v. Legear, App. 2 Dist.1975, 29 Ill.App.3d
884,
331 N.E.2d 659. Larceny k 64(1)
In light of testimony by owners of garbage containers that their
containers
were stolen and testimony by accomplice that he and defendant stole
them, that
they took containers to gas station, that he saw defendant repainting
them
three or four days later, and that he sold containers to owner of
pizzeria and
paid the money obtained therefor to defendant, whether containers which
were
recovered by police from owner of pizzeria were same containers as
originally
stolen was immaterial to issue of whether defendant was connected with
stolen
property. People v. DeBartolo, App. 2 Dist.1975, 24 Ill.App.3d 1009,
322
N.E.2d 258. Larceny k 55
Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction of defendant for theft of
property over $150 even though direct evidence of actual taking
consisted of
uncorroborated testimony of accomplice; even if accomplice took
property,
defendant was still guilty under theory of accountability. People v.
Agans,
App. 4 Dist.1974, 24 Ill.App.3d 64, 320 N.E.2d 25. Larceny k 27;
Larceny k 65
Evidence against defendant, who, with accomplice, assertedly entered
building
and removed two rolls of shag carpeting with approximate value of $600,
sustained conviction for burglary and theft over $150. People v.
Gentry, App.
4 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 861, 312 N.E.2d 441. Burglary k 41(1);
Larceny k
59
Despite the exculpating testimony of one companion who pled guilty and
assumed
full responsibility for the offenses, defendant's conviction on two
counts of
theft and one count of burglary was supported by sufficient
circumstantial
evidence, including fact that camper truck in which the stolen articles
were
found was owned by defendant and was being driven by him when he and
his two
companions were stopped by the police. People v. Street, App. 4
Dist.1973, 11
Ill.App.3d 243, 296 N.E.2d 606. Burglary k 42(1); Larceny k 64(1)
Evidence, including accomplice testimony, was sufficient to sustain
conviction
of arson, burglary and theft. People v. George, 1971, 49 Ill.2d 372,
274
N.E.2d 26. Criminal Law k 508(9)
Evidence, including testimony of an accomplice that he and defendant
had gone
to steal cigarettes from a store in order to purchase narcotics and
had, in
fact, stolen cigarettes from store on date in question, was sufficient
to
sustain conviction of petty theft.
Ill.App.2d
171, 272 N.E.2d 739. Larceny k 65
People v. Spence, App.1971, 133
Where testimony of accomplice that defendant was present when stolen
merchandise was stored in his barn, that he knew merchandise was
stolen, and
that he assisted original thieves to store merchandise in his barn was
corroborated by testimony of defendant himself, and weight of evidence
and
credibility of witnesses are for jury to determine, jury's verdict
which found
defendant, guilty of theft would not be disturbed on appeal. People v.
Sanders, App.1966, 75 Ill.App.2d 422, 220 N.E.2d 487. Criminal Law k
1159.2(10); Criminal Law k 1159.4(6)
Evidence supported bank employee's felony theft conviction, arising
from
unauthorized withdrawals from victim's account by use of false
automatic
teller machine (ATM) card; although recanted at trial, accomplice's
prior
testimony at his own sentencing hearing was that defendant set up false
ATM
card, that defendant told accomplice to go to bank to pick up card, and
that
accomplice did so, and gave card to defendant after withdrawing $400,
and
defendant's fingerprints were found on card. People v. Zizzo, App. 2
Dist.1998, 234 Ill.Dec. 685, 301 Ill.App.3d 481, 703 N.E.2d 546.
Larceny k 55
258. ---- Accomplice testimony, uncorroborated, sufficiency, evidence
Evidence, consisting of testimony of alleged accomplices, was
sufficient to
sustain conviction for residential burglary of a dwelling place,
burglary of a
building, and theft of property, in excess of $300. People v.
Cadwallader,
App. 4 Dist.1989, 130 Ill.Dec. 108, 181 Ill.App.3d 488, 536 N.E.2d
1319,
appeal denied 136 Ill.Dec. 593, 127 Ill.2d 623, 545 N.E.2d 117.
Criminal Law
k 508(9)
Testimony of accomplice, which was not substantially impeached, was
sufficient
to sustain theft conviction, despite contention that accomplice had
motives of
revenge and self-protection, and despite alibi evidence. People v.
DeBartolo,
App. 2 Dist.1975, 24 Ill.App.3d 1000, 322 N.E.2d 251. Criminal Law k
508(9)
The uncorroborated testimony of an alleged accomplice is sufficient to
convict
if it satisfies a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
1959, 16
Ill.2d 364, 158 N.E.2d 1. Criminal Law k 510
People v. Baker,
Evidence, though largely that of accomplices, was sufficient to support
conviction for larceny of hogs. People v. Bugg, 1931, 177 N.E. 718,
345 Ill.
210. Criminal Law k 508(9)
Uncorroborated testimony of accomplice is sufficient to sustain
conviction of
larceny. People v. Erickson, 1930, 170 N.E. 782, 338 Ill. 542.
Criminal Law
k 510
259. ---- Rebuttal testimony, sufficiency, evidence
Rebuttal testimony of police officer that defendant, after being
properly
warned, told officer that defendant would take entire blame if officer
would
release other men was strong evidence of guilt. People v. Banks, App.
1
Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 512, 308 N.E.2d 247. Criminal Law k 414
260. ---- Common scheme or design, sufficiency, evidence
Where defendant, sanitary district official, was charged with theft
arising
out of his receipt of $420 check written by village treasurer for
rental from
sanitary district of certain flood protection equipment and his cashing
of
check without delivering funds to sanitary district, evidence that
defendant
subsequently received and cashed second $420 check which was written by
same
person and given to defendant for same reason without giving funds to
district
was admissible to show common scheme or design and to show absence of
mistake
on defendant's part. People v. Campbell, App. 5 Dist.1975, 28
Ill.App.3d 480,
328 N.E.2d 608. Criminal Law k 372(8)
In light of fact that defendant who allegedly entered jewelry store
with two
associates, questioned clerk about watches, and obscured clerk's view
of a
diamond case from which merchandise was later found to be missing, was
identified with reference to all of jewelry store thefts, that the
incidents
all took place within a relatively short span of time, and that the
circumstances of all the incidents were essentially identical, evidence
of
prior and subsequent incidents was admissible to establish defendant's
scheme
or design, mode and method of operation and to establish specific
intent.
People v. McNear, App. 4 Dist.1974, 16 Ill.App.3d 1055, 308 N.E.2d 200.
Criminal Law k 371(2); Criminal Law k 372(5)
Evidence, showing scheme by township tax collector and his wife to
withhold
tax funds from taxing bodies and to appropriate such funds to their own
use
and showing tax collector's presence at bank at time of purchase of
interest
in oil well in his and his wife's names using check on his account as
tax
collector, showing his presence when deposit was made in their joint
savings
account using another check on his account as tax collector, and
showing his
knowledge that large sums of money were being deposited in his personal
bank
account, was sufficient to support convictions of such husband and wife
of
theft of property valued in excess of $150 and to support conviction of
husband of official misconduct. People v. Haycraft, App.1972, 3
Ill.App.3d
974, 278 N.E.2d 877. Larceny k 55; Taxation k 2831
261. ---- Failure to pay, sufficiency, evidence
Evidence, including security guard's testimony that he observed that
accused
was not wearing a jacket when he entered store, that he took jacket off
rack
and put it on and that he attempted to leave store without paying for
jacket,
was sufficient to sustain conviction of theft. People v. Sykes, App. 1
Dist.1975, 30 Ill.App.3d 726, 333 N.E.2d 466. Larceny k 55
In prosecution for theft, defendant's evidence did not establish that
he was
trying to collect a debt. People v. McLilly, App. 1 Dist.1974, 19
Ill.App.3d
682, 312 N.E.2d 302. Larceny k 55
In theft prosecution, security guard's testimony that he saw defendant
in
store select belt and dog collar and leave store without paying for
those
items was sufficient to prove ownership of the items by the store.
People v.
Ruiz, App. 1 Dist.1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 1047, 305 N.E.2d 653. Larceny k
60
Evidence was sufficient to authorize trier of fact to find not only
that
defendant attempted theft of pants by exercising unauthorized control
over the
merchandise, but that when he was observed continuously by store
detective,
and left store wearing the apparel over or under his own pants, he
evidenced
intent to permanently deprive store of the pants. People v. Carr, App.
1
Dist.1973, 16 Ill.App.3d 76, 305 N.E.2d 554. Larceny k 66
Evidence was sufficient to sustain petit theft conviction of defendant
who did
not intend to pay for merchandise when he placed it into shopping bag
which he
had brought into store and who ran from the store after he saw store
employee
watching him. People v. Ida, App. 1 Dist.1973, 14 Ill.App.3d 407, 302
N.E.2d
713. Larceny k 65
Testimony of security guard for department store that defendant was
arrested
as he exited from store carrying men's pants in closed up bag, that
defendant
did not attempt to pay for pants and did not have sales slip in bag and
that
store had not given defendant permission to appropriate pants
constituted
sufficient circumstantial evidence to support jury's conclusion that
pants
were owned by store and not by defendant and to support defendant's
conviction
of theft. People v. Thomas, App. 1 Dist.1972, 9 Ill.App.3d 384, 292
N.E.2d 153
. Larceny k 60
Evidence supported conviction for theft where defendant was shown to
have
created a false impression that he was a sign manufacturer, where he
obtained
control over steel, immediately sold steel at reduced price to bona
fide
purchaser and where his promise to pay for steel was so consistently
broken as
to show conclusively that defendant never intended to pay. People v.
Kamsler,
App.1966, 67 Ill.App.2d 33, 214 N.E.2d 562. False Pretenses k 49(1)
262. ---- Receipts, sufficiency, evidence
Dentist's filing of claim and accepting payment from city for city
employees'
dental work that was never completed, or completed by other dentists,
was
theft by unauthorized control over city's money rather than contract
dispute
arising out of dentist's debtor-creditor relationship with city;
dentist not
only prematurely billed for future dental work but did not perform the
work
even years after receiving payment. People v. Berke, App. 1 Dist.1992,
177
Ill.Dec. 667, 236 Ill.App.3d 322, 603 N.E.2d 737, appeal denied 183
Ill.Dec.
24, 148 Ill.2d 645, 610 N.E.2d 1268. False Pretenses k 18
Theft conviction of automobile dealership's delivery manager was
supported by
evidence that delivery manager collected payments from customers,
controlled
influx of money into dealership, failed to give customers receipts for
down
payments, and that money which defendant handled was discovered
missing; in
addition, defendant confessed to theft and offered repayment when
confronted.
People v. Wiesneske, App. 1 Dist.1992, 175 Ill.Dec. 252, 234 Ill.App.3d
29,
599 N.E.2d 1266. Larceny k 55
Evidence that defendant, a licensed insurance producer engaged in the
practice
of writing credit life or disability policies insuring bank's loan
customers,
failed to procure policies after premiums were deposited in his escrow
account, was insufficient to support theft conviction, absent evidence
that
the premiums deposited were withdrawn by defendant. People v. Davis,
App. 3
Dist.1989, 137 Ill.Dec. 121, 189 Ill.App.3d 815, 545 N.E.2d 774, appeal
denied
140 Ill.Dec. 675, 129 Ill.2d 567, 550 N.E.2d 560. Larceny k 55
Evidence in prosecution for theft and official misconduct pertaining to
unauthorized or deceptive control of authorizations to purchase food
stamp
cards allegedly used to illegally obtain food stamps, was sufficient to
support determinations, upon which convictions on 34 counts of theft
and
official misconduct were based, that defendant made false entries on
ledger to
which information from authorization forms was transferred, typed false
authorizations to purchase cards and received some amount of money for
her
efforts, notwithstanding evidence that ex-husband may have participated
in
falsification of authorization cards. People v. Walton, App. 1
Dist.1981, 50
Ill.Dec. 387, 94 Ill.App.3d 903, 419 N.E.2d 495. Agriculture k 2.6(5);
False
Pretenses k 49(3)
Evidence was sufficient to support conviction on 18 counts of theft and
official misconduct pertaining to unauthorized or deceptive control of
authorizations to purchase food stamp cards which were allegedly used
to
illegally obtain food stamps, notwithstanding sloppiness of procedures
in
office of State Department of Public Aid and climate in which
responsibility
for particular task was often unclear, in view of defendant's admission
to
making certain ledger entries in course of her employment and of
assigning
specific authorizations to purchase food stamp cards in her possession
to each
ledger entry, unrefuted evidence that there were discrepancies between
ledger
and cards in respect to name of card's recipient and face value of
card, and
testimony of every recipient, save one, named either on ledger or on
authorizations to purchase cards denying receiving or redeeming cards.
People
v. Walton, App. 1 Dist.1981, 50 Ill.Dec. 387, 94 Ill.App.3d 903, 419
N.E.2d
495. Agriculture k 2.6(5); False Pretenses k 49(1)
When defendant left store without any evidence of purchase or exchange
he
exercised unauthorized control over pants and was guilty of theft and
lesser
included offense of attempted theft. People v. Carr, App. 1 Dist.1973,
16
Ill.App.3d 76, 305 N.E.2d 554. Larceny k 21; Larceny k 24
Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction, for stealing meat valued
at
$18.40, of defendant who was observed by security guard in check-our
line with
shopping bag full of meat and was stopped by the guard while crossing
from one
line to another and who said that he had paid for the meat but had no
receipt
because the cashier had allegedly not given him one. People v.
Jamison, App.
1 Dist.1973, 11 Ill.App.3d 516, 297 N.E.2d 664. Larceny k 55
263. ---- Use of force, sufficiency, evidence
Defendant's taking of property subsequent to his choking victim until
he
thought she was dead established only theft and attempt murder, which
are not
lesser included offenses of robbery, and thus robbery conviction would
be
reversed. People v. Pack, App. 5 Dist.1976, 34 Ill.App.3d 894, 341
N.E.2d 4.
Indictment And Information k 191(9)
Testimony of complaining witness that defendant seized him by the neck
during
dice game, forced him against wall and removed his billfold containing
about
$50, was sufficient to sustain conviction of theft of property under
$150 in
value. People v. Murrell, 1975, 60 Ill.2d 287, 326 N.E.2d 762. Larceny
k 65
Evidence that defendant came into apartment where victim was visiting,
took
money from victim's wallet, forced victim at knife point to go to
victim's
apartment, from which defendant took stereo equipment, and that
defendant
later took victim's wristwatch sustained defendant's conviction for
aggravated
assault and theft, even though victim initially failed to implicate
others in
the theft and even though there were other inconsistencies in the
testimony of
the witnesses. People v. Taylor, App. 1 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 976,
320
N.E.2d 398. Assault And Battery k 91.6(2); Larceny k 55
Complaining witness's testimony concerning theft from her pocketbook on
a bus
and detailing how the defendant and his brother pinned her between them
while
the defendant's brother was brushing against her and the defendant was
a foot
away was not self-contradictory and did not cast doubt on the weight of
her
testimony. People v. Jackson, App. 1 Dist.1974, 21 Ill.App.3d 791, 315
N.E.2d
661. Criminal Law k 553
Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction of battery and of
attempted
theft notwithstanding claim that prosecution failed to prove that
defendant
either demanded or attempted to remove money or property from victim.
People
v. Tripp, App. 1 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 200, 311 N.E.2d 168. Assault
And
Battery k 91.2; Larceny k 66
Evidence, including testimony of complaining witness that defendant's
cousin
grabbed him from rear and defendant facing him from front took $11 from
witness' pants pocket, sustained theft conviction. People v. Jones,
App. 1
Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 603, 308 N.E.2d 357. Robbery k 24.10
264. ---- Flight, sufficiency, evidence
Defendant's conviction for felony theft was supported by evidence that
defendant, who was manager of banquet center, had accepted over $8,800
in cash
from individuals who had held functions at banquet over weekend, that
cash
collected was not deposited in safe in center's business office, as was
normal
procedure, and that after weekend, and without providing any prior
notification, defendant left his job and moved to Florida. People v.
Devine,
App. 1 Dist.1998, 229 Ill.Dec. 796, 295 Ill.App.3d 537, 692 N.E.2d 785.
Larceny k 63
Evidence of defendant's flight when police officers came to talk to him
corroborated proof of his guilt of burglary and felony theft and tended
to
make it more likely than not that his guilt flowed from possession of
stolen
items. People v. Riley, App. 4 Dist.1981, 54 Ill.Dec. 474, 99
Ill.App.3d 244,
424 N.E.2d 1377. Criminal Law k 552(2)
Evidence, including that defendant was seen rolling stolen tires down
an alley
at 2:15 in the morning and that he fled when approached by police, was
sufficient to sustain conviction of theft. People v. Lofton, App. 1
Dist.1977, 7 Ill.Dec. 423, 49 Ill.App.3d 559, 364 N.E.2d 584.
Receiving
Stolen Goods k 8(3)
Testimony which placed defendant at scene of theft in dormitory and
identification of radio found on defendant's companion as being one
taken from
complaining witness' unlocked room together with testimony that
defendant and
his companion broke into run upon leaving dormitory building was
sufficient to
show defendant's involvement in acts of companion and sharing of
common,
illegal purpose, and to sustain conviction of defendant for theft,
though
defendant claimed that he and his companion were running to catch bus
rather
than fleeing scene of crime. People v. Crawford, App.1971, 133
Ill.App.2d
210, 272 N.E.2d 706. Larceny k 55
265. ---- Alibi, sufficiency, evidence
Defendants' testimony that they had come to town after business hours
to take
a friend to a court date, that they had left to return to another city
for a
funeral, and that they did not suspect car was stolen even though it
bore
dealer's license plates and price schedule sticker on the window did
not
preclude conviction of theft of an automobile worth more than $150.
People v.
Brisbon, App. 3 Dist.1975, 26 Ill.App.3d 268, 324 N.E.2d 644. Larceny
k 65
Evidence, in tire theft prosecution, including testimony by the sole
occurrence witness whose testimony as to year of defendant's automobile
and
license number was inconsistent and whose testimony as to her distance
from
the occurrence was refuted by a witness for the defendant and a
photograph,
was insufficient to sustain conviction, especially in view of
defendant's
uncontroverted alibi and lack of proof as to criminal intent. People
v. Mogi,
App. 1 Dist.1974, 21 Ill.App.3d 706, 315 N.E.2d 557. Larceny k 55
Arresting officer's testimony positively identifying defendant as
person who
was being chased by victim from whom money had been taken was
sufficient to
sustain conviction of misdemeanor theft, even though it conflicted with
testimony of defendant's alibi witnesses. People v. Huey, App. 1
Dist.1974,
17 Ill.App.3d 245, 307 N.E.2d 767. Criminal Law k 572
Trial court was not obligated to believe alibi testimony over positive
identification testimony of officer based upon sufficient opportunity
to
observe defendant, in prosecution for misdemeanor theft. People v.
Huey, App.
1 Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 245, 307 N.E.2d 767. Criminal Law k 572
In prosecution of defendant for theft, trial judge, sitting as trier of
fact,
did not err in disregarding defendant's alibi testimony that he was in
Florida
in Navy at time of alleged offense. People v. Betts, App. 1 Dist.1974,
17
Ill.App.3d 22, 307 N.E.2d 672. Criminal Law k 572
Fact that defendant produced an alibi, supported by one witness, did
not, in
and of itself, constitute a reasonable doubt as to his guilt on theft
charge.
People v. Savaiano, App. 1 Dist.1973, 10 Ill.App.3d 666, 294 N.E.2d
740.
Criminal Law k 572
Notwithstanding defendant's claim of alibi to the effect he spent the
night
playing cards, evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction of
defendant for
theft. People v. Johnson, App. 1 Dist.1973, 9 Ill.App.3d 920, 293
N.E.2d 375.
Criminal Law k 572
Evidence, including corroborating evidence that defendants had been
assigned
to beat and that patrol car radio had been taken off air during time in
question, sustained conviction of police officers for theft and
bribery,
despite victim's uncertain identification of one officer and existence
of
alibi testimony. People v. Burke, App.1970, 131 Ill.App.2d 76, 266
N.E.2d 547,
certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 558, 404 U.S. 1000, 30 L.Ed.2d 552.
Criminal Law k
566
Alibi testimony could not be disregarded where only evidence
contradictory
thereof rested on identity of defendant as man who committed crime.
People v.
Gold, 1935, 196 N.E. 729, 361 Ill. 23. Criminal Law k 572
266. ---- Reputation of accused, sufficiency, evidence
Testimony of several character witnesses that trustee who appropriated
money
from a trust foundation enjoyed a good reputation for honesty and
integrity
did not raise a reasonable doubt of trustee's guilt of theft. People
v.
Lopez, App. 1 Dist.1984, 84 Ill.Dec. 730, 129 Ill.App.3d 488, 472
N.E.2d 867,
appeal denied. Criminal Law k 381
Evidence was insufficient to sustain conviction for larceny of sewing
machine
where evidence of defendant's good reputation was uncontroverted and
alibi
evidence was contradicted only by prosecuting witnesses' identification
of
defendant as man who committed crime. People v. Gold, 1935, 196 N.E.
729, 361
Ill. 23. Criminal Law k 381; Criminal Law k 572
While evidence of good reputation is not proof of innocence, it is not
to be
disregarded, and it may be sufficient to raise reasonable doubt as to
defendant's guilt. People v. Gold, 1935, 196 N.E. 729, 361 Ill. 23.
Criminal
Law k 381
267. ---- Prior convictions, sufficiency, evidence
Provision of enhancement statute for repeat theft offenders limiting
enhancement to when a defendant has been convicted of theft of property
not
exceeding $300 in value, other than a firearm and not from the person,
does
not set forth factors that must be proved prior to enhancement, so as
to be
subject to Apprendi; rather it simply describes present offense of
which trier
of fact found defendant guilty. People v. Ligons, App. 4 Dist.2001,
259
Ill.Dec. 689, 325 Ill.App.3d 753, 759 N.E.2d 169, appeal denied 262
Ill.Dec.
623, 198 Ill.2d 602, 766 N.E.2d 243. Jury k 34(6); Sentencing And
Punishment
k 1238; Sentencing And Punishment k 1380(4)
Defendant was not estopped from asserting that he was not guilty of
felony
theft because State failed to present evidence of prior theft
conviction, on
theory that defendant invited the error by successfully moving to
exclude the
prior conviction because he did not knowingly waive his right to
counsel in
the prior case. People v. Nolan, App. 5 Dist.1989, 135 Ill.Dec. 637,
188
Ill.App.3d 251, 543 N.E.2d 1384. Criminal Law k 1137(7)
Where defendant's federal conviction for mail fraud had been reversed
and
remanded for new trial, it was "voidable" or capable of being voided,
rather
than "void," and thus, State could properly use federal conviction for
impeachment purposes in prosecution for forgery and theft, especially
where
there was sufficient substantive evidence from which trier of fact
could infer
that defendant was guilty of federal offense. People v. MartinTrigona, App.
1 Dist.1982, 67 Ill.Dec. 291, 111 Ill.App.3d 718, 444 N.E.2d 527.
Witnesses k
345(10)
A certified copy of alleged prior conviction for a misdemeanor theft on
which
appeared a name similar to defendant's was not proof beyond a
reasonable doubt
of a prior conviction of defendant for purpose of imposing the enhanced
penalties of this section. People v. Connell, App.1972, 6 Ill.App.3d
791, 286
N.E.2d 565. Sentencing And Punishment k 1381(3)
268. ---- Accountability, generally, sufficiency, evidence
Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for
conspiracy to
commit theft and insurance fraud, even if she played no role in actual
staging
of fake automobile accident; defendant procured insurance for her
automobile
after codefendant informed her of plan to fake accident in order to
obtain
insurance proceeds, and codefendants obtained settlement proceeds under
fraudulent pretenses. People v. Buffman, App. 1 Dist.1994, 201
Ill.Dec. 351,
260 Ill.App.3d 505, 636 N.E.2d 783. Conspiracy k 47(4); Conspiracy k
47(11);
Insurance k 3654
Evidence established that defendant knowingly aided another before
theft of
tile saw was completed so as to sustain conviction for felony theft on
accomplice liability theory; defendant helped unsnag box which
contained saw
knowing that other person was stealing it, during time in which other
person
was stealing, and knowing that unsnagging box would help other person
complete
offense. People v. Clark, App. 2 Dist.1991, 163 Ill.Dec. 568, 221
Ill.App.3d
303, 581 N.E.2d 722. Larceny k 55
Evidence was sufficient to sustain finding that defendant helped
accomplice
commit crime of theft by exerting control over stolen property, where,
contrary to defendant's testimony that he had remained in car while
accomplice
loaded it with stereo equipment he told defendant was his, eyewitness
testified that he had seen two people loading stereo equipment into
car.
People v. Ortiz, App. 1 Dist.1988, 121 Ill.Dec. 2, 170 Ill.App.3d 1083,
524
N.E.2d 1050. Larceny k 55
Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendants' convictions of theft
of
gasoline arising out of incident at gasoline station, since defendants
both
testified that price of gasoline which appeared on pump was, in fact,
paid,
and uncontradicted evidence showed that both defendants were impressed
with
need for payment of gasoline; furthermore, codefendant's only part in
the
transaction was to bring money to defendant, and at no time did
codefendant
aid, abet or attempt to aid defendant in the planning or commission of
any
offense. People v. Worlds, App. 1 Dist.1980, 35 Ill.Dec. 948, 80
Ill.App.3d
628, 400 N.E.2d 85. Larceny k 55
Evidence, in prosecution for robbery and theft, that defendant
approached,
with codefendant, an alcove where decoy police officer was pretending
to be
intoxicated and stood at the entrance, looking up and down the street,
while
codefendant took ring from police officer, and that codefendant handed
defendant the stolen ring and defendant threw it to the ground when he
saw the
police approach was sufficient for jury to conclude that defendant's
conduct
rendered him legally accountable. People v. Houston, App. 1 Dist.1979,
30
Ill.Dec. 493, 74 Ill.App.3d 586, 393 N.E.2d 529. Robbery k 24.20
Evidence was insufficient to sustain conviction for theft of property
in the
value of $20, despite contention of State that evidence showed
defendants'
guilt under <section> 5-2 of former chapter 38 in relation to theft of
money
from service station cash register. People v. Badalamenti, App. 1
Dist.1975,
29 Ill.App.3d 576, 331 N.E.2d 177. Larceny k 55
Evidence failed to establish accused's accountability for another's
alleged
theft of bicycle and thus was insufficient to sustain conviction of
theft
under $150. People v. Banks, App. 1 Dist.1975, 28 Ill.App.3d 784, 329
N.E.2d
504. Larceny k 65
Evidence, in prosecution for theft, was sufficient to prove that
defendant's
brother took the victim's wallet from her purse when she boarded a bus
and
that the defendant aided in the theft. People v. Jackson, App. 1
Dist.1974,
21 Ill.App.3d 791, 315 N.E.2d 661. Larceny k 55
Evidence that defendant and three others approached victim, that
defendant
then said "He's all right. Leave him alone," that defendant then
walked five
feet from victim and stood there while one of the others produced a gun
and
took victim's wallet and that defendant said or did nothing during
actual
robbery was insufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that
defendant
was accountable for actions of the others or to sustain conviction of
theft.
People v. Gilmore, App. 1 Dist.1974, 18 Ill.App.3d 846, 310 N.E.2d 712.
Robbery k 24.20
Where defendants joined with two other men to rob a couple, fact that
defendant's companions spontaneously grabbed one victim, took her away
and
raped her before taking her purpose while defendant remained with the
other
victim did not exonerate defendant from liability for theft of the
purse.
People v. Bernett, App. 1 Dist.1973, 14 Ill.App.3d 816, 303 N.E.2d 544.
Robbery k 15
Acquittal of persons who, according to witness, participated with
defendant in
charged crime of theft of a slab of meat having value of $20 did not
relieve
defendant of his own responsibilities. People v. Arthur, App. 1
Dist.1973, 12
Ill.App.3d 738, 295 N.E.2d 586. Criminal Law k 877
Where defendant acted together with two codefendants in assaulting and
taking
property of victim, defendant was a participant in and was therefore
legally
accountable for actions of his codefendants who took and began to
search
victim's bag of groceries and deliberately smashed his eyeglasses, even
though
defendant did not physically touch the groceries or eyeglasses. People
v.
Bell, App. 1 Dist.1972, 9 Ill.App.3d 465, 292 N.E.2d 219. Larceny k 27
Evidence that defendant distracted grocery store clerk at time money
disappeared from counter behind clerk, that defendant prevented pursuit
by
clerk of woman seen leaving store when loss of money was discovered but
that
defendant did not leave and attempted to persuade clerk of his
innocence in
face of accusations of complicity was not compatible only with
hypothesis of
defendant's innocence of aiding and abetting confederate in commission
of
theft. People v. Pendleton, App.1966, 75 Ill.App.2d 314, 221 N.E.2d
112.
Larceny k 55
Evidence that defendant entered grocery store with woman, that
defendant and
woman walked aisles together and she called him "honey", that defendant
approached clerk who had put money on counter and asked her to read
soap
label, that money disappeared and woman was seen leaving store, and
that
defendant prevented immediate pursuit of woman by clerk supported
determination that theft was committed and that defendant intentionally
aided
and abetted confederate in commission of theft. People v. Pendleton,
App.1966, 75 Ill.App.2d 314, 221 N.E.2d 112. Larceny k 55
That defendant accused of theft was not shown to have initiated
wrongful
asportation of stolen automobile is immaterial where it is shown that
he has
knowingly obtained or exerted unauthorized control over owner's
property.
People v. Nunn, App.1965, 63 Ill.App.2d 465, 212 N.E.2d 342. Larceny k
27
In prosecution for larceny of washing machine from which serial numbers
had
been removed, where state contended that theft was committed through
innocent
agents who were acquitted of larceny and evidence was conclusive that
accused
never had possession of machine, conviction was precluded, since
removal of
serial numbers indicated criminal intent precluding finding that
alleged
agents were innocent agents of accused. People v. Walker, 1935, 198
N.E. 353,
361 Ill. 482. Larceny k 27
269. ---- Accountability, presence, sufficiency, evidence
Evidence that defendant was seen with codefendant after theft had taken
place
and that defendant ran with codefendant to bus upon being pursued by
police
officer did not establish that he participated in or facilitated
codefendant's
theft by pickpocketing. People v. Ceasar, App. 1 Dist.1992, 172
Ill.Dec. 810,
231 Ill.App.3d 54, 596 N.E.2d 89, appeal denied 176 Ill.Dec. 807, 146
Ill.2d
635, 602 N.E.2d 461. Larceny k 55
Evidence that defendant knew in advance of planned theft, was present
during
commission of offense, and shared equally in division of proceeds was
sufficient to support defendant's theft conviction as accomplice,
despite
defendant's claim that he was merely present at crime scene and only
subsequently became aware of commission of offense. People v. Furby,
1990,
150 Ill.Dec. 534, 138 Ill.2d 434, 563 N.E.2d 421, on remand 169
Ill.Dec. 360,
228 Ill.App.3d 1, 591 N.E.2d 533. Larceny k 55
Evidence that defendant was standing next to burglarized van, saw
companion,
who was inside van, remove a tool box from floor of vehicle, was handed
tool
box by companion and then placed it in trunk of second companion's
automobile
with full knowledge that it did not belong to first companion, and
finally
departed scene of burglary in car containing tool box was sufficient to
sustain conviction of burglary and theft under $300 on theory that
defendant
was legally accountable for criminal actions of another. People v.
Ruckholdt,
App. 2 Dist.1984, 77 Ill.Dec. 543, 122 Ill.App.3d 7, 460 N.E.2d 847.
Burglary
k 41(1)
Although defendant's presence in
brought out
of apartment was insufficient to
be
considered with reference to his
Riley, App.
4 Dist.1981, 54 Ill.Dec. 474, 99
Criminal Law
k 69
automobile when stolen items were
convict him, it was a circumstance to
guilt as an accessory.
People v.
Ill.App.3d 244, 424 N.E.2d 1377.
Evidence in defendant's prosecution for theft of property over $150 in
value,
including testimony that there were other people in store at time
property was
taken from upstairs living quarters of store owner and that none of
gypsies,
including defendant, were seen upstairs or near living quarters, was
insufficient to support conviction of defendant for theft on theory of
aiding
and abetting person or persons who actually took property. People v.
Kostatinovich, App. 2 Dist.1981, 54 Ill.Dec. 114, 98 Ill.App.3d 611,
424
N.E.2d 864. Larceny k 55
In prosecution for retail theft in excess in $150, jury could
reasonably have
concluded that defendant's conduct in store and, thereafter, presence
of
perpetrators of crime in car she was driving, and large size or bulk of
stolen
items and their location in car were actions and circumstances which
demonstrated that she was a participant in a crime rather than an
innocent
bystander. People v. Grice, App. 2 Dist.1980, 43 Ill.Dec. 209, 87
Ill.App.3d
718, 410 N.E.2d 209, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 1714, 450 U.S. 1003,
68
L.Ed.2d 207. Larceny k 55
Evidence that defendant was shopping with room-mate and was present
when
room-mate purchased diamond ring, silverware, and china on defendant's
checking account, that defendant admitted that she was aware of roommate's
activities, and that defendant subsequently falsely reported checkbook
to have
been stolen, was sufficient to support trial court's finding that
defendant
had intentionally aided and abetted commission of theft. People v.
Maxon,
App. 3 Dist.1976, 35 Ill.App.3d 670, 341 N.E.2d 479.
49(1)
False Pretenses k
Defendants' mere presence in alley with person who was carrying stolen
battery, even if defendants had knowledge that crime had been
committed, was
not alone sufficient to establish accountability in prosecution for
theft.
People v. Thompson, App. 1 Dist.1975, 35 Ill.App.3d 105, 340 N.E.2d
631.
Larceny k 27
Evidence including showing that defendant and principal who stole
bicycle
arrived together and left at the same time, that principal returned to
the
automobile and spoke with defendant on two occasions, and after the
principal
had finished cutting the chain of the bicycle he motioned to defendant
at
which time the defendant drove away sustained conviction of defendant
of theft
of property valued at less than $150. People v. Ilich, App. 1
Dist.1974, 25
Ill.App.3d 334, 323 N.E.2d 509. Larceny k 55
In absence of any evidence, direct or circumstantial, that defendants
aided,
abetted or otherwise contributed to or participated in theft by
another, mere
evidence that defendants were found present in vehicle with person who
did
commit thefts was insufficient to support defendants' convictions,
People v.
Collins, App. 1 Dist.1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 1001, 305 N.E.2d 186.
Criminal Law k
59(3)
Defendant was not improperly convicted of felony theft on ground that
he was a
mere passenger in automobile where stolen items were found, where
evidence
disclosed, inter alia, lug nuts were found inside the automobile in
area where
defendant had been seated, fingerprint expert testified that
defendant's
fingerprints were found on the automobile from which the property had
been
stolen, and defendant's brother testified that he fell asleep in the
automobile while defendant was driving. People v. Briseno, App.1972, 2
Ill.App.3d 814, 277 N.E.2d 743. Larceny k 55
III. VALUE OF PROPERTY
<Subdivision Index>
Acquittal, verdict 325
Admissibility of evidence 305-309
Admissibility of evidence - In general 305
Admissibility of evidence - Expert testimony 309
Admissibility of evidence - Insurance proceeds 307
Admissibility of evidence - Owner's testimony 308
Admissibility of evidence - Relevance 306
Aggravation and mitigation, sentencing 327
Aggregation of values 297
Burden of proof 304
Concurrent and consecutive terms, sentencing 329
Conduct of trial 302
Evidence, admissibility of 305-309
Evidence, sufficiency of 312-320
Expert testimony, admissibility of evidence 309
Expert testimony, sufficiency of evidence 316
Fact questions 311
General verdict 324
Grand and petit theft 292
Indeterminate term, sentencing 328
Indictment and information 298-300
Indictment and information - In general 298
Indictment and information - Statutory language 300
Indictment and information - Value 299
Instructions 321
Insurance proceeds, admissibility of evidence 307
Judicial notice 310
Market value of property 293
Market value, sufficiency of evidence 313
Motor vehicles, sufficiency of evidence 318
Negotiable instruments, sufficiency of evidence 317
Opinion evidence, sufficiency of evidence 315
Owner's testimony, admissibility of evidence 308
Owner's testimony, sufficiency of evidence 314
Place of theft 295
Possession of stolen property, sufficiency of evidence 319
Presumptions and burden of proof 304
Probation, sentencing 330
Purpose 291
Recovery of property 296
Relevance, admissibility of evidence 306
Remarks of judge 303
Selling price 294
Sentencing 326-330
Sentencing - In general 326
Sentencing - Aggravation and mitigation 327
Sentencing - Concurrent and consecutive terms 329
Sentencing - Indeterminate term 328
Sentencing - Probation 330
Statutory language, indictment and information 300
Sufficiency of evidence 312-320
Sufficiency of evidence - In general 312
Sufficiency of evidence - Expert testimony 316
Sufficiency of evidence - Market value 313
Sufficiency of evidence - Motor vehicles 318
Sufficiency of evidence - Negotiable instruments 317
Sufficiency of evidence - Opinion evidence 315
Sufficiency of evidence - Owner's testimony 314
Sufficiency of evidence - Possession of stolen property 319
Sufficiency of evidence - Uncontradicted testimony 320
Uncontradicted testimony, sufficiency of evidence 320
Value, indictment and information 299
Variance 301
Verdict 322-325
Verdict Verdict Verdict Verdict Verdict forms 323
In general 322
Acquittal 325
General verdict 324
Verdict forms 323
291. Purpose, value of property
The only purpose in requiring the jury to find the value of the
property
stolen, in a prosecution for larceny by embezzlement, was to have it
properly
determined that the property had some value, and that the value was
either
more or less than $15. People v. Preble, 1925, 316 Ill. 233, 147 N.E.
124;
People v. Slattery, 1924, 312 Ill. 202, 143 N.E. 395.
"Theft" is committed by stealing of anything of value, regardless of
value
thereof, and value relates only to nature and extent of penalty which
may
properly be imposed. People v. Kelly, App.1965, 66 Ill.App.2d 204, 214
N.E.2d
290. Larceny k 6
In prosecution for receiving stolen property it is necessary to
establish
value of property in order to fix grade of offense. People v. Todaro,
1958,
14 Ill.2d 594, 153 N.E.2d 563. Receiving Stolen Goods k 7(6)
292. Grand and petit theft, value of property
Term "grand theft" had a commonly accepted meaning of a violation of
this
section in which the value of property exceeds $150. People v.
Figueroa, App.
1 Dist.1975, 30 Ill.App.3d 656, 333 N.E.2d 586. Larceny k 23
Petty theft is not an included offense in grand theft. People v.
Kelly,
App.1965, 66 Ill.App.2d 204, 214 N.E.2d 290. Indictment And
Information k
189(9)
The distinction between petit and grand larceny was the difference
between the
punishments where the value of the property taken was smaller or
greater than
the fixed statutory sum, and value alleged in indictment did not
govern, but
it was value proved that determines which of the two types of larceny
was
established and what punishment was to follow as a consequence. People
v.
Swinson, 1950, 92 N.E.2d 758, 406 Ill. 233. Larceny k 23
The fundamental distinction between grand and petit larceny is largely
matter
of punishment based on value of property stolen. People v. Harwell,
1947, 75
N.E.2d 889, 398 Ill. 369. Larceny k 23
There was no distinction between "petty larceny" and "grand larceny"
except
punishment. People v. Burke, 1924, 145 N.E. 164, 313 Ill. 576. Larceny
k 23
Under statutes prior to Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, ch. 38, <section> 389
(repealed),
the terms "grand larceny" and "petty larceny" were not specifically
defined,
but such terms have been simply used to signify punishment; "petty
larceny"
being used to designate that grade of larceny which subjected the
offender to
punishment otherwise than in penitentiary. People v. Burke, 1924, 145
N.E.
164, 313 Ill. 576.
293. Market value of property
Although market value is relevant to gravity of theft and therefore
length of
thief's sentence under Illinois law, theft of item that has no market
value is
still theft, and neither explicitly nor implicitly does power of
attorney
authorize power holder to steal from his grantor. Boyce v. Fernandes,
C.A.7 (
Ill.)1996, 77 F.3d 946. Larceny k 6; Larceny k 15(1)
Original cost or replacement cost is not the standard in determining
fair cash
market value of stolen property. People v. Collins, App. 3 Dist.1977,
6
Ill.Dec. 296, 48 Ill.App.3d 643, 362 N.E.2d 1118. Larceny k 46
The criteria used in determining value in theft cases is the fair cash
market
value at the time and place of the theft; cost is not the standard,
whether
it be original cost or replacement cost. People v. Brown, App. 3
Dist.1976,
36 Ill.App.3d 416, 343 N.E.2d 700. Larceny k 46
Term "value" in this section means fair cash market value, and such
value must
be proved by state in order to establish a felony rather than merely a
misdemeanor; cost is not the standard, whether it be original cost or
replacement cost; on the other hand, cost along with testimony as to
the
condition, quality and obsolescence or modernness, may afford a basis
for a
finding of value at time of the offense. People v. Cobetto, App. 5
Dist.1975,
32 Ill.App.3d 696, 336 N.E.2d 505, affirmed in part, reversed in part 6
Ill.Dec. 907, 66 Ill.2d 488, 363 N.E.2d 854. Larceny k 40(2); Larceny
k 46
In a theft prosecution, proof of value is shown by fair cash value at
time and
place of theft. People v. Lombardi, App. 1 Dist.1973, 13 Ill.App.3d
754, 301
N.E.2d 70. Larceny k 46
The criterion used in determining value in theft cases is the fair cash
market
value at time and place of theft. People v. Briseno, App.1972, 2
Ill.App.3d
814, 277 N.E.2d 743. Larceny k 46
With respect to offense of theft of property valued in excess of $150,
criterion is the fair cash market value of the property and not its
cost.
People v. Hayes, App.1971, 133 Ill.App.2d 885, 272 N.E.2d 423. Larceny
k 6
The value of property which makes the offense of theft a felony rather
than a
misdemeanor is the fair cash market value of the article at the time
and place
of its taking. People v. Parker, App.1968, 98 Ill.App.2d 146, 240
N.E.2d 475.
Larceny k 23
The value which makes it a felony rather than a misdemeanor is the fair
cash
market value of the property at the place and at the time of the theft,
and
evidence of price for which it was sold does not meet the requirement
of proof
of value beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Kurtz, App.1966, 69
Ill.App.2d
282, 216 N.E.2d 524, affirmed in part, reversed in part 37 Ill.2d 103,
224
N.E.2d 817. Larceny k 65
Value of goods stolen is not based on cost but on fair cash market
value.
People v. Hansen, 1963, 28 Ill.2d 322, 192 N.E.2d 359, certiorari
denied 84
S.Ct. 664, 376 U.S. 908, 11 L.Ed.2d 608, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct.
665, 376
U.S. 910, 11 L.Ed.2d 608. Receiving Stolen Goods k 2
Value of stolen
Hansen,
1963, 28 Ill.2d
376 U.S.
908, 11 L.Ed.2d
L.Ed.2d
608. Receiving
property is not judged by amount recovered.
People v.
322, 192 N.E.2d 359, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 664,
608, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 665, 376 U.S. 910, 11
Stolen Goods k 2
Absent evidence of any significant variation in weight or value of
coils of
wire stolen, trial judge was justified in considering figure testified
to as
fair value of coil as value of each coil. People v. Smolarek, 1962, 26
Ill.2d
148, 185 N.E.2d 838. Larceny k 65
In proof of offense of receiving stolen property, value must be proved
in
order for court to mete out proper punishment, and value proved must be
fair
cash market value of property at place of theft, testified to by a
person who
has sufficient knowledge of property and values to give a reasonable
estimate
thereof. People v. Stewart, 1960, 20 Ill.2d 387, 169 N.E.2d 796.
Receiving
Stolen Goods k 7(6); Receiving Stolen Goods k 8(3)
In cases involving distinction between petty larceny and grand larceny,
the
criterion is the fair cash market value of the property and not its
cost,
together with other proof, may afford basis for a valid finding as to
value.
People v. Rose, 1960, 19 Ill.2d 292, 166 N.E.2d 566. Larceny k 23
294. Selling price, value of property
Cost does not determine fair market value for purpose of determining
value in
theft cases. People v. Briseno, App.1972, 2 Ill.App.3d 814, 277 N.E.2d
743.
Larceny k 46
In prosecution for offense of theft of property having value in excess
of
$150, fair cash market value of unlawfully seized commodities would
most
accurately be reflected by retail prices of the commodities.
Leman,
App.1968, 95 Ill.App.2d 212, 238 N.E.2d 213. Larceny k 46
Where invoice accompanied merchandise and was price
to pay",
prosecution for obtaining property by deception was
rule that
price at which item is sold is not proof of value.
App.1967, 84 Ill.App.2d 269, 228 N.E.2d 131. False
People v.
defendant "agreed
not governed by
People v. Wilson,
Pretenses k 49(2)
Automobile, described as 1959 four-door vehicle, had actual value,
whether it
had market value or not, and was subject of larceny; and evidence,
from which
it was found that automobile had been taken and driven by defendants,
was
sufficient to support conviction of taking property of value not
exceeding
$150. People v. Kurtz, 1967, 37 Ill.2d 103, 224 N.E.2d 817. Larceny k
6;
Larceny k 59
Gas is subject to larceny and its value is taken at the selling price.
Woods
v. People, 1906, 78 N.E. 607, 222 Ill. 293, 113 Am.St.Rep. 415, 6
Am.Ann.Cas.
736.
295. Place of theft, value of property
Boat store value of stolen outboard motor which defendant had purchased
was
not the proper value to be proved in prosecution for receiving stolen
goods,
and value was value of motor at place of theft. People v. Stewart,
1960, 20
Ill.2d 387, 169 N.E.2d 796. Receiving Stolen Goods k 8(2)
Where article stolen has market value at time and place where stolen,
it is
competent to prove fair cash market value of such property, but it is
not
competent to prove such value at distant point where market is
maintained.
People v. Herring, 1947, 71 N.E.2d 682, 396 Ill. 364. Larceny k 46
296. Recovery of property, value of property
The amount of property stolen is not determined by the amount actually
recovered and a conviction for theft may be upheld even where no
property is
ever recovered, especially where the defendant has had an opportunity
to
dispose of some of the proceeds. People v. Dayani, App. 1 Dist.1973,
16
Ill.App.3d 615, 306 N.E.2d 488. Larceny k 59
297. Aggregation of values, value of property
Information stating that the offense of obtaining control over property
stolen
from different people was committed on a day certain, "the exact time
being
unknown," alleged only one act or transaction, and requirements of
<section>
111-4 of former chapter 38 permitting the charging of two or more acts
or
transactions as a single offense were not required to be met in order
to
combine the total values of all the stolen property obtained by the one
act or
transaction to determine if the theft alleged was a felony. People v.
Giles,
App. 4 Dist.1976, 35 Ill.App.3d 514, 341 N.E.2d 410. Indictment And
Information k 125(13)
Where sums of money and merchandise allegedly obtained by accused by
drawing
and delivering checks, which would not be paid by depository because of
either
insufficient funds or no account, were obtained from different persons
and
there was no allegation that such persons had a common interest in the
property, value of such sums and merchandise could not be aggregated so
as to
form basis for a charge of theft of property exceeding value of $150 by
deception. People v. Adams, App. 4 Dist.1975, 26 Ill.App.3d 324, 325
N.E.2d
71. False Pretenses k 20.5
298. Indictment and information, value of property--In general
Defendants were adequately apprised that they were being charged with
felony
of theft in excess of $300, even though one count of indictment charged
defendant with theft of only $300, where two other counts charged one
defendant with theft at $1,500 and $500, and other counts charged both
defendants with bribery and solicitation. People v. Freedman, App. 1
Dist.1987, 108 Ill.Dec. 165, 155 Ill.App.3d 469, 508 N.E.2d 326.
Larceny k 31
Juvenile declared a ward of the court by reason of theft of property
having a
value less than $150 could not be heard to complain that he could have
been
charged with the offense of robbery instead of theft. In Interest of
Littlejohn, App. 1 Dist.1974, 24 Ill.App.3d 40, 320 N.E.2d 449. Infants
k 253
In prosecution for conspiracy to commit theft, indictment which alleged
that
defendants obtained and exerted unauthorized control over automobiles
belonging to others sufficiently alleged that things of value were
involved
and, therefore, was not defective on ground that it failed to state
value of
the property. People v. Brouilette, App.1968, 92 Ill.App.2d 168, 236
N.E.2d
12. Conspiracy k 43(6)
Indictment charging larceny was fatally defective, where it failed to
allege
the value of the goods stolen and failed to describe the goods in any
other
language than "divers goods and chattels" of named individual. People
v.
Meyers, 1947, 73 N.E.2d 288, 397 Ill. 286. Larceny k 30(1); Larceny k
31
Indictment charging embezzlement was not defective because money
involved was
merely alleged to be money, not lawful money of United States. People
v.
Anderson, 1932, 183 N.E. 588, 350 Ill. 603. Embezzlement k 28
An indictment or information for petit larceny was required to be
construed in
accordance with the Criminal Code (repealed), and it should be deemed
sufficiently technical and correct, if it stated the offense in the
terms and
language of the Code, or so plainly that the nature of the offense
could be
easily understood by the jury. People v. Cohen, 1922, 135 N.E. 731,
303 Ill.
523. Indictment And Information k 110(18)
Since larceny was not an infamous crime when the property stolen was of
the
value of $15 or less, under the amendment of the Criminal Code in 1911
an
information charging the larceny of $2.10 was not required to allege
that the
offense was committed "feloniously." People v. Greenberg, 1922, 135
N.E. 67,
302 Ill. 566. Indictment And Information k 91(2)
An indictment charging the larceny of a bill of exchange, which alleges
that
the bill was the property of an individual named, and was "of the value
of
$150 to the First National Bank," etc., and which contains no other
averment
as to value, is fatally bad for failing to allege value, for the words
"to the
First National Bank" cannot be rejected as surplusage. People v.
Silbertrust,
1908, 86 N.E. 203, 236 Ill. 144. Larceny k 31
Where an indictment charged larceny of property worth about $600 and
also
charged the receiving of such property knowing it to be stolen, the
felony
could be waived and the indictment still be sufficient to support a
conviction
for petit larceny if the evidence showed the value of the property did
not
exceed $15. People v. Goodman, 1923, 228 Ill.App. 494.
Larceny indictment charging that property stolen was "two dollars in
U.S.
currency" was not substantially defective as against contention that
the
denominations of the bills or currency should have been described.
People v.
Greenberg, 1922, 222 Ill.App. 243, affirmed 302 Ill. 566, 135 N.E. 67.
299. ---- Value, indictment and information, value of property
Indictment for larceny must aver the value of the goods stolen. Brown
v.
People, 1898, 173 Ill. 34, 50 N.E. 106; Collins v. People, 1866, 39
Ill. 233.
In theft prosecution, value is material allegation to be included in
indictment and of which proof must be made during trial and
specifically found
by court or by jury and incorporated in its verdict. People v. Webb,
App.1969, 116 Ill.App.2d 370, 253 N.E.2d 682. Larceny k 40(2);
Larceny k 83
Allegation of value is not essential to an indictment for theft, but
indictment must show that a thing of value was stolen. People v.
Brouilette,
App.1968, 92 Ill.App.2d 168, 236 N.E.2d 12. Larceny k 31
Defendant was charged with grand theft of property in excess of $150 in
value,
notwithstanding the theft count stated that defendant "knowingly
obtained
unauthorized control over one hundred fifty dollars", in view of
language in
conspiracy count "to commit the offense of theft of property in excess
of
$150.00 in value." People v. Radford, App.1967, 87 Ill.App.2d 308, 232
N.E.2d
100. Larceny k 28(4)
Information charging that accused stole 80 cents in U.S. currency, was
not
defective because it did not state the value of the currency, since the
value
of coins and other forms of money of the United States need not be
expressly
averred. People v. O'Campo, App.1947, 71 N.E.2d 375, 330 Ill.App. 401.
Larceny k 30(9)
In those types of larceny in which value of the property is material,
the
value must be alleged and proved and the proof must show the fair, cash
market
value at the time and place of theft. People v. Fognini, 1940, 28
N.E.2d 95,
374 Ill. 161. Larceny k 40(2)
Where value of property is material, it must be alleged and proved.
People v.
Butman, 1934, 192 N.E. 564, 357 Ill. 506. Larceny k 40(1)
Where place or duration of punishment for crime within generic term
"larceny"
depends on allegation and proof of value of property stolen, such value
must
be set forth in indictment and proved. People v. Crane, 1934, 190 N.E.
355,
356 Ill. 276. Larceny k 40(2)
An indictment charging the larceny of a bill of exchange must aver the
value
thereof. People v. Silbertrust, 1908, 86 N.E. 203, 236 Ill. 144.
300. ---- Statutory language, indictment and information, value of
property
An indictment or information for petit larceny is sufficient if it
states the
offense in the terms and language of the Code, so that the nature of
the
offense charged may be readily understood. People v. Ristick, 1938,
292
Ill.App. 644, 11 N.E.2d 828; People v. Miller, 1938, 292 Ill.App. 643,
11
N.E.2d 827.
While it is a well settled doctrine that where a statute defines an
offense
such as petit larceny, no essential element of the offense as defined
by the
statute can be omitted from the indictment or information, it is not
necessary, however, to use in an indictment or information the very
words of
the statute defining the offense; it is sufficient if the words used
convey
the same meaning. People v. Waltyn, 1915, 191 Ill.App. 86.
301. Variance, value of property
Variance between indictment, which charged defendant with stealing five
garments, total value of which could not have exceeded $150, and proof
presented at trial, which showed that defendant stole six garments
valued at
more than $150, did not require reversal of defendant's conviction for
felony
theft where variance presented by the indictment did not hamper
defendant in
preparation of her defense and where her resulting conviction was a bar
to any
future prosecutions arising out of the same conduct. People v. Ritter,
App. 3
Dist.1980, 44 Ill.Dec. 438, 89 Ill.App.3d 113, 411 N.E.2d 560. Larceny
k
40(4); Larceny k 40(6)
If theft indictment alleges value to be in excess of $150, but proof
shows
value to be less than $150, a fatal variance is not shown, but court
imposing
sentence is limited to a misdemeanor sentence. People v. Edwards, App.
4
Dist.1974, 21 Ill.App.3d 354, 315 N.E.2d 91. Larceny k 40(4)
Proof that $133 was recovered from defendant's person and that $16.71
in
change and over $100 in checks were found in bag defendant had placed
on chair
outside restroom shortly after theft of money from department store was
in
substantial conformance with indictment charging that $222 had been
taken, any
discrepancy in amount of money stolen being unimportant on issue of
guilt.
People v. McKibbins, App.1970, 128 Ill.App.2d 175, 263 N.E.2d 131.
Larceny k
40(8)
Where defendant was indicted for having stolen an automobile having
value of
more than $100 and convicted of having stolen automobile exceeding $150
in
value, crime for which defendant was indicted was theft and value of
stolen
property went only to penalty which might be imposed, so that he was
not
convicted of a crime for which he had not been indicted. People v.
Price,
App.1967, 81 Ill.App.2d 111, 225 N.E.2d 453. Larceny k 23
Where indictment charged defendant with larceny of two pistols of the
value of
$35 and $50 and the jury found him "guilty of larceny in manner and
form as
charged in indictments" and found value of property stolen to be $35,
and the
court adjudged him guilty as charged by the indictment, the judgment
was
proper and could not be attacked as not based upon or responsive to the
verdict merely because the jury found the value of the property stolen
to be
$35 instead of $85 as alleged in the indictment. People v. Nelson,
1948, 77
N.E.2d 171, 399 Ill. 132.
Sentencing And Punishment k 375
Where indictment charged larceny of money or property, the amount
stolen or
value of the property did not need to be proved as charged in
indictment, but
a finding that value of money or property stolen was over $15, without
definitely fixing the value, would support a judgment and sentence of
imprisonment in the penitentiary. People v. Taylor, 1945, 62 N.E.2d
683, 391
Ill. 11, certiorari denied 66 S.Ct. 333, 326 U.S. 784, 90 L.Ed. 476.
Larceny
k 40(6); Larceny k 83
In petit larceny prosecution, proof that value of property stolen was
greater
than alleged was not a variance. People v. Greenberg, 1922, 222
Ill.App. 243,
affirmed 302 Ill. 566, 135 N.E. 67.
302. Conduct of trial, value of property
Where defendant did not show that testimony of sales manager concerning
value
of stolen automobile, which was elicited after the close of defendant's
case,
was unfair or that defendant was prejudiced by its being received out
of
sequence, and where defendant made no attempt to rebut it by
introducing
evidence of contrary value, there was no abuse of discretion. People
v.
Parker, App.1968, 98 Ill.App.2d 146, 240 N.E.2d 475. Criminal Law k
680(1)
Prosecution was not required to produce in evidence articles allegedly
received to establish their value in prosecution for receiving stolen
goods.
People v. Carmone, App.1964, 51 Ill.App.2d 131, 201 N.E.2d 180.
Receiving
Stolen Goods k 8(3)
303. Remarks of judge, value of property
Court's remark, in prosecution for receiving stolen goods, that there
was
"enough evidence on that unimportant point," referring to value of
goods, was
improper. People v. Brooks, 1930, 172 N.E. 29, 340 Ill. 74. Criminal
Law k
656(3)
304. Presumptions and burden of proof, value of property
To convict a defendant of felony theft, the state must prove that the
value of
the property exceeds $300. People v. Burks, App. 1 Dist.1999, 238
Ill.Dec.
62, 304 Ill.App.3d 861, 710 N.E.2d 859. Larceny k 6; Larceny k 23
To convict for felony theft, state must prove that fair cash market
value of
property at time and place of theft exceeded $150, and original or
replacement
cost is not standard, but evidence of cost together with evidence
concerning
age, condition and utility of stolen item may afford basis for
determining
value. People v. Langston, App. 5 Dist.1981, 51 Ill.Dec. 532, 96
Ill.App.3d
48, 420 N.E.2d 1090. Larceny k 23; Larceny k 59
Value is a material element of the offense of theft and must be proved
by the
State. People v. Dell, 1972, 52 Ill.2d 393, 288 N.E.2d 459. Larceny k
40(2)
In order to have a valid conviction for felony rather than the
misdemeanor of
theft the value of stolen property must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt to
be in excess of $150. People v. Briseno, App.1972, 2 Ill.App.3d 814,
277
N.E.2d 743. Larceny k 65
In order to sustain a conviction of felony the value of the property
stolen
must be shown to be in excess of $150. People v. Webb, App.1971, 131
Ill.App.2d 206, 268 N.E.2d 161. Larceny k 23
The state must prove fair cash market value of article at time and
place of
theft. People v. Nelson, App.1969, 117 Ill.App.2d 431, 254 N.E.2d 529.
Larceny k 40(2)
Generally, where value of property taken is relevant, it must be
proved, and
proof must show fair cash market value at time and place of theft.
People v.
Newton, App.1969, 117 Ill.App.2d 232, 254 N.E.2d 165. Larceny k 40(2)
Where theft of an automobile worth more than $150 is charged, fair cash
value
of automobile must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v.
Newton,
App.1969, 117 Ill.App.2d 232, 254 N.E.2d 165. Larceny k 59
In order to sustain felony conviction for theft, value of property
stolen must
be shown to be in excess of $150. People v. Tassone, 1968, 41 Ill.2d
7, 241
N.E.2d 419, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 1318, 394 U.S. 965, 22 L.Ed.2d
567.
Larceny k 23
State, in prosecution for larceny of a ring, had burden of proving that
value
of the ring was in excess of $50, in order to warrant conviction of a
felony.
People v. Mack, 1961, 23 Ill.2d 198, 177 N.E.2d 841. Larceny k 41
In prosecution for receiving stolen property, in order to warrant
conviction
of felony and consequent penitentiary sentence it was incumbent on
people to
prove that property had value in excess of $50 and where such proof was
required, criterion was fair cash market value of property and not its
cost.
People v. Todaro, 1958, 14 Ill.2d 594, 153 N.E.2d 563. Receiving
Stolen Goods
k 7(6); Receiving Stolen Goods k 8(2)
In prosecution for receiving stolen property, the fair cash market
value of
the property must be established by proof, for the fixing of
punishment.
People v. Long, 1945, 63 N.E.2d 726, 391 Ill. 529. Receiving Stolen
Goods k
7(6)
Where value of property is material, proof must show fair cash market
value at
time and place of theft. People v. Butman, 1934, 192 N.E. 564, 357
Ill. 506.
Larceny k 59
305. Admissibility of evidence, value of property--In general
Where subject of theft charge was automobile frame, value of the
automobile at
time of its disappearance was of no consequence for purposes of
determining
whether defendants had committed offense of theft of property valued in
excess
of $150. People v. Hayes, App.1971, 133 Ill.App.2d 885, 272 N.E.2d
423.
Larceny k 46
In absence of contrary evidence, testimony as to worth of stolen
property is
proper proof of its value. People v. Newton, App.1969, 117 Ill.App.2d
232,
254 N.E.2d 165. Larceny k 59
Admission of testimony as to value of articles taken was not error
where
evidence was relevant to larceny charge, and its admission was not
prejudicial
even though defendant was convicted of burglary only. People v.
Sellers,
1964, 30 Ill.2d 221, 196 N.E.2d 481.
k 46
Criminal Law k 1169.1(4); Larceny
To prove fair cash market value of a stolen object, in a prosecution
for
receiving stolen property, the witness must have sufficient knowledge
of
property and values to give a reasonable estimate thereof. People v.
George,
1947, 76 N.E.2d 60, 398 Ill. 318. Criminal Law k 460
Testimony of a policeman that the man arrested for its theft told him
he sold
a $250 watch for $25 was inadmissible in prosecution for receiving
stolen
goods to prove fair cash market value at the place of theft since the
witness
did not have a sufficient knowledge of properties and values, and his
testimony was hearsay. People v. George, 1947, 76 N.E.2d 60, 398 Ill.
318.
Criminal Law k 419(10); Criminal Law k 460
Evidence regarding price stolen hog would have brought in open market
was
competent, notwithstanding witness used words, "I believe." People v.
Palmer,
1932, 184 N.E. 205, 351 Ill. 319. Criminal Law k 460
Any one having knowledge of value of hog stolen was competent to
testify to
it.
People v. Palmer, 1932, 184 N.E. 205, 351 Ill. 319. Criminal
Law k 460
Testimony as to value of stolen wire should be limited to fair cash
market
value. People v. Lawson, 1928, 160 N.E. 125, 328 Ill. 602. Larceny k
46
306. ---- Relevance, admissibility of evidence, value of property
Value of property taken is immaterial and its precise identification is
unnecessary if character thereof is such that exact identification is
difficult as with money which, in most instances, cannot be positively
identified unless it bears some peculiar mark or designation not common
to all
currency. People v. Moore, App.1968, 104 Ill.App.2d 343, 244 N.E.2d
337.
Larceny k 58
In prosecution for receiving stolen property, evidence of value of
property
was vitally important, since it bears on punishment. People v. Brooks,
1930,
172 N.E. 29, 340 Ill. 74. Receiving Stolen Goods k 8(2)
Where conviction was for larceny, it was necessary to find the value of
the
property taken.
Burke v. People, 1893, 35 N.E. 376, 148 Ill. 70.
307. ---- Insurance proceeds, admissibility of evidence, value of
property
Testimony of victim of theft concerning insurance settlement was
admissible
evidence of insurer's belief as to the market value of property taken
in
theft, and it was sufficient to establish that value of stolen property
was in
excess of $300.00, and thus defendant was properly convicted of felony
theft.
People v. Davis, App. 1 Dist.1985, 87 Ill.Dec. 319, 132 Ill.App.3d 199,
476
N.E.2d 1311. Larceny k 65
Amount owners of stolen automobile received from their insurance
company was
not competent or relevant evidence, in prosecution for theft of
property
valued in excess of $150, where defendants were found with a strippeddown
chassis. People v. Hayes, App.1971, 133 Ill.App.2d 885, 272 N.E.2d 423.
Larceny k 46
308. ---- Owner's testimony, admissibility of evidence, value of
property
Automobile owner possessed requisite familiarity with automobile to
testify to
its value in theft prosecution. People v. Nelson, App.1969, 117
Ill.App.2d
431, 254 N.E.2d 529. Criminal Law k 452(1)
Although generally a nonexpert witness cannot give his opinion as to
value,
owner of personal property of a usual and ordinary nature is allowed to
testify to its value where he has some familiarity with the property.
People
v. Newton, App.1969, 117 Ill.App.2d 232, 254 N.E.2d 165. Criminal Law
k
452(1)
Owner of automobile, an item of usual and ordinary nature, who had
purchased
automobile new and owned it until date of its theft had sufficient
knowledge
and familiarity with vehicle to know its value and was competent to
testify as
to value on date of theft, in prosecution for theft of automobile
valued in
excess of $150. People v. Newton, App.1969, 117 Ill.App.2d 232, 254
N.E.2d
165. Criminal Law k 452(1)
309. ---- Expert testimony, admissibility of evidence, value of
property
In prosecution for theft of automobile tires, security personnel of
department
store's automobile center, from which tires were stolen, were competent
to
testify as to retail value of tires, which testimony was based on price
books
which gave retail price of tires, despite fact that security personnel
had no
sales experience. People v. DeBartolo, App. 2 Dist.1975, 24 Ill.App.3d
1000,
322 N.E.2d 251. Criminal Law k 464
Witness, who for 20 years had been supervisor of packing and shipping
department of company from which merchandise had been stolen, was
qualified to
testify as to value of such merchandise, and his testimony placing
value of
merchandise taken at $546.95 and value of merchandise returned by
police after
theft at $440.20 was sufficient to establish value of merchandise taken
to be
in excess of $150. People v. Banks, App.1971, 2 Ill.App.3d 401, 276
N.E.2d 64
. Criminal Law k 478(1); Criminal Law k 494
Police officer, who was member of auto theft unit of city police
department
and who, although he could not be characterized as an expert in pricing
autos,
worked with autos on a daily basis, was properly allowed to give his
opinion,
in prosecution for theft and criminal trespass to vehicle, so as to
establish
value of stolen automobile to be over $150. People v. Webb, App.1971,
131
Ill.App.2d 206, 268 N.E.2d 161. Criminal Law k 478(1)
Protection supervisor of store, in prosecution for theft of property
having
value in excess of $150, was competent to testify as to retail value of
stolen
commodities. People v. Leman, App.1968, 95 Ill.App.2d 212, 238 N.E.2d
213.
Criminal Law k 460
Partner in clothing store who stated that he had purchased trousers for
his
business for period of seven years and had purchased some 7,000 pairs
of
trousers was qualified to give opinion as to value of trousers which
had been
stolen from his store. People v. Dell, App.1966, 77 Ill.App.2d 318,
222
N.E.2d 357, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 73, 389 U.S. 826, 19 L.Ed.2d 81.
Criminal Law k 452(1)
In prosecution for larceny of accessories from stolen automobile,
police
officer having some 15 years experience in the stolen automobile
division of
police department was competent to testify as to value of accessories
stripped
from vehicle. People v. Hayes, 1960, 20 Ill.2d 319, 169 N.E.2d 760.
Criminal
Law k 478(1)
In prosecution for grand larceny in stealing a dress from a shop, shop
owner
who had been in the women's apparel business for 27 years was competent
to
express an expert opinion as to value of dress, and her testimony as to
"fair
cash price" of the dress referred to a standard other than the price at
which
owner held it for sale, but to a standard that took account of present
condition and style of the dress. People v. Rose, 1960, 19 Ill.2d 292,
166
N.E.2d 566. Criminal Law k 478(1); Larceny k 46
In prosecution for larceny of boat, testimony of boatbuilder that no
boats
were being built during the war and that there were hardly any boats
changing
hands at the time and that in his opinion the fair value of boat
alleged to
have been stolen was a designated sum, was competent, and satisfied
rule
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, weight and credibility being
for
jury. People v. Herring, 1947, 71 N.E.2d 682, 396 Ill. 364. Criminal
Law k
460; Larceny k 59; Larceny k 68(1)
310. Judicial notice, value of property
Evidence was sufficient to support felony theft conviction; though
actual
cash value of items taken was not proven, court could properly take
judicial
notice that gun, jewelry, cash and drugs taken were worth more than
statutory
minimum. People v. Matthews, App. 1 Dist.1990, 150 Ill.Dec. 310, 205
Ill.App.3d 371, 562 N.E.2d 1113, appeal denied 153 Ill.Dec. 380, 136
Ill.2d
550, 567 N.E.2d 338, habeas corpus denied, affirmed 32 F.3d 570.
Larceny k 65
In prosecution for theft of property exceeding $150 in value, court
would not
take judicial notice that "True-tone" color television set that only
projected
black and white picture was worth more than $150, since such is not
matter of
common knowledge. People v. Scott, App. 2 Dist.1978, 17 Ill.Dec. 376,
59
Ill.App.3d 864, 376 N.E.2d 375. Criminal Law k 304(2)
Judicial notice may be taken of fact that property had some value.
People v.
Tassone, 1968, 41 Ill.2d 7, 241 N.E.2d 419, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct.
1318,
394 U.S. 965, 22 L.Ed.2d 567. Criminal Law k 304(1)
Court took judicial notice of fact that a 1960 automobile of a certain
make
had some value in 1964. People v. Price, App.1967, 81 Ill.App.2d 111,
225
N.E.2d 453. Criminal Law k 304(1)
Court may take judicial notice that 1959 Chevrolet driveable in 1964 is
thing
of some value in 1964 even though it may not, without more proof,
conclude
that value exceeds $150. People v. Kelly, App.1965, 66 Ill.App.2d 204,
214
N.E.2d 290. Criminal Law k 304(1)
In prosecution for receiving stolen goods, trial court's finding of his
own
knowledge that 43 cartons of cigarettes had a value of $1 each at time
and
place of theft satisfied requirement as to proof of value beyond a
reasonable
doubt, where defendant did not offer to contradict such finding and was
not
convicted of a felony. People v. Nitti, App.1955, 5 Ill.App.2d 371,
125
N.E.2d 856, affirmed 8 Ill.2d 136, 133 N.E.2d 12. Receiving Stolen
Goods k
8(3)
311. Fact questions, value of property
Weight to be given to testimony of owner of automobile that value of
automobile was in excess of $150, in prosecution for theft of
automobile
valued in excess of $150, was for trier of fact to determine. People
v.
Newton, App.1969, 117 Ill.App.2d 232, 254 N.E.2d 165. Criminal Law k
741(4)
Although employee, who had worked for fur rental corporation for three
and
one-half years, was not expert in valuation of fur pieces, his
testimony
regarding cost for fur stole allegedly taken by defendant using false
driver's
license and false social security card was entitled to some weight and
was
matter for determination of trier of fact in prosecution for theft by
deception. People v. Neary, App.1969, 109 Ill.App.2d 302, 248 N.E.2d
695.
Criminal Law k 553
312. Sufficiency of evidence, value of property--In general
Evidence was sufficient to establish theft of property having value
over $300;
victim testified that total value of stolen items was approximately
$1,200.
People v. Foster, App. 4 Dist.1990, 145 Ill.Dec. 387, 199 Ill.App.3d
372, 556
N.E.2d 1289, appeal denied 151 Ill.Dec. 387, 135 Ill.2d 561, 564 N.E.2d
842.
Larceny k 65
Although evidence was sufficient to show defendant had stolen two
automobile
wheels, it was insufficient to establish that he had stolen four
automobile
wheels; thus, evidence did not establish defendant's guilt of felony
theft,
and conviction had to be reduced to misdemeanor theft. People v.
Burnside,
App. 3 Dist.1985, 88 Ill.Dec. 393, 133 Ill.App.3d 453, 478 N.E.2d 884.
Larceny
k 65
There was sufficient evidence in record for jury to find that value of
stereo
equipment was in excess of $150 on date defendant was charged with
possession
thereof, over contention of defendant that evidence on issue of fair
cash
market value of stolen property at time it was stolen was insufficient
to
prove value at later time when defendant was charged with possession.
People
v. Collins, App. 3 Dist.1977, 6 Ill.Dec. 296, 48 Ill.App.3d 643, 362
N.E.2d
1118. Receiving Stolen Goods k 8(3)
Evidence that stolen stereo equipment was purchased for $800 and had
been used
four months when stolen was insufficient to prove the property had a
value in
excess of $150. People v. Brown, App. 3 Dist.1976, 36 Ill.App.3d 416,
343
N.E.2d 700. Larceny k 59
In theft prosecution, where value of coat was sufficiently proved by
testimony
of store clerk, evidence regarding contents of tag which clerk said had
been
affixed to coat but was not on coat when coat was produced in court and
identified was cumulative and its receipt, if erroneous, was harmless
error.
People v. Banks, App. 1 Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 512, 308 N.E.2d 247.
Criminal
Law k 1169.2(2)
Testimony by one store investigator that value of merchandise was $300
and
testimony by second investigator after refreshing his memory by looking
at
order blank that merchandise had value of $290.84 together with display
of
merchandise to jury was sufficient to show value of merchandise
obtained by
deception was in excess of $150. People v. Wilson, App.1967, 84
Ill.App.2d
269, 228 N.E.2d 131. False Pretenses k 49(2)
Proof which failed to show value of articles allegedly stolen by
defendant was
insufficient to support theft conviction. People v. Styles, App.1966,
75
Ill.App.2d 481, 220 N.E.2d 885. Larceny k 59
Store manager's testimony that three suits stolen from store had
combined
retail value of $273 and that none of suits had been on the rack for
more than
three months warranted finding that value of property stolen was in
excess of
$150. People v. Adams, App.1966, 70 Ill.App.2d 397, 217 N.E.2d 560.
Larceny k
59
Owner's testimony that eight months after theft of automobile he sold
it for
$200 was insufficient to prove that value of automobile at time of
theft
exceeded $150 so that theft was misdemeanor and not felony. People v.
Kurtz,
App.1966, 69 Ill.App.2d 282, 216 N.E.2d 524, affirmed in part, reversed
in
part 37 Ill.2d 103, 224 N.E.2d 817. Larceny k 65
Testimony of garageman in prosecution for theft of property exceeding
$150 in
value that he estimated that cost of repair of stolen automobile, which
was
wrecked at time of arrest of defendant, at $500 did not necessarily
evidence
value of automobile at more than $150. People v. Kelly, App.1965, 66
Ill.App.2d 204, 214 N.E.2d 290. Larceny k 59
In prosecution for larceny of two suits of clothes, where it appeared
that the
suits had been on shelves of company for 3 1/2 years, and that they
were out
of style and shop-worn, and examination of witnesses as to value was
with
respect to fair cash value without reference to market value, evidence
was
insufficient to sustain conviction for failure to establish the fair
cash
market value of the suits. People v. Fognini, 1940, 28 N.E.2d 95, 374
Ill.
161. Larceny k 59
313. ---- Market value, sufficiency of evidence, value of property
Where victim testified only as to possible original prices of
television set
and stereo speakers, and State did not produce proof relating to their
quality
or working condition at time of burglary, State's proof was not
sufficient to
establish market value at time and place of offense, in prosecution for
felony
theft. People v. Moore, App. 3 Dist.1982, 65 Ill.Dec. 496, 109
Ill.App.3d
874, 441 N.E.2d 409. Larceny k 59
In prosecution for theft of two garbage containers, testimony by
business
manager of disposal company which owned such containers that value of
each
container was between $80 and $90 was sufficient to sustain finding
that value
of stolen items was in excess of $150, despite fact that defendant sold
such
containers for less than $150. People v. DeBartolo, App. 2 Dist.1975,
24
Ill.App.3d 1009, 322 N.E.2d 258. Larceny k 59
Where it was admitted by defendant charged with felony theft that
stolen items
were part of an automobile awaiting sale, and evidence indicated that
retail
prices for optional whitewall tires, magnesium wheels and chrome lug
nuts were
included in retail price of the automobile, the retail market was the
market
open for the sale of property stolen, and since evidence disclosed that
retail
price was in excess of $150, the value necessary for felony conviction
was
proven beyond reasonable doubt. People v. Briseno, App.1972, 2
Ill.App.3d
814, 277 N.E.2d 743. Larceny k 65
Where partner in jewelry store partnership, which owned stolen ring,
had been
jeweler for 20 years, his testimony in theft prosecution as to value of
ring
in terms of gross value, received without objection, was sufficient to
establish value of ring notwithstanding lack of evidence that ring was
not
affected by obsolescence, depreciation or deterioration. People v.
Harden,
1969, 42 Ill.2d 301, 247 N.E.2d 404. Criminal Law k 493
The testimony of a sales manager, who had 14
automobile business, provided adequate proof
it was
stolen and justified the jury's finding that
in
excess of $150. People v. Parker, App.1968,
N.E.2d 475
. Larceny k 59
years' experience in the
of automobile's value when
its fair market value was
98 Ill.App.2d 146, 240
The testimony of owner as to cost of automobile some six months prior
to its
theft was not satisfactorily probative of its value on date of its
theft, nor
was the owner's testimony as to cost of repairs to stolen automobile
after it
was recovered evidence of its value at time of theft. People v.
Parker,
App.1968, 98 Ill.App.2d 146, 240 N.E.2d 475. Larceny k 59
Evidence, including testimony of warehouse manager that cartons of
pharmaceuticals retrieved from defendant's garage bore his warehouse
location
markings and had fair market value of $3,000, was sufficient to
establish that
stolen goods had fair cash market value in excess of $150. People v.
Marino,
App.1968, 95 Ill.App.2d 369, 238 N.E.2d 245, affirmed 44 Ill.2d 562,
256
N.E.2d 770. Receiving Stolen Goods k 8(3)
Testimony in regard to value of stolen property may be received in
response to
question as to its "value" or "worth" and be sufficient proof, by
itself, of
market value at time of alleged crime in absence of any objection.
People v.
Dell, App.1966, 77 Ill.App.2d 318, 222 N.E.2d 357, certiorari denied 88
S.Ct.
73, 389 U.S. 826, 19 L.Ed.2d 81. Larceny k 59
Testimony by witness qualified to give opinion as to value of 129 pairs
of
stolen trousers that trousers had value of $250, which was not rebutted
by
defense, was adequate evidence of market value of stolen property.
People v.
Dell, App.1966, 77 Ill.App.2d 318, 222 N.E.2d 357, certiorari denied 88
S.Ct.
73, 389 U.S. 826, 19 L.Ed.2d 81.
Larceny k 59
Testimony of owner of jewelry store, in larceny prosecution, that fair
cash
value of watch taken from the store was $89.50, was sufficient to
sustain
finding as to value, where such evidence was received without
objection, and
there was nothing to suggest witness was not thinking in terms of
market value
or that his testimony would have been any different had question been
phrased
in terms of fair cash market value, rather than fair cash value.
People v.
Evans, 1961, 23 Ill.2d 302, 178 N.E.2d 376. Larceny k 59
In prosecution for larceny in stealing a dress from a store, testimony
of
store owner's protection manager, that fair market value of dress in
his
opinion was $175, as indictment alleged was adequate, in absence of
objection
to support trial judge's finding of defendant's guilt of larceny as
charged in
indictment. People v. Officer, 1957, 10 Ill.2d 203, 139 N.E.2d 773.
Larceny k
59
Where the value of property in a prosecution for receiving stolen goods
is
material and involves a distinction between petit and grand larceny,
the fair
cash market value at the place of theft must be proved, and owner's
single
statement of original cost of a watch and writing set stolen from him
was
insufficient in a prosecution for receiving stolen property, to prove
the fair
cash market value, since it failed to disclose the condition of the
articles,
quality and age. People v. George, 1947, 76 N.E.2d 60, 398 Ill. 318.
In prosecution for larceny of boat, testimony of boatbuilder that no
boats
were being built during the war and that there were hardly and boats
changing
hands at the time and that in his opinion the fair value of boat
alleged to
have been stolen was a designated sum, was competent, and satisfied
rule
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, weight and credibility being
for
jury. People v. Herring, 1947, 71 N.E.2d 682, 396 Ill. 364. Criminal
Law k
460; Larceny k 59; Larceny k 68(1)
Testimony that value of copper wire similar to that stolen was certain
amount
was sufficient as evidence of value; it being evident that witness
referred
to fair cash market value. People v. Lawson, 1928, 160 N.E. 125, 328
Ill. 602
. Larceny k 46
314. ---- Owner's testimony, sufficiency of evidence, value of
property
Evidence concerning cash taken from restaurant owner's desk drawer,
independent of defendants' confessions, established that value of
property
taken exceeded $300, as corpus delicti for felony theft; restaurant
owner
testified that he routinely kept over $400 in the drawer and that he
had added
over $600 in cash receipts prior to theft. People v. Furby, 1990, 150
Ill.Dec. 534, 138 Ill.2d 434, 563 N.E.2d 421, on remand 169 Ill.Dec.
360, 228
Ill.App.3d 1, 591 N.E.2d 533. Criminal Law k 535(2)
Property owner's testimony established that value of stolen property
exceeded
$300, so as to support conviction for felony theft as opposed to
misdemeanor
theft; stolen property included 15-month-old $1,499 personal computer,
three-month-old color monitor, disc drive, and various other computer
attachments costing approximately $1,500, three-month-old microwave
oven which
cost $277, stereo turntable, IBM selectric typewriter, 13-inch color
television, and leather luggage. People v. Richardson, App. 1
Dist.1988, 120
Ill.Dec. 217, 169 Ill.App.3d 781, 523 N.E.2d 1128. Larceny k 65
315. ---- Opinion evidence, sufficiency of evidence, value of property
Evidence from which it appeared that opinion of doctor as to value of
stolen
medical equipment was based at least in part on cost of similar medical
equipment with allowance for its condition and newness was sufficient
to
permit jury to find that value of property was in excess of $150.
People v.
Songer, App. 3 Dist.1977, 6 Ill.Dec. 305, 48 Ill.App.3d 743, 362 N.E.2d
1127.
Larceny k 59
Opinion testimony of one who has sufficient knowledge of property and
its
value to give reasonable estimate, received without objection, is
sufficient
in absence of contrary evidence to establish value in theft
prosecution.
People v. Harden, 1969, 42 Ill.2d 301, 247 N.E.2d 404. Criminal Law k
493
In prosecution for receiving stolen property, evidence, disclosing
liquor was
recently purchased for more than $600 and sold the day it was stolen,
or the
following day, for $175 to one of defendants who estimated its value at
$350,
sustained finding that liquor had greater value than $50 and
sufficiently
established grade of offense. People v. Todaro, 1958, 14 Ill.2d 594,
153
N.E.2d 563. Receiving Stolen Goods k 8(3)
316. ---- Expert testimony, sufficiency of evidence, value of property
Absent objections or contrary evidence, testimony of man familiar with
jewelry
and experienced in jewelry business was sufficient to support finding
on
question of value of goods in prosecution for receiving stolen goods.
People
v. Carmone, App.1964, 51 Ill.App.2d 131, 201 N.E.2d 180. Receiving
Stolen
Goods k 8(3)
Testimony from an assistant supervising storeroom storekeeper for
company from
which coils of copper wire were stolen, whose qualifications were not
objected
to, fixing fair cash value of coil of wire at price paid by company was
competent, and, in absence of evidence showing any lesser value,
sufficient to
sustain finding that value of property was $348, making offense felony
rather
than misdemeanor. People v. Smolarek, 1962, 26 Ill.2d 148, 185 N.E.2d
838.
Larceny k 46; Larceny k 65
317. ---- Negotiable instruments, sufficiency of evidence, value of
property
Theft of money occurred at time defendant exercised unlawful control
over
check issued to him by title and trust company on deposit of another
check
drawn on insufficient funds, that being the time defendant took check
from
title company; in absence of anything to the contrary, it could be
assumed
that at time check was drawn it had value to title company of stated
$15,000
amount; thus, the State had not failed to prove that defendant, who
immediately deposited title company's check in another bank and
withdrew
$1,000 therefrom in cash, was guilty of theft of more than $150, on
theory
that there was no evidence that title company had total amount of check
in
drawee bank or that any money was disbursed from its account in payment
thereof. People v. Lombardi, App. 1 Dist.1973, 13 Ill.App.3d 754, 301
N.E.2d
70. False Pretenses k 49(2)
Where defendant, who had obtained check drawn to his order on
depositing with
title company a second check drawn on insufficient funds, immediately
opened
account at another bank by depositing title company's check and
withdrawing
$1,000 in cash, there was sufficient proof of defendant's guilt of
theft of
over $150 since, as holder in due course of an instrument on which
payment was
later stopped, the second bank had right to recover the $1,000 from
title
company, the drawer. People v. Lombardi, App. 1 Dist.1973, 13
Ill.App.3d 754,
301 N.E.2d 70. False Pretenses k 49(2)
Proof that defendant actually obtained sum of $422.20 for allegedly
stolen
check sufficiently established value of check in prosecution for theft
of
property exceeding value of $150. People v. Jones, App.1970, 123
Ill.App.2d
389, 259 N.E.2d 393. Larceny k 59
Testimony of witnesses for people in prosecution for larceny of notes
that
value of notes was $2500, was sufficient proof of value of notes, in
absence
of evidence to contrary. People v. Franklin, 1953, 114 N.E.2d 661, 415
Ill.
514. Larceny k 59
318. ---- Motor vehicles, sufficiency of evidence, value of property
Evidence of disparity in price paid by defendant and true value of two
trucks,
together with extremely low mileage, warranted conviction of theft and
possession of a vehicle with a false identification number,
notwithstanding
that defendant's testimony that he had purchased the vehicles through
or from
his brother as "rebuilt" trucks was uncontradicted. People v.
Schaefer, App.
3 Dist.1980, 42 Ill.Dec. 634, 87 Ill.App.3d 192, 409 N.E.2d 129.
Automobiles k
355(11); Larceny k 55
Evidence of owner that his stolen automobile was 1961 model of a
particular
make and that he had owned automobile for about two years and that he
had
bought it for $1,358 and that present value of automobile was around
$800 or
$900 was sufficient to establish that value of automobile was in excess
of
$150. People v. Nelson, App.1969, 117 Ill.App.2d 431, 254 N.E.2d 529.
Larceny
k 59
Testimony by automobile owner that he purchased automobile for $1,000
one week
before theft was sufficient to establish value of stolen vehicle to be
in
excess of $150. People v. Webb, App.1969, 116 Ill.App.2d 370, 253
N.E.2d 682.
Larceny k 59
319. ---- Possession of stolen property, sufficiency of evidence,
value of
property
Where the only proof that defendant stole victim's property was his
unexplained possession of part of it, worth less than $150, he could be
convicted only of misdemeanor theft and could not be convicted of theft
of
property worth over $150 on theory that possession of part of the
property
showed that he had stolen all of victim's missing property, worth some
$1,200.
People v. Johnson, App. 2 Dist.1981, 52 Ill.Dec. 338, 96 Ill.App.3d
1123, 422
N.E.2d 19. Larceny k 64(1)
320. ---- Uncontradicted testimony, sufficiency of evidence, value of
property
In prosecution for burglary and theft of over $150, State established
that
value of stolen motorcycle exceeded $150 by direct, uncontradicted
testimony
of owner that motorcycle was worth $200. People v. Miller, App. 4
Dist.1975,
27 Ill.App.3d 788, 327 N.E.2d 253. Burglary k 41(7); Larceny k 59
321. Instructions, value of property
Defendant was not prejudiced by instruction that State was only
required to
prove that value of stolen automobile was $150 to sustain felony theft
conviction, despite statutory requirement that value of stolen property
exceed
$300, where evidence was uncontradicted that value of automobile
exceeded
$300. People v. Traylor, App. 1 Dist.1985, 94 Ill.Dec. 163, 139
Ill.App.3d
443, 487 N.E.2d 1040, appeal denied. Criminal Law k 1172.1(3)
Where defense counsel objected to owner's testimony as to value of
stolen
property on ground that owner was not an expert but no evidence was
introduced
tending to prove that value of stolen property was less than $150
rather than
above $150 as alleged by owner, trial court did not err in refusing to
instruct jury on misdemeanor theft. People v. Garlin, App. 5
Dist.1981, 57
Ill.Dec. 147, 101 Ill.App.3d 716, 428 N.E.2d 697. Larceny k 79
Where there was no instruction on value in theft prosecution, felony
theft
conviction could not be sustained. People v. Williams, App. 1
Dist.1978, 21
Ill.Dec. 928, 65 Ill.App.3d 1, 382 N.E.2d 292. Larceny k 72
Giving instruction that jury must find that stolen diamond ring had
value in
excess of $150 before they could find defendant guilty of theft
eliminated any
possibility that jury might find defendant guilty of lesser offense and
removed any ambiguity in verdict of jury finding defendant guilty but
not
making specific finding as to value, a material element upon which
place of
punishment and duration depended. People v. Harden, 1969, 42 Ill.2d
301, 247
N.E.2d 404. Larceny k 83
Where, in larceny prosecution, there was no conflict in evidence as to
fact
that value of property involved exceeded $50, refusal to instruct on
petty
larceny was not error. People v. Rogers, 1959, 16 Ill.2d 175, 157
N.E.2d 28.
Criminal Law k 814(20)
In larceny prosecution, instruction stating that if evidence proved
property
of some value had been stolen jury should find defendant guilty was not
error
on ground of dispute as to value of property because of variance in
evidence
between cost and retail price of goods, since such variance did not
constitute
dispute as to value, and there was no evidence that property taken was
of
value other than that testified to by witnesses for people. People v.
Baker,
1936, 6 N.E.2d 665, 365 Ill. 328. Larceny k 72
In larceny prosecution, instruction that indictment charged larceny
consisting
of stealing of hog of value of $40 was not objectionable as informing
jury
hog's value was $40. People v. Palmer, 1932, 184 N.E. 205, 351 Ill.
319.
Criminal Law k 763(1)
In prosecution for embezzlement by
check,
value of check was prima facie its
instruction that
proof of market value of check was
People v.
Dean, 1926, 151 N.E. 505, 321 Ill.
fraudulent conversion of employer's
face value, and requested
essential was properly refused.
128.
Embezzlement k 44(3)
322. Verdict, value of property--In general
Where general verdict returned by jury finding defendant "guilty of
theft"
made no reference to value of property taken, so that verdict could not
support conviction of felony theft but would only support conviction of
misdemeanor theft, outright reversal of defendant's conviction of theft
of
property valued at over $150 was not warranted, but degree of offense
would be
reduced to offense of misdemeanor theft. People v. Stark, App. 5
Dist.1978,
16 Ill.Dec. 719, 59 Ill.App.3d 676, 375 N.E.2d 826. Criminal Law k
1184(3)
Where no issue was raised, during trial of defendant indicted for theft
of
property of value exceeding $150, as to value of automobile defendant
was
charged with taking and jury was instructed that defendant was charged
with
theft of property exceeding $150 in value, jury's failure to include in
verdict a finding that value of the property was in excess of $150 was
not
error. People v. Eastland, App. 4 Dist.1973, 11 Ill.App.3d 271, 296
N.E.2d 363
. Larceny k 83
Where owner testified that one week before theft he paid $1,000 for
vehicle
which was stolen and court made general finding that defendant was
guilty as
charged in indictment which alleged value of vehicle to be in excess of
$150,
failure of court to make specific finding of value did not prejudice
defendant. People v. Webb, App.1969, 116 Ill.App.2d 370, 253 N.E.2d
682.
Criminal Law k 260.11(6)
Fact that verdict of jury which found defendant guilty of larceny in
the
manner and form charged in the indictment also contained statement "and
we
further find from the evidence the value of the property so stolen to
be
$43,098.57" did not render the verdict invalid, as the finding with
respect to
the value of the stolen property could be rejected as surplusage.
People v.
Knox, App.1967, 90 Ill.App.2d 149, 234 N.E.2d 128. Larceny k 83
In prosecution for larceny, jury's verdict finding accused guilty must
fix
value of property stolen. People v. Smithka, 1934, 191 N.E. 211, 356
Ill. 624
. Larceny k 83
Verdict must find value of goods received. People v. Jackson, 1924,
144 N.E.
314, 312 Ill. 611. Receiving Stolen Goods k 9(3)
In prosecution for receiving stolen property, a verdict reciting the
jury
found the value of the property received by accused to be "over $15,"
was not
too indefinite, vague, and uncertain as to the value of the property
received
to sustain judgment of conviction; the word "over," in such
connection,
meaning "more than," "in excess of." People v. Shupe, 1922, 137 N.E.
515, 306
Ill. 31. Receiving Stolen Goods k 9(3)
A verdict finding the value of the property stolen by embezzlement at
$15,700,
whereas the bill of particulars and the evidence showed it to be $700
less,
does not require reversal, since the value in either event was
sufficient to
make the offense a felony, and the determination of the grade of the
offense
was the reason for requiring the finding of value. People v. Jasiecki,
1921,
133 N.E. 281, 301 Ill. 23. Criminal Law k 1175
Where court found the defendant guilty of the criminal offense of
larceny of
property of the value of $2.60, the finding as to value of the property
was
sufficient. People v. Greenberg, 1922, 222 Ill.App. 243, affirmed 302
Ill.
566, 135 N.E. 67.
323. ---- Verdict forms, value of property
Omission of value on felony theft verdict form was not plain error in
prosecution for felony theft, in that issues instruction stated that
proof
over $300 in value was necessary to find defendant guilty of felony
theft, and
jury found defendant not guilty of theft under $300. People v.
McCreary, App.
2 Dist.1984, 79 Ill.Dec. 114, 123 Ill.App.3d 880, 463 N.E.2d 455.
Criminal Law
k 1038.1(3.1)
Where value of stolen trousers was inserted in verdict form before form
was
submitted to jury, value was sufficient to make offense a felony and
jury
returned such form, rather than form finding defendant not guilty or
guilty of
theft as charged in felony indictment, and jury was not instructed that
it
could find a lesser value so as to constitute offense a misdemeanor and
defendant had served sentence equivalent to that imposed for
misdemeanor
offense, verdict could not be reformed as jury had not independently
determined value, a material element of offense of theft, and, thus,
judgment
was required to be reversed and defendant discharged. People v. Dell,
1972,
52 Ill.2d 393, 288 N.E.2d 459. Criminal Law k 1187
324. ---- General verdict, value of property
Where defendant was charged with felony offense of theft of property
valued
over $150, where jury was neither asked to nor did its verdict find
property
had any particular value, where there was no indication that indictment
charging defendant with theft of property valued over $150 was ever
read to
jury, and where general verdict form returned by jury finding defendant
"guilty of theft" made no reference to value of property taken nor did
it
refer to felony theft, verdict could not support conviction of felony
theft
but would only support conviction of misdemeanor theft, despite
undisputed
evidence that value of property taken greatly exceeded $150. People v.
Stark,
App. 5 Dist.1978, 16 Ill.Dec. 719, 59 Ill.App.3d 676, 375 N.E.2d 826.
Larceny
k 83
In prosecution for receiving stolen property and conspiracy to commit
theft,
where no issue concerning the value of stolen automobiles which
defendant
allegedly sold to third parties was raised and evidence clearly
established
that value of the automobiles was in excess of $150, general verdict
was
sufficient to sustain felony conviction; instruction that value of
property
taken had to exceed $150 was not necessary. People v. Piehl, App.1972,
6
Ill.App.3d 296, 285 N.E.2d 612. Receiving Stolen Goods k 9(2);
Receiving
Stolen Goods k 9(3)
Where defendant refused to stipulate as to value of merchandise
allegedly
obtained by deception but did not cross-examine witnesses who testified
on
value and his only objection was based on claim that invoice introduced
in
evidence was not an original, there was no real issue as to value and
general
verdict was proper. People v. Wilson, App.1967, 84 Ill.App.2d 269, 228
N.E.2d
131. False Pretenses k 53
Submission of general verdict to jury in prosecution for theft of
property of
value of more than $150 was proper where no issue was raised as to
value of
stolen property and evidence affirmatively established the same to be
well in
excess of $150. People v. Tomaszek, App.1964, 54 Ill.App.2d 254, 204
N.E.2d
30, certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 62, 382 U.S. 827, 15 L.Ed.2d 72. Larceny
k 82
In a larceny prosecution, a general verdict finding defendant guilty in
manner
and form charged in indictment does not constitute a finding that value
of
goods stolen is value alleged, and value of property taken is a
material fact
necessary to establish the type of larceny charged, and it must be
specifically found by the jury and be incorporated in the verdict.
People v.
Swinson, 1950, 92 N.E.2d 758, 406 Ill. 233. Larceny k 83
Where defendants by single indictment were jointly charged with larceny
of
corn valued at $147, and jury returned verdict against each finding him
guilty
of larceny in manner and form charged in indictment, but jury did not
fix
value of corn stolen, verdict found defendants guilty of petit larceny
only,
and court could not properly sentence defendants to the penitentiary.
People
v. Swinson, 1950, 92 N.E.2d 758, 406 Ill. 233. Larceny k 82; Larceny
k 88
General verdict of guilty is sufficient where value of property is not
material element of crime, but not where place and duration of
imprisonment
depend on value of property stolen. People v. Smithka, 1934, 191 N.E.
211,
356 Ill. 624. Criminal Law k 881(1)
General verdict, finding defendant guilty in manner and form as charged
in
larceny indictment, omitting required allegation of value of property
stolen,
is insufficient. People v. Crane, 1934, 190 N.E. 355, 356 Ill. 276.
Larceny k
83
General verdict that defendant was guilty of embezzlement was
insufficient,
since term and place of imprisonment depend on value of property taken,
and
verdict must fix such amount. People v. Valanchauskas, 1926, 154 N.E.
906,
324 Ill. 187. Embezzlement k 49
325. ---- Acquittal, verdict, value of property
Conviction of larceny of motor vehicle under counts of indictment
without
reference to counts charging grand larceny of automobile of value of
$200 was
acquittal of grand larceny charge. People v. Sobucki, 1944, 56 N.E.2d
628,
387 Ill. 358. Criminal Law k 878(3)
326. Sentencing, value of property--In general
Provision amending this paragraph, which classified taking of goods
with value
in excess of $150 as Class 3 felony, by classifying taking of goods
valued in
excess of $300 as Class 3 felony, changed substantive law of theft,
and, thus,
defendant, whose theft of goods with value of $179.98 occurred before
amendment became effective but who was convicted after amendment became
effective, was not entitled to have his sentence reduced to conform to
penalties for a Class 4 felony under ch. 1, <paragraph> 1103 providing
that if
any penalty was mitigated by new law, party affected could have it
applied to
any judgment pronounced after new law took effect. People v. Jimerson,
App. 3
Dist.1982, 66 Ill.Dec. 868, 111 Ill.App.3d 82, 443 N.E.2d 794. Larceny
k 2
Where there was no claim made in trial court, either by request for
appropriate instructions or tender of appropriate verdict forms, that
value of
property taken could only support misdemeanor charge and there was no
claim of
any failure or errors in instructions, it could be inferred that value
of
property was described as element of offense in issues instruction;
thus,
indictment charging defendant with theft of property having value of
more than
$150 and verdict form providing that jury found defendant guilty of
felony
theft were sufficient to support imposition of felony sentence,
notwithstanding contention that jury had failed to determine value of
property
stolen. People v. Clement, App. 3 Dist.1975, 28 Ill.App.3d 136, 327
N.E.2d
601. Larceny k 83
Two to four-year sentence imposed on defendant after negotiated plea of
guilty
to theft of property of more than $150 in value was subject to Unified
Code of
Corrections where it was on appeal on the effective date thereof, and
under
rule minimum sentence would be reduced to one year and four months
since the
minimum sentence shall not exceed one-third of the maximum. People v.
Gibson,
App. 2 Dist.1973, 11 Ill.App.3d 875, 297 N.E.2d 31. Criminal Law k
1184(5)
Sentence of not less than two nor more than five years upon defendant's
conviction of the offense of theft of property with the value in excess
of
$150 was not excessive, where defendant was 18 years of age at the time
of the
offense, where he had one prior conviction for forgery, and where the
trial
court was fully informed as to his history and background. People v.
Coggins,
App.1972, 7 Ill.App.3d 212, 287 N.E.2d 143. Larceny k 88
Where no attempt was made to fix value of automobile frame found in
possession
of defendants, degree of offense would be reduced from theft of
property
valued in excess of $150 to theft of property not exceeding $150 in
value and
defendants must be resentenced on that basis. People v. Hayes,
App.1971, 133
Ill.App.2d 885, 272 N.E.2d 423. Larceny k 88
Test whether property stolen exceeded $150 in value and, thus, whether
sentence of from one to ten years in penitentiary may be imposed on
conviction
of theft must be applied to value of the property stolen and not value
of that
which may have been recovered in possession of defendant after he has
had
opportunity to dispose of some of the proceeds. People v. McKibbins,
App.1970, 128 Ill.App.2d 175, 263 N.E.2d 131. Larceny k 88
Value of stolen property is relevant only to determination of
punishment for
theft. People v. Jordan, App.1969, 115 Ill.App.2d 307, 252 N.E.2d 701.
Larceny k 46
Offense of receiving stolen goods could not be reduced to misdemeanor
merely
because only five articles having value of $44.75 were found or because
wholesale cost of each of ten articles involved was $4.98 where court
found
value of ten to be $89.50. People v. Hansen, 1963, 28 Ill.2d 322, 192
N.E.2d
359, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 664, 376 U.S. 908, 11 L.Ed.2d 608,
certiorari
denied 84 S.Ct. 665, 376 U.S. 910, 11 L.Ed.2d 608. Criminal Law k 27
The distinction between petit and grand larceny is the difference
between the
punishments where the value of the property taken is smaller or greater
than
the fixed statutory sum, and value alleged in indictment does not
govern, but
it is value proved that determines which of the two types of larceny is
established and what punishment is to follow as a consequence. People
v.
Swinson, 1950, 92 N.E.2d 758, 406 Ill. 233. Larceny k 23
Where defendants by single indictment were jointly charged with larceny
of
corn valued at $147, and jury returned verdict against each finding him
guilty
of larceny in manner and form charged in indictment, but jury did not
fix
value of corn stolen, verdict found defendants guilty of petit larceny
only,
and court could not properly sentence defendants to the penitentiary.
People
v. Swinson, 1950, 92 N.E.2d 758, 406 Ill. 233. Larceny k 82; Larceny
k 88
Where there is no proof of market value necessary to create grand
larceny, or
the felony of receiving property knowing it to be stolen, presumption
of
knowledge arising from an inadequate consideration must fail in a
prosecution
for receiving stolen property, since in absence of proof of market
value, no
presumption of inadequate consideration can exist. People v. George,
1947, 76
N.E.2d 60, 398 Ill. 318. Receiving Stolen Goods k 8(1)
"Larceny" is generic term including petit larceny, grand larceny,
larceny from
the person, larceny of automobile or horse, larceny by embezzlement,
etc.;
basic distinction between different kinds being principally matter of
punishment.
k 1
People v. Crane, 1934, 190 N.E. 355, 356 Ill. 276. Larceny
Whether defendant, convicted of receiving stolen property, should be
imprisoned in penitentiary or county jail depends entirely on value of
property. People v. Brooks, 1930, 172 N.E. 29, 340 Ill. 74. Prisons k
13.3
327. ---- Aggravation and mitigation, sentencing, value of property
Sentencing defendant to term of four years' imprisonment for theft over
$300
and three years' imprisonment for retail theft of property valued at
less than
$300 was justified, in light of defendant's significant history of
adult
criminal activity, including numerous convictions for theft, burglary,
and
petty larceny, as well as his several probation violations. People v.
Smith,
App. 2 Dist.1985, 88 Ill.Dec. 689, 133 Ill.App.3d 574, 479 N.E.2d 24,
appeal
denied. Larceny k 88
Trial court in sentencing defendant to 60 and 40 years on two counts of
armed
robbery, and to five years on felony theft counts, and to 40 years on
armed
violence counts did not abused its discretion in view of showing, inter
alia,
that sentences were imposed after a careful review of aggravating
factors
showing that defendant threatened serious physical harm or death, that
defendant did not act under any strong provocation, that he had no
justification or excuse for his conduct, and that he was not induced to
commit
a crime by anyone else. People v. Jones, App. 4 Dist.1979, 29 Ill.Dec.
342,
73 Ill.App.3d 99, 391 N.E.2d 767. Assault And Battery k 100; Larceny
k 88;
Robbery k 30
Term of one to five years was not excessive for crime of grand theft,
where
defendant, in addition to prior conviction for selective service
violation,
had previously received penitentiary sentences for narcotic offense and
for
grand larceny. People v. Smart, App.1972, 6 Ill.App.3d 1074, 287
N.E.2d 35.
Larceny k 88
Sentence of five to ten years for theft of property over $150 was not
excessive and would not be reduced, where hearing in aggravation and
mitigation disclosed convictions of theft, criminal trespass to motor
vehicle,
armed robbery, and a parole violation, and defendant was 25 at time of
sentencing. People v. Graves, App.1972, 6 Ill.App.3d 612, 285 N.E.2d
236.
Larceny k 88
328. ---- Indeterminate term, sentencing, value of property
No factual basis existed for disturbing the sentence of three to ten
years in
the penitentiary imposed upon defendant upon his conviction of burglary
and
the theft of property under the value of $150; further, his
constitutional
rights to due process and equal protection were not violated since the
sentence imposed was well within statutory limits, and there was no
indication
that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence
greater than
that imposed upon defendant's accomplices. People v. Gibbs, App.1972,
7
Ill.App.3d 517, 288 N.E.2d 70. Burglary k 49; Constitutional Law k
250.3(1);
Constitutional Law k 270(3); Larceny k 88
Despite fact that state recommended a sentence of from one to three
years for
defendant's conviction of theft of property of a value of less than
$150, and
despite fact that the sentencing standards adopted by the American Bar
Association prescribe that the maximum of an indeterminate sentence
should be
no greater than three times the minimum, sentencing defendant to a term
of
from one to five years (for reason that parole authorities would be
better
able to determine when defendant should be released from custody) was
not
improper, considering fact that the Bar Association sentencing
standards have
not officially been adopted by the Illinois courts, and considering
fact that,
within the previous 13 months, defendant had been found guilty of a
deceptive
practice offense and another theft offense. People v. Johnson,
App.1972, 3
Ill.App.3d 1094, 279 N.E.2d 540. Sentencing And Punishment k 57;
Larceny k 88
A sentence for burglary and larceny, to penitentiary for "not less than
one
year from and after the date of delivery hereof and may extend to life
and
that he be held paroled and discharged according to the provisions of
the
statute in such case made and provided", did not impose two punishments
and
was proper. People v. Ross, 1947, 71 N.E.2d 65, 396 Ill. 11, certiorari
denied
67 S.Ct. 774, 330 U.S. 824, 91 L.Ed. 1274.
532
Sentencing And Punishment k
329. ---- Concurrent and consecutive terms, sentencing, value of
property
Trial judge, who was within scope of his discretion in relying
primarily on
history and character of defendant as basis for decision and who
expressed his
opinion that defendant's long history of other nonviolent offenses
would
likely continue in his effort to support $150 a day heroin habit, that
his
history showed that drug rehabilitation program could only have chance
of
success if he was incarcerated and that consecutive term was required
to
protect public from further criminal conduct, did not abuse his
discretion in
imposing consecutive rather than concurrent sentence upon defendant
following
his conviction of attempt to commit theft over $150. People v.
Stinnette,
App. 2 Dist.1977, 7 Ill.Dec. 24, 49 Ill.App.3d 134, 363 N.E.2d 945.
Larceny k
88
Where defendant, who had been sentenced by county court to State Farm
for
petit larceny, escaped and was sentenced by circuit court to
penitentiary for
crime of escape, the sentence to State Farm did not run concurrently
with
sentence defendant served in penitentiary for escape, since the
sentences were
not to the same place of confinement, People v. Kennay, 1945, 63 N.E.2d
733,
391 Ill. 572. Sentencing And Punishment k 1129
330. ---- Probation, sentencing, value of property
Upon conviction of theft of property valued at over $150, it was not an
abuse
of discretion for trial court to sentence defendant to serve 52
consecutive
weekends in jail and to pay a $3,000 fine as a condition of his
probation.
People v. Riddle, App. 5 Dist.1977, 6 Ill.Dec. 934, 49 Ill.App.3d 46,
363
N.E.2d 881. Sentencing And Punishment k 1974(2); Sentencing And
Punishment k
1976(2)
Where defendant was admitted to probation after pleading guilty to
reduced
charge of theft of property valued at less than $150 and after
agreeing,
during personal interrogation by court, that $800 restitution would be
paid at
$50 per month through Probation Department, court acted properly in
fixing
value of stolen automobile at $800 despite fact that no evidence was
introduced as to actual value of automobile. People v. James, App. 1
Dist.1975, 25 Ill.App.3d 533, 323 N.E.2d 424. Sentencing And
Punishment k
1973(2)
IV. THEFT BY DECEPTION
<Subdivision Index>
Accountability 365
Admissibility of evidence 372-385
Admissibility of evidence - In general 372
Admissibility of evidence - Co-defendant's statements 381
Admissibility of evidence - Common plan or scheme 384
Admissibility of evidence - Confessions and admissions 380
Admissibility of evidence - Credibility of witness 379
Admissibility of evidence - Cure of error 385
Admissibility of evidence - Documents and records 376
Admissibility of evidence - Identification of defendant 375
Admissibility of evidence - Intent 373
Admissibility of evidence - Knowledge 374
Admissibility of evidence - Other offenses 382
Admissibility of evidence - Prior convictions 383
Admissibility of evidence - Reputation and character of
defendant 377
Admissibility of evidence - Witnesses, generally 378
Aggravation and mitigation, sentencing 409
Cheating 355
Circumstantial evidence, instructions 404
Circumstantial evidence, sufficiency of evidence 392
Co-defendant's statements, admissibility of evidence 381
Common plan or scheme, admissibility of evidence 384
Confessions and admissions, admissibility of evidence 380
Conflicting evidence, sufficiency of evidence 394
Consecutive sentences, sentencing 408
Control, instructions 400
Corpus delicti, sufficiency of evidence 387
Credibility of witness, admissibility of evidence 379
Credibility of witnesses, fact questions 397
Cure of error, admissibility of evidence 385
Deception defined 352
Defenses 368
Definitions, instructions 399
Documents and records, admissibility of evidence 376
Elements of offense 353
Evidence, admissibility of 372-385
Evidence, sufficiency of 386-394
Excessive punishment, sentencing 412
Fact questions 395-397
Fact questions - In general 395
Fact questions - Credibility of witnesses 397
Fact questions - Intent 396
False pretense 357-359, 391
False pretense - In general 357
False pretense - Misrepresentation 358
False pretense - Reliance 359
False pretense - Sufficiency of evidence 391
Identification of defendant, admissibility of evidence 375
Identification, sufficiency of evidence 390
Included offenses 367
Indeterminate sentence, sentencing 407
Indictment 369-371
Indictment - In general 369
Indictment - Sufficiency of indictment 370
Indictment - Variance 371
Inducements 363
Instructions 398-405
Instructions - In general 398
Instructions - Circumstantial evidence 404
Instructions - Control 400
Instructions - Definitions 399
Instructions - Intent 401
Instructions - Limiting instructions 405
Instructions - Reasonable doubt 403
Instructions - Value 402
Intent 361
Intent, admissibility of evidence 373
Intent, fact questions 396
Intent, instructions 401
Intent or knowledge, sufficiency of evidence 388
Knowledge, admissibility of evidence 374
Knowledge, sufficiency of evidence 389
Liens and encumbrances 364
Limiting instructions 405
Misrepresentation, false pretense 358
Obtained money 356
Other offenses, admissibility of evidence 382
Prior convictions, admissibility of evidence 383
Prior law 351
Probation, sentencing 410
Promises to pay 362
Reasonable doubt, instructions 403
Reasonable doubt, sufficiency of evidence 393
Reliance, false pretense 359
Reputation and character of defendant, admissibility of evidence 377
Restitution, sentencing 411
Review 413
Robbery distinguished 366
Sentencing 406-412
Sentencing - In general 406
Sentencing - Aggravation and mitigation 409
Sentencing - Consecutive sentences 408
Sentencing - Excessive punishment 412
Sentencing - Indeterminate sentence 407
Sentencing - Probation 410
Sentencing - Restitution 411
Sufficiency of evidence 386-394
Sufficiency of evidence - In general 386
Sufficiency of evidence - Circumstantial evidence 392
Sufficiency of evidence - Conflicting evidence 394
Sufficiency of evidence - Corpus delicti 387
Sufficiency of evidence - False pretenses 391
Sufficiency of evidence - Identification 390
Sufficiency of evidence - Intent or knowledge 388
Sufficiency of evidence - Knowledge 389
Sufficiency of evidence - Reasonable doubt 393
Sufficiency of indictment 370
Time of deception 354
Unauthorized control 360
Value, instructions 402
Variance, indictment 371
Verdicts, theft by deception 405.5
Witness credibility, admissibility of evidence 379
Witness credibility, fact questions 397
Witnesses, generally, admissibility of evidence 378
351. Prior law, theft by deception
Under Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section> 253 (repealed), instrument
signed
was required to be such as might possibly cause loss or injury to
person
signing it, and it was required to be an instrument of value or of such
a
character as exposes signer to liability as soon as it was signed, and
the
fraudulent obtaining of a signature was not enough in itself to
constitute an
offense. People v. Dolan, App.1959, 21 Ill.App.2d 312, 157 N.E.2d 817.
False
Pretenses k 13
352. Deception defined, theft by deception
Term "deception" within meaning of this section proscribing theft by
deception
is defined as knowingly to create or confirm impression which is false
and
which offender does not believe to be true; false workmen's
compensation
claim comes within that definition and is therefore just as much a
"theft by
deception" as any other scheme to obtain money by false pretenses.
People v.
Wurster, App. 3 Dist.1980, 38 Ill.Dec. 702, 83 Ill.App.3d 399, 403
N.E.2d 1306
. False Pretenses k 7(1)
353. Elements of offense, theft by deception
In order to convict a defendant of theft by deception, the State must
prove
that: (1) the victim was induced to part with money; (2) the transfer
of the
money was based upon deception; (3) defendant intended permanently to
deprive
the victim of the money; and (4) defendant acted with specific intent
to
defraud the victim. People v. Kotlarz, 2000, 250 Ill.Dec. 437, 193
Ill.2d
272, 738 N.E.2d 906; People v. Reich, App. 3 Dist.1993, 182 Ill.Dec.
700, 241
Ill.App.3d 666, 610 N.E.2d 124.
Gist of the offense is the false pretense. Regent v. People, 1901, 96
Ill.App. 189; Rainforth v. People, 1871, 61 Ill. 365.
When person induces owner to part with title and possession to his or
her
property absolutely it is not larceny even though owner is induced to
do so by
false pretenses or other deception. People v. Murray, App. 1
Dist.1994, 203
Ill.Dec. 644, 262 Ill.App.3d 1056, 640 N.E.2d 303. Larceny k 1;
Larceny k
14(1)
To sustain conviction of theft by deception, state must prove beyond
reasonable doubt that defendant induced victim to part with money,
obtained
money by deception, intended to permanently deprive victim of use or
benefit
of money, and acted with specific intent to defraud victim. People v.
Morrison, App. 4 Dist.1994, 198 Ill.Dec. 586, 260 Ill.App.3d 775, 633
N.E.2d
48, appeal allowed, vac 203 Ill.Dec. 710, 157 Ill.2d 514, 640 N.E.2d
630.
False Pretenses k 1
Essential elements which must be proved to sustain charge of theft by
deception are that a named person was the owner of a specified
property; that
the accused knowingly obtained by deception control over that property;
and
that the accused acted with the intent to permanently deprive the named
owner
of the use and benefit of that property. People v. Decker, App. 1
Dist.1974,
19 Ill.App.3d 86, 311 N.E.2d 228. False Pretenses k 4
Gist of offense of obtaining money by means of confidence game is trust
or
confidence reposed in swindler, obtained by some fraudulent scheme,
trick or
device, which confidence is afterwards betrayed and money or property
obtained
from victim, form of transaction being immaterial.
1963, 29
Ill.2d 336, 194 N.E.2d 318. False Pretenses k 16
People v. Gipson,
The gist of the offense is the obtaining of property by the fraudulent
use of
cards, the details by which this is effected being unimportant. Blemer
v.
People, 1875, 76 Ill. 265.
One who sells goods to another claiming to be the owner thereof, when
he is
not, in fact, the owner; and obtains money thereby, is guilty of
obtaining
money by false pretenses. Rainforth v. People, 1871, 61 Ill. 365.
354. Time of deception, theft by deception
Where defendant created impression that he had purchased bonds for
victim and
failed to correct this false impression, fact that the false impression
was
created subsequent to defendant's obtaining of control over the money
was not
dispositive with regard to his conviction for theft by deception.
People v.
Morrissey, App. 3 Dist.1985, 89 Ill.Dec. 232, 133 Ill.App.3d 1069, 479
N.E.2d
1238. False Pretenses k 4
Theft may be committed within meaning of Criminal Code even though
deception
is not contemporaneous with obtaining of lawful control or possession
of
property of another; thus, charge of theft was proper where defendant
obtained possession of money by means of valid endorsement of valid
check, and
where deception occurred only at later time when defendant executed
affidavit
of nonendorsement of such check. People v. Fowler, App. 4 Dist.1979,
28
Ill.Dec. 787, 72 Ill.App.3d 491, 390 N.E.2d 1377. False Pretenses k 12
In prosecution for obtaining signature to check by false pretenses,
remoteness
in time of making pretenses did not affect guilt of defendant, where
causal
connection existed between pretenses and obtaining of signatures.
People v.
Gruber, 1935, 200 N.E. 483, 362 Ill. 278. False Pretenses k 4
355. Cheating, theft by deception
"Cheating" is an offense at common law and is a different offense from
that of
false pretenses. People v. Konkowski, 1941, 39 N.E.2d 13, 378 Ill.
616. False
Pretenses k 20
At common law, cheating was a crime, to establish which it was
necessary to
allege and prove an intent to defraud. People v. Warfield, 1913, 103
N.E.
979, 261 Ill. 293. False Pretenses k 5
It is illegal at common law to obtain money or property, or to cheat
and
defraud by means of false pretenses. People v. Bain, 1935, 274
Ill.App. 215,
reversed on other grounds 359 Ill. 455, 195 N.E. 42.
356. Obtained money, theft by deception
Defendant who received check from elderly victim, after phoning her
from
prison claiming to be a relative in need of money, "obtained" money as
required to support conviction for theft by deception, despite fact
that
prison officials intercepted check before defendant could make use of
funds;
defendant took physical possession of check and endorsed it. People v.
Rohlfs, App. 4 Dist.2001, 256 Ill.Dec. 619, 322 Ill.App.3d 965, 752
N.E.2d
499, appeal denied 261 Ill.Dec. 354, 196 Ill.2d 557, 763 N.E.2d 324.
False
Pretenses k 14
Obtain within meaning of definition of "obtaining" money by false
pretenses
means to get hold of, to gain possession of, or to acquire. People v.
Shapiro, App.1939, 20 N.E.2d 107, 299 Ill.App. 255. False Pretenses k
12
Offense of "obtaining" money under false pretenses was complete when
money was
obtained, put in pocket of accused, and reduced to his possession.
People v.
Shapiro, App.1939, 20 N.E.2d 107, 299 Ill.App. 255. False Pretenses k
12
Word "obtain" is not used in the statute as synonymous with word
"retain."
Watson v. People, 1889, 27 Ill.App. 493.
357. False pretense, theft by deception--In general
Any designed misrepresentation of existing condition by which party
obtains
goods of another is "false pretense." People v. Gould, 1936, 363 Ill.
348, 2
N.E.2d 324; Courtney v. Sullivan, 1936, 363 Ill. 34, 1 N.E.2d 206;
People v.
___, 1935, 358 Ill. 326, 193 N.E. 150; People v. Blume, 1931, 345 Ill.
524,
178 N.E. 48; People v. Drury, 1929, 335 Ill. 539, 167 N.E. 823;
People v.
Schneider, 1927, 327 Ill. 270, 158 N.E. 448.
Under Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section> 253 (repealed), any
misrepresentation of a past fact, knowingly made to induce another to
part
with his property, was a false pretense. People v. Martin, 1939, 24
N.E.2d
380, 372 Ill. 484. False Pretenses k 7(1)
A "false pretense" is such a fraudulent representation of an existing
or past
fact, by one who knows it not to be true, as is adapted to induce the
persons
to whom it is made to part with something of value. People v. Pouchot,
1913,
174 Ill.App. 1.
358. ---- Misrepresentation, false pretense, theft by deception
Defendant to whom complaining witnesses were to pay $7,000 each
pursuant to
oil well drilling investment contract whereby defendant was to drill to
certain depth or refund the $7,000 and under which witnesses paid an
additional $7,500 each when defendant decided to set casing performed
in
accordance with agreement guaranteeing nothing in way of oil production
and
was not guilty of theft by deception with respect to witnesses who were
experienced investors, notwithstanding they were induced to enter into
agreement for offset wells on alleged basis of defendant's
representations
that first well would be productive. People v. Warren, App.1971, 2
Ill.App.3d
983, 276 N.E.2d 92. False Pretenses k 7(1)
Any designed misrepresentation of an existing condition, by which a
party
obtained goods of another, was a "false pretense" under <section> 253
(repealed). People v. Martin, 1939, 24 N.E.2d 380, 372 Ill. 484. False
Pretenses k 7(1)
Any false representation of an existing fact or condition by which
property of
another was obtained was a "false pretense" within Ill.Rev.Stat.1961,
ch. 38,
<section> 253 (repealed). People v. Gruber, 1935, 200 N.E. 483, 362
Ill. 278.
False Pretenses k 7(5)
One who falsely represented he had money in a bank and so obtained
goods was
liable under R.S.1874, p. 348, <section> 96 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38,
<section> 253; repealed). Barton v. People, 1890, 25 N.E. 776, 135
Ill. 405,
25 Am.St.Rep. 375.
To sustain prosecution for false pretenses, the representation must be
of a
present, material, existing fact, which the party making it knows, or
has good
reason to know, is false and a promise is not a pretense. People v.
Jacobs,
1897, 72 Ill.App. 286.
To constitute the crime of false pretenses there must be a false
representation when the false pretense is by verbal representation of
an
existing or past act. Austin v. People, 1896, 63 Ill.App. 303.
359. ---- Reliance, false pretense, theft by deception
Party must have been induced to act by reason of such false pretense,
though
he need not suffer loss. Simmons v. People, 1900, 187 Ill. 327, 58
N.E. 384;
Jackson v. People, 1886, 18 Ill.App. 508.
Evidence that both alleged victim and FBI believed that deputy sheriff
was
using at least part of money, which victim paid deputy, to fix cases
was
sufficient to establish that victim relied upon deputy sheriff's
representations and that reliance induced victim to pay deputy sheriff,
as
necessary for conviction of theft by deception, even though victim
allegedly
believed deputy sheriff was pocketing some of money. People v. Kaye,
App. 1
Dist.1987, 107 Ill.Dec. 348, 154 Ill.App.3d 562, 507 N.E.2d 12, appeal
denied
113 Ill.Dec. 310, 116 Ill.2d 568, 515 N.E.2d 119. False Pretenses k
49(5)
In prosecution for theft by deception the prosecution must show
reliance by
the victim on the defendant's deceptive conduct. People v. Davis,
1986, 96
Ill.Dec. 693, 112 Ill.2d 55, 491 N.E.2d 1153. False Pretenses k 9
Reliance upon misrepresentation of accused is not a separate element of
offense of theft by deception which must be specifically alleged,
particularly
where connection is apparent between defendant's misrepresentation and
acquisition of property. People v. Gunn, App. 3 Dist.1983, 68 Ill.Dec.
547,
112 Ill.App.3d 1011, 446 N.E.2d 281. False Pretenses k 31
360. Unauthorized control, theft by deception
In prosecution for theft for knowingly obtaining unauthorized control
over
another's property, evidence that defendant bought under assumed name,
bid
unduly high prices at auction and left without paying proved that she
bid
without intending to pay and thus obtained unauthorized control over
property
by deception, even though defendant contended that, while her rights in
property might be set aside in civil action for fraud, her control was
authorized because she had title when property was struck off to her
and she
was given possession. People v. Muskgrave, App. 4 Dist.1978, 18
Ill.Dec. 306,
60 Ill.App.3d 742, 377 N.E.2d 595. Larceny k 62(1)
One who obtains control over property of another by deception obtains
"unauthorized control" over that property within meaning of this
paragraph.
People v. Muskgrave, App. 4 Dist.1978, 18 Ill.Dec. 306, 60 Ill.App.3d
742, 377
N.E.2d 595. Larceny k 14(1)
361. Intent, theft by deception
The intent of the accused is the essence of the offense of false
pretenses.
Lane v. People, 1909, 142 Ill.App. 571; Gregg v. People, 1902, 98
Ill.App.
170.
Defendant's criminal intent usually must be proved by circumstantial
evidence,
and existence of intent to permanently deprive, which is question for
trier of
fact, may be inferred from act of taking another's property. People v.
Morrison, App. 4 Dist.1994, 198 Ill.Dec. 586, 260 Ill.App.3d 775, 633
N.E.2d
48, appeal allowed, vac 203 Ill.Dec. 710, 157 Ill.2d 514, 640 N.E.2d
630.
Criminal Law k 312; Criminal Law k 568
Schemes of fraud and deception frequently involve token acts toward
performance of agreement, but such acts will not always preclude
finding that
there was intent to permanently deprive owner. People v. Veasey, App.
2
Dist.1993, 190 Ill.Dec. 929, 251 Ill.App.3d 589, 622 N.E.2d 1246.
False
Pretenses k 49(2)
Defendant's intent to permanently deprive owner of property must be
deduced by
trier of fact from facts and circumstances surrounding alleged criminal
act.
People v. Veasey, App. 2 Dist.1993, 190 Ill.Dec. 929, 251 Ill.App.3d
589, 622
N.E.2d 1246. Larceny k 41
In order to convict builder of theft by deception for allegedly taking
money
from complainant for home which was never built, state had to prove
that, at
time builder agreed to build house, he had no intention of building it
or did
not believe it could be built for contract price. People v. Reich,
App. 3
Dist.1993, 182 Ill.Dec. 700, 241 Ill.App.3d 666, 610 N.E.2d 124. False
Pretenses k 5
Conviction for theft by deception should not stand where defendant
contracts
with person to perform services or deliver goods and defendant's
actions
between time of contract and arrest manifest intention to perform
contract.
People v. Riner, App. 4 Dist.1992, 175 Ill.Dec. 850, 234 Ill.App.3d
733, 600
N.E.2d 1308. False Pretenses k 5
For purposes of charge of theft by deception, failure to refund money
to
dissatisfied customers is not necessarily proof of specific intent to
defraud.
People v. Rolston, App. 3 Dist.1983, 70 Ill.Dec. 87, 113 Ill.App.3d
727, 448
N.E.2d 965. False Pretenses k 49(2)
In prosecution for theft by deception arising from alleged fraudulent
scheme
involving sale of tool distributorships by defendants to purchasers,
referred
to as investors, defendants' failure to perform promises, standing
alone, was
not evidence that they did not intend to perform and State had burden
of
proving that defendants made their various promises knowing either that
they
did not intend to perform promises or that they would not be performed
as
promised. People v. Ballard, App. 2 Dist.1978, 22 Ill.Dec. 410, 65
Ill.App.3d
831, 382 N.E.2d 800, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 262, 444 U.S. 925, 62
L.Ed.2d
180. False Pretenses k 39
In prosecution for theft by deception, evidence that defendant tendered
check
knowingly without having funds on deposit in and of itself supported
inference
of existence of requisite felonious intent. People v. Reans, App. 3
Dist.1974, 20 Ill.App.3d 1005, 313 N.E.2d 184. False Pretenses k 49(2)
To sustain conviction for false pretenses, facts must show that accused
obtained signature or goods with intent to defraud. People v. Scowley,
1933,
187 N.E. 415, 353 Ill. 330.
False Pretenses k 5
362. Promises to pay, theft by deception
Defendant's acquisition of property through false promises of future
payment
was indictable offense under this section. People v. Kamsler,
App.1966, 78
Ill.App.2d 349, 223 N.E.2d 237. False Pretenses k 7(5)
This section prohibits obtaining of goods or property by false promises
of
future payment. People v. Kamsler, App.1966, 67 Ill.App.2d 33, 214
N.E.2d 562
. False Pretenses k 7(5)
363. Inducements, theft by deception
The inducement of the execution of a parol executory contract was not
an
offense under law relating to obtaining money by false pretenses.
Josma v.
Western Steel Car & Foundry Co., 1911, 94 N.E. 945, 249 Ill. 508.
False
Pretenses k 1; False Pretenses k 11
364. Liens and encumbrances, theft by deception
Conviction may be had for obtaining money by falsely pretending that
certain
property was free from all incumbrances, though an examination of the
records
would have disclosed the falsehood. Keyes v. People, 1902, 64 N.E.
730, 197
Ill. 638. False Pretenses k 9
365. Accountability, theft by deception
Whether defendant kept money allegedly procured by means of confidence
game or
gave it to other person charged with same offense was immaterial, since
defendant would be guilty even though he had confederate to whom he
gave
money. People v. Gipson, 1963, 29 Ill.2d 336, 194 N.E.2d 318. False
Pretenses k 16
Criminality of false pretenses must be judged with reference to party's
capacity to detect the falsehood. And pretenses of one of several
defendants
are chargeable against all, where acting under an agreement among them.
Cowen
v. People, 1853, 14 Ill. 348.
366. Robbery distinguished, theft by deception
Evidence that defendant and another, posing as policemen, accosted
woman while
asleep in apartment at 6:30 a.m., that while searching apartment one of
men
brandished gun, told her to "Shut up, bitch," and told her they had her
husband, and asked where money was, constituted sufficient threat of
force to
warrant prosecution for robbery, rather than merely for theft by
deception.
People v. Denman, App.1966, 69 Ill.App.2d 306, 217 N.E.2d 457. Robbery
k 6
367. Included offenses, theft by deception
Deceptive practices was lesser included offense of theft by deception;
although statute defining theft by deception did not expressly include
element
of intent to defraud, required for deceptive practices conviction,
statutory
definition of intent to deceive, required for theft conviction,
specifically
included intent to defraud. People v. Brocksmith, App. 3 Dist.1992,
178
Ill.Dec. 536, 237 Ill.App.3d 818, 604 N.E.2d 1059, appeal allowed 183
Ill.Dec.
864, 149 Ill.2d 653, 612 N.E.2d 516, affirmed 205 Ill.Dec. 113, 162
Ill.2d
224, 642 N.E.2d 1230. Indictment And Information k 191(.5)
Defendant, who was improperly convicted of theft by deception, as
victim did
not rely on defendant's deception in transferring money to defendant,
could be
convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted theft. People v.
Davis,
1986, 96 Ill.Dec. 693, 112 Ill.2d 55, 491 N.E.2d 1153. Larceny k 24
368. Defenses, theft by deception
Negligence of purchaser is no defense to prosecution for false
pretenses.
Keyes v. People, 1902, 197 Ill. 638, 64 N.E. 730; Thomas v. People,
1885, 113
Ill. 531.
The existence of a warranty will not deprive the transaction of its
criminality. Jackson v. People, 1888, 126 Ill. 139, 18 N.E. 286;
Jackson v.
People, 1886, 18 Ill.App. 508.
In prosecution for felony theft based on allegations that defendant
had, by
means of deception, exerted unauthorized control over funds of
corporate
entities, defenses of necessity and compulsion were unavailable to
defendant.
People v. Parker, App. 4 Dist.1983, 69 Ill.Dec. 240, 113 Ill.App.3d
321, 447
N.E.2d 457. False Pretenses k 22
Fact that owners of insured property destroyed by fire were or could
have been
under misapprehension that they could not collect all insurance money
unless
they included in list of destroyed property a stereo set which they
knew had
not been destroyed by fire did not constitute defense to charge of
attempted
theft by deception on theory that owners could not have obtained money
from
insurance company that they were not entitled to because total personal
property loss exceeded policy limit even without listing of stereo, in
absence
of evidence establishing that total personal property loss was in fact
in
excess of the claimed amount. People v. Elmore, App.1970, 128
Ill.App.2d 312,
261 N.E.2d 736, affirmed 50 Ill.2d 10, 276 N.E.2d 325. False Pretenses
k 21
In prosecution of assistant purchasing agent of corporation for
obtaining
signature to check by false pretenses, that defendant had no
conversation with
employee of corporation who actually signed check did not affect guilt
of
defendant, where such conversation formed no part of regular course of
business in signing of corporation's checks. People v. Gruber, 1935,
200 N.E.
483, 362 Ill. 278. False Pretenses k 13
In prosecution of purchasing agent of corporation for obtaining
signature to
check by false pretenses, that corporation owed part of money covered
by check
did not affect guilt of defendant. People v. Gruber, 1935, 200 N.E.
483, 362
Ill. 278. False Pretenses k 14
Negligence of corporation in failing to ascertain true facts by
investigation
was not a defense in prosecution of corporation's assistant purchasing
agent
for obtaining signature to checks by false pretenses. People v.
Gruber, 1935,
200 N.E. 483, 362 Ill. 278. False Pretenses k 9
Where money is procured by a mortgage on cattle falsely represented by
defendant as belonging to him, the fact that defendant owns other
cattle
included in a prior mortgage to other parties does not relieve
defendant from
criminal liability for such false pretenses.
N.E.
535, 190 Ill. 331. False Pretenses k 22
Moore v. People, 1901, 60
It is no defense to a criminal prosecution for obtaining money under
false
pretenses that the prosecuting witness himself in the very transaction
of
which he complains was guilty of an intent to defraud. People v.
Koscielniak,
1930, 257 Ill.App. 514.
369. Indictment, theft by deception--In general
In prosecution for theft by deception based upon defendant's role in
fraudulently obtaining $240,000 commission by manipulating purchase
price of
real estate owned by public agency, indictment which alleged that both
buyer
of property and public agency had "interest in the property involved,"
sufficiently named both parties as victims of defendant's theft, and
thus
trial court could order defendant to make restitution to public agency
following his conviction; but for defendant's deception, funds paid to
him
would have been paid by buyer to public agency. People v. Kotlarz,
2000, 250
Ill.Dec. 437, 193 Ill.2d 272, 738 N.E.2d 906. Indictment And
Information k
101
Fact that indictment did not allege that employer relied on false
representations of defendant in paying workmen's compensation benefits
did not
render the indictment of defendants for crime of theft by deception
insufficient where connection was apparent between misrepresentation by
defendants and their acquisition of disability benefits; reliance upon
false
representation of defendants was not separate element of crime of theft
by
deception that had to be specifically alleged. People v. Wurster, App.
3
Dist.1980, 38 Ill.Dec. 702, 83 Ill.App.3d 399, 403 N.E.2d 1306. False
Pretenses k 31
Indictment for theft by means of deception stating that money allegedly
taken
was owned by complaining witnesses doing business as corporation was
sufficiently clear as to who owned the money notwithstanding that
incorporation had not been completed. People v. Gill, App.1970, 122
Ill.App.2d 60, 257 N.E.2d 115. Indictment And Information k 71.4(8)
Information, which charged that defendant unlawfully, wilfully and
fraudulently obtained heating unit by making false representations with
design
and for purpose of cheating and defrauding a company, which relied on
said
representations, was not defective for failure to allege intent.
People v.
Dee, App.1957, 14 Ill.App.2d 96, 142 N.E.2d 811. False Pretenses k 27
370. ---- Sufficiency of indictment, theft by deception
Information sufficiently charged theft by deception, notwithstanding
that it
did not allege facts detailing how victim was defrauded, or how
defendant
intended to do so, and did not otherwise describe the precise nature of
the
crime. People v. Varellas, App. 2 Dist.1985, 93 Ill.Dec. 287, 138
Ill.App.3d
820, 486 N.E.2d 388, appeal denied, habeas corpus denied, affirmed 985
F.2d
563, rehearing denied. False Pretenses k 26
Although defendant claimed, for first time on appeal, that no count in
indictment charged him with theft of over $300, and thus, he could only
be
convicted of a misdemeanor, not a felony, in light of extensive
documentation
presented at trial showing that defendant had stolen in excess of
$130,000 and
an instruction given incorporating amended statutory amount of $300 for
convicting defendant of theft by deception, indictment adequately
apprised
defendant that he was being charged with a felony. People v. Peebles,
App. 1
Dist.1984, 80 Ill.Dec. 427, 125 Ill.App.3d 213, 465 N.E.2d 539.
Indictment And
Information k 71.4(4)
Facts alleged in information charging theft by deception, i.e., that
defendant
knowingly obtained, by deception, control over property of bank
intending to
deprive owner permanently of use and benefit of property, sufficiently
apprised defendant of transactions which formed basis of offense
charged, in
order to enable him to prepare defense, and established natural
connection
between facts and offense so that reliance upon defendant's
misrepresentation
was apparent; thus it contained the necessary requirements of valid
charging
instrument. People v. Gunn, App. 3 Dist.1983, 68 Ill.Dec. 547, 112
Ill.App.3d
1011, 446 N.E.2d 281. Indictment And Information k 71.4(4)
Indictment which charged theft of money in the form of disability
benefits and
described false representation allegedly made by defendant husband to
obtain
the money sufficiently apprised defendants of transaction which was
basis of
crime charged, theft by deception, to enable them to prepare defense,
notwithstanding fact that indictment did not allege that the money was
obtained by claim under Workmen's Compensation Act. People v. Wurster,
App. 3
Dist.1980, 38 Ill.Dec. 702, 83 Ill.App.3d 399, 403 N.E.2d 1306.
Indictment
And Information k 71.4(4)
Where indictment was phrased in language of statute which set forth all
elements necessary to constitute offense intended to be punished, word
"theft"
was a word commonly understood, indictment particularized charge as
theft by
deception, indictment set forth names of persons whose property was
taken as
well as approximate day when thefts occurred, record demonstrated no
difficulty in preparing and presenting a defense and indictment was
sufficient
to support a plea of double jeopardy should need arise, failure of
indictment
to specifically allege various acts of deception did not render it
invalid.
People v. Ballard, App. 2 Dist.1978, 22 Ill.Dec. 410, 65 Ill.App.3d
831, 382
N.E.2d 800, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 262, 444 U.S. 925, 62 L.Ed.2d
180.
Indictment And Information k 110(15)
Indictment charging defendant with theft by deception from partnership
doing
business as a tavern fully advised defendant of source of money which
he
allegedly obtained by means of worthless check and testimony of
bartender who
was employed by partnership naming partners as owners of tavern was
sufficient
to prove ownership of property. People v. McClain, App.1972, 6
Ill.App.3d
451, 285 N.E.2d 239. False Pretenses k 49(1)
Where no specific date could be set forth as exact day when defendant
was
alleged to have committed deceptive practice which resulted in taking
of
money, bill of particulars stating that defendant had led complaining
witnesses to believe that he had authority from motel corporation to
accept
money, when in fact he did not, and that offense occurred in law office
of
complaining witnesses' attorney in Illinois was sufficiently specific.
People
v. Gill, App.1970, 122 Ill.App.2d 60, 257 N.E.2d 115. Indictment And
Information k 121.4
Information charging defendant with wilfully and unlawfully attempting
to
obtain goods on a charge plate issued to another failed to charge crime
of
attempting to obtain goods by false pretenses. People v. Tedesso,
App.1963,
41 Ill.App.2d 27, 190 N.E.2d 140. False Pretenses k 26
Information in prosecution for obtaining property by means of false
pretense
is fatally defective if it does not charge that the false pretense was
made
with intent to cheat and defraud. People v. Tedesso, App.1963, 41
Ill.App.2d
27, 190 N.E.2d 140. False Pretenses k 27
Word "unlawfully" used in information to describe the offense of
attempting to
obtain goods by false pretenses is but a conclusion and is not a
substitute
for the words charging intent to cheat and defraud, which are essential
to a
description of the crime of attempting to obtain goods by false
pretenses.
People v. Tedesso, App.1963, 41 Ill.App.2d 27, 190 N.E.2d 140.
Indictment And
Information k 63
371. ---- Variance, indictment, theft by deception
There was no fatal variance between indictment, which charged defendant
with
defrauding commodities corporation, and evidence at trial, which
referred to
some extent to defendant's fraudulent conduct in regard to trading
company;
evidence established that there was agency relationship between trading
company and commodities corporation, that such relationship was common
practice in commodities brokerage business, and that defendant was well
aware
that it was commodities corporation that ultimately was responsible for
financial losses occasioned by his fraud. People v. Brenner, App. 1
Dist.1985, 90 Ill.Dec. 577, 135 Ill.App.3d 877, 482 N.E.2d 396, appeal
denied.
False Pretenses k 38
In prosecution for theft by deception, alleged variance raised for
first time
on appeal was not fatal, inasmuch as defendant made no claim that he
was
misled in preparation of his defense and record adequately protected
him from
double jeopardy resulting from any future charges premised upon same
offense.
People v. Johnson, App. 1 Dist.1978, 17 Ill.Dec. 115, 59 Ill.App.3d
115, 376
N.E.2d 8. Larceny k 40(4)
372. Admissibility of evidence, theft by deception--In general
Records seized from used car dealer pursuant to warrantless search of
records
which was unauthorized under automobile dealer record keeping statute,
S.H.A.
ch. 95 1/2 , <paragraph> 5-403, would be excluded in prosecution for
felony
and misdemeanor theft by deception in which gravamen of charged offense
was
that cars were sold with odometers turned back. People v. Potter, App.
3
Dist.1986, 95 Ill.Dec. 113, 140 Ill.App.3d 693, 489 N.E.2d 334.
Criminal Law
k 394.4(11)
In prosecution for theft by deception, refusal to admit prior
consistent
statements of defendant and of witnesses for defendant was proper where
statements were made at time when motive to fabricate was in existence.
People
v. McBride, App. 5 Dist.1981, 48 Ill.Dec. 405, 92 Ill.App.3d 908, 416
N.E.2d
678. Witnesses k 414(2)
In prosecution for theft by deception in connection with fraudulent
claim for
workmen's compensation benefits, relevancy of whether witness told
State's
attorney about second beating witness gave to defendant husband so as
to make
defendant's claim that he had injured himself more believable was
obscure,
even though circumstances of second beating might be relevant to show
how
defendant received his injury, and therefore trial court did not abuse
its
discretion in excluding the evidence. People v. Wurster, App. 3
Dist.1980, 38
Ill.Dec. 702, 83 Ill.App.3d 399, 403 N.E.2d 1306. Criminal Law k
338(1)
Error in permitting witnesses to testify that defendant charged with
theft by
means of deception had no authority to receive money for motel
corporation was
not prejudicial, where cross-examination brought out that witnesses had
no
basis for their testimony and no affirmative showing was made that
defendant
did have such authority. People v. Gill, App.1970, 122 Ill.App.2d 60,
257
N.E.2d 115. Criminal Law k 1169.1(4)
In a prosecution for falsely representing the value of a horse, and
obtaining
therefor a price much above its value, the fact that the purchaser,
following
a direction and address advertised, found defendant at the place
indicated,
who made substantially the same representations as in the
advertisement, and
also found the horse there, is sufficient foundation to admit the
advertisement, without further proof that defendant authorized its
publication. Evidence of defendant's parol statements is admissible,
though,
after the sale and payment, written bills of sale were signed,
containing
specific warranty, and a clause stating the sale to have been on said
warranty, and not on parol representations. Jackson v. People, 1888,
18 N.E.
286, 126 Ill. 139. False Pretenses k 43(1)
373. ---- Intent, admissibility of evidence, theft by deception
In prosecution for theft by deception, evidence of attempts at
restitution
referred to by defendant in his testimony could bear only on question
of
extent to which such evidence tended to negate existence of a requisite
intent. People v. Reans, App. 3 Dist.1974, 20 Ill.App.3d 1005, 313
N.E.2d 184.
False Pretenses k 49(2)
In prosecution for obtaining signatures to checks by false pretenses,
evidence
of employee of corporation's financial auditing department, that
defendant had
told her that company which defendant in reality operated was local
representative of creditor of corporation, was admissible to show
fraudulent
intent, notwithstanding that conversation had occurred more than 18
months
before check was signed. People v. Gruber, 1935, 200 N.E. 483, 362
Ill. 278.
Criminal Law k 371(3)
In prosecution for obtaining money by false pretenses, refusal to
permit
accused to testify as to his intention was error. Lane v. People,
1909, 142
Ill.App. 571.
374. ---- Knowledge, admissibility of evidence, theft by deception
Evidence that defendant, indicted for obtaining money by falsely
representing
the qualities of a horse, and thereby obtaining a price far above its
value,
had been engaged in renting private stables, advertising horses, with a
fictitious reason for being willing to sell; that he dealt in windbroken,
heavy, and balky, as well as other, horses, is admissible, not to show
other
offenses, but as tending to prove his experience in the business, and
therefore his knowledge of the falsity of the representations.
v.
People, 1888, 18 N.E. 286, 126 Ill. 139. False Pretenses k 44
Jackson
375. ---- Identification of defendant, admissibility of evidence,
theft by
deception
In prosecution for theft by deception based on defendant's alleged
phone calls
to elderly women pretending to be a relative and asking for money,
evidence
linking defendant to three uncharged telephone scams was admissible to
establish defendant's identity as the caller; calls were all similar in
nature
and used similar tactics, such as asking for money for car repairs.
People v.
Rohlfs, App. 4 Dist.2001, 256 Ill.Dec. 619, 322 Ill.App.3d 965, 752
N.E.2d
499, appeal denied 261 Ill.Dec. 354, 196 Ill.2d 557, 763 N.E.2d 324.
Criminal
Law k 369.15
Witnesses' in-court identification of defendant as person who purported
to
represent charities, arranged to purchase phonograph records, took
records and
subsequently failed to pay for them had origin independent from
pretrial
viewings and, therefore, were admissible even if pretrial viewings were
improper, where both witnesses had unusually good opportunities under
excellent lighting conditions at time of the transactions to observe
person
who arranged to purchase records. People v. Cassman, App.1972, 7
Ill.App.3d
786, 288 N.E.2d 667. Criminal Law k 339.10(11)
376. ---- Documents and records, admissibility of evidence, theft by
deception
In prosecution for theft by deception and deceptive practices,
admission of
computer-generated bank records constituted harmful error since no
testimony
established that computer program at the data center which issued
statements
were standard, unmodified, and operated according to instructions and
bank
statements were introduced to support State's theory of deception, a
necessary
element of theft by deception. People v. Bovio, App. 2 Dist.1983, 74
Ill.Dec.
400, 118 Ill.App.3d 836, 455 N.E.2d 829. Criminal Law k 444; Criminal
Law k
1169.1(10)
In prosecution for theft by deception, trial court properly admitted
into
evidence copies of defendant's new account forms for three checking
accounts
with bank and copies of records of his checking account with other
bank, in
view of fact that records tended to establish beginning of a trail of
bad
checks from which jury could infer that defendant knew his money market
fund
redemption check would be returned unpaid. People v. Young, App. 3
Dist.1981,
53 Ill.Dec. 29, 97 Ill.App.3d 187, 423 N.E.2d 221. Criminal Law k
338(1)
In prosecution for theft by deception, trial court properly admitted
into
evidence correspondence from several payee banks to defendant informing
defendant that his checks were returned unpaid and correspondence from
several
drawee banks informing defendant that his accounts with those banks
were
closed, in view of evidence that letters were made in the regular
course of
business. People v. Young, App. 3 Dist.1981, 53 Ill.Dec. 29, 97
Ill.App.3d
187, 423 N.E.2d 221. Criminal Law k 433
Stamps of presenting banks found on back of defendant's checks
indicating
checks were returned because defendant's account contained no funds
were shown
to have been made in the regular course of business and thus were
admissible
as business records in prosecution for theft by deception. People v.
Young,
App. 3 Dist.1981, 53 Ill.Dec. 29, 97 Ill.App.3d 187, 423 N.E.2d 221.
Criminal
Law k 436(3)
Notations appearing on original order blank for fur stole rental and
not
appearing on carbon copy of order blank corresponding to identification
number
given fur stole after its purchase by fur rental corporation and to
value of
fur stole as testified to by employee of corporation were not such as
to
render original order blank or copy inadmissible as evidence under
Business
Records Act in prosecution for theft by deception. People v. Neary,
App.1969,
109 Ill.App.2d 302, 248 N.E.2d 695. Criminal Law k 436(3)
377. ---- Reputation and character of defendant, admissibility of
evidence,
theft by deception
In prosecution for fraudulently obtaining heating unit by means of
false
pretenses there was no error in producing witnesses to offer evidence
of
defendant's reputation for truth and veracity, when defendant had
voluntarily
testified. People v. Dee, App.1957, 14 Ill.App.2d 96, 142 N.E.2d 811.
Witnesses k 337(3)
378. ---- Witnesses, generally, admissibility of evidence, theft by
deception
President of fur rental corporation, who testified that he purchased
fur wraps
for corporation and purchased fur stole allegedly taken by defendant by
use of
false driver's license and false social security card, and who
identified
invoice attending sale of fur stole, was proper party to lay foundation
for
admission of invoice into evidence in prosecution for theft by
deception.
People v. Neary, App.1969, 109 Ill.App.2d 302, 248 N.E.2d 695.
Criminal Law k
444
Permitting testimony of state's two rebuttal witnesses into evidence in
bench
trial prosecution for theft by deception, where witnesses had been
present
during trial and pretrial motion to exclude witnesses had been allowed,
was
not error in absence of showing of prejudice. People v. Neary,
App.1969, 109
Ill.App.2d 302, 248 N.E.2d 695. Criminal Law k 665(4)
Where false pretenses indictment alleged accused caused complaining
witness to
pay mortgage, excluding cross-examination as to what was paid to
discharge
mortgage was prejudicial error. People v. Scowley, 1933, 187 N.E. 415,
353
Ill. 330. False Pretenses k 46
379. ---- Credibility of witness, admissibility of evidence, theft by
deception
In prosecution for fraudulently obtaining heating unit by means of
false
pretenses, testimony by state's reputation witnesses concerning other
litigation involving defendant and attack upon one of witnesses by
defendant
and question by prosecutor as to other cases pending against defendant
were
highly inflammatory and prejudicial. People v. Dee, App.1957, 14
Ill.App.2d
96, 142 N.E.2d 811. Criminal Law k 380; Criminal Law k 706(5);
Criminal Law
k 1169.1(6); Criminal Law k 1171.8(1)
380. ---- Confessions and admissions, admissibility of evidence, theft
by
deception
In prosecution for theft by deception, trial court properly admitted
into
evidence several checks written by defendant on his accounts with bank
and
money market fund which went unpaid when presented because defendant's
accounts with drawee banks had no funds, in view of fact that, although
checks
were not business records, they constituted an admission against
interest and
thus were admissible to prove truth of the matter asserted therein.
People v.
Young, App. 3 Dist.1981, 53 Ill.Dec. 29, 97 Ill.App.3d 187, 423 N.E.2d
221.
Criminal Law k 406(5)
381. ---- Co-defendant's statements, admissibility of evidence, theft
by
deception
In prosecution for theft by deception and conspiracy, any error arising
out of
trial court's admission of certain of codefendant's statements which
implicated defendant was harmless, since such testimony was no more
prejudicial or inculpatory to defendant's cause than numerous other
statements
attributable to defendant and admitted at trial, and in view of
overwhelming
evidence of defendant's guilt. People v. Moore, App. 2 Dist.1978, 22
Ill.Dec.
420, 65 Ill.App.3d 712, 382 N.E.2d 810, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct.
729, 444
U.S. 1043, 62 L.Ed.2d 729. Criminal Law k 1169.7
382. ---- Other offenses, admissibility of evidence, theft by
deception
In prosecution for theft by deception based on defendant's alleged
phone calls
to elderly women pretending to be a relative and asking for money,
evidence
linking defendant to three uncharged telephone scams was admissible to
establish defendant's identity as the caller; calls were all similar in
nature
and used similar tactics, such as asking for money for car repairs.
People v.
Rohlfs, App. 4 Dist.2001, 256 Ill.Dec. 619, 322 Ill.App.3d 965, 752
N.E.2d
499, appeal denied 261 Ill.Dec. 354, 196 Ill.2d 557, 763 N.E.2d 324.
Criminal
Law k 369.15
Any error in admitting evidence of defendant's prior arrest for felony
extortion offense, in prosecution for theft by deception arising from
driveway
repair work done for elderly homeowner, was harmless in light of
overwhelming
evidence of defendant's guilt; more work was done on driveway than
victim
agreed to, defendant filled in his name as payee on victim's checks and
immediately cashed checks, and amount victim paid far exceeded value of
work.
People v. Chapin, App. 3 Dist.1992, 174 Ill.Dec. 38, 233 Ill.App.3d 28,
597
N.E.2d 1250. Criminal Law k 1169.11
In prosecution of defendant charged with obtaining $4,064.50 from state
warrants by filing fraudulent "circuit breaker" tax rebate
applications,
issued pursuant to Senior Citizens and Disabled Persons Property Tax
Relief
Act (ch. 67 1/2 , <paragraph> 401 et seq.), admission into evidence of
other
warrants from which defendant received proceeds, but which were
themselves
time-barred from prosecution, for limited purpose of showing common
scheme,
design, intent, or other similar motives, did not deny defendant due
process,
and no abuse of discretion could be discerned. People v. Peebles, App.
1
Dist.1983, 70 Ill.Dec. 356, 114 Ill.App.3d 684, 449 N.E.2d 230.
Criminal Law
k 369.2(6)
In prosecution for theft by deception arising from alleged fraudulent
scheme
involving sale of tool distributorships by defendants to purchasers,
referred
to as investors, admission of evidence of other transactions of similar
design
was not error, even though defendants contended that similarity
requirement
was defeated because other transactions occurred six to 18 months after
last
date alleged in indictment, different companies were involved, no
direct
connection was made between such companies and instant company and in
two
ventures, unlike instant situation, no refunds were promised. People
v.
Ballard, App. 2 Dist.1978, 22 Ill.Dec. 410, 65 Ill.App.3d 831, 382
N.E.2d 800,
certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 262, 444 U.S. 925, 62 L.Ed.2d 180.
Criminal Law k
369.2(8)
In prosecution for theft by deception, evidence that at least a month
after
defendant allegedly obtained money from prosecuting witness by
deception he on
three occasions obtained money using the same scheme was properly
admitted.
People v. Hill, App.1968, 98 Ill.App.2d 352, 240 N.E.2d 801, certiorari
denied
89 S.Ct. 2150, 395 U.S. 984, 23 L.Ed.2d 773. Criminal Law k 372(9)
383. ---- Prior convictions, admissibility of evidence, theft by
deception
Defendant's prior conviction for theft by deception in operation of
pest
control business was properly before trial court in bench trial and
could be
considered by Appellate Court in support of theft by deception
conviction
relating to operation of pest control business when not limited to that
purpose. People v. Wilson, App. 5 Dist.1986, 96 Ill.Dec. 610, 142
Ill.App.3d
277, 491 N.E.2d 889, appeal denied. Criminal Law k 369.2(3.1);
Criminal Law k
1134(2)
In prosecution for theft by deception and conspiracy, trial court did
not
abuse its discretion in determining that defendant's prior conviction
in
Florida for grand larceny could be used to impeach his testimony if
defendant
testified, since admission of such prior offense directly related to
defendant's veracity, and any similarity between prior offense and
present
charges could have been properly excluded from jury. People v. Moore,
App. 2
Dist.1978, 22 Ill.Dec. 420, 65 Ill.App.3d 712, 382 N.E.2d 810,
certiorari
denied 100 S.Ct. 729, 444 U.S. 1043, 62 L.Ed.2d 729. Witnesses k
337(27)
384. ---- Common plan or scheme, admissibility of evidence, theft by
deception
In prosecution for theft by deception in connection with fraudulent
claim for
workmen's compensation benefits, testimony which tended to show that a
short
time after witness administered a beating to defendant husband to help
falsify
an injury and before husband's claim under Workmen's Compensation Act
(ch. 48,
<paragraph> 138.1 et seq.) had been settled, defendant wife suggested
that
witness participate in fraudulent personal injury claim involving "slip
and
fall" scheme at a grocery store was admissible to show defendant wife's
common
plan or scheme. People v. Wurster, App. 3 Dist.1980, 38 Ill.Dec. 702,
83
Ill.App.3d 399, 403 N.E.2d 1306. Criminal Law k 372(9)
Evidence of other independent but similar transactions whereby
defendant
obtained steel sheets allegedly for his advertising business but
instead sold
the sheets was properly admitted to establish a criminal scheme or
design on
part of defendant charged with theft by deception, theft by
unauthorized
control, and conspiracy. People v. Kamsler, App.1966, 67 Ill.App.2d
33, 214
N.E.2d 562. Criminal Law k 372(5)
385. ---- Cure of error, admissibility of evidence, theft by deception
In prosecution for theft by deception and conspiracy, trial court did
not err
in denying defendant's motion for mistrial based upon testimony of
witness who
alleged that various salesmen, and not specifically defendant, were
making
promises they could not possibly deliver on, since trial court
instructed jury
to disregard such statements as to defendant, and none of limited
evidence was
so prejudicial to defendant as to warrant declaration of mistrial.
People v.
Moore, App. 2 Dist.1978, 22 Ill.Dec. 420, 65 Ill.App.3d 712, 382 N.E.2d
810,
certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 729, 444 U.S. 1043, 62 L.Ed.2d 729.
Criminal Law
k 867
In prosecution for theft by deception, refusal to permit defendant to
present
evidence concerning further attempts at restitution following time when
he was
criminally charged did not constitute reversible error, where defendant
himself had testified to his attempts at restitution and was also
permitted to
testify that he did not possess requisite intent to deprive bank of
funds.
People v. Reans, App. 3 Dist.1974, 20 Ill.App.3d 1005, 313 N.E.2d 184.
Criminal Law k 1170(2)
In prosecution of assistant purchasing agent of corporation for
obtaining
signature to check by false pretenses, admitting invoice from
corporation
represented by defendant to employer as local representative of company
which
sold products to employer by which signing of check was induced, with
memorandum thereon which had been made out of defendant's presence, was
not
prejudicial error, where other testimony to same effect was admitted.
People
v. Gruber, 1935, 200 N.E. 483, 362 Ill. 278. Criminal Law k 1169.10
386. Sufficiency of evidence, theft by deception--In general
Revocation of probation was supported by evidence that probationer
convinced
victim to turn over $25,000 to him for investment by lying about his
personal
achievements and plans for the money. U.S. v. Levine, C.A.7
(Ill.)1993, 983
F.2d 785. Sentencing And Punishment k 2004
Sufficient facts existed to satisfy elements for conviction on charge
of theft
by deception under Illinois law, where defendant provided unqualified
buyers
with cash or money in order to assist buyers in misrepresenting their
qualifications for mortgage guaranteed by United States Department of
Housing
and Urban Development (HUD), defendant knew that those buyers were
unqualified, defendant admitted to intending to defraud and to obtain
money
and property from HUD and lenders, and HUD suffered loss due to default
or
foreclosure on certain properties sold by defendant. Calloway v.
Bartley,
N.D. Ill.2006, 2006 WL 3743727. False Pretenses k 49(4)
Defendant's conviction for theft by deception of an amount exceeding
$100,000
was supported by evidence that defendant, while purporting to act as
broker
for real estate transaction involving land owned by public agency,
knowingly
manipulated purchase price of property to divert $240,000 in funds from
public
agency to defendant, while not substantially changing purchase price
paid by
buyer. People v. Kotlarz, 2000, 250 Ill.Dec. 437, 193 Ill.2d 272, 738
N.E.2d
906. False Pretenses k 49(4)
Evidence supported defendant's conviction for one count each of theft
by
deception and criminal breach of fiduciary duty for each of seven
checks he
received from 78-year-old widow who was in ill health and who intended
checks
to be used to purchase insurance coverage; insurance executive
testified that
his company had no records of applications for insurance or billings
for
insurance renewals that corresponded with checks in question and that
defendant had never been appointed as company's agent, and handwriting
expert
testified that, while widow signed checks in question, defendant filled
in
additional information. People v. Lambert, App. 4 Dist.1990, 141
Ill.Dec.
932, 195 Ill.App.3d 314, 552 N.E.2d 300, appeal denied 144 Ill.Dec.
262, 132
Ill.2d 550, 555 N.E.2d 381. False Pretenses k 49(1); Fraud k 69(5)
Comparison of photographs showing that damage to car was virtually
identical
after alleged motor vehicle accidents, together with testimony
identifying
defendant as individual who represented himself to police officers as
owner of
car, and evidence that one check from one truck rental company was
deposited
in savings account of defendant's wife, was sufficient to sustain theft
convictions arising out of alleged scheme by defendant to obtain money
from
truck rental companies for alleged motor vehicle accidents. People v.
Shaw,
App. 1 Dist.1985, 88 Ill.Dec. 534, 133 Ill.App.3d 391, 478 N.E.2d 1142.
Larceny k 55
Evidence that delivery company owned by defendant was given contracts
to
deliver newspapers, that newspapers were not delivered, that some
newspapers
were seen being discarded, and that other newspapers were sold as scrap
was
sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for theft by deception.
People
v. Muir, App. 3 Dist.1983, 69 Ill.Dec. 773, 113 Ill.App.3d 1096, 448
N.E.2d
233. False Pretenses k 49(1)
Testimony of witness that he was president of corporation was
sufficient to
establish existence of corporation sufficient to secure conviction for
theft
by deception. People v. Puleo, App. 1 Dist.1981, 51 Ill.Dec. 859, 96
Ill.App.3d 457, 421 N.E.2d 367. Criminal Law k 567
Evidence in prosecution for theft by deception established that
complaining
witness, as vice-president of corporation and in behalf of his father
as
president of corporation, had both possession of and possessory
interest in
money given to defendant and that such facts fit within definition of
"owner"
for purposes of theft by deception. People v. Puleo, App. 1 Dist.1981,
51
Ill.Dec. 859, 96 Ill.App.3d 457, 421 N.E.2d 367. False Pretenses k
49(1)
Evidence that defendant received $300 check from complaining witness
for which
defendant promised but failed to deliver a television set was
sufficient to
prove guilt of theft by deception in obtaining control over property of
value
in excess of $150. People v. Leonard, App. 4 Dist.1974, 18 Ill.App.3d
527,
310 N.E.2d 15. False Pretenses k 49(1)
Testimony of car wash cashier that defendant was person who purported
to
represent charities, who arranged to purchase phonograph records and
who
failed to pay for records and evidence that records were taken from car
wash
by man a short time later and that receipt for records prepared by
cashier had
been signed was sufficient to prove defendant guilty of theft from car
wash
beyond reasonable doubt. People v. Cassman, App.1972, 7 Ill.App.3d
786, 288
N.E.2d 667. False Pretenses k 49(1)
In prosecution for theft through deception, evidence that meetings with
investors were held in Illinois and that letter confirming that
defendant was
authorized to act for motel corporation was received by complaining
witnesses'
attorney in Illinois was sufficient to show that substantial element of
crime
charged occurred in Illinois and to warrant prosecution of defendant in
Illinois. People v. Gill, App.1970, 122 Ill.App.2d 60, 257 N.E.2d 115.
Criminal Law k 564(1)
387. ---- Corpus delicti, sufficiency of evidence, theft by deception
Evidence that complaining witnesses gave defendant money because of
their
confidence in his patently fraudulent statements that they would
receive much
larger sums in return sufficiently proved corpus delicti of offense of
obtaining money by means of confidence game. People v. Gipson, 1963,
29
Ill.2d 336, 194 N.E.2d 318. False Pretenses k 49(3)
388. ---- Intent or knowledge, sufficiency of evidence, theft by
deception
In prosecution for theft by deception, evidence was sufficient to prove
that
victim relied upon alleged falsehoods and/or that defendant acted with
specific intent to defraud, where defendant went to used car
dealership,
placed $1800 down payment on automobile, and filled out loan
application, loan
application contained incorrect social security number, driver's
license
number, employer, and insurance carrier, and defendant was given
possession of
car before loan application was processed by finance company. People
v.
Gayton, App. 3 Dist.1997, 228 Ill.Dec. 229, 293 Ill.App.3d 442, 688
N.E.2d
1206, appeal denied 232 Ill.Dec. 454, 177 Ill.2d 576, 698 N.E.2d 545.
False
Pretenses k 49(5)
Trial court's finding that state failed to show that defendant accepted
money
from homeowners promising work which defendant did not intend to
perform, for
purpose of theft charge, collaterally estopped state from retrying
defendant
on charge of home repair fraud, which also required showing of such
intent.
People v. Watts, App. 2 Dist.1996, 217 Ill.Dec. 357, 281 Ill.App.3d
434, 667
N.E.2d 150, appeal allowed 219 Ill.Dec. 575, 168 Ill.2d 621, 671 N.E.2d
742,
affirmed 229 Ill.Dec. 542, 181 Ill.2d 133, 692 N.E.2d 315. Judgment k
751
Evidence supporting defendant's intent to permanently deprive victims
of their
money was not so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to
create
reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt of theft by deception, though
defendant
made interest payments to victims as required by investment agreements,
where
he fraudulently presented himself as licensed investment broker, he did
not
reveal his direct involvement in investment company, and he and his
partner
withdrew victims' investment funds from account shortly after they were
deposited, used funds from account for vacation in Europe, and did not
attempt
to comply with victim's demand for payment, or notify her of investment
company's demise. People v. Morrison, App. 4 Dist.1994, 198 Ill.Dec.
586, 260
Ill.App.3d 775, 633 N.E.2d 48, appeal allowed, vac 203 Ill.Dec. 710,
157
Ill.2d 514, 640 N.E.2d 630. False Pretenses k 49(2)
There was sufficient evidence that defendant acted with intent to
defraud
escrow agent and that he permanently deprived escrow agent of
possessory
interest in money to support his conviction of theft by deception, for
submitting false mechanic's lien waivers and sworn statements to escrow
agent
to obtain disbursement of loan proceeds to contractor. People v.
Moran, App.
2 Dist.1994, 198 Ill.Dec. 504, 260 Ill.App.3d 154, 632 N.E.2d 1115.
False
Pretenses k 49(2)
In defendant's trial for theft by deception, determination that
defendant who
fraudulently entered automobile lease had intent to permanently deprive
owner
of property was supported by evidence that when defendant concealed her
true
identity and credit history by providing false name and credit
information,
she effectively concealed vehicle from owner, that lease agreement was
voidable and defendant did not acquire any rights under agreement, and
that
defendant was in violation of lease agreement's terms from its
inception.
People v. Veasey, App. 2 Dist.1993, 190 Ill.Dec. 929, 251 Ill.App.3d
589, 622
N.E.2d 1246. False Pretenses k 49(2)
Defendant's failure to perform on contract is not proof of "specific
intent to
defraud," such as will support theft by deception conviction. People
v.
Reich, App. 3 Dist.1993, 182 Ill.Dec. 700, 241 Ill.App.3d 666, 610
N.E.2d 124.
False Pretenses k 49(2)
Impractical methods and substandard equipment used by builder in
constructing
home's foundation was not sufficient to show that he entered into
construction
contract with no intent to perform, but merely to deprive complainant
of money
by deception, where builder was not experienced home builder, and may
have
used substandard equipment solely in attempt to complete contract for
contract
price, which was less than half that quoted by other builders. People
v.
Reich, App. 3 Dist.1993, 182 Ill.Dec. 700, 241 Ill.App.3d 666, 610
N.E.2d 124.
False Pretenses k 49(2)
Proof of intent to defraud, such as will support theft by deception
conviction, cannot be based merely on supposition, guess or conjecture.
People v. Reich, App. 3 Dist.1993, 182 Ill.Dec. 700, 241 Ill.App.3d
666, 610
N.E.2d 124. False Pretenses k 49(2)
Evidence was sufficient to support conviction for theft by deception;
defendant's conduct between time he made contract to remove tree and
was
arrested demonstrated that he had no intention of removing tree.
People v.
Riner, App. 4 Dist.1992, 175 Ill.Dec. 850, 234 Ill.App.3d 733, 600
N.E.2d 1308
. False Pretenses k 49(2)
Finding that self-styled real estate developer had taken customers'
down
payments with no intent of constructing homes was sufficiently
supported by
evidence presented on theft by deception charges, including evidence
that
developer had accepted down payments on lots which he did not own and
for
which purchase negotiations were clearly dead. People v. McManus, App.
2
Dist.1990, 144 Ill.Dec. 272, 197 Ill.App.3d 1085, 555 N.E.2d 391,
appeal
denied 149 Ill.Dec. 331, 133 Ill.2d 566, 561 N.E.2d 701. False
Pretenses k
49(2)
Evidence supported defendant's conviction for theft by deception of
elderly
couple from whom he obtained $10,000 check, purportedly for investment
purposes, even though defendant contended that only payment due couple
under
parties' agreement was actually made on time; payment was made only
after
defendant became aware of investigation into his dealings with couple,
couple
never received prospectus or literature concerning company in which
they
invested, and defendant attempted to both rewrite parties' agreement
and to
recharacterize agreement as loan. People v. Lambert, App. 4 Dist.1990,
141
Ill.Dec. 932, 195 Ill.App.3d 314, 552 N.E.2d 300, appeal denied 144
Ill.Dec.
262, 132 Ill.2d 550, 555 N.E.2d 381. False Pretenses k 49(1)
Evidence supported defendant's conviction for theft by deception of
76-year-old widow whom he befriended and from whom he obtained checks
totaling
$43,000 for purported investments, notwithstanding defendant's
contention that
his failure to return money to dissatisfied investors such as widow was
not
necessarily proof of specific intent to defraud; one check was for
investment
in pay phones that widow never saw, and defendant did not give widow
receipt
for two other checks or any type of agreement concerning them or
annuity they
were intended to fund. People v. Lambert, App. 4 Dist.1990, 141
Ill.Dec. 932,
195 Ill.App.3d 314, 552 N.E.2d 300, appeal denied 144 Ill.Dec. 262, 132
Ill.2d
550, 555 N.E.2d 381. False Pretenses k 49(2)
Conviction of felony theft by deception was supported by evidence that
defendant represented himself as accountant and solicited business as
client,
deposited checks intended for payment of business' tax obligations in
the
account of another client, and represented to business owner that
delinquent
tax notices he received were sent as result of bureaucratic foul-up.
People
v. Lighthall, App. 2 Dist.1988, 125 Ill.Dec. 163, 175 Ill.App.3d 700,
530
N.E.2d 81, appeal denied 129 Ill.Dec. 153, 124 Ill.2d 559, 535 N.E.2d
918.
False Pretenses k 4
Evidence was sufficient to support finding of defendant's intent to
deceive
for purposes of theft by deception conviction relating to operation of
pest
control business, even though he did not inspect homes and did not tell
homeowners that evidence of termites had been found, but merely
negotiated and
effected execution of service contracts; evidence included defendant's
prior
theft by deception conviction relating to pest control, knowing
participation
in offenses in question, and illegal practice of having customers sign
waivers
of notice of cancellation rights. People v. Wilson, App. 5 Dist.1986,
96
Ill.Dec. 610, 142 Ill.App.3d 277, 491 N.E.2d 889, appeal denied. False
Pretenses k 49(2)
Evidence was sufficient to prove that at time defendant informed victim
he had
purchased bonds with her money, he in fact intended to transfer the
interest
in that money by utilizing it to salvage his business, thereby
supporting
conclusion that he obtained control over victim's property with intent
to
sell, give or otherwise transfer any interest in the property, thus
supporting
his conviction of theft by deception, notwithstanding that he may have
intended to repay the money at some future time. People v. Morrissey,
App. 3
Dist.1985, 89 Ill.Dec. 232, 133 Ill.App.3d 1069, 479 N.E.2d 1238.
False
Pretenses k 49(1)
Charges of theft by deception, which were based on allegations that
defendant
obtained money from church officials after telling them he needed the
money to
pay outstanding debt to the "mob" and thus avoid injury to himself and
his
wife and child, could not be sustained where State failed to establish
that
defendant's statements were false and where State failed to prove that
the
defendant intended to permanently deprive the owners of their money.
People
v. Jensen, App. 3 Dist.1982, 59 Ill.Dec. 219, 103 Ill.App.3d 451, 431
N.E.2d
720. False Pretenses k 49(2); False Pretenses k 49(4)
Evidence did not show any intent of dealer to cheat or defraud buyer,
who was
satisfied with automobile delivered to her as new automobile and
refused to
accept another new automobile in lieu thereof when it was disclosed
that
automobile delivered to her had previously been furnished to a church
for
raffle, but never titled to church or raffle winner, who had returned
it to
dealer in exchange for cost price thereof paid by church, and such
evidence
would not support charge that dealer sold and delivered second hand
automobile
as a new automobile with intent to cheat and defraud buyer. People v.
Nickey
Chevrolet Sales, Inc., App.1963, 41 Ill.App.2d 50, 190 N.E.2d 154.
False
Pretenses k 49(2)
389. ---- Knowledge, sufficiency of evidence, theft by deception
Evidence supported conclusion that defendant had committed theft by
deception;
defendant had been given $5,000 by park district board with which to
pay for
repair work on district building, and defendant had immediately
converted
check to his own purposes and made only token pretext of fulfilling
contract
by briefly speaking to two contractors regarding an estimate for work.
People
v. Wheadon, App. 5 Dist.1989, 138 Ill.Dec. 64, 190 Ill.App.3d 735, 546
N.E.2d
1119, appeal denied 140 Ill.Dec. 680, 129 Ill.2d 571, 550 N.E.2d 565.
False
Pretenses k 49(1)
In prosecution for deceptive practices and theft by deception, evidence
that
defendant gave two checks to open trading account with commodities
corporation
and to begin immediate trading, that his account did not even
approximate
amount of either check, that defendant knew his account to be grossly
insufficient, and that he stopped payment on checks immediately after
trading
losses was sufficient to sustain conviction. People v. Brenner, App. 1
Dist.1985, 90 Ill.Dec. 577, 135 Ill.App.3d 877, 482 N.E.2d 396, appeal
denied.
False Pretenses k 49(1)
Testimony of State's witnesses, from which jury could have inferred
that
defendant knowingly obtained control over diesel fuel by deception, was
not so
implausible as to justify reversal of conviction without remand.
People v.
Bovio, App. 2 Dist.1983, 74 Ill.Dec. 400, 118 Ill.App.3d 836, 455
N.E.2d 829.
Criminal Law k 1159.2(10)
In prosecution for theft by deception arising from alleged fraudulent
scheme
involving sale of tool distributorships by defendants to purchasers,
referred
to as investors, there was sufficient evidence to infer that failure of
defendants' enterprise came not from overenthusiasm or business
"naivete," but
that defendants never intended to fulfil their promises to investors to
furnish locations in high-volume retail outlets to place tools and
other
merchandise, to furnish tools and other merchandise of same high
quality which
they had demonstrated to investors and to refund investment within one
year if
investors desired to cancel. People v. Ballard, App. 2 Dist.1978, 22
Ill.Dec.
410, 65 Ill.App.3d 831, 382 N.E.2d 800, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct.
262, 444
U.S. 925, 62 L.Ed.2d 180. False Pretenses k 49(2)
In prosecution for theft by deception, evidence justified jury's
conclusion
that defendant had been an integral part of a scheme to defraud the
unwary by
inducing them through promises of marketing experts and high traffic
locations
to invest in an enterprise controlled by the defendant which he knew
was
doomed to failure. People v. Friedman, App. 2 Dist.1978, 22 Ill.Dec.
364, 65
Ill.App.3d 613, 382 N.E.2d 684, affirmed 38 Ill.Dec. 141, 79 Ill.2d
341, 403
N.E.2d 229.
False Pretenses k 49(1)
In prosecution for theft by deception, evidence that defendant tendered
a
check knowingly without having funds on deposit and evidence of a prior
course
of conduct concerning other bad checks was sufficient for jury to find
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Reans, App. 3
Dist.1974, 20 Ill.App.3d 1005, 313 N.E.2d 184. False Pretenses k 49(3)
Evidence in prosecution for theft by deception of more than $150 was
sufficient to show that defendant through whose agency policies were
sold knew
of the nonexistence of the insurance company named on the policies and
that
defendant participated in ordering the printing of the policies.
People v.
Decker, App. 1 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 86, 311 N.E.2d 228. False
Pretenses k
49(4)
Evidence that defendant wrote a bad check in her friend's name knowing
that
there was no bank account to cover it was sufficient to sustain
conviction for
theft by deception. People v. Jones, App.1972, 4 Ill.App.3d 927, 282
N.E.2d
283. False Pretenses k 49(1)
Evidence that defendant had carried on the business of a horse-dealer,
for
years, in the city, generally at stables in the rear of houses, making
his
business known by advertisements in the papers, as in this instance;
that,
led by such advertisement, representing the horse in question to be "a
real
nice driving-horse," very fast, the property of a lady, with other
statements
afterwards proving untrue, the purchaser went to the place, where
defendant
made substantially the same representations, and also that the horse
was a
good one, and had always worked for him, none of the statements being
made as
on information, and all being untrue, and the horse almost worthless,-sufficiently shows defendant's knowledge of their falsity, and, added
to the
fact that defendant knew the purchaser was ignorant of the diseases of
horses,
and trusted to his statements, justify a verdict of guilty. Jackson v.
People, 1888, 18 N.E. 286, 126 Ill. 139. False Pretenses k 49(1)
390. ---- Identification, sufficiency of evidence, theft by deception
Trial court in prosecution for theft by deception did not abuse its
discretion
in finding that identification of stolen property was sufficient where
complaining witnesses corroborated each other and no contrary evidence
was
presented. People v. Puleo, App. 1 Dist.1981, 51 Ill.Dec. 859, 96
Ill.App.3d
457, 421 N.E.2d 367. Criminal Law k 566
Evidence, in prosecution for theft, was sufficient as to identification
of
defendant as participant in scheme under which money was obtained from
victim
by use of deception. People v. McGill, App.1970, 121 Ill.App.2d 423,
257
N.E.2d 517. Criminal Law k 566
391. ---- False pretenses, sufficiency of evidence, theft by deception
Evidence sustained theft by deception conviction of defendant who used
false
driver's license and social security card in obtaining fur stole owned
by fur
rental corporation under pretext of acting on behalf of another.
People v.
Neary, App.1969, 109 Ill.App.2d 302, 248 N.E.2d 695. False Pretenses k
49(1)
Evidence that defendant initially represented himself to be husband of
party
who allegedly ordered merchandise and when truck driver refused to
leave
merchandise defendant brought his wife back to building and that after
merchandise was left defendant ran to garage behind building and
attempted to
hide under automobile was not so unsatisfactory as to raise reasonable
doubt
of defendant's guilt of crime of obtaining by deception property of
another.
People v. Wilson, App.1967, 84 Ill.App.2d 269, 228 N.E.2d 131. False
Pretenses k 49(1)
392. ---- Circumstantial evidence, sufficiency of evidence, theft by
deception
Circumstances surrounding defendant's actions in allegedly obtaining
fur stole
from rental corporation by using false driver's license and social
security
card and in pretending to act on behalf of another warranted inference
of
guilty knowledge and intention permanently to deprive corporation of
the
stole. People v. Neary, App.1969, 109 Ill.App.2d 302, 248 N.E.2d 695.
False
Pretenses k 49(2)
Specific intent to defraud need not be proved by direct evidence, but
may be
proved by facts and circumstances. People v. Blume, 1931, 178 N.E. 48,
345
Ill. 524. False Pretenses k 49(2)
393. ---- Reasonable doubt, sufficiency of evidence, theft by
deception
Evidence that defendant failed to correct false impression with
Department of
Public Aid that he earned less money than reported and that he was not
separated from his wife, and that defendant and his wife coindorsed
public aid
checks, was sufficient to allow jury to find that defendant was guilty
of
theft by deception beyond a reasonable doubt, despite defendant's claim
that
no evidence was adduced to show that he acted as a principal in the
deception.
People v. Peebles, App. 1 Dist.1984, 80 Ill.Dec. 427, 125 Ill.App.3d
213, 465
N.E.2d 539. False Pretenses k 49(1)
In prosecution for theft by deception, evidence that replacement
windows
dealer failed to order windows for customers and made false statements
to
customers explaining delays in ordering windows failed to establish
guilt
beyond all reasonable doubt. People v. Rolston, App. 3 Dist.1983, 70
Ill.Dec.
87, 113 Ill.App.3d 727, 448 N.E.2d 965. False Pretenses k 49(1)
Testimony of complaining witnesses in prosecution for theft by
deception that
money was given to defendant and not returned by him and that defendant
promised to return money, returned part of money, and told witness that
he
would "like to pay you back all of the money that I took from you" was
not so
improbable as to reach level of doubt requiring that defendant's
conviction be
set aside. People v. Puleo, App. 1 Dist.1981, 51 Ill.Dec. 859, 96
Ill.App.3d
457, 421 N.E.2d 367. False Pretenses k 49(1)
In prosecution for theft by deception, defendant was proved guilty
beyond
reasonable doubt by State's evidence consisting of testimony of food
store's
security guard that defendant, after removing smoked hams from shelf,
placed
them in his wife's purse, then picked up and placed in his shopping
cart a
carton of pop and wheeled cart to checkout line to pay for pop, while
his wife
left store with hams in her purse. People v. Johnson, App. 1
Dist.1978, 17
Ill.Dec. 115, 59 Ill.App.3d 115, 376 N.E.2d 8. Larceny k 55
394. ---- Conflicting evidence, sufficiency of evidence, theft by
deception
Grave inconsistencies in state's case made evidence insufficient to
support
convictions of Department of Rehabilitation Services (DORS) counselor
for
theft by deception and official misconduct in connection with
counselor's
alleged receipt of money from purported sale of state equipment and
compressor
for use by counselor's client; state failed to explain how counselor
could
sell compressor when it could not have been in existence, and state
failed to
establish any connection between checks received by counselor and
agreement
stating DORS was paying half cost of compressor and equipment. People
v.
Jones, App. 4 Dist.1993, 186 Ill.Dec. 313, 246 Ill.App.3d 339, 615
N.E.2d
1370, appeal denied 191 Ill.Dec. 624, 153 Ill.2d 565, 624 N.E.2d 812.
False
Pretenses k 49(1); States k 81
In prosecution for theft by deception, fact that evidence of state and
defendant was in conflict did not in and of itself as matter of law
raise
reasonable doubt as to guilt. People v. Reans, App. 3 Dist.1974, 20
Ill.App.3d 1005, 313 N.E.2d 184. False Pretenses k 49(1)
395. Fact questions, theft by deception--In general
In prosecution for obtaining by deception control over property of
another,
proof of elements of crime was for jury to determine. People v.
Wilson,
App.1967, 84 Ill.App.2d 269, 228 N.E.2d 131. False Pretenses k 51
396. ---- Intent, fact questions, theft by deception
Whether defendant acts with specific intent to defraud, within meaning
of
theft by deception statute, is question of fact which may be
established by
circumstantial evidence. People v. Reich, App. 3 Dist.1993, 182
Ill.Dec. 700,
241 Ill.App.3d 666, 610 N.E.2d 124. False Pretenses k 49(2); False
Pretenses
k 51
For purposes of theft by deception prosecution, whether specific intent
to
defraud exists is question of fact and does not have to be proved by
direct
evidence. People v. Lighthall, App. 2 Dist.1988, 125 Ill.Dec. 163, 175
Ill.App.3d 700, 530 N.E.2d 81, appeal denied 129 Ill.Dec. 153, 124
Ill.2d 559,
535 N.E.2d 918. False Pretenses k 49(1); False Pretenses k 51
In prosecution for theft by deception, whether specific intent to
defraud
exists is question of fact which does not have to be proved by direct
evidence; direct evidence of specific intent is rarely available, so
circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to sustain conviction.
People v.
Rolston, App. 3 Dist.1983, 70 Ill.Dec. 87, 113 Ill.App.3d 727, 448
N.E.2d 965.
False Pretenses k 49(2)
In prosecution for theft by deception concerning defendant's alleged
tender of
bad check, right to believe or disbelieve contentions of defendant as
to
existence of requisite felonious intent was prerogative of jury.
People v.
Reans, App. 3 Dist.1974, 20 Ill.App.3d 1005, 313 N.E.2d 184. False
Pretenses
k 51
397. ---- Credibility of witnesses, fact questions, theft by deception
Contradictory testimony by employee of fur rental corporation from
which
defendant obtained fur stole by use of false driver's license and false
social
security card that all writing on reverse side of order blank was
placed there
by employee and that defendant signed a name on that side of exhibit
was
matter of credibility to be determined by trier of fact in prosecution
for
theft by deception. People v. Neary, App.1969, 109 Ill.App.2d 302, 248
N.E.2d
695. Criminal Law k 742(1)
Whether impression was created that witness-employee of fur rental
corporation
from which defendant obtained fur stole by using false driver's license
and
social security card was still an employee of fur rental corporation at
time
of trial and what effect, if any, it had upon credibility of witnesses
was
question for trier of fact to determine. People v. Neary, App.1969,
109
Ill.App.2d 302, 248 N.E.2d 695. Criminal Law k 742(1)
398. Instructions, theft by deception--In general
Trial court's failure to read entire indictment charging defendant with
111
counts of theft by deception and one count of conspiracy to jury did
not
violate defendant's due process rights where other charges were
duplicative of
five basic counts which were read to jury and where jury was instructed
by
trial court as to elements of the offense for which defendant was
convicted.
People v. Peebles, App. 1 Dist.1984, 80 Ill.Dec. 427, 125 Ill.App.3d
213, 465
N.E.2d 539. Constitutional Law k 268(11)
An instruction, in a prosecution for obtaining money by false
pretenses, which
embraces all the false representations alleged in the indictment, and
requires
proof, in order to authorize a conviction, that they were false, and
known to
be so by the defendant, and made for the purpose of obtaining money and
operating as the efficient cause thereof, is not erroneous as
authorizing
conviction by proof of the falsity of immaterial statements. Moore v.
People,
1901, 60 N.E. 535, 190 Ill. 331. False Pretenses k 52
Where the evidence shows that the swindling was done by means of a
trick at
cards, and that the victim, by means of false representations in regard
to the
uses of such cards, was induced to take an interest therein, it is
proper to
charge that if defendant, by false representation and encouragement,
induced
the victim to part with his money, he should be found guilty. Maxwell
v.
People, 1895, 41 N.E. 995, 158 Ill. 248. False Pretenses k 17
399. ---- Definitions, instructions, theft by deception
Two statutory definitions of "deception" were sufficiently similar to
common
usage of term so as to allay any fear of jury confusion regarding type
of
conduct which would constitute deception, and thus, trial court, in
prosecution for theft by deception, did not abuse its discretion in
declining
to instruct jury on various definitions of term deception. People v.
Peebles,
App. 1 Dist.1984, 80 Ill.Dec. 427, 125 Ill.App.3d 213, 465 N.E.2d 539.
Criminal Law k 772(2)
400. ---- Control, instructions, theft by deception
In prosecution for felony theft arising out of incident in which
defendant
allegedly obtained "unauthorized control" over property of another by
making
purchase at auction without intending to pay and taking goods without
so
paying, any error was favorable to defendant in instruction, given by
trial
court on its own motion, that defendant was not guilty if defendant did
not
obtain control over goods in question or if defendant did obtain
control over
such goods but, at time defendant obtained such control, title to such
goods
had passed to defendant. People v. Muskgrave, App. 4 Dist.1978, 18
Ill.Dec.
306, 60 Ill.App.3d 742, 377 N.E.2d 595. Criminal Law k 1172.1(3)
401. ---- Intent, instructions, theft by deception
In prosecution for obtaining note by false pretenses, instruction
purporting
to state hypothetically the facts which, if believed, by the jury from
the
evidence would warrant a conviction, but omitting the essential element
of
intent to cheat and defraud was reversible error. Gregg v. People,
1902, 98
Ill.App. 170.
402. ---- Value, instructions, theft by deception
Where an instruction required that the jury find that prosecuting
witness was
"cheated and swindled," it sufficiently required a finding that the
stock sold
to witness was not worth the amount paid for it. People v. Donaldson,
1912,
99 N.E. 62, 255 Ill. 19, Am.Ann.Cas. 1913D,90. False Pretenses k 52
403. ---- Reasonable doubt, instructions, theft by deception
Where defendant charged, with theft by deception did not testify or
offer any
defense as to a separate theory, and opposing theories of guilt and
innocence
were not presented, defendant's tendered instruction that if
conclusions of
innocence and guilt can reasonably be drawn the jury should adopt the
one of
innocence was properly refused. People v. Decker, App. 1 Dist.1974, 19
Ill.App.3d 86, 311 N.E.2d 228. Criminal Law k 814(13)
404. ---- Circumstantial evidence, instructions, theft by deception
In prosecution for theft by deception, refusal to give as requested
second
paragraph of circumstantial evidence instruction that "You should not
find the
defendant guilty unless the facts and circumstances proved exclude
every
reasonable theory of innocence" was proper, since proof by prosecution
was not
entirely circumstantial. People v. Reans, App. 3 Dist.1974, 20
Ill.App.3d
1005, 313 N.E.2d 184. Criminal Law k 814(17)
Inasmuch as evidence in prosecution for theft by deception was not
entirely
circumstantial, defendant's tendered instruction on circumstantial
evidence
was properly refused. People v. Decker, App. 1 Dist.1974, 19
Ill.App.3d 86,
311 N.E.2d 228. Criminal Law k 814(17)
405. ---- Limiting instructions, theft by deception
Where all the matters on which a prosecution for obtaining money by
false
pretenses is predicated are admitted by all parties to have occurred on
a
certain date, an instruction limiting the jury to what occurred on that
date
is not erroneous. Moore v. People, 1901, 60 N.E. 535, 190 Ill. 331.
False
Pretenses k 52
405.5. Verdicts, theft by deception
Separate guilty verdicts arising from single incident under indictments
that
charged both defendants with alternative forms of theft by exerting
unauthorized control over property and by obtaining control over
property
under circumstances that would reasonably induce them to believe that
property
was stolen were not legally inconsistent; if defendants were actual
thieves
and exerted unauthorized control over property with intent to deprive
owners
of property, they would have had reason to believe that items they
obtained
unauthorized control over were stolen. People v. Price, 2006, 302
Ill.Dec.
762, 221 Ill.2d 182, 850 N.E.2d 199. Criminal Law k 878(4)
406. Sentencing, theft by deception--In general
Evidence that defendant was primary force responsible for theft by
deception
sustained sentence of three years' imprisonment. People v. Muir, App.
3
Dist.1983, 69 Ill.Dec. 773, 113 Ill.App.3d 1096, 448 N.E.2d 233. False
Pretenses k 54
Amendment which raised value demarcation in order for theft to be a
felony to
$300 had effect of mitigating the punishment for theft, and under ch.
1,
<paragraph> 1103 which requires that if any penalty, forfeiture or
punishment
is mitigated by any provision of a new law, provision may with consent
of
party affected be applied to any judgment pronounced after new law
takes
effect, the amendment could, by consent of defendant, be applied to his
sentence for theft by deception which was pronounced after the
amendment took
effect. People v. Palmore, App. 2 Dist.1983, 68 Ill.Dec. 740, 113
Ill.App.3d
926, 446 N.E.2d 911. Larceny k 2
It was necessary to vacate jail sentence for felony theft by deception
where
it appeared from the trial judge's statement that he relied to some
extent on
a custom or practice which did not appear of record and which might
have
precluded his full consideration of all sentencing alternatives,
including
probation without imprisonment. People v. Shook, App. 5 Dist.1980, 41
Ill.Dec. 478, 86 Ill.App.3d 174, 407 N.E.2d 976. Sentencing And
Punishment k
1890
Judgment adjudging defendant guilty of obtaining money by means of
false
pretenses with intent to cheat and defraud was improper under
information
charging defendant with violation of act punishing the making, drawing,
uttering, or delivering of checks, drafts, or orders for payment of
money with
intent to defraud, since defendant cannot be lawfully sentenced for
offense
not charged in information. People v. Dannies, App.1936, 5 N.E.2d 596,
287
Ill.App. 634. Criminal Law k 995(3)
In prosecution for obtaining signature to check by false pretenses,
judgment
sentencing defendant to pay fine of $10 and to serve 1 year in house of
correction on each of 15 counts of indictment, with sentences under
first 7
counts to run concurrently, and sentences under last 8 counts to run
concurrently commencing at expiration of those on first 7 counts, was
not
invalid as indefinite. People v. Gruber, 1935, 200 N.E. 483, 362 Ill.
278.
Sentencing And Punishment k 1129
407. ---- Indeterminate sentence, sentencing, theft by deception
Sentence of two to six years for theft by deception was reasonable in
light of
defendant's substantial criminal record which disclosed convictions of
at
least four felonies. People v. Treadway, App.1972, 7 Ill.App.3d 141,
287
N.E.2d 23. False Pretenses k 54
Sentence of two to seven years, for theft exceeding $150 based on
scheme of
approaching a businessman, showing him samples of telephone book covers
which
were to be placed in local hotel or motel and collecting $221 down
payment for
advertising space without producing any covers, would not be reduced on
appeal. People v. McCullough, App.1972, 5 Ill.App.3d 796, 283 N.E.2d
926.
False Pretenses k 54
408. ---- Consecutive sentences, sentencing, theft by deception
Defendant was not unconstitutionally sentenced in violation of
Apprendi, where
penalty for each individual crime was not increased, but rather,
defendant was
given consecutive sentences for convictions for theft and for failure
to
register as a professional fund raiser. People v. Knippenberg, App. 3
Dist.2001, 258 Ill.Dec. 978, 325 Ill.App.3d 251, 757 N.E.2d 667.
Sentencing
And Punishment k 571
Post-trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the
propriety
of defendant's sentence, where Apprendi was not decided until after
defendant
was sentenced, so counsel could not have anticipated change in law,
and, in
any event, defendant was properly sentenced to consecutive terms of
imprisonment for theft and for failure to register as a professional
fund
raiser. People v. Knippenberg, App. 3 Dist.2001, 258 Ill.Dec. 978, 325
Ill.App.3d 251, 757 N.E.2d 667. Criminal Law k 641.13(7)
Consecutive four-year terms for two theft convictions involving alleged
scheme
to obtain money from truck rental companies for alleged motor vehicle
accidents was not an abuse of discretion, since the two alleged
accidents did
not constitute a single course of conduct, testimony during sentencing
hearing
indicated that defendant was involved in numerous other incidents of
the same
type of financial fraud, and trial court expressed opinion that
defendant was
public nuisance and danger to society. People v. Shaw, App. 1
Dist.1985, 88
Ill.Dec. 534, 133 Ill.App.3d 391, 478 N.E.2d 1142.
Larceny k 88
Imposition of three years and four month to ten-year sentence for theft
by
deception, to run consecutively with prior five-year sentence for
unrelated
felony theft conviction was not an abuse of discretion, in light of
trial
court's statements that defendant was a mature adult when he engaged in
calculated cheating which was of considerable harm to taxpaying public
and
that severe sentence was needed to deter others who might be tempted to
engage
in similar conduct. People v. Peebles, App. 1 Dist.1984, 80 Ill.Dec.
427, 125
Ill.App.3d 213, 465 N.E.2d 539. Sentencing And Punishment k 586
Paragraph 1005-8-4 of former chapter 38 as it read prior to 1974
amendment
providing that aggregate maximum of consecutive sentence shall not
exceed
twice maximum term authorized for most serious felony and that
aggregate
minimum shall not exceed twice lowest minimum term authorized for most
serious
felony was inapplicable to sentence to indeterminate term of three
years and
four months to ten years for theft by deception, to be served
consecutively
with a prior five-year determinate sentence for unrelated felony theft
conviction, since such statute is applicable only to indeterminate
sentences.
People v. Peebles, App. 1 Dist.1984, 80 Ill.Dec. 427, 125 Ill.App.3d
213, 465
N.E.2d 539. Sentencing And Punishment k 1132
409. ---- Aggravation and mitigation, sentencing, theft by deception
Evidence adduced at hearing in aggravation and mitigation, in addition
to
probation officer's report, indicated that denial of probation on
conviction
for theft by deception in obtaining control over property of value in
excess
of $150 was not an abuse of discretion. People v. Leonard, App. 4
Dist.1974,
18 Ill.App.3d 527, 310 N.E.2d 15. Sentencing And Punishment k 1856
410. ---- Probation, sentencing, theft by deception
Where person convicted of theft had apparently made personal and social
adjustment to society except for the charged acts of defrauding state,
had
readily agreed to make monetary restitution to the state, was truly
repentant
and sincere in her plea to be given another chance, and was capable of
holding
responsible job, denial of application for probation was reversed and
probation granted without condition of incarceration. People v.
McClendon,
App.1970, 130 Ill.App.2d 852, 265 N.E.2d 207. Sentencing And
Punishment k
1870; Sentencing And Punishment k 1975(1)
411. ---- Restitution, sentencing, theft by deception
In prosecution for theft by deception in connection with fraudulent
claim for
workmen's compensation benefits, trial court did not abuse its
discretion in
ordering that restitution be made by defendant to victim employer.
People v.
Wurster, App. 3 Dist.1980, 38 Ill.Dec. 702, 83 Ill.App.3d 399, 403
N.E.2d 1306
. Sentencing And Punishment k 2121
412. ---- Excessive punishment, sentencing, theft by deception
Petitioner's 10-year sentences on convictions of theft by deception
that were
extended based on aggravating factor that victims were 60 years old or
older
exceeded maximum seven-year sentence for greater similar offense and
thus,
sentences were disproportionate under state Constitution and extended
term was
void. People v. Tooley, App. 3 Dist.2002, 262 Ill.Dec. 685, 328
Ill.App.3d
418, 766 N.E.2d 305, appeal denied 271 Ill.Dec. 940, 201 Ill.2d 608,
786
N.E.2d 198. False Pretenses k 54; Sentencing And Punishment k 38
Given magnitude and seriousness of offense, sentences of two to eight
years'
imprisonment for crime of theft by deception was not excessive, even
though
neither defendant, who each applied for probation, had any prior
offenses.
People v. Ballard, App. 2 Dist.1978, 22 Ill.Dec. 410, 65 Ill.App.3d
831, 382
N.E.2d 800, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 262, 444 U.S. 925, 62 L.Ed.2d
180.
False Pretenses k 54
Sentence of two to ten years on conviction for theft by deception in
obtaining
control over property of value in excess of $150 was not unduly harsh.
People
v. Leonard, App. 4 Dist.1974, 18 Ill.App.3d 527, 310 N.E.2d 15. False
Pretenses k 54
Sentence of from two to ten years for theft by deception was not
excessive
where defendant had previously served period of 38 months for breaking
and
entering, had violated probation and was returned to penitentiary and
completed sentence. People v. McClain, App.1972, 6 Ill.App.3d 451, 285
N.E.2d
239. False Pretenses k 54
Recognizing facts for what they were, that is a minor incident
involving two
unfortunate individuals endeavoring to lead their lives with limited
capacities, sentence of not less than one nor more than five years for
theft
by deception, based on proof that defendant had obtained control of two
dollars worth of ice crean and $8 in change from a bad check, was
excessive
and sentence was reduced to the time served. People v. Jones,
App.1972, 4
Ill.App.3d 927, 282 N.E.2d 283. Criminal Law k 1183
Sentence of from two to six years in penitentiary, for theft of metal
which
defendant allegedly ordered but did not pay for, was not unduly harsh,
in view
of his prior conviction of similar crime and evidence in regard to
scheme to
defraud innocent merchants. People v. Kamsler, App.1966, 78 Ill.App.2d
349,
223 N.E.2d 237. False Pretenses k 54
Theft by deception of $20,000 from victim over age 60 did not require
elements
identical to unauthorized theft of $20,000 from victim over age 60, and
thus,
penalty of seven to fourteen years for unauthorized theft was not
unconstitutionally disproportionate to penalty of three to seven years
for
theft by deception, where unauthorized theft did not require proof that
property was obtained by deception. People v. Graves, 2003, 279
Ill.Dec. 502,
207 Ill.2d 478, 800 N.E.2d 790, rehearing denied. Larceny k 2;
Sentencing And
Punishment k 1498
413. Review, theft by deception
Determination made by state appellate court, that petitioner's plea
agreement
supported prior theft by deception conviction, and hence extended
sentence
could be imposed for his subsequent voluntary manslaughter conviction,
was not
contrary to, or unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent
under
Apprendi, which stated that any fact that increased penalty for crime
beyond
prescribed statutory maximum, other than fact of prior conviction, had
to be
submitted to jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt; thus, petitioner
was not
entitled to federal habeas relief. Calloway v. Bartley, N.D. Ill.2006,
2006
WL 3743727. Habeas Corpus k 509(2)
Defendant could not maintain on appeal that trial court had duty to
make sure
that jury had been informed of each of 111 counts of theft by deception
and
one count of conspiracy with which he had been charged where defense
counsel
chose to read to jury only the five basic counts with which defendant
had been
charged, conceding that the balance of the counts were duplicative.
People v.
Peebles, App. 1 Dist.1984, 80 Ill.Dec. 427, 125 Ill.App.3d 213, 465
N.E.2d 539
. Criminal Law k 1137(3)
Record disclosed that court did not give credence to material elements
of
state's case, but did give credence to defendant's testimony as to
matters
which would tend to disprove commission by defendant of crime of theft
of
automobile by deception, requiring reversal of judgment of conviction.
People
v. Brown, App.1966, 73 Ill.App.2d 448, 220 N.E.2d 92. Criminal Law k
260.11(6)
V. MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT
<Subdivision Index>
Accountability 443
Admissibility of evidence 449-456
Admissibility of evidence
Admissibility of evidence
Admissibility of evidence
Admissibility of evidence
Admissibility of evidence
Admissibility of evidence
-
In general 449
Character of accused 453
Condition of vehicle 454
Confessions and admissions 452
Exhibits 455
Identification 450
Admissibility of evidence - Intent 451
Admissibility of evidence - Other crimes 456
Admissions, admissibility of evidence 452
Aggravation and mitigation, sentencing 490
Character of accused, admissibility of evidence 453
Circumstantial evidence, instructions 479
Circumstantial evidence, sufficiency of evidence 472
Condition of vehicle, admissibility of evidence 454
Confessions and admissions, admissibility of evidence 452
Conflicting evidence, sufficiency of evidence 473
Consent, sufficiency of evidence 463
Control, sufficiency of evidence 464
Credibility of witnesses 480
Criminal trespass to vehicle 442
Cross examination 457
Deprivation of use or benefit, instructions 476
Description of property, indictment 447
Elements of offense 441
Evidence, admissibility of 449-456
Evidence, sufficiency of 458-474
Excessive punishment, sentencing 492
Exclusive possession, sufficiency of evidence 467
Exhibits, admissibility of evidence 455
Fact questions 481, 482
Fact questions - In general 481
Fact questions - Intent 482
Flight, sufficiency of evidence 469
Identification, admissibility of evidence 450
Identification, sufficiency of evidence 465
Included offenses, instructions 478
Included offenses, sentencing 486
Incriminating circumstances, sufficiency of evidence 474
Indeterminate sentence, sentencing 488
Indictment 445-448
Indictment - In general 445
Indictment - Description of property 447
Indictment - Statutory language 446
Indictment - Variance 448
Instructions 475-479
Instructions - In general 475
Instructions - Circumstantial evidence 479
Instructions - Deprivation of use or benefit 476
Instructions - Included offenses 478
Instructions - Possession of stolen property 477
Intent, admissibility of evidence 451
Intent, fact questions 482
Intent, sufficiency of evidence 460
Joy riding 442
Judgment 484
Knowledge, sufficiency of evidence 461
Multiple counts, sentencing 487
Other crimes, admissibility of evidence 456
Ownership, sufficiency of evidence 462
Periodic imprisonment, sentencing 489
Possession, exclusive, sufficiency of evidence 467
Possession of stolen property, instructions 477
Possession of stolen property, sufficiency of evidence 468
Presumption of guilt, sufficiency of evidence 471
Property description, indictment 447
Reasonable doubt, sufficiency of evidence 470
Resentencing 493
Restitution, sentencing 491
Review 494
Search and seizure 444
Sentencing 485-493
Sentencing - In general 485
Sentencing - Aggravation and mitigation 490
Sentencing - Excessive punishment 492
Sentencing - Included offenses 486
Sentencing - Indeterminate sentence 488
Sentencing - Multiple counts 487
Sentencing - Periodic imprisonment 489
Sentencing - Resentencing 493
Sentencing - Restitution 491
Statutory language, indictment 446
Stolen property, possession of, instructions 477
Stolen property, possession of, sufficiency of evidence 468
Sufficiency of evidence 458-474
Sufficiency of evidence - In general 458
Sufficiency of evidence - Circumstantial evidence 472
Sufficiency of evidence - Conflicting evidence 473
Sufficiency of evidence - Consent 463
Sufficiency of evidence - Control 464
Sufficiency of evidence - Exclusive possession 467
Sufficiency of evidence - Flight 469
Sufficiency of evidence - Identification 465
Sufficiency of evidence - Incriminating circumstances 474
Sufficiency of evidence - Intent 460
Sufficiency of evidence - Knowledge 461
Sufficiency of evidence - Ownership 462
Sufficiency of evidence - Possession of stolen property 468
Sufficiency of evidence - Presumption of guilt 471
Sufficiency of evidence - Reasonable doubt 470
Sufficiency of evidence - Value 466
Sufficiency of evidence - Venue 459
Value, sufficiency of evidence 466
Variance, indictment 448
Venue, sufficiency of evidence 459
Verdict 483
Witness credibility 480
441. Elements of offense, motor vehicle theft
To sustain conviction for theft of motor vehicle, State must prove
ownership
of vehicle. People v. Walker, App. 4 Dist.1990, 140 Ill.Dec. 253, 193
Ill.App.3d 277, 549 N.E.2d 904. Larceny k 7
To prove felony offense related to illegal possession of motor vehicle,
neither element of intent to permanently deprive owner of use or
benefit of
property nor element of value of the vehicle need be established, but
in all
other respects, elements of that offense are contained in offense of
theft.
People v. Cramer, App. 3 Dist.1980, 36 Ill.Dec. 803, 81 Ill.App.3d 525,
401
N.E.2d 644, reversed 51 Ill.Dec. 681, 85 Ill.2d 92, 421 N.E.2d 189.
Receiving
Stolen Goods k 1
When an automobile, moved without authority of its owner, is found in a
vacant
lot, jacked up, three of its tires removed, its lugs loosened and its
ignition
pulled out, reasonable minds would conclude that unauthorized control
is
exerted over it. People v. Bullock, App.1970, 123 Ill.App.2d 30, 259
N.E.2d
641. Automobiles k 339
That automobile was left unguarded in street did not prevent taking
thereof
from being "larceny;" ch. 50, <section><section> 27, 28, 34,
concerning duty
of finder of lost property was inapplicable. People v. Cope, 1931, 178
N.E.
95, 345 Ill. 278. Larceny k 8
442. Joy riding, motor vehicle theft
Joy riding escapade is not to be treated as a "theft" but rather as a
criminal
trespass to a vehicle. People v. Woods, App. 5 Dist.1974, 17
Ill.App.3d 835,
308 N.E.2d 856. Automobiles k 339; Larceny k 3(4)
443. Accountability, motor vehicle theft
Defendant who pushed stolen automobile with another automobile was
responsible
for conduct of driver of stolen automobile as aiding and abetting in
commission of crime. People v. Schumacher, App.1967, 90 Ill.App.2d
385, 234
N.E.2d 574. Larceny k 27
Although passenger in
suspect that
driver had stolen the
rode with
the driver, she could
a
principal. People v.
stolen automobile had reasonable grounds to
automobile when she entered the automobile and
not be convicted of larceny of the automobile as
Barnes, 1924, 143 N.E. 445, 311 Ill. 559.
Passenger who entered stolen automobile with reasonable grounds to
suspect it
was stolen could not be convicted as a principal where she did not
actually
advise, encourage, aid or abet the perpetration of a crime. People v.
Barnes,
1924, 143 N.E. 445, 311 Ill. 559.
444. Search and seizure, motor vehicle theft
Where initial stop and investigation of truck, pursuant to which police
officer examined vehicle identification number and noted that number
plate was
affixed to door in irregular manner with sheet metal screws, were
proper,
actions of police officers in subsequent stop, in investigating serial
number
on frame of truck by looking behind front wheel, in finding that it had
been
obliterated and restamped with hand tools, and in lifting hood and
determining
that engine number had also been altered, were justified and did not
violate (
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 4) rights of defendant charged with theft of
property
valued in excess of $150. People v. Miller, App. 5 Dist.1975, 36
Ill.App.3d
542, 345 N.E.2d 1. Searches And Seizures k 60.1
Where officers first observed truck being driven by defendant upon
public
streets, several hours later officers went to defendant's place of
business
which was, by its nature, open to public, and observed truck parked
outside
rear door, officers observed, without entering or touching truck, that
serial
number on wrecker matched number of stolen wrecker, officers also noted
that
wrecker had been repainted, and after these observations officers
entered
defendant's building and placed him under arrest, there was no
infringement of
defendant's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches
and
seizures. People v. Punyko, App. 1 Dist.1973, 9 Ill.App.3d 1052, 293
N.E.2d
672. Searches And Seizures k 60.1
Where automobile was within view of police officers who had reasonable
cause
to believe that automobile being driven by defendant's wife was same
one
stolen from automobile dealership the previous year and automobile was
observed by police being driven away, police were entitled to seize
automobile, and admission of automobile was not error. People v.
Vagil, App.
2 Dist.1973, 9 Ill.App.3d 726, 292 N.E.2d 557. Searches And Seizures k
62
445. Indictment, motor vehicle theft--In general
Petition for wardship alleging that defendant committed offense of
theft in
that he knowingly exerted unauthorized control over vehicle did not
advise
defendant of additional element of knowingly entering vehicle of
another and
thus, defendant could not be found delinquent on ground of criminal
trespass
to vehicle. In re J.A.J., App. 2 Dist.1993, 184 Ill.Dec. 41, 243
Ill.App.3d
808, 612 N.E.2d 917.
Infants k 197
Where defendant was found in possession of stolen vehicle in middle of
month,
after vehicle had been stolen early in month, there was no error in
charging
defendant with theft under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, rather
than
under subparagraph requiring proof of receipt from another. People v.
Sherman, App. 2 Dist.1982, 65 Ill.Dec. 581, 110 Ill.App.3d 854, 441
N.E.2d 896
. Larceny k 18
Fact that indictment, charging theft of an automobile, alleged
ownership of
automobile in lessee rather than lessor did not render indictment
insufficient
to charge crime. People ex rel. Insolata v. Pate, 1970, 46 Ill.2d 268,
263
N.E.2d 44. Larceny k 32(5)
Indictment which stated that the offense of theft of automobile was
committed
within the county on a specified date was sufficiently definite.
People v.
Parker, App.1968, 98 Ill.App.2d 146, 240 N.E.2d 475. Indictment And
Information k 86(2); Indictment And Information k 87(2)
446. ---- Statutory language, indictment, motor vehicle theft
Indictment was not fatally defective as failing to charge defendant
with
offense of theft, notwithstanding that it omitted word "unauthorized"
in
charging that defendant obtained control over an automobile belonging
to
another, where defendant was properly apprised of act that was alleged
to have
been committed, that is, that he knowingly obtained control over
vehicle with
intent to permanently deprive owner of its use and benefits and
particulars
set out as to date, place and description of vehicle would not have
allowed
another indictment based on same theft. People v. Saurez, App. 2
Dist.1975,
33 Ill.App.3d 689, 338 N.E.2d 419. Larceny k 34
Failure of indictment, charging that defendants knowingly obtained
control
over an automobile, to include word "unauthorized" before the word
"control"
did not render indictment for theft fatally defective. People v.
Hayes,
App.1971, 133 Ill.App.2d 885, 272 N.E.2d 423. Larceny k 34
Use of word "thereby" in information which alleged that defendant had
knowingly obtained unauthorized control of automobile thereby intending
to
deprive owner permanently of its use or benefit rather than word "and"
as used
in this section was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal
where
throughout trial it was made clear to jury that there were two elements
necessary to establish the offense. People v. Juve, App.1969, 106
Ill.App.2d
421, 245 N.E.2d 293. Criminal Law k 1167(1)
447. ---- Description of property, indictment, motor vehicle theft
An indictment which charged theft of 1959 four-door Ford, named the
date of
the offense, the owner, and the place where the theft occurred
sufficiently
apprised defendants of exact crime with which they were charged, and
failure
to include serial number of stolen automobile did not make indictment
fatally
defective. People v. Kurtz, App.1966, 69 Ill.App.2d 282, 216 N.E.2d
524,
affirmed in part, reversed in part 37 Ill.2d 103, 224 N.E.2d 817.
Indictment
And Information k 71.4(8); Larceny k 30(1)
Indictment charging defendant with taking Ford, Dodge, and Chevrolet
radiators
was not defective for omitting word "automobile" after trade-name.
People v.
Graves, 1928, 162 N.E. 839, 331 Ill. 268. Larceny k 30(1)
448. ---- Variance, indictment, motor vehicle theft
Where a particular time was not an essential element of crime of theft
and
expiration of statute of limitations was not at issue, proof that
defendant
exerted unauthorized control over stolen automobile on a date other
than
precise date alleged in information did not constitute a fatal
variance.
People v. Alexander, 1982, 66 Ill.Dec. 326, 93 Ill.2d 73, 442 N.E.2d
887.
Larceny k 40(5)
In prosecutions for theft of an automobile no fatal variance is created
by any
indictment which alleges ownership in a person who has assigned title
to his
insurance company rather than alleging ownership in the insurance
company,
and, also, defendant could show no prejudice either in the sense that
he was
unable to prepare a defense or that he would be subject to a second
prosecution for same offense. People v. Schaefer, App. 3 Dist.1980, 42
Ill.Dec. 634, 87 Ill.App.3d 192, 409 N.E.2d 129. Larceny k 40(9)
In prosecution for theft of an automobile, no fatal variance was
created by
indictment which alleged ownership in person who assigned title to
insurance
company rather than alleging ownership in insurance company, in that
defendant
could show no prejudice either in the sense that he was unable to
prepare a
defense or that he would be subject to a second prosecution for same
offense.
People v. Allen, App. 2 Dist.1977, 6 Ill.Dec. 802, 48 Ill.App.3d 870,
363
N.E.2d 616. Larceny k 40(9)
Fact that person was alleged in theft indictment to be owner of stolen
vehicle, but that such person was buying vehicle on time and did not
hold
legal title to it, did not constitute fatal variance between indictment
and
evidence. People v. Davidson, App.1970, 121 Ill.App.2d 163, 257 N.E.2d
513.
Larceny k 40(9)
449. Admissibility of evidence, motor vehicle theft--In general
In prosecution for the theft of a truck, the references made by the
prosecution at trial to a pistol found in the glove compartment of the
truck
at the time it was repossessed were substantially cumulative in light
of the
magnitude and scope of other evidence which conclusively demonstrated
that
defendant was in possession of the truck, and the trial court therefore
erred
in admitting the pistol to establish defendant's possession of the
truck;
however, such evidence could not have had an impact on the jury's
verdict in
light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. People v.
Slaughter,
App. 2 Dist.1977, 13 Ill.Dec. 731, 55 Ill.App.3d 973, 371 N.E.2d 666.
Criminal Law k 675; Criminal Law k 1168(2)
In prosecution for theft of an automobile, trial court did not abuse
its
discretion when it granted jury's request to hear the complete
testimony of
one of the State's witnesses after deliberations had begun, where the
jury
could have reasonably wished to recall witness' testimony, particularly
with
relation to titles and vehicle identification plates found in
defendant's
possession, in order to compare it with defendant's testimony. People
v.
Allen, App. 2 Dist.1977, 6 Ill.Dec. 802, 48 Ill.App.3d 870, 363 N.E.2d
616.
Criminal Law k 859
Where defendant denied in prosecution for theft of certain type of
automobile
that he had ever driven that type of automobile, and on crossexamination he
denied that he had ever been in such type of automobile with State's
witness,
the State properly offered evidence in rebuttal. People v. Fleming,
App.1970,
121 Ill.App.2d 97, 257 N.E.2d 271. Criminal Law k 683(1)
That testimony relating to using and taking of automobiles was received
out of
its natural order was not fatal to its admissibility, in prosecution
for theft
of another automobile, as part of state's case in chief to rebut
defendant's
expected alibi testimony. People v. Horton, App.1966, 78 Ill.App.2d
421, 223
N.E.2d 202. Criminal Law k 680(1)
It was permissible for the state to offer a continuous narrative of the
events
that formed the context of defendant's arrest for theft of an
automobile.
People v. Alexander, App.1966, 69 Ill.App.2d 27, 216 N.E.2d 180.
Criminal Law
k 365(1)
In prosecution for larceny of automobile which was involved in accident
in
front of police station, testimony of police officers that they saw
stolen
automobile immediately after crash and that they saw defendant open the
door,
get out of the automobile and run, was competent. People v. Bucnis,
1950, 92
N.E.2d 158, 405 Ill. 568. Larceny k 50
In prosecution for stealing automobile, testimony that number on
automobile
block was changed, and that license number had been issued for another
car was
incompetent, where defendants' knowledge of, or connection with, such
offenses
was not shown. People v. Lawson, 1933, 184 N.E. 606, 351 Ill. 457.
Criminal
Law k 1169.1(7)
On trial for larceny of automobile, chattel mortgage through which
defendant
claimed to have acquired the car, was admissible, notwithstanding
misdescription of model and serial number. People v. Lindley, 1918,
118 N.E.
719, 282 Ill. 377. Receiving Stolen Goods k 8(2)
450. ---- Identification, admissibility of evidence, motor vehicle
theft
The admission of testimony of police officer and agent of National
Automobile
Theft Bureau who were both qualified to verify false automobile
identification
numbers, in prosecution for theft of Ford truck, as to the manner in
which
Ford vehicle identification numbers were stamped in the frame of Ford
trucks
in order to show knowledge on the part of the defendant that the
numbers on
the frame of the stolen truck had been altered was properly admitted,
over
hearsay objection, as opinion based upon personal knowledge and
examination of
the vehicles even though the witnesses had not seen the numbers
implanted on
the vehicles. People v. Snow, App. 4 Dist.1974, 21 Ill.App.3d 873, 316
N.E.2d
216. Criminal Law k 419(2.35)
In prosecution for stealing automobile, evidence that defendant had
formerly
owned automobile bearing number which was placed on the stolen car in
substitution of its correct number was admissible, where there was
evidence of
admission by defendant that he stole automobile and changed motor
number and
that he had junked his own car. People v. Manning, 1936, 6 N.E.2d 122,
365
Ill. 98. Larceny k 45
451. ---- Intent, admissibility of evidence, motor vehicle theft
Evidence of defendant's invasion of home, theft of homeowner's jewelry
and
money, and abduction of homeowner was properly admitted to show
defendant's
knowledge and intent in prosecution for theft of homeowner's
automobile.
People v. Alexander, 1982, 66 Ill.Dec. 326, 93 Ill.2d 73, 442 N.E.2d
887.
Criminal Law k 370; Criminal Law k 371(2)
Guns and masks found in stolen automobile and on defendant's person
were
admissible in prosecution for automobile theft, wherein issue was
defendant's
knowledge that automobile was stolen. People v. Torello, App.1969, 109
Ill.App.2d 433, 248 N.E.2d 725, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 1089, 397
U.S. 972,
25 L.Ed.2d 266.
Criminal Law k 404.65
Refusing to permit defendant's testimony regarding location of certain
of his
personal belongings, allegedly of considerable value, in order to prove
that
defendant had no intention of leaving city with automobile which he had
allegedly stolen, and thus had no intent to permanently deprive owner
of its
use or possession was not error where defendant could have had
requisite
intent to constitute violation of this section without design to leave
city.
People v. Juve, App.1969, 106 Ill.App.2d 421, 245 N.E.2d 293. Larceny
k 44
452. ---- Confessions and admissions, admissibility of evidence, motor
vehicle theft
There was no causal connection between defendant's arrest for auto
theft and
his subsequent volunteered admissions, two hours later, to unrelated
offense
of which the police had no knowledge, and thus the incriminatory
statements
were properly admitted even assuming the arrest was unlawful. People
v.
Malloy, App. 1 Dist.1982, 60 Ill.Dec. 392, 104 Ill.App.3d 605, 432
N.E.2d 1291
. Criminal Law k 412.1(3)
Testimony of police officer that, after overtaking defendant, defendant
stated, in response to question, that he was running because he knew
automobile was stolen did not prejudice defendant or deprive him of a
fair
trial, even though automobile to which defendant allegedly referred was
not
same vehicle stolen from victim to facilitate flight from armed
robbery, where
trial judge, in bench trial, unhesitatingly sustained objection to
testimony
and there was ample evidence to otherwise support finding of guilt.
People v.
Williams, App.1968, 98 Ill.App.2d 136, 240 N.E.2d 144. Criminal Law k
1169.5(5)
Officer's testimony that defendant stated that he had used narcotics on
day of
theft of automobile was hearsay as to defendant's actual use of
narcotics and
was not admissible to impeach prior contradictory statement of
defendant.
People v. Smith, 1967, 38 Ill.2d 237, 231 N.E.2d 185. Witnesses k 391
In prosecution for larceny of motor vehicle, admission of officer's
testimony
that accused in presence of assistant state's attorney said, "I might
as well
tell the truth," was not error, where no motion was made to suppress
evidence
with reference to statement made by accused, and officer also testified
that
accused stated that he stole automobile and no objection was made to
such
testimony, and evidence disclosed that accused decided it was useless
to deny
theft when he was confronted with fact that officer had discovered by
means of
secret number that automobile in accused's possession was stolen
vehicle.
People v. Topolski, 1935, 196 N.E. 721, 360 Ill. 586. Criminal Law k
698(1)
453. ---- Character of accused, admissibility of evidence, motor
vehicle
theft
Although the accused may always prove such previous good character as
is
inconsistent with the commission of the crime with which he is charged,
in a
prosecution for the theft of an automobile, evidence of peaceable and
law-abiding character of the accused was not admissible, since it was a
trait
of character not involved in the crime charged. People v. Redola,
1921, 133
N.E. 292, 300 Ill. 392. Larceny k 43
454. ---- Condition of vehicle, admissibility of evidence, motor
vehicle
theft
In prosecution for theft and possession of motor vehicle with falsified
identification number, wherein defendant contended that he had bought
the car
as a total "burn-out" and had purchased interior parts and refinished
the car,
police officer was properly permitted to testify that the vinyl top
appeared
to be slightly worn and that he could not see any place in interior
where
anything had been replaced. People v. Kilgore, App. 2 Dist.1975, 33
Ill.App.3d 557, 338 N.E.2d 124. Criminal Law k 459
455. ---- Exhibits, admissibility of evidence, motor vehicle theft
In prosecution for larceny of automobile, bumper wire by means of which
automobile had been started on evening it was stolen was properly
admitted.
People v. Bucnis, 1950, 92 N.E.2d 158, 405 Ill. 568. Criminal Law k
404.50
456. ---- Other crimes, admissibility of evidence, motor vehicle theft
Accomplice's testimony that he was in prison with defendant when they
planned
to sell stolen automobiles was relevant to show defendant's knowledge
and,
thus, was admissible other crimes evidence in prosecution for
automobile-related theft and theft of vehicle property by deception,
where
defendant was charged with knowledge that certain automobiles were
stolen and
that their vehicle identification numbers (VIN) were altered, and
defendant's
defense was that he lacked that requisite knowledge. People v. Kaye,
App. 1
Dist.1994, 201 Ill.Dec. 450, 264 Ill.App.3d 369, 636 N.E.2d 882.
Criminal Law
k 370
In prosecution for theft of property valued at more than $150 allegedly
occurring when defendant participated in theft of an automobile,
testimony of
witness concerning defendant's breaking into and taking of another
automobile
was admissible where disputed testimony tended to prove defendant's
intent to
commit theft, established his method of system of operation, tended to
demonstrate common scheme or design, and evidence of theft of other
automobiles showed defendant's knowledge of theft of automobile which
was
subject of instant suit and defendant's participation in that theft.
People
v. Riley, App. 3 Dist.1981, 50 Ill.Dec. 239, 94 Ill.App.3d 775, 419
N.E.2d 106
. Criminal Law k 370; Criminal Law k 371(2); Criminal Law k 372(5)
In theft prosecution, while some references to other similar car thefts
would
be permissible to establish defendant's requisite intent and modus
operandi,
when State introduced evidence of at least seven other car thefts,
those
offenses became more prejudicial than probative, and the prejudicial
effect
thereof influenced the jury's verdict and deprived the defendant of a
fair
trial. People v. Funches, App. 2 Dist.1978, 16 Ill.Dec. 504, 59
Ill.App.3d
71, 375 N.E.2d 135. Criminal Law k 371(2); Criminal Law k 372(5);
Criminal
Law k 1169.11
In prosecution for the theft of a truck, the admission into evidence of
a
pistol found in the glove compartment of the truck at the time it was
repossessed was not so prejudicial as to violate defendant's right to a
fair
trial. People v. Slaughter, App. 2 Dist.1977, 13 Ill.Dec. 731, 55
Ill.App.3d
973, 371 N.E.2d 666. Criminal Law k 404.65
In prosecution for theft of an automobile, admission of testimony that
FBI
wanted defendant picked up for violation of the Dyer Act (18 U.S.C.A.
<section> 2312) thus imputing to defendant the violation of a federal
statute
with which he was not charged and under which specific knowledge is a
requisite element, constituted prejudicial error. People v. Harris,
App.1970,
128 Ill.App.2d 256, 262 N.E.2d 99. Criminal Law k 369.5; Criminal Law
k
1169.11
Where defendant took stand in theft prosecution and denied that he had
ever
driven type of automobile stolen, testimony of State's witness relating
to
alleged cash payments to defendant for that type of automobile was not
admissible in rebuttal, since it related to another alleged offense.
People
v. Fleming, App.1970, 121 Ill.App.2d 97, 257 N.E.2d 271. Criminal Law
k
683(1)
Where defendant was charged with theft of automobile, court's allowing
prosecution to cross-examine him over objection as to his use of
narcotics was
prejudicial error. People v. Smith, 1967, 38 Ill.2d 237, 231 N.E.2d
185.
Criminal Law k 1170.5(5); Witnesses k 337(4)
Permitting evidence of taking or using of other automobiles on same
date that
theft of automobile for which defendant was being prosecuted occurred
was not
reversible error where court charged jury that only question to be
decided by
them was whether defendant had taken the automobile as charged. People
v.
Horton, App.1966, 78 Ill.App.2d 421, 223 N.E.2d 202. Criminal Law k
673(5)
Evidence that driver of stolen automobile had stolen other automobiles
was not
admissible in prosecution of passenger for larceny. People v. Barnes,
1924,
143 N.E. 445, 311 Ill. 559. Criminal Law k 372(5)
Evidence that passenger and driver of stolen automobile had lived
together as
man and wife, and had passed worthless checks, was not admissible in
prosecution for larceny of automobile. People v. Barnes, 1924, 143
N.E. 445,
311 Ill. 559. Criminal Law k 369.5
457. Cross examination, motor vehicle theft
In prosecution for theft of an automobile, record including showing
that
defendant was permitted to cross-examine the automobile owner in
considerable
detail about his personal finances did not reveal an abuse of
discretion in
restricting cross-examination of the owner concerning his financial
background
for purpose of establishing that owner intended to defraud his insurer
and in
fact was an accomplice in the theft. People v. Aprile, App. 4
Dist.1973, 15
Ill.App.3d 461, 304 N.E.2d 642. Witnesses k 267
Even though defendant did not cross-examine witness who answered on
direct
examination that he had obtained no favors or promises for his
testimony,
where witness was sole witness to testify as to defendant's statement
regarding his fraudulent procuring of license plates and registration
for
stolen automobile and testimony implied that defendant knowingly
exerted
unauthorized control over automobile, defendant should have been
allowed to
impeach witness by showing circumstances surrounding witness' arrest
for
towing a stolen automobile and the subsequent striking of charge
against
witness; thus, refusal to permit cross-examination as to witness'
arrest was
reversible error. People v. Vagil, App. 2 Dist.1973, 9 Ill.App.3d 726,
292
N.E.2d 557. Criminal Law k 1170.5(1); Witnesses k 350
In prosecution for larceny of automobile, where defendant testified
that he
was walking along street when automobile ran up on lawn and that he
fled to
avoid being shot, but officers testified that defendant got out of
automobile
and ran behind filling station, permitting cross-examination of
defendant
regarding the possession of sawed-off shotgun and whether he threw it
away was
not error on ground that defendant had become people's witness. People
v.
Strutynski, 1937, 12 N.E.2d 628, 367 Ill. 551. Witnesses k 277(3)
458. Sufficiency of evidence, motor vehicle theft--In general
Evidence that automobile was stolen, that automobile was seen
approximately
one hour after theft, that three occupants of the automobile left the
automobile after short chase by police, and that defendants, who
matched
description of those who had been riding in the automobile, were
stopped a
short distance from the automobile a short time later and appeared,
from their
breathing, to have been running sustained defendants' convictions for
automobile theft. People v. Harris, 1974, 57 Ill.2d 228, 314 N.E.2d
465.
Larceny k 55
Adjudication of delinquency for committing offense of theft was
required to be
reversed where almost every item of evidence heard by magistrate was
hearsay
and inadmissible as such and only competent evidence conceivably
linking
defendant with stolen car was fact that car fit description of vehicle
parked
outside jail where defendant was in custody. People v. Pitt, App.1971,
133
Ill.App.2d 859, 272 N.E.2d 250. Infants k 254
Finding of defendant's guilt of theft of automobile was not palpably
contrary
to weight of evidence and evidence was not so unreasonable, improbable
or
unsatisfactory as to justify reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt.
People v.
Jones, App.1969, 112 Ill.App.2d 464, 251 N.E.2d 293. Criminal Law k
260.11(5)
459. ---- Venue, sufficiency of evidence, motor vehicle theft
State's theory in the trial court was directed to proof of defendant's
guilt
of initial theft of automobile from parking lot in Collinsville, and
venue in
Madison County was thus properly proved. People v. McIntosh, App. 5
Dist.1977, 6 Ill.Dec. 599, 48 Ill.App.3d 694, 363 N.E.2d 128. Criminal
Law k
564(1)
460. ---- Intent, sufficiency of evidence, motor vehicle theft
In theft prosecution, evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant
had
intent to permanently deprive victim of use or benefit of his
automobile.
People v. Graydon, 1976, 38 Ill.App.3d 792, 349 N.E.2d 127; People v.
Graham,
1975, 27 Ill.App.3d 408, 327 N.E.2d 261.
Finding that car thief had intended to permanently deprive vehicle's
owner of
possession, and was not mere joyrider, was sufficiently supported by
evidence
presented in theft and possession of stolen motor vehicle prosecution,
including defendant's false statement to police officer that vehicle
belonged
to friend. People v. Henry, App. 1 Dist.1990, 148 Ill.Dec. 608, 203
Ill.App.3d 278, 560 N.E.2d 1205. Criminal Law k 414
Essential element of offense of theft is that accused possessed intent
to
deprive owner permanently of use or benefit of the property, and
generally
such intent is proved by circumstantial evidence and, in case at bar,
it was
sufficiently proved that defendant's intent was to deprive owner
permanently
of use or benefit of automobile, notwithstanding defendant's statements
that
the vehicle could not be sold because it was in probate. People v.
Soskins,
App. 2 Dist.1984, 83 Ill.Dec. 517, 128 Ill.App.3d 564, 470 N.E.2d 643,
appeal
denied. Larceny k 3(4)
In prosecution for felony theft of an automobile, evidence, including
testimony that defendant was going to commit suicide by driving car
into ditch
and that defendant was free from mental disease or defect and that she
did not
lack substantial capacity to appreciate criminality of her behavior or
to
conform her behavior to requirements of law, supported conclusion that
defendant had formed intent to permanently deprive owner of automobile
of its
use and benefit. People v. Eveland, App. 4 Dist.1980, 36 Ill.Dec. 498,
81
Ill.App.3d 97, 400 N.E.2d 1078. Larceny k 57
In absence of any evidence to suggest that defendant intended to return
vehicle to its owner or to leave it in a place where the owner could
safely
recover it and in view of evidence that defendant left the stolen car
in a
swamp when the car became stuck and he could travel no further in it,
circumstances were sufficient to establish that defendant intended
permanently
to deprive the owner of the use of the automobile. People v. Eatherly,
App. 2
Dist.1979, 34 Ill.Dec. 77, 78 Ill.App.3d 777, 397 N.E.2d 533. Larceny
k 62(1)
Where insured permitted use of her automobile by permittee whose
companion,
without permission, obtained keys from permittee, demolished automobile
in
accident and "ran from scene," acts of permittee's companion
constituted a
"theft" within automobile policy, notwithstanding companion's
stipulated
statement that he intended to return the automobile. Kelly v. State
Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., App. 3 Dist.1975, 34 Ill.App.3d 290, 339 N.E.2d 467.
Insurance
k 2706(3)
Evidence that defendant was either driving or riding in automobile he
knew to
be stolen, that owner was robbed of his coat and money, that when owner
fled
from his own automobile he saw it driven away by two individuals, and
that
defendant was present when automobile was taken, making it immaterial
whether
he was driving, was sufficient to establish defendant intended to
permanently
deprive owner of automobile and to establish that he had control over
the
vehicle, for purposes of this section. People v. Wright, App. 1
Dist.1974, 24
Ill.App.3d 26, 320 N.E.2d 483. Larceny k 57; Larceny k 62(1)
Evidence raised jury question as to whether defendant, who was accused
of
theft of truck which he took from lumber company yard and abandoned
alongside
highway when motor trouble began had intention to feloniously deprive
truck
owner of his property. People v. Boyd, App.1969, 108 Ill.App.2d 473,
247
N.E.2d 912. Larceny k 68(2)
Evidence in prosecution for theft of automobile was insufficient to
establish
intent to permanently deprive owner of his automobile on part of
defendant-automobile repairman, who went upon owner's property without
owner's
consent to obtain automobile previously voluntarily relinquished to
owner
after repairs but retaken for additional repair work, and who refused
to
relinquish automobile to owner until repair charges were paid. People
v.
Baddeley, App.1969, 106 Ill.App.2d 154, 245 N.E.2d 593. Larceny k 57
From facts and circumstances surrounding apprehension of defendant
while he
was in sole control of semitractor and trailer with load of automobile
tires,
trier of fact could properly infer that defendant had taken vehicle
from
premises of owner with intention of depriving owner permanently of its
use.
People v. Jones, App.1968, 99 Ill.App.2d 364, 240 N.E.2d 776. Larceny
k 57
Evidence that allegedly stolen automobile was found by police many
miles from
where owner had parked it four days previously and that defendant first
claimed that he was its owner, then claimed he was its bailee and then
completely denied any knowledge of the automobile was sufficient to
establish
element of intent necessary to support theft conviction. People v.
Price,
App.1967, 81 Ill.App.2d 111, 225 N.E.2d 453. Larceny k 57
Evidence failed to support larceny conviction of defendant who claimed
he took
another's automobile only for purpose of gettig coffee and was
returning to
service station from which he took automobile when he was arrested.
People v.
De Stefano, 1961, 23 Ill.2d 427, 178 N.E.2d 393. Larceny k 57
In prosecution for larceny of automobile, where the defense was an
intention
to return the car, defendants claiming they were returning the car to
the
place where it was taken when it was wrecked, and there was testimony
that
they did not intend to steal the car, but the prosecution claimed that
the car
was found wrecked headed directly away from the place where it was
taken,
conviction will be reversed, and the cause remanded for another trial,
where
the proof as to where the car was found and headed was not developed at
the
trial. People v. Pastel, 1923, 138 N.E. 194, 306 Ill. 565. Criminal
Law k
1189
461. ---- Knowledge, sufficiency of evidence, motor vehicle theft
Evidence was sufficient to support conviction of possession of stolen
automobile; defendant was apprehended after high speed chase of stolen
automobile, after which defendant and another individual fled from
automobile
on foot; even if defendant was only passenger, he was aware of
presence of
stolen property in question, that is, the automobile. People v. Span,
App. 2
Dist.1987, 109 Ill.Dec. 218, 156 Ill.App.3d 1046, 509 N.E.2d 1057.
Receiving
Stolen Goods k 8(3)
Defendant's knowledge that car in which he was riding was stolen was
sufficiently proven by circumstantial evidence that defendant told
arresting
officer that car belonged to his sister, who lived in Chicago, that car
bore
suburban sticker, that defendant offered to post his driver's license
in lieu
of that of driver, inferentially in attempt to block investigation of
ownership of vehicle, and that defendant was picked up in stolen
vehicle at
3:00 a.m. while allegedly trying to catch a 2:00 a.m. flight. People
v.
Chatmon, App. 1 Dist.1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 861, 305 N.E.2d 404.
Receiving
Stolen Goods k 8(4)
Evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant had knowledge that
automobile he was driving, when arrested, was stolen and was sufficient
to
sustain conviction for theft of automobile. People v. Jones, App.1969,
112
Ill.App.2d 464, 251 N.E.2d 293. Receiving Stolen Goods k 8(4)
462. ---- Ownership, sufficiency of evidence, motor vehicle theft
Evidence was sufficient to show ownership of motorcycle in theft trial,
where
witness identified photograph of a motorcycle as both his motorcycle
and
motorcycle which was subject of theft, and other witnesses also
identified
stolen motorcycle from photograph. People v. Walker, App. 4 Dist.1990,
140
Ill.Dec. 253, 193 Ill.App.3d 277, 549 N.E.2d 904. Larceny k 60
Absence of proof of ownership of vehicle allegedly stolen is reversible
error
in a prosecution for theft over $150. People v. Stone, App. 5
Dist.1979, 31
Ill.Dec. 608, 75 Ill.App.3d 571, 394 N.E.2d 810. Criminal Law k 1175;
Larceny
k 55
Evidence in prosecution for offense of theft over $150 was insufficient
to
establish ownership of automobile allegedly stolen by defendant where,
though
complainant testified as to year, make, model, color and license number
of
vehicle, as well as fact that vehicle registration bore his name,
registration
was not placed in evidence, and investigating officer testified only as
to
color of vehicle and not as to any other information to establish that
vehicle
he found was one which complainant had reported stolen. People v.
Stone, App.
5 Dist.1979, 31 Ill.Dec. 608, 75 Ill.App.3d 571, 394 N.E.2d 810.
Larceny k 60
Where defendant was charged with committing offense of theft over $150
by
obtaining unauthorized control over automobile, there was no testimony
by
alleged owner concerning license number of his automobile, testimony of
robbery victim described automobile used in commission of offense as
being of
different year than that indicated by automobile owner, and police
officers
involved in apprehension of defendant described automobile has having
four
doors while owner described automobile as having two doors, State
failed to
prove ownership of automobile in which defendant was arrested and
defendant's
conviction of theft was therefore reversed. People v. Irons, App. 5
Dist.1976, 39 Ill.App.3d 993, 350 N.E.2d 754. Larceny k 60
A certificate of title to a vehicle is not conclusive evidence of
ownership of
the vehicle. People v. Disharoon, App.1972, 5 Ill.App.3d 42, 282
N.E.2d 506.
Automobiles k 20
Although a prima facie presumption of ownership of a vehicle arises
from a
certificate of title, the presumption may be rebutted by other
competent
evidence. People v. Disharoon, App.1972, 5 Ill.App.3d 42, 282 N.E.2d
506.
Automobiles k 20
Documentary evidence, consisting of certificate of title, serial number
issued
in 1968 for homemade trailer and issuance of license in 1968 and 1969,
did not
conclusively establish that defendant, charged with theft, owned
trailer, on
which serial number issued to defendant had been stamped, which
allegedly had
been stolen from telephone company in 1969 and which weighed almost
3,000
pounds more than weight stated in defendant's application for title.
People
v. Disharoon, App.1972, 5 Ill.App.3d 42, 282 N.E.2d 506. Larceny k 60
Testimony that certain person was lessee of automobile that defendant
was
alleged to have stolen constituted sufficient evidence of ownership and
evidence of terms and conditions of lease was not required. People v.
Insolata, App.1969, 112 Ill.App.2d 269, 251 N.E.2d 73. Larceny k 60
Where theft indictment charged that defendant knowingly obtained
unauthorized
control over tractor trailer, of value of more than $150, the property
of
named company, and it was undisputed in theft prosecution that truck
had the
name of that company painted on its side, and an officer of that
company
testified as to the corporate existence of the company and stated that
his
company owned tractors and trailers normally kept in company garage in
the
state, evidence was sufficient to show that the truck was the property
of the
company. People v. Tassone, 1968, 41 Ill.2d 7, 241 N.E.2d 419,
certiorari
denied 89 S.Ct. 1318, 394 U.S. 965, 22 L.Ed.2d 567. Larceny k 60
That defendant who was discovered dismantling stolen automobile in
garage was
not shown to have been owner of garage did not preclude finding that
defendant
was in exclusive unauthorized possession of automobile within this
section.
People v. Nunn, App.1965, 63 Ill.App.2d 465, 212 N.E.2d 342. Larceny k
63
463. ---- Consent, sufficiency of evidence, motor vehicle theft
Defendant's admission that he sold car without permission, as
corroborated by
testimony of purchaser that defendant said that he had bought car from
"gentlemen" with whom he had been drinking the night before and that
"gentlemen" wanted car back, but that defendant was keeping it, was
sufficient
to support defendant's conviction of felony theft, despite fact that
owner of
car did not testify at trial that defendant did not have permission to
sell
car. People v. Ellis, App. 4 Dist.1985, 89 Ill.Dec. 769, 134
Ill.App.3d 924,
481 N.E.2d 320. Larceny k 55
In view of witness' testimony that automobile belonged to both her and
her
husband although automobile was registered in her husband's name alone
and
that she filed a stolen automobile report with police on day the
automobile
was discovered missing, there was sufficient proof that automobile was
taken
without owner's consent. People v. Tate, 1970, 45 Ill.2d 540, 259
N.E.2d 791,
certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 944, 401 U.S. 941, 28 L.Ed.2d 222. Larceny k
62(2)
464. ---- Control, sufficiency of evidence, motor vehicle theft
Evidence that automobile was moved without consent of owner and was
discovered
by officers in an alley at 2:15 a.m. where it was jacked up with one of
its
wheels in process of being removed, that defendant was seen jacking up
vehicle, ignition of which had been ripped out so that wires were
hanging
loose, and that, upon seeing officers, defendant ran and hid under a
nearby
abandoned vehicle was sufficient to establish that defendant exerted
"unauthorized control" over vehicle within prohibitions of this
section.
People v. Hoy, App. 1 Dist.1973, 12 Ill.App.3d 524, 299 N.E.2d 502.
Larceny k
63
465. ---- Identification, sufficiency of evidence, motor vehicle theft
Unrebutted evidence that person with defendant's name possessed and
sold
stolen vehicle established identity of defendant as person who
committed theft
and possessed and sold stolen motor vehicle. People v. Nivens, App. 2
Dist.1992, 177 Ill.Dec. 901, 239 Ill.App.3d 1, 603 N.E.2d 1275.
Automobiles k
355(1); Larceny k 64(7); Receiving Stolen Goods k 8(3)
Evidence putting defendant in possession of a car described only by
make and
model is insufficient to sustain a conviction for felony theft. People
v.
Daniels, App. 2 Dist.1983, 69 Ill.Dec. 291, 113 Ill.App.3d 523, 447
N.E.2d 508
. Larceny k 64(5)
Police officer's testimony that he saw defendant driving stolen car was
direct
evidence, and thus, exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence was
not necessary in order to affirm conviction. People v. Sherman, App. 2
Dist.1982, 65 Ill.Dec. 581, 110 Ill.App.3d 854, 441 N.E.2d 896.
Larceny k
64(1)
Fact that police officer who identified juvenile as driver of stolen
vehicle
had previously known juvenile served to enhance reliability of
officer's
identification in probation revocation hearing based on theft of
vehicle. In
Interest of Dever, App. 1 Dist.1978, 22 Ill.Dec. 107, 65 Ill.App.3d 68,
382
N.E.2d 427. Infants k 225
Even though record did not show precise basis on which officer
identified
serial number on automobile frame as that of stolen automobile, where
there
was no objection to officer's identification testimony, such evidence
was
adequate. People v. Hayes, App.1971, 133 Ill.App.2d 885, 272 N.E.2d
423.
Criminal Law k 566
Evidence, including fact that defendant went with his partner to stolen
automobile and was overpowered by complaining witness' nephew and
another, who
held both men until police arrived, together with testimony of
complaining
witness that he recognized the two men as those who had stolen his
automobile
the previous evening, after threatening him with a knife and robbing
him of
his wallet, and that they were wearing same clothing as they had worn
the
previous evening, was sufficient to convict defendant of armed robbery,
of
robbery, of theft, and of criminal trespass to a vehicle. People v.
Adams,
App.1969, 107 Ill.App.2d 155, 246 N.E.2d 87. Criminal Law k 566;
Robbery k
24.40
Even though it was dark, where the spotlight of arresting officer's
squad car
was focused on the stolen automobile and that vehicle's interior light
came on
when its driver half-opened the door, there was ample illumination to
enable
the arresting officer to observe the driver. People v. Parker,
App.1968, 98
Ill.App.2d 146, 240 N.E.2d 475. Criminal Law k 566
Fact that arresting officer could not recall whether or not driver of
stolen
automobile wore a hat did not reflect with any importance upon
arresting
officer's identification of defendant when arresting officer stated
that he
remembered how the driver was partially dressed. People v. Parker,
App.1968,
98 Ill.App.2d 146, 240 N.E.2d 475. Criminal Law k 566
Police officers' identification of defendant as driver of stolen
automobile
which had been driven off after having been stopped by officer and was
later
found abandoned by other officers who arrested defendant nearby,
together with
other circumstances, sustained conviction for automobile theft. People
v.
Smith, App.1966, 219 N.E.2d 724, reversed 38 Ill.2d 237, 231 N.E.2d
185.
Criminal Law k 566
Testimony of owner of apartment building and a tenant sufficiently
identified
defendant accused of automobile theft as the man who had rented garage
in
which stolen automobile was found. People v. Walker, App.1964, 54
Ill.App.2d
365, 204 N.E.2d 141. Criminal Law k 566
466. ---- Value, sufficiency of evidence, motor vehicle theft
In prosecution for theft of an automobile valued in excess of $150,
evidence
including testimony of the vehicle's owner that he had purchased it for
$200
and thereafter expended $275 to $300 for labor and materials to restore
it to
a good condition was sufficient to establish that the value of the
vehicle
exceeded $150. People v. Eatherly, App. 2 Dist.1979, 34 Ill.Dec. 77,
78
Ill.App.3d 777, 397 N.E.2d 533. Larceny k 59
467. ---- Exclusive possession, sufficiency of evidence, motor vehicle
theft
To warrant conviction for theft on basis of possession of recently
stolen
automobile the possession must be proved to be exclusive in the accused
to the
extent of precluding the possibility that someone else may have stolen
the
vehicle. People v. Pitt, App.1971, 133 Ill.App.2d 859, 272 N.E.2d 250.
Larceny k 64(4)
Defendant's exclusive possession of recently stolen vehicle was, in and
of
itself, sufficient to prove him guilty of theft beyond reasonable
doubt.
People v. Jones, App.1968, 99 Ill.App.2d 364, 240 N.E.2d 776. Larceny
k 64(4)
Evidence sustained conviction for automobile theft in that defendant
exercised
dominion over garage in which stolen automobile was found to exclusion
of all
others during the period in question, and that he or some unknown
person
acting with him drove the stolen car into the garage. People v.
Walker,
App.1964, 54 Ill.App.2d 365, 204 N.E.2d 141. Larceny k 64(4)
Evidence that defendant was merely riding in back seat of stolen
automobile
driven by another was insufficient to sustain conviction for larceny
thereof.
People v. Abrams, 1935, 196 N.E. 801, 360 Ill. 594. Larceny k 64(4)
Proof that defendant and his companions were in the personal and
exclusive
possession of a stolen automobile recently after the theft is
sufficient to
raise an inference of guilt.
306
Ill. 138. Larceny k 64(4)
People v. Sturdyvin, 1922, 137 N.E. 593,
Proof that the automobile stolen was in accused's exclusive possession,
is
necessary before possession of stolen goods is any evidence of its
theft.
People v. Clark, 1922, 134 N.E. 95, 301 Ill. 428.
468. ---- Possession of stolen property, sufficiency of evidence,
motor
vehicle theft
Evidence, in prosecution for theft and possession of stolen automobile,
including fact that defendants exerted recent, exclusive and
unexplained
possession of stolen car, was sufficient to find defendants guilty.
People v.
Koris, App. 1 Dist.1982, 63 Ill.Dec. 662, 107 Ill.App.3d 821, 438
N.E.2d 593.
Larceny k 64(7); Receiving Stolen Goods k 8(3)
To warrant conviction based on defendant's recent, exclusive and
unexplained
possession of stolen vehicle or vehicle with falsified identification
numbers,
evidence must be of such a conclusive nature as to lead, on the whole,
to a
satisfactory conclusion and as to produce, in effect, a moral certainty
that
the accused, and no one else, committed the crime, and it must be such
that
the circumstances proved cannot, upon any reasonable theory be true and
defendant innocent. People v. Kilgore, App. 2 Dist.1975, 33 Ill.App.3d
557,
338 N.E.2d 124. Automobiles k 355(11); Larceny k 64(1)
Testimony by automobile owner that he had given automobile which
juvenile was
accused of stealing to his son, that the ignition had been pulled from
the
automobile when it was recovered, and that there were no keys in the
automobile or in juvenile's possession when he was arrested shortly
after
jumping out of the automobile sustained finding that juvenile's
possession of
the automobile was unauthorized and justified delinquency adjudication.
People v. Woods, App. 1 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 753, 312 N.E.2d 822.
Infants
k 176
Evidence sustained theft conviction of defendant who was found in
possession
of a wrecker, taken off stolen truck, which he had repainted and
mounted on
his own truck, whose shop contained various other dismembered parts
from
stolen truck, and who testified that he built the wrecker by purchasing
individual parts from various unnamed people who came into his shop.
People
v. Punyko, App. 1 Dist.1973, 9 Ill.App.3d 1052, 293 N.E.2d 672.
Larceny k
64(1)
Recent, exclusive, and unexplained possession of stolen vehicle by
defendant
is, in and of itself, sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
People v. Donald, App.1971, 132 Ill.App.2d 598, 270 N.E.2d 85. Larceny
k
64(1)
Evidence, including fact that defendant was found in recently stolen
automobile at time of arrest, together with testimony of police officer
that a
gasoline credit card was found in defendant's wallet along with a
purchase
receipt bearing license number of automobile, was sufficient to
establish that
defendant was in exclusive possession of automobile and to warrant
conviction
for theft of automobile. People v. Smith, App.1969, 107 Ill.App.2d
267, 246
N.E.2d 880. Larceny k 64(8)
Jury was justified in finding, in theft prosecution, that defendant's
relationship to stolen automobile was more than mere association and
was
actually possession within meaning of rule that evidence of recent,
exclusive,
and unexplained possession of stolen goods after theft is sufficient
evidence
to convict. People v. Hyde, App.1968, 97 Ill.App.2d 43, 239 N.E.2d
466.
Larceny k 64(8)
Possession of a recently stolen automobile is sufficient to warrant
conviction
for theft of that automobile. People v. Davis, App.1966, 69 Ill.App.2d
120,
216 N.E.2d 490. Larceny k 64(1)
Where stolen automobile was partially dismantled at time of discovery
by
police and defendant was proceeding to take out motor for purpose of
sale it
was sufficiently shown that defendant was in unauthorized possession of
automobile within this section. People v. Nunn, App.1965, 63
Ill.App.2d 465,
212 N.E.2d 342. Larceny k 63
Undisputed proof that accused and codefendant, when arrested were in
possession of an automobile containing several recently stolen suits of
men's
clothing, warranted conviction of accused of larceny in absence of any
explanation of his possession of automobile or stolen goods. People v.
Kasallis, 1943, 52 N.E.2d 209, 385 Ill. 158. Larceny k 64(1)
Evidence that defendant was sitting at right of driver of recently
stolen
automobile when it was wrecked, that defendant fled and was arrested,
and that
he threw away a sawed-off shotgun, was sufficient to sustain conviction
for
larceny of automobile, since defendant was at least in joint possession
of
automobile. People v. Strutynski, 1937, 12 N.E.2d 628, 367 Ill. 551.
Larceny
k 64(8)
469. ---- Flight, sufficiency of evidence, motor vehicle theft
Evidence, including evidence that persons subsequently identified as
defendants fled from stolen car after it was stopped by police,
sustained
conviction for theft. People v. Harris, App. 1 Dist.1973, 13
Ill.App.3d 282,
300 N.E.2d 835, reversed and remanded 57 Ill.2d 228, 314 N.E.2d 465.
Larceny
k 55
Where two police officers testified that they chased speeding
automobile until
driver pulled into vacant lot, and one officer testified that driver
jumped
out and started to run, and that driver was overtaken, and that driver
was the
defendant, and automobile proved to be stolen, conviction of defendant
of
automobile theft was justified. People v. Tyson, App.1970, 130
Ill.App.2d
140, 264 N.E.2d 403. Larceny k 55
The evidence, including evidence that defendant was near and walking
away from
stolen automobile which came to halt in alley, and that defendant
attempted to
flee custody of police officers upon arrival at station, was
insufficient to
support conviction for automobile theft. People v. Davis, App.1966, 69
Ill.App.2d 120, 216 N.E.2d 490. Larceny k 55
Evidence that defendant was in stolen car when it was pursued by police
and
driven into curb and that he attempted to escape therefrom and
attempted to
hide was sufficient to sustain conviction for larceny of automobile.
People
v. Scholler, 1943, 52 N.E.2d 130, 385 Ill. 93. Larceny k 64(7)
470. ---- Reasonable doubt, sufficiency of evidence, motor vehicle
theft
Testimony of complainant that he saw defendant partially seated in
automobile,
with one hand on steering wheel and one hand on door, and that
defendant was
man who ran from automobile was sufficient, when combined with
testimony that
defendant impliedly acknowledged that key ring on which ignition key
was found
was his, to establish defendant's guilt of theft beyond a reasonable
doubt.
People v. Williams, App. 1 Dist.1981, 51 Ill.Dec. 740, 96 Ill.App.3d
250, 421
N.E.2d 248. Larceny k 62(1)
In view of testimony that the ignition had been pulled in automobile
when it
was recovered and that there were no keys in the car or on juvenile's
person
when he was arrested shortly after jumping from the automobile,
testimony by
juvenile and his father that there had been keys in the automobile when
the
father rode in it earlier in the day did not create a reasonable doubt
as a
matter of law on issue of whether juvenile, who was subject of
delinquency
proceeding, was authorized to possess the automobile. People v. Woods,
App. 1
Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 753, 312 N.E.2d 822. Infants k 176
471. ---- Presumption of guilt, sufficiency of evidence, motor vehicle
theft
Although defendant denied possession, his testimony indicated
dishonesty and
justified application of presumption, based on evidence that automobile
was
stolen four days before defendant was arrested, and that defendant used
car in
an armed robbery, that defendant was guilty of theft of the vehicle.
People
v. Akins, App. 4 Dist.1984, 84 Ill.Dec. 237, 128 Ill.App.3d 1009, 471
N.E.2d
1003. Larceny k 64(1)
Stipulation that car which was occupied
without
authority from rightful owner less than
arrest
and that value of the car was in excess
officer's
testimony as to circumstances of arrest
joint
by defendants had been taken
three hours before defendants'
of $150, together with
and evidence showing exclusive
possession of the recently stolen property, raised presumption of guilt
of
theft of over $150 against both defendants, even though both defendants
offered an explanation of their possession consistent with innocence to
both
arresting officer and the court. People v. Brisbon, App. 3 Dist.1975,
26
Ill.App.3d 268, 324 N.E.2d 644. Larceny k 64(7)
Recent, exclusive and unexplained possession of a stolen automobile
gives rise
to an inference of guilt of theft, absent other facts or circumstances
which
create a reasonable doubt. People v. Bynum, App. 1 Dist.1973, 12
Ill.App.3d
825, 299 N.E.2d 150. Larceny k 64(1)
Although it might have been subject to reasonable doubt that defendant
was
person who initially stole vehicle, where defendant was driving vehicle
when
arrested, vehicle bore stolen license places, and defendant was unable
to give
name of person who had lent him vehicle, tell where person lived, or
convincingly explain how we would return vehicle to unnamed person who
was
supposedly owner, circumstances, when coupled with information supplied
by
informer, were sufficient to raise a presumption of defendant's guilt
and were
sufficient to support conviction of theft. People v. Helm, App. 1
Dist.1973,
10 Ill.App.3d 643, 295 N.E.2d 78. Larceny k 64(7)
Recent, exclusive and unexplained possession of stolen automobile by an
accused gives rise to inference of guilt, absent other facts and
circumstances
which may leave a reasonable doubt. People v. Moore, App.1970, 130
Ill.App.2d
266, 264 N.E.2d 582. Larceny k 64(1)
In larceny prosecution of defendant who was found in possession of
stolen
automobile three days after its theft, defendant's possession was
recent
possession such as to give rise to presumption of guilt. People v.
Litberg,
1952, 108 N.E.2d 468, 413 Ill. 132. Larceny k 64(3)
Admission by defendant that he was one of occupants of automobile when
it was
pursued by police car and driven into curb was sufficient to raise
presumption
of guilt against him arising from possession of recently stolen
property and
established joint possession in defendant with driver of car. People
v.
Scholler, 1943, 52 N.E.2d 130, 385 Ill. 93.
Larceny k 64(4)
Fact that a defendant, who was riding with companions in an automobile
which
was stolen two hours before, did not seek to escape, as did his
companions
when automobile was stopped by policemen, did not prevent an inference
of
defendant's guilt of larceny of motor vehicle based on his possession
of
recently stolen property. People v. Kulig, 1939, 25 N.E.2d 73, 373
Ill. 102.
Larceny k 64(1)
472. ---- Circumstantial evidence, sufficiency of evidence, motor
vehicle
theft
To warrant conviction based on defendant's recent, exclusive and
unexplained
possession of stolen vehicle or vehicle with falsified identification
numbers,
it is not necessary that circumstantial evidence exclude every
possibility of
defendant's innocence or produce absolute certainty in mind of trier of
facts.
People v. Kilgore, App. 2 Dist.1975, 33 Ill.App.3d 557, 338 N.E.2d
124.
Automobiles k 355(11); Larceny k 64(1)
Notwithstanding claim that theft conviction was based purely on
circumstantial
evidence in that no one saw defendant steal vehicle and change its
license
plates, it could be inferred from attendant circumstances that
defendant knew
vehicle had been stolen, that he was exercising unauthorized control
over
property while driving vehicle without owner's permission, and that by
his
actions he intended to deprive owner of vehicle's use permanently.
People v.
Helm, App. 1 Dist.1973, 10 Ill.App.3d 643, 295 N.E.2d 78. Larceny k
64(7)
Evidence in prosecution for theft of automobile, including evidence
that
defendant was driving automobile five days after its theft and
attempted to
escape from police, was sufficient to sustain conviction, despite lack
of
direct evidence that defendant had taken automobile and despite
defendant's
testimony that he believed that automobile belonged to his companion's
father.
People v. Donald, App.1971, 132 Ill.App.2d 598, 270 N.E.2d 85. Larceny
k
64(1)
473. ---- Conflicting evidence, sufficiency of evidence, motor vehicle
theft
Testimony by police officer, in delinquency proceeding, that automobile
being
driven by juvenile was a 1972 or 1973 red-black over red Torino and
testimony
by owner that the automobile was a 1972 Torino with a red body and
black vinyl
top connected juvenile with automobile which he was alleged to have
stolen.
People v. Woods, App. 1 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 753, 312 N.E.2d 822.
Infants
k 176
474. ---- Incriminating circumstances, sufficiency of evidence, motor
vehicle
theft
Combination of circumstances, including payment by defendant of $500
for a car
valued at more than $2,000 and falsified vehicle identification numbers
on
bill of sale in defendant's possession, required that defendant furnish
a
reasonable explanation to avoid clear inference of guilty knowledge, in
prosecution for theft and possession of motor vehicle with falsified
identification number. People v. Kilgore, App. 2 Dist.1975, 33
Ill.App.3d 557,
338 N.E.2d 124. Automobiles k 353; Larceny k 64(7)
Defendants who were discovered contemplating dangling ignition wires
under
dashboard of automobile subsequently discovered to have been stolen
were
properly found guilty of theft of motor vehicle, notwithstanding
defendants
were not seen actually driving vehicle and were apparently unable to
start
vehicle when apprehended. People v. Woodall, App.1971, 2 Ill.App.3d
255, 276
N.E.2d 426. Larceny k 62(1)
Evidence, including evidence of defendant's statements, circumstances
in which
automobile was discovered by police, defendant's attempted flight from
scene,
and police officers' testimony supported finding that defendant was
guilty of
automobile theft. People v. Nunn, App.1965, 63 Ill.App.2d 465, 212
N.E.2d 342
. Larceny k 55
475. Instructions, motor vehicle theft--In general
Where, in prosecution of defendant who was indicted for theft of
property of
value exceeding $150 and who was specifically charged with theft of an
automobile, there was no evidence of concealment or abandonment, so
that jury
could not have been misled by instructions, which set forth portion of
this
section, that included words "concealed or abandoned," use of the
instructions
was not substantial error. People v. Eastland, App. 4 Dist.1973, 11
Ill.App.3d 271, 296 N.E.2d 363. Criminal Law k 808.5
Giving, in prosecution for theft and criminal trespass to vehicle, of
instruction that if jury believed beyond a reasonable doubt that
property
described in indictment was stolen and shortly thereafter was in
exclusive
possession of defendants, such exclusive possession, if reasonably
explained,
was sufficient to warrant conviction of offense was not error as
precluding a
finding of criminal trespass to vehicle without a concomitant finding
of auto
theft or, in view of instruction setting out requisite intent, as
failing to
require finding of requisite intent to permanently deprive owner of his
property. People v. Webb, App.1971, 131 Ill.App.2d 206, 268 N.E.2d
161.
Criminal Law k 759(4); Criminal Law k 822(7)
476. ---- Deprivation of use or benefit, instructions, motor vehicle
theft
Instruction which contained language of information which alleged that
defendant had obtained unauthorized control of automobile thereby
intending to
deprive owner of its use and instruction relating to proving intent by
the act
done did not erroneously indicate that evidence of taking would
establish
intent to deprive owner permanently, in view of instructions given
relating
specifically to intent and meaning of "permanently deprived." People
v. Juve,
App.1969, 106 Ill.App.2d 421, 245 N.E.2d 293. Criminal Law k 823(4)
477. ---- Possession of stolen property, instructions, motor vehicle
theft
In prosecution for larceny of automobile, instruction relating to
exclusive
possession of stolen property by defendant shortly after commission of
crime
was proper. People v. Bucnis, 1950, 92 N.E.2d 158, 405 Ill. 568.
Larceny k
77(1)
Instruction that if jury believed from evidence beyond reasonable doubt
that
automobile was stolen and shortly thereafter was found in exclusive
possession
of defendants, the evidence was enough to warrant conviction of larceny
of
automobile, and that, if evidence seeking to explain such possession
created a
reasonable doubt as to defendants' guilt, such possession was not
sufficient
to warrant conviction, was not objectionable as abstract in form and as
erroneously assuming that defendant was in possession of stolen
property.
People v. Scholler, 1943, 52 N.E.2d 130, 385 Ill. 93. Criminal Law k
761(15)
In a prosecution for larceny, the court can give an instruction
advising the
jury that the possession of the stolen automobile by defendant recently
after
the larceny was sufficient to warrant a conviction unless it appeared
from all
the facts and circumstances that there was a reasonable doubt of
defendant's
guilt. People v. Sturdyvin, 1922, 137 N.E. 593, 306 Ill. 138.
Criminal Law k
759(4)
In prosecution for the larceny of an automobile, an instruction that
possession of stolen property soon after the offense is prima facie
evidence
of guilt, unless explained, was misleading, in the absence of proof
that the
automobile stolen was ever in accused's exclusive possession. People
v.
Clark, 1922, 134 N.E. 95, 301 Ill. 428. Larceny k 77(3)
In a prosecution for larceny of an automobile, instruction that the
possession
of stolen property, the proceeds of a robbery or burglary, soon after
the
commission of the offense, is prima facie evidence of the guilt of the
person
in possession, was erroneous, in the absence of the statement "unless
such
possession is explained." People v. Surace, 1920, 129 N.E. 504, 295
Ill. 604.
Criminal Law k 815(9)
In a larceny case, an instruction that the possession of the stolen
automobile
by defendant recently after the theft, unless satisfactorily accounted
for,
was prima facie evidence of guilt, etc., was erroneous as applied to
the facts
in the case.
Larceny k
77(2)
People v. Mulvaney, 1918, 121 N.E. 229, 286 Ill. 114.
478. ---- Included offenses, instructions, motor vehicle theft
From evidence presented at prosecution of defendant for offense of
theft of
property having value in excess of $150, jury could find defendant
guilty of
theft or not guilty, and in addition could find that defendant took
truck but
did not intend to permanently deprive owner of its use or benefit, in
which
case defendant could be found guilty of felony offense related to
illegal
possession of motor vehicle but not theft; therefore, trial court
erred by
refusing instruction tendered by defendant on included offense of
felony
offense related to motor vehicle. People v. Cramer, App. 3 Dist.1980,
36
Ill.Dec. 803, 81 Ill.App.3d 525, 401 N.E.2d 644, reversed 51 Ill.Dec.
681, 85
Ill.2d 92, 421 N.E.2d 189. Larceny k 79
479. ---- Circumstantial evidence, instructions, motor vehicle theft
In prosecution for theft of automobile where record contained evidence
which
was not circumstantial in nature, trial court did not err in refusing
to give
tendered instruction that jury should not find defendant guilty unless
facts
and circumstances proved excluded every reasonable theory of innocence.
People
v. Harris, App.1970, 128 Ill.App.2d 256, 262 N.E.2d 99. Criminal Law k
814(17)
480. Credibility of witnesses, motor vehicle theft
That defendant before driving off in automobile had handed owner of
automobile
a card with defendant's name and address on it, with request that owner
find
job for defendant, and that defendant was located through use of such
name and
address went to credibility of testimony but did not make evidence of
defendant's theft of automobile so inherently improbable as to preclude
jury
determination of guilt. People v. Herron, App.1969, 116 Ill.App.2d 55,
252
N.E.2d 734. Larceny k 68(1)
Arresting officer's failure to account for his partner's activity did
not
reflect adversely
partner
would not be able
instructed by
the prosecutor to
his
partner observed.
N.E.2d
475. Criminal Law
on his credibility, where after stating that his
to testify for medical reasons, officer was
state only what he had observed and not what he and
People v. Parker, App.1968, 98 Ill.App.2d 146, 240
k 553
The contradiction by arresting officer as to exclusive possession of
set of
keys to stolen automobile, after the automobile had been taken into
possession
by the police, was peripheral to the main issue of establishing
defendant's
identity as driver of the stolen automobile and went only to the weight
to be
accorded to the arresting officer's testimony. People v. Parker,
App.1968, 98
Ill.App.2d 146, 240 N.E.2d 475. Criminal Law k 553
Credibility of witnesses in prosecution for theft of automobile was
matter for
trial judge. People v. Schumacher, App.1967, 90 Ill.App.2d 385, 234
N.E.2d
574. Criminal Law k 260.11(3.1)
481. Fact questions, motor vehicle theft--In general
Where trial judge was presented with conflicting versions as to how
defendant,
charged with theft, came into possession of missing motor vehicle, it
was
solely within his province, as trier of fact, to determine weight of
evidence
and credibility of witnesses. People v. Jones, App.1968, 99 Ill.App.2d
364,
240 N.E.2d 776. Criminal Law k 260.11(5)
In larceny prosecution wherein police officer denied accused's
allegation that
his statement made in state's attorney's office was result of accused's
having
been beaten and abused by officer, whether officer or accused told
truth was
for court sitting without jury. People v. Topolski, 1935, 196 N.E.
721, 360
Ill. 586. Criminal Law k 255.4
482. ---- Intent, fact questions, motor vehicle theft
The intent to permanently deprive owner of use of vehicle is a question
for
trier of fact. People v. Graydon, App. 4 Dist.1976, 38 Ill.App.3d 792,
349
N.E.2d 127. Larceny k 68(2)
Whether defendant who is accused of stealing motor vehicle had
felonious
intent to permanently deprive owner of motor vehicle is question for
jury.
People v. Graham, App. 5 Dist.1975, 27 Ill.App.3d 408, 327 N.E.2d 261.
Larceny k 68(2)
In prosecution of defendant, who admitted walking along curb and
looking into
automobiles to see if ignition keys had been left in automobiles, for
larceny
of automobile, questions whether automobile had been taken with
felonious
intent and whether there was intention to return automobile were for
jury.
People v. Heaton, 1953, 112 N.E.2d 131, 415 Ill. 43. Larceny k 68(2)
483. Verdict, motor vehicle theft
Although based on the same incident, finding of guilty of misdemeanor
theft
and acquittal of criminal trespass to a vehicle were not inconsistent
where
facts failed to demonstrate that defendant entered the automobile,
which
showing was necessary for finding of criminal trespass, but evidence
demonstrated that he caused the vehicle's removal from owner's property
for
purpose of sale, which showing was sufficient for finding of guilt
under the
theft statute. People v. Brown, App. 1 Dist.1977, 13 Ill.Dec. 890, 56
Ill.App.3d 348, 371 N.E.2d 982. Criminal Law k 878(4)
Conviction of larceny of motor vehicle under counts of indictment
without
reference to counts charging grand larceny of automobile of value of
$200 was
acquittal of grand larceny charge. People v. Sobucki, 1944, 56 N.E.2d
628,
387 Ill. 358. Criminal Law k 878(3)
Verdict specifically finding accused guilty on count charging larceny
of motor
vehicle without reference to count charging grand larceny was
equivalent to
acquittal on charge of grand larceny. People v. Smithka, 1934, 191
N.E. 211,
356 Ill. 624. Criminal Law k 878(3)
484. Judgment, motor vehicle theft
Felony theft conviction for allegedly knowingly exerting unauthorized
control
over victim's automobile with intent of depriving her permanently of
use and
benefit thereof would be vacated and conviction for attempt to commit
theft in
excess of $300 would be entered, absent evidence that defendant had
removed
entire ignition mechanism, thereby enabling him to activate car with
his
tools, with result that defendant's actions were, at most, steps
preliminary
to assertion of actual control or complete physical dominion over the
vehicle.
People v. Mullinex, App. 2 Dist.1984, 80 Ill.Dec. 344, 125 Ill.App.3d
87, 465
N.E.2d 135. Criminal Law k 1184(3)
That judgment imposing sentence for larceny of motor vehicle did not
set out
term of years did not render judgment inoperative, since term fixed by
Criminal Code for particular offense is read into judgment. People v.
Reese,
1951, 100 N.E.2d 907, 410 Ill. 11. Sentencing And Punishment k 1118
Where first count of indictment charged defendant with larceny of an
automobile without fixing any value, and second count charged larceny
of
automobile and fixed its value at $500, a judgment finding defendant
guilty of
theft of an automobile and sentencing him therefor, rather than for
grand
larceny, was not erroneous. People v. Twigg, 1947, 74 N.E.2d 710, 398
Ill. 50
. Criminal Law k 990.1
Where indictment in three counts charged larceny of an automobile
without
fixing any value and in three counts charged larceny of an automobile
fixing a
value, judgment finding defendant guilty of larceny of an automobile
was not
error, notwithstanding one count of indictment showed automobile to
have a
value of $400 which would have rendered the offense grand larceny.
People v.
Justat, 1945, 58 N.E.2d 887, 389 Ill. 138. Criminal Law k 990.1
Where indictment charged stealing a motor vehicle of value of $400,
plea of
guilty required sentencing for crime of grand larceny, and judgment
should
have been for not less than one or more than ten years, and court erred
in
sentencing defendant to reformatory for from one to twenty years. It
was not
necessary for judgment to find value of property stolen when it had
been
confessed by plea of guilty. People v. Huber, 1945, 58 N.E.2d 879, 389
Ill.
192. Larceny k 88
Where trial court, in mistaken belief that indictment charged larceny
of motor
vehicle under ch. 38, <section> 388a (repealed) instead of grand
larceny under
ch. 38, <section> 389 (repealed), sentenced accused to reformatory for
a term
of one to twenty years on his plea of guilty and judgment required
sheriff to
execute it by delivering defendant to reformatory within thirty days,
presumption was that judgment was carried out at that time. People v.
French,
1944, 55 N.E.2d 53, 387 Ill. 16. Criminal Law k 1144.17
485. Sentencing, motor vehicle theft--In general
That judgment imposing sentence for larceny of motor vehicle did not
set out
term of years did not render judgment inoperative, since term fixed by
Criminal Code for particular offense is read into judgment. People v.
Reese,
1951, 100 N.E.2d 907, 410 Ill. 11. Sentencing And Punishment k 1118
Sentence for larceny of an automobile was erroneous in so far as it
included
recommendation for minimum and maximum sentences. People v. Justat,
1945, 58
N.E.2d 887, 389 Ill. 138. Larceny k 88
486. ---- Included offenses, sentencing, motor vehicle theft
By reason of enhanced penalty, possession of stolen motor vehicle is no
longer
lesser included offense of theft; accordingly, proportional penalty
analysis
is no longer relevant in comparing the two offenses. People v. Ward,
App. 1
Dist.1990, 141 Ill.Dec. 162, 194 Ill.App.3d 229, 550 N.E.2d 1208.
Indictment
And Information k 191(5)
Sentencing scheme permitting harsher sentence for possession of stolen
motor
vehicle than for theft of motor vehicle did not violate constitutional
guarantees of due process and proportionate penalties; legislative
history
showed penalty for possession of stolen motor vehicle was gradually
increased
as part of deliberate effort to curb offense of automobile theft,
courts are
reluctant to invalidate penalties enacted by legislature, and parity
between
penalties for the two offenses was not required. People v. Carlyle,
App. 1
Dist.1987, 111 Ill.Dec. 815, 159 Ill.App.3d 964, 513 N.E.2d 61, appeal
denied
113 Ill.Dec. 306, 116 Ill.2d 564, 515 N.E.2d 115. Constitutional Law k
270(1);
Sentencing And Punishment k 38;
Receiving Stolen Goods k 10
Possession of stolen vehicle was lesser-included offense of theft,
since both
offenses arose from single act and, hence, only one sentence should
have been
imposed, and that one should have been for the greater offense, namely,
theft.
People v. Valentino, App. 1 Dist.1985, 86 Ill.Dec. 413, 131 Ill.App.3d
257,
475 N.E.2d 627, appeal denied. Indictment And Information k 191(5)
Where defendant was convicted of armed robbery and theft, extended term
sentence for lesser offense of theft was improper. People v. Akins,
App. 4
Dist.1984, 84 Ill.Dec. 237, 128 Ill.App.3d 1009, 471 N.E.2d 1003.
Sentencing
And Punishment k 537
487. ---- Multiple counts, sentencing, motor vehicle theft
Where accused stole motor vehicle on prison grounds as part of his plan
of
escape, theft was not independently motivated or otherwise separable
from
conduct which constituted offense of escape and it was, therefore,
improper to
sentence accused on theft charge as well as escape charge. People v.
Whittington, 1970, 46 Ill.2d 405, 265 N.E.2d 679. Sentencing And
Punishment k
532
Only one sentence, and that for the greater offense of automobile
theft,
should have been imposed in prosecution for automobile theft and
criminal
trespass to vehicle, based upon single act. People v. Torello,
App.1969, 109
Ill.App.2d 433, 248 N.E.2d 725, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 1089, 397
U.S. 972,
25 L.Ed.2d 266. Sentencing And Punishment k 532
488. ---- Indeterminate sentence, sentencing, motor vehicle theft
Sentence of three to ten years upon conviction of theft, exceeding $150
and
possession of motor vehicle with falsified identification number was
not
excessive and was within proper discretion of trial court, considering
defendant's prior record including two felony convictions. People v.
Kilgore,
App. 2 Dist.1975, 33 Ill.App.3d 557, 338 N.E.2d 124. Automobiles k
359;
Larceny k 88
Sentence of from three to five years imposed on defendant, who pleaded
guilty
to charge of theft in excess of $150, an automobile, and who at time he
stole
the automobile was on parole was appropriate and not excessive. People
v.
Brown, App.1972, 5 Ill.App.3d 644, 283 N.E.2d 732. Larceny k 88
Indeterminate sentence of one to five years on conviction of auto theft
was
not excessive in view of statutory limits of one-year minimum and tenyear
maximum sentence. People v. Johnson, App.1970, 128 Ill.App.2d 445, 262
N.E.2d
6. Larceny k 88
489. ---- Periodic imprisonment, sentencing, motor vehicle theft
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sentence, upon
defendant's conviction for felony theft of an automobile, of periodic
imprisonment for 18 months, with three separate two-week periods to be
served
in county correction center. People v. Daniels, App. 2 Dist.1983, 69
Ill.Dec.
291, 113 Ill.App.3d 523, 447 N.E.2d 508. Larceny k 88
490. ---- Aggravation and mitigation, sentencing, motor vehicle theft
Sentence of defendant, who was convicted of grand theft of automobile,
from
one to four years was not excessive, notwithstanding contention that
defendant
did not have a prior record and was attending a business college
training to
be a tailor, where sentence was well within maximum limits and where
there
were aggravating circumstances surrounding theft of car, ensuing cases,
and
flight of defendant after automobile crash involving stolen automobile.
People v. Wright, App. 1 Dist.1974, 24 Ill.App.3d 26, 320 N.E.2d 483.
Larceny
k 88
In absence of mitigating circumstances tending to confirm possibility
of
rehabilitation of defendant, who pleaded guilty to theft of an
automobile,
other than statements of his counsel that defendant had not been
convicted of
any crimes of passion or violence and that he had served four years in
the
armed forces, sentence of eight to ten years was proper even though
automobile
involved was eight years old and not worth much more than $150. People
v.
Lampley, App.1971, 1 Ill.App.3d 282, 274 N.E.2d 171. Larceny k 88
Imposing sentence of not less than two nor more than seven years in
state
penitentiary for theft of automobile was not abuse of discretion where
sentence was within limits prescribed by this section and where
defendant had
pleaded nolo contendere to charge of theft of rifle and riding saddle,
had
been charged with criminal trespass to an automobile and had had
difficulties
from over-use of alcoholic beverages. People v. Juve, App.1969, 106
Ill.App.2d 421, 245 N.E.2d 293. Larceny k 88
491. ---- Restitution, sentencing, motor vehicle theft
In sentencing defendant on his conviction for felony theft of
automobile,
trial court was without authority to order restitution paid to victim's
wife
for loss of property which allegedly was in the car at time it was
stolen
since wife was not "victim" of the offense and evidence that the
property was
in the car was contained in unsworn hearsay in presentence report.
People v.
Daniels, App. 2 Dist.1983, 69 Ill.Dec. 291, 113 Ill.App.3d 523, 447
N.E.2d 508
. Sentencing And Punishment k 2124
492. ---- Excessive punishment, sentencing, motor vehicle theft
Where defendant, who was convicted of theft of automobile of value in
excess
of $150, had been incarcerated for four separate misdemeanor offenses
during
preceding six years and served two one-year terms in state farm,
sentencing of
defendant to from two to ten years in state penitentiary was not
excessive,
though defendant's conviction for theft was his first felony
conviction.
People v. Insolata, App.1969, 112 Ill.App.2d 269, 251 N.E.2d 73.
Sentencing
And Punishment k 1416
493. ---- Resentencing, motor vehicle theft
Where indictment charged defendant with theft of an automobile having
value of
more than $100 and there was no evidence of automobile's value,
sentencing
defendant upon conviction to four to eight years under this section
governing
theft of property exceeding $150 in value was error, and defendant was
sentenced by reviewing court from one to five years under same section
governing second or subsequent theft of property not exceeding $150 in
value.
People v. Price, App.1967, 81 Ill.App.2d 111, 225 N.E.2d 453.
Sentencing And
Punishment k 630; Criminal Law k 1184(4.1)
494. Review, motor vehicle theft
Where trial court, in mistaken belief that indictment charged larceny
of motor
vehicle instead of grand larceny, sentenced accused to reformatory for
from
one to twenty years on his plea of guilty, and accused had presumably
been
incarcerated for more than maximum ten-year term to which he should
have been
sentenced, no remandment for resentencing was required on reversal.
People v.
Huber, 1946, 389 Ill. 192, 58 N.E.2d 879; People v. French, 1944, 387
Ill.
16, 55 N.E.2d 53.
Issue of whether information charging defendant with theft of
automobile
having value in excess of $150 was substantially defective in that it
improperly alleged that owner of automobile was corporation rather than
individual was not waived by failure to file posttrial motion. People
v.
Mick, App. 5 Dist.1980, 42 Ill.Dec. 370, 86 Ill.App.3d 1022, 408 N.E.2d
1079.
Criminal Law k 1044.1(2)
Reviewing court would not substitute its judgment for trial court's
judgment,
in bench trial at which defendant was found guilty of theft of
automobile, in
choosing not to believe testimony of tavern operator, who employed
defendant,
tending to explain how defendant obtained possession of automobile.
People v.
Jones, App.1969, 112 Ill.App.2d 464, 251 N.E.2d 293. Criminal Law k
260.11(5)
Where trial court in mistaken belief that indictment charged larceny of
a
motor vehicle instead of grand larceny sentenced accused to
penitentiary for
indeterminate term of one to twenty years on his plea of guilty and
accused
had served more than maximum term for grand larceny, the cause would
not be
remanded upon reversal of trial court's judgment. People v. Brown,
1943, 48
N.E.2d 953, 383 Ill. 287. Criminal Law k 1188
VI. THEFT OF ENTRUSTED PROPERTY
<Subdivision Index>
Accomplice testimony, sufficiency of evidence 562
Accountability 526
Admissibility of evidence 550-556
Admissibility of evidence - In general 550
Admissibility of evidence - Admissions of accused 554
Admissibility of evidence - Books and records 555
Admissibility of evidence - Competency of evidence 551
Admissibility of evidence - Cross-examination 556
Admissibility of evidence - Intent 552
Admissibility of evidence - Other crimes 553
Admissions of accused, admissibility of evidence 554
Argument of counsel 544
Bailment 535
Books and records, admissibility of evidence 555
Burden of proof 545-549
Burden of proof - In general 545
Burden of proof - Consent 548
Burden of proof - Corpus delicti 549
Burden of proof - Intent 547
Burden of proof - Ownership 546
Circumstantial evidence, sufficiency of evidence 563
Competency of evidence, admissibility of evidence 551
Consent, burden of proof 548
Control 524
Conversion 528
Corpus delicti, burden of proof 549
Corpus delicti, sufficiency of evidence 560
Counsel, argument of 544
Cross-examination, admissibility of evidence 556
Defenses 542, 543
Defenses - In general 542
Defenses - Restitution 543
Deposit in officer's name, public funds 533
Deprivation of use or benefit, sufficiency of evidence 559
Election of offenses, indictment 541
Embezzlement 527
Evidence, admissibility of 550-556
Evidence, sufficiency of 557-563
Gambling 521
Indictment 537-541
Indictment - In general 537
Indictment - Election of offenses 541
Indictment - Ownership of property 539
Indictment - Statutory language 538
Indictment - Variance 540
Instructions 564, 565
Instructions - In general 564
Instructions - Statutory language 565
Intent 525
Intent, admissibility of evidence 552
Intent, burden of proof 547
Intent, sufficiency of evidence 558
Interest, public funds 532
Negotiable instruments 530
Other crimes, admissibility of evidence 553
Ownership 523
Ownership, burden of proof 546
Ownership of property, indictment 539
Preservation of issue, review 570
Property 522
Public funds 531-534
Public funds - In general 531
Public funds - Deposit in officer's name 533
Public funds - Interest 532
Public funds - Warrants 534
Reasonable doubt, sufficiency of evidence 561
Restitution, defenses 543
Restitution, sentencing 568
Review 569, 570
Review - In general 569
Review - Preservation of issue 570
Security deposits 529
Sentencing 567, 568
Sentencing - In general 567
Sentencing - Restitution 568
Statutory language, indictment 538
Statutory language, instructions 565
Sufficiency of evidence 557-563
Sufficiency of evidence - In general 557
Sufficiency of evidence - Accomplice testimony 562
Sufficiency of evidence - Circumstantial evidence 563
Sufficiency of evidence - Corpus delicti 560
Sufficiency of evidence - Deprivation of use or benefit 559
Sufficiency of evidence - Intent 558
Sufficiency of evidence - Reasonable doubt 561
Variance, indictment 540
Venue 536
Verdict 566
Warrants, public funds 534
521. Gambling, theft of entrusted property
One who obtains money from another on the pretense that he will bet it
for him
on a race, which he pretends to do, and converts the money to his own
use, is
guilty of larceny. Doss v. People, 1895, 41 N.E. 1093, 158 Ill. 660,
49
Am.St.Rep. 180. Larceny k 15(1)
522. Property, theft of entrusted property
Where an attorney authorized to receive and collect drafts by his
client
converted the proceeds of a draft so received, he cannot defeat
conviction for
embezzlement on the ground that the draft was not property within the
statute,
not having been received by the client or a person authorized. People
v.
Duzan, 1916, 112 N.E. 315, 272 Ill. 478.
Embezzlement k 6
523. Ownership, theft of entrusted property
The fact that defendant was entitled to a fee for examining the title
to land
offered as security, which was to be paid by the borrower and generally
was
paid by permitting him to deduct the amount from checks for the loan
issued to
the borrower and indorsed back to the association for the payment of
outstanding obligations against the land, does not make him a joint
owner of
checks after their indorsement and return to the association so as to
prevent
his conviction for embezzling the checks. People v. Jasiecki, 1921,
133 N.E.
281, 301 Ill. 23. Embezzlement k 8
Since the fraudulent conversion must be of property belonging
exclusively to
another than accused, a partner cannot be guilty of embezzlement of
partnership property. People v. Dettmering, 1917, 116 N.E. 205, 278
Ill. 580.
Embezzlement k 8; Embezzlement k 15
The rule that a partnership was not a person or legal entity, as
distinguished
from the members composing the firm in whom the right of property
existed, was
not altered by R.S.1874, p. 348, div. 1, <section> 76
(Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch.
38, <section> 209; repealed, now this section). People v. Dettmering,
1917,
116 N.E. 205, 278 Ill. 580. Embezzlement k 8
Where accused, who was agent for the prosecuting witness, brought her a
large
sum of money, which she placed in a safety deposit box, and the
evidence
tended to show that she owed accused a small sum and expected to pay
him out
of the money in the deposit box, but did not wish to pay then, accused
who had
access to the box and embezzled the money therein, was not a joint
owner with
the prosecuting witness, as respects his guilt of embezzlement. People
v.
Goodrich, 1911, 96 N.E. 542, 251 Ill. 558. Embezzlement k 48(3)
Where accused, as agent of prosecutor, had an interest in certain rent
collected by him, he could not be convicted of larceny by embezzlement
of such
rent. Where accused by a contract in writing was empowered to dispose
of
certain hotel property as best he could, and when disposed of to pay
over the
proceeds to prosecutrix, such contract did not confer on accused an
interest
in the proceeds to the extent of any commissions he might be entitled
to for
his services; and hence his conversion of a portion thereof
constituted
larceny by embezzlement. People v. O'Farrell, 1910, 93 N.E. 136, 247
Ill. 44.
Embezzlement k 8
Agent who has the right first to deduct her commissions before paying
over to
her employer money collected and is, therefore, a joint owner of the
gross
sum, cannot embezzle it. McElroy v. People, 1903, 66 N.E. 1058, 202
Ill. 473.
Embezzlement k 44(4)
Money collected by an attorney-at-law for his client was not the
property of
the attorney in such manner as that he was not guilty of embezzlement
if he
appropriated it to his own use. Dinsmoor v. Bressler, 1895, 56
Ill.App. 207.
524. Control, theft of entrusted property
Mere act of attorney in fact in depositing to his own account proceeds
of
employer's notes, bonds, and stock did not necessarily render him
guilty of
embezzlement or fraudulent conversion. People v. Davis, 1915, 110 N.E.
9, 269
Ill. 256. Embezzlement k 11(1); Embezzlement k 14
Conversion by broker of money intrusted to him to be loaned constituted
embezzlement. Kribs v. People, 1876, 82 Ill. 425.
The statute treated an attorney in respect to the money he collected
for his
client and fails to turn over to them on demand the same in a criminal
point
of view as justice of the peace, clerk of the court or other persons
authorized by law to collect money, and subjected him to punishment as
an
embezzler to fine and imprisonment in county jail and disqualified him
from
practicing his profession. Dinsmoor v. Bressler, 1895, 56 Ill.App.
207.
525. Intent, theft of entrusted property
Intent is specific element of embezzlement. People v. Clark, 1956, 9
Ill.2d
46, 137 N.E.2d 54, certiorari denied 77 S.Ct. 559, 352 U.S. 1002, 1
L.Ed.2d
546; People v. O'Malley, 1949, 404 Ill. 165, 88 N.E.2d 454.
Although an intent to steal may ordinarily be inferred when a person
takes
property of another, proof of existence of state of mind incompatible
with an
intent to steal precludes a finding of theft. People v. Steinmann,
App. 5
Dist.1978, 15 Ill.Dec. 411, 57 Ill.App.3d 887, 373 N.E.2d 757. Larceny
k 57
Criminal intent was an essential element of the crime of embezzlement,
though
law defining offense failed so to declare it. People v. Riggins, 1958,
13
Ill.2d 134, 148 N.E.2d 450. Embezzlement k 5
Crime of "embezzlement" is not established by showing that an unsettled
account exists between principal and agent, or where a debtor-creditor
relation is shown, but it must be proved that agent converted property
to his
own use with felonious intent to deprive owner of property of its use.
People
v. Streich, 1935, 198 N.E. 350, 361 Ill. 490. Embezzlement k 44(6)
"Embezzlement" involves secrecy and concealment of conversion, and
absence of
proof thereof tends to negative accused's felonious intent. People v.
Parker,
1934, 189 N.E. 352, 355 Ill. 258. Embezzlement k 44(6)
One of elements necessary to be proven to constitute crime of
embezzlement by
clerk of court is criminal intent. People v. Ervin, 1930, 174 N.E.
529, 342
Ill. 421. Embezzlement k 5
526. Accountability, theft of entrusted property
Under the statute providing that one who stands by, and aids, abets, or
assists, or who, not being present, has advised, encouraged, or
abetted, the
perpetration of a crime, is a principal, and punishable accordingly,
where
defendants co-operated together in the conversion to their own use of
money
intrusted to them as bailees, they were equally guilty, irrespective of
which
one of them actually received the money from the bailor. McCracken v.
People,
1904, 70 N.E. 749, 209 Ill. 215. Embezzlement k 24
527. Embezzlement, theft of entrusted property
"Embezzlement" differs from "larceny," in that in case of embezzlement
accused
acquires possession lawfully as agent but subsequently converts
property
received with felonious intent. People v. Strong, 1936, 363 Ill. 602,
2
N.E.2d 942; People v. Streich, 1935, 361 Ill. 490, 198 N.E. 350;
People v.
Stevens, 1935, 358 Ill. 391, 193 N.E. 154; People v. Parker, 1934, 355
Ill.
258, 189 N.E. 352.
"Embezzlement" consists of the accused's conversion of another's funds
in his
possession in a fiduciary capacity, and the crime is complete when
there is a
fraudulent conversion without owner's consent. People v. Curoe, App. 1
Dist.1981, 52 Ill.Dec. 722, 97 Ill.App.3d 258, 422 N.E.2d 931.
Embezzlement k
4
A crime such as embezzlement is a continuing offense and is not
complete until
last known act in furtherance thereof has been committed. People v.
Adams,
App.1969, 106 Ill.App.2d 396, 245 N.E.2d 904. Criminal Law k 150
Embezzlement was unknown at common law, and its scope is limited to
those
persons designated by statute. People v. Riggins, 1956, 8 Ill.2d 78,
132
N.E.2d 519. Embezzlement k 12.1
"Embezzlement" is a generic term including a number of different
offenses.
People v. Chisholm, 1939, 19 N.E.2d 578, 370 Ill. 634. Embezzlement k
1
"Embezzlement" is not established by showing unsettled account between
principal and agent, but people must prove that agent converted
principal's
property to his own use with felonious intent to deprive owner thereof.
Agent's acts of maladministration, indifference to principal's
interests, or
breach of trust do not justify conviction for "embezzlement," unless
evidence
proves that he feloniously converted principal's property to his own
use or
took and secreted it with such intent, without principal's consent.
People v.
Parker, 1934, 189 N.E. 352, 355 Ill. 258. Embezzlement k 44(6)
Embezzlement was unknown at common law and was purely statutory.
People v.
Powell, 1933, 187 N.E. 419, 353 Ill. 582. Embezzlement k 1
Embezzlement was statutory offense governed by provisions of statute.
People
v. Preble, 1925, 147 N.E. 124, 316 Ill. 233. Embezzlement k 1
Whether there has been sufficient conversion to make out the crime of
embezzlement, is always dependent upon the instant circumstances and
relations
of the parties. People v. Ehle, 1916, 112 N.E. 970, 273 Ill. 424.
Embezzlement k 11(1)
528. Conversion, theft of entrusted property
Accused's deposit of client's draft in bank to his own credit contrary
to
client's instructions was fraudulent conversion of draft to accused's
use.
People v. Nevin, 1931, 175 N.E. 797, 343 Ill. 597. Embezzlement k
11(1)
Where accused did a collection agency business, and tried cases before
justices of the peace, holding himself out as an attorney at law, his
deposit
of client's draft in bank to his own credit contrary to client's
instructions
was fraudulent conversion of draft to accused's use. People v. Nevin,
1931,
175 N.E. 797, 343 Ill. 597.
A commission merchant unlawfully converted the goods of a patron to his
own
use under R.S.1874, p. 348, div. 1, <section> 78 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1961,
ch. 38,
<section> 212; repealed), although he gave the owner a check in payment
for
the goods, where the check was refused payment for want of funds in the
bank.
Warriner v. People, 1874, 74 Ill. 346.
The conversion by a collection agent of money belonging to his
principal is
embezzlement. City Trust S.D. & S. Co. v. Lee, 1903, 107 Ill.App. 263,
affirmed 204 Ill. 69, 68 N.E. 485.
529. Security deposits, theft of entrusted property
Where under terms of lease landlord had right to control security
deposit
until termination of lease and part of security deposit remained
unpaid, fact
that premises were occupied when tenant was to take possession did not
entitle
tenant to demand portion of security deposit which he had paid and
landlord's
refusal to return that portion of deposit did not constitute theft.
People v.
Mattingly, App.1969, 106 Ill.App.2d 74, 245 N.E.2d 647. Embezzlement k
10
530. Negotiable instruments, theft of entrusted property
President would be guilty of embezzlement of funds of bank by means of
notes,
notwithstanding loans were afterwards approved by board of directors,
where no
director other than president had knowledge that loans were not bona
fide.
People v. Binga, 1935, 195 N.E. 437, 360 Ill. 18. Embezzlement k 23
Bank president who was also treasurer of park district was not guilty
of
embezzling bank's funds where no restrictions on treasurer's authority
to
withdraw deposits were shown, and withdrawals by treasurer from park
district's account were debited on bank's books. People v. Wolf, 1933,
185
N.E. 233, 352 Ill. 109. Embezzlement k 11(1)
Employee fraudulently appropriating check to his own use and obtaining
for
himself amount for which it was drawn was guilty of embezzlement,
notwithstanding restricted indorsement on check. People v. Dean, 1926,
151
N.E. 505, 321 Ill. 128. Embezzlement k 6
Employee who appropriated check given to him by his employer to be
deposited,
and through false representations obtained amount for which check was
drawn,
was guilty of embezzlement, notwithstanding check contained a
restricted
indorsement, since the paper itself is a thing the embezzlement of
which is a
crime. People v. Dean, 1926, 151 N.E. 505, 321 Ill. 128.
Under <section><section> 207, 208 and 387 (repealed), employee who
appropriated check given to him by his employer to be deposited, and
through
false representations obtained amount for which check was drawn, was
guilty of
embezzlement, notwithstanding check contained a restricted indorsement,
since
the paper itself was a thing the embezzlement of which was a crime.
People v.
Dean, 1926, 151 N.E. 505, 321 Ill. 128.
531. Public funds, theft of entrusted property--In general
A public officer can be convicted of embezzling public funds only when
such
funds come into his hands by virtue of some duty or authority conferred
by
statute. People v. O'Connell, 1944, 54 N.E.2d 521, 386 Ill. 606.
Embezzlement
k 10
The Industrial Commission has authority to receive from self-insurer
bonds and
to hold them in trust, and the commission's chief security examiner in
receiving bonds was acting in his official capacity so as to be liable
under
this section for embezzlement when he converted them to his own use.
People
v. O'Connell, 1944, 54 N.E.2d 521, 386 Ill. 606. Embezzlement k 10;
Workers'
Compensation k 1059
Where assistant cashier of bureau of water misappropriated a check,
made in
payment of one account, to cover his prior defalcation in another
account
arising out of his misappropriations of money, the acts constituted a
criminal
offense within Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section> 214 (repealed; now
this
section). People v. Donohue, 1938, 17 N.E.2d 21, 369 Ill. 558.
Embezzlement k
11(2)
Where defendant, assistant cashier in the bureau of water, in violation
of
rule of water company requiring checks to be deposited on the day on
which
received, credited checks to accounts that had previously been paid in
cash
for the purpose of covering up previous defalcations in using the cash
for his
own purposes, the defendant, by failing to deposit checks on day
received,
thereby misappropriated funds belonging to water bureau and converted
them to
his own use. People v. Donohue, 1938, 17 N.E.2d 21, 369 Ill. 558.
Embezzlement k 11(2)
Interest of village in funds for redemption of its special assessment
bonds
was subject to embezzlement, since title to funds was unnecessary.
People v.
Pentis, 1935, 199 N.E. 805, 362 Ill. 306. Embezzlement k 6
Where village treasurer purchased special assessment bonds of village
at
discount and redeemed them at face value by drawing checks on special
assessment funds, retention of profits from such transaction by
treasurer held
not embezzlement, since profits never belonged to village, were never
in its
possession and never intrusted by it to treasurer. People v. Pentis,
1935,
199 N.E. 805, 362 Ill. 306. Embezzlement k 4
Town supervisor, could not be convicted of embezzling money on proof
that he
had received from the town collector town orders as such, even if he
had
embezzled the orders.
503.
Weimer v. People, 1900, 58 N.E. 378, 186 Ill.
Officer's agreement, in consideration of sureties' signing his bond, to
deposit public funds in their banks, for his and their benefit, is
unlawful
and against public policy. Ramsay's Estate v. Whitbeck, 1900, 56 N.E.
322,
183 Ill. 550. Contracts k 131
Defendant, treasurer of the state university, pledged $28,000 of
interest-bearing bonds of the invested endowment fund of the
university, and
received $25,000, which was placed to his credit in a bank of which he
was
president. He was prohibited by statute from investing the state moneys
in
anything except certain bonds, and from changing the securities except
from
one specified class to another, and such misapplication or
misappropriation
was made a criminal offense. There were three classes of funds held by
defendant as treasurer, viz. the general fund, the university endowment
fund,
and the invested endowment fund. The defendant was charged with the
knowledge
that warrants drawn on him for current expenses were not drawn on or
payable
out of the endowment fund, and that their payment out of such fund was
a
criminal offense under <section> 214 (repealed). If the deficit had
been
created in the expenses fund by his use of it under the supposition
that, by
the alleged agreement to pay interest, he could use it for himself by
supplying this deficit, the application of the $25,000 thereto was the
application to his own use, and not to the use of the university. In
both a
criminal intent is necessary, but if the acts constituting the
embezzlement
are fraudulently done, they are done with a criminal intent." Spalding
v.
People, 1898, 49 N.E. 993, 172 Ill. 40. Embezzlement k 11(2)
The test of criminality was not the agreement by the officer to deposit
public
funds for safe keeping at a place designated by his sureties from which
they
could be withdrawn in whole or in part at any time without notice; but
the
test was, the investment or the loaning of public funds for his own
use; in
other words it was the temporary conversion of public funds to his own
use.
Ramsey's Estate v. Whitbeck, 1899, 81 Ill.App. 210, reversed on other
grounds
183 Ill. 550, 56 N.E. 322.
532. ---- Interest, public funds, theft of entrusted property
R.S.1874, p. 348, div. 1, <section> 81 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38,
<section>
215; repealed), and ch. 36, <section> 4, providing that the county
treasurer
should receive and safely keep revenues and other public moneys of
county,
forbade the conclusion that fund collected by county treasurer was the
private
property of such officer, and therefore he was not entitled to interest
received on such fund, but was required to account to county therefor.
Lake
County v. Westerfield, 1916, 196 Ill.App. 432, affirmed 273 Ill. 124,
112 N.E.
308, Ann.Cas.1918E, 102.
If sureties on officer's bonds were furnished on an agreement that
public
funds should be loaned for officer's use and they were afterward
loaned, then
the offense was complete whether loans drew interest or not, and
therefore it
followed that receiving interest was not a necessary element of the
criminal
act but was a circumstance tending to show that the payment of interest
was
consequent on an agreement made with the officer for a loan on which
interest
was to be paid. Ramsey's Estate v. Whitbeck, 1899, 81 Ill.App. 210,
reversed
on other grounds 183 Ill. 550, 56 N.E. 322.
533. ---- Deposit in officer's name, public funds, theft of entrusted
property
The deposit of tax collections in banks by town collector in that
capacity did
not constitute violation of Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section> 215
(repealed), condemning investment of public funds by public officer for
his
own personal enrichment, notwithstanding crediting of interest to
account.
State Bank & Trust Co. v. Commercial Trust & Sav. Bank, App.1939, 21
N.E.2d
157, 300 Ill.App. 435. Towns k 59
That the treasurer of a sanitary district deposited the funds of the
district
in his own name, with the addition of the word "Treas.," taking a
certificate
of deposit, did not constitute embezzlement under Ill.Rev.Stat.1961,
ch. 38,
<section> 215 (repealed). McCormick v. Hopkins, 1919, 122 N.E. 151,
287 Ill.
66. Embezzlement k 11(2)
534. ---- Warrants, public funds, theft of entrusted property
Accused who, as secretary of board of education, filed fictitious
claims,
obtained orders directing payment and warrants signed by president of
board,
accused, and school treasurer, and disposed of warrants at discount was
not
guilty of embezzlement, since warrants were void, and neither district
nor
board had possession or control of or property interest in warrants.
People
v. Hayes, 1937, 6 N.E.2d 645, 365 Ill. 318. Embezzlement k 7
535. Bailment, theft of entrusted property
Possession may be obtained lawfully, of goods to be returned to the
giver, but
converting them to one's own use is larceny as bailee. Murphy v.
People,
1882, 104 Ill. 528; Stimson v. People, 1867, 43 Ill. 397; Welsh v.
People,
1856, 17 Ill. 339.
If owner of property parts with possession and title, expecting a
return of
something other than property delivered, "larceny as bailee" may not be
founded upon such transaction; but, where owner parts with possession
but not
with title expecting property shall be returned, property may be
feloniously
converted by bailee, and such conversion relates back to taking as
bailment
and constitutes larceny as bailee. People v. Garrahey, 1943, 52 N.E.2d
132,
385 Ill. 45. Larceny k 15(1); Larceny k 15(2)
In applying principles of bailment to a criminal action of larceny by
bailee,
it is established rule that if owner of goods alleged to have been
stolen
parts with both possession and title of goods to alleged thief
expecting
something other than such goods to be returned to him, neither taking
nor
conversion amounts to "larceny", and this is true title and possession
through
fraud and where owner is induced to part with misrepresentation of
alleged
thief, but if owner parts with possession although voluntarily but does
not
part with title, expecting and intending that goods shall be returned
to him
or disposed of in some particular manner as directed or agreed upon for
his
benefit, the goods may, under such circumstances, be feloniously
converted by
bailee and the conversion relates back and makes the taking and
conversion a
"larceny". People v. Moses, 1940, 31 N.E.2d 585, 375 Ill. 336. Larceny
k
15(1)
One receiving furs for purpose of purchase, who was bound to return
them if
price could not be agreed on, may be convicted of larceny as bailee for
conversion. People v. Barnard, 1927, 158 N.E. 729, 327 Ill. 305.
Larceny k
15(1)
Where owner of goods alleged to have been stolen parts with both
possession
and title to alleged thief, expecting something other than such goods
to be
returned, neither taking nor conversion is felonious, but can at most
amount
only to fraud. People v. Barnard, 1927, 158 N.E. 729, 327 Ill. 305.
Larceny k
14(1)
Where owner parts with possession of goods, though voluntarily, but
does not
part with title, and expects that same thing shall be returned to him,
or that
it shall be disposed of on his account, or in particular way as
directed or
agreed, for his benefit, goods may be feloniously converted by bailee,
and
such conversion may relate back to and make such taking and constitute
larceny. People v. Barnard, 1927, 158 N.E. 729, 327 Ill. 305.
Agent of seller of land to buyer, who agreed to pay in stock, and
subsequently
gave her notes to the agent as collateral for undelivered stock, by his
own
sale of one of the notes, and appropriation of the proceeds several
days after
the buyer delivered all the stock and completely closed the contract,
was
guilty of larceny as bailee. People v. Lalor., 1919, 124 N.E. 866, 290
Ill.
234. Larceny k 15(3)
Keeping the money received in exchange for a bill given one to secure
change
is larceny as bailee. Farrell v. People, 1855, 16 Ill. 506.
Consignment binding consignee to return diamonds within reasonable
time, and
rendering him liable in action in assumpsit on failure to do so, was
not
bailment but contract on sale or return, hence consignee was not guilty
of
larceny by bailee because he pawned diamonds before paying for them.
People
v. Feldstein, 1934, 273 Ill.App. 47.
536. Venue, theft of entrusted property
Evidence that defendant's employer was located in county and that
defendant
lived and worked in county established venue in prosecution arising
from
thefts and forgeries of employer's checks. People v. Toellen, App. 3
Dist.1978, 23 Ill.Dec. 686, 66 Ill.App.3d 967, 384 N.E.2d 480.
Criminal Law k
564(1)
Venue of indictment charging embezzlement of tax money collected by
distributor under Motor Fuel Tax Law (ch. 120, <section><section> 417
to 434),
was properly laid in county where accused was obligated to account.
People v.
Kopman, 1934, 193 N.E. 516, 358 Ill. 479. Criminal Law k 112(4)
Where the evidence showed that defendant had his office as treasurer of
the
University of Illinois, a public corporation, kept the bonds in
controversy in
the vaults, and pledged them with a bank, all in the same city and in
the
county in which the prosecution was brought, the venue was sufficiently
proved. Spalding v. People, 1898, 49 N.E. 993, 172 Ill. 40. Criminal
Law k
564(1)
537. Indictment, theft of entrusted property--In general
Indictment for embezzlement was not duplicitous merely because it
charged
ownership of property in same person in two different capacities.
People v.
O'Malley, 1949, 88 N.E.2d 454, 404 Ill. 165. Indictment And
Information k
125(1)
Where several counts of indictment for embezzlement all arose out of
one
transaction and all charged the same offense, indictment was not
duplicitous.
People v. O'Malley, 1949, 88 N.E.2d 454, 404 Ill. 165. Indictment And
Information k 128
Indictment alleging in one count that defendant fraudulently and
feloniously
embezzled and fraudulently converted to his own use one bull of value
$150,
the personal chattel of another which had been loaned to defendant, and
in
another count, practically the same language except that personal
property of
another had been entrusted to defendant as bailee, was sufficient to
charge
the offense of larceny by bailee, and was not objectionable as charging
more
than one offense. People v. Wheeler, 1949, 84 N.E.2d 832, 403 Ill. 78.
Embezzlement k 26; Indictment And Information k 128
Indictment charging that defendants, who were corporate officers,
directors,
and stockholders, collected motor fuel tax in name of and by and
through
specified corporation, a duly licensed distributor, and unlawfully,
wrongfully, and feloniously embezzled and converted to their own use
such tax
money, did not charge an offense. People v. Chapin, 1936, 4 N.E.2d
365, 364
Ill. 319. Embezzlement k 24
Indictment under <section> 207 (repealed) for embezzlement for failure
to pay
over to state gasoline tax money collected was not subject to motion to
quash
on ground that penalties provided by Motor Fuel Tax Law (ch. 120,
<section>
<section> 417 et seq., 431), for violation thereof were exclusive,
since
essential difference existed between charge of failure to pay over
gasoline
tax collected and charge of "embezzlement," which consisted of
fraudulent
conversion of property or money by a defendant to his own use. People
v.
Kopman, 1934, 193 N.E. 516, 358 Ill. 479. Embezzlement k 9
Indictment charging that defendant as township treasurer embezzled
property of
school district sufficiently charged him with embezzling moneys as
township
treasurer, though indictment did not charge that funds were property of
trustees of schools of township. People v. Lee, 1934, 190 N.E. 264,
356 Ill.
294. Embezzlement k 32
Counts charging defendant with refusing to turn over money to successor
in
office and with embezzlement of same funds was properly joined. People
v.
Rasmussen, 1927, 159 N.E. 360, 328 Ill. 332. Indictment And
Information k
129(1)
Counts of indictment charging defendant with larceny as bailee,
embezzlement
while assistant cashier, and larceny of $1,000 from bank, each charged
offense
which, if proven, made him liable for larceny in view of former chapter
38,
<section><section> 207 and 208 (repealed); see, now, this section.
People v.
Valanchauskas, 1926, 154 N.E. 906, 324 Ill. 187. Embezzlement k 26
538. ---- Statutory language, indictment, theft of entrusted property
Embezzlement indictment couched substantially in statutory language was
sufficiently specific. People v. Fry, 1963, 29 Ill.2d 455, 194 N.E.2d
267.
Indictment And Information k 110(13)
An indictment, charging in the language of the statute that defendant
was the
agent of B., and as such agent collected and embezzled funds belonging
to her
in the amount of $7,000, was sufficient. People v. O'Farrell, 1910, 93
N.E.
136, 247 Ill. 44.
Indictment for larceny by bailee is sufficient if it is in words of the
statute. McCracken v. People, 1904, 70 N.E. 749, 209 Ill. 215.
539. ---- Ownership of property, indictment, theft of entrusted
property
Indictment charging trustee with theft of foundation assets, which
alleged
that property over which defendant exerted unauthorized control was
owned by
the foundation, and which specifically named beneficiaries of the
foundation,
adequately identified owners and beneficiaries of the appropriated
monies.
People v. Lopez, App. 1 Dist.1984, 84 Ill.Dec. 730, 129 Ill.App.3d 488,
472
N.E.2d 867, appeal denied. Larceny k 32(1)
Indictment charging defendant, who had been administrator of an estate,
with
theft of estate assets was not fatally defective for failing to
identify
parties named therein as "owners," in that ownership did not need to be
alleged, and the ten living heirs and estate of one deceased heir were
specifically named in the indictment along with their interest as
heirs.
People v. Curoe, App. 1 Dist.1981, 52 Ill.Dec. 722, 97 Ill.App.3d 258,
422
N.E.2d 931. Larceny k 32(2)
Ownership of property alleged to have been embezzled must be averred in
indictment and must be proved as alleged. People v. Heinzelman, 1933,
184
N.E. 600, 351 Ill. 402. Embezzlement k 30
"Embezzlement," like "larceny," is offense against owner of property,
whose
name, if known, must be alleged. People v. Feldstein, 1931, 174 N.E.
843, 342
Ill. 615. Embezzlement k 30
An indictment which failed to negative the presumption of joint
ownership
arising from the allegation that the property belonged to a partnership
of
which the evidence showed accused was a member, was faulty. People v.
Dettmering, 1917, 116 N.E. 205, 278 Ill. 580. Embezzlement k 30
Unless the rule is modified by statute, the ownership of property must
be
alleged with the same accuracy in embezzlement as in larceny. People
v.
Dettmering, 1917, 116 N.E. 205, 278 Ill. 580. Embezzlement k 30
Where the ownership of property is shown, as in an unincorporated
business
firm, it must be so alleged in the indictment. People v. Dettmering,
1917,
116 N.E. 205, 278 Ill. 580. Embezzlement k 30
540. ---- Variance, indictment, theft of entrusted property
There was no variance between indictment which charged trustee with
theft of
trust funds occurring from 1968 to 1979 and proof which established
that theft
did not commence until 1976 or 1977, since proof of trustee's theft
from 1976
to 1979 was well within the period alleged in the indictment. People
v.
Lopez, App. 1 Dist.1984, 84 Ill.Dec. 730, 129 Ill.App.3d 488, 472
N.E.2d 867,
appeal denied. Larceny k 40(5)
There was no fatal variance between indictment charging accused with
theft on
August 31, 1962 and evidence showing numerous acts of alleged
embezzlement
between January, 1962 and August, 1962. People v. Adams, App.1969, 106
Ill.App.2d 396, 245 N.E.2d 904. Indictment And Information k 176
Where charge of embezzlement by Justice of the Peace was adequately
proven and
established by evidence received in trial court, it was immaterial that
total
amount proven to have been embezzled fell short of amount alleged in
indictment. People v. Brown, App.1966, 68 Ill.App.2d 17, 214 N.E.2d
465.
Embezzlement k 35
There was no variance between charge in indictment and evidence
produced on
trial in embezzlement prosecution because some counts of indictment
charged
that defendant embezzled property of certain heir of deceased in
certain
amount and of stated value while testimony was to effect that property
was
that of all heirs of deceased, where there was evidence that heir
referred to
in indictment was one of deceased's heirs, and that he was custodian of
check
and fund it represented as agent of all heirs, and that he was
personally
entitled to part of proceeds of check. People v. Stowe, App.1964, 51
Ill.App.2d 411, 201 N.E.2d 465. Embezzlement k 35
Where indictment charged defendant as county treasurer with embezzling
moneys
of school district No. 154, township 9 north, range 2 east of the third
principal meridian, S. county, Ill., whereas proof showed school
district was
union district including portion of F. county, there was no material
variance.
People v. Lee, 1934, 190 N.E. 264, 356 Ill. 294. Embezzlement k 35
Ownership, being essential element, must be proved as alleged. People
v.
Feldstein, 1931, 174 N.E. 843, 342 Ill. 615. Embezzlement k 35
Proof of partnership or corporate ownership of embezzled property does
not
support allegation of individual ownership. People v. Feldstein, 1931,
174
N.E. 843, 342 Ill. 615. Embezzlement k 35
A conviction of embezzlement will not be sustained when the indictment
charged
the money converted to belong to a wife, and the evidence shows that it
was
the joint property of her husband and herself. Rauguth v. People,
1900, 57
N.E. 832, 186 Ill. 93. Embezzlement k 35
Where indictment charged defendant with embezzlement of money in his
possession by virtue of his office as county treasurer, evidence that
defendant fraudulently converted county orders to his own use was
inadmissible. Goodhue v. People, 1879, 94 Ill. 37.
541. ---- Election of offenses, indictment, theft of entrusted
property
Vice president charged with embezzling insurance company's property and
funds
and, in another count, with embezzling money, goods, and property,
accompanied
by allegation of certain amount of money constituting total of several
transactions, was not entitled to require people to elect as to which
check or
transaction shown in evidence would be relied on, where checks were not
set
forth in indictment and people's theory was that amounts taken, whether
by
checks or otherwise, were parts of one scheme and that conversion of
entire
amount was one offense. People v. Heilemann, 1935, 199 N.E. 792, 362
Ill. 322
. Criminal Law k 678(1); Indictment And Information k 132(3)
Where defendant was indicted for embezzlement of money from bank of
which he
was president and for embezzlement on same day of same sum from a park
district of which he was treasurer, defendant had right at close of
people's
evidence to compel people to elect which charge would be relied on for
conviction. People v. Wolf, 1934, 193 N.E. 211, 358 Ill. 334.
Indictment And
Information k 132(7)
Where, in the course of trial charging defendant with embezzlement of
money in
his possession by virtue of his office as county treasurer, evidence
was
introduced tending to charge defendant as to at least three different
transactions, each of which the court charged the jury was, if
established, a
complete crime for which they must convict, it was error to refuse
defendant's
application to put the prosecution to the election as to which act of
embezzlement they would claim a conviction. Goodhue v. People, 1879,
94 Ill.
37.
542. Defenses, theft of entrusted property--In general
Arrangement between operator of collection agency and complaining
witness, for
whom operator of collection agency collected delinquent accounts,
whereby
operator of collection agency was to pay over collections only after
account
was paid in full, did not carry with it acquiescence or implied consent
of
complaining witness that operator of collection agency could use money
for any
purpose pending full collection, and was no defense in embezzlement
prosecution of operator of collection agency. People v. Riggins, 1958,
13
Ill.2d 134, 148 N.E.2d 450. Embezzlement k 23
Secretary-treasurer of corporation employed as manager of corporation's
property had no right to misappropriate and convert to his own use
property of
the corporation and could not confer such right on defendant charged
with
larceny by embezzlement. People v. Doerk, 1941, 35 N.E.2d 52, 376 Ill.
644.
Embezzlement k 11(1)
In prosecution of conservator for embezzling funds of ward deposited in
bank,
it was no defense that bank held ward's deposit in trust with notice
and might
be liable to ward. People v. Schnepp, 1936, 200 N.E. 338, 362 Ill.
495.
Embezzlement k 23
When official is guilty of embezzlement of funds of bank, subsequent
approval
of his fraudulent acts even if knowingly done, cannot exonerate him.
People
v. Binga, 1935, 195 N.E. 437, 360 Ill. 18. Embezzlement k 23
Accused's good faith claim of right to funds he is charged with
embezzling
completely negatives fraudulent and felonious intent, necessary to
constitute
"embezzlement." People v. Parker, 1934, 189 N.E. 352, 355 Ill. 258.
Embezzlement k 5
Conversion of checks or moneys by one asserting right thereto in good
faith on
reasonable grounds does not constitute "embezzlement," though claim is
ill
founded or without merit. People v. Parker, 1934, 189 N.E. 352, 355
Ill. 258.
Embezzlement k 5
Proof corporation's money was taken for unlawful purposes at order and
direction of president would constitute no defense, and evidence with
respect
thereto was inadmissible. People v. Schueneman, 1926, 150 N.E. 664,
320 Ill.
127. Embezzlement k 43; Larceny k 52
Since the fraudulent converting to one's own use is embezzlement, if
the acts
constituting the embezzlement were fraudulently done, they were done
with a
criminal intent; and the fact that defendant intended to pay the debt
incurred by pledging the bonds is immaterial. Spalding v. People,
1898, 49
N.E. 993, 172 Ill. 40.
543. ---- Restitution, defenses, theft of entrusted property
One who steals money from another does not exculpate himself from
criminal
consequences by returning money. People v. Ackerman, App.1964, 52
Ill.App.2d
296, 202 N.E.2d 98.
Larceny k 26
If there is a willful and wrongful taking, use and appropriation of
employer's
money by an agent, criminality of act is not removed by intention to
make
restitution. People v. Riggins, 1958, 13 Ill.2d 134, 148 N.E.2d 450.
Embezzlement k 5
Intention to restore proceeds of draft wrongfully converted could not
do away
with criminal nature of transaction. People v. Nevin, 1931, 175 N.E.
797, 343
Ill. 597. Embezzlement k 23
That bank credited account of employer with amount of check after its
fraudulent conversion by employee had been discovered, or that employer
by
reason of restricted indorsement was later relieved of loss, did not
relieve
employee from charge of embezzlement. People v. Dean, 1926, 151 N.E.
505, 321
Ill. 128.
That employer was recompensed for his loss sustained by embezzlement of
employee, did not relieve latter from charge of embezzlement. People
v. Dean,
1926, 151 N.E. 505, 321 Ill. 128. Embezzlement k 23
One wrongfully and intentionally appropriating to his own use the
property of
another lawfully in his possession is guilty of embezzlement, though he
may
also at the same time intend subsequently to return the property or to
make
restitution. A broker who misappropriated the proceeds of the sale of
stock
was guilty of embezzlement though he gave a note which the principal
accepted
for the amount due. People v. Schrager, 1924, 146 N.E. 151, 315 Ill.
169.
Where there is a willful and known wrongful taking, use or
appropriation of
money, the criminality of the act is not removed by an intention to
make
restitution. Spalding v. People, 1898, 49 N.E. 993, 172 Ill. 40.
Embezzlement
k 5
544. Argument of counsel, theft of entrusted property
In a prosecution for embezzlement, where defendants introduced in
evidence a
contract whereby they were to care for the body of the person whose
property
they embezzled, at his death, and to furnish him certain clothing
during his
life, and, in arguing to the jury, defendants' counsel insisted that
the money
which defendants had embezzled was in consideration of the obligations
they
had assumed in signing the contract, it was proper for the state's
attorney,
in reply to this argument, and in discussing the evidence, to refer to
the
insolvency of defendants. McCracken v. People, 1904, 70 N.E. 749, 209
Ill.
215. Criminal Law k 726
545. Burden of proof, theft of entrusted property--In general
In prosecution of chief security examiner for the Industrial Commission
for
embezzlement, it was not necessary that defendant be shown to have been
occupying an office created by statute. People v. O'Connell, 1944, 54
N.E.2d
521, 386 Ill. 606. Embezzlement k 36
To establish "embezzlement," people must prove beyond reasonable doubt
that
accused was agent charged with receiving principal's money or property,
acquired possession thereof in due course of employment, and converted
it to
his own or another's use, with knowledge that it was not his. To
justify
conviction of "embezzlement," evidence must establish beyond reasonable
doubt
that defendant feloniously and fraudulently converted to his own use or
took
and secreted with such intent another's money or property, without
owner's
consent. Mere proof of agent's or employee's receipt of funds and
failure to
account therefor is insufficient to show "embezzlement." People v.
Parker,
1934, 189 N.E. 352, 355 Ill. 258.
Where an agent of an express company had disappeared, so that demand
could not
be made on him to account for the proceeds of money orders sold by him,
proof
of such demand and refusal to account is unnecessary to sustain
conviction of
embezzlement, but the conversion may be otherwise shown. Kossakowski
v.
People, 1899, 53 N.E. 115, 177 Ill. 563. Embezzlement k 38
Embezzlement not presumed merely because money is unaccounted for.
Thomas v.
Dunaway, 1863, 30 Ill. 373.
546. ---- Ownership, burden of proof, theft of entrusted property
Where the title of the property is alleged to be in a partnership
composed of
many persons, the names of the persons must be proved. People v.
Dettmering,
1917, 116 N.E. 205, 278 Ill. 580. Embezzlement k 35
547. ---- Intent, burden of proof, theft of entrusted property
Guilty intent is necessarily inferred in embezzlement prosecution from
voluntary acts of accused in depriving his principal or employer of his
property. People v. Riggins, 1958, 13 Ill.2d 134, 148 N.E.2d 450.
Embezzlement k 36
In prosecution for embezzlement defendant's felonious intent must be
proved
beyond reasonable doubt. People v. Long, 1944, 53 N.E.2d 446, 385 Ill.
495.
Criminal Law k 561(2)
People in embezzlement prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt
that
agent converted property to his own use with felonious intent to
deprive owner
thereof. People v. Stevens, 1934, 193 N.E. 154, 358 Ill. 391.
Embezzlement k
5
Guilty intent of accused was necessarily inferred from accused's
voluntary
deposit of client's draft to accused's bank account contrary to
client's
instructions. People v. Nevin, 1931, 175 N.E. 797, 343 Ill. 597.
Embezzlement
k 36
Unlawful and felonious intent to embezzle or fraudulently convert must
be
established against defendant beyond a reasonable doubt before he can
be
convicted. People v. Paddock, 1921, 133 N.E. 240, 300 Ill. 590.
Criminal Law
k 561(2)
An employee who retains his employer's money without accounting for it
is not
to be presumed innocent of the intent implied by his act, or to have no
intent
to defraud his employer. Zuckerman v. People, 1904, 72 N.E. 741, 213
Ill. 114
. Embezzlement k 36
548. ---- Consent, burden of proof, theft of entrusted property
In embezzlement prosecution against insurance company's vice president,
who
contended that company authorized taking of funds in payment of bonus,
people
were bound to prove that president or directors conspired with
defendant to
permit conversion of company's funds. People v. Heilemann, 1935, 199
N.E.
792, 362 Ill. 322. Embezzlement k 36
In embezzlement prosecution against insurance company's vice president,
who
contended that company authorized taking of funds, people had burden of
showing felonious intent and lack of company's consent. People v.
Heilemann,
1935, 199 N.E. 792, 362 Ill. 322. Embezzlement k 36
Insurance company's vice president, charged with embezzlement and
contending
that company authorized taking of funds in payment of bonus, need not
show
valid authority, since defendant's evidence as to such authorization
was
merely to negative felonious intent. People v. Heilemann, 1935, 199
N.E. 792,
362 Ill. 322. Embezzlement k 11(1)
549. ---- Corpus delicti, burden of proof, theft of entrusted property
The "corpus delicti" as basis for embezzlement conviction is not
required to
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence which excludes or is
aside
from confession or admissions of the accused, and direct and positive
evidence
is unnecessary to prove corpus delicti, and the same evidence which
tends to
prove corpus delicti may tend to prove connection of accused with the
crime,
so that existence of the crime and guilt of accused may stand together
on one
foundation, the test being whether the whole evidence proves the fact a
crime
was committed and that accused committed it. People v. Henderson,
1941, 38
N.E.2d 727, 378 Ill. 436. Criminal Law k 563
State had burden to prove that tax warrants which allegedly were
embezzled
were intrusted to defendant as agent of prosecuting witness, that
warrants
were witness' property, and that there was a felonious conversion.
People v.
Streich, 1935, 198 N.E. 350, 361 Ill. 490. Embezzlement k 36
To justify conviction for embezzlement, evidence must establish, beyond
reasonable doubt, that defendant feloniously and fraudulently converted
to his
own use or took and secreted with intent to do so, without his
principal's
consent, money or property involved. People v. Munday, 1934, 193 N.E.
509,
358 Ill. 470. Embezzlement k 44(1)
550. Admissibility of evidence, theft of entrusted property--In
general
In prosecution for embezzlement of sum claimed by defendant as fee
under
verbal contract with prosecuting witnesses to clear title to and sell
their
land, defendant's testimony as to how much time he devoted to title
should
have been admitted over prosecution's objection that there was prior
written
agreement fixing smaller fee, as amount and character of services
rendered by
defendant might have tended to prove that they could not have been
within
parties' contemplation when fee was agreed on. People v. Long, 1944,
53
N.E.2d 446, 385 Ill. 495. Criminal Law k 447
In larceny prosecution against attorney for keeping client's money,
testimony
of assistant state's attorneys that they questioned defendant as to
what he
did with moneys received from several other clients, and that defendant
admitted losing money in speculating, and was sane, was highly
prejudicial,
though testimony was ostensibly offered to show sanity. People v.
Patlak,
1936, 1 N.E.2d 228, 363 Ill. 40. Criminal Law k 1169.11
In prosecution of clerk in office of city treasurer for secreting with
intent
to embezzle, evidence of city treasurer and certified public accountant
who
audited defendant's books and another person to whom defendant made
payments
in restitution as to shortages in defendant's accounts was admissible
as
tending to prove crime. People v. Hauck, 1935, 199 N.E. 821, 362 Ill.
266.
Embezzlement k 38
In prosecution against president for embezzlement from bank by means of
notes,
evidence concerning note not included in bill of particulars which was
substituted in assets of bank for note which was specified was
admissible.
People v. Binga, 1935, 195 N.E. 437, 360 Ill. 18. Indictment And
Information
k 169
In a prosecution of an auction clerk for embezzlement, where defendant
claimed
he had deposited funds to his credit as clerk in a bank which had
subsequently
failed, evidence that prosecuting witness had filed his claim in
bankruptcy
for the funds was inadmissible on behalf of defendant. People v.
Paddock,
1921, 133 N.E. 240, 300 Ill. 590. Embezzlement k 43
In a prosecution for embezzlement, evidence as to the purpose for which
defendant desired to get a certain sum from prosecutrix a year before
the
alleged embezzlement was properly excluded where such fact has no
connection
with the embezzlement. Hobbs v. People, 1899, 55 N.E. 692, 183 Ill.
336.
Embezzlement k 39
In a prosecution for embezzlement by an agent of an express company of
the
proceeds of money orders, proof that he disposed of money orders, and
appropriated the proceeds in another state, is admissible, since the
embezzlement was committed in the state where the failure to account
took
place. Kossakowski v. People, 1899, 53 N.E. 115, 177 Ill. 563.
Embezzlement k
38
551. ---- Competency of evidence, admissibility of evidence, theft of
entrusted property
In prosecution of assistant cashier in the bureau of water for
embezzlement of
a check, introduction of other checks received by defendant through the
mail
was competent to prove defendant's shortage as a cashier and to explain
system
he employed to cover his defalcations. People v. Donohue, 1938, 17
N.E.2d 21,
369 Ill. 558. Criminal Law k 372(8)
Statements of parties interested in transactions relative to records of
defendant's employer was incompetent in prosecution for embezzlement
against
defendant alleged to be office manager and agent of corporation.
People v.
Mooney, 1928, 162 N.E. 148, 330 Ill. 565. Criminal Law k 419(12)
Where paying teller was charged with embezzlement from bank, testimony
of bank
examiner, based entirely upon examination of books and records was
competent.
People v. Preble, 1925, 147 N.E. 124, 316 Ill. 233.
552. ---- Intent, admissibility of evidence, theft of entrusted
property
Fact that defendant charged with embezzlement offered to make
restitution was
not a defense, but it was a fact to be taken into consideration, along
with
all other facts, in determining absence or presence of felonious
intent.
People v. Barrett, 1950, 90 N.E.2d 94, 405 Ill. 188. Embezzlement k
23;
Embezzlement k 39
Great latitude is allowed in proving intent where intent is an
essential
element of the crime charged, but a defendant charged with embezzlement
should
be permitted to show in his defense such facts and circumstances as
tend to
rebut presumption that he intended to commit embezzlement. People v.
Barrett,
1950, 90 N.E.2d 94, 405 Ill. 188. Embezzlement k 39
In prosecution for embezzlement, proof of similar offenses is competent
to
show intention of defendant in particular act of embezzlement charged
in
indictment. People v. O'Malley, 1949, 88 N.E.2d 454, 404 Ill. 165.
Criminal
Law k 371(2)
In prosecution of chief security examiner for the Industrial Commission
for
embezzlement of bonds deposited by self-insurer, it was proper to admit
evidence of other transactions with bonds similarly deposited with the
commission, as bearing on criminal intent. People v. O'Connell, 1944,
54
N.E.2d 521, 386 Ill. 606. Criminal Law k 371(2)
In embezzlement prosecution against insurance company's vice president,
who
contended that company authorized taking of funds in payment of bonus
and
charging of account of creditor to which company was indebted on
agreement for
rewriting certain polices, testimony of company's attorney regarding
his
conversation with president in defendant's presence concerning account
of
creditor was admissible as tending to negative felonious intent, where
evidence was cumulative as to company's recognition of such account and
bonus
and of defendant's claim to funds involved. People v. Heilemann, 1935,
199
N.E. 792, 362 Ill. 322. Embezzlement k 39
Accused has right to testify as to his intention in commission of acts
relied
on as constituting embezzlement. People v. Stevens, 1934, 193 N.E.
154, 358
Ill. 391. Criminal Law k 390
Where intent is of essence of crime charged, defendant may testify
regarding
intention in committing acts which state claims constitute crime. In
prosecution against clerk of court for embezzlement, evidence regarding
intention with which defendant received money paid him was improperly
excluded. People v. Ervin, 1930, 174 N.E. 529, 342 Ill. 421.
In a prosecution against decedent's attorney for embezzlement of
property
belonging to a decedent's estate, evidence of a witness that defendant
made a
collection for him which he failed to turn over, and of conversations
had with
defendant and one in his employ in relation to a note and mortgage
belonging
to the estate, in which defendant promised to turn them over to him,
was
competent on the question of motive, and in explanation of the acts
charged,
though it tended to prove a distinct offense. Schintz v. People, 1899,
52
N.E. 903, 178 Ill. 320. Embezzlement k 39
553. ---- Other crimes, admissibility of evidence, theft of entrusted
property
Evidence as to second loan made by defendant subsequent to first loan
for
which he was indicted for larceny was properly admitted to show a
particular
plan of defendant to commit offense. People v. Knox, App.1967, 90
Ill.App.2d
149, 234 N.E.2d 128. Criminal Law k 372(5)
In prosecution against receiver for embezzlement evidence of
embezzlement from
other estates was admissible, in view of confused condition of
defendant's
accounts. People v. Goldman, 1925, 148 N.E. 873, 318 Ill. 77, error
dismissed
47 S.Ct. 90, 273 U.S. 637, 273 U.S. 693, 71 L.Ed. 816. Criminal Law k
369.5
Evidence of similar offenses at other times, cheating other people, is
inadmissible to prove embezzlement. Kribs v. People, 1876, 82 Ill.
425.
554. ---- Admissions of accused, admissibility of evidence, theft of
entrusted property
In prosecution for embezzlement, evidence that defendant gave
complaining
witness a check, which was returned for insufficient funds, was
admissible to
show that defendant admitted his obligation to complaining witness and
that he
failed to return any money to her. People v. O'Malley, 1949, 88 N.E.2d
454,
404 Ill. 165. Embezzlement k 38
In prosecution of clerk in office of city treasurer for secreting with
intent
to embezzle, defendant's admission with respect thereto were admissible
as
tending to prove crime. People v. Hauck, 1935, 199 N.E. 821, 362 Ill.
266.
Criminal Law k 406(6)
555. ---- Books and records, admissibility of evidence, theft of
entrusted
property
Adequate foundation was laid for admission of computer-generated
records of
bank account under business records exception to hearsay rule by
evidence that
records were made in regular course of business, that information
reflected in
records was immediately entered into system by tellers or automatic
teller
machines, that information was audited for accuracy by three separate
auditing
entities, that records and computer systems were reconciled and
balanced each
day, and that computer software was used by other banking institutions,
even
if direct evidence was not elicited that computer system was standard
in
industry. People v. Lombardi, App. 2 Dist.1999, 238 Ill.Dec. 323, 305
Ill.App.3d 33, 711 N.E.2d 426, appeal denied 242 Ill.Dec. 146, 185
Ill.2d 650,
720 N.E.2d 1101. Criminal Law k 444
Original bank statements of townhome association given to police
officer by
defendant, who was association president at time, that were either
addressed
to association or bore its name were sufficiently authenticated to
support
their admission in theft prosecution for unauthorized withdrawals from
townhome account, particularly where information contained in them was
identical to information in other account records supplied by bank.
People v.
Lombardi, App. 2 Dist.1999, 238 Ill.Dec. 323, 305 Ill.App.3d 33, 711
N.E.2d
426, appeal denied 242 Ill.Dec. 146, 185 Ill.2d 650, 720 N.E.2d 1101.
Criminal Law k 444
Original ledger sheets of account of defendant in bank, carbon copies
of
deposit slips, evidence deposits made by defendant in bank, and deposit
slip
evidencing deposit in defendant's personal account of check were
properly
admitted in embezzlement prosecution, over objection that no proper
foundation
had been laid for their admission, where bank's cashier produced ledger
sheets, copies of deposit slips, and deposit slip at trial and
testified with
respect thereto. People v. Stowe, App.1964, 51 Ill.App.2d 411, 201
N.E.2d 465
. Criminal Law k 444
In prosecution for embezzlement, against officers of bank engaged in
real
estate business, who in bankruptcy proceedings were required to turn
over to
receiver all partnership books, etc., and thereafter receiver was
required to
turn them over to the state attorney, the introduction in evidence, of
books
kept in real estate business was not in violation of defendant
officers'
rights under U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 4, as to unreasonable searches and
seizures
nor was it in violation of defendant officers' rights under
U.S.C.A.Const.
Amend. 5, as to no person being compelled to be a witness against
himself.
People v. Bransfield, 1919, 124 N.E. 365, 289 Ill. 72. Criminal Law k
394.4(1)
556. ---- Cross-examination, admissibility of evidence, theft of
entrusted
property
Cross-examination of probate judge to prove that defendant, charged
with
embezzling funds of ward, had offered alternative investment in
mortgages
rather than in government bonds, was properly refused as calling for
proof of
restitution. People v. Schnepp, 1936, 200 N.E. 338, 362 Ill. 495.
Embezzlement k 38
557. Sufficiency of evidence, theft of entrusted property--In general
Conservator's withdrawal, by series of checks, of funds deposited in
ward's
account, constitutes evidence of conversion and of continuing offense
of
embezzlement. People v. Schnepp, 1936, 200 N.E. 338, 362 Ill. 495.
Embezzlement k 44(6)
Mere proof of receipt of funds by circuit clerk and failure to account
therefor was not sufficient in itself to show embezzlement by clerk of
court.
People v. Ervin, 1930, 174 N.E. 529, 342 Ill. 421. Embezzlement k
44(6)
To convict of embezzlement, it need only be shown that defendant, who
was
office manager and agent of corporation, received money which he failed
to pay
over without necessarily showing total amount. Defendant must be shown
to be
person who embezzled funds to convict of embezzlement. People v.
Mooney,
1928, 162 N.E. 148, 330 Ill. 565. Embezzlement k 35
Where an agent of an express company received for sale money orders
signed by
the proper officers, and to be valid when signed by the agent, his
conviction
of embezzlement of the proceeds is sustained without proof that the
company
has paid the orders. Kossakowski v. People, 1899, 53 N.E. 115, 177
Ill. 563.
Embezzlement k 44(1)
558. ---- Intent, sufficiency of evidence, theft of entrusted property
Evidence that trustee filed annual reports ten years after a trust
foundation
had been established which revealed that amount receivable from trustee
had
reached approximately $24,000, evidence that by following year trustee
had
appropriated $57,000 from the trust funds to his personal use, evidence
that
the next year $23,000 was taken from foundation's accounts, and
evidence that
trustee was unable to and had no means to repay the money that he had
misappropriated, was sufficient to prove trustee's felonious intent.
People
v. Lopez, App. 1 Dist.1984, 84 Ill.Dec. 730, 129 Ill.App.3d 488, 472
N.E.2d
867, appeal denied. Larceny k 57
Fact that trustee of charitable trust, who withdrew funds from the
trust for
his own purposes, made no effort to conceal his withdrawal and
conversion of
the trust funds to his personal use, along with fact that he documented
use of
the trust funds with his promissory notes made payable to the trust,
and fact
that he made partial payment on the notes, did not demonstrate that he
did not
have any intent to deprive the owners of the trust funds of their
property.
People v. Lopez, App. 1 Dist.1984, 84 Ill.Dec. 730, 129 Ill.App.3d 488,
472
N.E.2d 867, appeal denied. Larceny k 3(4)
Theft defendant's mere contention that he did not intend to permanently
deprive trust foundation or trust beneficiaries of their property by
appropriating such property to his own use was not decisive on issue of
his
intent. People v. Lopez, App. 1 Dist.1984, 84 Ill.Dec. 730, 129
Ill.App.3d
488, 472 N.E.2d 867, appeal denied. Larceny k 57
Fact that defendant charged with embezzlement did not withdraw any of
the
allegedly embezzled funds for his own use was a fact to be considered
along
with all other facts in determining question of felonious intent.
People v.
Barrett, 1950, 90 N.E.2d 94, 405 Ill. 188. Embezzlement k 39
Fact that there was no concealment or secrecy on part of defendant
charged
with embezzlement, in withdrawing funds, was a circumstance tending to
negative charge that he was actuated by a felonious intent. People v.
Barrett, 1950, 90 N.E.2d 94, 405 Ill. 188. Embezzlement k 39
In prosecution for embezzlement of funds received from sale of warrants
which
had been sold to defendant by school teacher, evidence of felonious
intent to
deprive teacher of funds was insufficient for jury. People v. Streich,
1935,
198 N.E. 350, 361 Ill. 490. Embezzlement k 47
Absence of proof of secrecy and concealment is circumstance which tends
to
negative charge of felonious intent in embezzlement prosecution.
People v.
Stevens, 1934, 193 N.E. 154, 358 Ill. 391. Embezzlement k 44(2)
In a prosecution of an auction clerk for embezzlement of the funds
received by
him, evidence that he deposited the funds in a bank in his name as
clerk, and
that the funds were still there when the bank was closed, was
insufficient to
show a fraudulent intent to convert the funds to defendant's own use.
People
v. Paddock, 1921, 133 N.E. 240, 300 Ill. 590. Embezzlement k 44(2)
Agent who converts to her own use money of her employer, but without
concealing the fact or denying the indebtedness, which she promises to
pay,
whereupon the employer suspends criminal prosecution against her, is
not shown
with sufficient certainty to have possessed the requisite criminal
intent.
McElroy v. People, 1903, 66 N.E. 1058, 202 Ill. 473.
If a person fraudulently converts money of a municipality to his own
use, even
though he may have an intent to return it, the conversion is made with
a
criminal intent, since a guilty intent is necessarily inferred from a
voluntary commission of such an act, the inevitable effect of which is
to
deprive the true owner of property and appropriate it to the
defendant's own
use. Tonsor v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 1913, 173 Ill.App. 383.
559. ---- Deprivation of use or benefit, sufficiency of evidence,
theft of
entrusted property
Evidence in defendant's prosecution, including evidence that defendant
had
exclusive control over both receipts and disbursements and all records
of
bingo operation, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for
theft by
knowingly exerting unauthorized control over bingo fund intending to
deprive
fund permanently of use or benefit of its property. People v. Chacon,
App. 2
Dist.1984, 80 Ill.Dec. 922, 125 Ill.App.3d 649, 466 N.E.2d 374.
Larceny k 63
In prosecution of defendant, who had been administrator of an estate,
for
theft of asset from estate, evidence was sufficient to sustain finding
that
defendant intended to permanently deprive the heirs of the use and
benefit of
their property, and thus evidence sustained the guilty verdict. People
v.
Curoe, App. 1 Dist.1981, 52 Ill.Dec. 722, 97 Ill.App.3d 258, 422 N.E.2d
931.
Larceny k 57
560. ---- Corpus delicti, sufficiency of evidence, theft of entrusted
property
Evidence established corpus delicti and supported conviction of head
cashier
for theft in excess of $300; cash register voids as shown by computer
data
could not be attributed to anyone other than head cashier, there was no
evidence of anyone returning large quantities of merchandise,
percentage of
voids over four-year period dramatically decreased on days on which
head
cashier did not work, and voids decreased weekly by over $600 after
head
cashier was fired. People v. Stell, App. 3 Dist.1992, 165 Ill.Dec.
907, 223
Ill.App.3d 531, 585 N.E.2d 638. Larceny k 55
Evidence was sufficient to establish corpus delicti of theft, where 24
deposits were not credited to store's bank account while defendant was
store
manager, defendant signed for each of the deposits on daily forms,
there was
testimony that defendant had responsibility to take deposits to bank,
defendant was only employee who worked every day that deposits were
missing,
and bank statements, which were admitted without proper foundation,
established that deposits were not credited to store's bank account.
People
v. Friedland, App. 1 Dist.1990, 148 Ill.Dec. 415, 202 Ill.App.3d 1094,
560
N.E.2d 1012. Larceny k 55
State failed to prove corpus delicti of offense of theft of less than
$300;
manager of store from which money was allegedly taken could not verify
from
first hand knowledge that bundle from which money was allegedly stolen
ever
actually contained $100, could not testify from personal knowledge
either to
total amount of money that was supposed to be in safe or total amount
that was
actually in safe, there were eight or more people who had access to
safe,
there was a large sum of money in the safe, and there was difference
between
amount allegedly stolen and amount stated in defendant's confession.
People
v. Bennett, App. 3 Dist.1987, 105 Ill.Dec. 915, 152 Ill.App.3d 762, 505
N.E.2d
41. Larceny k 65
Evidence that secretary of building, loan and investment association
had made
statement to examiner promising to repay association's money which
secretary
had used, and that secretary failed to show any sums of money he
claimed he
had paid out for the association by way of taxes and insurance
premiums,
established the "corpus delicti" in embezzlement prosecution. People
v.
Henderson, 1941, 38 N.E.2d 727, 378 Ill. 436. Embezzlement k 44(1)
If jury believed testimony of examiner that secretary of building, loan
and
investment association admitted that he had used association's money
and
offered to repay it as soon as he could, and testimony that secretary
received
$30 from one person and other cash payments from others no record of
which was
kept, the "corpus delicti" and guilt of secretary of embezzlement were
established beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Henderson, 1941, 38
N.E.2d
727, 378 Ill. 436. Embezzlement k 44(1)
Corpus delicti was sufficiently proved in prosecution of assistant
treasurer
for embezzlement of checks belonging to fraternal association, where
deficit
was independently shown aside from defendant's admissions. People v.
Nachowicz, 1930, 172 N.E. 812, 340 Ill. 480. Embezzlement k 44(1)
Mere proof of the receipt of funds and failure to account therefor is
not
sufficient in itself to show embezzlement by an agent or servant.
People v.
Davis, 1915, 110 N.E. 9, 269 Ill. 256. Embezzlement k 44(6)
Evidence disclosing that tax collector for town collected money, that
he
retained it and appropriated it to his own use, that a demand was made
on him
for it and he failed to pay it over was sufficient to establish that he
was
guilty of embezzlement. Tonsor v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 1913,
173
Ill.App. 383.
561. ---- Reasonable doubt, sufficiency of evidence, theft of
entrusted
property
Evidence of trustee's voluntary commission of acts which permanently
deprived
true owners of trust funds of their property, along with trustee's
appropriation of such property to his own use, established beyond a
reasonable
doubt that trustee intended to permanently deprive owners of their
property.
People v. Lopez, App. 1 Dist.1984, 84 Ill.Dec. 730, 129 Ill.App.3d 488,
472
N.E.2d 867, appeal denied. Larceny k 57
562. ---- Accomplice testimony, sufficiency of evidence, theft of
entrusted
property
Testimony of insurance company's assistant secretary who, having been
jointly
indicted with vice president for embezzlement, obtained severance and
testified for people at trial of vice president, was subject to
suspicion and
should have been satisfactorily corroborated.
1935, 199
N.E. 792, 362 Ill. 322. Criminal Law k 510
People v. Heilemann,
563. ---- Circumstantial evidence, sufficiency of evidence, theft of
entrusted property
Evidence was sufficient to prove store manager guilty beyond reasonable
doubt
of theft, where 24 deposits were not credited to store's bank account,
manager
signed for each of the deposits on daily forms, there was testimony
that
manager had responsibility to take deposits to bank, manager was only
employee
who worked every day that deposits were missing, and bank statements,
which
were admitted without proper foundation, established that deposits were
not
credited to store's bank account. People v. Friedland, App. 1
Dist.1990, 148
Ill.Dec. 415, 202 Ill.App.3d 1094, 560 N.E.2d 1012. Larceny k 55
564. Instructions, theft of entrusted property--In general
In prosecution for embezzlement by fraudulent conversion of employer's
check,
value of check was prima facie its face value under former ch. 38,
<paragraph>
217 (repealed), and instruction that proof of market value was
essential was
properly refused. People v. Dean, 1926, 151 N.E. 505, 321 Ill. 128.
Embezzlement k 44(3)
Where defendant fled immediately after committing crime, instruction,
not
supported by evidence, that jury might consider flight if induced by
charge
preferred against defendant was erroneous. People v. Dean, 1926, 151
N.E.
505, 321 Ill. 128. Criminal Law k 814(3)
In a prosecution for larceny as bailee of defendant agent of the seller
of
land to a buyer, who contracted to pay in stock and gave notes as
security for
its delivery, the agent selling and converting the proceeds of one of
such
notes, instruction submitting the only issue, whether the buyer
authorized
defendant agent to sell the note, was not erroneous, as ignoring
defendant
agent's theory of the contract for the sale of land, and taking from
the jury
the question whether the note remained the property of the buyer, etc.
People
v. Lalor., 1919, 124 N.E. 866, 290 Ill. 234. Criminal Law k 815(5)
In a prosecution for embezzlement, where accused was not a joint owner
of the
money embezzled, an instruction charging the jury that if he was such
an owner
there could be no conviction was properly refused, not being applicable
to the
evidence. People v. Goodrich, 1911, 96 N.E. 542, 251 Ill. 558.
In a prosecution for embezzlement, a confession of embezzlement is
properly
submitted to the jury under an instruction as to the consideration and
credit
to be given it, and directing the consideration of all the evidence
respecting
it, including its character and the manner in which it was obtained.
Zuckerman
v. People, 1904, 72 N.E. 741, 213 Ill. 114. Criminal Law k 517(2)
Defendant, who was indicted for embezzlement, was treasurer of the
University
of Illinois, an institution founded by state laws, maintained by state
and
federal funds, and governed by trustees elected by the people. The
jury was
instructed that the defendant was an officer of a "municipal"
corporation, and
subject to R.S.1874, <section> 80. Since the university was a public
corporation, in common with those mentioned in that section, and since
the
words "or other officer" meant any like officer, and the defendant was
an
officer of the same kind as those mentioned in the section, it was
immaterial
whether the court called it a municipal or a public corporation.
Spalding v.
People, 1898, 49 N.E. 993, 172 Ill. 40. Embezzlement k 21
Where indictment charged that defendant did actually embezzle money in
his
possession by virtue of his office as county treasurer, instructions
given by
court directing jury to convict if defendant did certain fraudulent
acts
within intent to embezzle, was error. Goodhue v. People, 1879, 94 Ill.
37.
565. ---- Statutory language, instructions, theft of entrusted
property
In embezzlement prosecution, giving of instructions in language of
Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section><section> 207 and 210 (repealed)
which
defined embezzlement by an agent, which ordained that embezzlement was
larceny, and which referred to secretion of funds, was not prejudicial
error,
though there was no evidence that defendant secreted funds he allegedly
embezzled. People v. Riggins, 1958, 13 Ill.2d 134, 148 N.E.2d 450.
Criminal
Law k 1172.6
Instructions in statutory language on embezzlement and larceny, charged
in
indictment against bank president were proper. People v. Colegrove,
1930, 174
N.E. 536, 342 Ill. 430. Criminal Law k 808
In a prosecution of one canvassing for a paper on commissions for
embezzling
collected subscriptions, it is misleading to instruct that an agent
selling
goods on commission will be guilty of embezzlement in appropriating
money
collected, etc. McElroy v. People, 1903, 66 N.E. 1058, 202 Ill. 473.
Embezzlement k 48(4)
566. Verdict, theft of entrusted property
In prosecution of clerk in office of county treasurer under
Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section> 214 (repealed), a general verdict
finding
clerk guilty as charged was sufficient to sustain conviction
notwithstanding
absence of special finding as to value of property alleged to have been
converted. People v. Chisholm, 1939, 19 N.E.2d 578, 370 Ill. 634.
Embezzlement k 49
Where defendant was indicted for embezzlement of money from bank of
which he
was president, and for embezzlement on same day of same sum from a park
district of which he was treasurer, general verdict of guilty on
indictment
could not be sustained because two separate issues were charged.
People v.
Wolf, 1934, 193 N.E. 211, 358 Ill. 334. Criminal Law k 878(2)
567. Sentencing, theft of entrusted property--In general
Sentence of three years and four months to ten years upon 50 felony
counts of
embezzlement and sentence of 364 days on each of nine misdemeanor
counts, with
all sentences to run concurrently, was not excessive. People v.
Lumley, App.
2 Dist.1979, 31 Ill.Dec. 761, 76 Ill.App.3d 221, 394 N.E.2d 1079.
Embezzlement
k 52
568. ---- Restitution, sentencing, theft of entrusted property
Appropriate amount of restitution for theft from bingo fund was $23,408
rather
than $39,855.06 ordered by trial court, where $39,855.06 figure was
derived
from determination that disbursements to cash and to apparent
individual prize
winners totalling approximately $15,000 did not have adequate
documentation
and from $23,408 loss computation based upon beginning balances of
accounts
received by defendant, receipts and disbursements over three-year
period that
defendant handled fund, and actual balance turned over by defendant to
his
successor and $15,000 figure was too speculative to support restitution
order.
People v. Chacon, App. 2 Dist.1984, 80 Ill.Dec. 922, 125 Ill.App.3d
649, 466
N.E.2d 374. Sentencing And Punishment k 2167
Where defendant was ordered imprisoned u