State
Politics (1997)
17(1) pp. 45±52
of the
ART
Divided by a Common
Language: Political
Theory and the Concept
of Power
Colin Hay
Power is probably the most universal and
fundamental concept of political analysis. It
has been, and continues to be, the subject of
extended and heated debate. In this article I
critically review the contributions of
Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes to our
understanding of the multiple faces of power.
I suggest that although the former's twodimensional approach to power is ultimately
compromised by the residues of behaviouralism that it inherits from classic pluralism, the
latter's three-dimensional view suggests a
potential route out of this pluralist impasse.
To seize the opportunity he provides, however, requires that we rethink the concept of
power. In the second half of the paper I
advance a de®nition of power as contextshaping and demonstrate how this helps us to
disentangle the notions of power, responsibility and culpability that Lukes con¯ates. In
so doing I suggest the we di€erentiate clearly
between analytical questions concerning the
identi®cation of power within social and political contexts, and normative questions concerning the critique of the distribution and
exercise of power thus identi®ed.
The changing face(s) of
power
That political scientists remain divided by the
common language of power is perhaps testament to the centrality of the concept to political analysis. Quite simply, power is politics,
politics is power. As Ball notes, `power is
arguably the single most important organising
concept in social and political theory' (1992:
14). It is not surprising then that in the
`essentially-contested' ®eld of political science,
the concept of power is more essentially-contested than most (on `essential contestability'
see Connolly 1993; Gallie 1956). Yet this was
not always the case. For in the early postwar
Colin Hay, University of Birmingham
# Political Studies Association 1997. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK
and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
45
Divided by a common language . Colin Hay
years, when political science was simple,
there was but one `face of power'. Debate
may have raged incessantly between sociologists and political scientists as to the locus of
power, but by and large political scientists
remained united and intransigent in their
defence of pluralism. Power was transparent,
expressed in an unambiguous and empirically-demonstrable way in the decisionmaking process.
Thus for Dahl, one time doyen of classic
pluralism, A has power over B to the extent
that s/he can `get B to do something that B
would not do otherwise' (1957, p.201) and,
crucially, where there is a direct con¯ict of
interests (here equated with preferences)
between the actors involved. In its concentration on the actions of individuals within the
decision-making process (as distinct from the
context within which such decision-making
takes place) this is an agency-centred account
(Hay 1995, pp.195±6). Such an approach had,
and still has, an obvious appeal. Power is visible and can be catalogued, classi®ed and
tabulated in terms of the realisation of preferences in the heat of the decision-making
process. An obvious and apparent object of
analysis is identi®ed; a series of unproblematic methodological strictures naturally
follow. Yet such certainties, and the theoretical and empirical con®dence they engendered, were not to last for long.
Enter Bachrach and Baratz. In a short but
highly signi®cant methodological critique (and
later in empirical detail), they proceeded to
demolish the edi®ce of classic pluralism
(Bachrach & Baratz 1962, 1970). Power, they
argued, is janus-faced, its complex nature
merely obscured by a narrow concentration
on the decision-making process. While decision-making is essentially and obviously a
power relation insofar as the actions of A
a€ect B, this is not the end of the story. For
power is also exercised in `non-decision
making'. Here `A devotes his (sic) energies to
creating or reinforcing social and political
values and institutional practices that limit the
scope of the political process to public con46
Politics (1997)
17(1) pp. 45±52
sideration of only those issues which are
comparatively innocuous to A' (1962. p.948).
It is all very well to consider the exercise of
power within the decision-making chamber,
but if this is merely a talking shop from
which consideration of all contentious issues
has already been excluded, then the wood is
being missed for the foliage on the trees.
Indeed such a narrow concern with decisionmaking is tantamount to condoning systematic and deep-seated power relations. In such a
situation, classic pluralism threatens to
become an apology for power masquerading
as a theory of power.
If this is Bachrach and Baratz's principal
problem with Dahl's rendition of classic pluralism then it is not their only one. For insofar
as power is exercised in formal decisionmaking processes, Dahl provides no basis
(objective or otherwise) for ascribing importance to speci®c issues and decisions. Clearly
some decisions are more signi®cant than
others and an approach which merely concentrates on the frequency with which di€erent groups and actors get their way is likely
to distort systematically the power relations
involved. It may well be, for instance, that a
strategic and hegemonic group will allow
minority interests to prevail on certain issues
which do not directly threaten its domination,
reserving its in¯uence for matters of greater
signi®cance. Indeed, such strategies may be
crucial to the ability of an elite to maintain its
hegemonic position. A simple tally of successes and defeats may in such circumstances
hide more than it reveals.
Bachrach and Baratz's critique suggests the
need to locate decision-making within the
immediate context of agenda-setting. The
resulting `two-dimensional view' of power
represents a signi®cant advance on that of the
classic pluralists in its sensitivity to the selectivity of the decision-making agenda and the
mechanisms by which signi®cant issues may
be ®ltered out and thereby excluded from the
decision-making process. It is not however
unproblematic. Like their pluralist forebears,
Bachrach and Baratz assume that power rela# Political Studies Association 1997
Politics (1997)
17(1) pp. 45±52
tions exist only insofar as there is actually
observable con¯ict between those exercising
power and those over whom it is exercised
(1970. p.49). They thus exclude the possibility of power being exercised in situations in
which the subordinated do not identify themselves as the subjects of subordination ± in
which they do not perceive themselves as
possessing an interest which they are prevented from realising (either in the decisionmaking process itself or in the process of
agenda-setting). Where there is consensus
there is no power being exercised. Despite
their critique of classic pluralism then, they
retain a residual behaviouralism which they
inherit from the pluralist problematic. For in
their concentration on the observable phenomenon of agenda-setting, no consideration
is given to the less visible (and arguably more
signi®cant) processes by which preferences
(and by their own de®nition interests) are
shaped.
Beyond behaviouralism:
giving it the third degree
In outlining the limitations of Bachrach and
Baratz's bold attempt to overcome the parochial pluralism of Dahl's early work, Lukes
lays the basis for his distinctive and important
intervention in the debate. In what might at
®rst seem like an exercise in one-upmanship
(all the protagonists of this particular
exchange being male), he calls for a radical
three-dimensional conception of power.
Where once there was only one face of
power, there would now be three. Yet in so
doing Lukes o€ers us a route out of the
behaviouralist impasse, as he formulates a still
more complex understanding of power.
To restrict the use of the term `power' to
situations in which actual and observable
con¯ict is present, he argues, is unrealistic.
Actor A certainly exercises power over actor
B by getting her/him to do what they s/he
does not want to do. But power and an altogether more e€ective and invidious form of
# Political Studies Association 1997
Divided by a common language . Colin Hay
power at that is also exercised when A in¯uences or shapes the very preferences of B. As
Lukes asks himself,
. . . is it not the most insidious exercise of
power to prevent people, to whatever
degree, from having grievances by shaping
their perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that they accept
their role in the existing order of things,
either because they can see or imagine no
alternative to it, or because they see it as
natural or unchangeable, or because they
value it as divinely ordained and bene®cial?
(Lukes, 1974, p.24).
What is required then is a framework which
is capable of reconciling within a single
account a sensitivity to: (i) the strategies,
struggles and practices that characterise the
decision-making process; (ii) the actions and
inactions involved in the shaping of the
agenda for the decision-making process; and
(iii) the actions and inactions similarly implicated in the shaping of perceived interests
and political preferences. This Lukes advances
in his `radical' three-dimensional conception
of power.
Lukes' achievement is considerable, but his
formulation is ultimately no less problematic
for that. In expanding the notion of power to
include preference-shaping, he is forced to
draw the distinction between subjective or
perceived interests on the one hand, and
actual or `real' interests on the other. For to
identify a power relationship within Lukes'
schema is not merely to identify a situation in
which A gets B to act in a way that s/he
would not otherwise have done. It is also,
crucially, to demonstrate that, regardless of
B's preferences, this was indeed contrary to
her/his genuine interests. The analyst thus
becomes the supreme arbiter of the genuine
interest of the `victim'. Lukes thus resurrects
the spectre of false consciousness which
many had thought exorcised from contemporary social and political theory. The
problem with such a formulation is the
47
Divided by a common language . Colin Hay
deeply condescending conception of the
social subject as an ideological dupe that it
conjures up. Not only is this wretched individual incapable of perceiving her/his true
interests, paci®ed as s/he is by the hallucinogenic e€ects of bourgeois indoctrination. But
rising above the ideological mists which tame
the masses is the enlightened academic who
from his/her high perch in the ivory tower
may look down to discern the genuine interests of those not similarly blessed.
Clearly such a formulation is both logically
unsustainable and politically o€ensive, and at
times Lukes seems only too well aware of this
(see also Benton 1981; Clegg 1989; p.95).
Thus, whether A acts in a manner contrary to
B's interests in any given situation is, he concedes, essentially `an evaluative matter' (1974;
p.34). If this is indeed the case then the convenient di€erentiation between real and perceived interests simply cannot be sustained.
Yet at points in the argument Lukes falls back
on precisely such a distinction. Thus, when
he asks himself `can power be exercised by A
over B in B's real interests?' he identi®es two
potential answers:
(1) that A might exercise `short-term
power' over B . . . but that if and when B
recognises his (sic) real interests, the
power relation ends: it is self-annihilating;
(2) that . . . successful control by A over B
. . . constitutes a violation of B's autonomy;
that B has a real interest in his own autonomy; so that such an exercise of power
cannot be in B's real interests (Lukes, 1974,
p.33).
Lukes ultimately plumps for the former,
albeit somewhat reluctantly and with the proviso than an empirical basis for identifying
real interests must be insisted upon to `obviate the potential dangers'. This may sound
attractive. But since Lukes provides us with
no suggestion as to how such an empirical
basis can be established and, as already
noted, concedes that identifying interests is
essentially a normative task, it is not at all
48
Politics (1997)
17(1) pp. 45±52
clear that a `paternalist license for tyranny' has
indeed been precluded (see also Clegg 1989,
p.103). While any doubt remains, the `anarchist defence' against tyranny embodied in
the second answer is perhaps to be preferred.
Power: analytical and critical
perspectives
The above discussion raises two crucial questions. First, why, despite his obvious unease
at the theoretical contradictions and political
dilemmas that it generates, does Lukes insist
on premising his analysis of power on the
distinction between real and perceived interests? And, relatedly, can a genuinely threedimensional conception of power (that is,
one sensitive to power as decision-making,
agenda-setting and preference-shaping) be
formulated that does not rely upon such a
distinction?
Attributing power: analysis or critique?
Given Lukes' seeming inability to o€er an
objective, empirical, or even normative basis
from which to assess the genuine interests of
social subjects in a potential power relationship, and his evident reluctance (in the
absence of such criteria) to position himself
as the supreme arbiter of such interests, it
seems obvious to ask why he makes the attribution of power dependent upon such an
assessment. The answer is revealing and suggests a potential route out of Lukes' theoretical dilemma.
Lukes, it should be recalled, is a self-professed critical theorist advancing a radical
conception of power. What makes his conception both critical, and more speci®cally,
radical is that to identify a power relationship
is, for Lukes, to engage in critique. To identify
A as exercising power over B is to identify a
situation in which B's (real) interests are
being subverted, and to identify A as not only
# Political Studies Association 1997
Politics (1997)
17(1) pp. 45±52
responsible but culpable. It is, in short, to
engage in a critique of A. Within such a
schema power is not so much an analytical
category as a critical category. At times Lukes
is clearly aware of this, as for instance when
he refers to power as an essentially-contested
concept, and when he suggests that whether
B's real interests are indeed subverted in any
particular situation is, undeniably, an evaluative matter (1974, p.34). Yet, at other times,
as for instance when he refers to the need to
establish an empirical basis for identifying
real interests, he seems to be referring to
power as an analytical concept (1974, p.33).
Lukes thus comes dangerously close to con¯ating analysis and critique. Indeed, much of
the appeal of his argument resides in his ability to present an essentially value-laden critical
conception of power as a neutral analytical
category.
The practice of social and political critique
(from whatever perspective) is inherently normative, ethical, evaluative and value-laden, as
distinct from neutral, dispassionate, empirical
and scienti®c. To engage in critique is not to
apply a scienti®c principle or analytical technique but to compare real practices to an idealised (often utopian) alternative. This requires
(normative or value) judgements about the
legitimacy of conduct which cannot be grounded in claims to neutrality or objectivity.
If Lukes' analysis is ultimately somewhat
frustrating then this is because he smuggles
the normative and ethical foundations for his
critical theory into his analysis of power. Thus
when it comes to identifying a particular relationship as one of power Lukes, and those
following his schema, are forced to make an
ethical judgement what are the real interests
of both parties, and can they be adjudicated
without consideration of their preferences?
There is, and can be, no empirical, scienti®c
or analytical basis from which to answer such
questions for as ethical dilemmas they belong
to an entirely di€erent cognitive realm.
Once recognised for what it is then (an
invitation to an ethical critique of power relations as distinct from an analytical technique
# Political Studies Association 1997
Divided by a common language . Colin Hay
for the identi®cation of power relations),
Lukes' schema is not in itself contradictory.
Nonetheless it should be noted that many of
the things he says about it are, and that
Lukes' highly ambiguous acknowledgement of
the value-laden nature of his reformulation of
the notion of power serves only to obfuscate
things further. Moreover, his failure to disentangle the identi®cation of power and the critique of its distribution and exercise has a
series of unfortunate consequences. First,
power becomes a purely pejorative concept
by de®nitial ®at. If to identify a power relationship is to engage in a critique of that relationship, then it is clear that power cannot be
exercised responsibly or legitimately. The
essence of power is negative, the purpose of
critique to expose power relations as a
potential means to their elimination. This is
all very well, and indeed is logically entailed
by the respeci®cation of the concept. Yet is
serves to narrow our understanding of power
such that it no longer bears any relationship
to that familiar from pre-existing social and
political theory, or from lay uses of the term.
Moreover it suggests the need for a new conceptual repertoire to refer to all of those lay
and theoretical uses of the term now eliminated at a de®nitional stroke.
Secondly, by rede®ning power in this way
Lukes generates a situation in which no two
theorists are ever likely to agree on what constitutes a power relationship. For power is
now understood as a departure from a utopian ideal in which the interests of all individuals are never subverted. Yet as Lukes
himself notes, what an actor's real interests
are is a matter of (ethical) judgement and the
likelihood of critics and theorists making
identical judgements across the spectrum of
potential social and political scenarios is
remote. The concept of power is thus rendered relative. Moreover, power is now to be
analysed not on the basis of how the social
and political world is, but how it ought to be,
or rather, how `the real world' di€ers from
the critic or theorists' idealised projection of
how it ought to be (which, as a projection,
49
Divided by a common language . Colin Hay
itself likely to vary over time). The casualty in
all of this is the possibility of a dialogue
about power, its distribution, and its exercise,
between those who do not share identical
(ethical) perspectives for the adjudication of
the validity of interests.
Redefining power
Need this be so? Does Lukes' bold attempt to
extent the de®nition of power to include the
shaping of perceived interests and preferences necessarily entail a purely negative
yet relative conception of power? Perhaps
not. For the above discussion would suggest
that the theoretical confusions and ethicalpolitical dilemmas that punctuate Lukes' discussion of power derive not from his conception of power as preference-shaping. Rather
they have their origins in (1) his attempt to
revise and modify (rather than reject and
replace) the behavioural and agency-centred
de®nition of power that he inherits from Dahl
and Bachrach and Baratz, (2) the resulting
need to di€erentiate between real and perceived interests, and (3) the associated smuggling of normative criteria into an analytical
de®nition. In short, the problems of Lukes'
formulation reside in his failure to di€erentiate clearly between analytical questions
concerning the identi®cation of power within
social and political settings, and normative
questions concerning the critique of the distribution and exercise of power thus identi®ed. Whilst Dahl and Bachrach and Baratz
simply assume that preferences and interests
are identical, thereby dissolving an ethical
question (what are A's real interests?) into an
empirical question (what does A perceive
her/his interests to be?), Lukes problematises
this by introducing the important observation
that preferences may be shaped by the powerful. If he is not to reject altogether the
behavioural conception of power (in which A
gets B to do something that B would not
otherwise do, and where there is a con¯ict of
interest between the two), this obliges him to
50
Politics (1997)
17(1) pp. 45±52
address the ethical question which the pluralists conveniently side-step in the very de®nition of power itself. Yet this is precisely the
problem. The alternative then is simple: we
must reject the behavioural de®nition of
power and rede®ne the concept in such a
way as to separate out these distinct ethical
and analytical questions that Dahl, Bachrach
and Baratz, and Lukes con¯ate.
The task then is to disarticulate the analysis
and identi®cation of power from its critique.
This requires a de®nition of power that is not
in itself a value-judgement yet which is true to
the spirit of Lukes' three-dimensional view.
Such a conception of power must emphasise
not only the consequences of A's choices for
the actions of B, but also, and perhaps primarily, their e€ects upon the context within
which subsequent action must take place.
Power then is about context-shaping, about
the capacity of actors to rede®ne the parameters of what is socially, politically and economically possible for others. The ability to
in¯uence directly the actions and/or choices
of another individual or group is but one
special case of this more general capacity.
More formally then we can de®ne power as
the ability of actors (whether individual or
collective) to `have an e€ect' upon the context which de®nes the range of possibilities
of others (Hay 1995, p.191). This is a positive
conception of power: power of as opposed to
power over. Yet it may also provide the basis
for a negative conception of power: power
over as opposed to power of. Thus actor A
may be regarded as occupying a position of
domination or power over B insofar as s/he
has the capacity through intentional or strategic action to transform the context within
which B ®nds her/himself; and where this is
not a reciprocal relationship (i.e.: where B's
actions would not have a similar e€ect on the
context within which A ®nds her/himself).
It should be stressed that this is little more
than the analytical basis of Lukes's third face
of power rendered in de®nitional form. Yet
this cannot be the end of the story. For to
leave the rede®nition of power here would be
# Political Studies Association 1997
Politics (1997)
17(1) pp. 45±52
to replace a three-dimensional perspective
with an (albeit expanded) one-dimensional
account. To de®ne power as context-shaping
is to emphasise power relations in which
structures, institutions and organisations are
shaped by human action in such a way as to
alter the parameters of subsequent action.
This is an indirect form of power in which
power is mediated by, and instantiated in,
structures. Yet power is also exercised in a
direct sense when A gets B to do something
that s/he would not otherwise do (for our
purposes, independently of their respective
interests). Thus, to indirect power or power
as context-shaping we must also add direct
power or power as conduct-shaping. Indirect
power is evidenced in the capacity of a government, say, to pass legislation. This does
not directly and instantaneously a€ect the
conduct of B, but once instantiated in statute
serves to rede®ne the parameters within
which B will continue to act while providing a
power resource for the potential exercise of
direct power by the law enforcement agencies
of the state. Direct power, by contrast, is
immediate, visible and behavioural, and is
manifest in such practices as decision-making,
physical and psychological coercion, persuasion and blackmail.
Such a respeci®cation of the concept of
power has a number of signi®cant consequences. First, it suggests that there are in
fact two rather di€erent conceptions of
power submerged within the faces of power
debate (direct and indirect power), and that
Lukes fails to acknowledge the decisiveness of
the break with Dahl and Bachrach and Baratz
that his critique logically entails. In the ®rst
formulation, power is a behavioural phenomenon which is immediate, directly observable,
and empirically-veri®able; in the second,
power refers to the capacity to rede®ne structured contexts and is indirect, latent and
often an unintended consequence.
Second, and perhaps more signi®cantly, the
above reformulation of power as both context- and conduct-shaping does not rely in
any sense on value-judgements about the
# Political Studies Association 1997
Divided by a common language . Colin Hay
interests (real or imagined) of the actors
involved. To suggest that A exercises power
over B is to make no claim, within this
schema, about the subversion or violation of
B's `true interests' (though such a claim is
clearly not precluded by such a statement).
Moreover, ascribing power in this way does
not in any sense imply that the theorist occupies some privileged vantage point from
which the `genuine' interests of social subjects can be ascertained. Though the identi®cation of a power relationship (particularly
one which is indirect) is still likely to be
highly contestable, it does not imply that the
political analyst ®rst engage in ethical judgements about the legitimacy of the conduct of
those involved, or the interests of those likely
to be e€ected. Ethical and normative judgements can thus be suspended temporarily
while the analysis and identi®cation of power
takes place. Thus, although theorists and critics from divergent political and ethical stances
are unlikely to agree upon the legitimacy of
the actions of the powerful, they may at least
be able to share a common analysis of the
distribution and exercise of power within a
given social and political context.
Accordingly, to attribute power on the
basis of the above de®nition is to attribute
neither responsibility nor culpability for particular e€ects as Lukes' purely pejorative conception of power would imply. The actor
who unwittingly treads on a spider and kills it
exercises a considerable power but one for
which we may not wish to hold her/him
responsible. Exercising power may be a
necessary condition for being held responsible, but it is not a sucient one. Moreover,
the doctor who terminates the life of a
patient in a consensual act of euthanasia
clearly exercises a similar power, and one for
which we may wish to hold her/him accountable and responsible. Yet in so doing we
may well wish to absolve the responsible
subject of culpability. This furnishes us with
an answer to Lukes' ®nal conundrum:
Can A properly be said to exercise power
51
Divided by a common language . Colin Hay
over B where knowledge of the e€ects of A
upon B is just not available to A? (1974,
p.51).
This is a telling example, for here Lukes
clearly con¯ates power, responsibility and
culpability. His assumption in the brief passage which follows this question is that the
consequences of A's actions must be negative
such that to ascribe responsibility is to apportion blame, and to identify a power relation
between A and B is to hold A responsible for
its consequences. Yet if we follow the de®nition of power outlined above then clearly A
exercises power in this situation. Whether we
hold her/him responsible and, if so, culpable
cannot be adjudicated in the abstract. It is
certainly unfair to attribute responsibility and
culpability to actors whom we do not regard
as exercising power; but it may be equally
unfair to assume that all actors with power
should be held responsible and culpable for
the consequences of their action.
Is it likely that political scientists will
remain divided by the common language of
power. Yet we may be able to agree on what
divides us. If so, it is ®rst essential that we
di€erentiate between the analytical questions
concerning the identi®cation of power, and
the normative questions concerning the critique of the distribution and exercise of
power thus identi®ed. It is this, above all else,
52
Politics (1997)
17(1) pp. 45±52
that is surely the lesson of the faces of power
debate.
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# Political Studies Association 1997