Labour Migration Policy and
Constitutional Change in Scotland
David N.F. Bell
Division of Economics
University of Stirling,
Centre for Population Change and IZA
Email: [email protected]
(Corresponding Author)
Allan Findlay
Department of Geography and Sustainable Development
University of St Andrews
Centre for Population Change
David McCollum
Department of Geography and Sustainable Development
University of St Andrews
Centre for Population Change
1
ABSTRACT: Scotland is holding a referendum on independence in 2014, which implies that
the Scottish Government would become responsible for migration policy in the event of a
Yes vote. Control over labour migration could be a vital policy tool for the Scottish
Government, influencing long-run economic growth rates and demographic change. This
paper explores migration policy in the context of alternative constitutional outcomes for
Scotland. It asks what scope a small economy that is intimately linked to a neighbouring
larger economy has in shaping immigration policy. It finds that the level of international
migration to Scotland is relatively low and that there are some significant differences in
migrant characteristics compared to the rest of the UK (rUK). It also considers the political
economy aspects of labour immigration through analysis of recent survey data. Whatever the
outcome of the referendum, we would argue that Scotland would benefit from a more
nuanced approach to immigration policies rather than the current ‘one size fits all’ UK wide
model.
1. Introduction
A referendum on Scottish independence will take place in September 2014. Under current
constitutional arrangements, immigration policy in Scotland is ‘reserved’ to the UK
Parliament. However an independent Scotland would have the power to set its own migration
policy. With the exception of the “Fresh Talent” initiative, which was in place between 2004
and 2008, and offered the opportunity for some highly skilled migrants (in particular
international students who had studied in Scotland) to remain in Scotland with the purpose of
contributing to the country’s economic growth, the regulations governing labour migration to
Scotland have historically been the same as those in the UK as a whole. Scotland accounts for
only 8.4 per cent of the UK population: therefore its circumstances are likely to play only a
small part in the processes by which immigration policy is determined at UK level.
These arguments are not unique to Scotland: they could apply to sub-national governments in
any democratic state. However, the possibility of constitutional change casts this issue into
much sharper focus in Scotland, since an independent Scotland would, in principle, be able to
adopt a quite different labour immigration policy than that which might be pursued in the rest
of the UK (rUK). The questions of how to address migration policy both in a sub-national
2
state, and in an independent state whose labour market is very much dominated by a close
neighbour form the subject matter of this paper.
While the possibility of constitutional change might on the face of it seem to mark a clear
break between a regime where Scotland has no powers to shape an immigration policy to one
where a distinctive Scottish policy could be put in place, reality is more nuanced. Firstly,
political independence does not mean that immigration policies can be set independently. The
reactions of actors both in other jurisdictions and in domestic and foreign labour markets
constrain the set of feasible policies. Second, sub-national immigration policies are in place
in other developed countries: it is possible therefore to conceive of Scotland having an
immigration policy different in some respects from that applying to other parts of the UK
within the current political structure. It is important for commentators to recognize that
independence is not the only constitutional arrangement under which Scotland might be able
to develop a more distinctive approach to labour immigration.
This paper considers some of the evidence that might be relevant for a future Scottish labour
migration policy, in the presence or absence of constitutional change and touches on the more
general question of whether there is a case for a regionally differentiated labour migration
policy within a larger economic union. It begins with a brief review of the sub-national
migration policy literature to investigate whether there is evidence of migration policies at
national and regional level being effective in shaping migration outcomes. It then turns to
providing some empirical evidence on migration flows to Scotland to investigate whether a
case for a differentiated migration policy can be made. Finally, new survey evidence is
provided to illustrate how far there is support for a differentiated approach to migration in
Scotland.
2. Literature Review
Our first argument is that the evidence suggests that labour immigration can, under certain
circumstances, promote economic growth. There is evidence that skilled migrants can boost
innovation (Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010; Ozgen et al, 2011), stimulate employment
growth (Zavodny, 2011) and encourage the local labour force to invest in training to take on
3
and specialize in jobs in which the nation or region has a comparative advantage (Stark, 1997
and 2004; Beine et al, 2001 and 2003; Peri and Sparber, 2009).
Our second argument is that recognition of the positive role that immigration may play has
led many countries to integrate their immigration policies into their wider strategies for
economic growth (Kofman, 2013). This has led to the perception that states, regions and
cities must compete in a global ‘war for talent’ (Beaverstock and Hall, 2012, 272). The
measures adopted by countries to attract ‘global talent’ have taken a range of forms and the
research literature reflects critically on the effectiveness of different measures (Kuptsch and
Pang, 2006; Zaletel, 2006). The most widely used policy tool has been the incorporation of a
points based systems (PBS) in immigration policies in an attempt to selectively attract those
migrants deemed to have the greatest potential to boost economic growth. The PBS approach
scores potential entrants on a number of core criteria such as educational qualifications, age,
career history, language and possession of a job offer. Canada introduced the first points
system in the late 1960s, followed by Australia in 1989, New Zealand in 1991, the Czech
Republic in 2003, Singapore in 2004, Hong Kong in 2006, Denmark in 2007 and the United
Kingdom in 2008 (Murray, 2011). Recent US immigration policy has also been pro-active in
shifting policy levers from a stance that assumed that opportunity attracts talent to a proactive re-working of its visa system to attract talent and to retain key skill groups such as
international students (Martin et al, 2006). In the context of this literature it is hard to argue
against the case for a territory with distinctive labour market and economic needs faring
better with its own distinctive immigration policy, than being subject to an externally set
immigration policy based on a ‘one size fits all’ mentality.
However, while we have introduced above the case that might underpin arguments for an
‘independent’ immigration policy tailored to the specific ‘talent’ needs of an economy, it is
equally important to recognize that many countries are to some extent constrained in the
immigration policies that they set because of the international context in which they find
themselves. The UK, for example, as a member of the European Union (EU), can only
implement its recently adopted five tier (and points-based) immigration policy in relation to
non-EU citizens, since other EU citizens are free to work anywhere within the EU. Most
4
provincial and regional governments find themselves only able to set migration objectives
that are embedded within the wider context of immigration policies set at national level.
Although immigration is generally considered to be a part of relations negotiated between
states, and as such is almost exclusively kept under central government control (Spiro, 2001),
under some federal systems, elements of governance relating to immigration have been
entrusted to sub-national decision makers. This allows sub-national institutions to formulate
immigration policies that are directed towards their particular economic, demographic and
sociocultural needs or preferences (Boushey and Luedtke, 2011). Spiro’s (2001) three models
of federalism in immigration policy provide a useful categorisation. The central government
hegemony model is the conventional application of immigration policy, whereby central
government retains responsibility for immigration decision making. In the cooperative
federalism model, central government retains primary control over immigration policy, but
allows subnational authorities some discretion to account for particular subnational needs.
This is the model of immigration policy under which Scotland currently operates since some
(limited) Scotland-specific measures exist within broader UK-wide immigration policy.
Finally the devolutionary federalism model involves central government ceding primary
control over immigration to subnational units. This could take the form of a modified PBS,
akin to the regionalised Canadian and Australian immigration systems described by Wright
and Mosca (2009).
A further important distinction in immigration policy is control over the inflow of new
immigrants and the integration of already-resident immigrants (Boushey and Luedtke 2011).
Devolving control over inflows is generally more politically controversial than ceding powers
over integration policies to sub-national authorities. Canada has devolved some aspects of
both immigration recruitment and integration powers to provincial governments: they can
seek to attract immigrants that match their local cultural, linguistic or economic preferences
while the federal government retains authority to control the overall flow of immigration
(Bhuyan and Smith-Carrier, 2012).
Boushey and Luedtke (2006) argue that inflow control should be a federal responsibility but
integration policy could be decentralised. Centralised inflow control allows for the free flow
5
of immigrant labour across subnational units, reducing labour market inefficiencies,
transaction costs and spillovers. Sub-national units contributing to the costs of maintaining a
single external border is more cost effective than each authority being responsible for its own
borders. Benefits of decentralised integration policy include the increased responsiveness to
local labour market needs and the provision of information and matching of the preferences
of prospective immigrants and employers. It has been argued to also help preserve national
wellbeing by allowing provinces to efficiently respond to local cultural and linguistic
preferences without triggering political conflict. Established examples of effective multi-level
governance in relation to the integration of migrants exist in Canada, such as the numerous
Local Immigration Partnerships and other initiatives in Ontario (Burr, 2011; Walton-Roberts,
2007).
Wright and Mosca (2009, 56) argue that a devolved model for non-EU migration would be
feasible for Scotland within the present constitutional arrangements:
“It is somewhat surprising that the UK Government praises the Canadian and Australian
immigration systems yet at the same times ignores the fact that regionality is a cornerstone of
both. Scottish specificity could easily be built in through bonus points or lower thresholds for
those who agree to live, work and stay in Scotland for a minimum period of time. Or the
responsibility for immigration could be transferred to the Scottish Government along the
lines of the Canada-Quebec Accord.”
If the literature reviewed above illustrates the potential for differential immigration policies to
operate within a modern state, our next argument is that constraints on immigration policies
also exist for autonomous states. Many smaller nations find their national immigration
policies constrained by other states. For example, despite being an independent country, the
Republic of Ireland, because it shares a land border with the UK, has an immigration policy
that is closely aligned with Britain’s. As Ryan (2001) notes, Ireland is very much the junior
partner in the relationship between the UK and Ireland on immigration policy and as such has
‘tended to be involved in the implementation of British immigration policy rather than vice
versa’ (Ryan, 2001, 874). This is most evident in relation for example to the Schengen treaty.
While most EU member states are signatories to Schengen and to the free movement of
people between the Schengen states, Ireland, in order to maintain its favoured position within
the Common Travel Area with the UK, has foregone Schengen membership. Immigration
policy in smaller states is therefore often constrained by the pressures emanating from the
6
desire to be treated favourably in relation to access to the labour markets of their larger
neighbours.
3. Sub-National Migration Policies
We turn now to consider a descriptive economic framework for labour migration policies.
Thus Equation 1 is a production function showing output in region r, Qr , being produced by a
combination of migrant,
LMr
and native labour
LNr
.
Qr  f r  LNr , LMr 
(1)
Migrant inflow (Equation 2) depends on region specific characteristics,  r , including
population size, Pr, (a simple gravity model) and the ratio of the regional wage, wr, to the
outside wage, wo, where the outside wage is the migrant’s best alternative wage rate. Finally,
the model is completed by the term, Mr, which captures the restrictiveness of migration
policy in region r. For convenience, define M r [0,1] so that a complete ban on migration is
captured by Mr = 0, no restriction by Mr = 1 and PBS would give some outcome between 0
and 1.
LMR   r  Pr 
wr
Mr
wo
(2)
Finally, Equation 3 captures the notion that commonly migration policies are not set at the
regional level and that a “one-size fits all” approach (in this case given by M) is usually
adopted.
M  M1  M 2  ...  M N
(3)
Where there is a single policy and regional characteristics are identical, labour migrants will
tend to move to high income regions, with their flow (and their effects on output and growth)
being controlled by the tightness of immigration policy. Where characteristics differ, some
regions may experience reduced growth because they are less attractive to labour migrants
than others. Such differences obviously depend on the size of the region, but may well
7
include characteristics such as the size of the existing pool of migrants; cultural and linguistic
similarities, all of which reduce the costs of migration to the potential migrant.
The outside wage may be the wage at the migrant’s point of origin. However, for someone
that has already migrated, Equation (2) may also be relevant for further migration. In this
case, the outside wage may be the wage in some other region within the country. If the costs
of such internal movement are high, then state governments may wish to inhibit such
spillover effects by insisting that migration policy is set centrally by the state (as in Equation
(3)). Assuming that regional characteristics and wage relativities are fixed in the short-run, a
national policy would remove the incentive to engage in a second stage of migration. An
alternative is to impose some regulation preventing internal migration for a fixed period of
time or by tying visa eligibility to local employment.
It is also important to recognize that decisions by state governments to impose tight migration
policies may have a negative impact on economic growth of some parts of the state, but that
they may help achieve some other policy objective (for example, cultural homogeneity).
Equally it is true that regional governments within a state may have economic and social
priorities (including those achieved through more open or more restrictive immigration
policies) that differ from those of central state government. As implied above, if migrant
populations can be isolated regionally, then such differences in priorities can in principal be
accommodated.
Another approach, which is not explored in this paper would be to set inter-regional transfers
to compensate regions adversely affected by spillover effects from immigration, or from a
restriction on immigration
4. Labour Immigration to Scotland
How is this argument relevant for Scotland? Suppose that all potential migrants have the
same outside wage: then Equation (2) would predict some broad correlation between the
proportion of foreign born residents in an area and the local wage. Figure 1 plots such data
for UK regions in 2012. It is clear that Scotland is an outlier to this relationship, having a
8
much lower proportion of foreign born residents relative to its population than would be
expected, given the level of gross weekly wages*. Scotland is shown to have higher gross
weekly wages than all other regions of the UK, with the exception of the South East of
England. At these higher wage levels, the expectation would be that Scotland would attract
many more labour migrants, pushing up the proportion of foreign-born from 8% to 12-13%
of the resident population. That such a marked deviation exists is at least suggestive of there
being something different about migration flows to Scotland, raising several questions
including both whether restrictive UK immigration policies have in some way dampened
immigration to Scotland and also whether there are distinctive aspects of the Scottish
economy that have made it less attractive to immigrants.
Figure 1: Wages and Proportion of Foreign Born Residents (2012)
25
South-East
Proportion Foreign Born
20
15
West Midlands
10
East Midlands
Yorkshire
North West
South West
Northern
Scotland
North East
5
0
£440
Wales
£460
£480
£500
£520
£540
£560
£580
Gross Weekly Wage (£)
Source: Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 2012, Annual Population Survey 2012
* Clearly the slope of this relationship is strongly influenced by the high wages and large immigrant population
in the South East. However, if the South East is omitted from the calculation, Scotland is still an outlier relative
to other parts of the UK.
Another issue that we can address is whether migrants identify themselves with the region to
which they have migrated. We examined this issue using responses to the question on
national identity carried in the Annual Population Survey. Four years of this survey were
amalgamated, giving a total of 1.3m observations for the UK as a whole.
9
Figure 2: National Identity by Area of Residence and Country of Birth
Hong Kong, China, Other
Country of Birth
Wales
Scots in England
Northern Ireland
English in Scotland
Identity English
Poland
Identity Scottish
Pakistan
Republic of Ireland
India
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Percent Scottish/English
Source: Annual Population Survey, 2012
It is clear from Figure 2 that the foreign born living in Scotland are more likely to describe
themselves as Scots than the foreign born living in England to describe themselves as
English. This is true of Asians, Poles and those from the Republic of Ireland. Indians seem
particularly willing to take on a Scottish identity. In summary, analysis of recent evidence
suggests that cultural differences do not explain the low proportion of foreign born living in
Scotland relative to England1.
The authors tested to see if the greater propensity for immigrants to Scotland expressing a
Scottish identity than was the case for the same groups living in England describing
themselves as English was due to differences in the time that they had resided in the country.
This test was in recognition of the possibility that those that have been resident for a
considerable period are more likely to take on the identity of the host population. Figure 3
addresses this issue. It uses a kernel density to estimate the distribution of arrival times of
foreign born residents to rUK and Scotland by the year in which they arrived.
1
For reference, data from all the home countries is included in Figure 2. The Welsh-born are slightly more
likely to describe themselves as Scots, but for the Northern Irish, there is no difference. Interestingly, the
English-born living in Scotland are much more likely to describe themselves as Scots as are the Scots-born
living in England.
10
Figure 3: Distribution of Year of Arrival of Foreign Born Residents in Scotland and rUK
It is clear from Figure 3 that there are no substantial differences in the distribution of arrival
times in Scotland and rUK. Levels of migration from abroad peaked around 2008 and since
then have fallen sharply, reflecting both the impact of the global economic recession and also
the increasingly restrictive stance of UK immigration policy, with its knock-on influence in
reducing the overall flow of immigrants to Scotland. The important point however, is to note
that differences in the time the foreign born have been resident in Scotland and rUK do not
provide an explanation of differences in assimilation to the local identity. Consequently the
analysis points towards the need to reject the idea that differences in migration histories
offers an explanation of Scotland’s low levels of foreign born population relative to local
wage levels (Figure 1). This leaves open the argument that Scotland does have to some extent
a different relationship with international migration systems than the rest of the UK and that
it is therefore worth considering both whether other important distinctions can be identified
11
and whether there is merit in considering whether a distinctive immigration policy is either
desirable or possible2.
Are there therefore other significant differences between the foreign born population in
Scotland and that in rUK that might supplement the case for arguing in favour of a separate
migration policy for Scotland? Our analysis considered three labour market characteristics of
the immigrant population: education levels, economic activity and wages.
One characteristic that impacts directly on economic growth, and which is central to the
Scottish Government’s strategy, is the level of education of immigrants. The argument (in
line with the economic literature) is that it is beneficial for any country to add to its stock of
globally talented people via immigration. Comparisons of qualifications gained in different
countries are difficult: we adopted a simpler approach of classifying individuals by their age
on completing education. Differences in the distributions of age-completed-education for
foreign born residents in Scotland and in rUK are relatively minor and we do not reproduce
them here. As anticipated, the selectivity effect of migration has however resulted in
Scotland’s immigrant population adding to the country’s human talent by comparison with
the Scots-born population. For example the 2012 Annual Population Survey shows that 13.1
per cent of the Scottish-born workforce in Scotland are graduates, lower than any immigrant
group (e.g. for Poles the equivalent figure is 18.6% and for Indians 49.1%). In addition, it is
fair to conclude that the data suggest that Scotland has been no less attractive as a destination
for well-educated foreign-born workers than other parts of the UK.
A second important characteristic that might influence migration policy is how the foreign
born adjust to the conditions of the Scottish labour market. Table 1 shows the distribution of
economic activity (expressed as a share of the relevant working age population) among those
born inside and outside the UK, for those resident in Scotland and in rUK. Again the data is
drawn from the merged 2009-2012 Annual Population Surveys. Note that, in line with our
2
One possibility that we cannot test here is that the relatively high concentrations of the foreign born in rUK has
reduced the likelihood of taking on the local identity since the probability of interaction with other foreign born
residents is greater, which may act as a restraint on adopting the local identity.
12
previous argument, these data suggest that in rUK, the foreign born comprise 15.7 per cent of
working age population, while in Scotland they comprise only 8.4 per cent.
Table 1: Economic Activity among those of Working Age
Residence
rUK
UK/Foreign Born
UK
Foreign
70.9%
66.2%
Employed
6.0%
6.7%
Unemployed
13.4%
17.5%
Other inactive
5.6%
7.6%
Inactive student
4.1%
1.9%
Retired
Source: Annual Population Survey, 2009-12
UK
71.0%
6.2%
14.0%
4.6%
4.2%
Scotland
Foreign
68.1%
5.9%
13.0%
11.1%
1.9%
In both Scotland and rUK, the proportion of the working age population in employment is
higher among the UK born than among those born outside the UK. Part of the explanation
lies in the greater numbers of foreign born who are students. This is particularly important in
Scotland’s case, where only 4.6 per cent of the UK born population of working age could be
described as inactive students, while 11.1 per cent of those born outside the UK describe
themselves in the same way. Foreign students are a relatively more important source of
migrants to Scotland than to rUK (Tindal et al, 2013). Clearly, they have an economic
significance both in terms of their contribution to Scotland’s exports, to future trade linkages,
and to enhancing Scotland’s productive potential if they choose to stay following their
studies. This provides an argument for some differentiation in migration policy, as was the
case with the “Fresh Talent” initiative, which ran from 2005 to 2008 and offered overseas
graduates from Scottish universities, who expressed an intention of living and working in
Scotland, to stay on for two years following graduation to seek employment. Moreover, it is
fair to argue that since international student entry to the UK has been included on the UK
government-imposed cap on immigrant numbers, that UK policy is currently holding
Scotland back in relation to this key aspect of immigration to Scotland (Tindal et al, 2013).
The proportion of retirees among those of working age is much lower among the foreign born
throughout the UK, a reflection of their relative youth at the time of migration and the
concentration of migration flows in recent years. And though the foreign born in rUK are
substantially more likely to be otherwise inactive than the native population, in Scotland the
share of this group is smaller than in the rest of the UK. One major difference is the relatively
13
high proportion of students among the foreign born in Scotland compared with rUK,
reflecting the relatively greater importance of student flows to the Scottish economy.
Though the foreign born may be better qualified than natives, their average contribution to
GDP may be less if they are unable to exploit their qualifications in the Scottish labour
market. If this is the case, one would expect that this group would have lower earnings than
the native born. Figure 4 shows earnings at each decile of the income distribution for both
natives and foreign born resident in Scotland and rUK during the period 2009-2012.
Figure 4: Real Wages of those Resident in rUK and Scotland, UK and Foreign Born
1000
900
800
£ per week
700
600
500
400
UK rUK
300
UK Scotland
200
Foreign rUK
100
Foreign Scotland
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Income decile
7
8
9
Source: Annual Population Survey 2009-2012 (Weekly gross wages adjusted to real values
using the annual Consumer Price Index)
The data suggest that there are no substantial differences between the earnings of the UK
born and the foreign born who are resident in the UK. However, while the UK born living in
Scotland have a broadly similar income distribution to that in rUK, the foreign born working
in Scotland earn less than the other three groups from around the 4th to the 8th income decile.
This is suggestive that there are relatively few foreign-born workers who are working in
“middle-level” occupations in Scotland. This is compatible with other evidence showing that
14
Scotland benefits both from an inflow of highly talented migrants commanding high salaries
and also from the inflow of low wage labour engaged in sectors such as agriculture and
hospitality (Findlay and McCollum, 2013). Again, this evidence is suggestive of differences
in the characteristics of labour migrants to Scotland from those to the rest of the UK.
To summarise the findings of this section of our paper, Scotland has a much lower proportion
of foreign born compared with other parts of the UK, conditional on its relative wages. While
there is a difference in scale (see Packwood and Findlay (2014) for a fuller discussion of why
scale may matter), the differences in the characteristics of the foreign born in Scotland
compared with the foreign born living in rUK cannot be dismissed. They are more likely to
describe themselves as Scottish than are, for example, the foreign born living in England.
Their levels of education differ little from migrants to the rest of the UK, but they add
significantly to Scotland’s skill pool relative to the native Scots-born population. Scotland
has a relatively larger proportion of foreign students and fewer who are “otherwise inactive”.
And from our understanding none of these differences explain why Scotland has relatively
few foreign born – in terms of Equation 2, a low value ofψr.
Even if an intellectual case for support can be made, a differentiated, more open, migration
policy to raise the proportion of foreign born would require popular support if Scotland was
independent. In the next section, we examine evidence on Scots attitudes to immigration.
5. How do Scots Feel about Immigrants?
The Scottish Government’s post-independence migration policy was outlined in the White
Paper (2013).
“We plan to develop and operate a controlled, transparent and efficient immigration
system that best meets Scotland’s needs. This will include a points based approach
targeted at particular Scottish circumstances. … There will not be any border controls
between Scotland and the rest of the UK or Ireland – these countries (and also the Isle
of Man and Channel Islands) already operate a common travel area which Scotland will
remain part of. … Yes Scotland believes that UK immigration policy is not appropriate
for Scotland.” White Paper on Independence (2013)
On independence, the Scottish Government could only develop a more open migration policy
with popular support. There is evidence that Scotland is more receptive to immigration, partly
15
because the case for more immigration was strongly supported when Scotland’s population,
unlike that of the UK as a whole, was declining (McCollum et al, 2013; McCollum et al
2014). Research on attitudes to immigration reveals however that public opinion on the issue
is notoriously changeable. A recent survey (December 2013) by the University of Stirling
suggest for example growing opposition in Scotland to immigration, although hostility
remains much less than in England. The University of Stirling survey was commissioned to
identify voter preferences in a number of domains. The respondents comprised 2,067 Scottish
adults of which 1,612 answered a key question on immigration policy.
The results suggest that those favouring the formation of a new country support increased
heterogeneity, in contrast to Alesina and Spoloare’s (1997, 1027) suggestion that country
formation is ‘a specific tradeoff between the benefits of large political jurisdictions and the
costs of heterogeneity in large populations’. Respondents to the survey were asked which of
the following statements best represents their views on immigration in the event of a “Yes”
vote. The options were: there would be more immigrants which would be a bad thing; there
would be more immigrants which would be a good thing; there would be fewer immigrants
which would be a bad thing; there would be fewer immigrants which would be a good thing;
finally, independence wouldn’t make much difference to the flow of immigrants. Results,
again cross-tabulated by voting intentions are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Expectations of the effects of independence on immigration following a “Yes” vote
disaggregated by voting intention in the referendum.
Should Scotland be an independent
country?
Total
Yes
No
32.2
4.5
15.57
More immigrants, good
thing
16.8
48.8
36.04
More immigrants, bad
thing
17.8
7.3
11.48
Fewer immigrants, good
thing
1.6
10
6.64
Fewer immigrants, bad
thing
31.62
29.4
30.27
I don't think the
outcome will make a
difference
100
100
100
Total
Source: YouGov Poll December 2013 n = 1,612
16
For this prospective question, similar sentiments are expressed. It is those who support
independence who are most likely to express the view that an increase in immigration would
be a good thing. Among “No” voters, the largest group, by a large margin, are those who
expect an increase in immigration post-independence and who believe this would be a bad
thing. Again, these results seem to reverse the usual argument that nationalism is associated
with a greater desire for cultural and social homogeneity.
More detailed analysis based on ordered logit estimates of the responses indicate that women,
those in social classes C2 (skilled working class) and DE (working class and non-working),
and the less educated are significantly more likely to believe that there has been too much
immigration in the last decade3. However, conditional on these effects, it is still true that
those who express an intention to vote in favour of independence are significantly less likely
to believe that there has been too much immigration. The results indicate that there is much
stronger support for migration among those who are likely to vote in favour of Scottish
independence.
What are the implications of these findings for political support of a differentiated migration
policy for Scotland? If those who vote “Yes” are more influential in a post-independence
Scotland, then a more liberal policy might emerge. On the other hand, if the “No” vote
prevails, then the supporters of this outcome are less likely to argue strongly for a
differentiated approach to migration policy for Scotland within a still-unified UK. Clearly if
Scotland remains within the UK, such differentiation would be conditional on agreement with
other parts of the UK, who might be concerned about any spillover effects that might result
from different immigration regulations being in force in Scotland.
6. Conclusions in relation to economic policies favouring immigration to
Scotland
This paper examines the case for a differentiated migration policy for Scotland either as an
independent state, or within the UK. The Scottish Government believes that independence is
a necessary precondition for the development of an effective migration policy that will
facilitate its objectives of economic and population growth. Constitutional arrangements are
3
Results available upon request
17
clearly important, but not necessarily decisive: states such as Canada and Australia operate
spatially differentiated migration policies.
We have developed a simple model which shows how levels of labour migration might
respond to differences in wages, in migration policies and spatial or regional “fixed effects”.
We go on to show that, given the level of Scottish wages, the number of foreign-born
residents in Scotland is relatively low, compared with rUK. This suggests that Scotland is an
outlier relative to other parts of the UK in the sense of having a large negative fixed effect on
immigration levels. We also show that some economic characteristics of the foreign-born in
Scotland are somewhat different from the Scots-born population as well as from some aspects
of foreign born people resident in rUK. On balance, he evidence suggests a case for a
differentiated migration policy for Scotland whether within the UK or separate from the UK
(see below). Clearly a multiplicity of migration policies within one state would be costly and
subject to spillover effects that would undermine its effectiveness and credibility. Only in
those areas that are demonstrably outliers in respect of migration patterns and where spillover
effects can be minimised might a differentiated migration policy be considered feasible. From
a political economy perspective, it would also need to command sufficient support in the
relevant decision making bodies – which in turn depends on how government is structured.
Under a new devolved settlement, Scotland (and the rest of the UK) might be able to benefit
from establishing more effective ‘provincial’ immigration policies. The cooperative federalist
model of government provides the context in which such policies might emerge.
In an independent Scotland, immigration policy would also require political support.
Supporters of independence were more open to immigration than those who favoured no
change in the constitutional arrangements. This seems to contrast with the widely accepted
view of Alesina and Spoloare (1997) that the motive for state formation is principally to
maintain cultural or social homogeneity and points to how distinctive the current debate is
over Scotland’s future.
In our view the Republic of Ireland is arguably the nearest parallel to the situation that
Scotland might find itself in if it became independent. In this context Scotland, like Ireland,
would most likely wish to remain in a common travel area with the rest of the UK because of
18
its close labour market ties with England. As a consequence it seems likely that an
independent Scotland would, like Ireland, remain outside of Schengen if allowed to do so by
the EU. It would also, as a consequence of its desire to keep open borders with rUK, seek to
shape its international migration policy with the rest of the world in a fashion that facilitated
increased immigration but without contradicting rUK immigration policy.
References
Alesina, A, and Spolaore, E. (1997) ‘On the number and size of nations.’ The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1027-1056.
Beaverstock, J. and Hall, S. (2012), ‘Competing for Talent: Global mobility, Immigration and
the City of London’s Labour Market’, Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and
Society, 5, 271-287.
Beine, M., Dacquier, F. and Rapoport, H. (2001), ‘Brain Drain and Economic Growth:
Theory and Evidence’, Journal of Development Economics, 64(1), 275-289.
Beine, M., Docquier, F. and Rapport, H. (2003), ‘Brain Drain and LdCs’ Growth: Winners
and
Losers’, IZA
Discussion
Paper
819,
available
at
ftp://repec.iza.org/RePEc/Discussionpaper/dp819.pdf.
Bhuyan, R. and Smith-Carrier, T. (2012), ‘Constructions of migrants’ rights in Canada: is
subnational citizenship possible?’ Citizenship Studies, 16(2), 203-221.
Boushey, G. and Luedtke, A. (2006), ‘Fiscal federalism and the politics of immigration:
centralized and decentralized immigration policies in Canada and the United States’, Journal
of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 8(3), 207-224.
Boushey, G. and Luedtke, A. (2011), ‘Immigrants Across the U.S. Federal Laboratory:
Explaining State-level Innovation in Immigration Policy’, State Politics & Policy
Quarterly, 11(4), 390-414.
Burr, K. (2011), ‘Local Immigration Partnerships: Building Welcoming and Inclusive
Communities Through Multi-level Governance’. Research Report, Horizons Policy Research
Initiative, available at http://p2pcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Local-ImmigrationPartnerships-Building-Welcoming-and-Inclusive-Communities.pdf
19
Findlay A and McCollum D (2013) Recruitment and employment regimes, Journal of Rural
Studies, 30, 10-19.
Hunt, J. and Gauthier-Loiselle, M. (2010), ‘How Much does Immigration Boost Innovation?’
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2(2), 31-56.
Kofmann, E. (2013), ‘Towards a Gendered Evaluation of (Highly) Skilled Immigration
Policies in Europe’, International Migration, early view version 24th July, 2013.
Kuptsch, C. and Pang, E. F. (eds) (2006), Competing for Global Talent, International Labour
Organization, Geneva.
McCollum D, Findlay A, Bell D and Bijak J (2013) Patterns and perceptions of migration: Is
Scotland distinct from the rest of the UK? Briefing Paper 10, ESRC Centre for Population
Change, Southampton.
McCollum D, Nowok B and Tindall S (2014) Public attitudes towards migration in Scotland,
Scottish Affairs 23.1. pp 79–102
Martin, P., Abella, M. and Kuptsch, C. (2006), Managing Labor Migration in the TwentyFirst Century, Yale University Press, New Haven
Murray, A. (2011), ‘Britain’s Points Based Migration System’. Centre Forum Discussion
Paper, available at http://www.centreforum.org/assets/pubs/points-based-system.pdf.
Ozgen, C., Nijkamp, P., and Poot, J. (2011), ‘Immigration and Innovation in European
Regions’.
EconStor
Working
Paper,
available
athttp://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/51721/1/668198893.pdf.
Packwood H and Findlay A (2013) Immigration, Scotland and the constitutional change
debate: Geography, difference and the question of scale. Briefing Paper 14, ESRC Centre for
Population Change, Southampton
Peri, G. and Sparber, C. (2009), ‘Task Specialization, Immigration, and Wages’,American
Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1(3), 135-169.
Ryan, B. (2001), ‘The Common Travel Area Between Britain and Ireland’,Modern Law
Review, 64(6), 855-874.
Scottish Government (2013), ‘Scotland’s Future: your guide to an independent Scotland’,
Scottish Government White Paper, available at
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2013/11/9348/downloads#res439021.
20
Spiro, P. (2001), ‘Federalism and Immigration: Models and Trends’,International Social
Science Journal, 53(167), 67-73.
Stark, O. (1997), ‘Frontier issues in International Migration’, World Bank, pp. 361-403.
Stark, O. (2004) ‘Rethinking the Brain Drain’, World Development, 32(1), 15-22
Tindal S, Wright R, Findlay A and Bell D (2013) European Union and International students
in Scottish higher education institutions, Briefing Paper 13, ESRC Centre for Population
Change, Southampton
Walton-Roberts, M. (2007), ‘Immigration regionalization in Ontario: policies, practices and
realities’.
In
Graham,
K.
(ed),
Our
diverse
cities
Policy
Paper,
available
at http://www.metropolis.net/pdfs/ODC%20Ontario%20Eng.pdf.
Wright, R.E. and Mosca, L. (2009), ‘Devolved Immigration Policy: Will it Work in
Scotland?’ Fraser of Allander Economic Commentary, 33(2), 55-59.
Zaletel, P. (2006), ‘Competing for the Highly Skilled Migrants: implications for the EU
Common Approach on Temporary Economic Migration’, European Law Journal, 12(5), 613635.
Zavodny, M. (2011), ‘Immigration and American Jobs’. American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research and the Partnership for a New American Economy, available at
http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/img/NAE_Im-AmerJobs.pdf.
21