Kristina,
I went to the NYT offices on Friday and met with Jo Becker and Mike McIntyre for
two hours to get briefed on their upcoming story that is drawn from some of the
allegations in the forthcoming book, Clinton Cash.
As you know, Jo wrote an extensive, investigative piece in 2008. That story
suggested that WJC, during a trip to Kazakhstan in 2005, lobbied the country’s
government to approve Frank Giustra’s intended acquisition of three Kazakh
uranium mines. The article was written carefully to only present “facts,” and never
outright accused WJC of helping Giustra acquire the Kazakh mines due to Giustra’s
extensive contributions to the Foundation. But that was the obvious impression left.
Aspects of the 2008 article were challenged shortly after it was published. Most
notably, Forbes published a story documenting a series of apparent errors. For
instance, Forbes, citing Giustra, reported that the Kazakhstan government’s
approval was not even necessary to Giustra’s acquisition of the uranium mines,
making WJC’s alleged advocacy on Giustra’s behalf moot. And moreover, Forbes
said, Giustra’s acquisition was clinched prior to WJC’s trip. To this day, Jo is angry
about the Forbes piece for questioning the accuracy of her reporting, and in her
upcoming story, she intends to present new evidence that she believes will vindicate
her on the points that Forbes called into question. [More on that in a moment.]
Jo considers her upcoming piece to be a “sequel” to her 2008 article. It purports to
tell the story of what happened to Giustra’s company—urAsia—after it successfully
acquired the mining interests in Kazakhstan in 2005. Once again, Jo will lay out a
series of “facts” without alleging anything outright; but the way she presents these
facts will leave the reader with the overwhelming impression that the Clintons again
took action to benefit Giustra and his business associates on account of their
financial assistance to the Foundation.
Below is a summary of the facts/events that Jo considers suspicious and intends to
connect in her story:
SUMMARY OF EVENTS

In 2007, Giustra’s mining company, urAsia, is acquired by another Canadianbased mining firm, Uranium One. The deal is very lucrative for Giustra. Even
after the sale, he retained a stake in the newly merged company, though his
stake was less than 10 percent.

In 2008, Uranium One obtains a series of U.S. uranium holdings in Wyoming
to go along with its holdings in Kazakhstan. These holdings in Wyoming
represent 20 percent of known uranium deposits in the U.S.

In 2009, the Kazakhstan government arrests the head of the state-owned
nuclear energy company on charges of corruption. Executives from Uranium
One begin fearing that its ownership of the Kazakhstan uranium mines—
which had been acquired in 2005 by Giustra—will be called into question.
o A State Department cable—which has been made public by
Wikileaks—indicates that in 2009, U.S. embassy officials in
Kazakshtan were visited by a Uranium One executive. The executive,
Paul Lewis Clarke, told embassy officials that the company wanted
written reassurances that its ownership of the Kazakhstan uranium
mines would be honored despite the ongoing prosecution of the
energy company official. The executive said that the ownership rights
should not be in dispute because they were approved by the
Kazakhstan government at the time Giustra purchased the mines in
2005.

Two points here:

Clarke’s reference to government approval of the sale of
the uranium mines in 2005 to Giustra contradicts the
contention in the Forbes story that such approval was
never sought or received.

Jo finds it suspicious that a Canadian firm like Uranium
One would voice its concerns and seek assistance from
the U.S. embassy unless the firm believed it would
receive help based on Giustra’s connections to the
Clintons.

Ultimately, despite believing that the 2005 sale of the uranium mines to
Giustra was corrupt, the Kazakhstan government decides not to revisit
Uranium One’s ownership rights regarding those mines.

In 2009, a company owned entirely by the Russian government (ARMZ
Uranium Holding Company) obtains a 17 percent stake in Uranium One. A
year later, the Russians increased their stake to 51 percent, giving them
majority control of Uranium One and all its assets—including the U.S.
uranium reserves in Wyoming.
o According to Jo, Russia’s interest in acquiring uranium deposits was in
keeping with a strategic aim of Putin’s. Prior to Russia’s purchase of
Uranium One, Russia owned 40 percent of the world’s uranium
enrichment capacity, but only six percent of the world’s known
reserves of uranium. By buying up more raw uranium, Russia was
seeking to increase its supply of uranium to match its enrichment
capabilities, in order to consolidate its grip on the world’s nuclear
energy supply. Jo points out that this long-term goal of Russia’s is very
much in conflict with the strategic interests of the U.S. and Europe,
meaning that the sale of a majority stake in Uranium One to Russia
should have raised flags across the West.

Because Russia’s acquisition of Uranium One involved the transfer of
ownership of U.S. uranium assets, it triggered CFIUS review. (CFIUS is an
inter-agency process that occurs whenever a foreign entity attempts to
purchase U.S. assets. The State Department is one of the top agencies
involved in the review.) The CFIUS process generated significant media
attention, and several members of Congress wrote letters expressing concern
about the prospect of Russia gaining control of U.S. uranium assets.

Meanwhile, during the same period of time when the sale of Uranium One to
the Russian government is undergoing CFIUS review, a large number of
individuals who stand to benefit from the sale are contributing to the
Clinton-Giustra Sustainable Growth Initiative. By Jo’s count, stakeholders in
the sale gave a combined $130m to the initiative during this period. This
figure includes $100m from Giustra himself, who, as noted earlier, retained a
small share in Uranium One. Among the non-Giustra donors who accounted
for the other $30m was Ian Telfer, the acting head of Uranium One and a
close associate of Giustra’s, whom Jo believes donated $5.35 million during
this time.
o Most suspicious to Jo is that this $5.35m in donations by Telfer—$3m
from him personally, and 2.35m from his family foundation (the
Fernwood Foundation)—apparently goes undisclosed by the Clinton
Foundation, in a violation of the MOU that was in effect during HRC’s
tenure at the State Department.

Also while the Uranium One deal is pending CFIUS review, in June 2010, WJC
is personally paid 500k to give a speech in Moscow to a Russian investment
firm known as Renaissance Capital (RenCap). The firm has deep ties to the
Russian government in the form of many of its executives being former KGB
agents. Following the speech, WJC meets with Putin himself, and Putin thanks
him for speaking at RenCap.
o Jo believes Giustra himself may have facilitated the speaking
engagement, and the fee. This suspicion is based on the fact that a
separate philanthropy run by Giustra counts RenCap as one of its four
donors.

Despite the concerns raised about the possibility of Russian control of the
U.S. uranium assets, U.S. authorities overseeing the CFIUS process approve
the sale of Uranium One to Russia in October 2010. Though the details of the
CFIUS process are not public, since the deal was greenlighted, that
presumably means the State Department—led by HRC—signed off.

Following the approval of the sale, the Russian government reneges on many
of the commitments it had made when it was seeking approval of the
acquisition. Rather than keep the company publicly traded on the Canadian
stock exchange, the Russians took the company entirely private and replaced
much of the Canadian leadership of the company.
o In the years since, Russian government officials have joked about the
irony that they now own a significant stake of U.S. uranium assets.

The U.S. approval of the deal appears even stranger because during the same
period when HRC was at State, a deal involving the possible sale of mining
interests in Nevada to the Chinese government was rejected, in part, because
of concern of foreign ownership of the U.S. uranium supply.
Questions that NYT is posing, based on the above description of events:
The Diplomatic Cable

What ever came of the 2009 cable that was sent from the U.S. embassy in
Kazakhstan relaying the Uranium One executive’s request for assistance in
preserving their ownership rights to Kazakhstan’s mines? To whom was the
cable sent at the State Department in Washington? Did HRC or anyone in her
office ever see it? Was any action ever taken based on it?

Can HRC or her staff provide any explanation as to why an executive of a
Canadian mining company operating in Kazakhstan would seek assistance
from the U.S. embassy unless the executive expected a favorable reception
based on Giustra’s connection to the Clintons?
The CFIUS Review Process

What was the nature of the State Department’s role in the CFIUS process that
resulted in U.S. approval of Russia’s acquisition of Uranium One? Was the
State Department the co-lead agency alongside Treasury, as is often the case
with the CFIUS process?

While the acquisition was pending CFIUS approval, did the matter ever get
briefed at then-Secretary Clinton’s level?
o If so, what was her personal position on the transaction? Did she have
any misgivings at the time? Or was she supportive?
o If she was not briefed, how is it possible that a matter of such
significance to the U.S. relationship with Russia did not reach the
Secretary?

Assuming Secretary Clinton was indeed aware of the matter when it was
undergoing CFIUS review, did she ever consider recusing herself given the
connection to Giustra and other donors to the Clinton Foundation? If not,
why not?

Did WJC ever bring up the matter to HRC? Did Giustra or any other Clinton
Foundation donors?

How does Secretary Clinton square the State Department’s apparent
approval of the sale of Uranium One to the Russians with her past record as
an ardent CFIUS hawk who opposed, for example, the Dubai World Ports deal
in 2006?

To what extent was HRC inclined to view the deal favorably on account of the
ongoing “reset” with Russia, and related diplomatic priorities such as the
START Treaty negotiations or the effort to gain Russia’s cooperation in the
Iran nuclear talks?
Clinton Foundation Donations

Why were $5.35m in donations by Uranium One executive Ian Telfer and his
family foundation never disclosed by the Clinton Foundation, as was
required under the MOU in place at the time?

Can the Clinton Foundation confirm that the MOU in place while HRC was
Secretary of State merely prohibited contributions from foreign
governments, and not contributions from foreign corporations or
individuals?

The Clinton Foundation recently announced reforms to its donor policies
whereby it will only accept donations from foreign governments that are
friendly to the U.S. But Jo believes the situation with Ian Telfer exposes the
flaw in this approach since, while direct donations by the Russian
government may be barred under the new policy, contributions from other
foreign individuals and corporations—in this case, Mr. Telfer and his
associates—still have the potential to exert influence in a way that benefits
the Russians. How would the Foundation respond?
WJC’s speech in Moscow

Who invited WJC to address RenCap? Was Giustra in any way involved in
securing the invitation or negotiating the fee?

Was the matter of the CFIUS review of the Russian acquisition of Uranium
One ever discussed during Clinton’s visit to Moscow?

Why would WJC accept an invitation from an investment firm so closely
aligned with the Russian government at a time when the Russians had a
delicate matter pending before his wife’s State Department?
Possibly Exculpatory Questions We Have for Giustra
Below are questions we would like to pose to Giustra in order to push back on theories
advanced by Jo:

What would Giustra say in light of the State Department cable showing the
Uranium One executive acknowledging that Giustra’s 2005 purchase of the
Kazakhstan uranium mines received government approval? [The cable seems
to contradict what Giustra told Forbes, so we would like to hear his side
about why he believes government approval was not needed.]

What is the nature of his relationship with RenCap, the firm that invited WJC
to speak in Moscow? Did he arrange for the speaking invitation? [The more
tenuous we can show his connection to the firm to be, the more we can
discredit the claim that it was a “payoff” to WJC intended to influence his
wife’s decision in the CFIUS review of Russia’s acquisition of Uranium One.]

What was the size of Giustra’s stake in Uranium One after its acquisition of
urAsia? [The lower Frank’s stake in Uranium One, the less interest he would
have had in helping facilitate CFIUS approval for its ultimate sale to the
Russians.]

What was the nature of Giustra’s fundraising activity on behalf of the GiustraClinton Sustainable Growth Initiative during the period of 2008-2010? [The
more we can show that Giustra took the lion’s share of the responsibility for
raising funds for the initiative—because he considered it a legacy project for
himself that bore his name—and the more we can show that he relied on his
business associates to raise funds because they had the means to contribute
and owed him favors, the less it will appear that the contributions from
people like Ian Telfer were intended to influence HRC while Uranium One’s
sale was undergoing CFIUS review.]