The financial crisis in Iceland. Economic and social disaster? Lilja Mósesdóttir 1 The largest bank collapse ! The profit of the liberalised and privatised banking system was privatised while the debt will be nationalised. The total debt of the central government (sovereign debt): A. Pre-crash debt : 653 billion Iskr. B. Nationalised debt due to the crash: ICEsave/Edge: (secured) loans lost by the Central bank Recapitalisation of the banks Short sale losses Fiscal deficit 2009 FIH bank 695 220 385 35 154 63.6 Total 2205.6 millj. Iskr. billion Iskr. billion Iskr. billion Iskr. billion Iskr. billion Iskr. billion Iskr. National debt becomes 145% of GDP 2 3 The economic situation % 2007 2008 2009 4.9 -0.1 -9.6 Inflation (CPI) 5 12.4 13.1 Budget Balance (% GDP) 5.5 -1.4 -13,2 Foreign currency (average price) change in Iskr) -2,5 40.1 22.6 Unemployment 2,3 3.0% 10% Real GDP growth Sources: Minstry of Finance, (2009) and Statistics Iceland (2008) Emergency law in October to ensure full access of Icelanders to their bank deposits 4 IMF backed program in Iceland The loan(s): IMF: 2.1 billion US$ Others: 3 billion US$ (Nordic countries, Russia & Poland) Conditions: 1. Implement IFM economic program 2. Demonstrate commitment to solve the dispute around ICEsave/Edge IMF program focus on: 1. Currency stabilisation Currency stability the goal of monetary policy • Capital controls • Central bank interest rate up to 18% 2. Bank restructuring New regulatory structure Recapitalize (The central bank and the 3 state-owned banks) 3. Fiscal consolidation Extensive cuts or higher taxes due to large debt-servicing burden 5 Criticism of the IMF program 1. Free floating currency instead of capital controls (right wing) 2. The program fails to take into account : the real economy The private sector (fishery sector) technically bankrupt Fish prices are falling due to the global recession counter-cyclical measures Fiscal policy: Fiscal deficit only allowed in 2009 Monetary policy: High interest rate Almost illiquid currency (Iskr) Keep Iskr. - limits the size of the banking and corporate sector Unilateral adaptation of foreign currency – no lender of last resort EU membership and then EMU membership – takes too long time 6 Threats to social cohesion 1.Inequality: Rich investors and households : Better able to hedge in advance and run away More likely to receive compensation when bank bailouts occur Better protected when the crisis spreads to the real economy Urban poverty increases more than rural poverty (may protect the poor) 2. Poverty: Unemployment (10%) and shorter working hours Large fall in real wages (16%) Price indexed housing loans 3. Wealth transfers: From the poor to the rich From few domestic investors to even fewer domestic investors From domestic investors to foreign investors 7 Social unrest in Iceland IMF program does not tackle the indebtedness of firms and households. No emergency plan Social policy measures focuses only on the most needy Banks accused of applying discriminatory rules when deciding on loans to firms So far, no consultation with trade unions and interest groups Poverty and inequality likely to increase in Iceland: Full access to deposits –capital owners compensated by the state Limited progressiveness of the tax system Price indexed housing loans and high real interest rate Voluntary pay decreases Low replacement rates of welfare benefits 8 Tackle poverty and inequality Social costs of financial crisis large and durable (Finland) The crisis offer an opportunity to introduce better policies: Lower real interest on housing loan and changes to the indexation Progressive tax (flat rate tax rate 37,38%) Lower tax rate among low earners stimulates demand more than among high earners Women’s labour supply more sensitive to tax changes than men’s Policies focused on reducing poverty essential and more acceptable during crisis (IMF constrains) Income support Workfare - infrastructure and R&D Knowfare (opportunity cost of schooling falls) Centralised wage negotiation to protect those in vulnerable position 9 Tackle wealth transfers Real estate Bubble 1997-2007 250% Household debt as % of GDP (2008,Q3) 115% Price fall 2008-2010 30% Solution: real estate turned into housing cooperatives?? Stock market (OMX Iceland 15) Bubble 2001-2007 500% Firm debt as % of GDP (2008,Q3) 316% Price fall (last 12 months) 94% Solution: Restructuring fund (RSF) – the state (+pension funds) Depreciate/subordinate debt and injecting capital (share holder/owner) Depreciate /subordinate debt and allow employees to take over firms Relax rules concerning bankruptcy of households and firms Investment companies should be forced into bankruptcy 10 Growth strategies Source: Ívar Jónsson (2003) 11 Growth strategy for Iceland? Export-led growth strategy based on the utilisation of natural resources and foreign direct investment in aluminium & ferrosilicon Falling fish prices Falling energy prices Too capital intensive strategy Likely to involve economic growth without much employment growth Require relatively low skill level How to manage ownership and utilisation of natural resources Import-substitution strategy Manufacturing production instead of service provision Natural resources used to produce for domestic or foreign markets Free trade agreements constrain 12
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