Governing Infrastructure and
Knowledge Commons
Brett Frischmann
Engaging the Research Community towards an
Open Science Commons
EGI Conference 2015
Lisbon, Portugal
18-22 May, 2015
Open Science Commons
• What is a Commons?
• Why Commons?
• How Commons?
Open Science Commons
• What is a Commons?
– Commons refers to resource management
/governance institutions that enable sustainable
shared use of certain resources within a
community.
• Why Commons?
• How Commons?
Open Science Commons
• What is Commons?
– Commons are resource management / governance
institutions that enable sustainable shared use of
certain resources within a community.
• Why Commons?
• Open Science is a complex resource system.
• Many shared resources are infrastructural.
• The scientific community defines and is defined by
commons.
• How Commons?
Open Science Commons
• What is Commons?
– Commons are resource management / governance institutions
that enable sustainable shared use of certain resources within
a community.
• Why Commons?
• Open Science is a complex resource system.
• Many shared resources are infrastructural.
• The scientific community defines and is defined by commons.
• How Commons?
– Open access works for some resources.
– But for most, governance is complex, contextual, resourcespecific and community-specific.
– Much more than “openness.”
Part I: Foundations
1: Defining Infrastructure and Commons Management
2: Overview of Infrastructure Economics
3: Microeconomic Building Blocks
Part II: A Demand-Side Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management
4: Infrastructural Resources
5: Managing Infrastructure as Commons
Part III: Complications
6: Commons Management and Infrastructure Pricing
7: Managing Congestion
8: Supply-Side Incentives
Part IV: Traditional Infrastructure
9: Transportation Infrastructure
Roads
10: Communications Infrastructure
Telecommunications networks
Part V: Nontraditional Infrastructure
11: Environmental Infrastructure
E.g., Lakes, ecosystems
12: Intellectual Infrastructure
E.g., Ideas, basic research, data
Part VI: Modern Debates
13: The Internet and the Network Neutrality Debate
14: Application to Other Modern Debates Google Books, p2p protocols, OSS
Background
1. Government intervention
2. Commons management is the norm
3. Positive externalities / large social surplus
Background
1. Government intervention
•
•
Government’s role varies considerably based
on resource, community, context
Infrastructure markets fail, in many different
ways!
2. Commons management is the norm
3. Positive externalities / large social surplus
Background
1. Government intervention
2. Commons management is the norm
3. Positive externalities / large social surplus
Commons Management
Commons  Open Access
1. Ownership
2. Community Definition
3. Degree of Exclusion
•For INFRASTRUCTURE BOOK, we focused on
nondiscriminatory sharing
•
•
•
Various institutional regimes
Lack of exclusion & member/nonmember boundaries
Not necessarily free
Commons Management
1. Ownership
2. Community Definition
3. Degree of Exclusion
•But our focus will broaden as we study of
knowledge commons
Background
1. Government intervention
2. Commons management is the norm
3. Positive externalities / large social surplus
Infrastructural Resources
1. The resource may be consumed nonrivalrously;
2. social demand for the resource is driven
primarily by downstream productive activity
that requires the resource as an input; and
3. the resource is used as an input into a wide
range of goods and services, including private
goods, public goods and/or social goods.
• Infrastructure enable many systems (markets and
non-markets) to function and satisfy demand
derived from many different types of users.
• Infrastructure are not special purpose resources,
optimized for a particular user or use to satisfy
the demand derived from a particular
downstream market or set of markets.
• Infrastructure provide basic, multi-purpose
functionality.
Value
Social Demand (y + s)
Private Demand (y)
User (x)
Value
Social Demand (y + s)
Private Demand (y)
User (x)
Value
Private Demand Curve
∑ yz
Use (z)
Uses z1, z2, z3, … ranked according to aggregated willingness to
pay.
Social Demand Curve
∑ ( yz+sz)
Value
Private Demand Curve
∑ yz
Use (z)
Note: Uses z1, z2, z3, … ranked according to aggregated willingness to pay.
Different Social Demand Curves
∑ ( yz+sz)
Value
Private Demand Curve
∑ yz
Use (z)
Note: Uses z1, z2, z3, … ranked according to aggregated willingness to pay.
Different Social Demand Curves
∑ ( yz+sz)
Value
Private Demand Curve
∑ yz
Use (z)
Note: Uses z1, z2, z3, … ranked according to aggregated willingness to pay.
YouTube
Matthew’s Birthday Party Video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2PcxxiDvgRc
stats:
100 views
0 likes, 0 dislikes
0 comments
Intended audience? Maybe 25?
Charlie bit my finger -- again! Video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_OBlgSz8sSM
stats:
469,739,454 views
934,803 likes, 131,326 dislikes
754,333 comments
Intended audience? 1? Maybe 25?
YouTube
Matthew’s Birthday Party Video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2PcxxiDvgRc
stats:
168 views
0 likes, 0 dislikes
0 comments
Intended audience? Maybe 25?
Small scale spillovers add up when
activity is widespread.
Charlie bit my finger -- again! Video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_OBlgSz8sSM
stats:
469,739,454 views
934,803 likes, 131,326 dislikes
754,333 comments
Intended audience? 1? Maybe 25?
Substantial
spillovers from
a single video.
YouTube
Ex ante,
neither
Matthew’s Birthday Party Video:
market
nor
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2PcxxiDvgRc
stats:
government
will
168 views
Small scale spillovers
add up when
0
likes,
0
dislikes
efficiently0 comments
select or
activity isIntended
widespread.
audience?
Maybe
25?
support
either
type.
Charlie bit my finger -- again! Video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_OBlgSz8sSM
Open infrastructure,
stats:
469,739,454
views
however,
supports
Substantial
934,803 likes, 131,326 dislikes
754,333capability.
comments
basic user
spillovers from
Intended audience? 1? Maybe 25?
a single video.
Why does this matter?
Different Social
Demand Curves
∑ ( yz+sz)
Social
Demand (y
+ s)
Value
Private
Demand (y)
User (x)
Private Demand Curve
∑ yz
Use (z)
Note: Uses z1, z2, z3, … ranked according to
aggregated willingness to pay.
Market failures
(from relying on blue curves)
– Undersupply of infrastructure
– Undersupply of infrastructure-dependent
public and social goods
– Misoptimization of infrastructure
– Market bias / Optimization for
• Applications/uses that generate observable
and appropriable value (rather than spillovers)
• Known or expected applications/uses
First, evolution from infrastructure to non-infrastructure:
Use 1
Use 2
Use 3
Use 4
Infrastructural
(general purpose)
input
Non-infrastructural
(special purpose)
input
…
Use 1
Second, evolution from mixed infrastructure to commercial infrastructure:
Public
goods
Private
goods
Mixed
Infrastructure
Private
goods
Social
goods
Private
goods
Commercial
Infrastructure
Private
goods
Infrastructure
User Activities
within economic, cultural, political, and other systems
User Generated Outputs
Private Goods
Public Goods
Social Goods
Output Markets
Spillovers
Special purpose input? Commercial infrastructure?
Infrastructure
User Activities
within economic, cultural, political, and other systems
User Generated Outputs
Private Goods
Public Goods
Social Goods
Output Markets
Spillovers
Special purpose input? Commercial infrastructure?
Static and dynamic market failures driven by
demand side
Infrastructure
• not mitigated by competition
• not
mitigated
User
Activitiesby making prioritization a user
choice
within economic, cultural, political, and other systems
Why? Both rely on private demand (the blue
Usercurves).
Generated Outputs
Private Goods
Public Goods
Social Goods
Output Markets
Spillovers
Infrastructure
COMMONS MANAGEMENT
User Activities
within economic, cultural, political, and other systems
User Generated Outputs
Private Goods
Public Goods
Social Goods
Output Markets
Spillovers
• Commons alleviates the need to rely on
either the market mechanism or the
government to “pick winners”
– Market allocates access to infrastructure based
on appropriability of returns from outputs
– Market failures w/r/t public and social goods
– Could rely on the government to figure out
which public good or social good outputs are
worthy of subsidization or special treatment
– Government failures w/r/t with public and social
goods
Infrastructural Resources
1. The resource may be consumed nonrivalrously;
COMMONS MANAGEMENT
2. social demand for the resource is driven
primarily by downstream productive activity that
requires the resource as an input; and
3. the resource is used as an input into a wide
range of goods and services, including private
goods, public goods and/or social goods.
Chapter 12: Intellectual Infrastructure
A.
B.
The Cultural Environment as Infrastructure (Meta- or Infrainfrastructure)
Economic Characteristics of Intellectual Resources
1.
2.
C.
Intellectual Infrastructure
1.
2.
D.
Supply-side problems
a.
(Non)excludability
b.
Nonrivalry
Intellectual resources and activities, products and processes
Applying the criteria to delineate intellectual infrastructure
Ideas
a.
Ideas as Infrastructure
b.
Commons Management via First Amendment, Copyright, and Patent
Jurisprudence
Intellectual Property Laws as Semi-commons Arrangements
Appendix: Basic Research
Ideas / Basic Research / Data
User Activities
within economic, cultural, political, and other systems
User Generated Outputs
Private Goods
Public Goods
Social Goods
Output Markets
Spillovers
Ideas / Basic Research / Data
often are infrastructural
1. The resource may be consumed nonrivalrously;
COMMONS MANAGEMENT
2. social demand for the resource is driven
primarily by downstream productive activity that
requires the resource as an input; and
3. the resource is used as an input into a wide
range of goods and services, including private
goods, public goods and/or social goods.
MOTIVATION FOR THE
KNOWLEDGE COMMONS PROJECT

Standard IP theory overly-simplistic




Beyond binary of markets / public domain


Dichotomy btw property/ “public domain”
Incentive/free rider story
Difficulty making useful predictions – empirically unresolved balancing
Approaches to creating intellectual resources that are
 Collective/collaborative
 Governed informally or formally by private ordering
Cooperative/collaborative modes of creativity

String of “one-off” case studies reveals important of norms, governance
How to systematize the inquiry?
The Ostrom Approach
• Construct a framework for analyzing various case
studies to identify and categorize potentially
important variables
• Organizes empirical inquiry by specifying general sets
of variables and relationships to each other
• Allows integrated and comparative inquiry across
domains
• Useful when one needs to identify and build theories
• Initial goal is to map our parameter space
The IAD Framework for structured
case study analysis
Players (ages, skill
level), rules, soccer
field, weather
Soccer game
League season
Skill, teambuilding, fun,
revenue
E.g. soccer league, fishery, agricultural cooperative

Results of Ostrom’s Approach:
 Design Principles for Governing Sustainable Resources








Clearly defined boundaries
Proportional equivalence btw benefits and costs
Governance by those affected
Monitoring
Graduated sanctions
Conflict-resolution mechanisms
Minimal recognition of rights for self-organization
Nested enterprises
We apply a similar approach to study knowledge commons
We do not anticipate uncovering the same design principles because
intellectual resources are different in important ways –
- Nonrivalry
- Resources must be created, not just managed
I.
Background Environment
A. What is the background context (legal, cultural, etc.) of this particular commons?
B. What is the “default” status of the resources involved in the commons? Patented? Copyright? Open?
II. Attributes of the Commons
A. Resources
i.
ii.
What resources are pooled and how they are created or obtained?
What are the characteristics of the resources, such as whether they are rival or non-rival, whether they are
tangible or intangible,
iii. What technologies and skills are needed to create, obtain, maintain and use them?
B. Community Members
i.
ii.
Who are the community members and what are their roles?
What are the degree and nature of openness of the community with respect to each type of community member
and the general public?
C. Goals and Objectives
i.
ii.
What are the goals and objectives, including obstacles or dilemmas to overcome?
What are the history and narrative of the commons?
III. Governance
A. What are the governance mechanisms of the commons (e.g., membership rules, resource contribution or
extraction standards and requirements, conflict resolution mechanisms, sanctions for rule violation)?
B. Who are the decision-makers and how are they selected?
C. What are the institutions that govern decision-making?
D. What informal norms govern the commons?
E. How do nonmembers interact with the commons? What institutions govern those interactions?
F. What legal structures (including intellectual property rules, subsidies, contract and licensing law,
antitrust provisions) govern the functioning of the commons?
IV. Patterns and Outcomes
A. What benefits are delivered to members and to others (including innovations and creative output,
production, sharing, and dissemination of those innovations and output to a broader audience, and
social interactions that emerge from the commons?)
B. What costs and risks are associated with the commons, including, for example, any negative
42
externalities?
Author
Title
Commons
Cole, Daniel
Learning from Lin: Lessons and Cautions from the Natural Commons
for the Knowledge Commons
Theory
Benkler, Yochai
Between Spanish Huertas and the Open Road: A Tale of Two Commons?
Theory
Contreras, Jorge
Constructing the Genome Commons
Gene data
Von Overwalle,
Geertrui
Strandburg,
Frischmann, & Cui
Van Overwalle, Geertrui, Governing Genomic Data: Plea for an ‘Open Commons’
Gene data
Madison, Michael
Commons at the Intersection of Peer Production, Citizen Science, and Big Data:
Galaxy Zoo
Astronomical data
Schweik, Charlie
Toward the Comparison of Open Source Commons Institutions
OSS
Morell, Mayo Fuster
Governance of online creation communities for the building of digital commons
Online creation communities
Shah, Sonali and
Moody, Cyrus
Creating a Context for Entrepreneurship: Examining How Users’ Technological &
Organizational Innovations Set the Stage for Entrepreneurial Activity
User Innovation
Meyer, Peter
An inventive commons: Shared sources of the airplane and its industry
Airplane invention
Murray, Laura
Exchange Practices Among Nineteenth-century US Newspaper Editors:
Cooperation in Competition
Journalism
Piper, Tina
How War Creates Commons: General McNaughton and the National Research Council, Military Technology
1914-1939
Fagundes, David
Labor and/as Love: Roller Derby’s Constructed Cultural Commons
Roller derby names
Daniels, Brigham
Legispedia
Congress
The Rare Diseases Clinical Research Network and the Urea Cycle Disorders Consortium Rare disease research
as Nested Knowledge Commons
Author
Title
Commons
Cole, Daniel
Learning from Lin: Lessons and Cautions from the Natural Commons
for the Knowledge Commons
Theory
Benkler, Yochai
Between Spanish Huertas and the Open Road: A Tale of Two Commons?
Theory
Contreras, Jorge
Constructing the Genome Commons
Gene data
Von Overwalle,
Geertrui
Van Overwalle, Geertrui, Governing Genomic Data: Plea for an ‘Open Commons’
Gene data
Strandburg, The Rare Diseases Clinical Research Network and the
Frischmann, & Urea Cycle Disorders Consortium as Nested Knowledge
Cui
Commons
Rare disease research
Madison, Michael
Commons at the Intersection of Peer Production, Citizen Science, and Big Data:
Galaxy Zoo
Astronomical data
Schweik, Charlie
Toward the Comparison of Open Source Commons Institutions
OSS
Morell, Mayo Fuster
Governance of online creation communities for the building of digital commons
Online creation communities
Shah, Sonali and
Moody, Cyrus
Creating a Context for Entrepreneurship: Examining How Users’ Technological &
Organizational Innovations Set the Stage for Entrepreneurial Activity
User Innovation
Meyer, Peter
An inventive commons: Shared sources of the airplane and its industry
Airplane invention
Murray, Laura
Exchange Practices Among Nineteenth-century US Newspaper Editors:
Cooperation in Competition
Journalism
Piper, Tina
How War Creates Commons: General McNaughton and the National Research Council, Military Technology
1914-1939
Fagundes, David
Labor and/as Love: Roller Derby’s Constructed Cultural Commons
Roller derby names
Daniels, Brigham
Legispedia
Congress
The Rare Disease Problem
• Few patients per disease (officially < 200K in US, often
only a few thousand globally)
• No “blockbuster” pharma profits
• Patients are geographically scattered
• Latest science: many diseases “rare” in the sense that
treatments must be personalized?
Requirements for research and treatment advances:
• Patient recruitment for studies and drug trials
• Protocol standardization and data aggregation
• Cooperation among widely scattered researchers
What is the Rare Disease Clinical
Research Network?
• Established in 2003 by NIH
• Peer-reviewed grants of about $1.25M/yr
• Now 19 Consortia (each dealing with a different cluster
of rare diseases)
Goals:
• Explore methods for rare disease research
• Overcome obstacles of small numbers/geographical
isolation
• Establish shared resources for rare disease research and
treatment development
Analysis
• RDCRCs involve many resources and outcomes
− Funding, patients as research subjects, DMCC, knowledge about
the disease and about research practice, publications, research
and treatment protocols, drugs, data, website (public and
researcher only) …
• RDCRCs involve many types of actors
− MD/PhD researchers (pediatricians, metabolic and genetic
specialists), Study PIs, Site PIs, study coordinator, site
coordinators, patients, patient advocacy group, NIH officials,
pharma representatives …
• RDCRCs involve many action situations
− Longitudinal Study (required by NIH), other research projects,
clinical trials, treatment of patients, training of junior researchers
(required by NIH), production of publications, protocols, website
Main Objectives
1. Create a pool of research subjects and
patient data
2. Sustain and grow community
3. Promote knowledge sharing within
community (and to outside communities)
4. Cooperate with patients in setting research
priorities and communicating results
5. Translate research into treatment (pharma)
Analysis
• Differences from default “typical NIH-funded medical
research” environment
Need to recruit large fraction of all patients
– Important role of patient advocacy groups and importance of
relationship to patients
Need to involve many clinical sites
– Importance of recruiting researchers to participate despite
potential issues: researcher competitiveness or researcher
disinterest/lack of career potential
– Governance and leadership issues
Difficulty attracting pharmco interest
– Cost/benefit issues for small patient pool
Themes from case studies
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Knowledge commons confront diverse obstacles and social
dilemmas, many of which are not well described or reducible to
the simple free rider dilemma.
Complex relationships between knowledge commons and the
systems within which they operate and/or are nested. (complex,
nested systems)
Knowledge commons often depended on shared infrastructure
Informal governance institutions, and especially trusted
leadership, often played key roles
Commons governance often evolved over time, and commons
seemed to play an important role in early stages of some
industries (evolution)
Knowledge commons governance often did not depend on one
strong type or source of individual motivations for cooperation.
(many motivations; complex)
Cambridge Studies on Governing
Knowledge Commons
• New book series, building field of study
– Currently planning future conferences and books
to expand knowledge base
– Open access publishing model
• Priced print copies
• Open access electronic version
• Next book in series:
Governing Medical Research Commons (2016)
Open Science Commons
• What is Open Science Commons?
• Why Open Science Commons?
• How Open Science Commons?
Open Science Commons
• Different models for the resource system
– Layered model, comparable to Internet
– Integrated system of complementary (human,
intellectual, physical, governance, and financial)
capital resources, comparable to university S&T
– Nested commons comparable to Rare Disease
Research Network case study
Layer
Social
Description
Examples
Relations and
Social networks,
social ties among affiliations, groups
users
Information/data E-mail
Content
conveyed to end- communication,
users
music, web page
Programs and
E-mail program,
Applications
functions used by media player, web
end-users
browser
Standards and
TCP/IP, domain
Logical
protocols
that
name system
Infrastructure
facilitate
transmission of
data across
physical networks
Physical
Telecommunications,
Physical
cable and satellite
Infrastructure hardware that
comprises
networks, routers and
interconnected
servers, backbone
networks
networks
Infrastructure and
knowledge
commons exist at
different layers.
Variance in
resources,
communities, and
governance
challenges.
Five-Layer Model of the Internet
Simple View of University Science and Technology Research System and its Outputs
INFRASTRUCTURAL CAPITAL INPUTS:
·
·
·
·
·
·
Human capital
Governance capital
Physical capital
Intellectual capital
Financial capital
PRODUCTION PROCESSES:
·
·
·
·
Research processes
Educational processes
Training processes
Socialization processes
OUTPUTS:
Human Capital: People
·
·
Skilled labor
Research community members
Intellectual Capital: Research Results
·
·
Basic à applied
Commercial à noncommercial
Author
Title
Commons
Cole, Daniel
Learning from Lin: Lessons and Cautions from the Natural Commons
for the Knowledge Commons
Theory
Benkler, Yochai
Between Spanish Huertas and the Open Road: A Tale of Two Commons?
Theory
Contreras, Jorge
Constructing the Genome Commons
Gene data
Von Overwalle,
Geertrui
Van Overwalle, Geertrui, Governing Genomic Data: Plea for an ‘Open Commons’
Gene data
Strandburg, The Rare Diseases Clinical Research Network and the
Frischmann, & Urea Cycle Disorders Consortium as Nested Knowledge
Cui
Commons
Rare disease research
Madison, Michael
Commons at the Intersection of Peer Production, Citizen Science, and Big Data:
Galaxy Zoo
Astronomical data
Schweik, Charlie
Toward the Comparison of Open Source Commons Institutions
OSS
Morell, Mayo Fuster
Governance of online creation communities for the building of digital commons
Online creation communities
Shah, Sonali and
Moody, Cyrus
Creating a Context for Entrepreneurship: Examining How Users’ Technological &
Organizational Innovations Set the Stage for Entrepreneurial Activity
User Innovation
Meyer, Peter
An inventive commons: Shared sources of the airplane and its industry
Airplane invention
Murray, Laura
Exchange Practices Among Nineteenth-century US Newspaper Editors:
Cooperation in Competition
Journalism
Piper, Tina
How War Creates Commons: General McNaughton and the National Research Council, Military Technology
1914-1939
Fagundes, David
Labor and/as Love: Roller Derby’s Constructed Cultural Commons
Roller derby names
Daniels, Brigham
Legispedia
Congress
Nested Structure: RDCRN Level
Zoom in
Here
ARPWSC
UCDC
RDCRC RDCRC
RDCRC
Coalition of
Patient Advocacy Groups
RDCRC
RDCRC
RDCRC
NIH Office of
Rare Disease Research
RDCRC
RDCRC
RDCRN
RDCRC
Steering Committee
Data Management
Coordinating Center
RDCRC
RDCRC
RDCRC
(DMCC)
RDCRC
RDCRC
RDCRC
RDCRC RDCRC
Nested Structure: Consortium Level
Data Management
Coordinating Center
(DMCC)
Zoom in
Here
NIH
Science Officer
Clinical
Research Site
Consortium
PIs
Clinical
Research Site
Study
Coordinator
Patient
Advocacy Group
Clinical
Research Site
Consortium
Steering Committee
NIH
Project Officer
Pharma
Company
Clinical
Research Site
Nested Structure: Site Level
Data Management
Coordinating Center
(DMCC)
Consortium
Steering Committee
Consortium
PIs
Site PI
Patients and
Families
Site
Coordinator
Study
Coordinator
Other
Researchers
Neurologists,
etc.
Pharma
Company
Open Science Commons
• No easy, “silver bullet” to governance
questions
• Requires careful study and deliberation, but
GKC framework can be useful lens, both for
self-examination and for learning from others.
• Look forward to Q&A and further discussion in
sessions throughout the conference!
Thank you!