Background Information Species: Variola virus Large and brick-shaped, measuring 302-350 nm by 244-270nm Linear double stranded DNA Unique among other DNA viruses because it replicates in the cytoplasm and not inside the nucleus Can be transmitted through airborne variola virus, direct contact with infected bodily fluids or objects, prolonged face to face contact Cause of death unclear, has to do with multiple organs Those who recover are usually disfigured for the rest of their lives Background Information Earliest credible evidence: Egyptian mummies of people who died 3000 years ago Disease likely emerged around 10,000 BC General symptoms are flu-like -Fever -Headache -Severe fatigue -Severe body aches -Overall discomfort Followed by formation of red spots on extremities, face, and trunk that become filled with pus, which then become scabs and fall off, leaving deep pitted scars Variolation practiced as early as 1000 BC, Vaccine discovered in 1796 Background Information Some statistics on Smallpox -In Europe, an estimated number of 80 million deaths occurred from Smallpox in the 18th century -An estimated number of 300 million deaths occurred from Smallpox in the 20th century globally -The last naturally occurring case developed in Somalia in 1977 Background Information Smallpox eradicated by 1979 Vaccination ceased gradually afterwards Official stocks of virus remain in TWO locations -CDC in Atlanta, Georgia, USA -VECTOR in Novosibirsk, Russia Fear of bioterrorism Questions of Interest What is a reasonable estimate for the R0 of a modern-day smallpox outbreak? How did socio-economic conditions, herd immunity, and public health interventions affect the R0 of a given historical outbreak? How can the same factors listed above affect the R0 of a modern-day smallpox outbreak? Methods For Boston, Burford, Chester, Warrington cases Epidemic modeling Similar to S-I-R model, the SEIU model Epidemic Model based on the following differential equations - dS/dt: -βϕSI - dEn/dt: βϕSI-αEn -dI/dt: αEn-γI -dU/dt: γI • Solve for R0 using the provided formula β=R0γ/φN Methods Susceptible Infectious Resistant Methods Susceptible Exposed Infectious (U): Dead and Recovered Methods Differential Equations -dS/dt: -βϕSI -dEn/dt: βϕSI-αEn Susceptible βφSI Exposed -dI/dt: αEn-γ -dU/dt: γI αEn Infectious γI (U): Dead and Recovered Variables S:Susceptible En: Exposed I: Infectious U: Dead and Recovered β: Rate at which potential infectious contacts occur ϕ: Proportions of contacts infected α: Average rate latent become infectious or (latency period)-1 γ: Rate at which individuals infected cover or die or (infectious period)-1 Results Boston R0: 4.3 Chester R0: 4.8 Warrington R0: 4.7 Burford R0: 3.4 a. Boston Monthly Deaths b. Chester Monthly Deaths c. Warrington Monthly Deaths d. Burford Daily Deaths Results London (1836-1870) -Endemic smallpox in London from 1836 to 1870 -Analysis of individual epidemics not possible due to lack of and quality of data -Lower bound of R0 is 5 Results Results The interesting case of KOSOVO (1972) Epidemic model more complex, included factors such as vaccination, herd immunity, quarantine, socioeconomic conditions Methods - Differential Equations for Kosovo dS/dt: χ2(1-ε1)Ci – β(ϕ+ρ-ϕρ)SI -dI/dt: α(1-ε2)En-γI dEn/dt: βϕ(1-ρ)SI-αEn -dQ/dt: α(1-ε2)Ei + αθEn-χ2Q dEi/dt: βϕρSI-(χ1ε2 + α(1-ε2))Ei -dU/dt: γI + χ2Q dCi/dt: βρ(1-ϕ)SI-χ1Ci -dV/dt: χ1(ε2Ei + ε1Ci) S: Susceptible Eii: Individuals exposed, but not found En:: Individuals exposed and found Ci: Individuals not exposed, but not found I: Infectious U: Dead and recovered V: Vaccination Q: Quarantine and leave community β:Rate at which potentially infectious contacts occurs φ: Proportion of contacts infected (1-φ): Proportion of contacts NOT infected ρ: Proportion of contacts found through tracing (1-ρ): Proportion of contacts NOT found through tracing ε1: Vaccine efficacy for those uninfected ε2: Vaccine efficacy for those infected α: Rate at which individuals become infectious θ: Daily rate at which exposed individuals leave enter quarantine (1-θ): Daily rate at which exposed individuals enter infectious class χ1: Rate at which quaratined traced contacts successfully vaccinated and released back into community χ2: Rate at which proportion quaratined enter U Methods Susceptible Exposed Vaccination Infectious Quarantine (U) Dead and Recovered Χ1(1-ε2) Methods Susceptibl e Ei: Untraced latent ρ β ε1 En: Traced latent (1-ϕ) ϕ (1-ρ) ε2 ρ Ci: Traced Uninfected α α (1-θ) Infectious (U): Dead and Recovered γ Χ1 1-ε2 (1-ρ) θ Vaccination Quarantine χ2 Results The interesting case of KOSOVO (1972) Epidemic model more complex, included factors such as vaccination, herd immunity, quarantine, socioeconomic conditions Predicted R0 of 10---Why? -Estimated 50% vaccination rate -Outbreak went unrecognized until second generations of infection -Hospital acquired cases -β estimated to be 50 -Interventions implemented 31 days of index case Results Analysis of 32 European Smallpox outbreaks post 1950 Implications Contemporary outbreaks in industrialized communities with low vaccination levels have an estimated R0 of 4-6 Important factors that can significantly lower the risk of a Smallpox epidemic -Early recognition -Unwavering herd immunity -Effective public health interventions
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