What is Game Theory

3. Basic Topics in Game Theory
Outline
3.1 What is a Game ?
3.1.1 The elements of a Game
3.1.2 The Rules of the Game: Example
3.1.3 Examples of Game Situations
3.1.4 Types of Games: Complete and Incomplete Infomation
3.2 Solution Concepts
3.2.1 Static Games of complete information: Dominant
Strategies and Nash Equilibrium in pure and mixed
strategies
3.2.2 Dynamic Games of complete information: Backward
Induction and Subgame perfection
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
3.1. What is a Game ?
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
Outline
3.1 What is a Game ?
3.1.1 The elements of a Game
3.1.2 The Rules of the Game: Example
3.1.3 Examples of Game Situations
3.1.4 Types of Games: Complete and Incomplete Infomation
3.2 Solution Concepts
3.2.1 Static Games of complete information: Dominant
Strategies and Nash Equilibrium in pure and mixed
strategies
3.2.2 Dynamic Games of complete information: Backward
Induction and Subgame perfection
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
So far we have studied Decision Problems. Those were
scenarios where the final outcome of our decision depends
on both the decision we take and (maybe) some uncertain
events.
Now we are going to study Strategic Problems. These are
scenarios where the final outcome of our decision depends
on both the decision we take and also the decision taken by
other agents (and maybe some uncertain events)
Such scenarios are often called “Games”
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
Game and
Decision Th.
Multipersonal
Game
Theory
Individual
Decision
Unipersonal
Decision
Theory
Without
Risk
Decision Th.
Under Cert.
Decision
Problem
Collective
Decision
With
Risk
Social Choice
Theory
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
Decision Th.
Under Uncert.
What is a Game ?
A Game is an scenario in which several agents (the players)
take decisions (follow strategies) that affect each other's
final outcome (the payoffs)
What is Game Theory ?
Game Theory is a set of techniques that help in the analysis
and understanding of game situations and, in many cases, can
produce a prediction of what is the more “logical” outcome of
the game
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
“Game theory doesn’t give you answers. But it does help you
discipline your intuition, requiring you to first be explicit about your
assumptions and then helping you see their interaction without
allowing extraneous considerations to cloud the picture. So think of
game theory (or any formal modeling) as Photoshop: it can remove
the red1eye and clear up the resolution, but you still take the
picture.”
Nathan Griffith
PhD. Political Science
Belmont University
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
Game Theory does not teach you how to win !
(But your chances of winning may improve if
you use Game Theory)
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
3.1.1 The Elements of a Game
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
Outline
3.1 What is a Game ?
3.1.1 The elements of a Game
3.1.2 The Rules of the Game: Example
3.1.3 Examples of Game Situations
3.1.4 Types of Games: Complete and Incomplete Infomation
3.2 Solution Concepts
3.2.1 Static Games of complete information: Dominant
Strategies and Nash Equilibrium in pure and mixed
strategies
3.2.2 Dynamic Games of complete information: Backward
Induction and Subgame perfection
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
3.1.1. The elements of a Game
1. The environment of the game
Players
Strategies
Payoffs
2. The rules of the game
Timing of moves
Nature of conflict and interaction
Information conditions
3. The assumptions of game theory
Rationality
Common knowledge
For each different game we must identify its environment (1) and
understand the rules (2). The assumptions (3) are “simplifications”
that apply to any game
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
1. The environment of the game
Players
Everyone who has to take an action that has an effect on your
earnings
All players' earnings are also affected by your
decision
Strategies
Actions available to each player
Define a plan of action for every contingency
Payoffs
“Numbers” associated with each outcome
Reflect the “utility” of the players
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
2. The rules of the game
Timing of moves
Are decisions taken simultaneously or sequentially (one after the
other) ?
Nature of conflict and interaction
Are players’ interests in conflict?
Do they seek to cooperate or coordinate ?
Will players interact once or repeatedly?
Information conditions
Do all players have the same information ?
Do players always know the “history” of the
game ?
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
3. The assumptions of game theory
Rationality
Players aim to maximize their payoffs
They are selfish, they only care about their payoffs
Players are perfect calculators
Common Knowledge
Each player knows the environment and the rules of the game
Each player knows that each player knows the environment and the rules
Each player knows that each player knows that each player knows the environment and
the rules
Each player knows that each player knows that each player knows that each player knows the environment and
the rules
Etc. Etc. Etc.
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
1. The environment of the game
Players
Strategies
Payoffs
For any specific game, these have to be clearly
identified.
1. The rules of the game
Timing of moves
Nature of conflict and interaction
Information conditions
The rules of the game need to be understood, but
they can not be changed
1. The assumptions of game theory
Rationality
Common knowledge
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
Example: The Obama-McCain debate at the
University of Mississippi (by N. Griffith)
So let’s look at McCain’s situation. There are two players, McCain and Obama.
They have two choices: attend the Mississippi debate or not. So there are four
potential outcomes:
1. Both attend the debate.
2. Obama attends the debate, but McCain does not.
3. McCain attends the debate, but Obama does not.
4. Both skip the debate to attend to other (allegedly more pressing) matters.
McCain preferences: 4 better than 1 better than 2 better than 3
Obama preferences: 2 better than 1 better than 4 better than 3
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
Example: The Obama-McCain debate at the
University of Mississippi (by N. Griffith)
We need to identify:
The players:
The strategies:
Obama and McCain
Attend and Do not attend (both players have the
same strategies)
For each player, we can define a payoff of 4 to the
best outcome, 3 to the second best, 2 to the third
and 1 to the worst outcome of all (based on the
preferences of each one) [see table on next slide]
The payoffs:
and to understand the rules of the game
Timing of moves:
Nature of conflict and interaction:
Information conditions:
They have to decide without knowing the decision
of the other (simultaneous move)
They have opposing interests (conflict)
The two of them have the same information
on all the items above
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
Example: The Obama-McCain debate at the
University of Mississippi (by N. Griffith)
Mr. Obama (player 2)
Attend
Do not attend
3, 3
Attend
1, 1
Mr. McCain
(player 1)
Do not
attend
2, 4
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
4, 2
Example: The Obama-McCain debate at the
University of Mississippi (by N. Griffith)
Mr. Obama (player 2)
Prediction of Game Theory:
Obama's best strategy is clear
Attend
Do not attend
Attend no matter what
3, 3
Attend
1, 1
Mr. McCain
(player 1)
Do not
attend
2, 4
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
4, 2
Example: The Obama-McCain debate at the
University of Mississippi (by N. Griffith)
Mr. Obama (player 2)
Prediction of Game Theory:
Obama's best strategy is clear
Attend
Do not attend
Attend no matter what
3, 3
Attend
1, 1
Mr. McCain
(player 1)
Do not
attend
2, 4
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
4, 2
Example: The Obama-McCain debate at the
University of Mississippi (by N. Griffith)
Mr. Obama (player 2)
Prediction of Game Theory:
McCain's best strategy is not
so clear
Attend if Obama does
Do not Attend otherwise
Attend
Do not attend
3, 3
Attend
1, 1
Mr. McCain
(player 1)
Do not
attend
2, 4
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
4, 2
Example: The Obama-McCain debate at the
University of Mississippi (by N. Griffith)
Mr. Obama (player 2)
Prediction of Game Theory:
McCain's best strategy is not
so clear
Attend if Obama does
Do not Attend otherwise
Attend
Do not attend
3, 3
Attend
1, 1
Mr. McCain
(player 1)
Do not
attend
2, 4
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
4, 2
Example: The Obama-McCain debate at the
University of Mississippi (by N. Griffith)
Mr. Obama (player 2)
Prediction of Game Theory:
But McCain's is rational, and he
knows Obama is also rational.
Hence he knows that Obama
will Attend
Attend
Do not attend
3, 3
Attend
1, 1
Mr. McCain
(player 1)
Do not
attend
2, 4
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
4, 2
Example: The Obama-McCain debate at the
University of Mississippi (by N. Griffith)
Mr. Obama (player 2)
Prediction of Game Theory:
But McCain's is rational, and he
knows Obama is also rational.
Hence he knows that Obama
will Attend
Attend
Do not attend
3, 3
Attend
1, 1
Mr. McCain
(player 1)
Do not
attend
2, 4
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
4, 2
Example: The Obama-McCain debate at the
University of Mississippi (by N. Griffith)
Mr. Obama (player 2)
Prediction of Game Theory:
Therefore, McCain's best
strategy is also to Attend
Attend
Do not attend
3, 3
Attend
1, 1
Mr. McCain
(player 1)
Do not
attend
2, 4
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
4, 2
Example: The Obama-McCain debate at the
University of Mississippi (by N. Griffith)
Mr. Obama (player 2)
Prediction of Game Theory:
Therefore, McCain's best
strategy is also to Attend
Attend
Do not attend
3, 3
Attend
1, 1
Mr. McCain
(player 1)
Do not
attend
2, 4
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
4, 2
Example: The Obama-McCain debate at the
University of Mississippi (by N. Griffith)
On the payoffs:
In this example the payoffs have been chosen arbitrarily
4 to the best outcome
3 to the second best
etc
The specific value of these payoffs is not important as long as
they keep the same order as in the actual preferences, that is,
Highest payoff to the best outcome
Second highest payoff to the second best outcome
etc
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
Example: The Obama-McCain debate at the
University of Mississippi (by N. Griffith)
You may check that, in this example, the final prediction of Game
Theory remains the same if we change the payoff values as in the
table below
B est O ut co me
S eco n d B est
T hir d B est
W o r st O ut co me
4 10 0
3
75
2
50
1 25
43
32
2
-8
In many games the payoffs are given, and correspond to real values (monetary profits,
market share, expected value of a lottery, etc).
In other cases, as in this example, we must define the payoffs so that they are consistent
with the preferences of the players (ordinal payoffs)
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
3.1.2 The Rules of the Game
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
Outline
3.1 What is a Game ?
3.1.1 The elements of a Game
3.1.2 The Rules of the Game: Example
3.1.3 Examples of Game Situations
3.1.4 Types of Games: Complete and Incomplete Infomation
3.2 Solution Concepts
3.2.1 Static Games of complete information: Dominant
Strategies and Nash Equilibrium in pure and mixed
strategies
3.2.2 Dynamic Games of complete information: Backward
Induction and Subgame perfection
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
As said before, the rules of the game are usually fixed and
they can not be changed. We must be aware of them in
order to understand how the game works, and to be able
to perform a proper analysis.
Nevertheless, there are cases in which some manipulation of
the rules is possible. Then, it might be profitable to shape the
rules to our own benefit
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
Example: The Agenda Setting
The city government of a small town must decide (by majority
voting) the location of a new school. There are 3 possible
locations available:
1. Next to the old school (OS)
2. Next to the Chapel (CH)
3. Next to the city park (CP)
Because of their background, the preferences of the nine
member of the city council are known to everybody
Four prefer OS to CH to CP
Three prefer CH to CP to OS
Two prefer CP to OS to CH
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
Example: The Agenda Setting
By Majority Voting (an alternative wins if it obtains more
than 50% of the votes), there is no winner
OS gets 4 votes
CH gets 3 votes
CP gets 2 votes
(At least 5 votes are
needed to win)
So, they decide to vote first between two alternatives and
then vote between the winner and the third alternative.
The Mayor must set the voting agenda (or voting rule)
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
Example: The Agenda Setting
Agenda 1: First, OS vs. CH
Then, winner vs CP
Agenda 2: First, OS vs. CP
Then, winner vs CH
Agenda 3: First, CP vs. CH
Then, winner vs OS
Imagine you are the Mayor, what Agenda would you choose ?
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
Example: The Agenda Setting
What will be the winner in each case ?
Agenda 1: First, OS vs. CH
OS (gets 6 votes)
Then, OS vs CP
CP (gets 5 votes)
Agenda 2: First, OS vs. CP
CP (gets 5 votes)
Then, CP vs CH
CH (gets 7 votes)
Agenda 3: First, CP vs. CH
CH (gets 7 votes)
Then, CH vs OS
OS (gets 6 votes)
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
Example: The Agenda Setting
Thus, if you are the Mayor, depending on whether you
prefer OS, CH, or CP, you will set the corresponding
Agenda for voting
In this sense, some rules are “manipulable”
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
Example: The Agenda Setting
But you could also “manipulate” the outcome of the
game without being the Mayor !
That is, you can change the outcome of the game
without changing nor manipulating the rules of the
game !
How ?
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
Example: The Agenda Setting
For instance, imagine that the Mayor sets Agenda 2 (because she
likes CH)
Agenda 2: First, OS vs. CP
CP (gets 5 votes)
Then, CP vs CH
CH (gets 7 votes)
and you are one of the two people that have CH as the worst
alternative
What can you do ?
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
Example: The Agenda Setting
Lie !
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
Example: The Agenda Setting
When you are called to cast your vote in the first round
(OS vs. CP), you should vote for OS (even though CP is your
preferred alternative). Then OS will win the first round !
(will get 5 votes)
Then, in the second round, when voting between OS and CH,
you can vote truthfully and OS will win the final round with
6 votes.
Agenda 2: First, OS vs. CP
OS (gets 5 votes)
Then, OS vs CH
OS (gets 7 votes)
So, you changed the outcome of the game without changing
the rules !
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ
Summary
A Game is a involved scenario where the profit of each
player depends on the actions of all the players
Make sure to clearly identify the players, the strategies, and
the payoffs
Make sure to understand the rules of the game
Make sure the rules are not manipulable
Act rational and always think that other players are rational
as well
Never take the behavior of the other players as given
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ