PRO-2003 Natural Gas Processing
Safety in Oil and Gas Industry
Adjunct Professor Jon Steinar Gudmundsson
Department of Engineering and Safety
University of Tromsø
May 2014
Outline
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Risikomatrise
Gruppering av utstyr
KPI = Key Performance Indicator
Sikkerhetsbarrierer
Forholdstall for ulykker
Farer i oljeindustrien
Farehindringerdiagram
Presentasjon fra Internett
Health and Safety Procedures
Always give careful consideration to:
Man…..
Machine…..
Environment…..
And, the interaction of each with the other!!
Risiko i prosessdesign og -drift
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Sannsynlighet
Konsekvens
Vi arbeider for å redusere sannsynlighet for uhell
Vi arbeider for å avgrense konsekvensene av
uhell
• Risiko = Sannsynlighet x Konsekvens
• Regularitet (%), reduseres hvis uhell skjer
• HMS og HAZOP
Gruppering av utstyr (soneinndeling)
• Innbyrdes plassering av moduler viktig
(platform layout = planløsning)
• API RP 14C (RP = Recommended
Practice)
• Konsekvense for layout av plattformen
• Hovedprinsippene
– Atskillelse av tennkilde og brannstoff
– Atskillense av bolighområde fra potensielle
farlige utstyr
Sikkerhetsbarrierer (NORSOK Standard D-010)
• Minst to uavhengige barrierer kreves i alle
type operasjoner
• Under boring: (1) Borevæske kolonne (2)
Subsea BOP
• Under produksjon: (1) Subsea X-mas tree
(2) Nedihulls sikkerhetsventil (SCSSSV)
Hazards (farer) i oljeindustrien
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Prosessfarer (hydrokarboner)
Logistikkfarer
Naturfarer
Sikkerhetsfarer
Fare = noe som har potensial til å gjøre skade
Skade på mennesker, miljø, business
(produksjon), omdømme
• Jarlsberg ost analogien (barrierene har hull)
HAZARD AWARENESS
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Forholdstall for ulykker
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Heinrichs trekant
Andre varianter av samme
Kultur/holdninger det viktigste
Heinrich (ca. 1940)
1 alvorlig ulykke
29 mindre alvorlige ulykker
270 ulykker uten skade
Et stort antall utrygge handlinger og
forhold
Hazard Barrier Diagram
What Causes Injuries?
Drilling in Texas
Acts of
God
2%
Unsafe
Conditions
20%
20%
Unsafe
Acts
78%
78 %
UNSAFE CONDITIONS
ACTS OF GOD
UNSAFE ACTS
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© Texas Workers’ Compensation Insurance Fund 2001
Tenk sikkerhet hele tiden, ikke som strutsen
References
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (2011): Process
Safety – Recommended Practice on Key Performance
Indicators, 34 pp.
• FØLGENDE LYSARK ER ET
SUPPLEMENT TIL FORELESNINGEN.
KOMMER IKKE TIL EKSAMEN
IMPORTANCE OF DESIGNING FOR SAFETY
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In the near future, the level of safety that companies and industries achieve
will relate directly to the quality of the initial design of their facilities,
equipment and machinery, tools, workplace layouts, overall work
environment, and work methods.
Included in this effort will be a design review process and redesign decisions
as companies seek to achieve continuous improvement in safety. This
approach can not only benefit workers but improve productivity and cost
effectiveness for the company.
General Principles and Definitions
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Designing for safety can be defined as the application of the concepts of
safety through design to processes, the workplace, work methods, and
products to achieve a state of operation for which the risks are judged to be
acceptable.
Risk is defined as a measure of the probability that a hazard may cause an
incident and the severity of the unpleasant effects. Risks are acceptable if
they are judged to be tolerable. For any company operation to succeed, its
risks must be acceptable.
If a system – the facilities, equipment, and work methods – is not designed
to minimize risk, companies cannot achieve superior results with respect to
safety, even if management and personnel factors approach the ideal.
Order of Design Priority
• To achieve the greatest effectiveness in hazard avoidance,
elimination, or control, companies should apply the following
priorities to all design and redesign processes.
First priority: Design for minimum risk
– From the very beginning, the top priority should be to eliminate
hazards in the design process.
– If an identified hazard can not be eliminated, the associated risk
is to be reduced to an acceptable level through design decisions.
Second priority: Incorporate safety devices
– If hazards cannot be eliminated or their risks effectively reduced
through design selection, the next step is to reduce risks to an
acceptable level.
– Companies can accomplish this step through the use of fixed,
automatic, or other protective safety design features or devices.
Third priority: Provide warning devices
– In some cases, identified hazards cannot be eliminated or their risks
reduced to an acceptable level through initial design decisions or
through the built-in safety devices.
– Under these conditions, companies should develop systems to detect
hazardous conditions and warn personnel of the hazards.
– Warning signals should be designed to help workers react promptly and
correctly to a hazardous situation and should be standardized within all
systems.
Fourth priority: Develop and implement operating procedures and
employee training programs
– Where it is impractical to eliminate hazards or reduce their risks to an
acceptable level through design selection, incorporating safety devices,
or warning devices.
– Companies should develop and implement safe operating procedures
and use safety training programs.
Fifth priority: Use personal protective equipment
– When all other techniques cannot eliminate or control a hazard,
employees should be given personal protective equipment to prevent
injuries and illnesses.
Role of the Safety Professional
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The safety practitioner can influence the design of the workplace and work
methods at three critical points:
In the pre-operational design stage.
– Before a building system, or piece of equipment becomes operational, the
safety professional has the greatest opportunity to identify and analyze
hazards and to help engineers and architects design ways to avoid,
control, or eliminate them.
– This stage can avoid costly redesigning, or replacing elements of the
workplace.
In the operational stage.
– After a building system, or piece of equipment becomes operational, the
safety professional can seek to make them safer through the process of
continuous improvement.
In the post incident stage.
– After an incident has occurred, the safety professional can still work to
improve safety: By investigating the hazards related to the incident, he can
determine the causal factors involved and can review the possible impact
of design decisions on the incident.
– These data can then be used to improve future designs and eliminate the
factors that led to the current incident.
Behavior Modification versus Workplace Redesign
• Management and safety professionals tend to focus on behavior
modification or training as solutions when the problem is workplace
or work methods design.
• Although behavior modification and training are important elements
of a safety and health plan, such measures are misdirected when
applied to solve workplace or work methods design problems.
• If the design of the work is overly stressful or if the work situation
encourages employees to take risks, then the causal factors are
principally universal.
• To label the causal factors as "employee error" or "unsafe act" would
be inappropriate and ineffective, as the following actual case
histories illustrate.
– Bags weighing 100 lb (45 kg) were delivered to work stations on pallets.
Workers open the bags and lifted them to shoulder height to pour the
contents into hoppers.
– The job required a fast work pace, with workers bending down and
twisting to lift the bags. Back injuries were frequent. Investigative reports
always listed the causal factors as improper lifting.
– The corrective action was always "re-instruct the worker in proper lifting
techniques."
Objectives of Designing for Safety
• The following objectives should be considered when
companies are developing a safety-through-design
process.
– Safety, consistent with goals, is to be designed into all
processes, the workplace, work methods, and products in a
proactive, cost-effective manner.
– Risk assessment is to be an integral part of the design
processes.
– A fundamental design purpose is to have processes and
products that are error proof or error tolerant.
– Hazards must be identified and evaluated, and then avoided,
eliminated, or controlled so that the associated risks are at an
acceptable level throughout the entire life cycle of processes,
equipment, and products.
Conducting Hazard Analysis / Risk Assessment
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To determine what actions are to be taken to avoid, eliminate, or control
hazards, a system to determine risk levels must be applied.
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A good risk assessment model will enable decision makers to understand
and categorize the risks and to determine the methods and costs to reduce
risks to an acceptable level.
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For these purposes, risk is a measure of the probability and severity of
adverse effects deriving from hazards.
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From this risk assessment, the company can choose which of the priority
hazard control methods it will use to address the hazards that still remain.
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In each of the following steps, management and the safety professional
must seek the counsel and expertise of qualified, experienced personnel
who are knowledgeable about the work or process.
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This process is more effective if a hazard analysis/risk assessment scenario
is written covering each of the steps. Such a scenario would include the
following:
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Establish the analysis parameters.
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The team would select a manageable task, system, or process to be analyzed
and define its relationship with other tasks or systems, if appropriate.
Identify the hazards.
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Members of the team should concentrate on identifying hazards that could be
the cause of incidents.
They should then determine each hazard's potential for harm or damage,
arising out of the characteristics of a job, piece of equipment, system, and the
like, and the actions or inactions of employees.
At this point, the team should keep an assessment of hazard potential
separate from an assessment of hazard severity.
Consider the failure modes.
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The team should define the possible failure modes that would realize the
hazard's potential and result in an incident.
Describe the exposure.
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The purpose of this step is to establish the number of people, the type of
property, and the aspects of the environment that could be harmed or
damaged, and how frequently they might be exposed to danger should the
hazard be realized.
5. Assess the severity of consequences.
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The team makes calculated guesswork regarding the number of fatalities,
injuries, illnesses, value of property damaged, and extent of environmental
damage that might result should hazard-related incidents occur.
Historical data are of great value as a baseline. On a subjective basis, the team
would need to agree on a classification system for the severity of hazard related
consequences: e.g., catastrophic, critical, marginal, and negligible.
6. Determine the probability of the hazard being realized.
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Unless empirical data are available, the process of selecting the probability of
an incident occurring is subjective.
Probability has to be related to intervals of some kind, such as a unit of time or
activity, events, units produced, or life cycle.
Commonly used categories for assigning probability include frequent, probable,
occasional, remote, and unlikely.
7. Write a concluding statement.
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The team would conclude with a statement that addresses both the probability
of an incident occurring and the expected severity of its adverse results.
8. Develop proposals to remedy the hazards.
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The team would then concentrate on the design and operational changes
necessary to achieve an acceptable risk level.