1
SELECTING THE INTENTION: A DARWIN-IST APPROACH
(SELECTAREA INTENȚIEI: O ABORDARE DARWINISTĂ)
Abstract
The paper intends to propose a new view on the way in which the intention (as intentionality, in a
phenomenological sense) if formed. In this end, the entire chain from will to action is described,
but the analysis is focused only to a part of that chain: from will to intention. Essentially, the study
asserts the intention is an un-conscious process and, even more, this process is of Darwin-ist type,
i.e. based on a kind of „natural selection” between some „stories” (called plausible corroborations
– PCs). This sui generis „competition” leads to selection of a dominant PC, under the influence of
the situational framework (another concept the study introduces in order to explain the
mechanism of the „natural selection” of the dominant PC. The situational framework generates
some geodesics which act on the PCs in competition as attractors.
JEL Classification: B41, C00, E17
Key-words: conscious, un-conscious, situational framework, motivation, intention, Darwin-ist
selection
1. About the will
In our opinion, the most primary notion regarding the decision is the will. The majority of the
abstract studies (i.e. of philosophical nature), but also of concrete ones (psycho-physiology,
cognitive psychology, behavioural psychology, etc.) indicate, more or less clear, more or less
convincing, a primitive source of the human behaviour. With terms occasionally different, this
source is considered be the will. We will try now to describe, characterize and, eventually, define,
the concept of the will.
(a) Descriptive issues
The essay to describe the concept of will must avoid any metaphysical ground. Avoiding of the
metaphysics in describing the will introduces, of course, some difficulties, since this description
must deliver „guaranties” regarding the factual testability (either directly or indirectly). In other
words, the description in cause must contain the scientificity ingredients.
Firstly, we will require that the will be inalienable associated to a subject. Moreover, the will must
be associated to an awareness, i.e. to a cultural subject1. By subject we understand the natural
entity capable to grasp the alterity. By cultural subject we understand the subject capable to have
representations. In fact, this request for the will is identical with the definition of the cultural
subject. Equally, by awareness we understand a natural capacity of a subject to have
representations. So, only the cultural subject can be credited with awareness or, inversely, only an
entity endowed with an awareness can be credited as cultural subject.
Secondly, the cultural subject, i.e. the headquarter of the awareness, cannot be than an individual.
The linguistic expressions that lead to aggregated subjects (group, society, etc.) must be
1
There are, of course, non-cultural subjects (as are considered, by now, the animals), which although grasp also the
alterity, cannot develop representations (i.e. grasping of the alterity in the absence in actu of the object represented).
NB: grasping the alterity with the condition of the presence in actu of the object in cause we denominate as
perception. There are also a special category of subjects, which although have awareness, cannot be denominated
neither cultural subjects, nor non-cultural subjects. We denominate this category as a-cultural subjects. The set of acultural subjects contains a single component: the Divinity (the Christian trinity is considered here as indivisible, i.e., as
an atom).
2
considered as metaphors having some utility in the verbal communication, but not as having their
own denotate. So, we cannot talk, scientifically, about collective awareness2.
Thirdly, we think the will doesn’t need for an expression, even interiorly, of verbal type. So,
although the will must be considered inside the awareness of the cultural subject, it is not
necessary the will get a verbal communication form3. This issue could lead to some specific logical
developments. For example, if the will doesn’t need for a verbal expression (even interiorized 4),
that is the verbal expression is not a sufficiency predicate for the concept of the will, then maybe
we might accept the will is also present in the non-cultural subjects case (as it is accepted today,
the non-cultural subjects haven’t the psychological capacity of verbalization, although they use
languages). We will accept that, in the case of the non-cultural subjects, we have something
analogous to the will, namely the instinct. In other words, if the non-cultural subjects have, as
primitive instance of the behaviour, the instinct, the cultural subjects have, for this primitive
instance of the behaviour, both will and instinct. We must repeat a very important thing here: the
will is generated by the awareness, but not by the culture. The term „cultural subject” is not linked
to the concept of culture, as it is usually understood, but it is linked only to the fact that the
cultural subjects are capable of representations. The culture will intervene, as we will show below,
in order to create the consciousness, which is an exclusively cultural hypostasis of the cultural
subjects.
Figure 1. Will vs. instinct
(b) Parametric issues
The parametric issues of the will, as it was been conceptually „cut out” above, address its intrinsic,
immanent properties. The property is an inalienable predicate of a thing or relationship 5. In our
opinion, the parametric issues of the will can be systematized as follows:

2
the will is inherently to the cultural subject: the cultural subject, understood as the subject
capable of representations, has the will in a necessary way, not in a contingent one. The
instinct is, on its turn, a necessary datum also. The cultural subject have instinct too, as a
ground on which the will emerges. The will integrates the instinct based on its
There is, of course, a semantic difference between the awareness, and the consciousness. While the awareness has
exclusively a natural determination, the consciousness has, concomitantly, a natural and a cultural determination.
However, the consciousness cannot exist independently from the awareness, so we cannot talk about a collective
consciousness, for example, about a social consciousness (except the metaphorical case).
3
But it is not a condition of impossibility. The will can get a verbal form, and, in this case, we have something that we
can name, like Habermas, the communicative action. For example, the politicians use massively quite this type of
action in reaching the political goals.
4
In the way in which, many times, when we are reading a text, we pronounce, without sound (inside our mind), the
read words.
5
The relationship is a correlation, of any kind, between two things, or between two properties associated to the same
thing or to two different things. In the same way, the property can be associated to a thing or to a relationship. It
could exist, so, a property of second order: a property of a relationship which are developing between two properties
(something similar happens, for example, in the case of the logic of second order predicates, i.e. the logic of
predicates about predicates). This self-reference happens, for a while, in the field of the economic epistemology, by
the syntagma economics of economics.
3
representations capacity. The instinct is „triggered” by the presence in actu 6 of the object,
while the will can be „triggered” by the simple representation of the object. This means the
non-cultural subjects, which are capable exclusively for perceptions, cannot have will, but
instinct only;
6

the will is intermittently: the cultural subject doesn’t express its will continuously. There is
some descriptions of the will as being the logical sum between understanding and action.
Although such a description cannot be accepted without an analytical clarifying of the used
terms, it is of useful to argue the intermittently character of the will. Indeed, the
understanding seems to be not conditioned by the will straining (except the moment when
the subject decide to do the effort to understand), while the act/action needs for such a
will straining. So, we will accept the will is „required” by the act/action only. But this means
we must accept the intermittently character of the will manifestation;

the will is free7: this parameter is much more polemical and, consequently, we will discuss
it more detailed. By freedom is understood just the non-restricted manifestation of the will
(as consequence, the non-cultural subjects are not liable to freedom). The will is, on the
other part, a property of a historical, contingent cultural subject, but not an abstract or
necessary one. So, the historical cultural subject exists in a given natural and social context.
Even it would exist a single cultural subject in the Universe, the natural context would
impose him a set of constraints which limit its freedom: for example, it doesn’t live if it
doesn’t inhale air (to take an example on our planet). If, in addition, there are more
cultural subjects (at least two), then some social constraints emerge, generated by the
inherent interactions among the contemporary cultural subjects8. So, when we say the will
is free, we don’t understand it is free in an absolute way, but it is free that, in the existing
constraints framework (natural and social) to choose to do, or to do not9. The existence of
the freedom (or, the same, of the free will) justifies the responsibility. The free expression
of the will signifies, necessarily and categorically, the assuming of the responsibility
regarding the mentioned expression (for example, assuming its consequences, no matter if
we talk about the will to do, or about the will to do not10).
The perception, which is possible in the presence in actu of the object only, is the subjective form of the sensation
(here resides the Kant’s position regarding the distinction between the noumen and phenomenon: the phenomenon,
being a perception, so, a subjective alteration of the genuine sensation, we cannot principled know about the
noumen, as the Das Ding an Sich. The representation can renounce to the sensation or, better said, it can reproduce
the perception without the intermediation of the sensation (for example, can has as object of the representation a
thing that doesn’t exist or even a thing that is impossible to exist).
7
We consider the will (since it hold the parameter of freedom) and the free will must be considered two terms for the
same concept, that is, the two terms are semantically equivalent, having the same denotate.
8
At the limit, could exist also some constraints on the freedom generated by the non-contemporary cultural subjects:
for example, the Christian religion stipulated, 2000 years ago, a set of morale principles of behaviour which constitute,
for the current cultural subjects, constraints, that is, limitations of their freedom.
9
To be noticed that we don’t about choosing among alternatives, but about choosing between… to choose or to
choose not, so, more general saying, about choosing between to do or to forbidden. Choosing among alternatives is
an issue that passes much beyond the simple manifestation of the will, implying not the awareness only, but also the
consciousness (and, even more, the intellect). In other words, the free manifestation of the will (that is a pleonasm!)
as it was been sketched above, is the most primary manifestation. A useful analogy of the will manifestation could be
made with the instinctive reaction, with the distinction that the will implies the awareness. But, the will manifestation,
as it was already stated, is also a reaction situated at the most primary level of the cultural subject manifestation.
10
This is the reason for which the theism is generally associated, with the inexistence of the responsibility of the
persons taking decisions or doing actions, and the deism is generally associated with the existence of such a
responsibility.
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(c) Definitional issues
Based on the above discussions, let’s try to define the concept of the will. We think the will is the
inherent and immanent potential of the cultural subject to opt, from the performative point of
view, regarding the contingent.
-
the immanence and the inherence: they were been already explained;
-
the performative option: this specification inside the definition has the role to impose the
primitiveness of the last resort of the will, i.e., the fact the will opts for the most general
case: to do or to do not, without any special qualification of the option;
-
the association with the contingent: the will cannot, from the performative point of view,
opt regarding the necessary (nobody can express his/her will to die – except the case of
suicide – since the death of the cultural subject is a necessity), but only regarding the
contingent.
2. About the motivation/reason
In our view, the „road” from the will to act/action can be synoptically described as follows:
Figure 2. The chain from will to action
Logically, the motivation emerges from the will via the consciousness. The will involves the
awareness, but the last is only the subjective ground based on which the consciousness evolves.
When the will pass inside the consciousness, it becomes motivation. But what is the
consciousness? In our view, the consciousness emerges when the cultural subject gains a
representation (model) of the world and of the selfness. This representation (model) doesn’t
require a developed discursive form, it can exist in any form. But, higher the discursive level of it,
more active is the consciousness in the cultural subject behaviour. If the awareness gives to the
cultural subject the capability to perceive the alterity, i.e., the distinction between himself/herself
and his/her environment (including the alter ego), the consciousness is an awareness culturally
marked11. So, the motivation can be defined as the passing of the will under the consciousness
discretion.
The motivation constitutes the first form in which the will manifests itself. For the cultural subject
involved, the motivation is a first feel regarding its propensity to act. This feel is still enough
confuse, so more other subjective processes are needed to reach the stage of the act proper said.
The motivation is, however, a mandatory link in the road from the will to the act (behaviour).
11
To be noticed that the cultural implies, logically, the social, but the inversely is false (i.e., there are non-cultural
subjects which are, however, social subjects).
5
Although the motivation is not linked in any way to a rationality model12, however it is often called
as reason. We notice the reader that the result of applying a rationality model, i.e., the decision, is
not a reason, but a rational. So, by reason we understand the same thing as by motivation.
The crucial property of the motivation is that it is not non-ambiguous. The motivation is only a
hazy soup13 of potential intentions. This ambiguity of the direction in which the motivation moves
in order to become intention is something analogue with the probability distribution of the
elementary particles examined by the quantum mechanics: we don’t know where a particle is than
when an experiment is done to measure its position14.
3. About the intention
The next stage of the subject propensity from the will to the act is the intention forming15. The
intention forming is the most polemical issue in the human behaviour topic. The general approach
of the intention is grounded on the rationality model (we will move the rationality model action to
the point where the interest passes into the decision, see the above figure). We think the
intention forming is a more complicated subjective process and, in any case, a process with no
connection with the rationality16. Moreover, the above mentioned sub-liminal character leads, in
fact, this deliberation inside the sub-consciousness area17. In our opinion, once the motivation has
emerged inside the consciousness, this emergence automatically (i.e., outside the conscious
control, so at the level of sub-consciousness) triggers the weaving of „stories” which are
associated with the motivation in case. We will call these „stories” as plausible corroborations
(PCs). So, by PCs we understand a coherent series of successive „approvals” (in the form of
motivational chain), of a motivation, from diverse perspectives based on the natural and cultural
ground of the involved subject, as well as on events subjectively experienced in the past and living
in the memory of the subject. It must be presumed that, for a given motivation, it can principled
exist, more „stories” in competition one another, that is, more PCs18.
Transforming the motivation into intention implies the selection of one among these „stories”
(PCs). The crucial issue here is, so, the way in which this selection is achieved. We will say the
selection is determined by the impact of the situational framework (SF). Many theoretical
reasoning, but also many experiments or simple systematic observations have indicated that there
is a decisional latency at the individual level19, and this latency is „activated” by the so called
situational framework20. This way, an individual which would not manifest, in „aseptic” conditions,
12
A rationality model appears only when the interest is transformed into decision.
The fuzzy logic (initiated by L.A. Zadeh) tries to rigorously treat just this imprecision/vagueness.
14
Of course, the measurement is under the Heisenberg’s vagueness.
15
The concept of intention is used, across the study, in the sense of intentionality (referentiality, directionality), that
is, in the sense used by fenomenologists (like E. Husserl) or by the philosophers of mind (like J. R. Searle).
16
Many of recent works (see, for example, D. Kahneman, D. Ariely, L. Mlodinov, D.M. Wegner, G. Akerlof) point out
the fact that the behaviour decision is taken in a non-conscious way or, in any case, in a non-rational way.
17
We do not develop more here the possible distinction (of usefulness, maybe, in the case of some researches
focused more on a psychological goal) between sub-consciousness and the in-consciousness. In fact, in the current
study, we will consider the two concepts as equivalent, namely, as opposite both to the concept of consciousness.
Between the concept of sub-consciousness and the concept of in-consciousness we prefer the first.
18
Evidently, the things are more cuttingly in the case of different subjects. The same motivation (if this is acceptable)
appeared at more cultural subjects, could be supported by different „stories” (i.e., PCs), depending on the integral
personality (including own experiences) of every subject. S, even the external manifestation of the motivation (i.e., the
intention) is the same (a criterion for this identity of the external manifestation of the motivation could be the
identical effects generated by the operationalization of the intention), the „story” which supports the intention is,
almost always, different. To paraphrase John R. Searle (see, for example, his Mind. A brief Introduction, Oxford
University Press, 2004) we can say we have the same pragmatics, but different semantics.
19
As we will see, we can extend this parameter to homogeneous classes of individuals.
20
In a more pretentious terminology, we can call the situational framework as a praxiological occasion.
13
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a given intention, when he/her is within an adequate situational framework, he/her will manifest
the intention in case. This assertion regarding the influence of the situational framework on the
process of forming the intention21 is of great importance, firstly from theoretical point of view
(which constitutes our basic scientific interest here), because it allows to rethink the real
decisional model. Let’s try to describe, from the logical point of view, the concept of situational
framework (SF). We believe the following sufficiency predicates must be taken into consideration:
- the SF is relatively autonomic related to the subject; something similar we meet in the
case of the economic perfect competition: the competitional framework appears as
autonomic related to every individual participant, because the participants (considered as
atomic, so, without market power22) cannot influence the competitional framework. The
SF must be understood in a similar way: although it is a result, of synergic kind, of the
influence of all the participants, that is, of all the subjects which have interacted, interact,
and will interact with the subject in case, no one among these participants can decisively
influence the SF23;
- the SF is a complex24 entity: this means the SF is an entity of network type, where the
novelty is necessarily generated;
- the SF is relatively stable, comparative with the volatility of the behaviour of the subject,
so generating constraints or, by the contrary, incentives to form the intentions, i.e. the
„intentionalities portfolio”;
- the SF generates the geodesics of forming the intention25, that is, it generates the most
probable patterns26 in configuring the intentionality.
If this is the logical concept of the SF, then what is its content (denotation)? We think the
formation of the SF is generated by „putting together” of the following elements:
(a) the general cultural background of the social group (family, nation, people) from which
the subject is belonging; this background constitutes the structural foundation of the SF.
We notice this component of SF with 𝐵; 𝐵 contains:
21
We repeat we understand the intentionality when we talk about the intention.
We talk, in this case, about the so called price takers.
23
Sociologii și experții în psihologie socială vor putea identifica, desigur, centre locale de putere care „curbează”
această omogenitate perfectă a cadrului situațional, dar aceste dezvoltări nu vor fi abordate aici (la fel se întâmplă, de
altfel, și în cazul exemplului analog, al concurenței perfecte, unde pot apărea centre locale de putere de piață:
oligopoluri, monopoluri). De altfel, noi considerăm că problematica cadrului situațional ar trebui dezvoltată până la
ultimele sale consecințe logice, în speranța că aici ar putea subzista o șansă de recuperare a predictibilității în
domeniul social (economic). Vom reveni în altă parte cu asemenea dezvoltări.
24
By the word complex we understand the predicate which necessarily generates the novelty (in fact, the presence of
the subject inside a process transforms the process, ipso facto, in a complex system, even the given system is not
complicated one, that is, it is a simple system).
25
In our opinion, here is the point from which must start in order to develop a predictor relatively invariant for the
social (economic, implicitly): the description of the „curvature” specific of the SF, which can indicate, with the greatest
possible accuracy within a complex entity, what intentionalities will be selected to be actualized. Identifying and
describing in a structural-functional way of such a process of „natural selection” would constitute, we believe, a very
important step in developing the theory of prediction in the social (economic) field.
26
Here, the word probable haven’t its signification from the theory of probabilities (i.e., it doesn’t address neither the
objective probabilities – based on archives of factual observations – nor the subjective probabilities – based on
conceptable expectations), but it address the set of objective possibilities for the behaviour in the given SF (something
similar to the „probabilities” considered by Boltzmann when he grounded its statistical mechanics; in fact, these
„probabilities” were…objective possibilities).
22
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- common values 27 (axiological matrix): the common values deliver the space of
admissible decisions for the given community. They act as filters of aggregate
intentional commitment (FAIC). We notice this component of SF with 𝑉;
- formal institutions. We notice this component of SF with 𝐹𝐼;
- informal institutions (traditions, habits). We notice this component of SF with 𝐼𝐼;
- social histories: address the collective memory (which generates the feel of the group
identity). We notice this component of SF with 𝑆𝐻);
(b) the individual cultural background of the subject. We notice this component of SF with
𝑏; 𝑏 contains:
- rationality models28: the rationality models ensure the deliberative justifications to
form the individual intentionality. They act as filters of individual intentional
commitment (FIIC). We notice this component of SF with 𝑟𝑚;
- personal histories: address the individual memory (which generates the contingent
idiosyncrasy of the subject). We notice this component of SF with 𝑝ℎ.
The 𝐵 component of SF is „responsible” for generating the main lines of the most probable
common behaviours inside the social group in case. We call this lines geodesics29. The 𝑏 is
„responsible” for the individual behaviour inside the social group in case.
Figure 3. Geodesics and individual behaviour. The role of the situational framework
We can accept the following analytical formulas:
27

𝐵 = (𝑉)⋃(𝐹𝐼)⋃(𝐼𝐼)⋃(𝑆𝐻)

𝑏 = (𝑟𝑚)⋃(𝑝ℎ)

𝑏 = 𝑓(𝐵), where 𝑓 is a function (algebraic operator); this notation signifies that the
individual background is specifically „coloured” by the general background within
which the individual background is working;
By values we understand, generally, beliefs, either atheist, or theist. So, the values are not passible for justification
and do not imply deliberativness.
28
The issue of the existence of the rationality models at the social level (no matter the degree of aggregation) is very
controversial. In our opinion, such rationality models (that is, at the social level) cannot exist than in a metaphorical
way, similarly with the case of the collective awareness (or collective consciousness).
29
The concept of geodesic introduced here is perfectly similar with the concept of geodesic in the Einstein-ian model
of the space-time. Moreover, this geodesic acts identically (that is, like an attractor) as the „natural” geodesic in
physics.
8

𝐵 = 𝑔(ℭ𝑏) , where with ℭ is an operator that could be called „empirical
combination”; this notation signifies that the general background of the social group
is not either an amount, or an intersection of the individual backgrounds within the
given social group, but a result with a great degree of imprecision, generated by the
functional, empirical, contingent interferences among the individuals backgrounds.
This operator cannot be called simply as a synergic result of the individual
backgrounds interferences, but such a solution couldn’t signify than a simple
additional synergy related to the individual backgrounds. We want to „capture” not
only this additional effect, but also the general effect delivered by the mutual causal
relationships among the individual backgrounds in case; this means: 𝐵 = 𝑔(ℭ(𝑓(𝐵)),
which immediately indicates an iterative causality, like a spiral, between the general
background and the individuals backgrounds, that is, leads to the concept of coevolution of the two types of backgrounds.
Figure 4. The chain from will to intention
In fact, we believe the intention (as intentionality) arises in a Darwin-ist way, mediated by the
geodesics generated within the general cultural background. We think the following „procedure”
is working:
- once the motivation has appeared inside the consciousness, a set of „stories”, i.e., a set
of plausible corroborations (PCs) emerges around it;
- these PCs are originated in sub-consciousness and are generated by the individual
background (𝑏);
- in fact, many such PCs, arisen around the given motivation, enter a sui generis
competition, in order to become dominant;
- the competition for dominance among the PCs is „gravitationally” influenced by the
geodesics delivered by the general background (𝐵);
- so, will become dominant that PC which is staying, through the content of its „story”
associated to the motivation, most closed to one of the geodesics delivered by 𝐵;
- this means, the „selection” of one PC among the PCs in competition, to become
dominant, is a non-conscious process, governed by the inter-dependence between 𝑏
and 𝐵;
- this process of selecting the dominant PC, on the most closed or on the strongest
geodesics generated by 𝐵, we want call a Darwin-ist process of the „natural” selection
of the intention (intentionality).
4. Some concluding remarks
 the rationality model as vehicle to form the intention must be seriously revisited;
although such rationality models could play a certain role in forming the interest and the
decision, we don’t believe it is relevant for forming the intention (intentionality);
9
 the key piece in forming the intention is the concept of situational framework (SF) 30, as
generator of geodesics which „attract” the best placed PC (plausible corroboration) that
could justify, in an un-conscious way, the motivation/reason;
Figure 5. The play between conscious and un-conscious in forming the intention
 the process of selecting the best placed PC is of Darwin-ist type, and the engine of the
selection (inside a sui generis „competition” among different PCs) is the geodesics; so,
the geodesics act similarly with the „natural advantage” in the natural selection of the
living species evolution;
 the „play” between the conscious and the un-conscious in forming the intention seems
be relatively well documented by experiments in recent researches, but the hypothesis
on the Darwin-ist kind of this forming, based on the concept of situational framework,
could lead forward new researches in the matter;
 the concept of situational framework could also be a key link to „save” the predictability
in the social (economic) field, that is clearly compromised now by the Oedip effect;
 the concept of situational framework, together with the concept of Darwin-ist selection
of the intention could lead the economic discipline (and other social disciplines as well)
to find invariants, that is the final goal (in our opinion) of any cognitive discipline.
Selected bibliography
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30
Akerlof, G. A., Shiller, R.J. (2010), Spirite animale, Editura publica, București
Ariely, D. (2010), Irațional în mod previzibil. Forțele ascunse care ne influențează deciziile,
Editura Publica, București
Dinga, E. (2012), Rebuilding Economics. A Logical, Epistemological and Methodological
Approach. Lambert Academic Publishing, Saarbrucken, Germany
Gigerenzer, G. (2012), Intuiția. Inteligența inconștientului, Editura Curtea Veche, București
Gleik, J. (2011), Informația: o istorie, o teorie, o revărsare, Editura Publica, București
Hollis, M. (2001), Introducere în filosofia științelor sociale, Editura Trei, București
Kahneman, D. (2012), Gândire rapidă, gândire lentă, Editura Publica, București
Kahneman, D. (2012), Gândire rapidă, gândire lentă, Editura Publica, București,
Mlodinow, L. (2013), Subliminal. Cum ne determină inconștientul comportamentul, Editura
Humanitas, București
Norretranders, T. (2010), Iluzia utilizatorului. Despre limitele conștiinței, Editura Publica,
București
Wegner, D.M. (2012), Iluzia voinței conștiente, Editura Humanitas, București
In some a sense, the concept of situational framework could replace the methodological individualism that seems
be too artificial (even as euristic fiction) in explaining the individual behaviour. This replacing comes from a logical
perspective, similar to the Tocqueville’s idee (comming from a historical perspective) regarding the destroying of the
individual by the…individualism.