We Can’t Win This on Our Own: Unions, Firms, and the Mobilization of External Allies in Labor Disputes * Marc Dixon Department of Sociology Dartmouth College Andrew W. Martin Department of Sociology Ohio State University * Please do not cite this draft without the authors’ permission. Direct correspondence to Marc Dixon at the Department of Sociology, 6104 Silsby Hall, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, 03755, USA, or via e-mail: [email protected] We Can’t Win This on Our Own: Unions, Firms, and the Mobilization of External Allies in Labor Disputes Abstract To cope with steep losses in membership and eroding legal protections in recent decades, some unions have looked outward, forging alliances with civic, religious, and social change organizations. Yet surprisingly little is known about the frequency, nature, or determinants of such alliances. We take up these issues with a unique dataset on strike events from the 1990s and 2000s. Our findings build upon and extend the labor and social movement literatures on coalitions, demonstrating how threat matters not just for the mobilization of external allies but for the types of assistance typically brought to bear by allied groups. Our findings also reveal significant cleavages within the labor movement when it comes to the propensity for alliance formation: a crop of unions operating mostly in the service sector, often termed “social movement unions,” are better equipped at mobilizing external allies and at securing material assistance in the process. We conclude by discussing the implications of coalition formation dynamics among social movements more generally. 2 We Can’t Win This on Our Own: Unions, Firms, and the Mobilization of External Allies in Labor Disputes Observers and scholars of organized labor agree that today’s political and economic climate poses significant challenges for labor unions. From lockouts to organizing drives, there is growing evidence that those unions able to mobilize external allies consistently enjoy the greatest success (Turner and Cornfield 2007). More broadly, social movement scholars suggest that external allies provide considerable resources, both material and symbolic, to activist groups (Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). And these actors can bring significant pressure to bear on the targeted firm as well. Yet, despite the potential benefits for unions that may come from expanding the scope of labor conflict in this manner (e.g., Schattschneider 1960), it is not clear that most labor mobilizations actually move beyond the union-firm dynamic (see Martin 2008:1084 for one of the few estimates). In the paper we ask why certain unions may seek to expand the scope of conflict and engage sympathetic parties in some contexts but not in others. This is explored through the examination of labor strikes in the 1990s and 2000s, often a desperate measure for unions during this period (Rosenfeld 2006), and one in which the mobilization of allies was all the more crucial. Social movement literature on coalition formation offers a useful starting point. This research demonstrates how external threats (McCammon and Campbell 2002), progressive leadership (Krinsky and Reese 2006; Nissen 2004), and pre-existing ties among movement organizations (Isaac and Christiansen 2002; Rose 2000) all encourage organizational collaboration. Van Dyke’s (2003) research, moreover, suggests important differences leading to the formation of intra versus intermovement ties. Yet this literature is largely silent on what 3 various types of allies bring to the table. Indeed, most quantitative work has tended to focus on the coalition protest event or organizational collaboration as the outcome to be explained. We build on and advance this research in two important ways. First, in addition to bringing systematic evidence to bear on the incidence of external allies in labor disputes, and on factors leading to the formation of intra and intermovement collaborations, we also probe the various types of external support that are most often employed in contestation with firms. Our findings reveal a diverse landscape of union allies and the types of support they bring. We show how further scrutiny of these differences can inform general theoretical discussions of social movement effectiveness. Second, we bring two additional literatures to bear on the problem: research on the capacity and willingness of unions to engage in contentious politics (Cornfield 2007; Martin and Dixon 2010; Milkman 2006) and research on the targets of collective action (Soule 2009; Walker et al. 2008). Our theoretical framework thus begins with the understanding that not all unions are equally willing or able to confront corporations and to seek external support in this process. Recently a number of labor organizations have moved towards a social movement framework, which includes forging alliances with religious, civic, and social change groups. Moreover, these unions have also drawn staff and leaders from outside the labor movement, which also makes forging external alliances easier (Voss and Sherman 2000). We distinguish these so-called social movement unions and those unions that benefited the most from institutionalized collective bargaining during the postwar era. Second, while the mobilization of broader support depends on union efforts, scholars increasingly point to the role of targets (here firms) in shaping protest activity (Walker et al. 2008). We therefore consider important differences in target vulnerability and whether they provide ripe contexts for the expansion of conflict. 4 In what follows we suggest how these perspectives, along with the social movement literature on coalitions, and its emphasis on threat and opportunity in particular, can aid our understanding of the expansion of conflict both through both intra and intermovement ties. We then propose key differences in the types of support allies bring to labor conflict. To assess factors contributing to the expansion of conflict, we draw on descriptive evidence on the landscape of union allies as well regression analyses from a unique dataset of 321 labor strikes in the United States between 1993 and 2003. We conclude by speculating on the usefulness of these various alliances for union aims and discuss the broader implications of coalition formation dynamics among social movements more generally Unions, Targets, and the Political Context of Labor Disputes Unions Not all unions are equally willing or able to confront corporations and to seek external support in this process. Reaching out undoubtedly comes with costs (Jasper 2004). Sometimes ideological fissures between labor and other groups are too much to overcome. Social movement or community organizations may be reluctant to work with labor if they suspect that their efforts will not be reciprocated. Indeed, for much of the postwar era labor turned inward, often spurning various social movement and New Left alliances (Lichtenstein 2002). Yet recently a number of labor organizations have moved towards a social movement framework by making appeals to worker dignity, employing disruptive protest tactics, and by forging alliances with religious, civic, and social change groups (Bronfenbrenner 1997; Martin 2008; Turner and Cornfield 2007). 5 Those unions that have adopted such a social movement orientation account for the bulk of contemporary organizing efforts. Voss and Sherman’s (2000) research on renewed organizing efforts identifies the SEIU as perhaps the most aggressive of the revitalized union movement. UNITE-HERE and the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) have also been relatively quick to adopt these innovative methods of recruitment (see Crump 1991; Fantasia and Voss 2004; Fiorito et al. 1995). Not surprisingly, research suggests that such “social movement unions” and those with progressive leadership are more likely to forge coalitions with other groups and successful ones at that (Nissen 2004). Krinsky and Reese’s (2006) study on the workfare justice movement finds this social movement orientation to be an important factor for both coalition formation and longevity. The implication is that these particular unions are more politically committed to forging ties with other groups and better equipped to do so. Because many staffers in such unions have experience with other social movements, they are better able to serve as “bridge builders” or “coalition brokers” between groups (Isaac and Christiansen 2002; Obach 2004). Social movement research increasingly points to such interoganizational ties as crucial for coalition formation (Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). By contrast, those unions that have remained wedded to institutionalized collective bargaining are more likely to be insular and to resolve disputes through formal state machinery. While these developments are quite recent, many important distinctions among unions and their capacity for mobilization are rooted in a much longer history. For example, Milkman (2006) traces the divergent fate of labor unions in present-day Los Angeles in part to their origins in the AFL and CIO, arguing that AFL unions, particularly service sector unions, have a number of distinct advantages over their industrial brethren when organizing low-wage immigrant 6 workers. According to Milkman (2006:23-4), AFL unions like SEIU came of age prior to the supportive state framework of the New Deal, which gives them an edge in an era when such protections have been severely weakened. The industrial unions, by contrast, have had “enormous difficulty transcending the New Deal framework on which the CIO’s initial growth was so heavily predicated” (see also Cornfield 2007 on their divergent orientations). The historical argument posed by Milkman (2006) is consistent with Stinchcombe’s (1965) early statements on organizational inertia, as well as later path-dependent arguments (Mahoney 2000), which demonstrate how environmental demands at the time of the organization’s founding continue to affect internal organizational dynamics long after those particular pressures subside. Recent work that has followed up on this historical insight suggests a notable split between those social movement unions (mostly of the AFL) and the original CIO unions that came of age during a period of state sponsorship. For example, Martin and Dixon (2010) find that at the end of the twentieth century the original CIO unions were less militant in the face of environmental threats and more wedded to institutional politics as a solution to union decline than their social movement counterparts. These patterns combined with insights from the coalition literature suggest a number of possibilities regarding alliance formation. First, unions that have adopted a social movement orientation should be more likely to forge external alliances. As we describe below, however, the range of potential allies and the types of assistance they provide are quite diverse. Many alliances forged by unions are with other labor organizations. Because “crossing movement boundaries” (Van Dyke 2003) and forging ties with groups outside of the labor movement is likely more difficult, we suspect that social movement unions will also be more likely to forge alliances with non-labor organizations. 7 Targets of Collective Action The incidence and effectiveness of coalition protest is shaped in part by the characteristics of the institutions from which they seek change, or the targets of collective action. While the political opportunity literature has long pointed to the strengths and vulnerabilities of states as influential for social movement outcomes (McAdam 1982; Meyer 2004), recent work expands this focus beyond the state with clear implications for labor (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Luders 2007; Soule 2009; Walker et al. 2008). Indeed, Manheim’s (2001) analysis of corporate campaigns, wide-ranging union efforts to pressure firms from multiple angles, explicitly recognizes that firms vary in their “pressure points” (see also Lerner 2007). Scholarship points to certain characteristics of firms that increase the likelihood of social movement success and the use of certain protest repertoires. For example, several authors have begun to extend the contentious politics literature to fit the corporate medium, identifying “corporate opportunity structures” that condition activism and success in a manner similar to that of political opportunities (Raeburn 2004; King 2008; Soule 2009). Sympathetic actors in corporate governance, organizational restructuring, and potential intervention from the state all may encourage activism by increasing the prospects for success. The recent study by Walker and colleagues (2008) suggests that differences in the vulnerability of targets encourage certain protest repertoires on the part of challengers. Whereas the democratic state is generally open to multiple claimants, encourages more routine forms of collective action (e.g., petitioning, marches), and is unlikely to be brought to a halt by any one campaign, corporations are closed to these forms of claims-making but ultimately more 8 vulnerable to disruptive protest. The argument is that this vulnerability encourages more disruptive protest actions. We suspect that these firm characteristics are also influential for the activation of external allies on the part of labor. First, publicly traded firms have more points of access than private firms. Comprehensive bargaining campaigns often begin by mapping out such firm relations and points of access including corporate governance, shareholder relations, government oversight and so on (see Juravich 2007: 37). Considering the range of targets in labor disputes, public employers too have multiple stakeholders and points of access (e.g., politicians, voters) when compared to the privately held firm. Consistent with literature on corporate opportunity structures and target vulnerability, this access should encourage unions to seek out various sources of leverage and the allies to exploit them. These diverse points of access should also increase the likelihood of unions mobilizing allies outside of the labor movement. Labor research points to somewhat distinct opportunities for activism. Several studies document the positional power of unions in certain industrial sectors, where union power is linked to their disruptive potential in tightly integrated supplier chains (Silver 2003; Wallace, Griffin, and Rubin 1989; Wright 1997). Important today, is the distinction between mobile and immobile employers, or their geographic vulnerability (Herod 1995; Lerner 2007). Martin (2008) finds that those unions employing innovative organizing methods, including the formation of coalitions with diverse sets of allies, tend to target firms that are wedded to a particular locale (e.g., hotels, commercial cleaning). We expect therefore that firms for whom relocation is not possible or probable present greater opportunities for union activism and encourage the activation of allies. It is less clear how this impacts intra versus intermovement collaboration, so we offer no formal prediction relative to firm mobility and this distinction. 9 Political Opportunity and Threat The bulk of social movement research on coalitions points to the political context of conflict as influential (McCammon and Campbell 2002; Rohlinger 2006). While some have found political opportunities to encourage coalition formation (Kay 2005), threat appears to be a more powerful impetus for reaching out beyond organizational boundaries. Studies pertaining to campus activism (Van Dyke 2003), suffragist campaigns (McCammon and Campbell 2002), and corporate mobilization (Akard 1992; Quadagno 2004) all demonstrate how political threats encourage alliance-formation. Here threat is conceived as actions by political elites that are counter to the interests of activist groups and is often measured by the presence of political antagonists or policies counter to group interests (Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). Van Dyke’s (2003) study of coalition protests on college campuses distinguishes between local and more universal threats. Whereas local threats encourage within-movement coalitions, the presence of a national threat is what spurs inter-movement coalition events. Unions likewise face a range of threats to their interests. Their most immediate threats involve firm countermobilization. The past several decades has witnessed a fundamental shift in the American industrial landscape. There is mounting evidence that during our sample period firms often “baited” unions into strikes in the hopes of replacing their workforce with strikebreakers or at least extracting meaningful concessions from the union (Bandzak 1992; Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1999). These developments have indeed made strikes into desperate measures on the part of unions (Rosenfeld 2006). Because of this, we expect firm countermobilization to be spur alliance formation on the part of unions. 10 Following Van Dyke’s (2003) finding, it is plausible that the immediate threat of firm countermobilization will be more important for forging ties to other labor organizations but not necessarily extra-movement alliances. Instead, broader political threats including antagonists in government should push unions to draw on allies outside of the labor movement. We weigh each of these possibilities in the analyses that follow. We also acknowledge the potential impact of opportunities. McCammon and Campbell (2002) make a compelling case that opportunities provide little incentive for coalitions because they signal the potential for success independently. However, unions must first have sympathetic actors (potential allies) upon which they can draw. More liberal areas are more likely to have such union friendly actors. In this way, opportunities such as the political climate of a given locale should be important for unions’ ability to expand the scope of conflict, and particularly so for allies outside of the labor movement. Broad economic conditions likewise impact labor outcomes. Strike research during the postwar years showed that striking tended to increase when labor markets were tight and the threat of replacement was low (Rubin 1986). Though the nature of industrial conflict has undoubtedly changed, with firms having an upper hand regardless of the economic climate, we control for the health of the labor market in the analyses that follow. The Contribution of Allies The focus in the social movement literature on allies and coalition building stems from the belief that by banding together groups can increase their chances of success (Obach 2004). But not all contributions by allied actors are of equal value. Our theoretical discussion has thus far focused on factors leading to the mobilization of two distinct sets of allies: intramovement and external 11 (or non-labor) actors. We believe that this is a useful distinction, yet one that by itself offers little insight into what unions actually get when seeking out support. We extend this work by specifying different types of support that allies may provide. By honing in on not just the incidence of allied activity but the types of support brought to bear in labor disputes, our findings can inform more general discussions of movement effectiveness. Most scholars agree that social movements must have certain material resources (e.g, money, labor, meeting space) and be able to marshal them effectively in order to affect change (Cress and Snow 2000; Ganz 2000). Yet much of what movements do is symbolic in nature, such as consciousness raising and the forging of collective identity (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Taylor and Whittier 1992). Discussions of movement effectiveness often hint at these multiple aims by drawing broad distinctions between persuasive strategies on the part of movements, which involve mostly symbolic manipulation, and the mobilization of people and resources in direct protest actions (McAdam and Su 2002; McCammon et al. 2001). While we acknowledge that such distinctions are never so firm on the ground, they provide a useful entryway for assessing what allies bring to the table. We distinguish between the material and symbolic support brought by allies in labor disputes. Drawing on the resource mobilization tradition, we identify material support as money, labor, other material resources such as office space, as well as direct action brought to bear in labor disputes. Symbolic support by contrast typically involves endorsements in-person or from afar, written or verbal statements in support of the union, and other showings of support. Just which type of support proves most influential is context driven (see for example Jasper 2004), and is beyond the scope of this study. Our focus and contribution instead lies in first describing 12 this range of allied activity and then assessing if factors associated with the expansion of conflict similarly impact what types of support unions are likely to receive. Data and Methods We propose that industrial expansion is driven by a number of factors: the motivation and ability of the union to do so, the vulnerabilities and threat of the targeted firm, and features of the broader environment within which the contest takes place, including presence of potential allies, as well as the economic climate. We begin first by describing how strikes were selected for analysis and then discuss the data sources, primarily newspapers, used to compile the database of industrial expansion at the end of the twentieth century. Strike Selection. Historically scholars have relied upon government statistics to analyze strikes in the United States and other industrial countries, as well as cross-national comparisons. While the termination of the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s work stoppages data collection program in 1981 temporarily halted information on strikes, beginning in 1984 the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services has collected data on most work stoppages in the U.S. 1 Despite this government data set, our paper seeks to move beyond existing models of strike analysis (predicting when and where they occur) and to explore the dynamics of the events themselves, specifically when and where unions turn to external allies for support. Unfortunately, like the BLS, the FMCS strike records provide only the most basic event features: company and union name, size, industry, location, and length. Therefore, these data cannot provide any insight into the expansion of industrial conflict. To address this, we supplement the FMCS data with media accounts of strikes to capture our outcomes of interest. Scholars 1 The FMCS does not collect data on strikes in the airline and railroad industries, which are monitored by the National Mediation Board (NMB). Martin (2005) estimates that the FMCS captures about 99% of all strikes in existing today. 13 interested in social movements have long recognized the value of relying upon media sources to examine various movement dynamics, usually protest events (Eisinger 1973; McAdam 1982; Olzak 1992; Soule 1997). The strategy here is to use the FMCS data as the population of interest and then rely on various newspaper archives to assemble in-depth accounts of strikes that will be the basis of a detailed coding process, described in greater detail below. Not surprisingly, there are significant methodological concerns associated with the use of media sources to study collective action. Broadly, scholars (see Earl et al. 2004 for a review of this literature) have identified two major sources of bias. The first is selection bias, which simply recognizes that not all events receive media attention. Research has identified a range of pertinent event features, including size, location, and level of conflict that determine whether the protest is covered (McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996). Even if protest events do receive coverage, the press may not present details of the event accurately, referred to as description bias. While this is often seen as a distortion of facts, as Smith et al. (2001) find, one of the most pervasive types of description bias is simply missing information. Given these methodological concerns, we develop a systematic strategy for analyzing the widest and most representative set of strikes using newspaper data. First, rather than use a single newspaper like the New York Times, which only covers a small fraction of strikes (Martin 2005), we turn to electronic newspaper archives, specifically LEXIS-NEXIS. This database allows us to employ keyword searches to identify all stories on a particular strike from thousands of local newspapers. After extensive pretesting, we have found that the most efficient (greatest proportion of “hits” without missing any events) Boolean keyword search string is “strike” and “company name” or “union name.” For each strike included in the FMCS database we search LEXIS-NEXIS beginning two weeks before the event begins and ending two weeks after the 14 strike has been concluded. If stories related to the labor dispute are found at the beginning or end of our search period, we extend it back/forward until no new stories are uncovered. Additionally, because most newspapers are not archived before the early 1990s, we limit our analysis to strikes from the mid 1990s. While reducing the potential of selection bias, these two remedies do not ensure that all strikes will be covered nor does it eliminate the possibility of missing data, which is a particularly relevant concern given our goal of examining the behaviors of the union, firm, state and other actors during the course of the conflict. In order to assess the extensiveness of both types of bias, we performed a search on two distinct sets of strikes, 70% of strikes of more than 1,000 workers from 1993-2003 (of which there were 278) and a random sample of 400 strikes with less than 1,000 workers from 1998-2003. The results indicate that strike coverage is heavily contingent upon size, 222 (80%) of the large strikes received newspaper attention compared to only about one-third of the smaller strikes (136). Our final dataset included 328 events. We developed a codebook to capture various features of the strikes themselves (measures are described in greater detail below). A group of undergraduate coders was trained by the authors, and each one was closely monitored to ensure accurate coding. Overall, our assessment of the reliability of the coding was quite positive; for example, the intercoder reliability score for the expansion of conflict variable was quite high, exceeding .9 (check). In the following we describe our measures of interest. Table 1 includes descriptive statistics and indicates the source of data. Measurements and Data Sources. Our unit of analysis is the strike event and our primary dependent variable is the Expansion of Conflict, which we code from the newspaper and 15 measures any effort by the union to mobilize external allies to support the union during the strike. These allies can include other unions, businesses, government actors, 2 politicians, social movement groups, civic, and religious groups. While the labor movement has had its share of internal conflict, unions have a long history of supporting their fellow labor organization through actions like sympathy strikes and secondary boycotts. Expanding conflict beyond the boundaries of the labor movement to secure wider support has been linked to success not only in the labor movement (Clawson 2003), but social movement actors generally (Lipsky 1967). Thus, we model both the Number of Unions/Labor Organizations Mobilized and the Number of Non-Union Allies Mobilized. While securing external support in its own right is a critical success for unions, it is important to identify what the ally brings to the table. For example, among our strikes there were numerous instances of politicians shaking hands on the picket line and giving their support to the union. Contrast such actions to a strike by hospital workers in Massachusetts that was supported by elected officials who promised to veto a merge the hospital had proposed until it would engage in a meaningful dialogue with the union. As described above, we distinguish between Symbolic Actions, typically vocalizing support for the union, and Material Actions: actions that include providing resources, legal support, secondary boycotts, refusal to cross picket lines. We further divide these actions into both union and non-union symbolic and material actions. Explanatory Variables: 2 Government actors refer primarily to governmental organizations, like the Environmental Protection Agency. Because we are interested in the expansion of industrial conflict beyond normal firm/union relations, we do not include government actors that are typically embroiled in labor disputes, including federal mediators and the National Labor Relations Board. Our models, do, however, control for the presence and action of these actors. 16 Union Characteristics. Strikes in the United States are ultimately contests involving two actors, the union and the firm. There is growing evidence that a number of unions have begun to return to their social movement roots by drawing upon protest repertoires to pressure targeted firms (Voss and Sherman 2000). Because this often involves forging coalitions with allies (Manheim 2001), we use the FMCS database to identify strikes organized by Social Movement Unions. These include the Service Employees International Union, Hotel and Restaurant Employees, UNITE (a needletrades union that merged with HERE in 2004), and the United Food and Commercial Workers. Prior analysis of strikes suggest that these unions are substantially different from other unions in terms of recent strike activity (Martin and Dixon 2010). That same article, and other research (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1999), has also noted how CIO unions have sought to regain their footing after years of industrial decline by also seeking to forge external allies. Thus, we include a second union affiliation dummy variable, Original CIO Unions, including the United Mineworkers (founded as an AFL union, but its leader, John Lewis, was critical in the formation of the CIO, which it became a founding member of), United Steelworkers, and United Autoworkers. We also include union strength in the state, which should make intramovement mobilization easier. We employ two separate measures, the state’s Unionization Rate, or proportion of the employed population that belongs to a labor union, and Strike Rate, the number of strikes in the state per one thousand enterprises. Firm Characteristics. Scholars have also become increasingly interested in the ways that characteristics of targets affects outcomes from repertoire choice to types of claims made by social movement actors (Walker, Martin, and McCarthy 2008). We suspect that such 17 considerations also affect how unions approach firms in labor strikes. First, there is growing evidence that in the face of labor strife firms simply move to new locals with a more docile workforce (Cowie 1999). On the flip side, some firms must provide goods and service at the geographic point of production (medical services, hospitality, transportation, extraction), which gives unions considerable leverage to up the ante in the dispute without worrying about plant relocation. Using information from the FMCS on the product and industry of the firm, we created a dummy variable, Immobile, that captures this set of firms. 3 Additionally, firms varying in their ownership structure, which is another potential source of influence where external actors can be brought to bear; public employees and publicly traded firms both offer points of access, and there is evidence that for private firms, unions have used shareholders as allies (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1999 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1018 (1997-1998) Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions; Schwab, Stewart J.; Thomas, Randall S..). Thus, we include three dummy variables for firm ownership: Public Employer, Publicly Traded Private, and Privately Held as the reference category. Contextual Features: Threat and Political Opportunity. Labor disputes, like all movement contests, are shaped by the broader context within which they take place. Scholars have become increasingly aware of the role of threat in social change efforts, and how threatening behaviors by powerful groups such as the state affects movement actions (Almeida 2003). Since strike in the United States occur in the milieu of industrial relations dominated by firms, hostile efforts by the company should affect unions’ propensity to reach out to allies. One of the most significant tactical innovations taken by firms in the past 30 years is the use of replacement workers during the strike, and, increasingly as a way to permanently shed the union 3 Both authors coded the firms independently based on their industry and goods/services produced to determine if the firm would have been able to maintain production in another location, drawing on Clawson’s (2003:142) categorization of employment sectors highly vulnerable to globalization. The intercoder reliability was over .9. 18 (Banzak 1992). Because such actions raise the stakes considerably, we suspect that when the Firm Maintains Production, the union’s motivation to seek external allies is increased considerably. Following Van Dyke’s (2003) finding, immediate threats like firm countermobilization will encourage intra movement collaboration while more general threats should encourage labor to seek out alliances beyond the borders of the labor movement. To capture the overall hostility towards unions in the state, we measure the number of Decertification Elections, an NLRBsponsored election that allows the firm’s employees to vote to remove an existing union as their collective bargaining representative. 4 Our analysis also controls for Right to Work states, which outlaws the union shop, increasing unions’ difficulty in organizing and maintaining members. Historically Right-to-Work has proven to be a formidable impediment to labor mobilization and we expect it to dampen strike activity (Dixon 2008; Ellwood and Fine 1987). We suspect that the mobilization of allies will be considerably easier when sympathetic actors are proximate to the union. As unions have been forging more coalitions with groups on the left (Clawson 2003), we hypothesize that strikes in more liberal states will tend to have greater external support. We rely upon a Government Ideology indicator developed by political scientist William Berry and colleagues (1998) to assess the receptivity of a state’s political climate to labor unions (each of which is available from ICPSR). This annual measure uses interest group rankings of the ideological positions of state representatives to generate an aggregate government ideology score on a liberal-conservative continuum. The scale assigns the 4 Importantly, replacement workers can vote in decertification elections, which could affect the causal ordering (strikes drive decertification elections). However, under section 9 (c)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, striking employees are not permitted to vote in the decertification election until one year after the strike has begun. Because such workers are presumably strongly pro-union, firms typically wait until after the one-year anniversary to file a decertification election petition with the NLRB (LeRoy 1997). This does not apply to unfair labor practice strikes, a label used by the NLRB to designate strikes instigated by some employer wrongdoing. In these events, the striking employees cannot be replaced. 19 highest scores to the most liberal states and is useful for capturing ideological variation that is not perceptible when looking solely at partisan composition of state government. Economic considerations such as the unemployment rate have long been linked to various strike outcomes such as frequency of labor disputes (Ashenfelter and Johnson 1969). In addition to Unemployment Rate, we also include the proportion of Foreign Direct Investment at the state level, which has been linked to negative outcomes for unions (Brady and Wallace 2000). Controls. Our models also include a set of controls to capture other relevant features of the dispute. Research has long noted the importance of the “shape” of strikes, the Size and Length of these events (Shorter and Tilly 1977). We also include eight separate categories to measure the issue(s) for the strike. Finally, as noted above, many strikes involve state actors; we control for the presence of a Federal Mediator seeking to resolve the dispute (there is surprisingly little research on the effect mediators have on labor disputes), and whether the union sought to have the strike designated as an Unfair Labor Practice Strike by the National Labor Relations Board. If the NLRB rules in favor of the union, the firm is prevented from permanently replacing workers and owes the idle workers back pay. 5 Analytic Strategy Our analysis proceeds in three steps. (1) We first describe the landscape of union coalition activity during labor disputes. After showing notable splits across inter and intra-movement allies and the various forms of assistance that unions received, we assess union, firm, and 5 Typically the strike is ruled an Unfair Labor Practice strike if there is evidence that the firm purposefully encouraged the strike in an effort to weaken or rid themselves of the union. Note that this measure is only capturing whether the union sought to have this legal designation applied to the strike, not whether they were successful. Often the ruling does not occur until the strike is complete. 20 political contextual factors leading to (2) the expansion of conflict as indicated by the mobilization of external allies, and (3) factors encouraging specific types of allies (labor-related and extra-movement allies) and particular forms of assistance (material and symbolic). To assess factors impacting the expansion of conflict in labor disputes, we employ logistic regression with Stata version 10. The specific types of allies and assistance are measured instead as count variables. Because linear regression with count dependent variables can result in inefficient and biased estimates, researches typically use special count estimators such as Poisson and negative binomial (Long and Freese 2003). We use negative binomial for these analyses as there is evidence of overdispersion. Findings Figures 1 and 2 show the range of union allies drawn upon in labor disputes and the types of assistance typically received. There are several notable patterns. First, recall that most labor disputes in the sample remain contained to the union-firm dynamic. Only 26% percent of strikes involved the expansion of conflict (as shown in table 1). Our data show that when this does occur, most union allies come from within the labor movement (figure 1). Though scholarship suggests some unions are increasingly looking outside of the labor movement for help, evidence from labor disputes in the 1990s and 2000s indicates that intramovement allies remain important sources of support. Second, social movement organizations and other civic groups constitute a fairly small portion of the landscape of union allies; about 32% of all strikes with external mobilization were supported by such groups. Of the strikes with expansion of conflict the two most common allies were labor unions (74% of the conflicts) and politicians (54% of the conflicts). [Figures 1 and 2 about here] 21 Figure 2 reveals what allies brought to the table. We see that other intramovement allies in the form of unions and other labor organizations are equally likely to contribute symbolic and material resources, and in greater rates of both than any other actor. Politicians, the second most common ally, tend to contribute only symbolic support; rarely do words actually translate into action. While less common, social movement, religious, and civic groups tend to support strikers equally with symbolic and material action. Taken together the descriptive evidence suggests a more insular movement than commonly perceived, and one reliant on more traditional sources of support (e.g., other labor movement actors, politicians). Given this landscape of allies and support, we ask what union, firm, and political features identified in the literature are most influential for the expansion of conflict in the first place, and then how they impact the particular allies drawn upon and the types of support received. Table 2 displays estimates of (1) the expansion of conflict; (2) the number of union allies mobilized; and (3) the number of non-union allies mobilized. Model 1 is estimated with a logistic regression while models two and three are estimated with negative binomial regression. All of the models in tables 2 and 3 also control for the issue(s) behind the strike, although our presentation and focus centers on the theoretically informed explanatory variables. [Table 2 about here] Considering the expansion of conflict most generally, union characteristics are influential. Social Movement Unions are more likely to expand the scope of conflict by drawing upon external allies while CIO unions are not active in this regard. This is consistent with mounting research that identifies these unions as more willing and equipped to mount challenges in the neo-liberal era (Milkman 2006). There is also some evidence that union efforts are bolstered where labor is relatively active, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient 22 for the strike rate in the state. Firm characteristics likewise matter; when public employers are the target of collective action, the expansion of conflict is more likely than when a privately owned firm is the target. Contrary to our expectation, the presence of a publicly traded firm has no impact nor does employer mobility. The results for threat and opportunities are mixed. Immediate threat as indicated by the firm continuing operations during the strike has a strong, positive and significant impact on the expansion of conflict. The broader context of labor conflict as indicated by decertification elections in the state and the presence of a Right-to-Work law instead tends to dampen allied activity, though the coefficient for Right-to-Work is only marginally significant at p<.1. The composition of government has no impact. And there is no evidence that the economic context impacts the mobilization of allies. A number of controls for the size and shape of the strike are consistent with our expectations. Longer and larger strikes increase the likelihood of expanding conflict. Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) strikes and those that involve a federal mediator are also more likely to witness the expansion of conflict. Models 2 and 3 of table two consider differences across the types of allies mobilized.6 Negative binomial estimates show mostly consistent effect across the number of union and nonunion allies mobilized. Conflicts involving social movement unions see both more union and non-union allies mobilized. Labor activity in the state has a positive effect on the number of nonunion allies but is not significant when it comes to union-allies. Firm characteristics are mostly similar. Having a public employer as the target of collective action positively affects the number 6 We also assessed the likelihood of mobilizing union allies and non-union allies using dichotomous indicators and logistic regression. The results are similar. 23 of non-union allies mobilized but is not significant for union-allies. Firm mobility and having a publicly traded firm as the target are not influential. Immediate threats as indicated by the firm maintaining production impacts the expansion of conflict as well as the mobilization of both labor and non-labor allies. This bold move on the part of firms appears to motivate unions to look beyond the labor movement. More general threats including union hostility in the state and the presence of a Right-to-Work law diminish the number of allies labor draws upon; the coefficient for Right-to-Work is significant across each of the models while decertification elections only reduce the number of union allies. This indicates that unions respond to more localized, specific threats when seeking out allies. More diffuse opposition to unions, in contrast, weakens such motivation. The event-specific controls as well as more general economic features remain largely consistent across each of the models. Thus far the results offer the most support for perspectives on union capacity as well as threat-based arguments from the social movement literature. Notably, and counter to Van Dyke’s (2003) findings, there appears to be little difference in the impact of immediate versus more general threats on the types of allies mobilized. Our analysis to this point follows much social movement research in predicting some form of organizational collaboration. Yet we are also interested in just what allies contribute to labor conflict as this weighs heavily on union success. To this point, the negative binomial results presented in table 3 assess factors leading to material and symbolic actions in support of the union. [Table 3 about here] Model 1 of table 3 assesses the determinants of total material actions in support of the union. These actions include things like providing money (an action commonly taken by the AFL-CIO for its affiliate unions), and refusing to cross picket lines (Teamsters were especially 24 likely to show their support in this manner). The patterns are familiar. Union capacity matters, with strike events involving social movement unions again positively associated with the expansion of conflict, while firm characteristics do not appear to be influential. The immediate threat of firms maintaining production again has a positive impact on the number of material actions in support of the union. Notably, when we consider symbolic actions in support of the union (model 2), conflicts involving the CIO are positively associated with the number of symbolic actions in support of the union. The social movement union effect remains, but is less pronounced than the association with CIO conflicts. As these unions are argued to be more insular, this effect is contrary to our expectations—an issue we return to below. The presence of a public employer matters for symbolic actions as does the immediate threat of replacement. Union hostility in the state and the presence of a Right-to-Work law instead diminish the number of actions in support. In the final two models we consider varied action by non-union allies. Our first observation is that non-union material assistance is hard to come by. Only 46 % of all actions in support of labor take this particular form, compared to the more common symbolic actions, which occur 62% of the time. Common material actions by non-union allies include food provisions by area businesses and donations to strike funds by civic or social movement groups. Union capacity appears to have little effect on this outcome with the exception of strike activity in the state, which exhibits a positive effect. Immediate threat continues to be influential, although it is reduced in magnitude and significance (now significant at P<.1). Non-union symbolic actions are both more frequent and are associated with varied union capacities for alliance formation; the most common forms in our dataset are speeches and picket line support by politicians. Here conflicts involving CIO unions positively impact the number of symbolic 25 actions in support (p<.05), while the social movement association is smaller and marginally significant (P<.1). Immediate and more general threats impact the number of non-union symbolic actions in a manner consistent with the other outcomes, while the presence of a public employer as the target of collective action is again positive (p<.1). Across nearly every other outcome, the more aggressive social movement unions appear to be better at mobilizing external support. Yet when it comes to securing symbolic actions the CIO unions are quite effective. What could explain these divergent patterns? One explanation is that the types of symbolic actions usually marshaled in support of strikes (politicians walking the picket line, for example) are consistent with the institutionalized collective bargaining framework that captured much of the postwar era. Indeed, we suspect that these unions steeped in and wedded to electoral politics are likely to call on elected officials for these purposes. While other unions (including social movement unions) are no doubt engaged in the political process, the CIO unions stand out during our period. Whether or not the mobilization of such symbolic assistance is worth the effort is beyond the scope of this study. However, it is clear that securing material actions from non-union allies remains difficult for all unions even in a period when the labor movement self-consciously looked outward and sought to mobilize new constituencies. The following three patterns stand out from the descriptive evidence and regression results. First, the majority of strike events were contained to the union firm dynamic; when unions did expand the scope of conflict they usually looked to allies within the labor movement, who supplied both material and symbolic assistance. Second, the immediate threat of the firm continuing production provides a strong impetus for unions to reach out, supporting social movement perspectives on coalition formation (McCammon and Campbell 2002; Van Dyke 2003).This form of threat had a positive and significant effect across all seven of the expansion 26 of conflict outcomes. Third, unions vary in their capacity and motivation for outreach (Milkman 2006). Social movement unions are most often associated with the expansion of conflict, drawing on both union and non-union allies; CIO unions by contrast are only successful at securing symbolic support from allies. 7 Discussion and Conclusion Scholarship on labor and social movements increasingly points to the benefits of mobilizing external allies for a variety of outcomes and identifies a number of important conditions under which such alliances are likely to form (Turner and Cornfield 2007; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). This study contributes to and extends this work by examining strike events in the 1990s and 2000s, an increasingly risky protest tactic for unions and one for which the mobilization of external allies should be all the more crucial. Given the scholarly attention to the issue, we were surprised to find that the expansion of conflict beyond the union-firm dynamic is not more common. Just over a quarter of all labor disputes in the dataset involved the mobilization of external allies. And here the most common allies were other unions and labor organizations. Perhaps notable examples from high profile labor mobilizations (e.g., Justice of Janitors) have contributed to a somewhat exaggerated sense of a militant and outward looking labor movement. While some studies have shown outside allies to be a characteristic feature of innovative organizing drives (see Martin 2008:1084), our evidence on labor disputes suggests caution is needed when imputing these characteristics to the larger population of unions and contentious labor politics. 7 Across the last sets of models we tried both different indicators and estimation techniques (dichotomous outcomes and logistic regression), as well as additional explanatory variables including contextual features such as a liberal citizenry. These changes did not alter our core theoretical findings. 27 What matters for the expansion of conflict? Our findings offer consistent support for two theoretical perspectives. First, social movement perspectives on threat have considerable explanatory power (Van Dyke 2003). The immediate threat of firm countermobilization always positively impacts the presence of outside allies, whether inter or intra-movement actors. It also impacts the different types of support brought by allies to labor conflict. More diffuse threats are less consistent in their impact and, if anything, tend to dampen the mobilization of external allies. Secondly, those more active social movement unions identified in the labor literature (Martin and Dixon 2010; Milkman 2006) appear to be more effective at securing external support. Conflicts involving these unions were both more likely to involve external allies and to draw upon increased numbers union and non-union allies. This suggests the usefulness of disaggregating “the labor movement” to more distinct sets of union actors; even SMOs within the same social movement “industry” respond very differently to similar challenges depending upon their unique organizational capacity and circumstances. When we expand beyond traditional social movement foci to consider the types of support allies bring to bear, there are notable differences. The findings show that the more insular CIO unions are adept at securing a particular form of assistance: symbolic actions taken in support of the union by labor and non-labor actors alike. The most common form of non-union symbolic action involves politicians, typically speeches or shaking hands on the picket line. Not surprisingly, those unions that emerged from the New Deal and cut their teeth on electoral politics continue to rely on these actors in labor disputes. Of all the allies outside of the labor movement, politicians are both the most numerous and most likely to provide symbolic assistance. By contrast, civic groups and social movement organizations are less frequent in their support but tend to provide both symbolic and material assistances at equal rates. 28 The question we are unable to assess with these data is whether or not the mobilization of allies “is worth the effort.” Unfortunately there are no reliable measures of strike outcomes from the FMCS or the newspaper data. Yet our findings hold more general implications for the effectiveness of labor and social movement actors. While much research points to the benefits of organizational collaboration, more precise accounts of the types of allies drawn upon and the support typically received should advance our understanding of this process. For example, if politicians rarely provide anything more than speeches, as our data suggest, alliances of this type may be less impactful than others. 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Means and Standard Deviations of Measures Included in the Analysis Variables Outcomes Expansion of Conflict (Yes/No) Number of Unions Mobilized Number of Non-Union Allies Mobilized Total Symbolic Actions Total Material Actions Total non-Union Symbolic Actions Total non-Union Material Actions Unions Social Movement Union dummy Original CIO Union dummy Unionization Rate Strikes per 1,000 Enterprises Firms Firm Maintains Production Immobile Public Employer Publicly Traded Private Privately Held Private (reference) NLRB Decertification Elections Threat, Opportunity and Economic Context Firm Maintains Production NLRB Decertification Elections Right-to-Work Law (1=yes) Government Ideology Score Unemployment Rate Percent Employed in Foreign Owned Firms Controls Strike Size Strike Length Issue: Wages (Reference) Benefits Safety Concerns Plant Administration Union Recognition Sympathy Strike Security/Plant Closing Job Seniority Federal Mediator Union Unfair Labor Practice Strike Mean S.D. Data Source .255 1.37 .79 .88 1.33 .55 .25 .437 7.76 2.63 2.59 7.70 1.77 1.07 Newspaper Newspaper Newspaper Newspaper Newspaper Newspaper Newspaper .20 .19 17.26 .10 .40 .40 5.37 .11 FMCS FMCS Statistical Abstract FMCS .62 .62 .08 .36 .57 40.83 .49 .49 .26 .49 .50 29.41 Newspaper Newspaper .62 40.83 .16 43.92 4.84 4.65 .49 29.41 .37 22.47 1.23 1.04 Newspaper NLRB US Dept. of Labor Berry et al. (1998) BLS Survey of Current Business (various years) 3635.4 8 60.33 12880.0 8 141.76 FMCS .70 .64 .09 .44 .03 .02 .22 .09 .45 .16 .46 .48 .29.50 .17 .12 .41 .29 .50 .36 34 NLRB FMCS Newspaper Newspaper Newspaper Figure 1: Breakdown of Allies Union Politicians Business Government Civic/Religious/SM Other 35 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 Figure 2: Breakdown of types of support from allies (for strikes with expanded conflict) Union Symbolic Government Symbolic Politician Symbolic Civic/Religious/SM Symbolic Business Symbolic Other Symbolic 36 Union Material Government Material Politician Material Civic/Religious/SM Material Business Material Other Material Table 2. Logistic and Negative Binomial Estimates of the Expansion of Conflict Expansion of Conflicta # of Union Alliesb # of Non-Union Alliesb Unions Social Movement Union .275* (.064) 2.123* (.564) .100† (.537) CIO Union .085 (.070) .980 (.695) .910 (.656) Unionization Rate .004 (.006) .087 (.061) .017 (.052) Strikes per 1,000 Enterprises .797* (.252) .221 (.279) 3.731* (1.675) Firms Immobile -.053 (.062) -.531 (.680) .151 (.565) Publicly Traded -.035 (.056) .398 (.486) -.062 (.432) Public Employer .194* (.097) .761 (.864) 1.281† (.737) 1.267* (.533) 1.477* (.543) Threat, Opportunity and Economic Context Firm Maintains Production .153* (.051) Decertification Elections -.002* (.001) -.021† (.011) -.006 (.010) Right-to-Work -.141† (.085) -1.728† (.927) -2.507* (1.073) Government Ideology .001 (.001) -.019 (.012) -.002 (.011) Unemployment Rate .035 (.023) .083 (.236) -.128 (.215) -.032 (.025) -.423 (.281) -.041 (.263) % Employed in Foreign Owned Firms Controls Unfair Labor Practice Strike .149* (.069) .883 (.607) 1.047* (.504) Strike Size .004* (.001) .002 (.001) .001† (.000) Strike Length .005* (.001) .001 (.001) .003* (.001) Federal Mediator .129* (.050) 1.857* (.452) 1.559* (.440) Constant .005 -.140 (2.390) a (.238) Logistic Regression Estimates; bNegative Binomial Regression Estimates Note: N=321 Strike Events. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05; † p<.10 (two-tailed tests) All models control for strike issue(s). 37 -2.530 (2.155) Table 3. Negative Binomial Estimates of Allied Actions Material Actions Symbolic Actions Material Actions (non-union allies) Symbolic Actions (non-union allies) Unions Social Movement Union 1.639* (.064) 1.311* (.533) .621 (.655) .881† (.530) CIO Union 1.099 (.706) 1.633* (.679) .541 (.717) 1.689* (.713) Unionization Rate .086 (.064) .028 (.052) Strikes per 1,000 Enterprises 4.703*(1.861) .067 (.059) 2.265 (1.649) .030 (.051) 6.876* (2.066) 2.508 (1.601) Firms Immobile -.412 (.649) .385 (.583) -.002 (.604) .461 (.582) Publicly Traded .485 (.474) -.498 (.437) .372 (.515) -.531 (.444) Public Employer Threat, Opportunity and Economic Context Firm Maintains Production .720 (.831) 1.286† (.685) .871 (.789) 1.088† (.665) 1.965* (.568) 1.205* (.477) 1.000† (.616) 2.013* (.569) -.007 (.011) -.026* (.010) -.001 (.013) -.012 -1.370 (.878) -2.492* (.913) -.698 (1.111) -3.770* (1.407) Decertification Elections Right-to-Work (.011) Government Ideology -.011 (.022) -.006 (.011) -.007 (.014) -.002 (.011) Unemployment Rate -.125 (.236) .218 (.213) -.160 (.231) -.141 (.212) FDI -.513† (.269) -.162 (.265) .022 (.286) -.254 (.263) Controls Unfair Labor Practice Strike 1.188* (.032) Strike Size .002† (.001) Strike Length Federal Mediator .624 (.481) 1.283* (.595) .842† (.474) .002* (.000) .001† (.000) .001† (.000) .001 (.001) .003* (.001) 1.578* (.445) 1.571* (.430) (.001) .003* (.001) 2.008* (.564) .001 1.512* (.442) Constant 1.437 (2.206) -3.053 (2.188) -5.653* (2.465) Note: N=321 Strike Events. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05; † p<.10 (two-tailed tests) All models control for strike issue(s). 38 -2.222 (2.080)
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