Today’s Lecture
• Bertrand Russell
• Preliminary comments on Goldman and
naturalized epistemology
• Alvin Goldman
The Problems of Philosophy:
Appearance and Reality
• “When, in ordinary life, we speak of the colour of
the table, we only mean the sort of colour which it
will seem to have to a normal spectator from an
ordinary point of view under usual conditions of
light. But the other colours which appear under other
conditions have just as good a right to be considered
real; and therefore, to avoid favouritism, we are
compelled to deny that, in itself, the table has any
one particular colour” (FP, p.246).
The Problems of Philosophy:
Appearance and Reality
• Note something that may be important in what
Russell claims here. He suggests (though remember
he has actually argued for this suggestion) that our
ordinary claim to know the color of a table
presupposes a set of standards covering the truth
conditions for the claim. What’s more, these truth
conditions contain specifications regarding the
noetic health of the putative knower, perhaps her
level of education or degree of socialization, her
location and the conditions of viewing.
The Problems of Philosophy: The
existence of matter
• Two things to note about Russell’s opening
paragraph in the second chapter.
• (1) The philosophical problems surrounding our
knowledge of the external world have a ripple effect.
(i) If we do not have knowledge of objects in the
external world, we do not have knowledge of other
people’s bodies. (ii) If we do not have knowledge of
other people’s bodies, we do not have knowledge of
other people’s minds (FP, p.249).
The Problems of Philosophy: The
existence of matter
• (2) Though we cannot prove that epistemological
skepticism about the existence of an external world
is false, we have no good reason to think it is true.
• In this view Russell again agrees with Locke (FP,
p.249).
• Do be careful with this kind of argument. As it
stands, this is neither a rebuttal nor refutation of
skepticism. If Russell had gone as far as to suggest
that epistemological skepticism, on these grounds,
was false he would have committed the fallacy
known as ‘Argument from ignorance’.
The Problems of Philosophy: The
existence of matter
• Before Russell enters a brief discussion of
Descartes’ method of doubt, he notes two
further things: (1) at least some of our
immediate experiences are “absolutely
certain” (FP, p.249) and (2) and they
concern our awareness of sense data.
The Problems of Philosophy: The
existence of matter
• Russell also disputes Descartes’ claim to know with
certainty that “I think” and “I think, therefore I am” (FP,
p.249).
• Russell suggests that all that can be concluded from
Descartes’ method of doubt is that, when having the sense
data of the desk in front of me, ‘a green color is being seen’
(FP, p.250). This, argues Russell, only suggests that
something is seeing green, and that is not enough to ground
a claim about “that more or less permanent person whom
we call ‘I’” (FP, p.250).
• Is he right? Has he helped himself to more than he should
have?
The Problems of Philosophy: The
existence of matter
• Russell provides the following considerations for believing
that there are external material objects behind and causing
our experiences.
• (1) Many people have similar sense data when finding
themselves in “a given place at different times” (FP, p.250).
When I buy a table from someone else and use it as
furniture in my abode, I will have relevantly similar sense
data to those enjoyed by that other person when she was in
possession of the table in question. The best explanation of
these regularities is the presence of a public neutral object
lying behind our various experiences (FP, p.250).
• This argument fails because it is question-begging (FP,
pp.250-51).
The Problems of Philosophy: The
existence of matter
• (2) The hypothesis that external objects cause my
inner experiences is a simpler hypothesis than any of
the skeptical alternatives. A simpler hypothesis
should be valued more than a less simple
hypothesis. Therefore, I should value the hypothesis
that external objects cause my inner experiences
more than any of the skeptical alternatives (FP,
p.251).
The Problems of Philosophy: The
existence of matter
• The value of simple hypotheses, on which this point
rests, arises from such considerations as Ockham’s
Razor. Ockham’s Razor is the following: “[E]ntities
are not to be multiplied beyond necessity”
(Papineau, David. 2003. “Philosophy of Science”. In
The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy. Second
Edition. Edited by Nicholas Bunnin and E.P. TsuiJames. Malden (MA): Blackwell Publishers, Ltd,
p.298).
The Problems of Philosophy: The
existence of matter
• The thought is that when an explanation or
metaphysics positing fewer entities than its
competitors can do the same job (i.e. is as
predictive, yields useful ways of understanding and
thus manipulating phenomena, et cetera) as its
competitors, it is to be preferred over the others.
• This kind of maxim or principle has been used to
move beyond appeals to supernatural forces, occult
forces or mysterious powers when explaining events
in the world or ourselves.
The Problems of Philosophy: The
existence of matter
• Why is the view that external objects cause my inner
experiences a simpler hypothesis than the skeptic’s?
• Russell asks us to consider the interactions we may have
with a cat. Imagine that we do not see this cat constantly
throughout a day, but only encounter her from time to time.
• We note that the cat appears at various parts of the house. If
the cat were sense data, we would have to suppose it comes
into and out of being as our sense data of the cat appears
and disappears. It is simpler (assumes a simpler set of
regularities ‘governing’ the universe) to suppose she exists
independently of our perceptions of her and simply roams
the establishment (FP, p.251).
The Problems of Philosophy: The
existence of matter
• It is difficult to explain the recurring hunger behavior of the
cat if it ceases to exist between feedings (imagine the cat
only shows up during the day for feeding and is otherwise
out of sight). It is simpler to suppose that she exists during
the rest of the day, though out of sight, and slowly gets
hungry again over that period of time.
• What’s more, if the cat is mere sense data it cannot be
hungry, as I can only sense my own hunger, thus what I
thought of as her hunger behavior becomes inexplicable. It
is thus simpler to suppose she exists independent of my
sense data and is capable of having her own inner sensations
(FP, p.251).
The Problems of Philosophy: The
existence of matter
• Note Russell’s talk of what he calls “instinctive belief” on
pages 251 and 252 of your FP.
• He seems to think that we find a class of beliefs already
formed within our belief systems when we begin to
(philosophically) reflect (FP, p.251). These beliefs appear to
commit us to a mind-independent world (FP, p.252).
• We do not believe these beliefs as a result of any overt
investigation, inquiry or argument into the discoverable
truths about the world (FP, p.251).
• It is instinctive, Russell suggests, to believe in the external
world (FP, p.252). Is he right, is such a belief ‘instinctive’?
What is instinct? What he is after here?
The Problems of Philosophy: The
existence of matter
• This notion of instinctive belief gives Russell a third
argument against the skeptic.
• (3) We have instinctive beliefs that the external world exists
(independent of our perceiving it). These beliefs persevere
through our reflections concerning the distinction between
appearance and reality. What’s more, if we are to have any
knowledge at all, we must take at least some of these
instinctive beliefs to be true. Since these beliefs do not lead
to any substantial philosophical or practical difficulties and
they “simplify and systematize our account of our
experiences” (FP, p.252), we have no good reason to reject
them (FP, pp.251-52).
The Problems of Philosophy: The
existence of matter
• This is admittedly an odd argument. It’s also pretty
weak, at least on the face of it.
• It seems to accord positive epistemic status to a set
of beliefs merely on the grounds that (i) we can’t
possess knowledge without assuming the truth of at
least some of them and (ii) we have no good reason
to reject them all as false.
The Problems of Philosophy: The
existence of matter
• I suspect that we should understand these beliefs as in some
sense basic. Russell seems to privilege these beliefs and set
them apart from the more ‘run of the mill’ varieties. He goes
as far as to claim that “[t]here can never be any reason for
rejecting one instinctive belief except that it clashes with
others” (FP, p.252). This seems to indicate that they are
more foundational than other beliefs. This coupled with his
claim that without these beliefs we wouldn’t have any
knowledge (FP, p.252), gives us reasonably good textual
evidence that Russell held them in this way.
The Problems of Philosophy: The
existence of matter
• Russell suggests that philosophy should try and
extract a harmonious set of instinctive beliefs,
stripped of any additional irrelevancies (whatever
that may mean). We are already disposed to treat
such a set of beliefs as true. If we can arrive at a
coherent set of such instinctive beliefs by
eliminating those that generate incoherence and
which can be removed without detrimental effect to
the scope of the remaining beliefs within the set, this
will, according to Russell, only enhances the
presumption of their truth (FP, p.252).
The Problems of Philosophy: The
Nature of Matter
• In the opening of the third chapter Russell attempts
to present the scientific view of the world. Part of
the purpose of this discussion is to fully appreciate
the nature of the wedge between appearance and
reality. The world outside of ourselves is one devoid
of those qualities that are mind-dependent.
• He will also discuss what we can reasonably
suppose to know about the external world based on
the information derived from our senses.
The Problems of Philosophy: The
Nature of Matter
• “Physical science ... has drifted into the view that all
natural phenomena ought to be reduced to motions.
... The only properties which science assigns to it
[i.e. matter] are position in space, and the power of
motion according to the laws of motion” (FP,
p.253).
• “It is not only colours and sounds and so on that are
absent from the scientific world of matter, but also
space as we get it through sight or touch” (FP,
p.253).
The Problems of Philosophy: The
Nature of Matter
• He makes the following point about light (this point
can be applied to other constituents of our sensible
world that we believe to exist mind-independently)
(FP, p.253).
• We can divide up what we mean by light into that
which can be intersubjectively known and that
which can only be known privately. On the one hand
we have waves of a certain frequency of motion in
physical space, and on the other hand we have
various color and brightness sensations (FP, p.253).
The Problems of Philosophy: The
Nature of Matter
• That which can be intersubjectively known
is that which can be fully communicated,
discussed and investigated because such
knowledge makes no reference to properties
that are not third person observables.
• That which can only be known privately is
so because it (i.e. this kind of knowledge)
makes reference to properties that are only
first person observables (FP, p.253).
The Problems of Philosophy: The
Nature of Matter
• The privacy of our inner life (or the privacy
of our thoughts and sensations) will come
up again as an issue in the Philosophy of
Mind section of the course. One of the
problems such a view of our minds creates
is that we can only have indirect
(probabilistic) evidence of the existence of
other minds (be they human or nonhuman
minds).
The Problems of Philosophy: The
Nature of Matter
• What we can surmise from our experience, though
only after presuming that our sense data are in fact
caused by mind-independent objects in a mindindependent world, are certain relations that must
hold between objects in the world.
• The substantive properties we associate with these
objects are too variable, within our own experience,
to be plausibly regarded as inhering in external
objects. There is no reason to think that any one of
these properties is anything more than the product of
objects impacting on our senses.
The Problems of Philosophy: The
Nature of Matter
• However, these external objects must be in a
physical space not unlike our ‘private spaces’ and in
an order not unlike what we experience if they are
the objective causes of our experience.
• Though we can have a knowledge of the relations
that must hold between external objects based upon
our experience, we can have no knowledge of what
these objects are in themselves “so far at least as can
be discovered by means of the senses” (FP, p.255).
Preliminary comments on Goldman and
naturalized epistemology
• Alvin I. Goldman was born in 1938 and is still
‘among us’.
• I think that he may be in the Department of
Philosophy at Rutgers University (he was up until
recently in the Department of Philosophy at the
University of Arizona).
• He primarily writes in both cognitive science and
epistemology.
• I hesitate to say this, but I think it true to say that he
is a foundationalist. He is also an externalist.
Preliminary comments on Goldman and
naturalized epistemology
• The essay we see of Goldman’s can be understood within
two contexts: The Gettier problems and naturalized
epistemology.
• Edmund Gettier, who is also still ‘among us’, is Professor
Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts.
• He wrote a 1963 paper entitled “Is Justified True Belief
Knowledge?” in which he attacked the JTB analysis of
knowledge (it first appeared in the philosophy journal
Analysis Vol.23).
• He did this by devising thought experiments containing true
beliefs that are justified, but which are, nevertheless, not
Preliminary comments on Goldman and
naturalized epistemology
• The JTB analysis is attractive because it seems to
cohere well with our considered judgments about
knowledge.
• First, for something to be known it must be true.
You cannot know falsehoods.
• Second, for something to be known it must be
believed. Though there may be many truths about
the universe to be discovered, they are only properly
regarded as knowledge when they are believed by
someone.
Preliminary comments on Goldman and
naturalized epistemology
• Third, it can’t be that merely true beliefs are
knowledge. You might form the belief that Jean
Chrétien is Prime Minister of Canada on no other
grounds than that this popped into your head. Your
belief is true, but we’d hesitate to say you knew it.
• This seems to point to a much needed third
condition of knowledge, something that requires that
your true beliefs are not accidentally true. This is
where justification comes in, on the traditional
account.
Preliminary comments on Goldman and
naturalized epistemology
• Gettier’s argument depends on what logicians call
truth-functionality. The truth value of declarative
compound sentences is a function of the simple
sentences out of which they are constructed. This
formal notion of truth, when coupled with certain
rules of inference in deductive logic, makes it
possible to think of justified true beliefs that are
nevertheless not known.
Preliminary comments on Goldman and
naturalized epistemology
• Luckily we don’t need to enter the ‘realm’ of truthfunctionality to see the effect of this type of argument.
Subsequent Gettier Problems (which were counter-examples
to various suggested amendments to the traditional JTB
analysis of knowledge, though not by Gettier) have the
following form.
• You take a belief that is true.
• You find a belief context in which it can be held to be both
true and justified (and whatever else is added to compensate
for the [perceived] shortcomings of justification).
• The justification (and whatever else is added) is insufficient
for knowledge.
Preliminary comments on Goldman and
naturalized epistemology
• Here’s an example:
• Imagine Jennifer is in a hospital ward after suffering
an unfortunate boating accident.
• It’s June and various international tennis stars have
gathered to compete at Wimbledon.
• Jennifer is a moderate fan of Wimbledon (she
watches it when she can and enjoys it).
• Her partner manages to secure her a t.v. with a
sports network carrying the tennis matches, though
only pre-recorded.
Preliminary comments on Goldman and
naturalized epistemology
• Unbeknownst to Jennifer, one of days she is watching the
tennis she watches two competitors play in the quarter finals
of last year’s Wimbledon. It turns out that these same
players have indeed played in this year’s quarter finals
earlier in the day.
• Jennifer forms the belief that T won after seeing T win the
match on t.v. It turns out that T has indeed won the match
played earlier in the day. The grounds on which Jennifer has
formed this belief would be sufficient under normal
circumstances to grant that she knows T has won the
Wimbledon quarter finals. It seems at the very least that her
belief is justified, though not known.
Preliminary comments on Goldman and
naturalized epistemology
• Some early attempts to defeat these Gettier problems
involved trying to show that there must be a causal
connection between S’s belief that p and the fact that p.
• Goldman himself suggested such an early causal theory of
knowledge. You can read this in his essay “A Causal Theory
of Knowledge” (see the 1967 Journal of Philosophy, 64,
12).
• This theory fails because it cannot accommodate
mathematical knowledge, knowledge involving universal
generalizations, and knowledge involving counter-factuals
(statements that could have been true but in fact are not).
Preliminary comments on Goldman and
naturalized epistemology
• This is the immediate background for the paper.
• There is another context for this paper and all of
Goldman’s subsequent work in epistemology, and
that is naturalized epistemology.
• Naturalized epistemology represents a significant
methodological change in doing epistemology.
Preliminary comments on Goldman and
naturalized epistemology
• Up to the emergence of naturalized epistemology,
the epistemologist basically did her work at her
desk. Formulating conditions or analyses of positive
epistemic status and testing them against various
counter-examples cooked up by the imagination.
• Naturalized epistemology represents a rejection of
this method of doing epistemology. Instead
Naturalized epistemologists look to actual epistemic
practices and the relevant experts in these practices
and proffers analyses of knowledge based on such
inquiries.
Preliminary comments on Goldman and
naturalized epistemology
• The natural sciences are thought to be necessary for this
kind of inquiry. It is through there studies that we can learn
about how we actually go about our lives forming and
evaluating beliefs. We can also learn something of the
cognitive limitations of our hardware and from this make
informed judgments about what we are, and are not, able to
do when evaluating or revising our beliefs.
• This will in turn inform our talk of epistemic responsibility
or duty. After all, if we can’t do something it makes no
sense to say we have a duty to do it. Conversely, if we have
a duty to do something it must be possible for us to do it.
Preliminary comments on Goldman and
naturalized epistemology
• Perhaps more importantly, naturalized
epistemologists are concerned to better under the
sense faculties that are only vaguely talked about by
previous epistemologists in the Western canon. The
presumption of philosophers, at least historically,
has been that these faculties must be trustworthy. It
has also been presumed that we can know what we
have as sense faculties without leaving the
proverbial armchair. Naturalized epistemologists
have an interest in investigating both the
trustworthiness, and nature, of our sense faculties.
Preliminary comments on Goldman and
naturalized epistemology
• This means that naturalized epistemologists must make
some assumptions before they begin their inquiries (e.g.
assumptions about the nature of the world and our
embodiment). This is a problematic feature of naturalized
epistemology.
• In saying this, however, the assumptions being made are
well within the parameters assumed by traditional
epistemologists.
• Also, there is albeit limited room for revision of the initial
assumptions as philosophers continue their investigations of
the nature of our embodiment, our noetic equipment and the
nature of the external world.
Preliminary comments on Goldman and
naturalized epistemology
• Goldman’s work in naturalized epistemology has
primarily focused on cognitive science and what we
can learn about our cognitive processes from this
science.
• Other naturalized epistemologists are now beginning
to consider cognitive studies in such diverse areas as
ethology, cognitive ethology, primatology,
comparative psychology and studies in artificial
intelligence.