Vertical restraints – an economic perspective Patrick Rey 9th Competition Day, Fiscalia Nacional Económica Santiago, 27 October 2011 Outline Economic impact of vertical restraints Vertical coordination Impact on competition in the short-term Impact on competition in the long-term Policy implications: the case of RPM Efficiency benefits Anti-competitive harm Key factors Patrick Rey Vertical restraints - an economic perspective 1 1 Economic impact of vertical restraints Vertical coordination Prices: double marginalization o multiplication of margins results in excessive prices o solving double marginalization – via RPM, minimal quotas, non-linear (two-part) tariffs – is good for the firms and for consumers Non-price dimensions o upstream: quality, national advertising, ... o downstream: retail services, local advertising, ... o more ambiguous welfare implications – price vs services tradeoff – less ambiguous if strong inter-brand competition or free-riding Patrick Rey Vertical restraints - an economic perspective 2 2 Economic impact of vertical restraints Impact on competition in the short-term Sham dealer cartels (downstream collusion) Facilitating practices (upstream collusion) Competition-dampening (softening interbrand competition through strategic delegation) Commitment problems (restoring exercise of market power) Interlocking relationships (e.g., national brands in supermarkets) Patrick Rey Vertical restraints - an economic perspective 3 3 Economic impact of vertical restraints Impact on competition in the long-term Pro-competitive effects of the above effects o enhancing future profit fosters entry, innovation, investment, … o e.g., launching a new product, entering a new market, ... Vertical foreclosure o input foreclosure o customer foreclosure – exclusive dealing – fidelity rebates – vertical integration Patrick Rey Vertical restraints - an economic perspective 4 4 Resale Price Maintenance Efficiency benefits Eliminating double marginalization o price caps o purely bilateral: no need for industry-wide arrangement Alleviating free-riding and encouraging retail services o price floors o purely bilateral if market is sufficiently transparent Patrick Rey Vertical restraints - an economic perspective 5 5 Resale Price Maintenance Anti-competitive harm No competition-dampening effects Facilitating collusion o dealer cartel o enhanced transparency in case of upstream collusion Restoring the exercise of upstream market power o solves manufacturer’s commitment problem o requires retail network – wide arrangement Patrick Rey Vertical restraints - an economic perspective 6 6 Resale Price Maintenance Anti-competitive harm (cont’d) Interlocking relationships (Rey-Vergé JIE 2011) o eliminates interbrand as well as intrabrand competition – retailers as “common agents” (alleviates interbrand competition) – RPM eliminates competition among these agents o French experience: the 1996 Galland Act – reselling below cost is forbidden – “cost”? invoice price vs backroom margins o Empirical validation – price of national brands in supermarkets: France vs EU – Bonnet-Dubois Rand 2011: panel data – Biscourp, Boutin and Vergé: correlation margins/concentration Patrick Rey Vertical restraints - an economic perspective 7 7 Key factors Industry structure “Franchising" mode versus interlocking relationships o more serious concern in latter case o in case of “franchising”, market power of “franchisor” Tight oligopolies vs competitive industry (risk of collusion) o entry barriers, small number of competitors, frequent interaction o market transparency with / without RPM o symmetry, … Patrick Rey Vertical restraints - an economic perspective 8 8 Resale Price Maintenance Bilateral contracts versus industry-wide practices Bilateral contracts achieve most of efficiency gains o double marginalization o free-riding Industry-wide practice gives rise to potential harm o facilitating practices and cartel devices o interlocking relationships Patrick Rey Vertical restraints - an economic perspective 9 9 Resale Price Maintenance Temporary versus permanent programs temporary programs suffice for some efficiency benefits o launching a new product o entering a new market o … more permanent programs can give rise to potential harm o collusion / cartel devices o interlocking relationships Patrick Rey Vertical restraints - an economic perspective 10 10
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