MORE THAN A METAPHOR:
METAPHORIC STRATEGIES IN DYNAMIC
PROCESSES OF MEANING CONSTRUCTION
RICCARDO FUSAROLI AND CLAUDIO VANDI1
Abstract. This chapter aims at presenting a conception of metaphors as the
result of dynamic processes of meaning construction. Through the analysis
of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, Blending Theory and the metaphor “that
man is a caiman”, we highlight the need for a dynamic perspective on
embodied cognition, where sedimented conceptual structures are locally
deployed as resources and not as determining types. Considering cultural,
discursive, lexical and co-textual factors, it is possible to describe the
metaphor as a local diagram of semantic relations that can be manipulated,
as a part of wider interpretative strategies. Through this analysis, a
conception of schemata and conceptual structures as attractors sedimented
in the course of practices is proposed.
Introduction
An ever growing number of studies persuasively demonstrates that
everyday cognition is continuous and dynamic, not a punctual
transformation of stable states, but a process of partially overlapping fuzzy
grey areas that are drawn over time (Thelen and Smith 1994; Port and van
Gelder 1995; Clark 1997; Spivey 2006). The aim of this chapter is to
situate metaphorical occurrences in this unfolding of cognitive processes.
Assuming a particular kind of Cognitive Semantics approach – in which
“meaning is cognition” (Evans and Green 2006) and cognition is
ecological and deeply shaped by socio-cultural practices – we will focus
1
While the article has been thoroughly thought and discussed together,
Claudio Vandi has materially written “Between embodiment and situatedness” and
“Deep into the analysis” except “Which blends” and “Metaphors and diagrammatic
reasoning”; Riccardo Fusaroli: “Introduction”, “Cognitive linguistics and
metaphors” and “Conclusions”.
on linguistic data and not on the experiences of empirically tested subjects.
This perspective does not need to neglect discursive frames and contexts.
Since cognition is constituted by continuous overlappings, the construction
of the meaning related to a specific linguistic expression will emerge in a
wider field of expectations. This kind of analysis aims at tracking the
conditions through which the relation between text and context emerges,
the way a more schematic conceptual structure is constitutively situated
and the reason why a configuration of meaning should be conceived as a
moment in a trajectory rather than as a stable state.
In this sense, the first part of the chapter is dedicated to the review of
two of the main approaches to metaphors in Cognitive Linguistics
(Conceptual Metaphor Theory, from now on CMT, and Blending Theory,
from now on BT), highlighting the unsolved tension which they create
between the constitutive dynamicity of meaning construction and the
existence of stable and embodied conceptual structures. The second part of
the chapter aims at addressing this tension, by sketching a way in which to
account for the processual nature of meaning construction as unfolding in
social arenas, mixing textual analysis with theoretical reflections. We
believe that the real challenge for the scientist lies more in the
investigation of the process than in the investigation of the state (Vygotsky
1978); that it is the trajectory that constitutes the meaning of the single
moment and not vice versa.
Cognitive linguistics and metaphors
The study of metaphors goes far back in time and – contrary to what is
often reconstructed – metaphors were not always treated as rhetorical
ornaments. The importance of analogy for constructing knowledge was
acknowledged and investigated by Aristotle (cf. Eco 2005) Kant, Cassirer,
Blumemberg, Weinrich (cf. Jäkel 1999), and with his usual emphasis
Peirce stated that metaphors are “the only logical operation which
introduce any new idea” (Peirce 1931-1958: 5.171). However, it is only
with the cognitive turn in the study of metaphors – to which Cognitive
Linguistics has greatly contributed (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Ortony
1993; for an introduction, see Evans and Green 2006) – that the central
role they play in processes of thought has entered mainstream research.
Abstract concepts are re-defined as structured through the repetition – in
CMT – or the construction – in BT – of patterns. The role of metaphors is
to make possible the unfolding of meaning through acts of conflation, and
through the connection of different conceptual domains thus make
possible the understanding of something new through something already
known.
Conceptual Metaphor Theory
CMT emerges mainly from the works of Lakoff and Johnson (Lakoff and
Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987). Its aim is to uncover
the conceptual structure that underlies language use. In this model, imageschemata are specific and recurring action paths formed along time by
embodied experience. They act as regularities to orient future experiences
and are open to reconfiguration. Cognition also works through the
projection of these bodily-grounded patterns onto uncharted conceptual
domains, giving reasons for claiming that abstract thought too has a bodily
basis. Metaphorical mapping is the cognitive mechanism performing the
projection, and metaphors are the sedimented results of repeated
projections.
New metaphors have the power to create a new reality. This can begin to
happen when we start to comprehend our experience in terms of a
metaphor, and it becomes a deeper reality when we begin to act in terms of
it (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 146).
If CMT tends to emphasise the uni-directionality of this metaphoric
projection, from concrete domains to more abstract ones, it has to be
stressed that these concrete patterns, these image-schemata, are not that
simple and mono-dimensional (cf. Hampe 2005). Image-schemata are
related to sensorimotor patterns, but these patterns emerge in the blending
of culture, language, history and bodily mechanisms (Johnson 1987).
Image schemata are relatively abstract conceptual representations that arise
directly from our everyday interaction with and observation of the world
around us (Evans and Green 2006: 176).
A world that is deeply shaped by social and cultural practices.
However, in CMT, this complexity is problematic. A first stage of the
conceptual formation consists of a complete conflation of two basic
experiential domains (e.g. MORE IS UP, where quantity and verticality
are conflated through the “scale” schema) due to their experiential
correlations. These “primary metaphors” emerge “automatically and
unconsciously” as we experience various concrete and “subjective” events
together. Soon, however, there is a second stage of development,
“differentiation”, in which we recognize these conflated domains as
different, thus separating them conceptually. Conceptual metaphors –
emerging in this phase – are systems of more conventional conceptual
mappings held in long-term memory but still grounded in embodied
experience (e.g. TIME IS MONEY, in which the more abstract domain of
time is structured by an economic domain through a set of more basic
image schemata related to UNITY/MULTIPLICITY, OBJECT,
BALANCE, etc.).
The conflation is thus replaced by a more structured projection claimed
to be an invariant. In a related way, the analytical process performed by
CMT (cf. also Lakoff and Turner 1989) mainly consists of the
individuation of types under which discursive metaphorical occurrences
are subsumed without focusing on their local differences. What we are
looking at here, is what Kant called a determinative judgement, the
application of a rule (Kant 1781-1787). But Kant himself described
different kinds of judgements, the reflective and aesthetic ones (further
developed by Peirce through the concept of abduction, Peirce 1931-1958).
In these judgements, or cognitive processes, we do not have a
deterministic rule to apply. We have different regularities, different habits,
Peirce would say, that are applicable. Cognition is like bricolage, using
the different resources at hand and playing with them. To account for this
dynamic functioning, a semantic analysis should show how cognitive
resources are employed in the development of linguistic phenomena, not
neglecting the specificities of the single metaphors and their relation to the
context.
Blending theory
BT has been developed in the works of Fauconnier and Turner (2002) as
derived from the Mental Spaces Theory of Fauconnier (1985) 2. The first
crucial step that separates BT from CMT is the focus on mental spaces
rather than directly on conceptual domains. In CMT conceptual metaphors
are defined as sedimented projections from one domain of established
knowledge to another. In BT the focus is on partial and temporary
representational structures that speakers construct when thinking or
2
Mental Spaces have been criticised for focusing only on the
“inside the skull” conception of cognition. We will use Brandt and Brandt
(2005) version of mental spaces, that are constituted through interactions
with the environment and pertinences established in a more distributed
Semiotic Space.
talking. Mental spaces are thus certainly structured by domains, but they
are of a more unstable and local nature. A metaphor can be described by a
specific kind of blending between two or more of these mental spaces. The
“blending” – made possible by a partially common core structure –
generates a new and richer structure, which cannot be reduced to the sum
of its parts.3
Thus, metaphorical mappings are not resolved in the repetition of preestablished patterns of embodied meaning but in more general mental
operations which actively construct patterns and “spaces” of meaning. The
strong focus on embodiment that CMT built seems to be at least partially
lost here. Blending operations can certainly be grounded in neural
processes, but they seem to be free from embodied image-schemata in
their creation of patterns, even though they have as a goal the achievement
of blends – not better specified – at a “human scale” (Fauconnier and
Turner 2002: 312).
Critical evaluation
Through CMT it is possible to appreciate the embodied nature of our
conceptual patterns, and the way these metaphorical structures and
projections imbue the way we think and talk. Through BT we are able to
observe the emergence of new meanings and patterns, to focus on local
occurrences (thus describing not only linguistic metaphors determined by
conceptual ones, but metaphors in general in their putting into play
linguistic and conceptual elements). Unfortunately in BT, the strong aspect
of embodiment that was constructed in CMT is lost.
To overcome this unsolved tension, the reflection on metaphors needs
to take some additional steps:


3
to acknowledge the situatedness of metaphors in their environment
(culture, genre, situation, discourse and practice);
to acknowledge the dynamics between language and cognition, which
cannot be reduced to a determinative judgement;
In particular, a blend is considered metaphoric when: (1) a single
element in the blend corresponds to an element in each of the input spaces; (2)
certain very salient aspects of the input domains are prohibited from entering the
blend; (3) some salient structure in the blended space is prevented from floating
back to the inputs; (4) there are degrees of metaphoricity (cf. Grady, Oakley and
Coulson 1999).

to acknowledge the dynamic nature of conceptual and pre-conceptual
structures which cannot possibly be reduced to rigid types.
Thus embodiment can be preserved and the implied conception of
cognition in cognitive semantics can be re-attuned to other developments
in the cognitive sciences (ecological psychology, social cognition,
distributed cognition, dynamic systems approaches, etc.)
Between embodiment and situatedness
A political metaphor
In 2004, the most important Italian newspaper, at least for sales, and
readership, La Repubblica, published the following metaphor: “that man is
a caiman” (in the original version: “quell'uomo è un caimano”). Analysing
this as an independent token of language would leave us puzzled. Even
dwelling on the established conceptual metaphor PEOPLE ARE
ANIMALS, which traits of ‘caiman’ are projected onto ‘man’? Or,
employing Fauconnier and Turner, which common structure can be found
and which non-common traits can be blended, giving rise to new meaning?
It is hard to say. The analysis needs to account for the great relevance of
context in creating expectations through which a common structure can be
re-constructed, and the emergence of new meaning can happen. In order to
do so we need to critically analyse the work of two authors that, while
studying metaphors, focus on the issue of cultural variation (Kövecses
2002, 2005) and on the relevance of genre (Steen 1994).
The cultural element
A fundamental study of the cultural influence in metaphors is Metaphor
and culture by Zoltán Kövecses (2005). Kövecses attempts a systematic
investigation of Chinese, Hungarian and English, in order to show how
differences exist both in the way the source domain is used to
conceptualize the same target domain (e.g. both English and Chinese use
UP and LIGHT to conceptualize happiness, but only Chinese has
HAPPINESS IS FLOWERS IN THE HEART) and in the way the same
source is used to conceptualise different targets domains (e.g. the
BUILDING source, that it is used in English to speak of relationships, but
not in Tunisian Arabic).
These cross-cultural variations are often used as an argument against
the claim that it is possible to sketch an at least potentially limited list of
conceptual and metaphorical universals that shape human cognition,
universals that are grounded in our embodied experience and extended to
abstract domains via metaphorical mappings (Lakoff and Johnson 1980;
Lakoff 1987; Gibbs 1998). Kövecses (2002, 2005) defines two main
causes usually responsible for cross-cultural variations: the Broader
Cultural Context from which a metaphor arises and the Natural Physical
Context constituting its source domains.
However, cultural idiosyncrasies could be easily integrated at a higher
level, given the very abstract structure of primary metaphors (Grady 1997;
Grady, Oakley and Coulson 1999) on which conceptual metaphors are
grounded. A better approach, according to Lakoff and Johnson (2002), is
to define “specific level differences” according to how a specific metaphor
is instantiated by a specific culture in a specific context, leaving to
anthropologists the task of investigating the way the general schema is
“filled out” differently between cultures (Kövecses 2005).
The discursive element
This takes us to the second sense in which the expression “variation in
metaphors” can be interpreted, namely in the sense of intra-cultural
variations. This means focusing on the discursive nature of metaphors and
analyzing how the same conceptual metaphor can produce different
mappings when instantiated in different contexts. A common hypothesis is
that in conceptual metaphors certain schematic elements get mapped from
the source domain onto the target domain without changing their basic
structure. Olaf Jäkel’s investigation of religious discourse in Western
culture (Jäkel 2002) maps out the variations of LIFE IS A JOURNEY in
this specific context, despite the highly stable set of mappings that this
metaphor usually shows (Lakoff 1990, 1993). While a great number of
linguistic occurrences can be found – for instance “following God’s path”
– we can note some differences in the source domain of JOURNEY. While
this metaphor usually furnishes the possibility of defining multiple paths
through which one can reach one’s goal, an analysis of many passages of
the Old Testament shows some interesting variations:
1.
You must follow exactly the path that the Lord your God has
commanded you, [...]
2.
My foot has held fast to his steps; I have kept his way and have
not turned aside. (examples taken from Jäkel 2002)
These sentences clearly show that multiple paths are not given, i.e.
they are not inferential possibilities of LIFE IS A JOURNEY in this kind
of religious discourse. Analogous variations can be found in many
discursive genres. In business discourses, “to take a shortcut to reach one's
own goal” is quite a widespread and generally positive metaphor, while in
a religious text it would not be so and the few occurrences are generally
used to describe the negative habits of sinners and people who are weak in
their faith.
Defining context
The conception of conceptual metaphor as a rigid type to be
deterministically applied to local occurrences is now more clearly denied
in favour of a more dynamic structure constitutively varied in different
contexts. This dynamic conception is perfectly in line with certain
experimental developments in cognitive poetics. Conceptual structures –
prototypes in the quoted passage – emerge as “temporary constructions in
working memory constructed on the spot from generic and episodic
information in long-term memory, rather than as stable structures
stored in long-term memory” (Gibbs 2003:32).
Taking into account the previous observations and further elaborating
with usually less considered factors, we can sketch a non-exhaustive list of
elements to be taken into account in our analysis in order to define how a
metaphor emerges:
1.
Socio-historical constraints: previous instantiations of the same
metaphor, context of reference;
2.
Discursive context: the genre; the situation;
3.
More local expectations, like the sedimented style of the author,
the specific subgenre, etc.
4.
The co-text: the sentences that surround the analysed metaphor.
5.
Lexical choices.
Deep into the analysis
Style of the text and sentence processing
To analyse “that man is a caiman” we have to sketch the field of
expectations, or habits, that the style of the text gives rise to (Kövecses
2005). The metaphor appeared in a political commentary by Franco
Cordero in La Repubblica, a leftist newspaper. Thus the expectations in its
interpretation are of a limited amount of complexity, since a newspaper is
not usually subjected to in-depth reading (Steen 1994).
The co-text makes it easy to understand that the referent of ‘man’ is
Silvio Berlusconi, a man well known to the Italian audience and towards
whom both the newspaper and the author of the article have always
displayed a strong critical stance, something which is shared by their
audience. We could sketch the sedimented knowledge of Berlusconi in this
context as follows: Berlusconi is a specific individual, owner (among other
things) of three national television channels, the most influential Italian
advertising company and a very successful football team. At the time in
which the article was published Berlusconi was the Italian Prime Minister,
economically and politically involved in many Italian and international
industries, and undergoing a good deal of trials for corruption, financial
crimes and never clarified connections with well-known criminal
organisations.
The sedimented knowledge to which ‘a caiman’ gives access is more
complex to analyse. The caiman is a South American relative to the
crocodile, looking slightly more slender than its African counterpart.
There is also a less defined awareness of the fact that it lives in rivers, of
its thick skin, and of its voracity. These contextual expectations are part of
the meaning of the metaphor (Steen 1994; Kövecses 2005) and influence
the way in which “entrenched associations in long-term memory” are
recruited in the on-line processes (Grady et al. 1999) so that the
potentialities of each term are already constrained by the context and
meaning construction is conceived as distributed.
Which blends?
It can easily be said that “that man is a caiman” is a token of the more
general PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS conceptual metaphor and that the
common mapping in these cases consists of an attribution to the person
concerned of some moral quality related to traditional representations of
the animal, or behavioural traits recontextualised, and so on. The problem
is that in Italian culture, there is no traditional representation of the
caiman. A second powerful element in this metaphor is the potential
creation of a sharp “image metaphor”, an image-based metaphor that is
rich in imagistic details (Lakoff and Turner 1989; Kövecses, 2002). There
is in Italian culture quite a common imagery of crocodiles, to which, for
lack of a better understanding, caimans are assimilated. But which images
are to be used? The image of “crocodile tears”, of an immobile crocodile
sleeping on the bank of a river, or of its powerful jaws at work?
The only way in which the blending can be oriented without needing to
“posit specific mechanisms that override parts of source-to-target-domain
mappings in primitive metaphors” (Gibbs 2006: 118) is by sticking to the
embodied basis of metaphorical thought. But to articulate the mappings
that are triggered by the metaphor, to reconstruct a common structure that
allows the idealised subject to construct new meaning, we also have to rely
on the contextual expectations previously highlighted. The prejudiced
audience makes negative traits highly relevant. The strong presence of
Berlusconi in the media, his active invading of any possible field, makes
the sleeping image of the caiman less relevant. This activity reveals
instead a deep commonality with the image of the caiman’s jaws, a
commonality which emerges from this unfolding and tentative
comparison. The common structure which allows for blending is that of a
common force dynamics (Talmy 2000), that is seen through a dynamic
interaction of the two mental spaces. Just like the jaws of the caiman,
conceived as an agonist, are able to overcome any resistance in what they
are chewing (the antagonist), Berlusconi is able to destroy any boundary
and to break any resistance to his invasions.
The lexical element
In our description of the entailments that follow from the use of ‘caiman’
as a source space, we referred to the ‘crocodile’ as an animal to which the
caiman is usually associated in Italian culture. But we have not yet
considered the lexical aspects of this metaphor. Could the analysis made
up to now have worked equally well for “that man is a crocodile”? The
term ‘crocodile’ would have been simpler to comprehend since the caiman
is quite a marginal figure in the Italian zoological encyclopaedia. The use
of ‘caiman’ implies a less structured and vaguer mental space. Idiomatic
expressions like “to cry like a crocodile” (referring to people that cry for
the negative outcomes of actions for which they are nevertheless
responsible and which they would probably repeat) would constrain the
space of interpretation and make the emergence of a more adequate blend
in which voracity is the emergent meaning, more difficult. With a stronger
source space (with the more established conceptual structures related to
‘crocodile’), the metaphor would have been subjected to a more
directional mapping, while with a weak source the blend is due to negative
aspects of both the source and the target, thus producing a more negative
portrayal of the target (Berlusconi). The cultural specificities of one source
space are thus fundamental if we want to explain how metaphors are used
to conceptualize experience inside a particular culture. Concrete elements
used as sources are always inherently culturally embodied: “recognizing
that what is cognitive (and embodied) is inherently cultural should be a
fundamental part of how we do our work as cognitive psychologists,
linguists, and anthropologists” (Gibbs 1999: 156).
Journalistic metaphors
One possible critique to this analysis could be that we have not taken into
account evidence from Steen (1994) concerning the differences between
reading journalistic metaphor and literary metaphor. Steen, after having set
up many observations and experiments on subjects reading both literary
and journalistic texts, states that when dealing with literary texts readers
more often do the following:
1.
Process the focus
verbalizations.
of
metaphors
in
thinking-out-loud
2.
Build contexts in terms of author intentions.
3.
Identify metaphors explicitly.
4.
Express their judgement.
5.
Tend to re-conceptualise metaphors at later stages of the reading
process.
While these findings are highly relevant, their quantitative perspective
has to be integrated into a more local and qualitative approach. The fact
that we are dealing with a newspaper is not per se enough to state anything
about the way readers will interpret our metaphor. When analysing “that
man is a caiman”, we are dealing with a particular journalistic text. Franco
Cordero, the author, is renowned for his complex articles where Latin
quotations, puns and highly specialised juridical lexicon are common. This
has led to the creation of a very specialised audience that quickly adopts
and experiments with his metaphors. Moreover, La Repubblica has a
tradition of constructing strong identities for its best journalists and
editorialists, leading to a situation similar to the second point highlighted
by Steen on the specificities of literary metaphors: the attention to
(reconstructed) authorial intentions.
Metaphors and diagrammatic reasoning
The model of meaning construction underlying metaphorical occurrences
that we are sketching is a tentative procedure in which sedimented
structures are employed as resources, and re-deployed, in order to make
new meaning emerge. Conceptual structures are thus conceived not as
rigid types, but as more dynamic and evolving configurations, something
that it is possible to manipulate in social practices. In particular the process
described can be conceptualised as a diagrammatic reasoning: “By
diagrammatic reasoning, I mean reasoning which constructs a diagram
according to a precept expressed in general terms, performs experiments
upon this diagram, notes their results, assures itself that similar
experiments performed upon any diagram constructed according to the
same precept would have the same results, and expresses this in general
terms” (Peirce 1976 Volume 4: 47-48).
A diagram is a particular configuration of more general relations that
can be manipulated, in order to make new inferences possible. Through
the semantic processes highlighted we have actually constructed particular
configurations of semantic traits that can be manipulated. As already
reported, Peirce stressed the idea that metaphors were the only way in
which a singularity could generate a regularity, in which a new concept
could emerge. From the semantic diagram we constructed, many
consequences, many new interpretative tentative habits could be drawn.
Any new action performed by Berlusconi could be conceptualised as
expressions of his caiman-like voracity, of his need to invade every public
field, to increase public charges crushing any boundary and resistance.
The whole of Berlusconi’s past and future career is re-read in this way.
Not even the (poor) caiman is left untouched. It is now hard to say caiman
in Italian without stressing its voracity, which was not so salient before; or
without summoning the figure of Berlusconi. An entire movie,based on
this metaphor, namely Il Caimano by Nanni Moretti, later on definitely
stabilised this process.
The diagrammatic nature of this process escapes any rigid
schematicity, bringing to the foreground the dynamic nature of meaning in
general and of metaphors in particular. Indeed, new interpretative habits
and new contexts deeply reshape the metaphor. Let us make a thought
experiment. Let us imagine a right wing newspaper (generously funded by
Berlusconi) publishing the text “of course that man is a caiman: he needs a
thick skin to cope with all the insults that the communists throw at him”.
Here we can find a reverted FORCE DYNAMICS schema in which
Berlusconi as an agonist has to resist the pressure of the antagonist (the
political rivals). Another possibility could be “of course that man is a
caiman, the turbulent waves of Italian politics require no less to be tamed.
Thus Berlusconi is exactly the man we need”. We leave to the reader the
pleasure of finding the trajectory through culture and conceptual structure
that crosses this manipulation of the metaphor.
Conclusions: On variations and attractors
Adopting a dynamic (though qualitative) approach to cognition, we have
sketched a theoretical and analytical path through which metaphors can
articulate the known and the unknown, regularities and singularities.
Linguistic metaphors trigger processes of meaning construction that are
diagrammatic and not determined by a strict type-token logic. Different
semantic traits are available to be attempted and stabilised in a field of
expectations. Their stability is also defined according to their conceivable
consequences on the following cognitive processes and on the influence
they will have on further discourses. In this model, schemata and
established conceptual structures like conceptual metaphors do not lose
their importance. They are simply pushed further away from any possible
conceptualisation as rigid types determining local tokens. They are
structures culturally and ontogenetically emerging from local variations
and they keep this dynamics. Thus they can be conceived as attractors
(Thelen and Smith 1994), i.e. patterns of recurring experience that help a
system organise itself through the memory of the previous states. We are
not alone in stating this. Gibbs has already proposed that schemata should
be conceived as attractors which profile depends “on the overall state of
the organism involved in some activity and past basins of attractions
created within the system” (Gibbs 2006:115).
Our contribution is thus to have sketched a (very tentative) model of
the way these attractors mediate between situatedness and generality, and
the way in which they are re-deployed in processes of meaning
construction. Processes which can be defined as diagrammatic and which
are constitutively situated.
Language emerges as an arena for thought rather than as a place where
thought is expressed. Language is a symbolic artefact and environment
through which thought emerges and is engaged in its human specificities
(Clark 2006), through which conceptual structures are put into play and
potentially remodulated. To use and to understand conceptual structures,
but also local metaphorical occurrences, involves at least an implicit
understanding of their conceivable consequences, and of the way in which
they can be put to work in the unfolding cognitive process, in the dynamic
field of expectations in which meaning construction processes take place.
And since language use is prominently social and public, “conceptual”
here does not mean that metaphors are inner and subjective facts, but on
the contrary that they are among the strongest tools social communities
have to share and guide their experience. Metaphors can be used to enact
(Varela et al. 1991; Gibbs 2006) the embodied, concrete experience in our
mental activity; as Gibbs (1999) states it by quoting Kirmayer (1992):
“metaphors are tools for working with experience”. It is indeed high time
to
[…] move metaphor out of our heads and put it into the embodied and
public world […] (This move) does not make metaphor any less cognitive
than if we had long lists of metaphors nicely encoded in our heads. All this
move attempts to do is acknowledge the culturally embodied nature of
what is cognitive and to suggest that there is much less of a difference
between what is cognitive and what is cultural than perhaps many of us
have been traditionally led to believe. (Gibbs 1999:162).
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