Word count
abstract : 60
main text : 998
references : 127
total : 1206
Title: Knowledge and resilience
Author: Joe Yen-fong Lau
Institution and address:
Department of Philosophy
Pokfulam Road
The University of Hong Kong
Hong Kong
Email: [email protected]
Tel: (852)39172796
URL: http://philosophy.hku.hk/joelau
Abstract
Kalisch, Müller, and Tüscher regard a positive appraisal style as the mechanism
for promoting resilience. I argue that knowledge can enhance resilience without
affecting appraisal style. Furthermore, the relationship between positive
appraisals and resilience ought to be mediated by knowledge and is not
monotonic. Finally, I raise some questions about how appraisals fit into the dualprocess model of the mind.
Main text
According to Kalisch, Müller, and Tüscher (KMT), there is a single general
resilience mechanism that protects against the adverse effects of stress. In
particular, their central claim is that a positive appraisal style is “the common
resilience mechanism onto which all resilience factors converge and through
which they exert their protective effects on mental health.” I find their
framework very fruitful in thinking about the relationship between appraisals
and resilience. In this commentary I focus on the special role that knowledge
plays in promoting resilience, and see if it helps us understand and evaluate their
central claim.
Knowledge can obviously affect appraisal style, since a person might feel more
positive about an aversive situation if she knows how to overcome it. However,
presumably a difference in knowledge by itself does not necessitate a difference
in appraisal style. So let us imagine two similar subjects with exactly the same
appraisal style. Given identical stimuli, they would have appraisals of the same
strength and emotional responses of the same valence. (They can also have the
same dispositions when it comes to reappraisals and interference inhibition.)
But suppose one of them knows more about how to achieve her goals, and has
better metacognitive knowledge about her own weaknesses and motivators.
Using her knowledge, she is more skillful in avoiding temptations, overcoming
obstacles, and maneuvering herself into situations that trigger positive
appraisals. Consequently she encounters fewer stressors, and is more resilient
than her counterpart in the long run. But their appraisal tendencies are
supposed to be identical. If this is right, knowledge as a promoter of success is a
powerful individual factor that can enhance resilience without altering appraisal
style.
In fact, we might go further and suggest that the protective function of a positive
appraisal style is not without qualification, and needs to be moderated by
knowledge. Although elevated positive emotions might serve important
protective and motivational functions, it is also possible that unrealistic
expectations can increase the likelihood of failures and frustrations, and make
them more difficult to cope with. Positive valence has been linked to more
optimistic perception of risk (Johnson and Tversky, 1983), which can lead to
failure to take precautions or engagement in risky behavior. For example, an
athlete who is wildly confident of his ability and downplays pain and other
danger signs is susceptible to burnout and serious injury. This can exacerbate
stress and depression later on. More generally, human beings are prone to
cognitive biases, such as over-estimating their own competence (Kruger and
Dunning, 1999), and being too optimistic about the future (Helweg-Larsen and
Shepperd, 2001). It is worth noting that individuals afflicted by mania have
abnormally intense positive emotions, but the condition is associated with
dysfunctional behavior and heightened irritability (Gruber et al., 2011). In short,
positive appraisals and resilience need not have a straightforward monotonic
relationship.
The underlying point is the familiar Aristotelian idea that actions and feelings
should display moderation and appropriateness. Interestingly, Aristotle argued
that not all pleasures are worth having, because they interfere with each other.
Choosing the right pleasures is not based on the pleasures themselves, but with
reference to the goodness and badness of the activities they are associated with.
Similarly, positive appraisals are not all equally worth having for the sake of
resilience. Resilience is better promoted not by inflating positive appraisals, but
by using knowledge to calibrate appraisal valence that is appropriate to the
situation, making it more effective to achieve a goal or remove a stressor. Given
the interaction between knowledge and appraisals, I am not sure why the latter
should be regarded as the more central resilience mechanism.
The connection between knowledge and appraisals also raises questions about
how to understand potential conflicts between them. Consider someone fearful
of a dead spider next to him, while knowing too well there is nothing to be afraid
of. According to the popular dual process model of the mind, this is a case where
our fast, automatic, and intuitive system 1 is in conflict with the more analytic
and deliberate system 2 (Kahneman, 2011). If this picture is right, where are
appraisals supposed to be located? At one point, KMT offer a functional
definition of appraisal as a state that causes an emotional response given a
stimulus. This suggests that appraisals are more closely related to system 1.
(This is not to say that system 2 reasoning cannot lead to emotions.) Perception
of the dead spider triggers a highly negative appraisal of danger, which causes
the emotion of fear. But presumably it is sometimes possible for system 2 to
override such appraisals, as when the subject forces himself to remain seated
next to the spider. This suggests there is a different kind of evaluation of the
situation at work, perhaps corresponding to the consciously available judgment
that it is perfectly safe. It is not clear whether KMT will regard this evaluation as
an appraisal, since it does not seem to generate any emotion stronger than the
fear. (So I am not sure if their discussion of competing appraisals in interference
inhibition applies here). Apart from the present example of a positive evaluation
overriding a negative appraisal, it is also possible to have negative evaluations
overriding positive appraisals, as when we successfully resist temptations. But if
these evaluations can alter behavior and change exposure to stressors, they
constitute a different causal pathway that can affect resilience independently of
the appraisal mechanism. Of course, we can expand the term “appraisal” to
include such evaluations. But this might mean severing the essential link
between appraisals and emotions. Also, given the very different nature of these
two types of appraisals, it might be more accurate to speak of a dual-mechanism
model of resilience. Obviously, the dual process model of the mind is still
evolving and not without its critics. But given that KMT are interested in
pursuing psycho-biological mechanisms, I think it is not premature to see if the
model helps us clarify the concept and functional role of an appraisal.
References
Gruber, J., Mauss, I. B., & Tamir, M. (2011). A dark side of happiness? How, when,
and why happiness is not always good. Perspectives on Psychological Science,
6(3), 222-233.
Helweg-Larsen, M., & Shepperd, J. A. (2001). Do moderators of the optimistic bias
affect personal or target risk estimates? A review of the literature. Personality
and Social Psychology Review, 5(1), 74-95.
Johnson, E. J., & Tversky, A. (1983). Affect, generalization, and the perception of
risk. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 20–31.
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux.
Kruger, J., & Dunning, D. (1999). Unskilled and unaware of it: how difficulties in
recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 77(6), 1121-1134.