Economic rationality or legal reasonableness? Inquiry into folk standards of
good judgment
Igor Grossmann1*, Jacklyn Koyama2, Richard Eibach1
UNDER REVIEW
Affiliations:
1
University of Waterloo, Canada.
2
University of Toronto, Canada.
*Correspondence to: Igor Grossmann, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
N2L 3G1, Tel. +1 519 888-4567 ext. 31793, e-mail: [email protected].
1
Abstract
Neoclassical economists define rationality through choices that prioritize self-interest, whereas
legal scholars define reasonableness through consideration of fairness and group norms. Have
laypeople internalized either standard to guide their practical decision-making or are these
distinctions merely of academic interest? Here, we explore folk standards of rationality and
reasonableness, demonstrating a robust dissociation between expectations for rational and
reasonable choice in seven experiments (N = 2,835) involving classic economic dilemmas and
social transactions typical to daily life. Laypeople’s views for a rational choice are consistent
with the idea of protecting self-interests. However, this rational choice deviates from their view
of the reasonable choice. Moreover, a reasonable agent is preferred to represent opponent’s
interests, whereas a rational agent is preferred to represent personal interests. We conclude that
folk concept of rationality aligns with the notion of self-serving choice, yet this concept is not the
sole standard guiding intuitive decision-making.
Keywords: rationality, self-interest, folk beliefs, fairness, social dilemma, economic games
2
What constitutes good judgment? When addressing this question, evolutionary biologists,
neoclassical economists, psychoanalysts and some behavioral scientists point to the standard of
rationality, defined through choices that prioritize self-interest (Becker, 1962). Priority of selfinterest is aligned with such fundamental concepts as reproductive fitness, utility maximization,
the pursuit of pleasure, and reinforcement (Miller & Ratner, 1998). In parallel, ethicists, legal
scholars, and social and political scientists evaluate good judgment against the standard of
reasonableness. For instance, in legal practice a reasonable person is characterized by their
ability to weigh the foreseeable risk of harm to others versus the utility of one's actions (e.g.,
Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292, 1850). Ethicists and legal scholars recognize rationality and
reasonableness as conceptually distinct standards for evaluating the soundness of judgment
(Rawls, 1971; Sen, 2009; Sibley, 1953). Summarizing this distinction, Gewirth writes:
A person is said to be rational when he or she adopts the more efficient means to
achieving his or her ends. [...] A reasonable person, on the other hand, is one who takes
due account of the interests of other persons, […] maintaining a certain equitability or
mutuality of consideration between oneself and others. (Gewirth, 1983, p. 225).
It is noteworthy that scholarly notions of good judgment often draw from particular
cultural-historical contexts (Henrich et al., 2005; Toulmin, 2001), raising questions about
contemporary folk concepts of rationality and reasonableness. Do laypeople’s intuitions about
rationality and reasonableness match up with scholarly portrayals of self-serving homo
economicus and fair-minded homo reciprocans, respectively? Or are these concepts merely of
academic interest: useful for theorizing, but unrelated to laypeople’s standards of good
judgement?
3
On the surface, in everyday language rational and reasonable standards may appear
equivalent. Dictionaries treat rationality and reasonableness as synonyms, and the two terms
derive from the same etymological root (Kipfer, 2011). Some evidence would seem to suggest
that laypeople may not view rationality and reasonableness as distinct standards of good
judgment because they have not internalized the self-interested definition of rationality that is
emphasized by evolutionary biologists and neo-classical economics. For example, behavioral
studies have repeatedly shown that people’s choices often violate the self-serving standard of
rationality (for reviews, see Batson & Powell, 2003; Van Lange, Cremer, Van Dijk, & Van Vugt,
2007). Rather, people's actions suggest an emphasis on equity and fairness (e.g., Deutsch, 1975;
Lerner, 2003; Skitka, 2003). Even in completely anonymous, single-shot economic transactions,
people tend to forego a rational option that maximizes their self-interest (Thaler, 1986).
At the same time, some social critiques have pointed out that self-serving rationality has
gradually become the mainstream norm of sound judgment, crowding out other criteria for
reasonable judgment (Frank, Gilovich, & Regan, 1993; Schirrmacher, 2015; Toulmin, 2000).
Even in legal scholarship, there are strong advocates for the standard of self-serving rationality
as a foundation of jurisprudence to replace the traditional common law standard of reasonable
judgment (Posner, 1998). The dominating influence of neo-classical economics’ standard was
highlighted by Schirrmacher who raised a concern that we are entering into “a world which,
translated entirely into economics, sees self-interest as the innermost core of rationality”
(Schirrmacher, 2015, p. xii). From this perspective, too, folk standards of rationality and
reasonableness may be indistinguishable. However, this is because both prioritize self-interest,
with fairness or group-oriented concerns reflecting people’s impulsive heuristic-driven
preferences (Nesse, 2007; Rand et al., 2014) rather than hallmarks of deliberate judgment.
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Finally, it is possible that laypeople's understanding of rationality does approach the
definitions proposed by evolutionary biologists and neoclassical economists. However, defining
rationality in terms of self-interests does not preclude people from entertaining other standards of
good judgment (Tetlock, 2002), such as the standard of reasonableness. Like in legal and
political scholarship, lay definitions of reasonableness may concern community norms of
fairness and propriety (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). Thus, when self-interest conflicts
with fairness or propriety, the “rational person” standard may require people to act in an
“unreasonably” selfish manner while the “reasonable person” standard may require people to act
in an "irrationally" equitable manner. When these two standards come into conflict, a person’s
deliberate choice may depend on whether they prioritize being rational or being reasonable.
Study Overview
We conducted a series of seven experiments exploring folk concepts of rationality and
reasonableness. Specifically, we tested whether people recognize that rationality and
reasonableness make distinct demands on behavior in diagnostic situations where self-interest
conflicts with common-sense notions of fairness. We asked people what would be the rational vs.
reasonable thing to do in classic economic dilemmas such as the Dictator Game, Prisoner's
Dilemma, and Commons Dilemma (Study 1 - 4). These studies provide a direct test of whether
laypeople recognize that rationality and reasonableness make distinct demands on good
judgment or whether their definitions of rationality and reasonableness are blurred. Further, we
assessed preferences for rational and reasonable agents to represent oneself vs. one’s opponent in
economic games (Study 3) and social transactions people encounter in daily lives (Study 4).
5
Study 1: Expectations for Rational and Reasonable Agents in a Dictator Game
First, we examined whether people differentiate between reasonable and rational agents
when predicting behavioral responses in the context of a Dictator Game (Henrich et al., 2005) -a type of economic game where a Player A can choose what fraction of a resource ($10) to share
with anonymous Player B, who must accept the offer. To this end, we performed a set of three
experiments, varying design (within vs. between-subject) of the critical variable, and testing
several boundary conditions.
Methods
Participants. In Studies 1a-1b, we recruited Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers
who received $0.60 remuneration. Participants in Study 1c were undergraduate students from
the University of Waterloo, Canada, who took part in the study in exchange for a CAD$2 gift
certificate. Exclusion rates and further demographics are in Table 1. We aimed to recruit at least
130 participants per each of the four between-subject cells in Study 1a, following prior
recommendations (Gervais, Jewell, Najle, & Ng, 2015). Given that the critical factor of Study 1a
concerned a within-subject factor (rational vs. reasonable), we aimed to double the sample size
when examining this factor in a between-subject design in Study 1b. Study 1c targeted a more
homogeneous sample of non-psychology major college students. For pragmatic considerations of
not extending data collection over one academic term, we aimed to collect as many participants
as possible, but at least 110 per between-subject cell. We oversampled target size in each
experiment to account for data loss due to non-compliance.
Design. In Studies 1a-1b, utilizing within (Study 1a) or between-subject design (Study
1b), Amazon Mechanical Turk workers reported expected contributions by reasonable and
rational persons in Player A’s role. Study 1c replicated effects of the between-subjects design on
6
college students and explored whether predicted actions for reasonable or rational agents are
closer to the perceived norm in their student community and their personal choice as Player A.
Table 1
NRecruited
NValid
Agemean (SD)
Gender
(%f/m/other)
Ethnicity (%)
Asian-Am.
African-Am.
White
Latino
“Other”
Incomemedian*
Education (%)*
High school
Some college/
vocational
training
College
Prof. degree
Post-grad
Study 1a
690
548
36.07
(12.14)
57.8/42.2
Study 1b
1097
986
34.87
(11.82)
47.6/52.4
Study 1c
224
207
20.53
(2.26)
43.4/55.6/1
Study 2a
532
449
34.99
(11.36)
55.5/44.5
Study 2b
541
515
36.56
(12.43)
54.3/45.7
Study 3
447
387
35.77
(10.89)
56.9/42.9/.2
Study 4
294
291
36.71
(13.40)
54.8/45.2
5.5
7.2
78.5
4.6
4.2
35,00175,000
6.3
5.4
79.5
4.7
10.4
35,00175,000
35.1
1
40
1.5
22.4
75,001100,000
5.8
5.8
78.3
4.0
6.1
35,00175,000
6.9
6.2
78.4
5.4
3.1
35,00175,000
5.8
7.1
78.9
5
8.2
50,00175,000
7.2
5.2
75.5
5.2
6.9
35,00175,000
9.7
34.1
9.2
36
7.8
13.7
9.4
36.8
9.5
36
8.4
39.1
9
38.6
40.6
2.6
13
38.5
3.3
13
45.6
7.4
25.5
37.7
3.1
13
37.2
2.6
14.7
36.9
1.8
13.8
37.9
1.7
12.8
Notes. Demographic information for samples used across seven experiments. Valid N = sample
size after screening procedures (provide a response in a range between $0-$10, and who
provided a legible response to the open-ended question concerning the recall of the task). * For
Study 1c we used students’ parental household income and highest level of parental education.
Procedure for Study 1a. Participants (N = 548) were told they would be reflecting on a
situation in an economic game and answering questions about it, as well as answering a few
questions about themselves. Participants read a description of an economic game (a Dictator
Game, described to participants only as a ‘game’). Subsequently, they were either asked how
much of a resource ($10) would reasonable and rational persons give in Player A’s role or what
would be reasonable and rational amounts to give in this role. In a different set of experimental
conditions, participants were either asked how much of a resource ($10) would unreasonable and
irrational persons give in Player A’s role or what would be unreasonable and irrational amounts
7
to give. This experimental structure resulted in a 2 (framing: positive vs. negative) x 2 (person
vs. amount) design.
We did not counterbalance the presentation order of the characteristics within each
condition. Rather, all participants viewed statements in the order specified above (the order of
rational and reasonable was counterbalanced in the replication Study 1c, see below). To respond,
participants wrote a number between 0-10 for each characteristic. Given the exploratory nature
of this initial experiment, two additional characteristics were displayed to each participant after
reasonable and rational: wise and intelligent (positive characteristic condition) vs. unwise and
unintelligent (negative characteristic condition). These variables were not included in analyses,
as they followed the initial set of reasonable and rational questions.
On the following screen, participants were asked how much they would give to Player B
if they were in Player A's role. Participants again responded by writing a number between 0-10.
What followed was a filler task and a subsequent set of exploratory scales which lasted roughly
ten minutes (see Supplementary Appendix 1). This filler task was used to avoid effects of
specific response on a previous task on subsequent answers. Specifically, the filler task was
designed to divert attention by instructing participants to fill in letters for a series of words. By
diverting attention we aimed to attenuate priming effects (Mulligan, 1997).
Participants then rated the extent to which each of the characteristics seen previously
applied to them on a scale of 1 (Not at all like me) to 5 (Just like me). Analyses related to these
self-ratings had to be excluded from Study 1a results because a typo in the materials made this
measure invalid.
Before responding to a final set of demographics items, participants were asked to
describe the ‘money allocation task' (referencing the Dictator Game task) that they had
8
completed in the experiment. Individuals who could not recall any aspect of the task or who left
this item blank were screened out before all analyses along with individuals who responded to
the Dictator Game task with a number outside the range 0-10. See Supplementary Appendix 1
for materials.
Procedure for Study 1b. Participants (N = 986) read the same game description as in
Study 1a (contributions by reasonable and rational people). Next, they were asked to spend some
time considering the game instructions before proceeding to bring the main question up on the
screen (with the instructions still on the page). Utilizing a between-subject design, we asked
participants how much a rational [reasonable] person would give in Player A’s role. As in Study
1a, this task was followed by a page where participants were asked to indicate how much they
would give as Player A.
Participants completed a series of filler items. Like in Study 1a, the filler task asked
participants to complete five words, each with letters missing, by filling in the blanks. This was
followed by a 20-item scale of Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970) and a 40-item scale of
Rational-Experiential tendencies (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Participants were then asked to rate
the extent to which the characteristics reasonable and then rational applied to themselves on a
scale of 1 (Not at all like me) to 5 (Just like me). They were then asked to openly describe the
experimental task they took part in, to screen out inattentive participants (see Study 1a method),
followed by a short page of demographic items. See Supplementary Appendix 2 for materials.
Procedure for Study 1c. We conducted a replication of the key conditions of Study 1a
(positive–person conditions) with an undergraduate university sample (N =207) from the
University of Waterloo in Ontario, Canada. Main measures from Study 1a were included in
Study 1c.
9
Participants were presented with the Dictator Game description, and on the same page
were asked how much a reasonable, rational, and average uWaterloo student would give in
Player A’s role. The order of the rational and reasonable items was counterbalanced between
participants, and both were presented before the average uWaterloo student item. As in previous
studies, participants were asked how much they would give as Player A on the following page.
Participants then rated the extent to which the characteristics of reasonable and rational applied
to them on the same scale as in Studies 1a-1b (1 = not at all to 5 = just like me), and the order of
reasonable and rational items were counterbalanced. Finally, participants completed a short
page of demographic items. See Supplementary Appendix 3 for materials.
Results
5
Reasonable
M + 95% CI (Out of $10)
4.5
Rational
Average Student
4
Personal
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
Study 1a
Study 1b
Study 1c
Fig. 1. Expected contribution by reasonable and rational agents (Studies 1a-1c), an average
community member (Study 1c) and personal contributions (Studies 1b-1c). 95% CI = confidence
interval at α = .05 obtained via bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapping with 1000 samples.
As Figure 1 shows, across three experiments reasonable people were expected to
contribute on average 7-20% more than rational people. Reasonable agents were expected to
contribute more than rational agents, Study 1a:t(281) = 5.42, ηp2 = .095; Study 1b: t(960.89) =
5.23, ηp2 = .027; Study 1c: t(206) = 8.96, ηp2 = .280; all ps < .001, an average community
10
member, Study 1c: t(206) = 9.07, ηp2 = , p < .001, or oneself, Study 1b: t(491) = 3.83, ηp2 = .029;
Study 1c: t(206) = 4.95, ηp2 = .290; all ps < .001. Conversely, rational agents were expected to
contribute like average community members, Study 1c: t(206) = .86, p > .250, yet average
personal contributions were significantly higher than those expected for a rational agent, Study
1b: t(493) = 2.85, p = .005, ηp2 = .016, Study 1c: t(206) = 5.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .128, or an average
community member, Study 1c: t(206) = 5.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .109. The latter observation
dovetails with earlier work on expectations of selfishness by others vs. oneself (Miller & Ratner,
1998). It appears that people are more cynical about the average individual (Fetchenhauer &
Dunning, 2009), simultaneously acting more similar to a reasonable rather than rational person.
In these experiments, we also examined several alternative hypotheses. To control for
scale direction effects, half of Study 1a participants (n = 133) provided the same information for
unreasonable and irrational persons. Consistent with main results, unreasonable people (M =
3.08, 95% CIbootsrapped [2.59; 3.60]) were expected to contribute 33% less than irrational people
(M = 6.22, 95% CIbootsrapped [5.64; 6.82]), t(265) = 10.25, p < .001, ηp2 = .284. As Study 1a
methods indicate, we also varied the target, asking participants to report on expected choice for
agents (“how much would a rational person give?”) vs. actions (“what would be the rational
amount to give?”). The difference between implicit norms of rational vs. reasonable choice did
not depend on agent-based (reasonable vs. rational agent) or action-based (reasonable vs. rational
amount) framing, Fs < 1.28, ps > .250.
The distinction between reasonable vs. rational agents extends to personal choice. In
Studies 1b-1c, participants who viewed themselves as reasonable contributed significantly more,
βExp2 = .10, t = 2.51, p = .01, βExp3 =.33, t = 4.96, p < .001, whereas participants who viewed
11
themselves as rational contributed less, βExp2 = -.06, t = 1.49, p = .14, βExp3 = -.24, t = 3.62, p <
.001.
Study 2: Rational and reasonable personal choice
Building on the initial experiments testing folk standards of rationality and
reasonableness in general, the subsequent two experiments in Study 2 tested whether the
distinction between reasonable vs. rational agents extends to personal choice. Specifically, in
Studies 2a-2b participants reported how much money they would donate as Player A in a
Dictator Game if they were seeking to be reasonable versus rational. Furthermore, Study 2
directly tested whether the folk standard of rationality (vs. reasonableness) is more likely to
involve the notion of selfishness, explicitly asking participants to report their general impressions
of rational and reasonable agents.
Methods
Participants. As in Study 1a-1b, Study 2 participants were recruited from MTurk, with
$0.60 remuneration. Based on Study 1 results, we targeted at least 200 participants per condition,
which we oversampled to account for data loss due to non-compliance.
Procedure for Study 2a. We employed the same between-participant structure as Study
1b, but the main question asked participants (N = 449) how much they would give as Player A if
they were trying to be a rational or reasonable person (emphasis added). The question
participants saw read as follows: “What would you do if you were in Player A’s role and you
were trying to be a reasonable [rational] person? Out of the $10.00 total, how much would you
give to Player B in this situation?” After responding to this question, participants filled out a
filler task and scales as in Study 1b. However, the stimuli in the filler task were updated to
contain six new words, followed by the Machiavellianism and Rational-Experiential Scales, the
12
reasonable/rational self-rating scale and open-ended screening item (see Study 1b method), as
well as a short page of demographic items. See Supplementary Appendix 4 for materials.
Procedure for Study 2b. We aimed to directly replicate Study 2a with additional
measures related to folk perceptions of rational or reasonable people in society. Participants (N =
515) were asked to consider the Dictator game instructions and then respond to the same main
question as in Study 2a. Subsequently, participants were asked why they chose to give Player B
the amount they did. This task was followed by a page of scale-response items measuring
selfishness (1 = Not at all to 5 = Extremely), as well as fundamental dimensions of social
perception: communion (warmth) and agency (competence) (Abele & Wojciszke, 2014; Fiske,
Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005). There were five
items measuring warmth (warm, tolerant, good-natured, sincere, trusting; Cronbach's α = .85),
five items measuring competence (competent, intelligent, confident, independent, competitive;
Cronbach's α = .76), and 1 item measuring selfishness (selfish; 1 = Not at all to 5 = Extremely).
See Supplementary Analyses for more information on these measures and analyses based on
these measures. Following the warmth, competence, and selfishness measures, participants
completed the same screening and demographic items as in previous studies. See Supplementary
Appendix 5 for materials.
Results
As Fig. 2 shows, the reasonable prompt resulted in 5% more donations than the rational
prompts. Contributions were significantly higher for reasonable prompts, Study 2a: t(353.76) =
2.65, p = .009, ηp2 = .016, Study 2b: t(493.56) = 2.01, p = .045, ηp2 = .008. Notably, these effects
were somewhat smaller than general expectations for rational vs. reasonable standards, which is
expected due to the personal choice nature of the task in Study 2a-2b. Study 2b simultaneously
13
tested the impression of selfishness for rational vs. reasonable agents. Rational agents were
perceived as more selfish than reasonable agents, t(511) = 3.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .028, and this
difference in selfishness mediated the difference in contributions as a rational vs. reasonable
agent, Z = 3.19, 95% CIbootstrapped [.094,.344]. Supplementary analyses further indicated greater
attribution of warmth (vs. competence) stereotypes (Fiske et al., 2002) for reasonable compared
to rational agents.
Reasonable Agent
Rational Agent
M ± 95% CI (Out of $10)
5
4.5
4
3.5
3
Study 2a
Study 2b (Replication)
Fig. 2. Personal contributions as a reasonable vs. rational agent. 95% CI = confidence interval at
α = .05 obtained via bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapping with 1000 samples.
Study 3: Use of reasonable vs. rational standards and generalizability to other dilemmas
Study 1 results have revealed that participants' personal choices are intermediate between
their judgment of choices attributed to rational and reasonable agents. Given their intermediate
position, we examined whether people utilize the reasonable vs. rational choice distinction in
economic and interpersonal transactions. We predicted that participants would oscillate between
rational and reasonable choices in situations where their interests conflict with another party's
14
interests: If given the option to hire an agent to do the dirty work of prioritizing self-interest on
their behalf, participants might prefer a rational over reasonable agent. However, participants
would prefer that agents who represent their opponent’s interests would prioritize
reasonableness. Simultaneously, we tested whether the distinction between rational and
reasonable agents extends to expectations in other scenarios where an agent’s self-interest
conflicts with others’ interests -- i.e. Commons and Prisoner’s dilemmas (Rapoport & Guyer,
1967).
Methods
Participants. As in Studies 1a-1b, Study 3 participants were recruited from MTurk, with
$0.60 remuneration. Based on earlier studies, we targeted at least 200 participants per condition,
which we oversampled to account for data loss due to non-compliance.
Procedure. We utilized three economic dilemmas -- a Commons Dilemma, a Prisoner’s
Dilemma, and a Dictator Game Dilemma, asking participants (N = 387) whether they would
prefer a reasonable or rational person representing either themselves or the other party in each of
the dilemmas. For the first two dilemmas, participants were also asked what move they thought a
rational and then a reasonable person would make in the dilemma. Dictator Game instructions
were identical to previous studies. Commons and Prisoner’s dilemma were presented as raffle
games, to avoid familiarity bias. First, participants completed the Commons Dilemma and
Prisoner's Dilemma, each with their associated questions, which were presented in a randomized
order to avoid possible order effects. Given the previously established association between the
expectations and personal choice for reasonable vs. rational agents in a Dictator Game, we aimed
to prevent possible carry-over effects from expectations in a Dictator Game by examining
responses to this dilemma last.
15
For each dilemma, participants indicated whether they would prefer a reasonable or a
rational agent to act on their behalf and on behalf of another party (in a randomized order). To
assess expectations for the Commons dilemma, participants indicated their expectation for
withdrawal of lottery tickets from a common pool. To evaluate expectations for the Prisoner’s
dilemma, participants indicated whether reasonable/rational agents would choose a
prosocial/group-gain maximizing option or rather a selfish/self-gain maximizing option.
Following economic dilemma tasks, participants completed the same measures of warmth
(αreasonable = .83, αrational = .83), competence (αreasonable = .74, αrational = .80), and selfishness (Fiske
et al., 2002; Judd et al., 2005) as in Study 2b, for each rational and reasonable people in a
randomized order. Participants responded to the same self-rating scale for reasonable then
rational characteristics as in Study 1b and were asked to recall the three economic games
completed earlier as a screener item, before filling out a short page of demographics items. See
Supplementary Appendix 6 for materials.
Results
Extending prior results, participants expected rational agents (M = 2.02, 95% CI [1.91,
2.12]) to withdraw 12% more from the common pool as compared to reasonable agents (M =
1.67, 95% CI [1.56, 1.76]) in the Commons Dilemma, t(305) = 5.27, p < .001, ηp2 = .083. In the
Prisoner’s dilemma, participants expected rational agents to pick selfish and cooperative options
to a similar extent (selfish = 197 / cooperative = 190), but expected reasonable agents to
overwhelmingly select a cooperative option (selfish = 84 / cooperative = 303), N = 387, χ2 = 7.04
(df = 1), p = .008, Cramer’s V = .14. Like in Study 2, participants rated rational people as more
selfish (M = 3.28, 95% CI [3.18, 3.37]) than reasonable people (M = 2.26, 95% CI [2.18, 2.35]),
t(386) = 13.56, p < .001, ηp2 = .322.
16
Moreover, participants overwhelmingly favored a rational agent to act on their behalf in
economic games (see Fig. 3). Conversely, they favored a reasonable agent to act on behalf of
another party. We estimated a multi-level model with binomial choice and game type nested
within participants. Participants favored a rational over reasonable agent to act on their behalf,
Wald χ2 = 39.40 (df = 1), p < .001. Conversely, participants favored a reasonable over rational
agent for the other parties involved in a dilemma, Wald χ2 = 21.63 (df = 1), p < .001. This effect
was uniform across economic games, choice type X game interaction, Wald χ2 = 0.90 (df = 2), p
> .250.
Interpersonal Scenario (Study 4)
Economic Games (Study 3)
Self
Other Party
Commons Dilemma
Prisoner's Dilemma
Dictator Game
Schedule Manager
Negotiation
Legal Dispute
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
% Preference for a Rational vs. Reasonable Agent ± 95 % CI
Fig. 3. Preference for rational agents to act on one’s behalf and for a reasonable agent to act on
behalf of another party. Estimated represent percentage of participants preferring rational over
reasonable agent and confidence interval at α = .05 obtained via bias-corrected and accelerated
bootstrapping with 1000 samples.
17
We also assessed self-evaluations of reasonable and rational characteristics, which we
entered in the multilevel model as additional predictors of choice type. Participants who rated
themselves as more reasonable favored reasonable over rational agents, Wald χ2 = 9.31 (df = 1), p
= .002, whereas participants who rated themselves as more rational favored rational over
reasonable agents, Wald χ2 = 7.96 (df = 1), p = .005. The dissociation of preference for rational
vs. reasonable agents for self vs. the other parties were particularly pronounced for participants
who viewed themselves as more reasonable, Wald χ2 = 7.33 (df = 1), p = .007.
Study 4: Use of reasonable vs. rational standards in interpersonal transactions
Finally, in Study 4 we explored whether people differentially prefer reasonable vs.
rational agents within interpersonal transactions that were situated in more familiar real-world
contexts, including a legal dispute, a negotiation, and work schedule assignment in an
organization.
Methods
Participants. As in Study 1a-1b, Study 4 participants were recruited MTurk, with $0.60
remuneration. Based on earlier studies, we targeted at least 200 participants per condition, which
we oversampled to account for data loss due to non-compliance.
Procedure. Participants (N = 291) were told the aim of this experiment was to determine
what were considered good characteristics for decision-makers, across different scenarios.
Participants were presented with a randomized set of seven scenarios. For each scenario, they
were asked whether they would choose a rational or reasonable person to fill the described role
and why they’d made that choice (open-ended response item). An example of a script is: “Whom
would you prefer to represent your side in a legal dispute – an attorney who has a reputation for
being very rational or one who has a reputation for being very reasonable?” In addition to six
18
scenarios analyzed in the main text, we included an exploratory scenario concerning a judge
deciding a case one is involved in (see Supplementary Appendix 7). Items representing both the
participant's interests and the interests of others were presented. Following each scenario,
participants provided an open-ended response explaining their choice (used for screening
nonsense responses).
We measured perceptions of warmth (αreasonable = .83, αrational = .84), competence (αreasonable
= .81, αrational = .78), and selfishness (Fiske et al., 2002) for rational and reasonable others
(presentation order was randomized) as in Study 3. The same filler task and scale for
Machiavellianism as in Study 1b were presented, followed by the self-rating scale from Study 1b
and a short page of demographics items. For this experiment, participants were screened based
on their response to the seven open-ended scenario items. Participants who provided no response
or an incoherent response to these items were screened out. See Supplementary Appendix 7 for
materials.
Results
We estimated a multi-level model with binomial choice and game type nested within
participants. Extending the pattern observed for economic dilemmas in Study 3, Figure 3
indicates that participants favored a rational over reasonable agent to act on their behalf, Wald χ2
= 7.92 (df = 1), p = .005. Conversely, participants favored a reasonable over rational agent for
the other parties involved in a dilemma, Wald χ2 = 85.38 (df = 1), p < .001. This effect was more
pronounced in interpersonal transactions involving a legal dispute and a negotiation, type X
vignette interaction, Wald χ2 = 10.74 (df = 2), p = .005. In the standout scenario, the workscheduling context, participants preferred a reasonable work-shift manager both if they imagined
were the business owner and if they imagined they were a subordinate working within a factory
19
setting. However, even within this scenario, a reasonable (vs. rational) person is more preferred
as a manager by participants who imagined themselves in the role of subordinates (compared to
owners), Wald χ2 = 22.73 (df = 1), p < .001.
Supplementary analyses also indicated that participants viewed rational (vs. reasonable)
agents as more selfish, t(289) = 14.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .415, which in turn moderated participants
choice: The more selfish participants viewed rational (vs. reasonable) agents, the more likely
they were to pick a rational agent to act on their behalf and a reasonable agent to act on behalf of
the other party.
Discussion
Though dictionaries treat standards of rationality and reasonableness interchangeably, our
results show that people intuitively draw a distinction between a rational standard and a
reasonable standard of judgment and decision-making. People’s lay beliefs about rationality
align with the standard of good judgment advocated by neo-classical economics and evolutionary
biologists, whereas lay beliefs about reasonableness appear to correspond to the standard of a
reasonable person discussed in legal and social science scholarship. Moreover, people do not
always give priority to one of these standards when making choices. Rather people selectively
apply standards of reasonableness vs. rationality in diagnostic situations where their self-interest
conflicts with fairness.
Our findings strongly oppose the possibility that people fail to internalize the standard of
rationality proposed by neo-classical economic theory. However, while our results indicate that
laypeople may have assimilated the self-interested definition of rationality, this has not crowded
out other standards of good judgment, contrary to concerns raised by some social critics (Frank
et al., 1993; Schirrmacher, 2015; Toulmin, 2000). Indeed, we found that laypeople continue to
20
recognize and apply a distinct standard of reasonableness that balances self-interest with
consideration of others’ interests. The present work thus supports the idea that a variety of
distinct intuitive models guide everyday judgment and decision-making (Tetlock, 2002).
The deliberate preference for the rational standard for the self and the reasonable standard
for other parties dovetails with the evidence of selfish motivation upon deliberation (Everett,
Ingbretsen, Cushman, & Cikara, 2017; Grossmann, Brienza, & Bobocel, 2017; Rand, 2016).
Evidence for a dissociation between rational and reasonable choice established here also
advances the discussion about the concept of rationality in economics (Smith, 2003).
Though our work suggests that lay beliefs about the standards of good judgment
corresponds to key messages communicated by economists (Frank et al., 1993) and legal
scholars (Rawls, 1971), the present evidence does not directly speak to the beliefs about the
mechanisms through which good judgment may be realized (Gigerenzer, 1996; Tetlock, 2005),
or beliefs about expected utility of good judgment (Hsee, Zhang, Yu, & Xi, 2003), opening up a
fruitful avenue for future research. Future research may also explore additional conditions under
which the standard of reasonableness, alone or in conjunction with other ecological factors,
contributes to economically irrational choice. The present findings also suggest a novel
intervention to encourage people to make more cooperative choices: reduce the demand to be
rational and enhance the request to be reasonable.
21
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Acknowledgments: Garrett Shay provided valuable assistance when collecting data for this
project. The present research was funded by Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada Insight Grants 435-2014-0685 (to I.G.). All data and statistical analyses
that support the findings of this study are publicly available on Open Science Framework
website with identifier https:// osf.io/2h4gx.
Author contributions: I.G. and R.E. provided the initial study concept and design. I.G. and
J.K. collected the data. I.G. and J. K. carried out data analysis. All authors contributed to the
conceptual analysis of the results. I.G. drafted the initial version of the manuscript. All
authors contributed to revision of the manuscript and approved the final manuscript for
submission.
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
25
Supplementary Online Materials:
Supplementary Analyses
Supplementary Appendices 1-7
26
Supplementary Analyses
Comparing donation amounts for positive vs. negative characteristics (Study 1a). We
conducted between-subjects t-tests to compare perceptions of rational vs. irrational and
reasonable vs. unreasonable others. To correct for unequal variance, t-tests followed Wald’s ttest approach. Participants thought irrational (M = 5.46, 95% CIbootsrapped [4.71; 6.24]) vs.
rational people (M = 3.51, 95% CIbootsrapped [3.10; 3.92]) would give more in Player A’s role, t(df
= 214.98) = 4.23, p < .001. Similarly, expectations for irrational amounts (M = 7.01, 95%
CIbootsrapped [6.24; 7.66]) were significantly smaller than expectations for rational amounts (M =
3.62, 95% CIbootsrapped [3.27; 3.99]), t(df = 185.94) = 8.53, p < .001.
A similar analysis suggested reasonable people (M = 4.30, 95% CIbootsrapped [4.00; 4.58])
would give more than unreasonable people (M = 2.16, 95% CIbootsrapped [1.53; 2.87]) in Player
A’s role, t(df = 195.46) = 6.06, p < .001. However, expectations for reasonable amounts (M =
4.14, 95% CIbootsrapped [3.87; 4.41]) were not significantly greater from expectations for
unreasonable amounts (M = 4.06, 95% CIbootsrapped [3.87; 4.41]), t(df = 162.80) = .22, p > .250.
Self-evaluations of rational/reasonable characteristics as predictors of personal donation
choices (Study 1b-1c). In Study 1b, we examined the extent to which participants thought the
characteristics of reasonable and rational applied to themselves. Since each participant rated
themselves on the characteristics of both reasonable and rational, we performed a within-subject
General Linear Model to account for the dependence between these two measurements.
Participants rated themselves as significantly more reasonable (M = 4.09, 95% CIbootsrapped [4.05;
4.13]) than rational (M = 4.03, 95% CIbootsrapped [3.98; 4.08]), F(1, 985) = 9.27, p = .002, ηp2 =
.009. Notably, this was a very small effect. Furthermore, participants who rated themselves as
more reasonable predicted they would make higher donations as Player A than those who rated
27
themselves as less reasonable, β = .10, t (df = 1) = 2.51, p = .012. There was no significant effect
for self-ratings of rationality leading to lower contributions, β = -.06, t (df = 1) = 1.49, p = .136.
In Study 1c, we failed to observe a significant difference in self-ascriptions of being
rational (M = 3.80, 95% CIbootsrapped [3.69; 3.91]) vs. reasonable (M = 3.86, 95% CIbootsrapped [3.74;
3.98]) among college students, F(1,206) = .72, p > .250. Replicating Study 1a, students who
rated themselves as more reasonable predicted they would make higher donations as Player A
than those who rated themselves as less reasonable, β = .33, t (df = 1) = 4.96, p < .001.
Furthermore, students who rated themselves as more rational predicted they would make lower
donations as Player A than those who rated themselves as less rational, β = -.24, t (df = 1) = 3.62,
p < .001.
Perceptions of warmth, competence, and selfishness among rational and reasonable people
(Study 2b). Principal component analyses indicated that responses to measures of warmth
(warm, tolerant, good-natured, sincere, trusting competence, and selfishness reduced to two
dimensions, with the first factor (37.41% variance) characterized by warmth and lack of
selfishness, the second factor (20.92% variance) characterized by competence. We used the
average scores of warmth, competence, as well as the selfishness score for subsequent analyses.
Participants attributed reasonable (vis-à-vis rational) people greater warmth, R2 = .050,
F(1, 511) = 26.97, p < .001, and lower competence, R2 = .032, F(1, 511) = 16.77, p < .001.
Additionally, the relationship between warmth and competence varied as a function of condition,
competence x condition interaction: R2p = .014, t = 2.72, p = .007. For reasonable people, warmth
was substantially associated with competence, r = .47, whereas for rational people the
association between warmth and competence was weak, r = .17.
28
Greater attribution of warmth among reasonable vs. rational agents was associated with
greater contributions in a Dictator Game, r¸= .24, whereas the reverse was the case for
competence, r = -.15. Moreover, the difference in contributions by reasonable vs. rational agents
was statistically explained by a tendency to view reasonable agents as warmer and less
competent compared to rational agents, as indicated by results of a mediation analysis with
bootstrapping (2000 resamples). Specifically, simultaneously entering warmth and competence
scores as additional predictors into a linear regression revealed significant indirect effects of
warmth, β = .068, Z = 4.079, p < .001, 95% CI [0.37, 0.11], and competence, β = .041, Z = 3.158,
p = .016, 95% CI [0.02, 0.07].
Perceptions of warmth, competence, and selfishness moderate the effect of
rational/reasonable characteristics on predicted choice in economic dilemmas (Study 3). As
reported in the main text, participants expected rational agents to withdraw 12% more from the
common pool as compared to reasonable agents in the Commons Dilemma, t(305) = 5.27, p <
.001, and to select a selfish (vs. prosocial) option in a Prisoner’s dilemma, χ2 = 7.04 (df = 1), p =
.008, Cramer’s V = .14. For both dilemmas, results were moderated by attributions of selfishness
to rational vs. reasonable persons, Commons: F(1,304) = 7.05, p = .008; Prisoner’s: Wald χ2 (df =
1) = 20.24, p < .001. Specifically, the relative preference to attribute selfishness to rational vs.
reasonable agents resulted to a greater expectation that rational agents would take more in a
commons dilemma and choose a selfish option in the prisoner’s dilemma.
We observed similar interaction results for attribution of competence to rational vs.
reasonable persons, Commons: F(1,304) = 7.17, p = .008; Prisoner’s: Wald χ2 (df = 1) = 15.92, p
< .001. Moreover, we observed the opposite interaction effect for attributions of warmth,
Commons: F(1,304) = 2.25, p = .066, Prisoner’s: Wald χ2 (df = 1) = 25.03, p < .001.
29
Self-evaluations of rational/reasonable characteristics as predictors of choice of rational vs.
reasonable agent (Study 3). We assessed self-evaluations of reasonable and rational
characteristics, which we entered in the multilevel model as additional predictors of choice type.
Participants who rated themselves as more reasonable favored reasonable over rational agents,
Wald χ2 = 9.31 (df = 1), p = .002, whereas participants who rated themselves as more rational
favored rational over reasonable agents, Wald χ2 = 7.96 (df = 1), p = .005. Furthermore, the
dissociation of preference for rational vs. reasonable agents for self vs. the other parties were
particularly pronounced for participants who viewed themselves as more reasonable, Wald χ2 =
7.33 (df = 1), p = .007.
Judge Scenario (Study 4). In the Judge Scenario presented in Experiment 7, we asked
participants to choose the preferred characteristic (rational vs. reasonable) of a judge presiding
over one’s legal case. Results for this exploratory item were not presented in the main text
because it did not follow the symmetric set of scenarios benefitting the self vs. other-benefitting
choice (i.e. evaluations for the judge are expected to be the same to the self and the other party).
Consistent with the idea that one would pick a reasonable option when the intuitive norm of
reasonableness concerns fairness, 67% of participants favored a reasonable (vs. rational) judge, p
(binomial test) < .001.
30
Appendix 1
Experiment 1a materials
Main Task: Perceptions of rationality/reasonableness
For this first task, please read the description of a game below, and try to understand the principles of the game. In
the following questions, we would like you to think about what different people may do.
This is a game with two players – Player A and Player B. Both players are informed that they are playing
anonymously throughout the game and will never know each other’s identities. Player A receives $10.00 and has to
decide how much of this money (ranging from the minimum of $0.00 up to the maximum of $10.00) he or she would
choose to give to another participant (Player B). Player B is then given whatever amount Player A chose to split
with Player B and Player B has to accept whatever amount Player A decided to give to him or her.
Positive framing - Person
First, we’d like to know what you think a reasonable person would do in Player A’s role.
In Player A’s role how much of the $10.00 total would a reasonable person give to Player B? Type your answer in
the box to the right.
Next, we’d like to know what you think a rational person would do in Player A’s role.
In Player A’s role how much of the $10.00 total would a rational person give to Player B? Type your answer in the
box to the right.
Next, we’d like to know what you think a wise person would do in Player A’s role.
In Player A’s role how much of the $10.00 total would a wise person give to Player B? Type your answer in the box
to the right.
Next, we’d like to know what you think an intelligent person would do in Player A’s role.
In Player A’s role how much of the $10.00 total would an intelligent person give to Player B? Type your answer in
the box to the right.
Negative framing - Person
First, we’d like to know what you think an unreasonable person would do in Player A’s role.
In Player A’s role how much of the $10.00 total would an unreasonable person give to Player B? Type your answer
in the box to the right.
Next, we’d like to know what you think an irrational person would do in Player A’s role.
In Player A’s role how much of the $10.00 total would an irrational person give to Player B? Type your answer in
the box to the right.
Next, we’d like to know what you think an unwise person would do in Player A’s role.
In Player A’s role how much of the $10.00 total would an unwise person give to Player B? Type your answer in the
box to the right.
Next, we’d like to know what you think an unintelligent person would do in Player A’s role.
In Player A’s role how much of the $10.00 total would an unintelligent person give to Player B? Type your answer
in the box to the right.
Positive framing - Amount
First, we'd like to know what you think would be a reasonable amount of money for Player A to give Player B.
Out of the $10.00 total what would be a reasonable amount of money for Player A to give to Player B? Type your
answer in the box to the right.
Next, we'd like to know what you think would be a rational amount of money for Player A to give Player B.
Out of the $10.00 total what would be a rational amount of money for Player A to give to Player B? Type your
answer in the box to the right.
Next, we'd like to know what you think would be a wise amount of money for Player A to give Player B.
Out of the $10.00 total what would be a wise amount of money for Player A to give to Player B? Type your answer
in the box to the right.
Next, we'd like to know what you think would be an intelligent amount of money for Player A to give Player B.
Out of the $10.00 total what would be an intelligent amount of money for Player A to give to Player B? Type your
answer in the box to the right.
Negative framing - Amount
First, we'd like to know what you think would be a unreasonable amount of money for Player A to give Player B.
Out of the $10.00 total what would be a unreasonable amount of money for Player A to give to Player B? Type your
answer in the box to the right.
Next, we'd like to know what you think would be an irrational amount of money for Player A to give Player B.
Out of the $10.00 total what would be an irrational amount of money for Player A to give to Player B? Type your
answer in the box to the right.
31
Next, we'd like to know what you think would be an unwise amount of money for Player A to give Player B.
Out of the $10.00 total what would be an unwise amount of money for Player A to give to Player B? Type your
answer in the box to the right.
Next, we'd like to know what you think would be an unintelligent amount of money for Player A to give Player B.
Out of the $10.00 total what would be an unintelligent amount of money for Player A to give to Player B? Type your
answer in the box to the right.
Participant Choice: How much participants would give in Player A’s role
If you were in Player A’s role, how much money would you give to Player B?
Out of the $10.00 total, how much would you give to Player B? Type your answer in the box to the right. _____
Filler Task & Scales
Filler Task 1
Here you will be looking at lists of words with letters missing. Your task will be to fill in the blanks to make
complete words as quickly as you can. The words you create should be real words, however do not spend too much
time on any word, we are interested in the first word that comes to your mind. Please press submit when you are
done!
s__a_ ; rId__ ; _re_t ; _ous_ ; f_n_
Exploratory Scales (not used in the project)
Machiavellian Scale (Christie & Geis, 1970)
Need for Cognition Scale - Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E. & Kao, C. F. The efficient assessment of need for
cognition. J. Pers. Assess. 48, 306–307 (1984).
Rational-Experiential Scale (Pacini & Epstein, 1999)
Short Schwartz Value Scale - Lindeman, M. & Verkasalo, M. Measuring Values With the Short Schwartz’s Value
Survey. J. Pers. Assess. 85, 170–178 (2005).
State-level Wise Reasoning Scale (Grossmann et al., 2017)
Self-Ratings
Please rate the extent to which you feel that the following characteristics apply to you, on a scale from 1 (not at all
like me) to 5 (just like me).
1 (Not at all like me) – 2 (Not much like me) – 3 (Somewhat like me) – 4 (Quite a lot like me) – 5 (Just like
me)
Positive characteristic condition
Reasonable / Irrational / Wise / Intelligent
* The Irrational item in the positive characteristic condition was a typo and should have said Rational.
Because of this error, analyses with self-ratings were not conducted for Experiment 1.
Negative characteristic condition
Unreasonable / Irrational / Unwise / Unintelligent
Screening item (open-ended)
Please recall the money allocation task you completed earlier. Can you recall what the task was about?
Demographics
These demographics questions will be used to generally describe the experiment sample and make comparisons
between groups, not to identify participants in any way. We would like to stress that the information collected is
confidential, and you may decline to respond to any question by leaving it blank.
Age (type in a number) _____ Sex [male ; female]
Race [Aboriginal/Native ; Asian ; Black ; East Indian ; Hispanic ; Middle Eastern ; Mixed Race ; White ; Other/Not
Listed]
Religious Group (if any) [Buddhist ; Christian – Catholic ; Christian – Protestant ; Christian – Other ; Hindu ;
Jewish ; Muslim ; Sikh ; Non-Religious ; Other]
If you selected “other” for religious group, please specify: _____
How would you characterize your political beliefs? [1 (Liberal) – 2 – 3 – 4 (Neutral) – 5 – 6 – 7 (Conservative)]
Please indicate the level of education you have completed or highest degree you have received. [Less than high
school ; High school degree or equivalent (e.g., GED) ; Some college ; Vocational or technical degree ; Bachelor’s
degree ; Master’s degree ; Doctoral degree ; Professional degree (MD, JD, etc)]
Residential Area [Urban ; Suburban ; Rural]
Total annual household income [Under $15,000 ; $15,001 - $25,000 ; $25,001 - $35,000 ; $35,001 - $50,000 ;
$50,001 - $75,000 ; $75,001 - $100,000 ; $100,001 - $150,000 ; Over $150,000]
32
Appendix 2
Experiment 1b Materials
Main Task: Perceptions of rational/reasonable others
Game Description (page 1)
For this first task, please read the description of a game below, and try to understand the principles of the game. You
will then be asked to think about what certain people may do.
This is a game with two players – Player A and Player B. Both players are informed that they are playing
anonymously throughout the game and will never know each other’s identities. Player A receives $10.00 and has to
decide how much of this money (ranging from the minimum of $0.00 up to the maximum of $10.00) he or she would
choose to give to another participant (Player B). Player B is then given whatever amount Player A chose to split
with Player B and Player B has to accept whatever amount Player A decided to give to him or her.
Rational characteristic condition (page 2a)
For this first task, please read the description of a game below, and try to understand the principles of the game.
Now we would like you to think about what certain people may do.
This is a game with two players – Player A and Player B. Both players are informed that they are playing
anonymously throughout the game and will never know each other’s identities. Player A receives $10.00 and has to
decide how much of this money (ranging from the minimum of $0.00 up to the maximum of $10.00) he or she would
choose to give to another participant (Player B). Player B is then given whatever amount Player A chose to split
with Player B and Player B has to accept whatever amount Player A decided to give to him or her.
Before proceeding, please take some time to think about what a rational person would do in Player A’s role.
When you have given the situation some thought please respond to the question below by writing your answer in the
box to the right.
In Player As role, how much of the $10.00 total would a rational person give to Player B? Type your answer in the
box to the right.
Reasonable characteristic condition (page 2b)
For this first task, please read the description of a game below, and try to understand the principles of the game.
Now we would like you to think about what certain people may do.
This is a game with two players – Player A and Player B. Both players are informed that they are playing
anonymously throughout the game and will never know each other’s identities. Player A receives $10.00 and has to
decide how much of this money (ranging from the minimum of $0.00 up to the maximum of $10.00) he or she would
choose to give to another participant (Player B). Player B is then given whatever amount Player A chose to split
with Player B and Player B has to accept whatever amount Player A decided to give to him or her.
Before proceeding, please take some time to think about what a reasonable person would do in Player A’s role.
When you have given the situation some thought please respond to the question below by writing your answer in the
box to the right.
In Player As role, how much of the $10.00 total would a reasonable person give to Player B? Type your answer in
the box to the right.
Participant Choice: How much participants would give in Player A’s role
- See Appendix 1: Experiment 1 materials > Participant Choice: How much participants would give in Player A’s
role Filler Task
- See Appendix 1: Experiment 1 materials > Filler Task & Scales > Filler Task 1 Additional Scales (not used in this project)
Machiavellian Scale (Christie & Geis, 1970)
Rational-Experiential Scale (Pacini & Epstein, 1999)
Self-Ratings
Please rate the extent to which you feel that the following characteristics apply to you, on a scale from 1 (not at all
like me) to 5 (just like me).
Scale:
1 (Not at all like me) – 2 (Not much like me) – 3 (Somewhat like me) – 4 (Quite a lot like me) – 5 (Just like
me)
Reasonable / Rational
Screening item (open-ended)
- See Appendix 1: Experiment 1 materials > Screening item (open-ended) Demographics
- See Appendix 1: Experiment 1 materials > Demographics 33
Appendix 3
Experiment 1c Materials
Perceptions of rational/reasonable others
For this first task, please read the description of a game below, and try to understand the principles of the game. In
the following questions, we would like you to think about what different people may do.
This is a game with two players – Player A and Player B. Both players are informed that they are playing
anonymously throughout the game and will never know each other’s identities. Player A receives $10.00 and has to
decide how much of this money (ranging from the minimum of $0.00 up to the maximum of $10.00) he or she would
choose to give to another participant (Player B). Player B is then given whatever amount Player A chose to split
with Player B and Player B has to accept whatever amount Player A decided to give to him or her.
We’d like to know what you think a reasonable person would do in Player A’s role.
In Player A’s role how much of the $10 total would a reasonable person give to Player B? Type your answer in the
box to the right.
We’d like to know what you think a rational person would do in Player A’s role.
In Player A’s role how much of the $10 total would a rational person give to Player B? Type your answer in the box
to the right.
We’d like to know what you think an average uWaterloo student would do in Player A’s role.
In Player A’s role how much of the $10 total would an average uWaterloo student give to Player B? Type your
answer in the box to the right.
* The order of the reasonable and rational item were randomized between participants
Participant Choice: How much would you give in Player A’s role?
- See Appendix A: Experiment 1a materials > Participant Choice
Self-Ratings
- See Appendix B: Experiment 1b materials > Self-Ratings
* The order of the reasonable and rational self-rating item were randomized between participants
Screening item (open-ended)
- See Appendix 1: Experiment 1a materials > Screening item (open-ended)
Demographics
- See Appendix 1: Experiment 1a materials > Demographics
* Sex item was altered: Sex [male ; female ; other]
34
Appendix 4
Experiment 2a Materials
Self as a rational or reasonable person
Game Description (page 1)
- See Appendix B: Experiment 2 materials > Experiment 2 Main Task: Perceptions of rational/reasonable others >
Game Description (page 1) Reasonable characteristic condition (page 2a)
What would you do if you were in Player A’s role and you were trying to be a reasonable person? Out of the $10.00
total, how much would you give to Player B in this situation? Type your answer in the box below.
For reference, the game instructions are repeated below.
This is a game with two players – Player A and Player B. Both players are informed that they are playing
anonymously throughout the game and will never know each other’s identities. Player A receives $10.00 and has to
decide how much of this money (ranging from the minimum of $0.00 up to the maximum of $10.00) he or she would
choose to give to another participant (Player B). Player B is then given whatever amount Player A chose to split
with Player B and Player B has to accept whatever amount Player A decided to give to him or her.
Rational characteristic condition (page 2b)
What would you do if you were in Player A’s role and you were trying to be a rational person? Out of the $10.00
total, how much would you give to Player B in this situation? Type your answer in the box below.
For reference, the game instructions are repeated below.
This is a game with two players – Player A and Player B. Both players are informed that they are playing
anonymously throughout the game and will never know each other’s identities. Player A receives $10.00 and has to
decide how much of this money (ranging from the minimum of $0.00 up to the maximum of $10.00) he or she would
choose to give to another participant (Player B). Player B is then given whatever amount Player A chose to split
with Player B and Player B has to accept whatever amount Player A decided to give to him or her.
Filler Task
Here you will be looking at lists of words with letters missing. Your task will be to fill in the blanks to make
complete words as quickly as you can. The words you create should be real words, however do not spend too much
time on any word, we are interested in the first word that comes to your mind. Please press submit when you are
done!
sh__e ; pea__ ; t__st ; ag__e ; soc__ ; h_l_
Exploratory Scales (not used in the present project)
Machiavellian Scale (Christie & Geis, 1970)
Rational-Experiential Scale (Pacini & Epstein, 1999)
Self-Ratings
- See Appendix 2: Experiment 1b materials > Self-Ratings
Screening item (open-ended)
- See Appendix 1: Experiment 1a materials > Screening item (open-ended)
Demographics
- See Appendix 1: Experiment 1a materials > Demographics
35
Appendix 5
Experiment 2b Materials
Self as a rational or reasonable person
Game Description (page 1)
- See Appendix B: Experiment 2 materials > Experiment 2 Main Task: Perceptions of rational/reasonable others >
Game Description (page 1) Reasonable characteristic condition (page 2a)
- See Appendix D: Experiment 4 materials > Experiment 4 Main Task: Predictions for self as a rational or reasonable
person > Reasonable characteristic condition (page 2a) + Why did you choose to give Player B this amount?
Rational characteristic condition (page 2b)
- See Appendix D: Experiment 4 materials > Experiment 4 Main Task: Predictions for self as a rational or reasonable
person > Rational characteristic condition (page 2b) + Why did you choose to give Player B this amount?
Ratings of Warmth, Competence, & Selfishness
Reasonable characteristic condition (page 3a)
We would now like you to evaluate rational and reasonable people on several different features. Specifically, we
would like you to think about how society generally views these types of people.
For the next few questions, please think about how society views reasonable people.
As viewed by Society…
How warm/tolerant/good-natured/sincere/trusting/competent/intelligent/confident/independent/ competitive/selfish
are reasonable people? (1 Not at all to 5 Extremely)
Rational characteristic condition (page 3b)
We would now like you to evaluate rational and reasonable people on several different features. Specifically, we
would like you to think about how society generally views these types of people.
For the next few questions, please think about how society views rational people.
As viewed by Society…
How warm/tolerant/good-natured/sincere/trusting/competent/intelligent/confident/independent/ competitive/selfish
are rational people? (1 Not at all to 5 Extremely)
Screening item (open-ended)
- See Appendix 1: Experiment 1a materials > Screening item (open-ended)
Demographics (see Appendix S1 demographics)
36
Appendix 6
Experiment 3 Materials
Commons Dilemma
Game description
Imagine that you are playing a game. An agent is representing your interests in this game with two other agents who
are representing the interests of two other players. The goal of the game is to draw as many tickets as possible from
a slowly regenerating pool of resources. The resource pool starts with a total of 15 tickets in it. In each round of the
game, each player’s agent can choose to withdraw 0, 1, 2, or 3 tickets from the pool. At the end of each even-numbered
round, the remaining tickets in the pool double, up to a maximum of 15 tickets. However, if the common pool is
drained to zero tickets, the game ends. The game could go up to 15 rounds if the agents do not deplete the common
pool by then. During the game, the agents are not able to communicate with each other to coordinate their choices.
At the end of the game, each ticket that a given player’s agent collects will be given to the player. These are lottery
tickets which can win up to $1,000.
Representation questions
If you were to play this game, which of the following agents would you prefer to be representing your interests? [An
agent who is very rational; An agent who is very reasonable]
If you were to play this game, which of the following agents would you prefer to be representing one of the other
player’s interests in the game? [An agent who is very rational; An agent who is very reasonable]
* Order of rational and reasonable items are randomized
Folk standard questions
How many tickets would a rational agent choose to withdraw from the common pool on Round 1 of this game?
How many tickets would a reasonable agent choose to withdraw from the common pool on Round 1 of this game?
Prisoner’s Dilemma
Game description
Imagine that you are playing a game. An agent is representing your interests in this game with another agent who is
representing the interests of another player. The object for each player’s agent is to earn tickets for a raffle for a
$1,000 gift certificate. One player’s agent is given three red cards worth +5, +5, and -5 tickets, which means they
enter the game with a net value of 5 tickets. The other player’s agent is given the same three cards, which are blue
instead of red.
Each agent will then give one of their three cards to the other in a simultaneous exchange. The agents cannot discuss
their choices and thus neither will know in advance what the other agent plans to do. There’s another special
consideration: a combination of two different colored +5 cards, one red and one blue, is worth double the number of
tickets. Thus if an agent ends with a +5/+5 red-blue pair, that pair is worth 20 tickets, not 10. If an agent ends up with
a negative total (i.e. they are holding two -5 cards at the end of the game), they receive 0 tickets.
If both agents give +5 cards, each would end with 15 tickets (20 for the +5/+5 red-blue pair, -5 from the -5 card). If
both agents give a -5 card, each would end with 5 tickets. If one gives a +5 and the other a -5, the former would end
with 0 tickets and the latter with 25.
Representation questions
If you were to play this game, which of the following agents would you prefer to be representing your interests? [An
agent who is very rational; An agent who is very reasonable]
If you were to play this game, which of the following agents would you prefer to be representing the interests of the
other player? [An agent who is very rational; An agent who is very reasonable]
* Order of rational and reasonable items are randomized
Folk standard questions
What card would a rational agent choose to give to the other person? [One of the +5 cards; One of the -5 cards]
What card would a reasonable agent choose to give to the other person? [One of the +5 cards; One of the -5 cards]
Ultimatum Game Dilemma
Game description
Imagine that you are playing a game. An agent is representing your interests in this game with another agent who is
representing the interests of another player. One agent receives ten tickets and has to decide how many of these tickets
(ranging from the minimum of 0 up to the maximum of 10) they would choose to give to the other agent. The other
agent is then given whatever amount the first agent chose to split with them. You do not know if your agent will be
dividing the tickets or simply receiving them.
At the end of the game, each ticket that a given player’s agent collects will be given to the player. These are lottery
tickets which can win up to $1,000.
37
Representation questions
If you were to play this game, which of the following agents would you prefer to be representing your interests? [An
agent who is very rational; An agent who is very reasonable]
If you were to play this game, which of the following agents would you prefer to be representing the interests of the
other player? [An agent who is very rational; An agent who is very reasonable]
* Order of rational and reasonable items are randomized
Ratings of warmth, competence, & selfishness
- See Appendix 5: Experiment 5 materials > Ratings of warmth, competence, & selfishness –
* Order of Reasonable characteristic condition (page 3a) and Rational characteristic condition (page 3b) are
randomized
Self-Ratings
- See Appendix 2: Experiment 1b materials > Self-Ratings
Screening item (open-ended)
Please recall the “agent” tasks you completed earlier. Can you recall what the task was about?
Demographics
- See Appendix 1: Experiment 1a materials > Demographics
* Sex item was altered to Gender [male; female; other]
38
Appendix 7
Experiment 4 Materials
Lawyer (as client) scenario
Who would you prefer to represent your side in a legal dispute – an attorney who has a reputation for being very
rational or one who has a reputation for being very reasonable? [Rational; Reasonable]
Please, explain why you chose this person. Type your response in the box below.
Lawyer (as opponent’s client) scenario
Who would you prefer to represent your opponent’s side in a legal dispute – an attorney who has a reputation for
being very rational or one who has a reputation for being very reasonable? [Rational; Reasonable]
Please, explain why you chose this person. Type your response in the box below.
Manager (as owner) scenario
As an owner of a company, who would you prefer to have as a shift manager creating the work schedule for your
company’s employees– a manager who has a reputation for being very rational or one who has a reputation for being
very reasonable? [Rational; Reasonable]
Please, explain why you chose this person. Type your response in the box below.
Manager (as employee) scenario
Who would you prefer to have as a shift manager creating the work schedule at your new job– a manager who has a
reputation for being very rational or one who has a reputation for being very reasonable? [Rational; Reasonable]
Please, explain why you chose this person. Type your response in the box below.
Negotiator (as client) scenario
If your company was involved in a business negotiation who would you prefer to have negotiating for your side– a
negotiator who has a reputation for being very rational or one who has a reputation for being very reasonable?
[Rational; Reasonable]
Please, explain why you chose this person. Type your response in the box below.
Negotiator (as opponent’s client) scenario
If your company was involved in a business negotiation who would you prefer to have negotiating for the other
side– a negotiator who has a reputation for being very rational or one who has a reputation for being very
reasonable? [Rational; Reasonable]
Please, explain why you chose this person. Type your response in the box below.
Judge scenario
Who would you prefer to preside over your legal case – a judge who has a reputation for being very rational or one
who has a reputation for being very reasonable? [Rational; Reasonable]
Please, explain why you chose this person. Type your response in the box below.
* Order of scenarios are randomized
Ratings of warmth, competence, & selfishness
- See Appendix S5: Experiment 5 materials > Ratings of warmth, competence, & selfishness –
* Order of Reasonable characteristic condition (page 3a) and Rational characteristic condition (page 3b) are
randomized
Filler Task & Scale
- See Appendix 2: Experiment 1b materials > Filler Task & Scales
Self-Ratings
- See Appendix 2: Experiment 1b materials > Self-Ratings
Demographics
- See Appendix 1: Experiment 1a materials > Demographics
39