RISE and FALL of COOPERATION Jun Kobayashi (Seikei U) Yuhsuke Koyama (Tokyo I of Tech) Hideki Fujiyama (Dokkyo U) Hirokuni Oura (Teikyo U) August 15, 2005 ASA, Philadelphia OVERVIEW Mutual Effects of Group Cooperation Rate & Group Size? (traditional) Social Dilemma Experiment w/ Intergroup Mobility (Not traditional) 3 QUESTION Olson... Size↑→Cooperation↓ Free-rider Problem, Social Dilemma Counter Effect? Modern Societies… Exit Option Moving, Job change, Divorce Effect of Group Cooperation Rate on Group Size??? ON the RUN (Erhart + Keser) Experiment, Intergroup Mobility 9 players in 3 group, 10 Sessions Cooperators RUN AWAY Cycle: Size↑→Cooperation↓→ S↓→C↑ Various Conditions??? Introduction Data Result 6 EXPERIMENT 2003/4, 4 universities in Japan 10 Sessions, 170 Students ¥1289.0 ($11), 90 minutes Computer-based, Group data “LOW” “MIDDLE” “HIGH” Mobility 17 in 4 Groups, Anonymous 10 Rounds, 9 Exit chances 7 8 ROUND (10 times) A B C D Free-rider Problem Exit Chance 9 1. FREE-RIDER PROBLEM Resource ¥20 PROVIDE or NOT Pooled Resources... DOUBLED...3/more-player groups x 1.5... 2-player Groups SAME... 1-player Groups EQUALLY Distributed in Group 10 EXAMPLE (4 Players) x2= Provide Not Not Not Provide = 40m/4 = 10m (Providers) Not = 40(m-1)/4 + 20 = 10m + 10 11 2. EXIT CHANCE LOW Mobility... ¥50 to Exit MIDDLE Mobility... ¥20 HIGH Mobility... ¥0 Groups’ Average Payoffs Last Stage Group C Round 2 Stage 2 Your Decisions and Payoffs in This Round A 33.33 B 25.00 C 27.50 D 25.00 Stage Your Decision Your Payoff 1 NOT 35.00 2 PROVIDE 5.00 Groups’ Average Payoffs in This Round A 33.33 B 25.00 Your Total: 125 yens C 27.50 (20 yens subtracted for Moving) D 25.00 Groups’ Size A 3 B 4 C 8 D 2 Group C's Members: You (ID 6) and Other 7 What do you do next stage? PROVIDE 20 yens NOT Provided 20 yens: 3 persons Not: 4 persons Your Decision: Provide Your Payoff: 17.14 yens Groups’ Average Payoffs and Size last Round A 30.00 3 B 33.33 4 C 25.00 8 D 27.50 2 ROUND END Groups’ Average Payoffs Group Stage 1 2 3 4 5 A 33.33 20.00 15.55 24.76 35.00 B 25.00 35.00 19.10 35.00 35.00 C 27.50 27.50 22.00 27.50 20.00 D 25.00 35.00 25.00 25.00 18.88 Your payoff Last Round: 112 yens in Group C Which Group in Next Round? Move with Group A B C D 50 yens HYPOTHESES H1. Size↑→Cooperation↓ Cooperation Rate H2. Cooperation↓→ Size↓ H2 H1 H1 H2 Size H3. Mobility↑→Cycle Accelerated REGRESSION ANALYSES Unit… Group (N=360) H1. Size↑ Cooperation↓ Round Number, Previous Cooperation H2. Previous Coop.↓ Size↓ Round Number, Previous Size Introduction Data Result 18 DESCRIPTIVE STAT. Cooperation Rate ¥50 0.500 0.400 0.300 0.200 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.200 ¥20 ¥0 0.400 Mobility Rate 0.600 0.800 H1. SIZE on COOPERATION Cooperation Rate ¥50 ¥20 ¥0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Size y = COOPERATION RATE Mobility Cost ¥50 ¥20 ¥0 ROUND .00 .00 .00 SIZE -.04*** -.05*** -.03* Previous COOP. .47*** .11 -.04 R2 .32 .16 .11 *p<.05, **.01, ***.001 H2. COOPERATION on SIZE Size ¥50 ¥20 10 8 6 4 2 0 ¥0 10 8 6 4 2 0 0 1 10 8 6 4 2 0 0 1 0 Previous Cooperation Rate 1 y = SIZE Mobility Cost ¥50 ¥20 ¥0 ROUND .00 -.01 .07 Previous COOP. 2.12*** 3.11*** 4.83*** Previous Size .83*** .65*** .36** R2 .60 .37 .27 *p<.05, **.01, ***.001 H3. MOBILITY on CYCLE Cooperation Rate ¥50 ¥20 ¥0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 0 1 Size ¥50 ¥20 ¥0 Size 6 4 2 0 0 1 Previous Cooperation Rate Interaction Effects… Not Significant EXAMPLES of CYCLE (LOW) ¥50 8 Cooperation Group A B C D 0.8 6 0.6 4 0.4 0 Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0.2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Size 1 Cooperation Rate Size MIDDLE MOBILITY ¥20 Size Cooperation 12 1 10 0.8 8 0.6 6 0.4 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0.2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 2 HIGH MOBILITY ¥0 Size Cooperation 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 28 SUMMARY Large Groups DECREASE Cooperation, then SHRINK Then INCREASE Cooperation, then EXPAND MOBILITY ACCELERATES Cycle
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